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BY

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Quorsum enim sacræ leges inventæ et sancitæ fuere, nisi ut ex ipsarum justitia unicuique jus suum tribuatur? — MASCARDUS EX ULPIAN.

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In this edition, the work has again been carefully revised and corrected; with the addition of many notes, and all the important cases which have been published since the former edition.

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June 15, 1850.

CONTENTS.

	Page / Section
Table of Cases cited	Page ix.
Preliminary Observations	Section 1 – 17
Abatement	18 – 27
Accord and Satisfaction	28 – 33
Account	34 – 39
Adultery	40 – 58
Agency	59 – 68
Arbitration and Award	69 – 81
Assault and Battery	82 – 100
Assumpsit	101 – 136
Attorneys	137 – 149
Bastardy	150 – 153
Bills of Exchange	154 – 207
Carriers	208 – 222
Case	223 – 232
Covenant	233 – 247
Custom	248 – 252
Damages	253 – 278
Debt	279 – 292
Deed	293 – 300
Duress	301 – 302
Ejectment	303 – 337
Executors and Administrators	338 – 352
Heir	353 – 360
Infancy	362 – 368

	Section
Insanity	369 – 374
Insurance	375 – 409
Libel and Slander	410 – 429
Limitations	430 – 448
Malicious Prosecution	449 – 459
Marriage	460 – 464
Nuisance	465 – 476
Partnership	477 – 486
Patents	487 – 515
Payment	516 – 536
Prescription and Custom	537 – 546
Real Actions	547 – 559
Replevin	560 – 570
Seduction	571 – 579
Sheriff	580 – 599
Tender	600 – 611
Trespass	612 – 635
Trover	636 – 649
Waste	650 – 656
Way	657 – 665
Wills	666 – 695

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

A.

Section

Abbey *v.* Lill 193
Abel *v.* Potts 388
Abercrombie *v.* Parkhurst 562
Abitbol *v.* Bristow 382, 384
Acerro *v.* Petroni 479
Ackworth *v.* Kempe 580, 597, 621
Ackland *v.* Pierce 191
A'Court *v.* Cross 442
Acton *v.* Blundell 467
Adam *v.* Kerr 296
Adams *v.* Balch 585
——— *v.* Chaplin 677
——— *v.* Emerson 616
——— *v.* Freeman 98, 615, 627
——— *v.* Robinson 141
Addington *v.* Clode 545
Addison *v.* Round 644
Addy *v.* Grix 677
Ætna Fire Ins. Co. *v.* Tyler 405
Aflalo *v.* Fourdrinier 192
Agg *v.* Davies 363
Ahern *v.* Maguire 404, 418
Aikin *v.* Buck 614
Ainslie *v.* Wilson 113, 118
Aitkenhead *v.* Blades 628
Akerley *v.* Haines 578
Alchorne *v.* Gomme 565, 566
Alden *v.* Dewey 492
——— *v.* Murdock 556
Alder *v.* Saville 78
Alderman *v.* French 275
Alderson *v.* Clay 479, 483, 485
——— *v.* Langdale 523
——— *v.* Waistell 83
Aldrich *v.* Albee 610
Alexander *v.* Brown 602
——— *v.* Bonnin 627

Section

Alexander *v.* Macauley 584
——— *v.* McGinn 25
——— *v.* Owen 523
——— *v.* Southey 645
——— *v.* Vane 114
Alexandria (Mayor, &c. of) *v.* Patten 529, 532
Alfray *v.* Alfray 462
Allam *v.* Heber 359
Allan *v.* Gomme 659
Allcock *v.* Ewen 440
Allen *v.* Blanshard 486
——— *v.* Cook 128
——— *v.* Carter 615
——— *v.* Crary 560
——— *v.* Edmonson 194
——— *v.* Harris 31
——— *v.* Harrison 686
——— *v.* Hearn 286
——— *v.* Kemble 153 *a.*
——— *v.* Mille 448
——— *v.* McKeen 121
——— *v.* Rostain 483
——— *v.* Watson 79, 80, 81
Allegre *v.* Maryland Ins. Co. 251
Allison *v.* Rayner 142
Allport *v.* Meek 165
Alna *v.* Plummer 108
Alpass *v.* Watkins 124, 125
Alsager *v.* Close 642, 649
Alsept *v.* Eyles 599
Alsleger *v.* Erb 461
Alsop *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 381
Alston *v.* Mechanics Ins. Co. 396
Alton *v.* Gilmanton 141
Amesbury *v.* Amesbury 111, 121
Amery *v.* Rogers 378
American Ins. Co. *v.* Dunham 390
Ames *v.* Milward 78

	Section
Amies *v.* Stevens	219
Amory *v.* Fairbanks	521
——— *v.* Hamilton	66, 67
——— *v.* Fellows	691
Anderson *v.* Anderson	45
——— *v.* Brock	11 *a*
——— *v.* Buckton	273
——— *v.* Bullock	296
——— *v.* Commonwealth	48
——— *v.* Johnson	93
——— *v.* Pitcher	384
——— *v.* Robson	156
——— *v.* Sanderson	65
——— *v.* Watson	139
——— *v.* Weston	167
Andrew *v.* Robinson	118
Andrews *v.* Askey	253, 579
——— *v.* Bartholomew	274
——— *v.* Boyd	190
——— *v.* Gallison	344, 345
——— *v.* Hooper	556
——— *v.* Palmer	79
——— *v.* Vanduzer	425
Angell *v.* McLellan	366
Anichini *v.* Anichini	52
Anstey *v.* Dowsing	691
Anthony *v.* Gilbert	272
——— *v.* Harreys	627
Antram *v.* Chase	71
Appleby *v.* Clark	115
Appleton *v.* Bancroft	108
Arbuckle *v.* Taylor	453
Arcangelo *v.* Thompson	193, 383, 388
Arden *v.* Tucker	139
Argall *v.* Bryant	433
Argent *v.* Durrant	625
Armfield *v.* Tate	367
Armory *v.* Delamirie	637
Arms *v.* Ashley	118
Armsby *v.* Farnham	478
Armstrong *v.* Christiani	186
——— *v.* Percy	254, 256, 262
Armsworth *v.* S. East. Railw. Co.	473
Arnold *v.* Camp	523
Arnsby *v.* Woodward	325
Arthur *v.* Dartch	126
Arundell *v.* Tregono	452
Ashley *v.* Harrison	256, 420
Ashmore, in re	676
Aspinal *v.* Wake	164
Assay *v.* Hoover	671
Astin *v.* Parkin	333
Astley *v.* Astley	44, 52
——— *v.* Reynolds	121
——— *v.* Weldon	257, 258
Aston *v.* Heaven	221
Astor *v.* Hoyt	239
——— *v.* Miller	239
——— *v.* Union Ins. Co.	377
Atkins *v.* Banwell	107, 114
——— *v.* Boardman	659 *a*
——— *v.* Sanger	690
——— *v.* Tredgold	344
Atkinson *v.* Clapp	11 *a*
——— *v.* Laing	478
Attorney Gen. *v.* Parnther	689, 690
——— *v.* Vigor	686
Attwood *v.* Rattenbury	167
Atwater *v.* Woodbridge	111, 121
Atwood *v.* Monger	452
Aubert *v.* Walsh	111
Austen *v.* Willward	277
Austin *v.* Debnam	453
——— *v.* Drew	405
——— *v.* Gage	361
——— *v.* Rodman	112, 195
——— *v.* Sawyer	615
——— *v.* Taylor	252
——— *v.* Whitlock	296
Avarillo *v.* Rogers	414
Aveson *v.* Ld. Kinnaird	55
Avery *v.* Pixley	674, 681
——— *v.* Ray	89, 267
Ayer *v.* Bartlett	640
——— *v.* Hawkins	531 *a*
——— Hutchins	115, 199, 200
Aylet *v.* Dodd	259
Ayton *v.* Bolt	410

B.

Babcock *v.* Bryant	186
——— *v.* Thompson	111
Bacon *v.* Brown	533
——— *v.* Crandon	79
——— *v.* Page	15
Back *v.* Stacey	471
Backus *v.* Backus	53
——— *v.* McCoy	241, 264
——— *v.* Shipherd	190
Badger *v.* Phinney	561
Badgley *v.* Heald	136 *a*
Badlam *v.* Tucker	637
Bagnall *v* Underwood	412, 417
Bagshaw *v.* Gaward	270
Bagwell *v.* Babe	19
——— *v.* Elliot	672
Bailey *v.* Applegate	544
——— *v.* Bailey	669, 672
——— *v.* Porter	189

	Section
Bailiffs of Tewksbury *v.* Bicknell	544, 568
Baillie *v.* Ld. Inchiquin	441
Bainbridge *v.* Pickering	366
Baird *v.* Blaigrove	296
——— *v.* Cochran	207
Baker *v.* Arnold	207
——— *v.* Briggs	204
——— *v.* Carey	104
——— *v.* Dening	674
——— *v.* Fales	561
——— *v.* Garratt	599
——— *v.* Green	254, 599, 581
——— *v.* Howell	120
——— *v.* Stackpole	529, 532, 533
——— *v.* Wheeler	276
Bakeman *v.* Pooler	602
Baldney *v.* Ritchie	25
Baldwin *v.* Cole	642
——— *v.* Elphinstone	416
Bales *v.* Wingfield	599
Ball *v.* Claflin	11*b*
Ball *v.* Taylor	296
Ballard *v.* Dyson	659
Ballingalls *v.* Gloster	181
Balston *v.* Baxter	31
——— *v.* Bensted	475
Baltimore Turnpike Case	74
Bamfield *v.* Massey	58, 577
Banbury Peerage Case	152
Bangs *v.* Hall	440, 443
Bank of U. States *v.* Carneal	186
——————— *v.* Hatch	202
——————— *v.* Sill	156
——————— *v.* Dandridge	62
——————— *v.* Bank of Georgia	523, 601
Bank of Alexandria *v.* Swann	189
——— Columbia *v.* Patterson	62, 257
——————— *v.* Lawrence	186
——— Geneve *v.* Howlett	187
——— Ireland *v.* Archer	161
——— Orange *v.* Brown	214
——— Rochester *v.* Gould	189
——— Troy *v.* Hopping	347
Baptist Ch. *v.* Robbards	681
Barber *v.* Fletcher	396
Barclay *v.* Gouch	113
——— *v.* Howell	660
——— *v.* Raine	240
Baring *v.* Clark	169
——— *v.* Henkle	391
Barker *v.* Bates	618
——— *v.* Braham	621
——— *v.* Miller	629
——— *v.* Packenhorn	603
Parker *v.* Prentiss	136, 207
——— *v.* Parker	179
——— *v.* Phœnix Ins. Co.	394
——— *v.* Richardson	475, 545
Barkins *v.* Wilson	207
Barlow *v.* Bishop	166
——— *v.* Leckie	377
——— *v.* McIntosh	389
——— *v.* Todd	78
Barnard *v.* Graves	520
Barnardiston *v.* Chapman	646
Barnes *v.* Bartlett	265
——— *v.* Hunt	627
——— *v.* Holloway	414
Barnes *v.* Hatch	297
Barnstable *v.* Thacher	618
Barnwall *v.* Church	401
Barnum *v.* Vandusen	635 *a*
Baron *v.* Abeel	336, 337
Barough *v.* White	199
Barraclough *v.* Johnson	660
Barrett *v.* Deere	518, 606
——— *v.* Lewis	536
Barrington *v.* Turner	630
Barry *v.* Nesham	481
——— *v.* Rush	347
Bartelot *v.* Hawker	51
Bartlett *v.* Emery	127
——— *v.* Walter	379
Barton *v.* Glover	258
——— *v.* Hanson	214
——— *v.* Williams	646
Barwell *v.* Adkins	418
Barwick *v.* Thompson	305
Basely *v.* Clarkson	622
Bass *v.* Bass	447
——— *v.* Clive	164
Basten *v.* Butter	136
Bate *v.* Hill	58, 577
Bates *v.* Cooke	73
——— *v.* Norcross	430, 557
——— *v.* Townley	126, 128
Bateman *v.* Daniels	28
——— *v.* Pierce	136
——— *v.* Goodyear	253
——— *v.* Pinder	440
——— *v.* Joseph	195
Batley *v.* Catterall	173
Batson *v.* Donovan	220
Battely *v.* Faulkner	435
Battles *v.* Holley	541
Bawn *v.* Crandon	79
Baxter *v.* Earl of Portsmouth	369
——— *v.* Hozier	38
——— *v.* Penniman	342
——— *v.* Taylor	663
——— *v.* Taber	589

	Section
Baxter *v.* Wales	259
Bayley *v.* Bates	594
—— *v.* Homan	31
Baylis *v.* Lawrence	411
Baynham *v.* Holt	126, 128
Beach *v.* Norton	26
Beal *v.* Nind	443
—— *v.* Pettit	380
Bealey *v.* Shaw	471, 475, 546
Bean *v.* Farnam	78, 79, 80
—— *v.* Mayo	242
—— *v.* Parker	292
Bearce *v.* Jackson	241
Beard *v.* Beard	687
—— *v.* Cowman	342
—— *v.* Kirk	68 *a*
Beardsley *v.* Knight	240
—— —— *v.* Maynard	275
Beardsley *v.* Root	113
Beauchamp *v.* Parry	200
Beaumont *v.* Greathead	516
Beck *v.* Sargent	73
Beckett *v.* Dutton	11 *d*
Beckford *v.* Crutwell	209
—— *v.* Montague	584
Beckwith *v.* The St. Croix Man. Co.	183
—— *v.* Sydebotham	401
—— *v.* Shordike	94
Bedford *v.* Hunt	492, 494
—— *v.* McKnow	579
Beeby *v.* Beeby	52, 53, 54
Beed *v.* Blandford	124
Beeler *v.* Young	365
Beekman *v.* Satterlee	431
Bell *v.* Ansley	380
—— *v.* Bell	397
—— *v.* Byrne	414
—— *v.* Cunningham	66
—— *v.* Chaplain	109
—— *v.* Graham	453
—— *v.* Morrison	439
—— *v.* Reed	219
—— *v.* Rowland	440
—— *v.* Smith	393
Bemis *v.* Smith	244
Bemus *v.* Beekman	563
Bender *v.* Fromberger	264
Bennett *v.* Alcott	88, 273, 572, 573
—— *v.* Appleton	95
—— *v.* Deacon	421
—— *v.* Farnell	166
—— *v.* Hyde	269
—— *v.* Jenkins	264
—— *v.* Sherrod	681
Benson *v.* Frederick	253
—— *v.* Matsdorf	333, 337
Bentley *v.* Bentley	346
—— *v.* Fleming	502
Benton *v.* Sutton	589
Berkeley *v.* Wilford	269
Berkshire Bank *v.* Jones	190
Bernard *v.* The Commonwealth	599
—— *v.* Torrance	483
Bernardi *v.* Motteaux	383
Berney *v.* Read	71
Berolles *v.* Ramsay	365
Berry *v.* Adamson	451
—— *v.* Heard	640
Berryman *v.* Wise	138, 412
Bertie *v.* Beaumont	614
Berthon *v.* Loughman	397
Besford *v.* Saunders	367
Bessey *v.* Olliott	270
—— *v.* Windham	597
Best *v.* Strong	111
Bethell *v.* Moore	681
Betts *v.* Betts	45
—— *v.* Gibbins	115
—— *v.* Jackson	688 *a*
Betterbee *v.* Davis	604, 605
Bevan *v.* Jones	584
—— *v.* Rees	604
—— *v.* Waters	192
Beynon *v.* Grant	593
Bibb *v.* Thomas	681
Bickerdike *v.* Bollman	195
Bickford *v.* Page	240
—— *v.* Skewes	490
Bicknell *v.* Dorion	449
Biddell *v.* Dowse	80
Biddlesford *v.* Onslow	469
Biddulph *v.* Ather	545
Bigelow *v.* Jones	120, 244, 264, 619
Biggs *v.* Dwight	535
—— *v.* Lawrence	480
Bilbie *v.* Lumley	136, 393
Billinghurst *v.* Vickers	675
Bilton *v.* Long	431
Bingham *v.* Allport	606
—— *v.* Garnault	93
Binney *v.* Chapman	120
Birch *v.* Gibbs	300
—— *v.* Stephenson	259
—— *v.* Tebbutt	531
—— *v.* Wright	329
Bird *v.* Astock	643, 648
—— *v.* Holbrook	473
—— *v.* Randall	29, 231, 257
Birks *v.* Trippet	76
Birt *v.* Barlow	130
—— *v.* Kershaw	207
Bishop *v.* Chitty	523
—— *v.* Crawshay	638

	Section
Bishop *v.* Eagle	36
——— *v.* Little	448
——— *v.* Pentland	387, 391
——— *v.* Shillito	638
Bissell *v.* Erwin	264
Bixby *v.* The Franklin Ins. Co.	378
——— *v.* Whitney	74, 610
Blachford *v.* Dod	454
Black *v.* Smith	603, 605
Blackburn *v.* Blackburn	423
Blackett *v.* Lowes	616
Blackham *v.* Pugh	421
Blackham's case	338
Blackley *v.* Sheldon	629
Blackstone Bank *v.* Hill	529, 536
Blackwell *v.* Justices of Lawrence Co.	264
Blagg *v.* Sturt	417
Blake's case	28
Blake *v.* Barnard	82
——— *v.* Knight	676
——— *v.* Pilford	422
Blakeley *v.* Grant	163
Blakemore *v.* Glamorganshire Canal Co.	434
Blaker *v.* Anscombe	640
Blanchard *v.* Baker	544
——— *v.* Hilliard	190
——— *v.* Bridges	475
——— *v.* Sprague	489
Bland *v.* Ansley	598
Blaney *v.* Bearce	239
Blaymire *v.* Hayley	573, 574
Blight *v.* Ashley	603
——— *v.* Rochester	557
Blin *v.* Campbell	85, 226
Bliss *v.* Campbell	85, 226
——— *v.* Thompson	120
Blood *v.* Goodrich	66
——— *v.* Harrington	11 *a*
——— *v.* Wood	317, 619
Bloomer *v.* Juhel	566
Bloxam *v.* Elsee	490
——— *v.* Hubbard	649
——— *v.* Saunders	638, 640
Bloxsome *v.* Williams	638
Bluett *v.* Middleton	160
Blunt *v.* Starkie	114
——— *v.* Little	459
Blyth *v.* Archbold	363
——— *v.* Topham	473
Board *v.* Head	635 *a*
Boardman *v.* Roe	121
——— *v.* Sill	648
Bodley *v.* Reynolds	276, 649
Bodwell *v.* Osgood	275, 417, 420
——— *v.* Swan	275, 418
Boehm *v.* Campbell	176
——— *v.* Garcias	181
Bogart *v.* McDonald	11 *e*
Bohanon *v.* Walcot	683
Boies *v.* McAllister	275
Bolivar Man. *v.* Nepon. Man. Co.	539
Bolling *v.* Mayor & Co. of Petersburg	539
Bolton *v.* Colder	249
——— *v.* Reichard	523
Bonafous *v.* Walker	265, 590
Bond *v.* Bond	462
——— *v.* Douglass	416
——— *v.* Farnham	190
——— *v.* Pittard	477
——— *v.* Ward	585, 594
——— *v.* Warden	520
Bonney *v.* Seely	113
Boody *v.* McKenney	367
Boot *v.* Cooper	449
Boon *v.* Morris	639
Boosey *v.* Davidson	515
Booth *v.* Grove	581
——— *v.* Smith	30
Bootle *v.* Blundell	694
Boorman *v.* Nash	261
Borradaile *v.* Lowe	196
Borrinsale *v.* Greville	367
Borthwick *v.* Carruthers	362, 366
Bosanquet *v.* Anderson	159, 165
——— *v.* Wray	478, 531
Boston Bank *v.* Chamberlin	367
——— Manuf. Co. *v.* Fiske	253
——— Water Power Co. *v.* Gray	78
Bott *v.* Burnell	315
Boudinot *v.* Bradford	683
Boulter *v.* Clark	85
Bourdillon *v.* Dalton	239
Bourg *v.* Bringier	207
Bovey's case	590
Bovill *v.* Wood	133
Bowditch *v.* Manley	300
Bowen *v.* Owen	605
——— *v.* Parry	95
——— *v.* Shapcott	27
——— *v.* The Hope Ins. Co.	383
Bowers *v.* Nixon	11 *d*
Bowles *v.* Bingham	151
Bowling *v.* Harrison	188
Bowman *v.* Wood	168
Bowsher *v.* Calley	583
Boyce *v.* Dorr	496
Boyd *v.* Cleaveland	190
——— *v.* Cook	678
——— *v.* Dodson	66
——— *v.* McAlpen	496
——— *v.* Moyle	11 *d*

	Section
Boydell *v.* Drummond	443
Boyden *v.* Boyden	367
Boyle *v.* Brandon	577
Boynton *v.* Page	563
——— *v.* Willard	621
Boys *v.* Ancell	258
Brackett *v.* Norcross	318
——— *v.* Norton	141, 143
Bracegirdle *v.* Orford	89, 253, 271
Bradbury *v.* Grinsell	545
Bradford *v.* Levy	388
——— *v.* Manly	124
Bradin *v.* Dubarry	66
Bradley *v.* Gregory	31
——— *v.* Heath	275, 421, 424
——— *v.* Waterhouse	220, 473
——— *v.* Windham	593
Bradlie *v.* Maryland Ins. Co.	392
Bradstreet *v.* Clark	554
Braithwaite *v.* Gardiner	164, 165
Bramner *v.* Williams	221
Branch *v.* Burnley	418
Brand *v.* Boulcott	110
Brander *v.* Ferriday,	398, 483
Brandram *v.* Wharton	444
Brandt *v.* Bowlby	638
Branscom *v.* Bridges	226
Brant *v.* Wilson	681
Brayshaw *v.* Eaton	365, 366
Brazier *v.* Bryant	147, 533
——— *v.* Jones	71
Brecken *v.* Smith	126
Bredin *v.* Divin	36
Bredon *v.* Harman	280, 282
Bree *v.* Holbeck	448
Breed *v.* Cook	523
——— *v.* Hurd	602, 603
——— *v.* Pratt	690
Brembridge *v.* Osborne	527
Brent *v.* Erving	156
Brest *v.* Lever	626
Bretherton *v.* Wood	209, 214, 228
Brewer *v.* Dew	253
——— *v.* Knapp	534
——— *v.* Sparrow	642
Brewster *v.* McCall	686
Brice *v.* Randall	658
Bridge *v.* Grand Junction Railway Co.	267
——— *v.* Wain	262
——— *v.* Yates	686
Bridges *v.* Blanchard	475
——— *v.* Mitchell	447
——— *v.* Smith	565
Briggs *v.* Richmond	523
——— *v.* Wilkinson	239
Bright *v.* Boyd	549
Bright *v.* Wilson	651
Brigstocke *v.* Smith	442
Brimmer *v.* Long Wharf	555
Brinckerhoof *v.* Remsen	675
Brine *v.* Featherstone	396
Brinley *v.* National Ins. Co.	407
Brisco *v.* Brisco	52
Bristol *v.* Burt	642
Bristow *v.* Eastman	368
——— *v.* Heywood	453
British Museum *v.* Finnis	660, 664
Brittain *v.* Lloyd	113
Britton *v.* Cole	629
——— *v.* Turner	136 *a*
Broad *v.* Ham	454
Brock *v.* Copeland	473
Brocklebank *v.* Sugrue	377
Broderick *v.* Broderick	678
Brograve *v.* Winder	691
Bromage *v.* Lloyd	163
——— *v.* Vaughan	186, 189
Bromfield *v.* Jones	584, 589
——— *v.* Smith	281 *a*
Bromley *v.* Coxwell	642
——— *v.* Frazier	176
——— *v.* Wallace	52, 56
Brommage *v.* Prosser	419
Brook *v.* Bishop	229
——— *v.* Briggs	305
——— *v.* Carpenter	452
——— *v.* Willett	568
Brookes *v.* Warwick	453
Brooks *v.* Barrett	689, 690
——— *v.* Blanchard	414
——— *v.* Bondsey	239
——— *v.* Hoyt	270, 599
——— *v.* Hubbard	259
——— *v.* Jenkins	501 *a*
Brotherston *v.* Barber	392
Broughton *v.* Whallon	621
Brown *v.* Anderson	342, 446
——— *v.* Allen	277
——— *v.* Bellows	78, 258
——— *v.* Chapman	449
——— *v.* Dean	565
——— *v.* De Winton	160
——— *v.* Dysinger	305
——— *v.* Feeter	526
——— *v.* Galloway	334
——— *v.* Gay	430, 475, 557
——— *v.* Gilmore	603, 605
——— *v.* Hanford	585
——— *v.* Howard	97, 433, 448
——— *v.* Hodgson	114
——— *v.* Hudson	114
——— *v.* Jackson	249, 523
——— *v.* Joddrell	369

	Section
Brown *v.* Mallet	219
——— *v.* Minns	412
——— *v.* Moore	688
——— *v.* Sayce	564
——— *v.* Saul	601
——— *v.* Tanner	79
——— *v.* Ware	618, 619
——— *v.* Watts	520
——— *v.* Wood	339, 672
Browne *v.* Knill	404
——— *v.* Murray	429
——— *v.* Powell	569
Brownell *v.* Manchester	637
Browning *v.* Kinnear	195
Brownlow *v.* Tomlinson	625, 659
Brunton *v.* Hall	659
Brush *v.* Wilkins	684
Bryan *v.* Atwater	557
——— *v.* Jackson	65
Bryant *v.* Com'th Ins. Co.	249
——— *v.* Ocean Ins. Co.	396
——— *v.* Ritterbush	207
Bryce, In re	674
Brydges *v.* Duchess of Chandos	686
——— *v.* Plumtree	412
——— *v.* Welford	588, 593
Buchanan *v.* Parnshaw	262
Buck *v.* Cotton	195
Buckland *v.* Conway	141
Buckle *v.* Bewes	596
Buckley *v.* Nightingale	356
——— *v.* Pirk	239
Buckmaster *v.* Grundy	264
Buddington *v.* Shearer	277
Bulkeley *v.* Butler	158
Bull *v.* Parker	605
Bullard *v.* Nantucket Bank	11 *a*
Bullen *v.* McGillycuddy	30
Buller *v.* Fisher	219
Bullet *v.* Bank of Pennsylvania	156
Bullis *v.* Giddens	280
Bullock *v.* Lloyd	170
——— *v.* Dommitt	245 *a*
Bullythorpe *v.* Turner	562
Bunker *v.* Shed	431
Burbige *v.* Jakes	209
Burchell *v.* Hornsby	655
Burden *v.* Halton	520
——— *v.* Webb	115
Burdick *v.* Green	431
Burgess *v.* Burgess	41, 45, 46
——— *v.* Cuthill,	203
——— *v.* Merrill	24, 133
——— *v.* Gray	232 *a*
Burghart *v.* Angerstein	363, 365, 366
——— *v.* Hall	366
Burgoyne *v.* Showler	677, 681
Burgue *v.* De Tatset	484
Burley *v.* Bethune	453
Burling *v.* Patterson	295
Burlingame *v.* Burlingame	457
Burn *v.* Boulton	444
——— *v.* Miller	104
Burnham *v.* Stafford Savings Bk.	41 *a*
Burrage *v.* Smith	244
Burrell *v.* Lithgow	599
——— *v.* North	212
Burrough *v.* Moss	171, 200
Burrows *v.* Heysham	11 *a*
Burt *v.* Palmer,	65
——— *v.* Place	111, 457
Burton *v.* Hughes	637
——— *v.* Payne	158
Burtonshaw *v.* Gilbert	682
Bush *v.* Canfield,	261
——— *v.* Parker	98
——— *v.* Sheldon	672
——— *v.* Steinman	232 *a*
Bushby *v.* Dixon	359, 360
Bushell *v.* Passmore	300
Bushwood *v.* Pond	544, 568
Bussy *v.* Donaldson,	253
Butler *v.* Basing	213
——— *v.* Heane	216
Butterfield *v.* Forrester	267, 473
——— *v.* Harrell	11 *b*
——— *v.* Windle	284
Buttermere *v.* Hayes	282
Butterworth *v.* Ld. Despencer	404
Button *v.* Hayward	423
Butts *v.* Dean	520
Bye *v.* Bower	11 *e*
Byers *v.* McClanahan	296, 297
Byne *v.* Moore	455
Byrne *v.* Crowninshield	439

C.

Cabanese *v.* Martin	454
Cabot *v.* Haskins	109
Caddy *v.* Barlow	453
Cadman *v.* Lubbock	604
Cadogan *v.* Cadogan	41
Cairnes *v.* Bleecker	66, 642
Calhoun *v.* Vechio	603
Call *v.* Hagger	589
Callan *v.* Gaylord	416
Callot *v.* Haigh	195
Calvart *v.* Horsfall	334
Cambridge *v.* Hobart	440
Camden and Amboy Railroad Co. *v.* Burke	215, 218, 221
Camden *v.* Anderson	378
Camelo *v.* Britten	389

	Section
Camp *v.* Camp	297, 305
Campbell *v.* Arnold	616
——— *v.* Gordon	19
——— *v.* Jones	235
——— *v.* Kincaid	141
——— *v.* Lewis	240
——— *v.* Morse	219
——— *v.* Pettengill	195
——— *v.* Phelps	68
——— *v.* Proctor	615
——— *v.* Stakes	368
——— *v.* Webster	189
——— *v.* Wilson	475, 545
Campbell's case	347
Campion *v.* Bentley	351
Canada *v.* Southwick	585
Canfield *v.* Ives	519
Canham *v.* Fisk	545
Canot *v.* Hughes	645
Capers *v.* Wilson	658
Capp *v.* Topham	115
Capron *v.* Balmond	579
Card *v.* Case	231
Cargill *v.* Taylor	589
Carley *v.* Vance	600
Carly *v.* Bancroft	601
Carnegie *v.* Waugh	109
Carpenter *v.* Gookin	11 *b*
——— *v.* Smith	502
——— *v.* Wahl	577
Carpue *v.* London Railway Co.	222
Carr *v.* Clarke	573
—— *v.* Foster	250, 545
Carrington *v.* Roots	627
——— *v.* Taylor,	254
Carroll *v.* Norwood	317
Carruthers *v.* Gray	388
Carter *v.* Carter	566
——— *v.* Johnson	625
——— *v.* Talcot	141
——— *v.* Thomas	686
Cartwright *v.* Cartwright	689
——— *v.* Cooke	31
Caruth *v.* Allen	626
Carvick *v.* Vickery	159
Carver *v.* Miller	651
Cary *v.* Gerrish	112
—— *v.* Stephenson	435
Case *v.* Barber	31
—— *v.* Boughton	524
—— *v.* Roberts	119
Cash *v.* Giles	124
Cass *v.* Cameron	590
Cassell *v.* Cooke	11 *b*
Casseres *v.* Bell	19
Casson *v.* Dade	678
Castrique *v.* Bernabo	187
Castro *v.* Bennett	142
Caswell *v.* Coare	262
——— *v.* Wendell	264
Catherwood *v.* Caslon	49, 461
——— *v.* Chabaud	341
Cator *v.* Stokes	587
Catterall *v.* Catterall	460
——— *v.* Kenyon	645
——— *v.* Sweetman	460
Catteris *v.* Cowper	618
Caunce *v.* Spanton	644
Caunt *v.* Thompson	186
Cave *v.* Holford	686
Cavendish *v.* ———	80
Cavett's appeal	674
Cawdor *v.* Lewis	337
Cayford's case	461
Central Bank *v.* Davis	190
Chace *v.* Lincoln	692
Chadwick *v.* Trower	466
Chalmers *v.* Shackell	425
Chamberlain *v.* Cuyler	445
——— *v.* Harlewood	226, 571
——— *v.* Shaw	644, 649
Chamberlyn *v.* Delarive	523
Chambers *v.* Caulfield	51
——— *v.* Robinson	418, 449, 453
Champion *v.* Terry	156
Champlin *v.* Tilley	338, 483
Chandler *v.* Morton	330
——— *v.* Parks	133
——— *v.* Thompson	471
Chapel *v.* Bull	241, 242, 297
——— *v.* Hickes	136, 143
Chappel *v.* Lee	359
Chapple *v.* Cooper	365
Chapman *v.* Annett	195
——— *v.* Pickersgill	449
——— *v.* Sutton	11 *d*
Chard *v.* Fox	186
Charlest. & Col. Boat Co. *v.* Bason	377
Charles River Bridge *v.* Warren Bridge	4
Charnley *v.* Wistanley	79
Charrington *v.* Laing	258
——— *v.* Milner	207
Charters *v.* Bayntun	365
Chase *v.* Cox	529
—— *v.* Dwinel	111, 121
—— *v.* Eagle Ins. Co.	403
—— *v.* Weston	240
Chaters *v.* Bell	166
Chauncey *v.* Yeaton	108
Cheap *v.* Harley	122
Cheasley *v.* Barnes	597, 629
Cheek *v.* Roper	181

	Section
Cheever *v.* Mirrick	141
——— *v.* Pearson	627
Cheminant *v.* Thornton	605
Chesapeake Ins. Co. *v.* Stark	393
Chesmer *v.* Noyes	183
Cheseldine *v.* Brewer	460
Chess *v.* Chess	297
Chichester *v.* Phillips	339
Chick *v.* Pillsbury	187
Chickopee Bank *v.* Eager	188
Chievly *v.* Bond	447
Child *v.* Homer	275
——— *v.* Horden	75
——— *v.* Morley	114
Chilton *v.* Whiffin	170
Chinn *v.* Morris	93, 267
Chirac *v.* Reinicker	333
Chisman *v.* Count	126
Chitty *v.* Naish	533
Cholmondeley (Earl of) *v.* Lord Clinton	140
Christian *v.* Coombe	385
Christie *v.* Cowell	423
——— *v.* Griggs	221, 222
Christopher *v.* Christopher	684
Christophers *v.* Sparke	528
Christy *v.* Reynolds	136
Chubb *v.* Flannagan	416
——— *v.* Westley	418
Church *v.* Crocker	684
Churchill *v.* Perkins	115
——— *v.* Speight	295
——— *v.* Watson	253, 271
Churchman *v.* Smith	481
Churchward *v.* Studdy	620
City Bank *v.* Cutter	190, 607
Clapham *v.* Higham	79
Clark *v.* Alexander	441
——— *v.* Baker	63
——— *v.* Bigelow	183
——— *v.* Bogardus	524
——— *v.* Burdett	534
——— *v.* Cochran	669
——— *v.* Foxcroft 113, 585, 593,	597
——— *v.* Gray	209
——— *v.* Hougham	338, 448
——— *v.* Mersiglia	261
——— *v.* Newsam	253
——— *v.* Pinney	261, 519
——— *v.* Ray	297
——— *v.* Skinner	560
——— *v.* Smith	103, 104
——— *v.* Spence	213
——— *v.* Swift	240
——— *v.* Webb	126
——— *v.* Wright	688 *a*
Clarke *v.* Clarke	642, 643, 648
Clarke *v.* Davies	564
——— *v.* Dinsmore	30, 31
——— *v.* Dutcher	441
——— *v.* Gray	401
——— *v.* Holmes	25
——— *v.* Leslie	365
——— *v.* McAnulty	244
——— *v.* Morey	19
——— *v.* Spence	638
Clarkson *v.* Carter	486
Clay *v.* Langslow	485
—— *v.* Willan	220
Clayton *v.* Blackey	329
——— *v.* Corby	250, 544
——— *v.* Hunt	216
——— *v.* Kynaston	281
Clayton's case	529, 532, 533
Cleaveland *v.* Cleaveland	660
——— *v.* Dashwood	65
——— *v.* Union Ins. Co.	399
Clementson *v.* Williams	441
Clemson *v.* Davidson	563
Cleverly *v.* Brett	347
Clifford *v.* Burton	65
Clift *v.* Stockdon	117
Clifton *v.* Hooper	584
Clinton *v.* Strong	111, 121
Close *v.* Phipps	121
Clunnes *v.* Pezzey	255
Clutterbuck *v.* Chaffers	414
Coates *v.* Hughes	684, 672
—— *v.* Wilson	365
Coats *v.* Chaplin	212
Cobb *v.* Bryant	566
Cobden *v.* Bolton	217
Coble *v.* Willborn	243
Coburn *v.* Hollis	430, 557
Cock *v.* Richards	259
Cockcroft *v.* Smith	95
Cockell *v.* Bridgman	156
Cocker *v.* Crompton	626
——— *v.* Cooper	631
Cockerill *v.* Armstrong	95
Cockshott *v.* Bennett	121
Codling *v.* Johnson	544
Codman *v.* Jenkins	120
——— *v.* Winslow	555
Coffin *v.* Coffin	321
——— *v.* Cottle	80
——— *v.* Newbp't Ins. Co.	382, 403
Cogswell *v.* Dolliver	445
Cohen *v.* Hinckley	382, 384
—— *v.* Morgan	453
Coit *v.* Commercial Ins. Co.	251, 377
—— *v.* Houston	31
—— *v.* Starkweather	295
Colby *v.* Sampson	589

	Section
Colcord *v.* Swan	11 *a*
Cole *v.* Blake	605
—— *v.* Goodwin	215
—— *v.* Terry	646
—— *v.* Trull	536
—— *v.* Turner	84
Coleman *v.* Parish	332
Coles *v.* Bell	608
—— *v.* Trecothick	60, 61
—— *v.* Wright	645
College *v.* Horne	442
Collings *v.* Hope	251
Collingwood *v.* Irwin	244
Collins *v.* Evans	230 *a*, 561
—— *v.* Prentice	658, 660
—— *v.* Westbury	301
Colman, In re	678
Colsell *v.* Budd	290, 528
Colson *v.* Selby	131
—— *v.* Bonzey	239
Colt *v.* McMechen	219
—— *v.* Barnard	179
Coltman *v.* Marsh	443
Colton *v.* Goodridge	300
Columbia Ins. Co. *v.* Lawrence	387
Colwill *v.* Reeves	614, 622
Combe *v.* Pitt	286
Commercial Bank *v.* Cunningham	536
—— *v.* St. Croix Man. Co.	195
—— *v.* Wilkins	585
Commissioners *v.* Allen	588
—— *v.* Hanion	292
—— *v.* Rose	141
—— *v.* Taylor	665
Commonwealth *v.* Bradford	459
—— *v.* Chapman	286
—— *v.* Davis	457
—— *v.* Dudley	241
—— *v.* Eyre	83
—— *v.* Isaacs	48
—— *v.* Littlejohn	461
—— *v.* Meckling	11 *b*
—— *v.* Merriam	47
—— *v.* McDonald	660
—— *v.* Moseler	371 *a*, 372
—— *v.* Newbury	664
—— *v.* Norton	26
—— *v.* Pejepscot	78
—— *v.* Putnam	48
—— *v.* Shepard	150
—— *v.* Snelling	453
—— *v.* Stricker	150
Compagnon *v.* Martin	414
Compton *v.* Chandless	144, 433
—— *v.* Jones,	112
—— *v.* Richards	471
Comstock *v.* Smith	520
Concanen *v.* Lethbridge	586
Concklin *v.* Pearson	444
Cone *v.* Baldwin	136
Connecticut, State of, *v.* Jackson,	529
Connor *v.* Henderson	124
Conover *v.* Mut. Ins. Co. Albany	405
Consens *v.* Paddon	143
Consequa *v.* Willing	249
Converse *v.* Converse	688
Cook *v.* Bachellor	227
—— *v.* Deaton	366
—— *v.* Ellis	253
—— *v.* Green	616
—— *v.* Hartle	649
—— *v.* Harris	239
—— *v.* Round	288
—— *v.* Stokes	414
—— *v.* Ward	417
—— *v.* Wortham	577
Cooke *v.* Hughes	323
—— *v.* Lloyd	462
—— *v.* Munstone	103, 104
—— *v.* Rhodes	140
—— *v.* Stafford	11 *d*
Coolidge *v.* Choate	272
—— *v.* Learned	539
Coon *v.* Moffet	575
Cooper *v.* Barber	425, 475
—— *v.* Blandy	305, 565
—— *v.* Bockett	676, 681
—— *v.* Galbraith	316
—— *v.* Johnson	79
—— *v.* Meyer	166
—— *v.* South	484
—— *v.* Stower	627
Coore *v.* Callaway	608
Cope *v.* Cope	150
—— *v.* Humphreys	528
Copeland *v.* Merchants Ins. Co.	66
—— *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co.	400
Copp *v.* McDougall	195
Copper *v.* Power	523
Coppin *v.* Braithwaite	222 *a*, 253, 267, 272
Cordron *v.* Ld. Massarene	115
Corfield *v.* Coryell	614, 616
Corney *v.* Da Costa	195
Cornell *v.* Le Roy	406
Cornish *v.* Keene	490, 494, 502
Cornwall *v.* Gould	113, 519
Cornwell *v.* Isham	691
Corporation of Clergymen's Sons *v.* Swainson	347
Cortland *v.* Underhill	78
Cortelyou *v.* Van Brundt	616

Section

Cory *v.* Scott 197
Coryell *v.* Colbaugh 269
Coryton *v.* Littlebye 227
Cossey *v.* Diggons 564
Coster *v.* Murray 447
Costigan *v.* M. & H. Railroad Co. 261 *a*
Cotes *v.* Davis 166
Cothers *v.* Keever 261
Cottam *v.* Partridge 445, 447
Cotterell *v.* Griffiths 474
Cottle *v.* Aldrich 343, 344
Countess of Salop *v.* Crompton 615
Courteen *v.* Touse 66
Couscher *v.* Toulam 39
Cousens *v.* Paddon 143
Coutts *v.* Gorham 471
Covell *v.* Laming 622
—— *v.* Weston 358, 361
Covert *v.* Irwin 303
Cowan *v.* Silliman 243
Cowell *v.* Edwards 114
Cowling *v.* Higginson 659
Cowlishaw *v.* Cheslyn 652
Cowper *v.* Andrews 545
Cox *v.* Callender 332
—— *v.* Dugdale 271
—— *v.* Glue 616
—— *v.* Strode 264
Coxe *v.* Harden 640
—— *v.* State Bank 601
Coxedge *v.* Coxedge 51
Coxhead *v.* Richards 421
Coxon *v.* Lyon 12
Craig *v.* Craig 113
—— *v.* Missouri 135
Crain *v.* Colwell 196
—— *v.* Petrie 256
Cranch *v.* Kirkman 445
—— *v.* White 645
Crandall *v.* Bradley 112, 118
—— *v.* Dawson 425
Cranley *v.* Hillary 30
Cranston *v.* Kennedy 78
Crantz *v.* Gill 365
Craufurd *v.* The State 299
Cravath *v.* Plympton 108
Crawford *v.* Whittal 338
Creamer *v.* Perry 190
Cremer *v.* Higginson 529
Creevy *v.* Carr 424
Creswell *v.* Byron 142
Crewe *v.* Crewe 42, 50
Crisdee *v.* Bolton 258, 259
Critchlow *v.* Parry 166
Crofoot *v.* Allen 74
Croft *v.* Croft 46

Section

Croft *v.* Pawlett 677
Crofton *v.* Ilsley 668
Crofts *v.* Waterhouse 221
Crogate's case 95, 632
Cromwell *v.* Lovett 520
Crook *v.* McTavish 434
—— *v.* Wright 139
Crooker *v.* Hutchinson 145, 146
Cropper *v.* Nelson 207
Crosby *v.* Wadsworth 615
—— *v.* Wyatt 439
Cross *v.* Lewis 545
Crosse *v.* Smith 194, 349
Crossen *v.* Hutchins 195
Crossley *v.* Beverley 490
Crossland *v.* Murdock 672
Croughton *v.* Blake 679
Crowley *v.* Cohen 379
Crowningshield *v.* Robinson 136
Crowther *v.* Ramsbottom 629
Crozer *v.* Pilling 453, 606
Crutchly *v.* Mann 163
Cubitt *v.* Porter 617
Cull *v.* Sarmin 13
Cumber *v.* Wane 28, 31
Cumberland *v.* North Yarmouth 74
Cummen *v.* Smith 412
Cumming *v.* Hackley 113, 520, 521
Cummings *v.* Noyes 108
Cunningham *v.* Day 11 *b*
—— *v.* Lawrents 120
Currie *v.* Donald 295
Curry *v.* Com'th Ins. Co. 396, 408
Curtis *v.* Carson 95
—— *v.* Deering 244
—— *v.* Drinkwater 221
—— *v.* Hall 295, 300
—— *v.* Hannay 262
—— *v.* Hunt 347
—— *v.* Vernon 344, 345, 350
Cushing *v.* Adams 622
—— *v.* Aylwin 686
—— *v.* Gore 112
Cushman *v.* Blanchard 243
—— *v.* Waddell 93
Cuthbert *v.* Peacock 524
Cutler *v.* Close 136, 143
—— *v.* How 259
—— *v.* Johnson 259
Cutter *v.* Powell 103
Cutts *v.* Spring 618
Cuyler *v.* Nellis 187

D.

D'Aguilar *v.* D'Aguilar 41, 53, 54
Dagget *v.* Adams 635 *a*

	Section
Dailey *v.* Beck	240
Daines *v.* Hartley	414
Dale *v.* Birch	587
—— *v.* Wood	95
Dalglish *v.* Davidson	393
Dalloway *v.* Turrill	411
Dalton *v.* Favour	226
——— *v.* Gib	366
Dalzell *v.* Mair	381
Damon *v.* Bryant	597
Damron *v.* Roach	268 *a*
Dan *v.* Brown	681, 694
Dana *v.* Coombs	367
Dance *v.* Robson	424
Dane *v.* Kirkwall	370, 371
Danforth *v.* Culver	441, 443
——— *v.* Schoharie	127
Daniel *v.* North	475, 545
Daniels *v.* Daniels	644
——— *v.* Pond	615
Danielson *v.* Andrews	11 *e*
Darby *v.* Mayer	672
——- *v.* Smith	635
Dauce *v.* Luce	95
Davenport *v.* Lamson	471
——— *v.* Rackstrow	478
——— *v.* Russell	89
David *v.* Ellice	127
—— *v.* Moore	213
—— *v.* Preece	11 *e*
Davidson *v.* Willasey	382
Davies *v.* Jenkins	144
—— *v.* Mann	220
—— *v.* Nicholas	644
—— *v.* Vernon	644, 645
——- *v.* Williams	574
Davis *v.* Calvert	690
—— *v.* Davis	688 *a*
—— *v.* Dodd	156
—— *v.* Griffith	275
—— *v.* Hardy	454
—— *v.* James	212
—— *v.* Oswell	276
—— *v.* Smith	445
—— *v.* Saunders	94
—— *v.* Sigourney	688 *a*
—— *v.* Willan	216
—— *v.* West	431
Davison *v.* Hanslop	127
——— *v.* Oswell	648
——— *v.* Penton	257, 258
——— *v.* Smith	367, 440
——— *v.* Stacey	564
——— *v.* Stephens	539, 659, 664
Davy *v.* Faw	78
—— *v.* Smith	678
Dawes *v.* Peck	212, 640, 648

	Section
Dawes *v.* Shed	446
Dawson *v.* Chamney	230
——— *v.* Lawley	139
——— *v.* Moore	472
——— *v.* Tibbs	135
Dax *v.* Ward	136
Day *v.* Bream	415
—— *v.* Holloway	255
—— *v.* Lamb	431
—— *v.* Nix	136
—— *v.* Ridley	213
Dean *v.* James	604
—— *v.* Pitts	443
—— *v.* Peale	88, 273, 574
—— *v.* Williams	530
Dean &c. of Ely *v.* Warren	250
Deane *v.* Clayton	473
Dearborn *v.* Dearborn	145, 146
Deblois *v.* Ocean Ins. Co.	400
De Berkom *v.* Smith	483
De Bernales *v.* Fuller	119
Decker *v.* Freeman	296
De Crespigny *v.* Wellesley	424
Deering *v.* Sawtel	330
Defries *v.* Davis	418
De Gaminde *v.* Pigou	381
Delano *v.* Blake	367
Delegal *v.* Higley	418, 454, 455
Delancy *v.* McKean	331
Delacroix *v.* Thevenot	414
De la Courtier *v.* Bellamy	12
De la Torre *v.* Barclay	442
Delavergne *v.* Norris	242
Delvalle *v.* Plomer	594
De Mantort *v.* Saunders	25
De Marentille *v.* Oliver	82
Demarest *v.* Willard	240
Den *v.* Matlock	676
—— *v.* McCann	539
—— *v.* Vancleve	690
Denew *v.* Daverell	136
Denham *v.* Crowell	290
Denis *v.* Warder	686
Denison *v.* Hyde	253
Denn *v.* Chubb	336
—— *v.* Flack	112
—— *v.* Mason	295
—— *v.* Purvis	317
—— *v.* Wright	66
Dennett *v.* Crocker	557
Dennie *v.* Harris	640
——— *v.* Hart	520
Denning *v.* Roome	660
Dennis *v.* Cumming	258
——— *v.* Pawling	93
Denny *v.* Lincoln	115
Denys *v.* Shuckburg	433

	Section
Derisley *v.* Custance	239, 354
Derosne *v.* Fairie	489
Deshon *v.* Eaton	440
Dessebats *v.* Berquier	668
De Sobry *v.* De Laistre	669
Despatch Line &c. *v.* Bellamy Man. Co.	66
Deuch *v.* Walker	642
Devereaux *v.* Barclay	642
Devoe *v.* Corydon	648
De Vera Maraver, In re	668
Dewey *v.* Bayntun	594
——— *v.* Brown	317
——— *v.* Dewey	295, 676, 678
——— *v.* Humprey	607
——— *v.* Osborn	333, 336
Dew *v.* Clark	371 *a*
—— *v.* Parsons	121
De Woolfe *v.* ——	147
De Wolf *v.* Dearborn	640
Dey *v.* Dox	261
De Zichy Ferraris *v.* Marq. of Hertford	668
Dickson *v.* Lodge	380
Dickinson *v.* Barber	275, 424, 690, 691
——— *v.* Boyle	254, 268
——— *v.* Prentice	203
——— *v.* Coward	49
——— *v.* Shee	602
Dickenson *v.* Dickenson	681
Dickerson *v.* Watson	85
Dickey *v.* Sleeper	80
Digby *v.* Atkinson	245 *a*
Dimmick *v.* Lockwood	264
D'Israeli *v.* Jowett	384
Ditcham *v.* Chivis	209
——— *v.* Bond	225, 627
Dixon *v.* Bell	268
——— *v.* Clarke	601
——— *v.* Deveridge	126
Dobree *v.* Eastwood	193
Dobson *v.* Sotheby	408
Dodd *v.* Holmes	467, 473
—— *v.* Kyffin	625
—— *v.* Norris	58, 577, 579
Doddington *v.* Hudson	469
Dodge *v.* Morse	27
Dodwell *v.* Burford	84
——— *v.* Gibbs	332
Doe *v.* Archer	323
—— *v.* Banks	327
—— *v.* Barford	684
—— *v.* Batten	321, 325
—— *v.* Baytup	305
—— *v.* Bevan	245
—— *v.* Bird	318
Doe *v.* Calvert	321, 693
—— *v.* Carver	245
—— *v.* Chaplin	317, 323
—— *v.* Clarke	306
—— *v.* Creed	325
—— *v.* Crick	321, 324
—— *v.* Cuff	318
—— *v.* Davis	336, 456, 677
—— *v.* Doe	45
—— *v.* Dunbar	324
—— *v.* Durnford	322
—— *v.* Edwards	305
—— *v.* Evans	674
—— d. Farr *v.* Hicks	58
—— *v.* Fenn	317
—— *v.* Fleming	462
—— *v.* Forster	321
—— *v.* Frowd	325
—— *v.* Grazebrook	463
—— *v.* Griffin	354
—— *v.* Grubb	321, 325
—— *v.* Harris	321, 625, 681
—— *v.* Hare	336
—— *v.* Hersey	691
—— *v.* Hilder	665
—— *v.* Horner	78
—— *v.* Huddart	336
—— *v.* Inglis	325
—— *v.* Jesson	355
—— *v.* Johnson	325
—— *v.* Jones	439
—— *v.* Knightley	323
—— *v.* Knight	297
—— *v.* Lambly	321
—— *v.* Lancashire	684
—— *v.* Lewis	305
—— *v.* Lonsdale	317
—— *v.* Lucas	324
—— *v.* Manifold	678
—— *v.* Meaux	325
—— *v.* Mills	305
—— *v.* Mitchell	305
—— *v.* Mizen	305
—— *v.* Murless	316
—— *v.* Nepean	355
—— *v.* Palmer	321, 324
—— *v.* Pasquali	321
—— *v.* Pattison	674
—— *v.* Payne	245
—— *v.* Pegge	306
—— *v.* Porter	641
—— *v.* Potts	317
—— *v.* Prosser	318, 557
—— *v.* Read	317
—— *v.* Rickarby	245, 328
—— *v.* Roe	318
—— *v.* Salter	625

	Section
Doe *v.* Smith	316
—— *v.* Spiller	323
—— *v.* Steel	314
—— *v.* Trye	591
—— *v.* Watkins	324
—— *v.* Watson	305
—— *v.* Whitroe	305
—— *v.* Whittic	325
—— *v.* Wippel	317
—— *v.* Williams	325
—— *v.* Wilkinson	306
—— *v.* Wolley	310, 355, 679
—— *v.* Woombwell	321
—— *v.* Wright	626
—— *v.* Wrightman	323
Dogan *v.* Ashbey	520
Doggett *v.* Everson	230 *a*
Dole *v.* Hayden	113
—— *v.* Lyon	424
Dollfus *v.* Frosch	195
Don *v.* Lippman	669
Donaldson *v.* Winter	672
Doolittle *v.* Blakesley	438
Dorr *v.* Munsell	300
—— *v.* Pacific Ins. Co.	401
Dorrell *v.* Johnson	622
Doty *v.* Wilson	108
Douglas *v.* Forrest	344, 437
——— *v.* Mooyl	113
——— *v.* McAlister	261
——— *v.* Scougall	401
——— *v.* Patrick	604
Doune *v.* Estevin de Darby	277
Dover *v.* Rawlings	562
Dow *v.* Smith	393
Dowd *v.* Wadsworth	645
Dowdale's case	361
Dowden *v.* Fowle	593
Downer *v.* Madison	256
Downs *v.* Skrymsher	47, 95
Drake *v.* Drake	135
—— *v.* Hudson	252
—— *v.* Rogers	662
—— *v.* Sykes	64, 582
—— *v.* Shorter	643
Draper *v.* Arnold	580
——— *v.* Fulkes	647
Drewell *v.* Towler	544
Drury *v.* Strong	264
——— *v.* Worcester	662
Dry Dock Co. *v.* McIntosh	129 *a*
Dubois *v.* Doubleday	112
——— *v.* Keates	453
Dublin *v.* Chadbourn	669, 339, 672
Duberly *v.* Gunning	51
Dubost *v.* Beresford	414
Duches of Cleveland *v.* Dashwood	65
Dudley *v.* Follett	243
—— *v.* Littlefield	171
——— *v.* Smith	221
Duff *v.* Budd	212
Duffield *v.* Scott	116
——— *v.* Morris	688
Dufresne *v.* Hutchinson	30, 648
Dugan & al. *v.* The United States	166, 169
Duggan *v.* O'Connor	565
Duhammel *v.* Pickering	107
Duke of Norfolk *v.* Germaine	47, 55
——— Somerset *v.* France	250
Duke *v.* Spring	359
Dunbar *v.* Jumper	240
Duncan *v.* Findlater	232 *a*
——— *v.* Keiff	114
——— *v.* Sparrow	163
——— *v.* Scott	165, 172
——— *v.* Spear	637
Duncombe *v.* Daniell	424
Dunham *v.* Jackson	603
——— *v.* Wykoff	561
Dunk *v.* Hunter	565
Dunlap *v.* Dunlap	677
Dunlop *v.* Higgins	261
Dunman *v.* Bigg	421
Dunn *v.* Body	104
—— *v.* Dunn	54
—— *v.* Large	336
—— *v.* St. Andrews Church	62
Durant *v.* Durant	41, 44, 53, 54
Durell *v.* Mosher	642
Durling *v.* Loveland	675
Dunford *v.* Messiter	114
Duryee *v.* Dennison	196
Dutton *v.* Poole	109
——— *v.* Solomonson	640
Dwight *v.* Brewster	215, 642
Dwinel *v.* Barnard	662
Dwyer *v.* Bowley	566
Dye *v.* Leatherdale	622
Dyke *v.* Aldridge	584
—— *v.* Sweeting	290

E.

Eager *v.* The Atlas Ins. Co.	249, 377
—— *v.* Grimwood	577 *a*
Eagle Bank *v.* Smith	156
——— *v.* Chapin	187, 191
——— *v.* Hathaway	188
Eames *v.* Savage	124
Earl of Derby *v.* Taylor	239
Earl *v.* Hall	232 *a*
Earl of Leicester *v.* Walter	275, 424
Earle *v.* Harris	383

	Section
Earle *v.* Peale	365
—— *v.* Rowcroft	390
—— *v.* Sawyer	489, 491, 495
Easley *v.* Moss	414
East *v.* Chapman	424, 425
—— *v.* Smith	186
East London Waterworks Co. *v.* Bailey	62
East India Co. *v.* Prince	441, 442
Eastwick *v.* Hugg	117
Eastwood *v.* Kenyon	107, 282
Easterby *v.* Pullen	442
Eaton *v.* Bright	462
—— *v.* Jaques	239
—— *v.* Lynde	640
—— *v.* Ogier	11 *b*, 599
—— *v.* Whitaker	11 *b*
Ebersoll *v.* Krug	11 *b*
Eckert *v.* Wilson	440
Eckstein *v.* Reynolds	605
Eccleston *v.* Petty al. Speake	678
Eddy *v.* Smith	117
Edelen *v.* Hardey	678
Edge *v.* Pemberton	655
Edgerley *v.* Emerson	11 *b*
Edgerton *v.* Brackett	112
Edie *v.* The East India Co.	249, 252
Edlestone *v.* Speake	678
Edmunds *v.* Cox	79
—— *v.* Downes	440
Edmonds *v.* Lowe	205
Edmonson *v.* Machell	273, 573
Edson *v.* Weston	135
Edwards *v.* Astley	681
—— *v.* Beach	253
—— *v.* Crock	57
—— *v.* Footner	396
—— *v.* Hooper	642, 644
—— *v.* Sharratt	220
—— *v.* Yeates	608
Efner *v.* Shaw	76
Ege *v.* Kyle	478
Egg *v.* Barnett	527
Egleston *v.* Macauly	262
Eichon *v.* Le Maitre	27
Ela *v.* Rand	25, 131
Elden *v.* Keddel	315
Eliot *v.* Allen	277
—— *v.* Eliot	44
Elliott *v.* Aston	502
—— *v.* Edwards	124
—— *v.* Morgan	131
—— *v.* Nicklin	579
Elliott *v.* Swartwout	121, 123
Ellis *v.* Abrahams	454
—— *v.* Ellis	365
—— *v.* Paige	615
Ellis *v.* Watson	484
—— *v.* Welch	243, 244
—— *v.* Wild	523
Ellsworth *v.* Brewer	112
Elsam *v.* Fawcett	56
Elsey *v.* Metcalf	297
Elting *v.* Scott	396
Elwes *v.* Elwes	43
Elwood *v.* Bullock	250
Emerson *v.* Boville	684
—— *v.* Cutts	166
—— *v.* Propr's of Minot	244
—— *v.* Thompson	342
—— *v.* Wiley	665
Emmerson *v.* Blonder	65
—— *v.* Heelis	61
England *v.* Slade	305, 565
Epis. Charit. Society *v.* Ep. Ch. in Dedham	66
Erick *v.* Johnson	67
Erskine *v.* Townsend	330
—— *v.* Olmstead	615
Erwin *v.* Blake	141
Estes *v.* Troy	660
Etheridge *v.* Binney	483
Evans *v.* Ascough	361
—— *v.* Brander	586, 599
—— *v.* Birch	38, 528
—— *v.* Curtis	483
—— *v.* Eaton	508
—— *v.* Evans	42, 616
—— *v.* Gray	136
—— *v.* Hettich	508
—— *v.* Huey	301
—— *v.* Judkins	605
—— *v.* Manero	599
—— *v.* Morgan	462
—— *v.* Powis	31
—— *v.* Stephens	284
—— *v.* Vaughan	243
—— *v.* Verity	126
Eveleigh *v.* Sylvester	387
Evelyn *v.* Chichester	367
Everett *v.* Coffin	642
—— *v.* Collins	520
—— *v.* Tindall	285
Everth *v.* Tunns	389
Ewart *v.* Kerr	649
—— *v.* Street	219
Ewer *v.* Coxe	511
—— *v.* Jones	435
Ewing *v.* French	11 *b*
—— *v.* Peters	347
Exall *v.* Partridge	114
Eyles *v.* Faikney	115, 590
Eyre *v.* Palsgrave	98, 389

F.

	Section
Fairbank *v.* Phelps	640
Fairbanks *v.* Blackington	118
——— *v.* Stanley	112
——— *v.* Wilkinson	240
Fairclaim *v.* Shackleton	318
Fairlee *v.* Denton	112
Fairlie *v.* Birch	589
Fairman *v.* Ives	421, 423
Faith *v.* McIntyre	203
Fane *v.* Fane	524
Fannin *v.* Anderson	438
Farmer *v.* Arundel	123
——— *v.* Darling	453
Farmer's Bank *v.* Reynolds	156
Farne *v.* Rand	190
Farnham *v.* Brooks	448
Farnsworth *v.* Garrard	136
Farnum *v.* Fowle	179
——— *v.* Platt	658
Farr *v.* Newman	594
—— *v.* Smith	647
Farrant *v.* Olmins	259
——— *v.* Thompson	640
Farrar *v.* Ayres	690
——— *v.* Barton	635 *a*
——— *v.* Beswick	646
——— *v.* Merrill	541
Farrington *v.* Lee	445
Faugier *v.* Hallet	393
Faulder *v.* Silk	246, 371
Faulkner *v.* Brown	637
Favenc *v.* Bennet	536
Faw *v.* Roberdeau	437
Fawcett *v.* Hall	327
——— *v.* Jones	675
Fay *v.* Bradley	530
— *v.* Goulding	14
— *v.* Prentice	474
Fearnley *v.* Morley	121
Featherstonhaugh *v.* Johnston	642
Feize *v.* Thompson	255
Feltham *v.* Cartwright	627
——— *v.* Terry	117, 121
Felton *v.* Dickenson	104
Femings *v.* Jarratt	343
Fenn *v.* Grafton	471
Fenner *v.* Duplock	565
——— *v.* Lewis	65
Fennings *v.* Ld. Grenville	646
Fenton *v.* Reed	460
Fenwick *v.* Floyd	316
Ferguson *v.* Cappeau	209
Ferrer *v.* Oven	70
Ferrers *v.* Costello	107
——— *v.* Ferrers	53
Ferris *v.* Fuller	325
Fessenmeyer *v.* Adcock	37, 112, 126
Fetherley *v.* Waggoner	679
Fetter *v.* Beale	89
Field *v.* Holland	533
——, In re	674
—— *v.* Nickerson	179
Fielder *v.* Starkin	262
Filliter *v.* Phippard	253
Finch *v.* Brook	602, 603
——— *v.* Blount	649
——— *v.* Gridley	412
——— *v.* Miller	605
Fincham *v.* Edwards	678
Findlay *v.* Smith	651, 656
Finnerty *v.* Tipper	418
Fish *v.* Chapman	215
Fisher *v.* Bradford	168
——— *v.* Bristow	452
——— *v.* Duncan	342
——— *v.* Fellows	114
——— *v.* Jewett	24, 367
——— *v.* Pimbley	78, 79
——— *v.* Samuda	136
——— *v.* Willard	66
Fiske *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co.	398
——— *v.* Small	618
Fitch *v.* Hilleary	445
—— *v.* Sutton	28, 519
Fleetwood *v.* Curley	417
Flemington *v.* Smithers	267
Fletcher *v.* Braddyll	416
——— *v.* Dyche	259
Flewster *v.* Royle	621
Flint *v.* Clinton Co.	62
—— *v.* Flemyng	380, 382
Flower *v.* Adam	473
——— *v.* Pedley	414
——— *v.* Young	378, 484
Floyd *v.* Day	118
Foley *v.* Ld. Peterborough	51
Folly *v.* Vantuyl	297
Folsom *v.* Mussey	136
Forbes *v.* Ld. Middleton	432
Ford *v.* Ford	681
—— *v.* Fothergill	366
—— *v.* Jones	73
—— *v.* Phillips	367
Forde *v.* Skinner	84
Fores *v.* Wilson	88, 573
Forney *v.* Hallacher	49, 461
Forrester *v.* Pigou	396
Forster *v.* Forster	52
Forse & Hembling's case	684
Forsyth *v.* Ganson	352
Forty *v.* Imber	564
Forward *v.* Pittard	219

	Section
Foshay *v.* Ferguson	454
Foster *v.* Allanson	127
——— *v.* Bates	339
——— *v.* Blakelock	317
——— *v.* Gorton	640
——— *v.* Pointer	11 *d*
——— *v.* Stewart	108
——— *v.* The Essex Bank	68
——— *v.* United States Ins. Co.	382
——— *v.* Wilmer	382
Fouldes *v.* Willoughby	642
Founes *v.* Ettricke	462
Fowler *v.* Bott	245 *a*
——— *v.* Bush	520
——— *v.* Down	640
——— *v.* Hunt	439
——— *v.* Sharp	346
Fox *v.* Evans	694
—— *v.* Marston	684
—— *v.* Northern Liberties	621
—— *v.* Whitney	204
—— *v.* Widgery	557
Foxcroft's case	150
France *v.* Lucy	191
Francis *v.* Grover	681
——— *v.* Wilson	263
Franklin *v.* Miller	136
——— *v.* Vanderpool	520
Frankum *v.* E. of Falmouth	11 *e*
Fraunces's case	243
Frazer *v.* Berkley	93, 267
——— *v.* Hopkins	378
Frazier *v.* Dick	202
——— *v.* Hyland	530
Freary *v.* Cook	250
Frederick *v.* Lookup	284
Free *v.* Hawkins	164
Freeman *v.* Arkell	455
——— *v.* Birch	212
——— *v.* Bluett	597
——— *v.* Boynton	179
——— *v.* Haskins	199
——— *v.* Kennell	160
Freer *v.* Peacock	371 *a*, 372, 689
Freestone *v.* Butcher	64 *a*
French *v.* Bank of Columbia	195
——— *v.* French	295
——— *v.* Kirk	452
Frets *v.* Frets	79
Fricker *v.* Tomlinson	282
Friend *v.* Eastabrook	246
Frisbie *v.* Larned	523
Fromont *v.* Coupland	214
Frost *v.* Bengough	441
—— *v.* Dougal	584
Frothingham *v.* Haley	67
Frye *v.* Barker	441
Fuller *v.* Little	603
——— *v.* McDonald	190, 196
——— *v.* Wilson	68
Fullerton *v.* Warwick	93
Fulton *v.* Griswold	136
Funk *v.* Voneida	242
Furneaux *v.* Hutchins	250
Furness *v.* Cope	195
Furniss *v.* Ellis	11 *a*
Fydell *v.* Clark	523

G.

	Section
Gabay *v.* Lloyd	377
Gaby *v.* Wilts & Berks Canal Co.	434
Gaillard *v.* Smart	141
Gainsford *v.* Carroll	261
Gale *v.* Capern	24
Galloway *v.* Bleaden	494
Galvin *v.* Bacon	561
Gammon *v.* Everett	195
Gardiner *v.* Campbell	615
——— *v.* Cleaveland	113
——— *v.* Collins	297
——— *v.* Croasdale	260
——— *v.* Gardiner	293
——— *v.* Jadis	56
——— *v.* Madeira	47
——— *v.* Peerage case	152
——— *v.* Slade	421
——— *v.* Tudor	440
——— *v.* Webber	431
Gargrave *v.* Smith	634
Garnett *v.* Woodcock	178
Garrett *v.* Handley	109
Garrison *v.* Sandford	242
Garritt *v.* Sharp	476
Garth *v.* Howard	64
Garvey *v.* Hibbert	298
Gass *v.* Stinson	533
Gates *v.* Bayley	634
—— *v.* Bowker	11, 413
—— *v.* Butler	430, 475, 557
—— *v.* Gates	561
Gathercole *v.* Miall	415
Gathings *v.* Williams	464
Gaylord *v.* Van Loan	14
Gayetly *v.* Bethune	657
Gaze *v.* Gaze	676
George *v.* Surrey	677
Gerard *v.* Baker	65
Gerrish *v.* Edson	599
——— *v.* Nason	675
Gerrard *v.* O'Reilly	259
Germantown Railr. Co. *v.* Wilt	621
Gibbs *v.* Cannon	186
—— *v.* Chase	621

	Section
Gibbs *v.* Merrill	24, 133
Gibbens *v.* Cross	684
Gibbon *v.* Coggon	184, 584
——— *v.* Featherstonhaugh	527
Gibbons *v.* McCasland	441
——— *v.* Pepper	85, 94
——— *v.* Wilcox	484
Gibson *v.* Chaters	453
——— *v.* Fleming	95
——— *v.* Farley	358
——— *v.* Minet	119
——— *v.* Wells	655
Gidley *v.* Williams	338
Gidney *v.* Earl	616
——— *v.* Stone	270
——— *v.* Williams	142
Gilbert *v.* Birkinsham	255
Gilchrist *v.* Cunningham	118
Giles *v.* Dyson	347
—— *v.* Edwards	104
—— *v.* Grover	637
—— *v.* Harris	607
Gill *v.* Cole	332, 336
—— *v.* Kuhn	481
—— *v.* Logher	142
Gillett *v.* Maynard	124
——— *v.* Rippon	113, 114
Gillies *v.* Smither	348, 349
Gillon *v.* Boddington	434
——— *v.* Wilson	86
Gilman *v.* Lowell	275
Gilmore *v.* Hague	165
Gilmore *v.* Spies	180
Gilson *v.* Stewart	127
Gisborne *v.* Hart	71
Gist *v.* Robinet	317
Givens *v.* Briscoe	141
Givers *v.* Higgens	343
Gladstone *v.* McGowran	570
Glasier *v.* Eve	597
Glasscott *v.* Day	602, 605
Gleason *v.* Clark	142
Glezen *v.* Rood	486
Glossop *v.* Colman	478
——— *v.* Jacob	161
——— *v.* Poole	594
Gloucester Bank *v.* Salem Bank	522
Glover *v.* Black	379
——— *v.* Thompson	165
Goddard *v.* Cox	529, 531
——— *v.* Hodges	531
——— *v.* Smith	452
Godefroy *v.* Dalton	145
——— *v.* Jay	142
Godson *v.* Good	131
——— *v.* Richards	163
Gold *v.* Whitcomb	415
Golding *v.* Nias	570
Goldshmidt *v.* Whitmore	388, 390
Goldsmid *v.* Bromer	463
Goldsworthy *v.* Strutt	258, 259
Golightly *v.* Ryn	644
Good *v.* Cheeseman	31
—— *v.* Hill	237
Goodin *v.* Ferris	434
Goodland *v.* Blewith	606
Goodman *v.* Harvey	639
Goodrich *v.* Walker	297
Goodright *v.* Davids	325
——— *v.* Glazier	683
——— *v.* Gregory	297
——— *v.* Moss	151
——— *v.* Saul	150
Goodsell *v.* Myers	367
Goodtitle *v.* Baldwin	303
——— *v.* Newman	312
——— *v.* North	337
——— *v.* Otway	686
——— *v.* Tombs	336
——— *v.* Woodward	323
Goodwin *v.* Holbrook	609
——— *v.* Morse	112
Gordon *v.* Buchanan	377
——— *v.* Harper	561, 616, 640
——— *v.* Little	219, 377
——— *v.* Martin	104
——— *v.* Mass. Ins. Co.	379
——— *v.* Strange	520
Gore *v.* Brazier	149, 264, 316
—— *v.* Gibson	171
Gorgier *v.* Mieville	639
Gorham *v.* Gale	580
Gorton *v.* De Angelis	454
Goss *v.* Quinton	638
Gough *v.* Davies	127
——— *v.* Gough	689
Gouger *v.* Jolly	216, 217
Gould *v.* Banks	607
——— *v.* Barratt	456
——— *v.* Hulme	412, 417
——— *v.* Lasbury	24
——— *v.* Shirley	440
——— *v.* Weed	275
Govett *v.* Radnige	209
Gov. &c. of Chelsea Water Works *v.* Cowper	348
Gowan *v.* Jackson	483
Grable *v.* Margrave	253, 269
Grafton bank *v.* Moore	484
Graham *v.* Barras	383
——— *v.* Bickham	258
——— *v.* Moore	305
——— *v.* Peat	618
——— *v.* Wigley	51

	Section
Grainger *v.* Hill	449, 452
Grand Bank *v.* Blanchard	188
Granger *v.* George	284, 431, 433, 448, 648
——— *v.* Granger	233
Grant *v.* Austen	119
——— *v.* Button	143
——— *v.* Duel	271, 453, 457
——— *v.* Hunt	161
——— *v.* Shurter	486
——— *v.* Thompson	371
——— *v.* Vaughan	14
Grantley *v.* Garthwaite	681
Gravenor *v.* Woodhouse	565
Gray *v.* Bond	545
——— *v.* Berryman	432
——— *v.* Jenks	330
——— *v.* Palmer	159
——— *v.* Russell	514
——— *v.* The Portland Bank	68, 261
——— *v.* Wass	141, 330, 518
Gray's case	544, 568
Grayson *v.* Atkinson	676
Grazebrook *v.* Davis	79
Grecly *v.* Thurston	187
Greely *v.* Bartlett	118
——— *v.* Hunt	177
Green *v.* Bartram	98
——— *v.* Biddle	549
——— *v.* Button	449
——— *v.* Chelsea	554
——— (or Dean) *v.* Crane	342
——— *v.* Dunn	645
——— *v.* Elmslie	387
——— *v.* Goddard	98
——— *v.* Hewitt	121
——— *v.* Jackson	138
——— *v.* Kemp	556
——— *v.* Liter	554
——— *v.* Lowde	584, 587
——— *v.* Merch. Ins. Co.	397
Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt	276, 642, 649
Greening *v.* Wilkinson	276, 649
Greenleaf *v.* Cook	136
Greenough *v.* Rolfe	78
Greenwood *v.* Curtis	111
——— *v.* Misdale	79
Greeves *v.* McAlister	107
Gregory *v.* Doidge	305
——— *v.* Hill	98, 514
——— *v.* Howard	78
——— *v.* Piper	621
——— *v.* Williams	268, 268 *b*
Grensell *v.* Grindlestone	441
Griffin *v.* Blanford	544
——— *v.* Bixby	617
Griffin *v.* Fairbrother	240
——— *v.* Parsons	83, 94
Griffis *v.* Sellars	457
Griffith *v.* Hodges	605
——— *v.* Goodhand	236
——— *v.* Lee	213
——— *v.* Lewis	421
——— *v.* Willing	37
Grimaldi *v.* White	136
Grinnell *v.* Phillips	580, 621
——— *v.* Wells	573, 575, 579
Grissell *v.* Dufrene	114
Griswold *v.* Plumb	644
Grose *v.* West	616
Gross *v.* Zorger	78
Grosvenor *v.* Danforth	141
Groton *v.* Dalheim	177, 195
Grymes *v.* Shack	220
Guerrant *v.* Tinder	457
Guest *v.* Elwes	11 *d*
Guild *v.* Hale	431
Guille *v.* Swan	224, 622
Guion *v.* McCulloch	25
Gullet *v.* Lewis	141
Gulliver *v.* Cosens	120
Gummer *v.* Adams	300
Gunter *v.* Astor	253
——— *v.* Clayton	584
Gunton *v.* Nurse	644
Gutteridge *v.* Munyard	245 *a*
Guy *v.* Kitchiner	95
——— *v.* Livesey	88
——— *v.* Rand	317
Guyther *v.* Pettijohn	646
Gwinn *v.* Whitaker	350, 533
Gwyllim *v.* Scholey	586

H.

	Section
Hacket *v.* Martin	200
Hadden *v.* Mills	456
Haddow *v.* Parry	380
Hadlock *v.* Losee	445
Haggett *v.* Welsh	79
Hague *v.* French	12
Hahn *v.* Corbett	219
Haigh *v.* De La Cour	393
Haight *v.* Holley	27
Haile *v.* Lillie	363
Haines *v.* Haines	681
Hale *v.* The New Jersey Steam Nav. Co.	219
Halifax *v.* Lye	164
Hall *v.* Butler	306
——— *v.* Bumstead	357
——— *v.* Conn. R. Steamboat	253
——— *v.* Davis	98

	Section
Hall *v.* Dean	242
—— *v.* Doe	329
—— *v.* Fearnley	85, 94, 270
—— *v.* Gittings	331
—— *v.* Huse	159
—— *v.* Hale	207
—— *v.* Hall	676
—— *v.* Marston	109, 119
—— *v.* Palmer	297
—— *v.* Smith	25
—— *v.* Stevens	556
—— *v.* Swansea	121
Halliday *v.* McDougall	183, 483
——— *v.* Ward	441
Halsey *v.* Woodruff	277
——— *v.* Whitney	297
Hambly *v.* Trott	108
Hamer *v.* Raymond	470
Hamilton *v.* Cutts	149, 244
——— *v.* Marsden	305
——— *v.* Taylor	305
Hamlet *v.* Richardson	123
Hammersly *v.* Knowlys	529
Hammerton *v.* Hammerton	41
Hammon *v.* Huntley	352
Hammond *v.* Dufrene	195
——— *v.* Mich. State Bank	59
Hanbury *v.* Ella	11, 11 *d*
Hancock *v.* Cook	444, 447
——— *v.* Southall	621
——— *v.* Winter	414
Handcock *v.* Baker	99
Handley *v.* Rankin	296
Hands *v.* Slaney	365
Handy *v.* James	677
Haney *v.* Townsend	226
Hankey *v.* Wilson	165
Hankinson *v.* Bilby	417
Hanmer *v.* Wilsey	635 *a*
Hannam *v.* Mockett	231
Hannen *v.* Edes	95
Hannum *v.* Belchertown	660, 662
Hanover *v.* Turner	108
Hansard *v.* Robinson	156
Hanson *v.* Buckner	264
Hantz *v.* Sealey	460
Harcourt *v.* Romsbottom	79
Harden *v.* Gordon	128
Harding *v.* Brooks	426
——— *v.* Carter	65
——— *v.* Davies	603
——— *v.* Greening	416
——— *v.* Stokes	287
Hardingham *v.* Allen	119
Hardwick *v.* Blanchard	203
Hardy *v.* Martin	258
Hare *v.* Cator	239, 241
Hear *v.* Horton	297
—— *v.* Pearson	642
—— *v.* Travis	382
Hargrave *v.* Dusenbury	523
——— *v.* Hargrave	150
——— *v.* Le Breton	419
Harker *v.* Birkbeck	168
——— *v.* Whitaker	35
Harlow *v.* Thomas	242
Harman *v.* Vaux	391
Harmer *v.* Killing	367
——— *v.* Rogers	665
——— *v.* Wright	300
Harper *v.* Charlesworth	663
——— *v.* Hampton	28
——— *v.* Hough	78
——— *v.* Luffkin	88, 573
——— *v.* Williamson	139
Harrington *v.* Payne	642
Harris *v.* Butler	573
——— *v.* Costar	221
——— *v.* Clap	263
——— *v.* Cook	625
——— *v.* Dennis	432
——— *v.* Eagle Fire Co.	407
——— *v.* Johnston	523
——— *v.* Jones	245 *a*
——— *v.* Mantle	237
——— *v.* Mitchell	73
——— *v.* Nicholas	251
——— *v.* Oke	103
——— *v.* Osbourn	142
——— *v.* Packwood	218
——— *v.* Wall	367
Harrison *v.* Barnby	566
——— *v.* Bevington	414
——— *v.* Elwin	674, 677
——— *v.* Fane	365
——— *v.* Fitzhenry	195
——— *v.* Harrison	261, 677
——— *v.* Jackson	61
——— *v.* Nixon	671
——— *v.* Phillips Academy	297
——— *v.* Rowan	672
——— *v.* Ruscoe	186
——— *v.* Wright	257
Harrison's case	688
Harrod *v.* Benton	593
Hart *v.* Allen	219
—— *v.* Ayres	112
—— *v.* Boller	523
—— *v.* Frame	144
—— *v.* Horn	570
—— *v.* Prater	365
—— *v.* Sattley	212
Hartford Bank *v.* Hart	193
Hartley *v.* Herring	420

	Section
Hartley *v.* Wharton	367
Hartness *v.* Thompson	133
Harvard College *v.* Gore	339
Harvey *v.* Brydges	622, 623
——— *v.* Watson	51
Harwood *v.* Goodright	681
Hasbrouck *v.* Tappen	258, 259
Hasser *v.* Wallis	120
Hastings *v.* Crunkleton	656
——— *v.* Shorley	605
Hatch *v.* Dennis	200
——— *v.* Dickinson	156
——— *v.* Hatch	297
——— *v.* White	524
Hathorn *v.* King	691
Haughton *v.* Ewbank	66
Havard *v.* Davis	681
Haven *v.* Foster	123
Hawes *v.* Wyatt	687
Hawkes *v.* Salter	193
——— *v.* Hawkes	681
Hawkins *v.* Cooper	220, 473
——— *v.* Hoffman	218, 642
——— *v.* Plomer	589, 599
——— *v.* Ramsbottom	133
——— *v.* Rutt	525
Hawley *v.* Foote	31
Hay *v.* Brown	77
——— *v.* Graham	256
——— *v.* Ousterout	607
Haycraft *v.* Creasy	230 *a*
Hayward *v.* Hague	608
——— *v.* Leonard	136
Haydon *v.* Shed	622
——— *v.* Williams	440
Hayes *v.* Warren	114
Haynes *v.* Morgan	11 *b*
Haythorn *v.* Lawson	420
Hazard *v.* Treadwell	65
Hazeldine *v.* Walker	11 *a*
Head *v.* Head	150
Headlam *v.* Headley	616
Headley *v.* Mildmay	277
Heard *v.* Bowers	236
Hearle *v.* Hicks	681
Heath *v.* Hubbard	646
——— *v.* Knapp	331, 556
——— *v.* Samson	172
——— *v.* Unwin	496
——— *v.* Whidden	240
——— *v.* Williams	618
Heathcote *v.* Crookshanks	31, 519
Hebden *v.* Hartsink	520
Heckscher *v.* McCrea	216 *a*
Hedge *v.* Drew	297
Hedgley *v.* Holt	365
Heeney *v.* Heeney	261

	Section
Hellings *v.* Shaw	443
Hellyar *v.* Helyar	681
Helmsley *v.* Loader	158, 159
Helsby *v.* Mears	214, 218
Heminway *v.* Saxton	273
Hemming *v.* Parry	11 *d*
Hemmingway *v.* Fernandez	240
Henderson *v.* Wild	480
Henfrey *v.* Henfrey	681
Henniker *v.* Wigg	533
Henning *v.* Withers	264
Henry *v.* Brown	13
——— *v.* Goldney	26
——— *v.* Jones	179
Henslow *v.* Faucett	287
Henwood *v.* Oliver	605
Hepburn *v.* Auld	605
——— *v.* Sewell	276
Herne *v.* Bembow	655
Herrick *v.* Bennet	15
——— *v.* Lapham	420
——— *v.* Whitney	206
Herring *v.* Polley	66
Hervey *v.* Hervey	462
Heslop *v.* Metcalf	142
Hetherington *v.* Kemp	193
Hewes *v.* Parkman	642, 648
Hewitt *v.* Thompson	195
Hewlett *v.* Cruchley	459
Hewlins *v.* Shippam	631
Heyden *v.* Thompson	172
Heydon's case	277
Heylin *v.* Adamson	176
——— *v.* Hastings	342
Heyman *v.* Parish	387, 390
Heys *v.* Heseltine	14
Heyward *v.* Lomax	533
Hibbert *v.* Pigon	384
Hick *v.* Keats	112
Hickey *v.* Heyter	347, 348
Hickman *v.* Walker	342
Hicks *v.* Bingham	533
Higbee *v.* Rice	23, 555, 556
Higgins *v.* Livermore	249
——— *v.* Whitney	635 *a*
Higginson *v.* Dall	379
——— *v.* York	622
Higham *v.* Baddely	605
——— *v.* Rabett	659
Highmore *v.* Primrose	126
Hight *v.* Wilson	674, 677
Hill *v.* Davis	108
—— *v.* Featherstonhaugh	143
—— *v.* White	131
—— *v.* Salt	11 *d*
—— *v.* Scales	296
—— *v.* Crosby	471

	Section
Hill *v.* Warren	473
—— *v.* Manchester Waterw. Co.	483
—— *v.* Thompson	494
—— *v.* Wright	566
Hilliard *v.* Cox	338
Hills *v.* Banister	136
Hilt *v.* Campbell	209
Hilton *v.* Burley	135
——— *v.* E. of Granville	250
Hinde *v.* Whitehouse	638
Hindle *v.* Blades	586
Hingham *v.* Sprague	614
Hinkley *v.* Fowle	118
Hinsdale *v.* Bank of Orange	156
Hinton *v.* Heather	455
Hiscocks *v.* Jones	591
Hitchcock *v.* Humfrey	186, 186 *a*
——— *v.* Harrington	330
——— *v.* North	458
——— *v.* Whitney	253
Hitchen *v.* Teale	86, 624
Hitchin *v.* Campbell	108
Hix *v.* Whittemore	371
Hoar *v.* Clute	521
—— *v.* Wood	421
Hoare *v.* Allen	56
Hobart *v.* Norton	382
Hobbs *v.* Lowell	656
Hoby *v.* Built	142
Hock *v.* Hock	694
Hodgdon *v.* Dexter	219
Hodges *v.* Green	687
——— *v.* Hodges	74
——— *v.* The State	414
——— *v.* Windham	51, 56
Hodgkinson *v.* Marsden	289
Hodgson *v.* Anderson	518
Hodgskin *v.* Queensborough	243
Hodsden *v.* Lloyd	684
——— *v.* Harridge	36
Hodsdon *v.* Wilkins	115
Hodsall *v.* Stallbrass	263 *b*
Hoffman *v.* Ptti	316
——— *v.* Savage	665
Hoffnagle *v.* Leavitt	11 *b*
Holbrook *v.* Brown	379
Holder *v.* Coates	617
Holding *v.* Liverpool Gas Co.	267
Holford *v.* Wilson	195
——— *v.* Hatch	239
Holker *v.* Parker	141
Holland *v.* Holland	45
——— *v.* Makepeace	200
——— *v.* Bird	226
Holliday *v.* Camsell	646
Hollis *v.* Pond	296
—— *v.* Smith	338
Hollister *v.* Newlen	215
Hollingsworth *v.* Brodrick	400
Holloway *v.* Abell	571, 573, 578
——— *v.* Turner	268
Hollowell & Augusta Bank *v.* Howard	601
Holman *v.* Borough	13
——— *v.* Walden	21
Holmes *v.* Clifton	593
——— *v.* D'Camp	127, 128, 520
——— *v.* Kerrison	435
——— *v.* Seeley	658
——— *v.* Wilson	622
Holton *v.* Button	330
Holyday *v.* Oxenbridge	99
Holyoke *v.* Haskins	317
Homer *v.* Dorr	249
——— *v.* Fish	448
Hooe *v.* Oxley	66
Hooper *v.* Williams	160
Hopcroft *v.* Keys	565
Hope *v.* Harman	297
Hopewell *v.* Amwell	296
Hopkins *v.* Liswell	190
——— *v.* Richardson	124
——— *v.* Smith	483
——— *v.* Young	236
Hopley *v.* Dufresne	195
Hore *v.* Whitmore	383
Horn *v.* Noel	463
Hornketh *v.* Barr	573, 576
Horsefall *v.* Testar	300
Hotchkiss *v.* Le Roy	139
——— *v.* Lathorp	275
——— *v.* McVicker	640
——— *v.* Oliphant	275
Hotham *v.* East India Co.	404
Household *v.* Neilson	501 *a*
Houstman *v.* Thornton	386
Howard *v.* Howard	330
——— *v.* Newton	86
——— *v.* Miner	609, 610, 611
——— *v.* Witham	136
Howe *v.* Perry	275
Howell *v.* King	471
——— *v.* Richards	300, 404
——— *v.* Young	433
Howes *v.* Martin	113
Howland *v.* Coffin	521
Huband *v.* Grattan	259
Huble *v.* Clark	688 *a*
Hubbard *v.* Chenango Bank	604
——— *v.* Cummings	367
——— *v.* Norton	242
Hubbell *v.* Rochester	614
Hubbly *v.* Brown	204
Huckle *v.* Money	253

	Section
Hucks *v.* Thornton	390
Hudson *v.* Johnson	141, 518
——— *v.* Robinson	24
——— *v.* Swift	124
Hughes *v.* Hollingsworth	141
——— *v.* Large	171
——— *v.* Parks	296
——— *v.* Thomas	431
Hulle *v.* Heightman	103, 104
Hume *v.* Oldacre	229, 624
——— *v.* Peploe	607
Humes *v.* McFarlane	686
Humphrey *v.* Moxon	203
Humphreys *v.* Jones	440
Hunt *v.* Chambers	563
——— *v.* Hunt	554
——— *v.* Haskell	649
——— *v.* Jones	420
——— *v.* Silk	124
——— *v.* Stevens	338
——— *v.* Spaulding	431
Hunter *v.* Agnew	367
——— *v.* Britts	333, 335
——— *v.* Cochran	331
——— *v.* French	452
——— *v.* King	288, 590
Huntley *v.* Bulwer	143
Huntington *v.* Brinkerhoff	432
——— *v.* Rumnill	146
Hurd *v.* Darling	646
——— *v.* Fletcher	243
Hurst *v.* Parker	431, 446
——— *v.* Rodney	240
Huscombe *v.* Standing	302
Huse *v.* Alexander	519
Hutchins *v.* Adams	106, 260
Hutchinson *v.* Stiles	357
Huxham *v.* Smith	605
Hyde *v.* Trent & Mersey Nav.	219
——— *v.* Louis. State Ins. Co.	392
——— *v.* Stone	647
Hylton *v.* Brown	337

I.

Ilot *v.* Wilkes	473
Ilott *v.* Genge	676
Ilsley *v.* Jewett	520
——— *v.* Stubbs	561
Imason *v.* Cope	98
Incledon *v.* Berry	454, 455
Ingalls *v.* Dennett	113
——— *v.* Bills	222
Ingersoll *v.* Jackson	244
Inglis *v.* Haigh	447
Ingram *v.* Lawson	268, *b.* 420
——— *v.* Wyats	675
Ingraham *v.* Martin	561
Innis *v.* Crawford	217
Ireland *v.* Johnson	208, 209, 228
——— *v.* Coulter	354
——— *v.* Higgins	620
Ireson *v.* Pearman	144, 149
Irish *v.* Smith	680, 689
——— *v.* Cloyes	635 *a*
Irvine *v.* Haulin	37
Irving *v.* Wilson	121
——— *v.* Manning	392
Irwin *v.* Dearman	88, 573, 579
Isherwood *v.* Whitmore	611 *a*
Israel *v.* Argent	363
——— *v.* Benjamin	159
——— *v.* Clark	221
——— *v.* Rodon	684
Isteed *v.* Stonely	240
Ives *v.* Van Epps	136
Ivey *v.* Young	11 *e*
Izett *v.* Mountain	220

J.

Jack *v.* Martin	564
Jackaud *v.* French	480
Jacks *v.* Henderson	684
Jackson *v.* Ambler	78
——— *v.* Anderson	642
——— *v.* Ayres	305
——— *v.* Bartlett	141, 518
——— *v.* Betts	680, 681, 694
——— *v.* Bodle	297
——— *v.* Blanshan	679
——— *v.* Bradt	317
——— *v.* Brownson	656
——— *v.* Bull	457
——— *v.* Burleigh	453
——— *v.* Bush	305
——— *v.* Carpenter	367
——— *v.* Chase	329
——— *v.* Christman	310, 677
——— *v.* Combs	334
——— *v.* Cooley	306
——— *v.* Creal	305
——— *v.* Cuerden	305, 325
——— *v.* Davis	305
——— *v.* Deyo	325
——— *v.* De Waltz	305
——— *v.* Fuller	329
——— *v.* Graham	305
——— *v.* Green	329
——— *v.* Harrington	331
——— *v.* Harsen	305
——— *v.* Hinman	305
——— *v.* Langhead	329
——— *v.* Larroway	310

	Section
Jackson *v.* Legrange	672, 694
——— *v.* Loomis	337
——— *v.* Marsh	244
——— *v.* McLeod	325
——— *v.* Norris	305
——— *v.* Parkhurst	325, 331
——— *v.* Perkins	300
——— *v.* Randall	333
——— *v.* Reynolds	305
——— *v.* Richards	195
——— *v.* Rosenvelt	356
——— *v.* Rowan	325
——— *v.* Sample	317, 325
——— *v.* Scissam	305
——— *v.* Shillito	659
——— *v.* Sidney	317
——— *v.* Sisson	331
——— *v.* Stackhouse	329, 330
——— *v.* Stewart	305
——— *v.* Stiles	205
——— *v.* Thompson	672, 679
——— *v.* Van Dusen	674, 677
——— *v.* Vandyke	694
——— *v.* Vickory	694
——— *v.* Vosburg	305, 308
——— *v.* Walker	305
——— *v.* Warwick	136
——— *v.* Wheeler	325
——— *v.* Whitford	305
——— *v.* Wilsey	325
——— *v.* Winne	460
Jacob *v.* Hungate	172
Jacobs *v.* Humphrey	583
Jacoby *v.* Laussatt	265, 644
Jaffray *v.* Frebain	133
James *v.* Biddington	40, 55
——— *v.* Browne	39
——— *v.* Campbell	85
——— *v.* Cohen	683
——— *v.* David	31
——— *v.* Hackley	352
——— *v.* Marvin	683
——— *v.* Phelps	455
Jansen *v.* Ostrander	280
Janson *v.* Brown	630
Jarvis *v.* Dean	539, 660
Jayne *v.* Price	311
Jefferson *v.* Jefferson	656
Jeffrey *v.* Bastard	586
Jeffreys *v.* Gurr	114
Jenks *v.* Coleman	222 *a*
——— *v.* Phelps	431
Jenkins *v.* Hopkins	33, 242
——— *v.* Phillips	11 *d*
——— *v.* Plume	347
——— *v.* Pritchard	309
——— *v.* Tucker	108, 114
Jenner *v.* Joliffe	642
Jennings *v.* Camp	103, 104
——— *v.* Major	605
——— *v.* Rundall	368
Jerritt *v.* Weare	430
Jervis *v.* Sydney	582
Jesser *v.* Gifford	469
Jeune *v.* Ward	362, 363
Jevens *v.* Harridge	239
Jew *v.* Wood	306
Jewell *v.* Schroeppel	104
Jewett *v.* Davis	27
John *v.* Currie	11 *e*
Johns *v.* Arthur	601
——— *v.* Dodsworth	277
——— *v.* Stevens	539
Johnson *v.* Alston	142
——— *v.* Browning	450, 457
——— *v.* Courts	271
——— *v.* Farwell	431
——— *v.* Hudson	415
——— *v.* Johnson	153, 520, 676
——— *v.* Jones	566
——— *v.* Kennison	205
——— *v.* Lawson	462
——— *v.* Lewis	599
——— *v.* Mason	63, 158, 565
——— *v.* Peck	230 *a*
——— *v.* Spiller	108
——— *v.* Sumner	265, 649
——— *v.* Thoroughgood	568
——— *v.* Smith	284, 431
——— *v.* Ward	66, 380
——— *v.* Weed	519, 523
——— *v.* Weedman	253
——— *v.* Wollyer	562
Johnston *v.* Brannan	28
——— *v.* Columbian Ins. Co.	394
——— *v.* Johnston	684
Johnstone *v.* Sutton	453, 454
Jones *v.* Brinley	112, 118
—— *v.* Brown	88
—— *v.* Brooke	203
—— *v.* Boyce	221
—— *v.* Conoway	448
—— *v.* Clayton	592
—— *v.* Darch	166
—— *v.* Edwards	191
—— *v.* Fales	188
—— *v.* Fort	644
—— *v.* Givin	449, 452
—— *v.* Green	259
—— *v.* Hart	645
—— *v.* Hoar	108, 120
—— *v.* Hunter	485
—— *v.* Hill	655
—— *v.* Kennedy	520

	Section
Jones *v.* Kitchen	95
—— *v.* Mars	158
—— *v.* Marsh	324
—— *v.* Morgan	159, 160
—— *v.* Moore	342, 440
—— *v.* Nichols	449
—— *v.* Perchard	580
—— *v.* Pitcher	219
—— *v.* Ryde	522
—— *v.* Savage	196
—— *v.* Stevens	138, 412, 417
—— *v.* Thompson	55, 56
—— *v.* Turnour	165
—— *v.* Voorhees	215
—— *v.* Wood	582
—— *v.* Wylie	82
—— *v.* Yates	480
Jordain *v.* Wilson	240
Jordan *v.* Wilkins	36, 37
Jory *v.* Orchard	322
Judah *v.* Kemp	645
Judd *v.* Fox	560
Judson *v.* Lake	672
Juxon *v.* Thornhill	75

K.

Kaley *v.* Shed	272, 276
Kane *v.* Sanger	240, 293
Kannon *v.* McMullen	142
Kavanagh *v.* Gudge	627
Kay *v.* Duchesse de Pienne	130
—— *v.* Marshall	493
Kaye *v.* Waghorne	28
Kean *v.* McLaughlin	418
Kearney *v.* King	13, 15
Kearslake *v.* Morgan	30
Keay *v.* Goodwin	615
Keck's case	104
Keeble *v.* Hickringill	254, 622
Keech *v.* Hall	329
Keen *v.* Baltshore	81, 126
Keene *v.* Thompson	124
Keep *v.* Goodrich	72
Keigwin *v.* Keigwin	676
Kell *v.* Nainby	139
Kelley *v.* Johnson	78
Kellogg *v.* Gilbert	141, 518
——— *v.* Ingersoll	242
——— *v.* Robinson	240
Kellow *v.* Rowden	359, 360
Kelly *v.* Dutch Church of Schenectady	244
Kemble *v.* Farren	257, 258
——— *v.* Mills	195 *a*
Kemp *v.* Burt	144
——— *v.* Tinden	114
Kempland *v.* Macauley	584, 593
Kennard *v.* Burton	267
Kenebel *v.* Scrafton	684
Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Call	555, 557, 619
——————— *v.* Laboree	430, 457
——————— *v.* Springer	430, 555, 557
Kennedy *v.* Motte	202
——— *v.* Strong	648
——— *v.* Whitwell	261
Kenny *v.* Clarkson	379
Kenrick *v.* Kenrick	44
Kensington *v.* Inglis	389
Kent *v.* Waite	659 *a*
Keplinger *v.* Griffith	159
Kerby *v.* Denby	270
Kerr *v.* Osborne	119
—— *v.* Shaw	243
—— *v.* Willan	216
Kershaw *v.* Bailey	421
Kester *v.* Stokes	11 *b*
Keyes *v.* Powell	238
Keyworth *v.* Hill	642, 647
Kimpton *v.* Walker	240
Kincaid *v.* Howe	11 *a*
Kinder *v.* Shaw	644
King *v.* Baker	570
—— *v.* Barns	556
—— *v.* Bridges	594
—— *v.* Milsom	163
—— *v.* Phippard	96, 633
—— *v.* Sears	114
—— *v.* Waring	419, 421
King of France *v.* Morris	37
Kingman *v.* Hotaling	155
——— *v.* Pierce	65, 67
Kingsford *v.* Marshall	391
Kingsley *v.* Bill	75
Kingston *v.* Grey	348
——— *v.* Phelps	72, 81
Kinlyside *v.* Thornton	655, 656
Kinnaird, Ld. *v.* Saltoun	298
Kinsey *v.* Heyward	432
Kirby *v.* D. Marlborough	534
—— *v.* Sisson	156
Kirk *v.* Glover	141
Kirke *v.* Kirke	681
Kirkman *v.* Hargreaves	642
Kirton *v.* Braithwaite	606
Kist *v.* Atkinson	136
Kleine *v.* Catara	78
Kline *v.* Husted	648
Knapp *v.* Lee	136
——— *v.* Maltby	259
——— *v.* Salsbury	625
Knight *v.* Benett	565

	Section
Knight *v.* Hughes	113, 114
Knobell *v.* Fuller	425
Knott *v.* Diggess	225
——— *v.* Farren	443
Knowles *v.* Michel	126, 127
Knowlton *v.* Bartlett	580
Knox *v.* Jenks	23
——— *v.* Kellock	554, 556
Kortz *v.* Carpenter	243
Koster *v.* Innes	382
——— *v.* Jones	386
——— *v.* Reed	386
Kraus *v.* Arnold	602
Kuhen *v.* North	253
Kupfer *v.* Augusta	66
Kyle *v.* Gray	642

L.

Lacey *v.* Forrester	173
Lackwood *v.* Sturdevant	241
Laclough *v.* Towle	648
Lade *v.* Shepherd	660
Laidlaw *v.* Organ	397
Laing *v.* Meader	605
Lake *v.* Billers	597, 629
Lamb *v.* Burnett	95
——— *v.* Durant	378
——— *v.* Lathrop	610
Lamb *v.* Mills	567
Lambert *v.* Atkins	246
——— *v.* Pack	166
——— *v.* Sandford	141
Lamb's case	415, 416
Lamine *v.* Dorrell	265
Lanauze *v.* Palmer	192
Lane *v.* Applegate	29, 421
——— *v.* Cotton	68
——— *v.* Ironmonger	64 *a*
——— *v.* Reynard	303, 331
Langdon *v.* Potter 141, 338,	518, 555
Lamphier *v.* Phipos	144
Lapham *v.* Barnes	113
La Place *v.* Aupoix	642
Larned *v.* Buffington	275, 425
Larue *v.* Slack	317
Latham *v.* Rutley	209
Lathrop *v.* Cook	561
Latkow *v.* Eamer	594
Laugher *v.* Brefitt	265
Laughton *v.* Atkins	672, 681, 692
Law *v.* Harwood	433
Lawrence *v.* Obee	473
——— *v.* Ocean Ins. Co.	394
——— *v.* Pond	316
——— *v.* Potts	142
——— *v.* Ralston	190
Lawson *v.* Lovejoy	367
——— *v.* Morrison	683
——— *v.* Sherwood	186
Lawton *v.* Sweeney	129 *a*, 255
Lavender *v.* Adams	681
Leader *v.* Barry	130, 362, 461
——— *v.* Moxon	431
Leadbetter *v.* Fitzgerald	618 *a*
Leame *v.* Bray	84
Leatherdale *v.* Sweepstone	602
Lebanon *v.* Olcott	473
Le Cheminant *v.* Pearson	402
Ledgard *v.* Thompson	295
Ledwith *v.* Catchpole	99
Lee *v.* Cooke	332
—— *v.* Gray	382
—— *v.* Muggeridge	114
—— *v.* Shore	117
—— *v.* Wolsey	93, 267
Leech *v.* Baldwin	220
Leery *v.* Goodson	118
Leeson *v.* Holt	216
Leffingwell *v.* White	195
Legg *v.* Benion	321
Legge *v.* Thorpe	195, 205
Legh *v.* Hewitt	105
——— *v.* Lewis	259
Leigh *v.* Shepherd	567
Leighton *v.* Wales	259
Leland *v.* Stone	259
Lemayne *v.* Stanley	674
Lempriere *v.* Humphrey	626
Lenox *v.* Leverett	183
——— *v.* United Ins. Co.	394
Lent *v.* Padelford	66
Leonard *v.* Gary	196
——— *v.* Leonard	371
——— *v.* Tidd	644
Le Sage *v.* Coussman	524
Lesly *v.* Nones	528
Lesher *v.* Levan	295, 296
Leslie *v.* Rounds	232 *a*
Lethbridge *v.* Winter	625
Leveck *v.* Shaftoe	478
Le Veux *v.* Berkeley	437
Levi *v.* Essex	204
——— *v.* Waterhouse	218
Levy *v.* Peters	190
——— *v.* Wilson	158
Lewis *v.* Alcock	584
——— *v.* Cosgrave	199
——— *v.* Crockett	236
——— *v.* Davis	488
——— *v.* Farrell	452
——— *v.* Gamage	141, 518
——— *v.* Hoover	87
——— *v.* Jones	30, 526

	Section
Lewis *v.* Lewis	672
——— *v.* Maris	694
——— *v.* Marling	501
——— *v.* Peake	262
——— *v.* Peytarin	156
——— *v.* Ponsford	618
——— *v.* Price	471
——— *v.* Rucker	381
——— *v.* Thatcher	249
Leyfield's case	300
Liardet *v.* Johnson	490
Lide *v.* Lide	688
Lienow *v.* Ritchie	616
Liford's case	619
Liggins *v.* Inge	475
Lightbody *v.* The Ontario Bank	522
Lightly *v.* Clouston	108
Lillie *v.* Lillie	681
Lilly *v.* Corne	287
Limbery *v.* Mason	681
Lincoln & Kennebeck Bank *v.* Page	190
Lincoln *v.* Saratoga Railr. Co.	268 *b*
Lindenberger *v.* Beall	191
Lindo *v.* Belisario	463
Lindon *v.* Hooper	120, 265
Lindus *v.* Bradwell	161
Linginfetter *v.* Linginfetter	683
Linningdale *v.* Livingston	104
Linsley *v.* Bushnell	253
Lion *v.* Burtis	353
Liscom *v.* Boston Mut. Ins. Co.	407
Little *v.* Blunt	437, 439, 441
——— *v.* Libby	430, 557
——— *v.* Megguier	430, 557
——— *v.* Palister	616
——— *v.* Phœnix Bank	195 *a*
Littledale *v.* Dixon	397
——— *v.* Ld. Lonsdale	232 *a*
Littlefield *v.* Shee	114
Littler *v.* Holland	235
Livingston *v.* Delafield	398
——— *v.* Rogers	72
——— *v.* The Maryland Ins. Co.	252
Lloyd *v.* Archbowle	478
——— *v.* Jewell	136
——— *v.* Maund	442
——— *v.* Wigney	434
Loader *v.* Kemp	245 *a*
Lobdell *v.* Hopkins	609
Locke *v.* N. Amer. Ins. Co.	379
Locksmith *v.* Creswell	641
Lockyer *v.* Offley	390
Loeschman *v.* Machin	640
Logan *v.* Austin	85
——— *v.* Houlditch	644
Logan *v.* Murray	575, 576
Loker *v.* Damon	256, 261
Lomax *v.* Lomax	451
Londonderry *v.* Chester	460
Lone *v.* Chifney	172
Long *v.* Baillie	156
——— *v.* Billings	586
——— *v.* Hebb	641
——— *v.* Ramsey	295, 296
Longchamp *v.* Fish	678
——— *v.* Kenney	118
Longdill *v.* Jones	587, 588
Longford *v.* Eyre	678, 694
Lonsdale *v.* Church	263
Lord *v.* Baldwin	478
——— *v.* Chadbourne	196
——— *v.* Dall	409
——— *v.* Ferrand	516
Lord Galway *v.* Matthew	485
——— Kinnaird *v.* Lady Saltoun	298
——— Peter *v.* Heneage	642
——— Suffield *v.* Bruce	107
Loring *v.* Bacon	466, 473
——— *v.* Cook	605
——— *v.* Gurney	251
——— *v.* Neptune Ins. Co.	393
Losee *v.* Dunkin	199
Lotan *v.* Cross	610
Lougher *v.* Williams	240
Love *v.* Hall	142
Loveden *v.* Loveden	40, 41, 44
Lovejoy *v.* Whipple	199
Lovelace *v.* Reignnolds	544
——— *v.* Reynolds	568
Lovell *v.* Martin	642
Lovering *v.* Lovering	51
——— *v.* Mercantile Ins. Co.	394
Lovett *v.* Bispham	454
Lowe's case	22
Lowber *v.* Shaw	203
Lowden *v.* Goodrick	89, 91, 278
Lowe *v.* Govett	632
——— *v.* Joliffe	694
——— *v.* Miller	646
——— *v.* Peers	259
Lowell *v.* Lewis	489, 494
Lowfield *v.* Bancroft	277
Lowndes *v.* Anderson	118
Lowrey *v.* Murrell	522
Lowry *v.* Russell	251
Loxley *v.* Jackson	681
Loyd *v.* Finlayson	338, 339
Lubbock *v.* Tribe	114
Lucas *v.* De la Cour	478
——— *v.* Novosilieski	528
——— *v.* Wasson	646
——— *v.* Worswick	123

	Section
Ludden *v.* Leavitt	561, 637
Lukin *v.* Godsall	474
Lundie *v.* Robertson	107
Lutterell's case	544
Lyle *v.* Clason	414
Lynch *v.* Commonwealth	145
——— *v.* Hamilton	396
Lynn *v.* Bruce	31
Lyon *v.* Annable	120
Lysaght *v.* Walker	533

M.

Macdonald *v.* Macdonald	448
Macdougall *v.* Robertson	79
Mace *v.* Cadell	130
Macferson *v.* Thoytes	165
Machell *v.* Ellis	642
——— *v.* Kinnear	478
——— *v.* Temple	678
Machu *v.* Lond. & S. W. Railr. Co.	232 *a*
Macklin *v.* Waterhouse	216
Maclean *v.* Dunn	59, 61
Macleod *v.* Wakley	418
Macomb *v.* Wilber	78
Macomber *v.* Parker	251
Maddox *v.* Miller	365
Magne *v.* Seymour	592
Magrath *v.* Browne	577
Mainwaring *v.* Mytton	205
——— *v.* Newman	478
Maitland *v.* Goldney	424
Major *v.* Pulliam	253
——— *v.* Williams	683
Mallory *v.* Aspinwall	297
Mandeville *v.* Wilson	445, 447
Maneely *v.* M'Gee	520
Mann *v.* Barrett	88, 573
——— *v.* Lang	347
——— *v.* Lovejoy	565
——— *v.* Marsh	529
——— *v.* Stephens	240
Manning *v.* Lunn	605
——— *v.* The Duke of Argyle	516
——— *v.* Westerne	530
Manson *v.* Felton	441
Mantz *v.* Collins	583
Manvell *v.* Thompson	88, 573
Mapes *v.* Weeks	275
Marchington *v.* Vernon	109
Marin *v.* Ingersoll	190
——— *v.* Palmer	183
Mariott *v.* Hampton	121
Markham *v.* Fawcett	253
Markland *v.* Crump	240
Markle *v.* Hatfield	124, 522, 523
Marlow *v.* Pitfield	365
Marr *v.* Boothby	619
Maryatts *v.* White	529, 530, 534
Marsden *v.* Goode	605
——— *v.* Reid	382, 396
Marsh *v.* Bancroft	586
——— *v.* Blythe	219
——— *v.* Bulteel	79
——— *v.* Gold	585, 594
——— *v.* Horne	218
——— *v.* Houlditch	532
——— *v.* Ward	25
——— *v.* Wood	79
Marshall's case	688
Marshall *v.* Nagel	141
——— *v.* Parker	388
Marshfield *v.* Marsh	338
Marsteller *v.* McClean	438
Marston *v.* Hobbs	240, 241
——— *v.* Roe	684
Martin *v.* Bell	582
——— *v.* Dortch	296
——— *v.* Fishing Ins. Co.	394, 401
——— *v.* Gillam	655
——— *v.* Goble	471
——— *v.* Long	264
——— *v.* Payne	88, 573, 576
——— *v.* Strachan	303
——— *v.* Thornton	74, 78
——— *v.* Winslow	179
Martins *v.* Gardiner	681
Martyn *v.* Blithman	115
——— *v.* Podger	597, 629
Maryon *v.* Carter	235
Marzetti *v.* Williams	146, 584
Mason *v.* Waite	118
Massey *v.* Goyner	473
Masters *v.* Pollie	617
Mather *v.* Clark	363
——— *v.* Green	433
Mathers *v.* Pearson	111
Matson *v.* Buck	275
——— *v.* Magrath	684
——— *v.* Trower	73
Matthews *v.* Medneger	649
——— *v.* Phillips	432
——— *v.* Terry	93, 97
——— *v.* W. Lond. Waterw. Co.	232 *a*
Matthie *v.* Potts	388
Matts *v.* Hawkins	617
Maunder *v.* Venn	88, 572
Maus *v.* Maus	11 *a*
Mawman *v.* Gillett	478
Max *v.* Roberts	209, 228
Maxwell *v.* Jameson	113
May *v.* Brown	275

	Section
Milford *v.* Worcester	460, 464
Milgate *v.* Kebble	640
Miller *v.* Adams	433
—— *v.* Adsit	561
—— *v.* Baker	621
—— *v.* Carothers	694
—— *v.* Delamater	166
—— *v.* Hackley	196
—— *v.* Halsey	244
—— *v.* Lancaster	442
—— *v.* M'Brier	305
—— *v.* M'Clenachan	485
—— *v.* Miller	108, 120, 414, 690
—— *v.* Race	122
—— *v.* Smith	136
—— *v.* The Mariner's Church	261
—— *v.* Webb	156
Milligan *v.* Wedge	232 *a*
Millikin *v.* Brown	519
Millne *v.* Wood	595
Mills *v.* Bank of the United States	16, 186, 189
—— *v.* Fowkes	532, 535
—— *v.* Gore	297
—— *v.* Spencer	424
Milman *v.* Dolwell	625
Milne *v.* Gratrix	79
Milnes *v.* Branch	240
—— *v.* Duncan	123
Miner *v.* Clark	241
Minet *v.* Gibson	14, 166
Minnett *v.* Whitney	484
Minor *v.* Mechanic's Bank	133
Minter *v.* Hart	492
—— *v.* Mower	489, 494
—— *v.* Wells	492
Minton *v.* Woodworth	280
Mires *v.* Solebay	642, 644
Mitchell *v.* Dall	534
—— *v.* Gibbes	290
—— *v.* Jenkins	453
—— *v.* King	605
—— *v.* Kingman	135, 370
—— *v.* Lunt	343, 345
—— *v.* Stavely	78
—— *v.* Warner	242, 244, 557
—— *v.* Williams	644
Moffat *v.* Van Millingen	478
Moffatt *v.* Parsons	606
Moilliet *v.* Powell	11 *d*
Moir *v.* Royal Ex. Ass. Co.	383
Moises *v.* Thornton	412
Moller *v.* Lambart	478
Monckton *v.* Pashley	229
Monk *v.* Noyes	245 *a*
Monprivatt *v.* Smith	273, 631
Montriou *v.* Jeffreys	143
Monumoi *v.* Rogers	625
Moodey *v.* Pender	457
Moodie *v.* Reid	675
Moody *v.* Stracey	11 *a*
Moon *v.* Andrews	351
—— *v.* Raphael	649
Moor *v.* Cornville	660
—— *v.* Hill	127
Moore *v.* Adam	89
—— *v.* Eddowes	123
—— *v.* Moore	112, 618, 683
—— *v.* Rawson	476
—— *v.* Robinson	226
—— *v.* Sheridine	209
—— *v.* Taylor	634
—— *v.* Terrell	427
—— *v.* Wilson	36, 209, 212
Moores *v.* Wait	640
Moorsum *v.* Moorsum	51
Moran *v.* Dawes	229, 571, 573
Moravia *v.* Levy	127
Moreland *v.* Bennett	290
Moreton *v.* Hardern	226
Morgan *v.* Banta	539
—— *v.* Brydges	582
—— *v.* Edwards	300
—— *v.* Hughes	452
—— *v.* Mather	78
—— *v.* Palmer	121
—— *v.* Richardson	136
—— *v.* Seaward	490, 493, 494
Moriarty *v.* Brooks	83
Morland *v.* Pellatt	587
Morris *v.* Corson	454
—— *v.* Davies	150
—— *v.* Edgington	545
—— *v.* Hauser	191
—— *v.* Miller	49, 461
—— *v.* Ross	78
Morrison *v.* Berkey	113, 118
Morse *v.* Aldrich	240
—— *v.* James	105
Mortara *v.* Hall	366
Mortimer *v.* Mortimer	45
Morton *v.* Shoppee	82
—— *v.* Webb	26
Moseley *v.* Reade	126
Moses *v.* Macferben	117
—— *v.* Norris	591
Mossop *v.* Eadon	156
Mostyn *v.* Fabrigas	86
Mott *v.* Kip	583
Mountford *v.* Gibson	345, 649
Mountstephen *v.* Brooke	440, 441
Mowry *v.* Todd	112
Mucklow *v.* Mangles	638
Muldrow *v.* McCleland	238, 241

Section

Mulgrave *v.* Ogden 642
Mulheran *v.* Gillespie 524
Mullet *v.* Hook 25
——— *v.* Hulton 274, 424, 425
Mumford *v.* McKay 647
Munn *v.* Baker 217
Munns *v.* Dupont 295, 454
Munroe *v.* Allaire 75
——— *v.* Cooper 172
Munson *v.* N. E. Ins. Co. 394
Munt *v.* Stokes 341
Murgatroyd *v.* Murgatroyd 579
Murphy *v.* Staton 219
Murray *v.* Baker 437
——— *v.* Burling 641
——— *v.* Carrett 156
——— *v.* E. I. Co. 435
——— *v.* Long 453, 454
——— *v.* Somerville 25
Musgrave *v.* Drake 159, 172
Muskett *v.* Hill 226
Musselbrook *v.* Duncan 75

N.

Nagle *v.* Baylor 300
Naish *v.* Tatlock 114
Naylor *v.* Naylor 52
——— *v.* Semmes 251
Neal *v.* Erving 66
—— *v.* Sheffield 28
Neale *v.* Ledger 73
Neave *v.* Moss 305
Needham *v.* Dowling 421
Neel *v.* Deans 124
Neil *v.* Neil 678
Neill *v.* Morley 369
Neilson *v.* Harford 489, 490
Nelson *v.* Salvador 383
——— *v.* Whittall 158
Nelthorpe *v.* Dorrington 649
Nesbit *v.* Nesbit 240
Nettleton *v.* Sikes 627
Newberry *v.* James 490
Newbold *v.* Lamb 296
——— *v.* Sims 39
——— *v.* Wright 249
Newborn *v.* Just 218
Newburyport *v.* Boothbay 462
——— Ins. Co. *v.* Oliver 393
Newby *v.* Read 386
Newcastle Ins. Co. *v.* Macmorran 406
New-England Bank *v.* Lewis 193
Newhall *v.* Wheeler 23, 555
New Haven County Bank *v.* Mitchell 193, 295

Section

New Haven Steamboat Co. *v.* Vanderbilt 267
Newland *v.* Douglas 78
Newman *v.* Newman 291
Newmarch *v.* Clay 529
Newnham *v.* Tetherington 483
Newport *v.* Hardy 135
Newsam *v.* Carr 458
Newsom *v.* Thornton 380
Newsome *v.* Graham 120
Newton *v.* Clarke 678
——— *v.* Galbraith 602
——— *v.* Harland 622
——— *v.* Rowe 425
——— *v.* Wilson 621
New York State Bank *v.* Fletcher 519
Niagara Bank *v.* Rosevelt 529, 531
Niblo *v.* N. Am. Ins. Co. 407
Nichole *v.* Allan 108
Nichols *v.* Luce 657, 658
Nicholson *v.* Coghill 453, 455
——— *v.* Croft 260, 377
——— *v.* Gouthit 195
Nickleson *v.* Stryker 88, 573, 576
Nicoll *v.* Glennie 644
Nicolls *v.* Bastard 640
Nightingal *v.* Devisme 112, 118
Nightingale *v.* Withington 166
Niles *v.* Sawtel 240
Nixon *v.* Jenkins 644
Noble *v.* Adams 638
——— *v.* Bates 259
——— *v.* Kennoway 250, 251
Noell *v.* Wells 339
Noke *v.* Awder 240
—— *v.* Ingham 133
Norbury *v.* Meade 665
Norcross *v.* Widgery 430, 557
Norfolk, ex parte 25
Norman *v.* Wells 240
Norris *v.* Smith 331
North Bank *v.* Abbott 197
——— *v.* Miles 583
——— *v.* North 53
Northrop *v.* Wright 557
Norton *v.* Babcock 244
——— *v.* Lewis 195, 197
——— *v.* Marden 123
——— *v.* Savage 73
——— *v.* Seymour 159, 161
——— *v.* Warner 55
Norwood *v.* Manning 530
Nowell *v.* Roake 336, 456
——— *v.* Sands 625
Noyes *v.* Dyer 556
Nye *v.* Smith 599

O.

	Section
Oakapple *v.* Copons	321
Oakes *v.* Brydon	318
——— *v.* Marcy	307
——— *v.* Wood	95
Odiorne *v.* Colley	637
——— *v.* Maxey	66, 68
Offut *v.* Offut	135
Ogle *v.* Cook	694
Ohl *v.* The Eagle Ins. Co.	378
Okell *v.* Smith	136
Olcott *v.* Rathbone	112, 520
Oldham *v.* Peake	417
Oldnall *v.* Deakin	679
Olmstead *v.* Beale	136 *a*
Omaly *v.* Swan	524
O'Neall *v.* Farr	682, 688
Onions *v.* Tyrer	680, 681
Onslow *v.* Orchard	277
Oothout *v.* Thompson	446
Orange Co. Bank *v.* Brown	221
Ord *v.* Portal	167, 478
Oridge *v.* Sherbone	186
Orpwood *v.* Barkes	414
Orr *v.* Churchill	258
Orser *v.* Storms	614
Osgood *v.* Breed	672
——— *v.* Spencer	135
O'Shaughnessy *v.* Haydn	275
Oswald *v.* Leigh	290
Otis *v.* Gibbs	265
—— *v.* Jones	635 *a*
Oughton *v.* Seppings	121
Oviatt *v.* Sage	646
Owen *v.* Barrow	65
—— *v.* Burnett	216
—— *v.* Lewyn	642
—— *v.* Owen	45
Owenson *v.* Morse	523
Owings *v.* Hull	66
Oxenham *v.* Clapp	350
Oxford Bank *v.* Haynes	186
Oystead *v.* Shed	621

P.

	Section
Pack *v.* Alexander	193
Packer *v.* Gillies	638
Padget *v.* Priest	343
Paddock *v.* Forrester	544
——— *v.* Franklin Ins. Co.	386, 399, 400, 401
——— *v.* Salisbury	424
Padmore *v.* Lawrence	421
Page *v.* Hatchett	471, 642
—— *v.* Mann	158
Page *v.* Wiple	453
Pain *v.* Whittaker	640
Paine *v.* Bacomb	103, 104
——— *v.* Hall	675
Palethorp *v.* Furnish	65
Palmer *v.* Fletcher	471
——— *v.* Manning	158
——— *v.* Stephens	158
Panton *v.* Holland	230, 466
——— *v.* Williams	454
Paradine *v.* Jane	235
Parfit *v.* Thompson	401
Parient *v.* Plumtree	591
Parish *v.* Burwood	285
——— *v.* Stone	136
Park *v.* Bates	264
Parke *v.* Ollat	675
Parker *v.* Atfield	351
——— *v.* Bailey	229, 571
——— *v.* Barker	484
——— *v.* Colcord	26, 431
——— *v.* Downing	518
——— *v.* Elliot	226, 571
——— *v.* Fenn	584, 592
——— *v.* Foot	539 *a*
——— *v.* Gordon	178
——— *v.* Great Western Railw. Co.	121
——— *v.* Hanson	206, 207
——— *v.* Norton	265
——— *v.* Potts	401
——— *v.* United States	113
Parkin *v.* Bainbridge	681
Parkins *v.* Cox	656
Parkman *v.* Osgood	446
Parks *v.* Boston	276
Parminter *v.* Symonds	164
Parmiter *v.* Coupland	411
Parrott *v.* Thacher	251, 252
Parry *v.* Fairhurst	11 *d*
—— *v.* House	305, 565
Parsons *v.* Crosby	478
——— *v.* Hall	78
——— *v.* Hancock	347
——— *v.* Loyd	621
——— *v.* Plaisted	11 *a*
Partington *v.* Butcher	443
Partridge *v.* Beere	329
——— *v.* Coates	285
Pasley *v.* Freeman	230 *a*
Pasmore *v.* Bousfield	24, 131
Patapsco Ins. Co. *v.* Coulter	387
Patience *v.* Townley	195
Patrick *v.* Colerick	627
——— *v.* Woods	11 *a*
Patten *v.* Patten	641
Patterson *v.* Patterson	441, 693

	Section
Pattison *v.* Hull	533
——— *v.* Jones	419, 423
——— *v.* Robinson	638, 644
Patton *v.* State Bank	156
Paull *v.* Simpson	343
Pawson *v.* Watson	396
Payne *v.* Jenkins	126
——— *v.* Rogers	473
Paynter *v.* Williams	114
Payson *v.* Caswell	457
——— *v.* Whitcomb	112
Peabody *v.* Denton	156
Peacock *v.* Harris	129
——— *v.* Peacock	477
——— *v.* Rhodes	163
Pearce *v.* Davis	520
——— *v.* Ornsby	418
——— *v.* Whale	412
Pearcy *v.* Dicker	295
Pearson *v.* Henry	347
——— *v.* Lemaitre	271
——— *v.* Lord	111
——— *v.* McGowran	284, 418
——— *v.* Parker	113
——— *v.* Wightman	295
Pease *v.* Hirst	478
——— *v.* Naylor	351
Peck *v.* McMurtry	238
——— *v.* Sill	11 *a*
Pecke *v.* Ambler	435
Peebles *v.* Reading	331
Peele *v.* Merchants Ins. Co.	392
——— *v.* Suffolk Ins. Co.	392
Peer *v.* Humphrey	638
Peeters *v.* Opie	136 *a*
Pegg *v.* Stead	136
Peirce *v.* Benjamin	635 *a*, 642
Peirse *v.* Bowles	608
Pemberton *v.* Pemberton	682
Pembroke's, Countess of, case	655
Penaro *v.* Flournoy	442
Pendleton *v.* Phelps	438
Pendrel *v.* Pendrel	150
Penfold *v.* Westcot	423
Penley *v.* Watts	245 *a*
Penn *v.* Glover	243
——— *v.* Ward	95
Penniman *v.* Tucker	382
Penny *v.* Porter	209
Penruddock's case	472
Penson *v.* Lee	382
People, The *v.* Cunningham	466
——— *v.* Dunning	580
——— *v.* Howell	520
——— *v.* Humphrey	461, 461
——— *v.* Niagara	136, 562
Pepper *v.* Burland	104
Peppin *v.* Shakespear	631
——— *v.* Solomons	383
Percival *v.* Blake	124
Perkins *v.* Hart	128
——— *v.* Lyman	258
——— *v.* Perkins	53, 431
——— *v.* Pitts	330
——— *v.* Savage	111, 121
——— *v.* Smith	645
——— *v.* The Franklin Bank	249
——— *v.* Washington Ins Co.	62
——— *v.* Wing	75
Perley *v.* Chandler	616
——— *v.* Foster	594
——— *v.* Little	440
Pernam *v.* Weed	658
Perrins *v.* Hill	139
Perris *v.* Roberts	536
Perry *v.* Dover	121
——— *v.* Jackson	438
——— *v.* Roberts	529
——— *v.* Slade	126
——— *v.* Turner	518
——— *v.* Watts	11 *e*
Peter, Ld. *v.* Heneage	642
Peters *v.* Anderson	530
——— *v.* Ballistier	66
——— *v.* Craig	79
——— *v.* Fleming	365
——— *v.* Foss	430
——— *v.* Warren Ins. Co.	387
Peterson *v.* Loring	74
Petit *v.* Addington	88, 89
Peto *v.* Hague	65
Petrie *v.* Lamont	621
Pettibone *v.* Derringer	489
Pettigrew *v.* Pringle	383
Pettison *v.* Hull	529
Pettit *v.* Addington	278
Peyton *v.* Mayor, &c. of London	473
Pfiel *v.* Vanbatenburg	155, 169, 170, 527
Phelps *v.* Hartwell	690
Phillimore *v.* Barry	639
Phillips *v.* Astling	186
——— *v.* Blake	522
——— *v.* Bridge	145
——— *v.* Covert	615
——— *v.* Earle	220
——— *v.* Hall	621
——— *v.* Howgate	95, 273
——— *v.* Hunter	460
——— *v.* Jansen	414
——— *v.* Naire	392
——— *v.* Phillips	440
——— *v.* Smith	264
——— *v.* Stevens	245 *a*

	Section
Phillips *v.* Warren	170, 527
Phillipson *v.* Mangles	584, 589
Philpot *v.* Bryant	202
——— *v.* Dobbinson	564
——— *v.* Holmes	625
——— *v.* Kelley	642, 644
Phipson *v.* Kneller	195
Phyn *v.* Royal Exch. Ass. Co.	390
Pickard *v.* Bankes	118
Pickering *v.* Rudd	622, 634
Pickett *v.* King	11 *a*
Picquet *v.* Curtis	174
Picton *v.* Jackson	412
Pidge *v.* Tyler	23
Pierce *v.* Benjamin	265, 272, 276, 649
——— *v.* Blake	142
——— *v.* Butler	204
——— *v.* Crafts	112
——— *v.* Drake	523
——— *v.* Fuller	259
——— *v.* Jackson	585, 593, 594
——— *v.* Pendar	188
——— *v.* Pickens	229, 624
——— *v.* Pierce	51
——— *v.* Thompson	449
Piercy, In re	678
Pierre *v.* Fernald	539 *a*
Pierson *v.* Hooker	190
——— *v.* Hutchinson	156
——— *v.* Post	620
Piggott *v.* Eastern Railw. Co.	230
Pigott *v.* Holloway	295
——— *v.* Kemp	95
Pike *v.* Emerson	141
Pilkington *v.* Hastings	569, 607
Pilkington's case	569
Pimm *v.* Grevill	569
Pinchon *v.* Chilcott	126, 127
Pindar *v.* Wadsworth	254
Pinley *v.* Bagnall	139
Pintard *v.* Tackington	156, 520
Pippett *v.* Hearn	449
Pirie *v.* Anderson	378
Pitcher *v.* Bailey	115
——— *v.* Livingston	264
——— *v.* Tovey	239
Pitkin *v.* Frink	104
Pitt *v.* Chappelow	164, 165
— *v.* Donovan	428
— *v.* Smith	300
— *v.* Yalden	144
Pittam *v.* Foster	441
Pitts *v.* Gaince	226
— *v.* Tilden	263
Planche *v.* Fletcher	396
Planck *v.* Anderson	599
Pleasant *v.* Benson	324
Plomer *v.* Long	529, 534
Pluckwell *v.* Wilson	220
Plumer *v.* Merchant	349
Plummer *v.* Dennett	449
——— *v.* Gheen	455
Plunkett *v.* Cobbett	418
——— *v.* Penson	360
Pocock *v.* Billings	200
Poignard *v.* Smith	430, 557
Polglase *v.* Oliver	601
Pollard *v.* Shaaffer	240
Ponsonby *v.* Adams	259
Poole *v.* Huskinson	660
— *v.* Palmer	161
— *v.* Smith	156
— *v.* Symonds	637
Pooley *v.* Millard	156
Poor *v.* Robinson	554
Pope *v.* Biggs	566
— *v.* Davies	284
Popkin *v.* Popkin	53
Popley *v.* Ashley	523
Poplin *v.* Hawke	672
Pordage *v.* Cole	136 *a*
Porter *v.* Cole	297
——— *v.* Cooper	126
——— *v.* Hill	440
——— *v.* Noyes	242
——— *v.* Sayward	265, 589
Porthouse *v.* Parker	164
Portland Bank *v.* Stubbs	642
Postlethwaite *v.* Mounsey	347
——— ——— *v.* Parkes	88, 574
Postmaster Gen. *v.* Furber	533
——— ——— *v.* Ridgway	292
Pothonier *v.* Dawson	645
Pott *v.* Cleg	112
— *v.* Eyton	481
Potter *v.* Lansing	599
— *v.* Taylor	242, 518
— *v.* Tyler	200
— *v.* Webb	672
Potts *v.* Ward	79
Pouverin *v.* Louis. State Ins. Co.	379
Powell *v.* Gudgeon	387
——— *v.* Little	518
——— *v.* Waters	207
Power *v.* Butcher	113
——— *v.* Wells	103
Powers *v.* Russell	297
Powley *v.* Newton	338
——— *v.* Walker	105, 251
Pownall *v.* Ferrand	44
Poynton *v.* Forster	452
Pratt *v.* Ayler	272
— *v.* McCullough	674

	Section
Pratt *v.* Putnam	66, 141
—— *v.* Swaine	435
—— *v.* Thomas	106, 260
Pray *v.* Pierce	556
—— *v.* Waterston	686
Prescott *v.* Finn	65
——— *v.* Hubbell	249
——— *v.* Trueman	241, 242, 244
——— *v.* Wright	635 *a*, 642
Presgrave *v.* Saunders	563
Preston *v.* Boston	111
——— *v.* Christmas	28, 31
Price *v.* Marsh	64
—— *v.* Neale	122
Prideaux *v.* Collier	205
Priest *v.* Cummings	19
Prince *v.* Wilbourn	659
Pringle *v.* Wernham	471
Pritchard *v.* Atkinson	242
——— *v.* Brown	295
——— *v.* Papillion	253
——— *v.* Powell	538
Probart *v.* Knouth	365
Procter *v.* Procter	52
Proctor *v.* Lainson	583
Propr's of Kennebec Purchase *v.* Boulton	277
——————— *v.* Springer	23
Propr's Trent. Nav. *v.* Wood	219
Prossar *v.* Woodward	562
Provost *v.* Calder	233
Puckford *v.* Maxwell	520
Pujolas *v.* Holland	274
Pullen *v.* Hutchinson	11 *b*
Purcell *v.* Macnamara	453, 454
Purdy *v.* Austin	440
Purnel's case	28
Pursell *v.* Horn	84
Purves *v.* Landell	144
Putnam *v.* Mercantile Ins. Co.	379
——— *v.* Putnam	48, 460
——— *v.* Ritchie	549
——— *v.* Wyley	614

Q.

Quarles *v.* Littlepage	342
Quarman *v.* Burnett	232 *a*
Quimby *v.* Buzzell	295

R.

Rackham *v.* Jessup	618
Rains *v.* McNarry	646
Rainwater *v.* Durham	365
Rambler *v.* Tryon	690
Ramchander *v.* Hammond	447
Ramsdell *v.* Soule	112
Ramuz *v.* Crowe	156
Rand *v.* Sargent	621
Randall *v.* Cleaveland	651
——— *v.* Everest	258
——— *v.* Randall	45
——— *v.* Rich	113
——— *v.* Rotch	249
——— *v.* Sweet	365
——— *v.* Van Vechten	62
Randle *v.* Webb	95
Randleson, ex parte	53
——— *v.* Murray	232 *a*
Randolph *v.* Kinney	240
Rapp *v.* Palmer	251
Rapson *v.* Cubitt	232 *a*
Ratcliff *v.* Huntley	272
Ravee *v.* Farmer	74
Ravenga *v.* McIntosh	459
Ravenscroft *v.* Hunter	681
Rawlins, In re	676
Rawlinson *v.* Clarke	481
Rawson *v.* Morse	625
Ray *v.* Law	449
—— *v.* Lines	539 *a*
—— *v.* Walton	675
Raymond *v.* Baar	124, 523
——— *v.* Bearnard	104
——— *v.* Merchant	520
Rayne *v.* Orton	31
Reab *v.* McAlister	136
Read *v.* Bertrand	38
—— *v.* Dunsmore	11 *d*
—— *v.* Goldin	603
Ream *v.* Rank	88, 226, 273
Reay *v.* Packwood	207
—— *v.* White	30
Reddie *v.* Scoolt	578
Redington *v.* Farrar	11 *a*
Redman *v.* Wilson	387
Reece *v.* Rigby	144
——— *v.* Taylor	95
Reed *v.* Batchelder	367
—— *v.* Bias	272
—— *v.* Cutter	492, 507
—— *v.* Davis	89, 269
—— *v.* McGrew	124
—— *v.* Prentiss	136
—— *v.* Taylor	449
—— *v.* Upston	520
Reedy *v.* Seixas	189
Reel *v.* Reel	690
Rees *v.* Marq. of Headfort	172
—— *v.* Waters	76, 78
Reeves *v.* Morris	561
Regina *v.* Cotesworth	84

	Section
Regina *v.* East Mark	662
——— *v.* James	82
——— *v.* Lovett	416
——— *v.* Moreau	90
——— *v.* Newton	461
——— *v.* Simmonsto	49, 461
——— *v.* Upton	461
Rehoboth *v.* Hunt	11 *a*
Reid *v.* Furnival	205
—— *v.* Payne	187
Reignolds *v.* Edwards	660
Reilly *v.* Jones	258, 259
Reinhold *v.* Alberti	141
Relyea *v.* Ramsay	80
Remington *v.* Congdon	421
Renner *v.* Bk. of Columbia	156, 188
Respublica *v.* DeLongchamps	84
——— *v.* Roberts	48
Revett *v.* Brown	618
Revill *v.* Satterfit	576
Rew *v.* Barber	523
Rex *v.* Almon	64, 416
—— *v.* Barr	663
—— *v.* Beare	416
—— *v.* Benedict	660
—— *v.* Bigg	62
—— *v.* Bp. of Chester	121
—— *v.* Bliss	663
—— *v.* Bramley	151
—— *v.* Brampton	463
—— *v.* Burdett	416
—— *v.* Clapham	363
—— *v.* Commerell	450
—— *v.* Dawes	471
—— *v.* Downshire	659
—— *v.* Gutch	416
—— *v.* Hermitage	544
—— *v.* Horsley	641
—— *v.* Hudson	660
—— *v.* Hunt	99
—— *v.* Johnson	416
—— *v.* Johnston	416
—— *v.* Kettleworth	450
—— *v.* Leake	660
—— *v.* Lloyd	660, 664
—— *v.* Longnor	295
—— *v.* Luffe	150
—— *v.* Navestock	251
—— *v.* Nichol	82
—— *v.* Pierce	415
—— *v.* Rosinski	82
—— *v.* St. George	284
—— *v.* St. James	665
—— *v.* St. Michael's	239
—— *v.* Sheward	627
—— *v.* Smith	450
—— *v.* Sutton	412
Rex *v.* Tippett	544
—— *v.* Waher	416
—— *v.* Watson	193, 416
—— *v.* Woodfall	416
—— *v.* Wright	660
Reynolds *v.* Ocean Ins. Co.	392
Rhind *v.* Wilkinson	380, 389
Rice *v.* Hosmer	433, 586
—— *v.* Stearns	206
—— *v.* Thompson	292
Rich *v.* Topping	203
Richardson *v.* Allan	166, 207
——— *v.* Anderson	66, 393
——— *v.* Atkinson	642
——— *v.* Chassen	253, 268
——— *v.* Dorr	241
——— *v.* Duncan	111, 121
——— *v.* Field	330
——— *v.* Hall	114
——— *v.* Jackson	605
——— *v.* Maine	390
——— *v.* Maryland Ins. Co.	432
——— *v.* Richardson	44
Richards *v.* Gilbert	219
——— *v.* Peake	626
——— *v.* Richards	309, 354, 424
Rickert *v.* Snyder	244
Rickets *v.* Salwey	544
Richmond *v.* Heapey	480
Richter *v.* Selin	190, 483
Riddle *v.* Sutton	347
Rider *v.* Ocean Ins. Co.	379
Ridley *v.* Taylor	203
—— *v.* Tindall	32
Rigden *v.* Wolcott	275
Rigg *v.* Curgenven	49, 286, 461
Riggs *v.* Denniston	427
—— *v.* Thatcher	584
Right *v.* Bawden	327
—— *v.* Cuthell	323
—— *v.* Price	674, 678
Ripley *v.* Dolbier	642
Rippon *v.* Norton	109
Rising *v.* Stannard	615, 622
Risley *v.* Baltinglass	686
Rison *v.* Berry	73
Ritchie *v.* Putnam	19
Rivers *v.* Griffith	608
Riviere *v.* Bower	471
Roach *v.* Ostler	160
—— *v.* Wadham	240
Robbins *v.* Borman	616
——— *v.* Otis	440, 443
——— *v.* Willard	484
Robert *v.* Garnie	530
Roberts *v.* Bradshaw	191
——— *v.* Camden	417

	Section
Roberts *v.* Carr	664
——— *v.* Elliot	686
——— *v.* Gallaher	523
——— *v.* Jackson	300
——— *v.* Karr	625
——— *v.* Reed	434
——— *v.* Round	682
——— *v.* Whiting	556
——— *v.* Wood	347
——— *v.* Wyatt	637
Robertson *v.* Barber	686
——— *v.* Ewer	387
——— *v.* French	378
——— *v.* Kennedy	295
——— *v.* Lynch	104
——— *v.* McNeil	79
——— *v.* Money	377
Robeson *v.* Ganderton	131
Robinson *v.* Alexander	447
——— *v.* Ames	195
——— *v.* Bland	38
——— *v.* Burleigh	431
——— *v.* Cook	605
——— *v.* Dunmore	210
——— *v.* Ferreday	605
——— *v.* Mansfield	621
——— *v.* Manuf. Ins. Co.	383
——— *v.* McDonald	641
——— *v.* Read	523
——— *v.* Ward	148
——— *v.* Yarrow	164, 165
Robison *v.* Borman	616
——— *v.* Gosnold	108
——— *v.* Otis	440, 443
——— *v.* Swett	311
Robson *v.* Godfrey	104
——— *v.* Rolls	642
Rock *v.* Layton	347
Rockwood *v.* Allen	253
Roden *v.* Ryde	158
Rodgers *v.* Nowill	253
Rodney *v.* Strode	277
Rodriguez *v.* Tadmire	458
Roe *v.* Charnock	251
—— *v.* Gore	462
—— *v.* Harvey	303
—— *v.* Lonsdale	317
—— *v.* Lord	309
—— *v.* Rowlston	438
—— *v.* Summersett	315
—— *v.* Wiggs	324
—— d. Wood *v.* Doe	73
Rogers *v.* Arnold	561, 563
——— *v.* Clifton	419
——— *v.* Crombie	265
——— *v.* Imbleton	226
——— *v.* Pitcher	565
Rogers *v.* Rogers	51, 672
——— *v.* Stephens	107
——— *v.* Sumner	587
Roger's case	372
Rolfe *v.* Peterson	259
Rolt *v.* Waterson	156, 520
Rooke's case	560
Roop *v.* Brubacker	78
Root *v.* Chandler	614, 621
—— *v.* King	275
Roper *v.* Harper	86
Ropes *v.* Barker	273
Rordasonz *v.* Leach	167, 478
Rose *v.* Bryant	291, 444
—— *v.* Groves	474
—— *v.* Story	253
—— *v.* Wilson	98, 100
Roseboom *v.* Billington	291
Rosewell *v.* Prior	472
Roskell *v.* Waterhouse	209
Ross *v.* Gould	430, 558
—— *v.* Hunter	390
—— *v.* Johnson	213, 642
—— *v.* Lapham	424
—— *v.* Overton	78
Rotan *v.* Fletcher	648
Rotch *v.* Hawes	642
Rotherham *v.* Green	544
Rowcroft *v.* Lomas	443
Rowe *v.* Young	174
Rowell *v.* Montville	660
Rowland *v.* Veal	597, 629
Rowlands *v.* Springett	189
Rowley *v.* Ball	156
——— *v.* Horne	216
Roworth *v.* Wilkes	514
Rowson *v.* Earle	142
Royce *v.* Burrell	357
Ruan *v.* Gardiner	252
Ruble *v.* Turner	20
Rucker *v.* Hiller	195
Rugby Charity *v.* Merryweather	660
Ruggles *v.* Keeler	439
——— *v.* Lawson	297
——— *v.* Lesure	625
Rulton *v.* Rulton	41
Runcorn *v.* Doe	545
Rundle *v.* Little	625
Rundlett *v.* Small	531
Runyan *v.* Nichols	136, 143
Rushby *v.* Scarlett	65
Rushworth *v.* Taylor	645
Russell *v.* Blake	337
——— *v.* Boehm	380
——— *v.* Coffin	295
——— *v.* Falls	678
——— *v.* Jackson	658

	Section
Russell *v.* Ledsam	489
——— *v.* Lewis	556
——— *v.* Lytle	31
——— *v.* Palmer	145, 148, 270
——— *v.* Skipwith	19
——— *v.* S. Britain Soc.	103
——— *v.* The Men of Devon	473
——— *v.* Tomlinson	277
——— *v.* Turner	599
Rust *v.* Baker	355
Rustell *v.* Macquister	418
Rutherford *v.* Evans	414
Rutland's, Countess of, case	649
Ryan *v.* Clarke	626
—— *v.* Goodwin	489, 493
Ryder *v.* Ld. Townsend	605
Rynes *v.* Clarkson	681

S.

Sackett *v.* Owen	78
Sackrider *v.* McDonald	279
Sadler *v.* Evans	124
Safford *v.* Annis	243
Salem Bank *v.* Gloucester Bank	68, 124, 159, 523
Salisbury *v.* Hale	186
Salmon *v.* Smith	133
Salomons *v.* Stavely	155
Saltous *v.* Commercial Ins. Co.	401
Sampson *v.* Coy	271, 273
——— *v.* Easterby	240
——— *v.* Henry	89, 618
——— *v.* Smith	97
Sanborn *v.* Neilson	51
——— *v.* Southard	190
Sandback *v.* Thomas	456
Sanderson *v.* Busher	383, 384
——— *v.* Lamberton	209
Sandford *v.* Dillaway	195
Sands *v.* Gelston	441, 442
Sandford *v.* Mickles	199
Santee *v.* Keister	317
Sapsford *v.* Fletcher	567
Sarell *v.* Wine	168, 342
Sargent *v.* Appleton	201
——— *v.* Ballard	539, 543
——— *v.* Blunt	640
——— *v.* Franklin Ins. Co.	261
——— *v.* Morris	212
——— *v.* Southgate	200
Sasportas *v.* Jennings	301
Satterthwaite *v.* Dewhurst	575
Saunders *v.* Darling	586
——— *v.* Edwards	433
——— *v.* Frost	605
——— *v.* Graham	604
Saunders *v.* Mills	424
——— *v.* Saunders	434
Saunderson *v.* Baker	580, 582, 621
——— *v.* Bell	518
——— *v.* Nicholl	346, 348
Savage *v.* Brewer	449, 457
——— *v.* Lane	347
——— *v.* Smith	596
Savery *v.* Goe	607
Savill *v.* Barchard	252
Saville *v.* Roberts	449
——— *v.* Robertson	483
Savory *v.* Chapman	141
Sawyer *v.* Mercer	348
Saxton *v.* Johnson	112
Sayer *v.* Kitchen	161
Sayre *v.* E. of Rochford	96, 633
Scales *v.* Jacob	440
Scheibel *v.* Fairbain	453
Schermerhorn *v.* Van Volkenburgh	648
Scholey *v.* Walsby	170
——— *v.* Walton	441
Scholfield *v.* Bayard	195
Schlosser *v.* Lesher	431
Schultz *v.* Astley	164
Scott *v.* Brest	284
—— *v.* Elmendorf	141
—— *v.* Galloway	295
—— *v.* Hull	247
—— *v.* McLellan	203
—— *v.* Nelson	107
—— *v.* Ray	536
—— *v.* Shepherd	84, 94, 226
—— *v.* Waithman	586
—— *v.* Wilson	457
Scarce *v.* Whittington	139
Scrimshire *v.* Scrimshire	460
Scruby *v.* Fordham	681
Scrugham *v.* Wood	297
Scurry *v.* Freeman	284
Seagar *v.* Sligerland	578
Seago *v.* Deane	107, 126, 127
Seamans *v.* Loring	382
Searight *v.* Calbraith	603
Searle *v.* Price	45
Sears *v.* Dillingham	691, 692
—— *v.* Lyons	272
Seaver *v.* Dingley	560, 561
——— *v.* Lincoln	179, 188
——— *v.* Phelps	369, 370
——— *v.* Seaver	113
Seaward *v.* Lord	443
Secor *v.* Babcock	455
Seddon *v.* Senate	243
Sedgwick *v.* Hollenback	241, 243
Sedley *v.* Sutherland	86, 624

	Section
Seers *v.* Hind	245
Seibert *v.* McHenry	563
——— *v.* Price	454, 455
Selby *v.* Bardons	95
Selden *v.* Beale	118
——— *v.* Hickock	646
Selkirk *v.* Adams	75
Sellers *v.* Till	412
Senhouse *v.* Christian	471
Sentance *v.* Poole	370
Seton *v.* Low	396
Severn *v.* Keppell	644
Sewall *v.* Sparrow	291 *a*
Seyds *v.* Hay	642
Seymour *v.* Mintern	28
——— *v.* Van Slyck	529, 530
Seymour's case	682
Shadwell *v.* Hutchinson	469
Shafer *v.* Smith	89, 273
Shaller *v.* Brand	679
Shamburg *v.* Commagere	207
Shannon *v.* Comstock	261 *a*
——— *v.* Shannon	561
Shapleigh *v.* Pilsbury	556
Sharp *v.* Bailey	195
——— *v.* Grey	221, 222
——— *v.* Hawker	147
——— *v.* United Ins. Co.	378
Shattuck *v.* Maley	454
Shaver *v.* Ehle	206
Shaw *v.* Broom	200
——— *v.* Crawford	539
——— *v.* Dartnall	118
——— *v.* Mitchell	251
——— *v.* Nudd	261
——— *v.* Picton	118, 530, 636
——— *v.* Reed	68
——— *v.* Robberds	405, 408
——— *v.* Tunbridge	594
——— *v.* Woodcock	121
Shearer *v.* Ranger	242
Shed *v.* Brett	193
Sheels *v.* Davies	136
Shelby *v.* Hearne	240
Sheldon *v.* Soper	640
Shelley's case	346
Shepard *v.* Johnson	261
——— *v.* Merrill	274
Shepherd *v.* Hampton	261
——— *v.* Temple	136
——— *v.* Watrous	78
Sheppard *v.* Sheppard	651
Sheriff *v.* Wilkes	159
Sheriffs of Norwich *v.* Bradshaw	590
Sherman *v.* Connecticut R. Bridge	11 *a*
Sherrow *v.* Wood	78
Sherry *v.* Schuyler	635 *a*
Sherwood *v.* Sutton	448
Shewell *v.* Fell	599
Shilcock *v.* Passman	144
Shipley *v.* Todhunter	416, 421
Shipwick *v.* Blanchard	648
Shires *v.* Glascock	678
Shirley *v.* Todd	200
Shorland *v.* Govett	622
Short *v.* McCarthy	433, 435, 448
——— *v.* Pratt	74
Shott *v.* Strealfield	484
Shotwell *v.* Few	645
Shove *v.* Webb	124
Shrewsbury *v.* Smith	618
Shult *v.* Baker	651
Shumway *v.* Holbrook	692
Shute *v.* Barrett	269
Shuttleworth *v.* Stephens	206
Sibree *v.* Tripp	28
Sicard *v.* Davis	296
Sice *v.* Cunningham	199
Sickles *v.* Mather	445
Sidford *v.* Chambers	165
Sigfried *v.* Levan	295
Siggers *v.* Brown	195
Sikes *v.* Johnson	270
Sill *v.* Rood	135
Simister's patent	496
Simmons *v.* Bradford	145, 599
——— *v.* Norton	656
——— *v.* Simmons	42
——— *v.* Swift	638
——— *v.* Wilmott	605
Simon *v.* Bradshear	141
Simonds *v.* White	393
Simonton *v.* Barrell	141
Simpson *v.* Lewthwaite	659
——— *v.* McCaffrey	267
——— *v.* Morris	84, 98
——— *v.* Robinson	418
——— *v.* Swan	117, 118
——— *v.* Walker	687
Sims *v.* Davis	539
Sinclair *v.* Eldred	453, 456
——— *v.* Jackson	331
Six Carpenters' case	270, 569, 607, 615, 622, 628
Skaife *v.* Jackson	517
Skee *v.* Coxon	79
Skelding *v.* Warren	204
Skelton *v.* Hawling	347
Skevill *v.* Avery	98
Skillin *v.* Merrill	114
Skinner *v.* Stocks	109, 478
——— *v.* Upshaw	648
Slaney *v.* Wade	462

	Section
Slater *v.* Rawson	240
——— *v.* Swann	231
Slaughter *v.* Barnes	582
Sledge *v.* Pope	89
Slegg *v.* Phillips	204
Sleght *v.* Kane	437
Slingerland *v.* Morse	603
Sliver *v.* Shelbeck	362
Sloman *v.* Herne	584
——— *v.* Walter	258
Slosson *v.* Beale	258, 259
Sluby *v.* Champlin	441
Sly *v.* Edgeley	232 *a*
Small *v.* Gray	451
——— *v.* Proctor	430, 558
——— *v.* Small	672, 675
——— *v.* Smith	172
Smallcourt *v.* Cross	593
Smart *v.* Hutton	580
Smedley *v.* Hill	348, 349
Smith *v.* Allison	51
——— *v.* Bank of Washington	186
——— *v.* Barrow	338
——— *v.* Bartholomew	519
——— *v.* Birmingham Gas-light Co.	62
——— *v.* Bonsall	672
——— *v.* Bossard	114
——— *v.* Bromley	121
——— *v.* Brown	28
——— *v.* Chester	165, 166
——— *v.* Compton	113, 114, 116
——— *v.* De Wruitz	200
——— *v.* Dickenson	258
——— *v.* Dovers	19
——— *v.* Fox	433
——— *v.* Fuge	378
——— *v.* Goodwin	226
——— *v.* Hart	599
——— *v.* Higbee	660
——— *v.* Hill	439
——— *v.* Hodson	108
——— *v.* Jones	686
——— *v.* Knowelden	11 *d*
——— *v.* Lord	160
——— *v.* Lovett	270
——— *v.* Macdonald	457
——— *v.* Mayo	367
——— *v.* M'Campbell	242
——— *v.* McClure	14, 160
——— *v.* McManus	183
——— *v.* Mercer	122
——— *v.* Milles	339, 614
——— *v.* Moore	209
——— *v.* Nilsen	114
——— *v.* Pickering	166
——— *v.* Plomer	640
Smith *v.* Robertson	392
——— *v.* Royston	626
——— *v.* Rutherford	224, 623
——— *v.* Scott	387
——— *v.* Sereven	529
——— *v.* Sear	164
——— *v.* Shackelford	452
——— *v.* Shaw	434
——— *v.* Shepherd	219
——— *v.* Smith	112, 259, 473
——— *v.* Spooner	428
——— *v.* Steele	672
——— *v.* Taylor	412
——— *v.* Whiting	74, 189, 190
——— *v.* Wigley	533
——— *v.* Williams	379
——— *v.* Williamson	561
——— *v.* Wood	415, 421
——— *v.* Wright	219, 249
——— *v.* Young	644
Smithson *v.* Garth	277
Smout *v.* Ilbery	220 *a*
Smyrl *v.* Niolon	219, 377
Snell *v.* Phillips	431
——— *v.* Snell	300
Snow *v.* Allen	459
——— *v.* Franklin	28
——— *v.* Perry	522, 601
Snowball *v.* Goodricke	583
Snowden *v.* Davis	121
Soilleaux *v.* Soilleaux	41, 46
Solomon *v.* Turner	199
Solomons *v.* Dawes	645
——— *v.* Medex	227
Somers *v.* Balabrega	141
Somes *v.* Skinner	240, 317
Sommer *v.* Wilt	253, 449
Soulden *v.* Van Ransselaer	431
Soulesby *v.* Hodgson	73
Southard *v.* Rexford	253
Southey *v.* Sherwood	515
Southwick *v.* Hayden	517
Soward *v.* Leggett	245 *a*
Spalding *v.* Vandercook	136
Sparhawk *v.* Bartlett	586
——— *v.* Bullard	307
Sparrow *v.* Chrisman	480
Speed *v.* Buford	554
Speight *v.* Oliviera	574
Spencer *v.* Billing	483
——— *v.* Daggett	219
——— *v.* Halstead	261
——— *v.* Hartford	524
——— *v.* Marriott	243
——— *v.* Tilden	258
Spencer's case	240
Spies *v.* Newbery	186

	Section
Spoor *v.* Holland	637
Sprague *v.* Baker	149, 240, 244
——— *v.* Kneeland	563
——— *v.* Waite	660, 662
Spratt *v.* Spratt	19
Spring *v.* Coffin	124
——— *v.* Gray	447
Springfield *v.* Hampden	660
Sprowl *v.* Kellar	219
Spybey *v.* Hide	608
Squire *v.* Hollenbeck	272, 635 *a*
Staats *v.* Ten Eyck	264
Stafford *v.* Clark	231
Stafford Canal Co. *v.* Hallen	473
Stammers *v.* Dixon	615
Standen *v.* Standen	151, 461
Stanley *v.* Barnes	668
——— *v.* Kean	672
——— *v.* Perley	556
——— *v.* Towgood	245 *a*
Stanard *v.* Eldrige	242
Stannard *v.* Ullithorne	149
Stante *v.* Pricket	47, 86, 624
Stanton *v.* Stanton	440
——— *v.* Wilson	365
Stanwood *v.* Scovel	11 *b*
Staple *v.* Spring	472
Staples *v.* Okines	205
——— *v.* Hayden	659 *a*
Starbuck *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co.	400
Stark *v.* Chesapeake Ins. Co.	19
—— *v.* Parker	136 *a*
Starr *v.* Jackson	614
State Bank *v.* Hurd	194
State, The *v.* Armfield	623
——— *v.* Bates	47
——— *v.* Brunson	48
——— *v.* Campton	660
——— *v.* Davis	84
——— *v.* Guild	363
——— *v.* Hunter	662
——— *v.* Marble	662
——— *v.* Miller	461
——— *v.* Pearce	48
——— *v.* Roswell	461
——— *v.* Wallace	48
Stead *v.* Anderson	500
—— *v.* Williams	501 *a*
Stearn *v.* Mills	347
Stearns *v.* Barrett	258, 492
——— *v.* Haven	477
Stedman *v.* Gooch	520
Steele *v.* Inland W. L. Nav. Co.	473
—— *v.* Price	688 *a*
Stegall *v.* Stegall	150
Steinman *v.* Magnus	28, 30, 526
Stephens *v.* Elwall	645
Stephens *v.* Myers	82
Stephenson *v.* Hart	212, 642
——— *v.* Walker	58
Sterling *v.* Adams	454
——— *v.* Peet	264
Sterndale *v.* Hawkinson	533
Stetson *v.* Mass. Ins. Co.	408
Stevens *v.* Lynch	207
——— *v.* Reeves	251
——— *v.* Vancleve	674
——— *v.* Whistler	616
Stevenson *v.* Lambard	240
Stewart *v.* Doughty	615
——— *v.* Drake	242, 244
——— *v.* Martin	635 *a*
St. George's *v.* St. Margaret's Parish	150
Stiles *v.* West	369
Still *v.* Halford	71, 73
Stilson *v.* Tobey	280
St. John *v.* Standring	646
Stock *v.* Mawson	121
Stocker *v.* Harris	403
——— *v.* Merrimack Ins. Co.	399
Stockman *v.* Parr	189
Stoddart *v.* Palmer	584
Stoever *v.* Whitman	249
Stokes *v.* Bate	338
——— *v.* Lewis	114
——— *v.* Saltonstall	221
Stokley *v.* Harnidge	453
Stone *v.* Codman	232 *a*, 276
——— *v.* Crocker	271, 449, 453, 454, 455
——— *v.* Damon	690
——— *v.* Forsyth	315
——— *v.* Marsh	518
——— *v.* National Ins. Co.	390
——— *v.* Seymour	530
——— *v.* Swift	459
——— *v.* Varney	421, 425
Stonehouse *v.* Elliot	99, 621
Storer *v.* Logan	203
Story *v.* Challands	421
—— *v.* Odin	471
—— *v.* Pery	366
Stoughton *v.* Lynch	529
Stout *v.* Jackson	264
——— *v.* Prall	269
——— *v.* Wren	85
Stoytes *v.* Pearson	246, 300
Strang *v.* Holmes	28, 30
Streeter *v.* Horlock	104
Strithorst *v.* Græme	457
Strong *v.* Harvey	605
——— *v.* Manuf. Ins. Co.	379
——— *v.* N. Y. Firem. Ins. Co.	393

	Section
Strong *v.* Williams	524
Strout *v.* Berry	625
Stuart *v.* Lovell	418
——— *v.* Whitaker	593
Stubbs *v.* Lainson	592
——— *v.* Parsons	566
Studdy *v.* Sanders	104
Stultz *v.* Dickey	251, 615
Sturge *v.* Buchanan	193
Sturges *v.* Bush	37, 39
Sturt *v.* Mellish	447
Sturton *v.* Richardson	36
Styart *v.* Rowland	126, 127, 529
Suffern *v.* Townsend	615, 627
Suffield, Ld. *v.* Bruce	107
Suffolk Bank *v.* Worcester Bank	607
Sullivan *v.* Holker	342
Sulston *v.* Norton	287
Sumter *v.* Lehie	332
Summersett *v.* Jarvis	642
Surrey Canal *v.* Hall	660
Sutcliffe *v.* Brooke	69
Sutton *v.* Buck	378, 637
——— *v.* Clark	434
——— *v.* Hawkins	605
——— *v.* Johnstone	271
——— *v.* Moody	620
——— *v.* Sutton	681
——— *v.* Waite	586
Swain *v.* Stafford	455
Swallow *v.* Beaumont	300
Swan *v.* Swan	550
Swayn *v.* Stephens	648
Sweeting *v.* Fowler	163
Sweigart *v.* Lowmater	39
Swett *v.* Boardman	675
——— *v.* Patrick	264
Swift *v.* Barnes	261
——— *v.* Stevens	156
Swindler *v.* Hilliard	219
Symmons *v.* Blake	418
Symonds *v.* Page	336
Symons *v.* Hearson	627
Sylvester *v.* Crapo	179, 199, 200
Sykes *v.* Dunbar	453, 454

T.

Tabart *v.* Tipper	424
Tabram *v.* Horn	139
Taft *v.* Montague	104
Tagart *v.* Hooper	682
Taggard *v.* Loring	378
Tait *v.* Harris	86, 624
Talbot *v.* Clark	207
——— *v.* Gay	186
——— *v.* Hodson	296
Talbot *v.* McGee	141
——— *v.* Talbot	684
Talcott *v.* Commercial Ins. Co.	401
——— *v.* Marine Ins. Co.	394
Tankersly *v.* Anderson	141
Tanner *v.* Bennett	385
——— *v.* Bean	160
——— *v.* Smart	440
Tapley *v.* Mebeaume	264
Tappenden *v.* Randall	111
Tarbuck *v.* Bipsham	127
Tarleton *v.* McGawley	231, 254
Tarling *v.* Boxter	638
Tarver *v.* Rankin	291 *a*
——— *v.* Tarver	672
Tassall *v.* Shane	31
Tate *v.* Humphrey	418
Tatham *v.* Wright	694
Tatlock *v.* Harris	518
Taunton *v.* Costan	618
Tayloe *v.* Sandiford	257, 258, 530
Taylor *v.* Beal	281
——— *v.* Cole	273, 628, 634
——— *v.* Commonwealth	592
——— *v.* Coryell	81
——— *v.* Crocker	164, 166
——— *v.* Draing	674
——— *v.* Fleet	230 *a*
——— *v.* Glaser	296
——— *v.* Higgins	113
——— *v.* Hooman	625
——— *v.* Horde	430
——— *v.* Jones	184, 196
——— *v.* Lendey	119
——— *v.* Lowell	401
——— *v.* Needham	305
——— *v.* Rainbow	85, 270
——— *v.* Shum	239
——— *v.* Smith	628
——— *v.* Snyder	180
——— *v.* Taylor	317, 683
——— *v.* Townsend	619, 658
——— *v.* Willams	454
——— *v.* Willans	454
——— *v.* Zamira	566
Teat's case	236
Teed *v.* Elworthy	478
Teller *v.* Burtis	430, 557
Tempany *v.* Burnand	404
Templer *v.* McLachlan	136, 143
Templeton *v.* Case	561
Ten Eyck *v.* Waterbury	554
Tenney *v.* Prime	11 *b*
Thatcher *v.* Dinsmore	519, 520
Thayer *v.* Bracket	179, 605
Thomas *v.* De Graffenried	452
——— *v.* Evans	602

	Section
Thomas *v.* Foyle	378
——— *v.* Graves	249, 251, 252
——— *v.* Hawkes	128
——— *v.* Heathorn	28
——— *v.* Marsh	98
——— *v.* Pearse	598
——— *v.* Von Kapff	240
——— *v.* Wright	331
Thompson *v.* Bernard	423
——— *v.* Bell	431
——— *v.* Brown	446, 531, 533
——— *v.* Button	560
——— *v.* Hale	179
——— *v.* Leach	369
——— *v.* Lockwood	302
——— *v.* Rose	644
——— *v.* Symonds	512
Thomson *v.* Lay	367
Thorne *v.* White	97
Thornton's case	688 *a*
Thornton *v.* Illingworth	367
—— *v.* Lance	402
——— *v.* Royal Exch. Co.	401
——— *v.* Stephen	423
——— *v.* United States Ins. Co.	393
——— *v.* Wynn	190
Thorpe *v.* Booth	435
——— *v.* Burgess	604
——— *v.* Burling	614
——— *v.* Combe	435
Thrupp *v.* Fielder	367
Thunder *v.* Belcher	325, 329
Thurman *v.* Wild	30
Thurston *v.* Blanchard	642
——— *v.* Hancock	467
——— *v.* McKown	199
Thurtell *v.* Beaumont	408
Tice *v.* Norton	564
Ticonic Bank *v.* Johnson	190
Tidmarsh *v.* Washington Ins. Co.	398, 401
Tilden *v.* Metcalf	271
Tilk *v.* Parsons	420
Tillier *v.* Whitehead	481
Tillotson *v.* Cheetham	253
Timmings *v.* Timmings	51, 54
Timothy *v.* Simpson	95
Tingley *v.* Cutler	259
Tinkler *v.* Walpole	484
Tisdale *v.* Essex	243
Tobey *v.* Barber	521
—— *v.* Webster	616
Tod *v.* Winchelsea	678
Todd *v.* Gallagher	136
—— *v.* Hawkins	421
—— *v.* Rome	660
Tolland *v.* Tichenor	26
Tomlinson *v.* Blacksmith	11 *e*
——— *v.* Collett	483
——— *v.* Tomlinson,	684
Tompkins *v.* Tompkins	672
Tompson *v.* Mussey	456, 459
Toogood *v.* Spyring	421
Toosey *v.* Williams	193
Topham *v.* Braddick	435
Tousaint *v.* Hartop	79
——— *v.* Martinnant	103, 114
Towers *v.* Barrett	103
Tower *v.* Durell	190
Towne *v.* Jaquith	74
Townsend *v.* Deacon	437
——— *v.* Ives	694
——— *v.* Kerns	618
——— *v.* Phillips	594
Townsley *v.* Sumrall	183
Towson *v.* Havre de Grace Bank	601
Tracy *v.* Strong	607
—— *v.* Swartwout	253
—— *v.* Wikoff	530
Treadwell *v.* Bladen	508
Treat *v.* Barber	253
—— *v.* McMahon	11 *a*
Treasurers *v.* McDowell	141
Trelawney *v.* Coleman	56
Trevelyan *v.* Trevelyan	681
Trevilian *v.* Pine	567
Trevivan *v.* Lawrence	281
Trimble *v.* Thorn	196
Trimmer *v.* Jackson	675
Tripp *v.* Thomas	456
Trott *v.* Wood	251
Troup *v.* Smith	448
Trower *v.* Chadwick	466
Troy Turnp. Co. *v.* McChesney	62
Trueman *v.* Fenton	114
——— *v.* Hurst	128, 445
Trull *v.* Eastman	240
Truman's case	461
Tryon *v.* Carter	290
Tubbs *v.* Richardson	646
Tuberville *v.* Savage	82, 83
Tucker *v.* Barrow	126
——— *v.* Cracklin	209, 213
——— *v.* Ives	445
——— *v.* Moreland	367
——— *v.* Smith	200
Tufts *v.* Adams	242, 244
Tugwell *v.* Heyman	108
Tullay *v.* Reed	98
Tullidge *v.* Wade	89, 253, 579
Tullock *v.* Dunn	352
Turberville *v.* Whitehouse	365
Turner *v.* Ambler	455

	Section
Turner *v.* Child	343
——— *v.* Eyles	239
——— *v.* Meymott	618
——— *v.* Myers	464
——— *v.* Protect. Ins. Co.	403
——— *v.* Turner	45, 449, 453
——— *v.* Wilson	219, 377
——— *v.* Winter	490
Turney *v.* Wilson	209
Turnipseed *v.* Hawkins	694
Turrill *v.* Dolloway	425
Turton *v.* Turton	43, 53, 54
Turvil *v.* Tipper	593
Tuthill *v.* Davis	207
Tuttle *v.* Cooper	484
——— *v.* Mayo	104
Tuson *v.* Evans	411
Tybout *v.* Thompson	123
Tye *v.* Gwinne	136
Tyler *v.* Binney	166
——— *v.* Duke of Leeds	593
——— *v.* Smith	619
——— *v.* Wilkinson	539
Twemlow *v.* Oswin	386
Twombly *v.* Henley	241
——— *v.* Hunnewell	588
Tyndal *v.* Hutchinson	280

U.

Uhde *v.* Walters	377
Ulmer *v.* Leland	454
Ulster Co. Bank *v.* McFarlan	161
Umphelby *v.* McLean	434
Underwood *v.* Hewson	85, 270
——— *v.* Parkes	274, 425
Union Bank *v.* Knapp	445
——— *v.* Ridgely	297, 300
Union Bank of Georgetown *v.* Geary	141
——— ——— ——— ——— *v.* Magruder	190
United States Bank *v.* Binney	481
——— ——— *v.* Wardwell	529
United States *v.* Appleton	659 *a*
——— ——— *v.* Coffin	296
——— ——— *v.* Drew	374
——— ——— *v.* Hoar	318, 350
——— ——— *v.* Kirkpatrick	533
——— ——— *v.* M'Daniel	251
——— ——— *v.* Ortega	84
——— ——— *v.* Wardwell	533
——— ——— *v.* Worrall	286
Upston *v.* Slark	211
Upton *v.* Curtis	570
Usticke *v.* Bawden	682, 683

	Section
Uther *v.* Rich	639
Utterson *v.* Vernon	337
Utterton *v.* Utterton	681

V.

Vallejo *v.* Wheeler	390
Valpey *v.* Manley	121
Van Alen *v.* Rogers	333
Van Buskirk *v.* Claw	464
Vance *v.* Foster	407
——— *v.* Vance	45
Van Cortlandt *v.* Underhill	73
Vanderplank *v.* Miller	473
Vandewall *v.* Tyrrell	114
Van Dorens *v.* Everett	367
Van Epps *v.* Harrison	136
Van Horn *v.* Freeman	226, 576
Van Horne *v.* Crain	240
Van Ostrand *v.* Reed	113
Van Ransselaer *v.* Platner	260
Vansandau *v.* Browne	142
Van Schaack *v.* Stafford	204
Van Valkingburg *v.* Rouk	300
——— ——— *v.* Watson	108
Van Vechten *v.* Hopkins	417
Varrill *v.* Heald	270
Vasse *v.* Smith	368
Vaughan *v.* Blanchard	280
Veazy *v.* Harmony	608
Vedder *v.* Vedder	28 *a*
Venafra *v.* Johnson	454
Venning *v.* Shuttleworth	204
Vere *v.* Cawdor	630
——— *v.* Lewis	164, 169
Vernon *v.* Curtis	344, 345
——— *v.* Kays	271
——— *v.* Smith	240
Verplank *v.* Sterry	297
Verrall *v.* Robinson	645
Verry *v.* Watkins	577
Vessey *v.* Pike	425
Vibbard *v.* Johnson	136
Vichars *v.* Wilcocks	256
Victors *v.* Davis	107
Vincent *v.* Cornell	544
——— *v.* Groome	142
Vines *v.* Terell	420
Visger *v.* Prescott	388
Vivyan *v.* Arthur	240
Vooght *v.* Winch	666
Vose *v.* Handy	330
Voss *v.* Robinson	394
Vowles *v.* Miller	617
Voyce *v.* Voyce	626
Vynior's case	79

W.

	Section
Waddell *v.* Cook	647
Wade *v.* Howard	330
——— *v.* Merwin	236
——— *v.* Wilson	112
Wade's case	602, 604
Wadhurst *v.* Damme	630
Wadsworth *v.* Marshall	142
——— *v.* Ruggles	690
Wafer *v.* Mocato	259
Wailing *v.* Toll	134, 366
Wait *v.* Maxwell	241, 555
Waithman *v.* Weaver	424
Wakefield *v.* Newbon	121
Wakeman *v.* Robinson	85, 94, 270
Wakley *v.* Johnson	275
Waland *v.* Elkins	214
Walcot *v.* Pomeroy	614
Walden *v.* Davison	580
——— *v.* New York Ins. Co.	397
Waldron *v.* Coombe	385
——— *v.* McCarty	243
Walford *v.* Anthony	625
Walker *v.* Ham	111, 121
——— *v.* Holyday	36
——— *v.* Maitland	387
——— *v.* Melcher	74
——— *v.* Seaborne	30
——— *v.* Smith	253
Wallace *v.* Hardacre	88
——— *v.* Kelsall	30
——— *v.* King	648
——— *v.* McConnell	174, 180 *a*
Walley *v.* Walley	448
Wallis *v.* Alpine	455
——— *v.* Mease	418
Walsh *v.* Bishop	277
Walter *v.* Green	55
——— *v.* Haynes	525
Walters *v.* Mace	414
——— *v.* Pfeil	473
Walton *v.* Kersop	562
——— *v.* Mascall	186 *a*
——— *v.* Potter	501 *a*
——— *v.* Robinson	441
——— *v.* Walton	686, 687
Walwyn *v.* St. Quintin	166, 202
Wankford *v.* Wankford	339
Wanstall *v.* Pooley	232 *a*
Warburton *v.* Storer	79
Ward *v.* Evans	66
——— *v.* Fuller	551, 555
——— *v.* Harrison	317
——— *v.* Lee	139
——— *v.* Lewis	297
——— *v.* Macauley	616
Ward *v.* Pearson	11 *d*
——— *v.* Smith	421
——— *v.* Weeks	414
Warden, In re,	676
Warder *v.* Tucker	190
Ware *v.* Gay	221, 222
——— *v.* Ware	690
——— *v.* Weathnall	264
Warfield *v.* Walter	635 *a*
Warmoll *v.* Young	593
Warne *v.* Chadwell	418
Warner *v.* Thurlo	263
——— *v.* Wheeler	124
Warr *v.* Jolly	421
Warrall *v.* Clare	633, 634
Warren *v.* Child	557
——— *v.* Leland	561
——— *v.* Lynch	296
——— *v.* Mains	601
——— *v.* Merry	207
——— *v.* Postlethwaite	675
——— *v.* Warren	183, 416
Warwick *v.* Foulkes	272
Warwicke *v.* Nookes	525
Waterman *v.* Robinson	561
Waters *v.* Lilley	625
——— *v.* Merchants's Ins. Co.	405
——— *v.* Paynter	163
——— *v.* Thanet	440
——— *v.* Tomkins	530
Watertown *v.* Cowen	240
Watkins *v.* Baird	121, 302
——— *v.* Hill	519, 520
——— *v.* Lee	452
——— *v.* Morgan	11 *e*
——— *v.* Vince	65
——— *v.* Woolney	644
Watkinson *v.* Inglesby	28
Watson *v.* Bayless	579
——— *v.* Christie	93, 97, 274
——— *v.* Clark	400, 401
——— *v.* King	338, 384
——— *v.* North Amer. Ins. Co.	401
——— *v.* Pears	488
——— *v.* Reynolds	428
——— *v.* Todd	580
——— *v.* Turner	107, 114
——— *v.* Whitmore	454
Watt *v.* Greenlee	457
Watts *v.* Baker	607
——— *v.* Frazier	275
——— *v.* Public Adm'r	674
——— *v.* Welman	242
——— *v.* Willing	523
Waugh *v.* Bussell	13
Way *v.* Bassett	179
Waynam *v.* Bend	163

	Section
Weatherstone *v.* Hawkins	419
Weaver *v.* Bachert	256
——— *v.* Bush	98
——— *v.* Lloyd	423
——— *v.* Ward	85, 270
Webb *v.* Alexander	243
——— *v.* Fox	637
——— *v.* Herne	584
——— *v.* Hill	13
——— *v.* Paternoster	475
——— *v.* Thompson	384
——— *v.* Turner	624
Webber *v.* Liversuch	96
——— *v.* Nicholas	456
——— *v.* Richards	625
——— *v.* Tivill	447
——— *v.* Webber	357
Webster *v.* Drinkwater	108
——— *v.* Lee	74, 199
Weeden *v.* Tunbrell	51
Weeks *v.* Gibbs	345, 347
Weidner *v.* Schweigart	527
Weigel *v.* Weigel	676
Weigall *v.* Waters	245 *a*
Weir *v.* Aberdeen	400
Welch *v.* Seaborn	112
Welcome *v.* Upton	544
Weld *v.* Bartlett	599
——— *v.* Oliver	646
Weleker *v.* Le Pelletier	21, 26
Welford *v.* Liddel	447
Weller *v.* Baker	227
Wellington *v.* Wentworth	644
Wells *v.* Cooke	73
——— *v.* Fish	448
——— *v.* Head	272
——— *v.* Hopwood	391
——— *v.* Ody	226, 472
——— *v.* Prince	554
——— *v.* Some	36
——— *v.* Williams	19
Welsted *v.* Levy	200
Wendover *v.* Hodgeboom	378
Wennall *v.* Adney	114
Wentworth *v.* Bullen	449
——— ——— *v.* Wentworth	30
West *v.* Chamberlin	524
——— *v.* Hughes	333
Weston *v.* Carter	562
——— *v.* Downes	103
——— *v.* Foster	29
——— *v.* Reading	557
Westmeth *v.* Westmeth	54
Wetzell *v.* Bussard	440, 443
Whaley *v.* Pepper	451, 454
Wharton *v.* Mackenzie	365
Wheaton *v.* East	241
Wheaton *v.* Hibbard	121
——— *v.* Peters	510, 511
Wheeler *v.* Alderson	675
——— *v.* Hatch	241
——— *v.* Horne	37
——— *v.* Rowell	618 *a*
——— *v.* Train	561, 640
Wheelock *v.* Doolittle	441
——— *v.* Wheelwright	642
Wheelwright *v.* Depeyster	649
——— ——— *v.* Wheelwright	297
Whelen *v.* Watmaugh	37, 38
Whelpdale's case	300
Whipple *v.* Walpole	253
Whitaker *v.* Edmonds	172
——— *v.* Sumner	316
Whitbeck *v.* Cook	11 *a*
——— *v.* Van Ness	523
——— *v.* Taylor	567
White *v.* Bailey	437, 439
——— *v.* British Museum	675
——— *v.* Crawford	659 *a*, 665
——— *v.* Demary	644
——— *v.* Dingley	259
——— *v.* Edgman	64
——— *v.* Franklin Bank	111, 121
——— *v.* Hague	232 *a*
——— *v.* Kibling	207
——— *v.* Mann	343
——— *v.* Mosely	272
——— *v.* Osborn	647
——— *v.* Pickering	317
——— *v.* Whitney	244
——— *v.* Wilson	689, 690
Whitehall *v.* Squire	649
Whitehead *v.* Howard	126, 443
——— ——— *v.* Taylor	567
——— ——— *v.* Tuckett	65
——— ——— *v.* Varnum	599
Whitehouse *v.* Atkinson	649
Whiteman *v.* Slack	236
Whitesell *v.* Crane	216
Whiteside *v.* Jackson	305
——— ——— *v.* Russell	219
Whitfield *v.* Savage	195
Whiting *v.* Smith	414
Whitmore *v.* Black	649
——— ——— *v.* Wilks	473
Whitney *v.* Bigelow	441, 444
——— ——— *v.* Dutch	367
——— ——— *v.* Ferris	484
——— ——— *v.* Lewis	136
——— ——— *v.* Peckham	457
——— ——— *v.* Smith	414
——— ——— *v.* Sterling	483
Whittemore *v.* Cutter	253, 254
Whittier *v.* Graffham	195

	Section
Whitwell *v.* Bennett	118
——— *v.* Johnson	187, 194
——— *v.* Kennedy	265
——— *v.* Varnum	599
——— *v.* Wells	561
Whitwill *v.* Scheer	11 *d*
Whorewood *v.* Shaw	109
Wickham *v.* Freeman	614
Wicks *v.* Fentham	452
Widdifield *v.* Widdifield	483
Widger *v.* Browning	324
Wilbaume *v.* Gorges	291
Wilbour *v.* Turner	163, 199
Wilbraham *v.* Snow	614, 637
Wilby *v.* Henman	431
Wilcox *v.* Howland	302
——— *v.* Hunt	672
——— *v.* McNutt	118
——— *v.* Plummer	146, 268
Wild *v.* Pickford	218
Wilde *v.* Clarkson	263
——— *v.* Fisher	112
Wilder *v.* Bailey	587
Wiggin *v.* Amory	390
Wigglesworth *v.* Dallison	251
——— *v.* Steers	300
Wightman *v.* Wightman	464
Wihen *v.* Law	363
Wilkins *v.* Aiken	514
——— *v.* Jadis	178
Wilkinson *v.* Byers	28
——— *v.* Haygarth	615
——— *v.* Howell	452
——— *v.* Jadis	196
——— *v.* Johnson	122
——— *v.* King	638, 640
——— *v.* Lutwidge	164
Willard *v.* Twitchell	241
Willbeam *v.* Ashton	258
Williams *v.* Annapolis	305
——— *v.* Bosanquet	239
——— *v.* Branson	219
——— *v.* Bridges	584
——— *v.* Burrell	240
——— *v.* Cranston	212
——— *v.* Crary	524
——— *v.* Cummington	662
——— *v.* Everett	119
——— *v.* Grant	219, 377
——— *v.* Griffith	535
——— *v.* Holland	220, 226
——— *v.* Houghtaling	529
——— *v.* Ingell	303
——— *v.* Innes	347
——— *v.* Jones	98
——— *v.* Lee	11 *a*
——— *v.* Matthews	197
Williams *v.* Mitchell	68
——— *v.* Moor	367
——— *v.* Morris	627
——— *v.* Mostyn	584, 599
——— *v.* Paschal	78
——— *v.* Reed	145
——— *v.* Roberts	431
——— *v.* Sills	234
——— *v.* Welch	562
——— *v.* Wetherbee	244
——— *v.* Williams	41, 44, 45, 49
——— *v.* Woodward	239, 241
Willis *v.* Barratt	160
——— *v.* Bernard	55
——— *v.* Dyson	485
——— *v.* Watson	686
Williston *v.* Smith	424
Wilmett *v.* Harmer	426
Wilmot *v.* Smith	606
Wilsford *v.* Wood	478
Wilson *v.* Appleton	437
——— *v.* Beddard	674
——— *v.* Coupland	112
——— *v.* Forbes	241, 264
——— *v.* Force	523
——— *v.* Freeman	218
——— *v.* Fuller	230 *a*
——— *v.* Hodges	110
——— *v.* Hurst	533
——— *v.* Kennedy	520
——— *v.* King	11 *a*
——— *v.* Mackreth	615
——— *v.* Martin	261
——— *v.* Mitchell	130
——— *v.* Norman	587
——— *v.* Ray	121
——— *v.* Reed	646, 647
——— *v.* Robinson	421
——— *v.* Tucker	149
——— *v.* Tummon	66, 68
——— *v.* Vysar	520
——— *v.* Wallace	11 *a*
——— *v.* Woolfryes	246
Wilt *v.* Ogden	135
Wiltby *v.* Mountfort	240
Wilton *v.* Girdlestone	644
——— *v.* Webster	51, 55, 57
Wiltshire *v.* Sidford	617
Winchilsea *v.* Wauchope	678
Wing *v.* Mill	107, 114
Wingfield *v.* Stratford	648
Winslow *v.* Merrill	11 *a*
Winsmore *v.* Greenbank	55
Winsor *v.* Pratt	674, 681
Winter *v.* Brockwell	475
——— *v.* Charter	472
——— *v.* Henn	51

	Section
Winter *v.* Trimmer	257
——— *v.* Wroot	56
Winthrop *v.* Union Ins. Co.	251, 252
Wintringham *v.* Lafoy	621
Winship *v.* United States Bank	481
Wiseman *v.* Lyman	523
Witheott *v.* Nine	243
Witham *v.* Gowen	457
Wittersheim *v.* Countess of Carlisle	435
Woert *v.* Jenkins	253, 272
Wolcott *v.* Hall	275
——— *v.* Knight	556
Wolmer *v.* Latimer	421
Wolstenholm *v.* Davies	65
Wood *v.* Buckley	449
——— *v.* Day	305
——— *v.* Edwards	103
——— *v.* Hickok	252
——— *v.* Hitchcock	605
——— *v.* Hopkins	141
——— *v.* Manley	627
——— *v.* Pope	245 *a*
——— *v.* Veal	545, 663
Woodbridge *v.* Brigham	179
Woodbury *v.* Northy	78
Woodcock *v.* Houldsworth	187, 193
——— *v.* Parker	492
Woodhull *v.* Holmes	206
Woodman *v.* Coolbroth	297
——— *v.* Gist	580, 591
Woods *v.* Russell	638
Woodward *v.* Booth	209
——— *v.* Newhall	24, 133
——— *v.* Giles	259
——— *v.* Larkin	378
——— *v.* Walton	88, 225, 273
Woodworth *v.* Sherman	492
Woodyer *v.* Hadden	660
Wookey *v.* Pole	639
Wooldridge *v.* Boydell	382
Woolley *v.* Clark	339, 641
——— *v.* Carter	635 *a*
Worcester *v.* Eaton	111, 121
Wordsworth *v.* Harley	434
Wormouth *v.* Cramer	11 *d*
Worsley *v.* Wood	406
Wortington *v.* Barlow	347
Wren *v.* Heslop	451
Wright *v.* Barnard	401
——— *v.* Butler	135
——— *v.* Castle	139
——— *v.* Laing	533
——— *v.* Lainson	593
——— *v.* Ld. Verney	115
——— *v.* Netherwood	681
——— *v.* Ramscott	630
Wright *v.* Rattray	659
——— *v.* Reed	601
——— *v.* Russell	478
——— *v.* Woodgate	421
——— *v.* Wright	675
Wurt *v.* Lee	518
Wyatt *v.* Gore	424
——— *v.* Harrison	467
Wynch *v.* E. India Co.	435
Wyeth *v.* Stone	489, 491, 507
Wyman *v.* Ballard	242
——— *v.* Hal. & August. Bank	68
——— *v.* Hook	108
Wyndham *v.* Wycombe	52
Wynn *v.* Allard	253
——— *v.* Heveningham	681
Wynne *v.* Anderson	624

Y.

Yale *v.* Saunders	649
Yarnold *v.* Wallis	686
Yate *v.* Willan	209
Yates *v.* Freckleton	518
——— *v.* Thompson	672
Yea *v.* Fouraker	441
—— *v.* Lethridge	586
Yeatman *v.* Erwin	187
Yeomans *v.* Bradshaw	338
Yerby *v.* Yerby	684
York *v.* Blott	161, 204
Youl *v.* Harbottle	642
Young *v.* Adams	112, 124, 522
——— *v.* Black	135
——— *v.* Bryan	183
——— *v.* Covell	271
——— *v.* Drew	317
——— *v.* Gregory	450
——— *v.* Grote	122
——— *v.* Hichens	620
——— *v.* Hosmer	586, 599
——— *v.* Hunter	483
——— *v.* Kenyon	431
——— *v.* Marshall	120
——— *v.* Mason	642
——— *v.* Miller	73
——— *v.* Patterson	164
——— *v.* Preston	103
——— *v.* Tustin	268 *a*
Yrisarri *v.* Clement	412, 417

Z.

Zeigler *v.* Gray	207
——— *v.* Zeigler	78
Zeniobio *v.* Axtell	11 *d*, 414
Zouch *v.* Willingale	321, 327

PART IV.

OF THE EVIDENCE REQUISITE

IN CERTAIN

PARTICULAR ACTIONS AND ISSUES

AT

COMMON LAW.

A

TREATISE

ON THE

LAW OF EVIDENCE.

PART IV.

OF THE EVIDENCE REQUISITE IN CERTAIN PARTICULAR ACTIONS AND ISSUES AT COMMON LAW.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

§ 1. Having, in the preceding Volume, treated, *First*, Of the Nature and Principles of Evidence, — *Secondly*, Of the Object of Evidence, and the Rules which govern in the production of Testimony, — and *Thirdly*, Of the Means of Proof, or the Instruments by which Facts are established; it is now proposed to consider, *Fourthly*, The Evidence requisite in certain Particular Actions and Issues, at Common Law, with reference both to the nature of the suit or of the issue, and to the legal or official character and relations of the parties.

§ 2. We have already seen, that the evidence must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue;[1] that the substance of the issue, and that only, must be proved;[2] that the burden of proof generally lies on the party holding the affirmative of the issue;[3] and that the best evidence, of which the nature of the case is susceptible, must be adduced.[4] These doctrines, therefore, will not be again discussed in this place.

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[1] Vol. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 1.
[2] Vol. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 2.
[3] Vol. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 3.
[4] Vol. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 4.

§ 3. The first thing which will receive attention, in the preparation of a cause for trial, will naturally be the issue, or proposition to be maintained or controverted. In the early age of the Common Law, the pleadings were altercations in open Court, in presence of the Judges; whose province it was to superintend or moderate the oral contention thus conducted before them. In doing this, their general aim was, to compel the pleaders so to manage their alternate allegations, as at length to arrive at some specific point or matter, affirmed on one side, and denied on the other. If this point was matter of fact, the parties then, by mutual agreement, referred it to one of the various methods of trial then in use, or to such trial as the Court should think proper. They were then said to be at *issue* (*ad exitum*, that is, at the *end* of their pleading); and the question thus raised for decision, was called the *issue*.[1] In this course of proceeding, every allegation, passed over without denial, was considered as admitted by the opposite party, and thus the controversy finally turned upon the proposition, and that alone, which was involved in the issue. This method was found so highly beneficial, that it was retained after the pleadings were conducted in writing, and it still constitutes one of the cardinal doctrines of the law of pleading.

§ 4. It will be observed, that, by the Common Law, the issue is formed by the parties themselves, through their attorneys; the Court having nothing to do with the progress of the altercation, except to see that it is conducted in the forms of law; and it always consists of a single proposition, precisely and distinctly stated. The advantages of this mode over all others in use, especially where the trial is by jury, are strikingly apparent. The opposite to this method is that, which was pursued in the Roman tribunals, and which still constitutes a principal feature in the proceedings in the Courts of Continental Europe; by which the complaint of the plaintiff may be set forth at large, with its circumstances and in all its relations, even to diffuseness, in his bill or libel, and the answer

[1] Stephen on Pleading, p. 29, 30.

and defence of the defendant may be made with equal variety and minuteness of detail. Proceedings in this form are utterly unfit for trial by a jury; and accordingly, when material facts are to be settled in Chancery, in England, the Chancellor ordinarily directs proper issues to be framed and sent for trial to the Courts of Common Law. In the United States, the same course is pursued, wherever the Equity and Common Law jurisdictions are vested in separate tribunals. But where the Courts of Common Law are also clothed with Chancery powers, if important facts are asserted and denied, which are proper to be tried by a jury, the Court, in its discretion will direct the making up and trial of proper issues, at its own bar.[1] In the Courts of the States of Continental Europe, where the forms of procedure are derived from the Roman Law, the necessity has been universally felt, of adopting some method of extracting from the multifarious counter-allegations of the parties the material points in controversy, the decision of which will finally terminate the suit; and various modes have been pursued, to attain this necessary object. In the Courts of Scotland, where the course of procedure is still by libel and answer, the practice, since the recent introduction of trials by jury, is for the counsel first to prepare and propose the issues to be tried, and if these are not agreed to, (or, which is more usual, are omitted to be prepared,) the Clerks frame the issues, which are sent to the Lord Ordinary for his approval. In all these methods, the point for decision is publicly adjusted by a retrospective selection from the pleadings; but in the more simple and certain method of the Common Law, the altercations of the parties, being conducted by the established rules of good pleading, will, by the mere operation of these rules, finally and unerringly evolve the true point in dispute, in the form of a single proposition.

§ 5. Of the issues, thus raised, some are termed *general issues;* others are *special.* The general issue is so called, because it is a general and comprehensive denial of the whole

[1] Charles River Bridge *v.* Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344.

declaration, or of the principal part of it. The latter kind of issue usually arises in some later stage of the pleadings, and is so called by way of distinction from the former. The general issue, as will be more distinctly seen in its proper place, puts in controversy the material part of the declaration, and obliges the plaintiff to prove it in each particular. Thus upon the plea of not guilty, in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, the plaintiff must prove his possession by right as against the defendant, the unlawful entry of the defendant, and the damages done by him, if more than nominal damages are claimed. But if the defendant specially pleads, that the plaintiff gave him a license to enter, then no evidence of the plaintiff's title or possession, or of the defendant's entry, need be adduced, the fact of the license being alone in controversy.

§ 6. The form of the general issue in *assumpsit* is, "that the defendant did not promise (or undertake) in manner and form," &c. This would seem to put in issue only the fact of his having made the promise alleged; and so, upon true principle, it appears to have been originally regarded. But for a long time, in England, and still, in the American Courts, a much wider effect has been given to it in practice; the defendant being permitted, under this issue, to give in evidence any matter, showing that the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of the suit, had no cause of action.[1] The same latitude has been allowed, under the general issue of not guilty, in actions of trespass on the case; by permitting the defendant not only to contest the truth of the declaration but, in most cases, to prove any matter of defence, tending to show that the plaintiff has no right of action, even though the matter be in confession and avoidance, such for example, as a release, or a satisfaction given.[2]

§ 7. It is obvious, that so very general a mode of pleading and practice, is contrary to one of the great principles of the law of remedy, which is, that all pleadings should be certain,

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[1] Stephen on Pleading, p. 179, 180. [2] Ibid. p. 182, 183.

that is, should be distinct and particular; in order that the party may have full knowledge of what he is to answer, and to meet in proof at the trial, as well as that the jury may know what they are to try, and that the Courts may know not only what judgment to render, but whether the matter in controversy has been precisely adjudicated upon in a previous action. To the parties themselves, this distinctness of information is essential, on principles of common justice. These considerations led to the passage of an act,[1] in England, under which the Courts have corrected the abuse of the general issue, by restricting its meaning and application to its original design and effect.[2]

§ 8. Thus, in all actions of *assumpsit*, except on bills of exchange and promissory notes, the general issue, by the English rules, now operates only as a denial in fact of the express contract or promise alleged, or of the matters of fact, from which the contract or promise alleged may be implied by law. In actions on bills of exchange and promissory notes the plea of *non assumpsit* is no longer admissible, but a plea in denial must traverse some particular matter of fact. All matters in confession and avoidance, whether going to the original making of the contract, or to its subsequent discharge, must now be specially pleaded. The plea of *non est factum*, in debt or covenant, is restricted in its operation, to the mere denial of the execution of the deed, in point of fact; all other defences, whether showing the deed absolutely void, or only voidable, being required to be specially pleaded. The plea of *non detinet*, also, now puts in issue only the detention of the goods, and not the plaintiff's property therein. In actions on the case, the plea of not guilty is now restricted in its effect to a mere denial of the breach of duty, or wrongful act, alleged to have been committed by the defendant, and not of the facts stated in the inducement; in actions of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, the same plea operates only as

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[1] 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42.

[2] See Regulæ Generales, Hil. T. 1834; 10 Bing. 453 – 475.

a denial, that the defendant committed the act alleged, in the place mentioned, and not as a denial of the plaintiff's possession or title ; and in actions of trespass *de bonis asportatis*, this plea operates only as a denial of the fact of taking or damaging the goods mentioned, but not of the plaintiff's property therein.

§ 9. While the learned Judges in England have thus labored to restore this part of the system of remedial justice to more perfect consistency, by limiting the general issue to its original meaning, thus securing greater fairness in the trial, by preventing the possibility of misapprehension or surprise ; the course of opinion and practice in the United States seems to have tended in the opposite direction. The general issue is here still permitted to include all the matters of defence, which it embraced in England prior to the adoption of the New Rules ; and in several of the States, the defendant is, by statute, allowed in all cases to plead the general issue, and under it to give in evidence any special matter pleadable in bar, of which he has given notice by a brief statement, filed at the same time with the plea, or within the time specified in the rules of the respective Courts.[1] In some

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[1] See New York Rev. Stat. Vol. 2, p. 352, § 10 ; Maine Rev. Stat. ch. 115, § 18; LL. Ohio, ch. 822, § 48, (Chase's ed.) ; LL. Tennessee, 1811, ch. 114. In Massachusetts, this privilege is given only in certain specified cases. See Mass. Rev. St. ch. 21, § 49 ; ch. 58, § 17 ; ch. 85, § 11 ; ch. 100, § 26, 27 ; ch. 112, § 3 ; but in nearly all the States it is accorded to Justices of the Peace, and other public officers and their agents, in actions for any thing done by them in the course of their official duties ; the statutes being similar to 21 Jac. 1, c. 52, and the other English statutes on this subject. In Maine, the plaintiff may file a counter brief statement of any matter on which he intends to rely, in avoidance of the matter contained in the brief statement of the defendant; so that the substance of the Common Law of pleading is not totally abolished, though exceptions of form, by special demurrer, can no longer be taken. Of the wisdom of such wide departures from the distinctness and precision of allegation required from both parties by the Common Law, grave doubts are entertained by many of the profession ; especially where the rules do not require the plaintiff to file any notice of the reply, intended to be made to the matter set up in defence. Nor is it readily perceived how the Courts can administer equal and certain justice to

States, however, the course of remedy is by petition and answer, somewhat similar to proceedings in Equity.

§ 10. Amid such diversities in the forms of proceeding, it is obviously almost impossible to adjust a work like this to the particular rules of local practice, without at the same time confining its usefulness to a very small portion of the country. Yet as, in every controversy, under whatever forms it may be conducted, the parties must come at last to some material and distinct proposition, affirmed on one side and denied on the other; and as the declarations and pleas, and the rules of good pleading, adopted in the Courts of Common Law, exhibit the most precise and logical method of allegation, the principles of which are acknowledged and observed in all our tribunals, it may not be impracticable, by adhering to these principles, to lay down in the following pages some rules, which will be found generally applicable, under whatever modifications of the Common Law of remedy justice may be administered.

§ 11. A further preliminary observation may here be made, applicable to every action founded on a written document, namely, that the first step in the evidence on the side of the plaintiff, is the production of the document itself. If there is any variance between the document and the description in the declaration, it will, as we have previously seen,[1] be rejected. If the variance is occasioned by a mere mistake in setting out a written instrument, the record may generally be amended, by leave of the Court, under the statutes of

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the parties, without adopting, in the shape of rules of practice, or in some other form, the principle of the Common Law, which requires that each party be seasonably and distinctly informed, by the record, of the proposition intended to be maintained by his adversary at the trial, that he may come prepared to meet it. But these are considerations more properly belonging to another place.

[1] Vol. 1, § 61, 63, 66, 69, 70. There is a material distinction between mere allegations, and matter of description. In mere matters of allegation, a variance in proof, as to time, number, or quantity, does not affect the plaintiff's right of recovery; but as to matters of description, a variance in time is fatal. Gates *v.* Bowker, 18 Verm. R. 23.

amendment, of the United States, and of the several States; and in England, under Lord Tenterden's act.[1] Thus, where a written contract by letter was set forth as a promise to pay for certain goods, and on production of the letter, the contract appeared to be an undertaking to guarantee to the plaintiff the amount supplied, an amendment was permitted.[2] But if the variance is occasioned by the allegation of a matter totally different from that offered in evidence, it will not be amended. Thus, where, in a declaration for a malicious arrest, the averment was, that the plaintiff in that action "did not prosecute his said suit, but therein made default," and the proof by the record was, that he obtained a rule to discontinue, the plaintiff was not permitted to amend, the matter being regarded as totally different.[3]

§ 11 *a*. The general practice in these cases may be illustrated by a few examples. And first, in regard to *amendments of the process*, in the *names of parties*. The rule of the Common Law, that no new parties can be *added* by amendment,[4] is believed to be universally adopted in the United States; though in some few States the Common Law in this respect has been changed by statutes, which permit this to be done in certain cases at law, as is done in all cases in Courts of Equity. But generally, parties unnecessarily and improperly made such, and having no interest in the matter, may be stricken out, where the cause or nature of the action is not affected, and no injury can accrue to the defendant. Thus, if the wife is improperly made defendant with the husband in an action on a contract made during coverture;[5] or if several are sued in covenant, and on oyer had it appears that some of them never became parties to the deed;[6]

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1 9 Geo. 4, c. 15. See also St. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42.

2 Hanbury *v.* Ella, 1 Ad. & El. 61.

3 Webb *v.* Hill 1 M. & Malk. 253, per Ld. Tenterden.

4 Winslow *v.* Merrill, 2 Fairf. 127; Wilson *v.* Wallace, 8 S. & R. 53; Atkinson *v.* Clapp, 1 Wend. 71.

5 Colcord *v.* Swan, 7 Mass. 291; Parsons *v.* Plaisted, 13 Mass. 189; Whitbeck *v.* Cook, 15 Johns. 483.

6 McClure *v.* Burton, 1 Car. Law Repos. 472. And see Wilson *v.* King,

the names improperly inserted may be stricken out of the process. But if such amendment will change the ground of action, or have the effect of constituting a different party to the record, as, if the suit be against two as partners, and it is proposed to amend by erasing the name of one, and so making it a suit against the other in his several capacity, it will not be allowed.[1] If the name of the party be misspelled, or the designation of *junior* be omitted, or a corporation be sued by a wrong name, the service of process being right, the mistake may be amended.[2] So also, the process may be amended by stating the capacity or trust in which the plaintiff sues, such as trustee or other officer or agent of a society beneficially interested in the suit, or the like; or, if an infant, by inserting the name of his next friend.[3] So, a *scire facias* may be amended by the record on which it is founded.[4]

§ 11 *b*. In the next place, as to *amendments of the pleadings*. The general doctrine of variance having already been discussed in the preceding volume,[5] it will suffice here to remark, that the Courts manifest an increasing disposition to give to the statutes of amendments the most beneficial effect, not suffering the end of the suit to be defeated, where the record contains *the substance of a valid claim*, and an amendment is seasonably asked for. The American statutes on

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6 Yerg. 493, *acc.* But see Redington *v.* Farrar, 5 Greenl. 379, where, in *assumpsit* against two, an amendment by striking out the name of one of them was refused.

[1] Peck *v.* Sill, 3 Conn. R. 157. Whether a writ of entry may be amended by striking out the name of one of the demandants, *quære*. See Treat *v.* McMahon, 2 Greenl. 120; Pickett *v.* King, 4 N. Hamp. 212, that it may not be. Rehoboth *v.* Hunt, 1 Pick. 224, that it may be.

[2] Furniss *v.* Ellis, 2 Brock. 14; Kincaid *v.* Howe, 10 Mass. 203; Bullard *v.* Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 99; Sherman *v.* Connecticut R. Bridge, 11 Mass. 338; Burnham *v.* Strafford Savings Bank, 5 N. Hamp. 573.

[3] Anderson *v.* Brock, 3 Greenl. 243; Blood *v.* Harrington, 8 Pick. 552.

[4] Maus *v.* Maus, 5 Watts, 345; Moody *v.* Stracey, 4 Taunt. 558; Williams *v.* Lee, 2 Taylor, 146; Burrows *v.* Heysham, 1 Dall. 133; Hazeldine *v.* Walker, 1 Har. & Johns. 487; Patrick *v.* Woods, 3 Bibb, 232.

[5] See *ante*, Vol. 1, § 63 – 73.

this subject give to the Courts much broader discretionary powers than are given by any English statutes, prior to Ld. Tenterden's act; and powers scarcely exceeded by that and the later statutes.[1] Accordingly, the only question in regard to the admissibility of an amendment of the pleadings now is, whether it introduces another and distinct cause of controversy. If it does not, but the original cause of action or ground of title or defence is adhered to, the allegations and pleadings may be amended.[2] Thus, if, in an action for money had and received, the promise be laid as made by the administrator, when it was the promise of his intestate;[3] or if the allegation of a demand be omitted, where it was necessary to the foundation of the action;[4] or if the indorser of a note in blank be charged as an original promissor, when he should have been charged as a guarantor;[5] or if the loss of a vessel be alleged to have been by capture and by perils of the sea, when it was by barratry;[6] or if, in trover for promissory notes, or in assumpsit to recover the money due upon them, they are misdescribed;[7] in these and the like cases the errors may be amended. But to add counts upon other promissory notes will not be allowed;[8] nor will the plaintiff be permitted to amend, in an action against the sheriff for a false return of bail when none was taken, by adding a count for refusing to deliver the bail bond, mentioned in his return.[9]

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1 See 6 Dane's Abr. ch. 184, art. 1, § 3; art. 11, § 7, 8.

2 Haynes *v.* Morgan, 3 Mass. 208; Ball *v.* Claflin, 5 Pick. 304; Cassell *v.* Cooke, 8 S. & R. 287, per Duncan, J.; Cunningham *v.* Day, 2 S. & R. 1; Kester *v.* Stokes, 4 Miles, 67; Commonwealth *v.* Meckling, 2 Watts, 130; Ebersoll *v.* Krug, 5 Binn. 53, per Tilghman, C. J.; Pullen *v.* Hutchinson, 12 Shepl. 249.

3 Eaton *v.* Whitaker, 6 Pick, 465.

4 Ewing *v.* French, 1 Blackf. 170.

5 Tenney *v.* Prince. 4 Pick. 385.

6 Anon. 15 S. & R. 83.

7 Hoffnagle *v.* Leavitt, 7 Cow. 517; Stanwood *v.* Scovell, 4 Pick. 422.

8 Farm. & Mech. Bank *v.* Israel, 6 S. & R. 294.

9 Eaton *v.* Ogier, 2 Greenl. 46. See further, Butterfield *v.* Harrell, 3 N. Hamp. 201; Edgerley *v.* Emerson, 4 N. Hamp. 147; Carpenter *v.* Gookin, 2 Verm. 495.

§ 11 *c*. The recent *English statutes* having been framed for the like objects, it may be useful here to advert to their provisions and the decisions under them. The statute, termed *Ld. Tenterden's act*,[1] empowers the Courts "to cause the record, on which any trial may be pending in any civil action, or in any indictment or information for any misdemeanor, *when a variance shall appear between any matter in writing or in print produced in evidence, and the recital or setting forth thereof upon the record whereon the trial is pending*, to be forthwith amended in such particular," on payment of such costs, if any, as the Court shall think reasonable. By a subsequent statute,[2] this power was extended not only to civil actions, but to informations in the nature of a *quo warranto*, and proceedings on a *mandamus*, the Courts being authorized, "*when any variance shall appear between the proof and the recital or setting forth on the record, writ, or document on which the trial is proceeding, of any contract, custom, prescription, name or other matter*, in any particular — in the judgment of the Court or Judge *not material to the merits of the case*, and by which the opposite party cannot have been prejudiced in the conduct of his action, prosecution, or defence, to be forthwith amended," upon such terms as to payment of costs, or postponing the trial, or both, as the Court or Judge shall think reasonable; and if the amendment, being in a particular not material to the merits, is such as that the opposite party may have been prejudiced thereby in the conduct of his suit or defence, then upon such terms as to payment of costs, *and* withdrawing the record, or postponing the trial, as the Court or Judge shall think reasonable.

§ 11 *d*. These statutes have been administered in England in the liberal spirit in which they were conceived; care being taken, as in the United States, that no new and distinct cause of controversy be created. Thus, in slander, where the words charged were, "S. is to be tried," for buying stolen goods, and the words proved were, "*I have heard* that he is to be tried," an amendment was allowed, as it

[1] Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 15. [2] Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42.

went only to the amount of the damages, and not to the merits of the action.[1] So, where the words stated were English, and the words proved were Welsh.[2] So, where the allegation was of a libel *published in a certain newspaper*, and the proof was of a slip of printed paper, not appearing to have been cut from that newspaper, though the newspaper contained a similar article.[3] So, where the plea to an action upon a bill of exchange was, that the bill was given for two several sums lost at play in two several games, and the proof was that the parties played at both games, and that the defendant lost the gross sum, in all, but not that he lost any amount at one of the games, it was held amendable.[4] An amendment has also been allowed in *assumpsit* upon the warranty of a horse, where a general warranty was alleged, and the proof was of a warranty with the exception of a particular foot.[5] So, where the allegation was with a qualification, and the proof was of a contract in general terms, without the qualification.[6] In like manner, where the contract, instrument, or duty, has been misdescribed in the record, it is held amendable ; as, in *assumpsit* on a charter party, where the allegation of the promise, being intended only as a statement of the legal effect of the instrument, was erroneous, the plaintiff was permitted to amend, either by striking out the allegation, or by substituting a corrected statement.[7] So, in assumpsit for the use and occupation of certain

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[1] Smith *v.* Knowelden, 2 M. & G. 561.

[2] Jenkins *v.* Phillips, 9 C. & P. 766, per Coleridge, J. The contrary was held, under the former statutes. Zenobio *v.* Axtell, 6 T. R. 162 ; Wormouth *v.* Cramer, 3 Wend. 394.

[3] Foster *v.* Pointer, 9 C. & P. 718, per Gurney, B.

[4] Cooke *v.* Stafford, 13 M. & W. 379.

[5] Hemming *v.* Parry, 6 C. & P. 580. See also Read *v.* Dunsmore, 9 C. & P. 588.

[6] Evans *v.* Fryer, 10 Ad. & El. 609.

[7] Whitwill *v.* Scheer, 8 Ad. & El. 301. But in a subsequent case of covenant, where it was objected that no such covenants could be implied in the deed, it was held by Maule, J. that the statutes of amendment were designed to meet variances arising from accidental slips, and not to extend to cases where the pleading has been intentionally and deliberately, but erroneously framed : and he therefore refused to allow an amendment. Bowers *v.* Nixon, 2 Car. & Kir. 372.

"standings, market places, and sheds," where the proof was of a demise of the "tolls" to be collected at those places, an amendment was allowed.[1] So, where the promise alleged was to "pay" for goods furnished to another, and the proof was, to "guarantee" the payment;[2] and where the declaration was upon an instrument described as a bill of exchange, but the instrument produced appeared in fact to be a promissory note;[3] and where a guarantee was set forth as for advances to be made by A., and the proof was of a guarantee for advances to be made by A. or any member of his firm, or, *è converso*;[4] and where the declaration charged the defendant upon the contract as a carrier, and the proof was, that if liable at all, it was only as a wharfinger, on a contract to forward;[5] and where the contract alleged was, to build for the plaintiff a certain room, booth, or building, according to certain plans then agreed on, by the 28th of June, for the sum of £20, and the contract proved was, to erect certain seats or tables, for £25, to be completed four or five days before that day, being the day of the coronation;[6] and where, in debt on a bond, the penalty was stated to be £260, but in the bond produced it was only £200;[7] and in case against the sheriff for a voluntary escape, where the proof was, that the officer did not arrest, but negligently omitted so to do, having opportunity;[8] and even where, in *assumpsit* upon a promissory note, described as made by the defendant on the 9th of November, 1838, for £250, payable on demand, the note produced bore date November 6th, 1837, and was payable with interest twelve months after date, it also not appearing that there

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[1] Mayor, &c. of Carmarthen *v.* Lewis, 6 C. & P. 608.

[2] Hanbury *v.* Ella, 1 Ad. & El. 61.

[3] Moilliet *v.* Powell, 6 C. & P. 233.

[4] Chapman *v.* Sutton, 2 Man. Gr. & Scott, 634; Boyd *v.* Moyle, Ibid. 644.

[5] Parry *v.* Fairhurst, 2 C. M. & R. 190; 5 Tyrw. 685.

[6] Ward *v.* Pierson, 5 M. & W. 16; 7 Dowl. 382.

[7] Hill. *v.* Salt, 2 C. & M. 420; 4 Tyrw. 271.

[8] Guest *v.* Elwes, 5 Ad. & El. 118; 2 N. & P. 230.

existed any other note between the parties;[1] in these, and many similar cases, amendments have been allowed.

§ 11 *e*. On the other hand, the Courts, acting under these statutes, have *refused amendments*, where the object was merely to supply material *omissions*, as well as where the amendment will probably *deprive* the defendant of a *good defence*, which he otherwise might have made, or would probably require *new pleadings*,[2] or would introduce a *transaction entirely different* from that stated in the plea.[3] Thus, an amendment has been refused in trespass, to extend the justification to certain articles omitted in the plea;[4] and in replevin, to extend the avowry in the like manner.[5] So, to enlarge the *ad damnum* in the declaration.[6] So, in *assumpsit* by the vendee against the vendor of goods, for non-delivery, where the contract alleged was for a certain price, and the contract proved was for the same nominal price, with a *discount of five per cent.*, an amendment was refused, as tending, under the circumstances stated at the bar, to preclude a good defence.[7] And, where the plaintiff alleged title to a stream of water as the possessor of a mill, which the defendant traversed, and the proof was, that he was entitled only as owner of the adjoining land, an amendment was refused, on the ground that it might require a change of the issue, and that the defendant may have been misled by the plaintiff's mode of pleading.[8]

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1 Beckett *v.* Dutton, 7 M. & W. 157; 4 Jur. 993; 8 Dowl. 865.

2 Perry *v.* Watts, 3 Man. & Gr. 775, as explained in Gurford *v.* Bayley, Ibid. 784.

3 David *v.* Preece, 5 Ad. & El. 440, N. S.

4 John *v.* Currie, 6 C. & P. 618.

5 Bye *v.* Bower, 1 Car. &. Marshm. 262. In the United States, amendments in these two cases would doubtless be allowed.

6 Watkins *v.* Morgan, 6 C. & P. 661. In the United States it has been held otherwise. See McLellan *v.* Crofton, 6 Greenl. 307; Bogart *v.* McDonald, 2 Johns. Cas. 219; Danielson *v.* Andrews, 1 Pick. 156. And see Tomlinson *v.* Blacksmith, 7 T. R. 132.

7 Ivey *v.* Young, 1 M. & Rob. 545.

8 Frankum *v.* E. of Falmouth, 6 C. & P. 529; 2 Ad. & El. 452.

§ 12. It is further to be observed, that though every part of a written document is descriptive, and therefore material to be proved as alleged, yet if, in declaring upon such an instrument, the allegation is, that it was *made upon such a day*, without stating that it *bore date* on that day, the day in the declaration is not material, and therefore need not be precisely proved; but if it is described as bearing date on a certain day, the date must be shown to be literally as alleged, and any variance herein will be fatal unless amended.[1] The date is not of the essence of the contract, though it is essential to the identity of the writing, by which the contract may be proved. The plaintiff therefore may always declare according to the truth of the transaction, only being careful, if he mentions the writing and undertakes to describe it, to describe it truly.[2]

§ 13. But an *immaterial discrepancy* between the record and the deed itself is not regarded. Thus, upon oyer of a deed, where the declaration was, that it bore date in a certain year of our Lord, and of the then king, and the deed simply gave the date thus — "March 30, 1701" — without mention of the Christian era, or of the king's reign, it was held well.[3] So, where the condition was, "without any fraud or *other* delay, the omission of the word "other" in the oyer was held immaterial.[4] Nor will literal mis-spelling be regarded as a variance.[5]

§ 14. Ordinarily, in stating an instrument or other matter in pleading, it should be set forth, not according to its *terms*,

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[1] Coxon *v.* Lyon, 2 Campb. 307, n.; Anon. 2 Campb. 308, n.; Cor. Ld. Ellenborough.

[2] Hague *v.* French, 3 B. & P. 173; De la Courtier *v.* Bellamy, 2 Show. 422.

[3] Holman *v.* Borough, 2 Salk. 658.

[4] Henry *v.* Brown, 19 Johns. 49.

[5] Cull. *v.* Sarmin, 3 Lev. 66; Waugh *v.* Bussell, 5 Taunt. 707. The omission of the word "sterling," as descriptive of the kind of currency, is immaterial. Kearney *v.* King, 2 B. & Ald. 301.

or its *form*, but according to its *effect in law ;* for it is under its latter aspect, that it is ultimately to be considered. Thus, if a joint-tenant conveys the estate to his companion by the words "give, grant," &c., the deed is to be pleaded as a release, such only being its effect in law. So, if a tenant for life conveys to the reversioner by words of grant, it must be pleaded, not as a grant, but as a surrender.[1] So, where a bill of exchange is made payable to the order of a person, it may be declared upon as a bill payable to the person himself.[2] If no time of payment be mentioned, the instrument should be declared upon as payable on demand.[3] If a bill be drawn or accepted, or a deed be made, by an agent in the name of his principal, it should be pleaded as the act of the principal himself.[4] And a bill payable to a fictitious person or his order, is, in effect, a bill payable to bearer, and may be declared on as such, in favor of a *bonâ fide* holder, ignorant of the fact, against all the parties who had knowledge of the fiction.[5]

§ 15. But, on the other hand, it will not always suffice to adhere to the *literal terms* of the instrument, in setting it forth in the declaration ; for sometimes the true interpretation of the instrument itself may lead to a result totally different from the intendment of law upon the face of the declaration. Thus, where a bill was drawn and dated at Dublin, for a certain sum, and in the pleadings it was described as drawn "at Dublin, to wit, at Westminster," without any mention of Ireland, or of Irish currency, it was held, that here was a material variance between the allegation and the evidence. For though the place and the sum corresponded, even to the letter, yet by the legal interpretation of the bill, the currency intended was Irish, whereas by the allegation in the record,

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1 Stephen on Pl. 389, 390.

2 Smith *v.* M'Clure, 5 East, 476 ; Fay *v.* Goulding, 10 Pick. 122.

3 Gaylord *v.* Van Loan, 15 Wend. 308.

4 Heyes *v.* Heseltine, 2 Campb. 604.

5 Chitty on Bills, 178 ; Bayley on Bills, 26, 431 ; Grant *v.* Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516 ; Minet *v.* Gibson, 1 H. Bl. 569 ; Story on Bills, § 56.

the Court could not legally understand any other than British sterling, because no other was averred, and the bill was not alleged to have been drawn in Ireland.[1] So, where a note was made without any mention of the time of payment, and none was averred in the declaration, the judgment was reversed, upon error brought, the plaintiff not having declared upon the contract, according to its legal effect, but on the evidence only.[2]

§ 16. In regard to the *proof* of the *formal execution* of deeds, bills of exchange, and other written documents, it was formerly the right of the adverse party to require precise proof of all signatures and documents, making part of the chain of title in the party producing them. But the great and unnecessary expense of this course, as well as the inconvenience and delay which it occasioned, have led to the adoption of salutary rules, restricting the exercise of the right to cases, where the genuineness of the instrument is actually in controversy, being either put in issue by the pleadings, or by actual notice given, pursuant to the rules of the Court.[3]

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[1] Kearney *v.* King, 2 B. & Ald. 301.

[2] Bacon *v.* Page, 1 Conn. R. 404. But see Herrick *v.* Bennett, 8 Johns. 374, where such a declaration was held well on demurrer.

[3] By the Rules of Hil. T. 1834, Reg. 20, (10 Bing. 456,) either party, after plea pleaded, and a reasonable time before trial, may give notice to the other of his intention to adduce in evidence certain written or printed documents; and unless the adverse party shall consent, in the manner therein prescribed, to admit their formal execution, or the truth of the copies to be adduced, he may be summoned before a Judge to show cause why he should not consent to such admission, and ultimately, if the Judge shall deem the application reasonable, may be compelled to pay the costs of the proof. See also Tidd's New Practice, p. 481, 482. In some of the United States, the original right to require formal proof of documents, remains as at Common Law, unrestricted by rules of Court. In others, it has been restricted either to cases where the genuineness of the document has been put in issue by the pleadings, or where previous notice of an intention to dispute it has been seasonably given; (Reg. Gen. Sup. Jud. Court Mass. 1836, Reg. LIII., 24 Pick. 399); or, where the attorney has been instructed by his client that the signature is not genuine; or, where the defendant, being present in Court, shall expressly deny that the signature is his. (Reg. Gen. Sup. Jud. Court, Maine, 1822, Reg. XXXIII., 1 Greenl. 421.) In the Circuit Court U. S.,

§ 17. If the *instrument* declared on is *lost*, the fact of the loss may be proved by the affidavit of the plaintiff, a foundation being first laid for this proof, by evidence, that the instrument once existed, and that diligent search has been made for it in the places where it was likely to be found.[1]

We now proceed to the consideration of the evidence to be offered under particular issues, in their order.

First Circuit, the defendant is not permitted to deny his signature to a note or bill of exchange, or the signature of a prior indorser, unless upon affidavit made of reasonable cause, necessary for his defence. Reg. 34. In the Seventh Circuit, the rule requires that the defendant shall first make affidavit that the instrument was not executed by him. And this rule has been held to be legal, under the Judiciary Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22. Mills *v.* Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 439, 440. By the law of South Carolina, the plaintiff is not obliged to produce the subscribing witnesses, to a bond or note, but may prove its execution by any other witness, unless the defendant will swear that it is not his signature. Statutes at Large, Vol. 5, p. 435.

[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 349, 558.

ABATEMENT.

§ 18. Such of the causes of abatement as may also be pleaded in bar, will generally be treated under their appropriate titles. It is proposed here to consider those only, which belong more especially to this title.

§ 19. The plea of *alien enemy* must be pleaded with the highest degree of legal certainty, or, as it is expressed in the books, with certainty to a certain intent in particular; that is, it must be so certain as to exclude and negative every case in which an alien enemy may sue. It therefore states the foreign country or place in which the plaintiff was born; that he was born and continues under allegiance to its sovereign, of parents under the same allegiance, or adherents to the same sovereign; that such sovereign or country is an enemy to our own; and, if he is here, that he came hither, or remains, without a safe conduct or license;[1] and that he has been ordered out of the country by the President's proclamation.[2] If the plaintiff should reply, that he is a native citizen and not an alien, concluding, as seems proper in such cases, to the country, the defendant has the affirmative, and must prove, that the plaintiff is an alien, as alleged in the plea.[3] If the plaintiff should reply, that he was *duly naturalized*, the proper evidence of this is the record of the Court in which it was done. If the judgment is entered on record in legal form, it closes all in-

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[1] Casseres *v.* Bell, 8 T. R. 166; Wells *v.* Williams, 1 Ld. Raym. 282; 1 Chitty on Pl. 214; Stephen on Pl. 67. License and safe conduct are implied, until the President shall think proper to order the party, either by name or character, out of the United States. 10 Johns. 72.

[2] Stat. U. S. July 6, 1798 (ch. 75); Clarke *v.* Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72; Bagwell *v.* Babe, 1 Rand. 272; Russell *v.* Skipwith, 6 Binn. 241.

[3] Jackson on Pleading in Real Actions, p. 62, 65; Smith *v.* Dovers, 2 Doug. 428.

quiry, it being, like other judgments, complete evidence of its own validity.[1] These proceedings in naturalization have been treated with great indulgence, and the most liberal intendments made in their favor.[2] The oath of allegiance appearing to have been duly taken, it has been held, that no order of the Court, that he be admitted to the rights of a citizen, was necessary, the record of the oath amounting to a judgment of the Court for his admission to those rights.[3] And such record is held conclusive evidence, that all the previous legal requisites were complied with.[4]

§ 20. If the plea is founded on a defective or improper *service of the process*, as, for example, that it was served on Sunday, the day will be taken notice of by the Court, and any almanac may be referred to. So, if the service is made on any other day, on which, by public statute, no service can be made, the like rule prevails; and this, whether the day is fixed by the statute, or by proclamation by the Executive.[5]

§ 21. If the defendant, in pleading a *misnomer*, allege that he was *baptized* by such a name, though the averment of his baptism was unnecessary, yet he is bound to prove the allegation, as laid, by producing the proper evidence of his baptism.[6] This may be proved by production of the register of his baptism, or, a copy of the registry or record, duly authenticated, together with evidence of his identity with the person there named.[7] If there is no averment of the fact of baptism, the name may be proved by any other competent evidence, showing that he bore and used that name.[8]

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[1] Spratt *v.* Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 408.

[2] Priest *v.* Cummings, 16 Wend. 617, 625.

[3] Campbell *v.* Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176.

[4] Stark *v.* The Chesapeake Ins. Co. 7 Cranch, 420; Ritchie *v.* Putnam, 13 Wend. 524; Spratt *v.* Spratt, 4 Pet. 393.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 5. 6.

[6] Ante, Vol. 1, § 60; Weleker *v.* Le Pelletier, 1 Campb. 479.

[7] Ante, Vol. 1, § 484, 493.

[8] Holman *v.* Walden, 1 Salk. 6.

§ 22. In *criminal cases*, it is a good objection, in abatement, that twelve of the grand jury did not concur in finding the bill; in which case the fact may be shown by the testimony of the grand jurors themselves, it not being a secret of State, but a constitutional right of the citizen.[1]

§ 23. In real actions, *non-tenure* is classed among pleas in abatement, because it partakes of the character of dilatory pleas; though it shows that the tenant is not liable to the action, in any shape, inasmuch as he does not hold the land.[2] The replication, putting this fact in issue, alleges that the tenant "was tenant as of freehold of the premises," and concludes to the country. Tenure may be proved *primâ facie* by evidence of actual possession.[3] It is also shown, by proof of an entry with claim of title;[4] or, by a deed of conveyance from a grantor in possession.[5] If a *disclaimer* is pleaded in abatement, the only advantage in contesting it seems to be the recovery of costs, where they are given by statute to the party prevailing. In such cases, the only proper replication is the same, in form, as to the plea of non-tenure, as before stated.[6]

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[1] Low's case, 4 Greenl. 439.

[2] 2 Saund. 44, n, (4); Jackson on Pl. in Real Actions, p. 91. The form of the plea is this: — "And the said T. comes and defends his right, when &c. and says, that he cannot render to the said D. the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances, because he says, that he is not, and was not on the day of the purchase of the original writ in this action, nor at any time afterwards, tenant of the said tenements as of freehold; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment of the writ aforesaid, and that the same may be quashed; and for his costs." See Jackson on Plead. in Real Actions, p. 93; Story's Pleadings, p. 41; Stearns on Real Actions, App. No. 49.

[3] Newhall *v.* Wheeler, 7 Mass. 189, 199.

[4] 1 Mass. 484, per Sewall, J.; Prop'rs Kennebec Purchase *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Higbee *v.* Rice, 5 Mass. 344, 352.

[5] Pidge *v.* Tyler, 4 Mass. 541; Knox *v.* Jenks, 7 Mass. 488.

[6] Jackson's Plead. p. 100, 101. The form of a general disclaimer, in abatement, is as follows: — "And the said T. comes and defends his right when, &c. and says that he has nothing, nor does he claim to have any thing, in the said demanded premises, nor did he have, nor claim to have, any thing therein on the day of the purchase of the original writ in this action, nor at

§ 24. The *non-joinder* of proper parties is also pleadable in abatement. If the defendant plead that he made the promise jointly with another, the plea will be maintained by evidence of a promise jointly with an infant;[1] for the promise of an infant is in general voidable only, and not void;[2] and it is good until avoided by himself. If he has avoided the promise, this fact will constitute a good replication, and must be proved by the plaintiff. Where the plea was, that several persons, named in the plea, being the assignees of H., a bankrupt, ought to have been joined as co-defendants, it was held, that proof of their having acted as assignees was not sufficient, and that nothing less than proof of the assignment itself would satisfy the allegation.[3] And if, on the face of the assignment, it should appear that there were other assignees, not named in the plea, this would falsify the plea.[4] If, upon the plea of the non-joinder of other partners as defendants, it is proved that, though the contract was made in the name of the firm, it was made by the agency of the defendant alone, and for his own use, and the proceeds were

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any time afterwards; but he wholly disclaims to have any thing in the said premises; and this he is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment of the writ aforesaid, and that the same may be quashed; and for his costs." Ib. p. 100.

[1] Gibbs *v.* Merrill, 3 Taunt. 307; Woodward *v.* Newhall, 1 Pick. 500. The form of such plea may be thus: — "And the said D. comes, &c., when, &c., and prays judgment of the writ and declaration aforesaid, because he says, that the said several promises in said declaration mentioned, were and each of them was made by one A. B. *jointly* with the said D.; which A. B. is still alive, to wit, at ——, and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore, because the said A. B. is not named in said writ and declaration, the said D. prays judgment of said writ and declaration, and that the same may be quashed." Story's Pl. 35; 1 Wentw. Pl. 17; 1 Chitty's Precedents, p. 197; Gould *v.* Lasbury, 1 C. M. & R. 254; Gale *v.* Capern, 1 Ad. & El. 102.

[2] Fisher *v.* Jewett, 1 Berton's R. 35. In this case, upon an able review of the authorities, it was held, by the learned Court of the Province of New Brunswick, that an infant's negotiable note was voidable only, and not void. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 234 – 236. 4 Cruise's Dig. 14, note (2) (Greenleaf's ed.)

[3] Pasmore *v.* Bousfield, 1 Stark. R. 296, per Ld. Ellenborough.

[4] Ibid.

actually so applied by him, in fraud of his partners, the plea will not be maintained.[1]

§ 25. In cases of *partnership*, if one be sued alone, and plead this plea, proof of the existence of secret partners will not support it, unless it also appears that the plaintiff had knowledge of the fact at the time of the contract.[2] If he subsequently discovers the existence of a secret partner, he may join him or not in the action.[3] But if the partnership is ostensible and public, and one partner buys goods for the use of the firm, and in the ordinary course of the partnership business, and is sued alone for the price; proof that the goods were so bought and applied, will support the plea of non-joinder, though the plaintiff did not, in fact, know of the existence of the partnership, unless there are circumstances showing that the partner dealt in his own name.[4] Any acts done by the defendant in these cases, such as writing letters in his own name, and the like, tending to show that he treated the contract as his own and not his partners', may be given in evidence by the plaintiff, to disprove the plea.[5] If both partners reside abroad, and one alone being found in this country is sued here, and pleads the non-joinder of the other in abatement, his foreign domicil and residence is a

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[1] Hudson *v.* Robinson, 4 M. & S. 475. So, if one partner was an infant, and the bill was accepted by the other, in the name of the firm, it has been held, that he was chargeable in as special count, a upon an acceptance by himself in the name of the firm. Burgess *v.* Merrill, 4 Taunt. 468. See further as to abatement, Post, tit. ASSUMPSIT, § 110, 130 – 134.

[2] Baldney *v.* Ritchie, 1 Stark. R. 338. But if the suit is against one secret partner, it is cause of abatement, that another secret partner is not joined. Ela *v.* Rand, 4 N. Hamp. 307; Story on Partn. § 241; Post, tit. ASSUMPSIT, § 110, 130 – 134.

[3] Ibid.; De Mautort *v.* Saunders, 1 B. & Ad. 398; Ex parte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, 458; Mullet *v.* Hook, 1 M. & Malk. 88.

[4] Alexander *v.* McGinn, 3 Watts, 220.

[5] Murray *v.* Somerville, 2 Campb. 99, n.; Clark *v.* Holmes, 3 Johns. 149; Hall *v.* Smith, 1 B. & C. 407; Marsh *v.* Ward, Peake's Cas. 130.

good answer to the plea.[1] So, the bankruptcy and discharge of the other, is made by statute[2] a good replication.

§ 26. Where the *pendency of a prior suit* is pleaded in abatement, the plea must be proved by production of the record, or by an exemplification, duly authenticated.[3] If the priority is doubtful, both suits being commenced on the same day, it will be determined by priority of the service of process.[4] And if both suits were commenced at the same time, the pendency of each abates the other.[5] But the principle of this plea is, that the *same person* shall not be twice vexed for the same cause of action. If, therefore, the first action was against one of two joint contractors, and the second

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[1] Guion *v.* McCulloch, N. Car. Cas. 78. By Stat. 3 & 4. W. 4, c. 42, § 8, the plea itself is bad, unless it shows, that the other party is resident within the jurisdiction.

[2] Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, § 9. *Quære*, whether it be good by the Common Law; and see Post, tit. Assumpsit, § 135.

[3] Commonwealth *v.* Churchill, 5 Mass. 174; Parker *v.* Colcord, 2 N. Hamp. 36.

[4] Morton *v.* Webb, 7 Vermont R. 124.

[5] Beach *v.* Norton, 8 Conn. R. 71; Haight *v.* Holley, 3 Wend. 258. One form of the plea of prior action pending, is as follows: — "And the said [defendant] comes and defends &c., when &c., and says, that he ought not to be compelled to answer to the writ and declaration of the plaintiff aforesaid, because he says, that the plaintiff heretofore, to wit, at the [*here describe the Court and Term*] impleaded the said [defendant] in a plea of ———, and for the same cause in the declaration aforesaid mentioned; as by the record thereof, in the same Court remaining, appears; and that the parties in the said former suit and in this suit are the same parties; and that the said former suit is still pending in the said Court last mentioned; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment if he ought to be compelled to answer to the writ and declaration aforesaid, and that the same may be quashed," &c. Story's Pleadings, p. 65; 1 Chitty's Precedents, p. 201. The last averment, that the former suit is still pending, is generally inserted; but it has been held to be unnecessary, it being sufficient if the plaintiff has counted in the first action, so that it may appear of record, that both were for the same cause. See Commonwealth *v.* Churchill, 5 Mass. 177, 178; 39 H. 6, 12, pl. 16; Parker *v.* Colcord, 2 N. Hamp. 36; Gould on Pleading, ch. 5, § 125. But see Toland *v.* Tichenor, 3 Rawle, R. 320.

action is against the other, the pendency of the former is not pleadable in abatement of the latter.[1]

§ 27. In all cases where a fact is pleaded in abatement, and issue is taken thereon, if it be found for the plaintiff, the judgment is peremptory and in chief, *quod recuperet*.[2] The plaintiff should therefore come prepared to prove his damages; otherwise he will recover nominal damages only.[3]

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[1] Henry *v.* Goldney, 10 Jur. 439.

[2] Eichorn *v.* Le Maitre, 2 Wils. 367; Bowen *v.* Shapcott, 1 East, 542; Dodge *v.* Morse, 3 N. H. 232; Jewitt *v.* Davis, 6 N. H. 518.

[3] Weleker *v.* Le Pelletier, 1 Campb. 479.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

§ 28. In the plea of accord and satisfaction, the issue is upon the delivery or acceptance of something, in satisfaction of the debt or damages demanded.[1] In cases of contract for the payment of a sum of money, the payment of a less sum will not be a good satisfaction; unless it was either paid and accepted before the time when it was to have been paid, or at a different place from that appointed for the payment; but in the case of a simple contract for a larger sum, a negotiable security given for a less sum may be a good satisfaction.[2] The acceptance of a collateral thing, of value, whenever and wherever delivered, is a good satisfaction. And if the action is for general and unliquidated damages, the payment and acceptance of a sum of money as a satisfaction, is a good bar.[3]

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[1] The plea is, that, "after the making of the promises in the declaration mentioned," (in *assumpsit*) or, "after committing the said supposed *grievances* in the declaration mentioned," (in *case*,) or, "*trespasses*," (in *trespass*,) or, "after the making of the said writing obligatory," (in *debt*, or *covenant*,) "to wit, on, (&c.) and before (*or after*) the commencement of this suit, he the said (*defendant*) delivered to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then accepted and received of and from the said (*defendant*) [*here describing the goods or thing delivered*] of great value, in full satisfaction and discharge of the several promises," [*or*, damages, *or*, debts and moneys, *as the action may be*,] "in the declaration mentioned, and of all the damages by the plaintiff sustained by reason of the non-performance," [*or*, non-payment, *as the action may be*,] "thereof. And this," &c. The usual form of the replication is by protesting the delivery of the thing, and traversing the acceptance of it in satisfaction. Chitty's Precedents, p. 205, 444 a., 619; Story's Pleadings, p. 120, 156; Stephen on Pl. 235, 236.

[2] Sibree *v.* Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23.

[3] Fitch *v.* Sutton, 5 East, 230; Steinman *v.* Magnus, 11 East, 390; Co. Lit. 212 b; Cumber *v.* Wane, 1 Stra. 426. But this case of Cumber *v.* Wane has recently been limited, in Sibree *v.* Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23, to the naked case of the acceptance of a less sum in satisfaction of a greater. Thomas *v.* Heathorn, 2 B. & C. 477; Pinnel's case, 5 Co. 117; Smith *v.*

But if the action is upon covenant, the satisfaction must have been made after breach; for if it were before breach, it is not good.[1] And where a duty in certain accrues by deed, *tempore confectionis scripti*, as, by an obligation to pay a certain sum of money, this certain duty having its origin and essence in the deed alone, the obligation, it seems, is not discharged but by deed; and therefore a plea of accord and satisfaction of the bond by matter *en pais* would be bad; but if it were a bond with condition, and the plea in such case had been in discharge of the sum mentioned in the condition of the bond, it would be good.[2]

§ 28 *a*. The facts, in respect to the arrangement or accord between the parties, being ascertained, their effect is purely a question of law, and is not to be submitted to the jury. Thus, where A. and B. having mutual causes of action in tort, and meeting for the purpose of adjusting the demands of B. only, it was insisted by the latter, that A. should pay him therefor a sum of money and give him a receipt in full of all demands, which was accordingly done, but nothing was said about A.'s cause of action; it was held that this was a good accord and satisfaction of the demand of A. against B.[3]

§ 29. In the United States, an accord with satisfaction may be *given in evidence* under the general issue in *assumpsit*, and in actions on the case; but in debt, covenant, and

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Brown, 3 Hawks, 580; Wilkinson *v.* Byers, 1 Ad. & El. 113, per Parke, J.; Watkinson *v.* Inglesby, 5 Johns. 391, 392; Seymour *v.* Minturn, 17 Johns. 169; Bateman *v.* Daniels, 4 Blackf. 71. But payment and acceptance of the principal sum, in full, without the interest, is sufficient. Johnston *v.* Brannan, 5 Johns. 271.

[1] Kaye *v.* Waghorne, 1 Taunt. 428; Snow *v.* Franklin, Lutw. 108; Smith *v.* Brown, 3 Hawks, 580; Harper *v.* Hampton, 1 H. & J. 675.

[2] Blake's case, 6 Co. 43; Neal *v.* Sheffield, Yelv. 192; Cro. Jac. 254, S. C.; Story's Plead. 157, note; Preston *v.* Christmas, 2 Wils. 86; Strang *v.* Holmes, 7 Cow. 224.

[3] Vedder *v.* Vedder, 1 Den. 257.

trespass, it must be specially pleaded. In England, since the late Rules, it must be specially pleaded in all cases.[1]

§ 30. As to the *parties to an accord*, proof of an accord and satisfaction made by one of several joint obligors, or joint trespassers, is good and available to all.[2] So, if it is made to one of several plaintiffs, though no authority appear from the others to make the agreement.[3] If the action is for an act done by the defendant as the servant of another, an accord and satisfaction by the latter is a good defence.[4] And as to the *subject matter*, it is not necessary that it proceed directly from the defendant; the obligation or security of a third person who is *sui juris*, is sufficient,[5] if it be accepted in satisfaction of the whole amount, and not of a part only ;[6] though it may be of a less amount than was actually due.[7] It is well settled that an accord, alone, not executed, is no bar to an action for a pre-existing demand. And the rule is equally

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[1] Chitty on Pl. 418, 426, 429, 432, 441; Bird *v.* Randall, 3 Burr. 1353; Chitty's Prec. 477, 478; Weston *v.* Foster, 2 Bing. N. C. 693; 1 Stephen's Nisi Prius, 391. Where the plaintiff, in an action of slander, agreed to waive the action, in consideration that the defendant would destroy certain writings relative to the charge; and he accordingly destroyed them, this was held admissible under the general issue, as evidence of an accord and satisfaction. Lane *v.* Applegate, 1 Stark. R. 97.

[2] Strang *v.* Holmes, 7 Cow. 224; Ruble *v.* Turner, 2 Hen. & M. 38. If several tortfeasors are jointly sued, and a sum of money is accepted from one of them, and the action is thereupon dropped, this may be shown as a full satisfaction in bar of a subsequent action against the others. Dufresne *v.* Hutchinson, 3 Taunt. 117.

[3] Wallace *v.* Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264. But if the payment be to one of the plaintiffs for his part only of the damages, it is no bar to the action. Clark *v.* Dinsmore, 5 N. Hamp. 136.

[4] Thurman *v.* Wild, 11 Ad. & El. 453.

[5] Kearslake *v.* Morgan, 5 T. R. 513; Booth *v.* Smith, 3 Wend. 66; Wentworth *v.* Wentworth, 5 N. Hamp. 410; Bullen *v.* M'Gillicuddy, 2 Dana, 90.

[6] Walker *v.* Seaborne, 1 Taunt. 526.

[7] Steinman *v.* Magnus, 11 East, 390; Lewis *v.* Jones, 4 B. & C. 506, 513; Reay *v.* White, 1 C. & M. 748; Cranley *v.* Hillary, 2 M. & S. 120.

clear, that the person who is to be discharged is bound to do the act which is to discharge him; and not the other party.[1]

§ 31. Whether an accord, with a *tender of satisfaction*, is sufficient, without acceptance, is a point upon which the authorities are not agreed. It is, however, perfectly clear, that a mere agreement to accept a less sum in composition of a debt, is not binding, and cannot be set up in bar of an action upon the original contract.[2] Thus, where an agreement was made between a debtor and his creditors, that the latter should accept five shillings and six pence in the pound, in full satisfaction of their respective debts, which sum was tendered and refused; it was held, that this constituted no bar to an action for the whole debt, for it was without consideration; though it was admitted, that had the debtor assigned his effects to a trustee, under an agreement for this purpose, it would have constituted a good consideration, and would have been valid.[3] So, where the agreement was to receive part of the debt in money, and the residue in specific articles, no tender of the latter being averred, though it was alleged that the defendant was always ready to perform, the plea was held bad, the accord being only executory.[4] But whether, where the agreement is for the performance of some collateral act, and is upon sufficient consideration, a tender of performance is equivalent to a satisfaction, seems still to be an open question; though the weight of authority is in the affirmative. In one case, which was very fully considered, it was laid down as a rule, warranted by the authorities, that a contract or agreement, which will afford a complete recompense to a party for an original demand, ought to be received, as a substitute and satisfaction for such demand, and is sufficient evidence to support

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[1] Cranley *v.* Hillary, 2 M. & S. 120, 122.

[2] Cumber *v.* Wane, 1 Stra. 425; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 146, (Am. Ed.); 43 Law Lib. 249–263.

[3] Heathcote *v.* Crookshanks, 2 T. R. 24. To the same effect are Tassall *v.* Shane, Cro. El. 193; Balston *v.* Baxter, Ib. 304; Clark *v.* Dinsmore, 5 N. Hamp. 136; Lynn *v.* Bruce, 2 H. Bl. 317.

[4] Rayne *v.* Orton, Cro. El. 305; James *v.* David, 5 T. R. 141.

a plea of accord and satisfaction.[1] Therefore, where the holder of a promissory note, agreed in writing with the indorser, to receive payment in coals at a stipulated price, and they were tendered accordingly, but refused, the agreement and tender were held to be a sufficient accord and satisfaction to bar an action on the note.[2] So, where a man's creditors agreed to take a composition on their respective debts, to be secured partly by the acceptances of a third person, and partly by his own notes, and to execute a composition-deed, containing a clause of release; it was held by Ld. Ellenborough, that an action for the original debt could not be maintained by a creditor, who had promised to come in under the agreement, to whom the acceptances and notes were regularly tendered, and who refused to execute the composition-deed, after it had been executed by all the other creditors; the learned Judge remarking, that a party should not be permitted to say there is no satisfaction, *to whom satisfaction* has been tendered, according to the terms of the accord.[3] But it has since been held, in this country, that a readiness to perform a collateral agreement is not to be taken for a performance, or as the satisfaction required by law.[4]

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[1] Coit *v.* Houston, 3 Johns. Cas. 249, per Thompson, J.; Case *v.* Barber, T. Raym. 450; 1 Com. Dig. Accord, B. 4. The later case of Allen *v.* Harris, 1 Ld. Rym. 122, that an accord upon mutual promises is not binding, because no action lies upon mutual promises, admits the general doctrine of the text, though it differs in its application. The same is true of Preston *v.* Christmas, 2 Wils. 86. But the doctrine in the text is fully supported by the decision in Cartwright *v.* Cooke, 3 B. & Ad. 701. See also Good *v.* Cheeseman, 2 B. & Ad. 328, 335. *Sed vid.* Bayley *v.* Homan, 3 Bing. N. C. 915, per Tindal C. J.

[2] Coit *v.* Houston, 3 Johns. Cas. 243. The same principle seems to have been conceded by Ashhurst and Grose, Js. in James *v.* David, 5 T. R. 141.

[3] Bradley *v.* Gregory, 2 Campb. 383. And see accordingly, Evans *v.* Powis, 11 Jur. 1043.

[4] Russell *v.* Lytle, 6 Wend. 390. But in this case, the decision of the same Court in Coit *v.* Houston, many years before, was not cited or adverted to, and the question was decided upon the earliest authorities. Yet in several of these, the reason why an accord without satisfaction is not binding, is stated to be, that the plaintiff has no remedy upon the accord; thus tacitly seeming to admit that, where there is such remedy, the accord with a tender of satisfaction is sufficient. 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Accord, pl. 11, 12, 13; Allen

§ 32. If the defendant *pleads payment and acceptance* of a sum of money in satisfaction, and the plaintiff replies, traversing the acceptance in satisfaction, this *puts both facts in issue;* and the defendant must therefore prove the payment, as well as the acceptance in satisfaction.[1]

§ 33. The plea of accord and satisfaction may often be *proved by the lapse of time* and acquiescence of the parties. Thus, it has been held, in an action upon a covenant against incumbrances, that the lapse of twenty years after damages sustained by the breach, unless rebutted by other evidence, was sufficient proof of the plea.[2]

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v. Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 122; Brook. Abr. tit. Accord, &c., pl. 6; 16 Ed. 4, 8, pl. 6. So in Lynn *v.* Bruce, 2 H. Bl. 317. See, however, Hawley *v.* Foote, 19 Wend. 516, where an agreement to accept a collateral thing in satisfaction, with a tender and refusal, was held not a good bar.

[1] Ridley *v.* Tindall, 7 Ad. & El. 134.

[2] Jenkins *v.* Hopkins, 9 Pick. 543.

ACCOUNT.

§ 34. The remedy at Common Law, by the action of account, has fallen into disuse in most of the United States; suits by bill in Chancery, or by action of *assumpsit*, being resorted to in its stead. It is, however, a legal remedy, where not abolished by statute.

§ 35. This action lies at Common Law between merchants, naming them such, between whom there was privity; also against a guardian in socage by the heir; and against bailiffs and receivers.[1] And by statutes it lies between joint-tenants and tenants in common, and their personal representatives; and by and against the executors and administrators of those who were liable to this action.[2] But it does not lie against an infant; nor against a wrongdoer, or any other person, where no privity exists.[3]

§ 36. Where the action is against one as receiver, it is necessary to set forth by whose hands the defendant received the money; but where he is charged as bailiff, it is not necessary.[4] It seems he may be charged in both capacities, in the same action.[5] But where one tenant in common sues his co-tenant

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[1] 1 Com. Dig. Accompt, A. B.

[2] 13 Ed. 1, c. 23; 25 Ed. 3, c. 5; 31 Ed. 3, c. 11; 4 & 5 Ann. c. 16; Sturton *v.* Richardson, 13 M. & W. 17.

[3] Co. Lit. 172 a; Harker *v.* Whitaker, 5 Watts, 474.

[4] Co. Lit. 172 a; Walker *v.* Holyday, 1 Com. R. 272; Bull N. P. 127; Bishop *v.* Eagle, 11 Mod. 186; Jordan *v.* Wilkins, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 482. For, where the money was received of the plaintiff, the defendant might have waged his law. Hodsden *v.* Harridge, 2 Saund. 65. Nor is it necessary, where the action is between merchants. Moore *v.* Wilson, 2 Chipm. 91.

[5] Wells *v.* Some, Cro. Car. 240; 1 Roll. Abr. 119, pl. 10; 1 Com. Dig. Accompt, E. 2. The declaration against a bailiff, is as follows: — "In a

in account, charging him as bailiff, under the statute of Anne, it must be alleged, in the declaration, and of course be proved, that he has received more than his share of the profits.[1] The pleas in bar appropriate to this action, are, that he never was bailiff; or guardian; or receiver; or, that he has fully accounted, either to the plaintiff; or before auditors; or, that the money was delivered to him for a specific purpose, which has been accomplished.[2] Whatever admits the defendant once liable to account, such as payment over by the plaintiff's order, &c., though it goes in discharge, should be pleaded before the auditors, and not in bar of the action; excepting the pleas of release, *plene computavit*, and the statute of limitations.[3]

§ 37. In this, as in other cases, the *evidence on the part of the plaintiff* must support the material averments in the decla-

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plea of account; for that the said D. was bailiff to the plaintiff of one messuage, with the appurtenances in —— from —— to ——, and during that time had the care and management thereof, and sufficient power to improve and demise the same, and to collect and receive the issues, rents, and profits of the said premises to the use of the plaintiff; yet, though requested, the said D. hath never rendered to the plaintiff his reasonable account of said moneys, rents, and profits, nor of his doings in the premises, but refuses so to do." The form of charging one as receiver is thus: — "for that the said D. was from —— to —— the plaintiff's receiver, and as such had received of the moneys of the plaintiff by the hands of one E, —— dollars, and by the hands of one F, —— dollars, to render his reasonable account thereof on demand. Yet," &c. — &c.

[1] Sturton *v.* Richardson, 13 M. & W. 17. Whether a special request, and the lapse of reasonable time should be alleged, *quære*. Ibid.

[2] 1 Com. Dig. Accompt. E. 3, 4, 5. In these cases the form of pleading is: — "that he never was bailiff of the premises, goods, and chattels aforesaid, to render an account thereof, to the said plaintiff in manner and form, (&c.)"; or, "that he never was receiver of the moneys of the plaintiff in manner, (&c.)"; or, "that after the time during which (&c.), to wit, on — he fully accounted with the plaintiff of and concerning the said premises, rents, (&c.) for the time he was so bailiff as aforesaid"; or, "of and concerning the moneys so by him received as aforesaid"; or, — "fully accounted before A. and B., auditors assigned by the Court here to audit the account aforesaid," &c. Story's Pleadings, 71, 72; 3 Chitty's Pl. 1297 – 1299.

[3] 1 Com. Dig. Accompt, E. 6; Godfrey *v.* Saunders, 3 Wils. 94; Bredin *v.* Divin, 2 Watts, 15.

ration.[1] There must be evidence of a privity, either by contract, express or implied,[2] or by law; and if the defendant is charged as bailiff, or guardian, or receiver, or tenant in common, or joint-tenant, he must be proved to have acted in the specific character charged; for the measure of their liability is different; tenants in common and joint-tenants being answerable for what they have actually received, without deducting costs and expenses; receivers being charged in the same manner, but allowed costs and expenses in special cases, in favor of trade; and guardians and bailiffs being held to account for what they might, with proper diligence, have received, deducting reasonable costs and expenses.[3] The property in the money demanded, or goods bailed, must be precisely stated and proved as laid, it being a material allegation. If therefore the declaration is for the money of the plaintiff, and the proof is of money belonging to the plaintiff and others as partners, the declaration is not supported.[4] And if there are several defendants, they must be proved to be jointly and not severally liable.[5] A special demand to account is not necessary to be proved.[6]

§ 38. If the plea is, that the defendant accounted before two, it will be supported by *evidence*, that he accounted before one of them only; for the accounting is the substance.[7] In general, to support the plea of *plene computavit*, it is necessary for the defendant to show a balance, ascertained and agreed upon.[8] But if the course of dealing is such as to call for daily

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1 An I. O. U. is evidence of an account stated between the parties. Fessenmayer *v.* Adcock, 16 M. & W. 449.

2 King of France *v.* Morris, cited 3 Yates, 251; Co. Lit. 172 a.

3 1 Selw. N. P. 1–3; Co. Lit. 172 a; Sargent *v.* Parsons, 12 Mass. 149; Griffith *v.* Willing, 3 Binn. 317; Wheeler *v.* Horne, Willes, 208; Jordan *v.* Wilkins, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 482; Stat. 4 & 5 Ann. c. 27; Irvine *v.* Hanlin, 10 S. & R. 221.

4 Jordan *v.* Wilkins, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 482.

5 Whelen *v.* Watmough, 15 S. & R. 158.

6 Sturges *v.* Bush, 6 Day, 442.

7 Bull. N. P. 127.

8 Baxter *v.* Hozier, 5 Bing. N. C. 288.

accounts and payments by the defendant, as, where the demand is against a servant for the proceeds of daily petty sales, of which it is not the course to take written vouchers, it will be *presumed*, that the defendant has accounted; and the burden of proof will lie on the plaintiff to show, that this ordinary course of dealing has been violated.[1] If the contract was, upon the consignment of goods to the defendant, that he should account for the sales, and return the goods which should remain unsold, the plea of *plene computavit* will not be maintained by evidence of having accounted for the sales, unless it be also proved, that the goods unsold have been returned.[2] This plea, and that of *ne unques* bailiff, &c., may be pleaded together; and the plea does not in that case admit the liability of the defendant to account.[3]

§ 39. After a *judgment quod computet*, and a reference to auditors, all articles of account between the parties, incurred since the commencement of the suit, are to be included by the auditors, and the whole is to be brought down to the time when they make an end of the account.[4] But after such judgment, rendered upon confession, against a receiver, if the auditors certify issues to be tried, the plaintiff, upon the trial of such issues, cannot give evidence of moneys received by the defendant during any other period than that described in the declaration.[5] The judgment *quod computet*, however, does not conclude the defendant as to the precise sums or times mentioned in the declaration; but the account is to be taken according to the truth of the matter, without regard to the verdict.[6]

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[1] Evans *v.* Birch, 3 Camp. 10.

[2] Read *v.* Bertrand, 4 Wash. 556.

[3] Whelen *v.* Watmough, 15 S. & R. 158.

[4] Robinson *v.* Bland, 2 Burr. 1086; Couscher *v.* Toulam, 4 Wash. 442.

[5] Sweigart *v* Lowmarter, 14 S. & R. 200.

[6] Newbold *v.* Sims, 2 S. & R. 317; James *v.* Browne, 1 Dall. 339; Sturges *v.* Bush, 5 Day, 452.

ADULTERY.

§ 40. The proof of this crime is the same, whether the issue arises in an indictment, a libel for divorce, or an action on the case. The *nature of the evidence*, which is considered sufficient to establish the charge before any tribunal, has been clearly expounded by Ld. Stowell, and is best stated in his own language. "It is a fundamental rule," he observes, "that it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery; because if it were otherwise, there is not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable; it is very rarely, indeed, that the parties are surprised in the direct fact of adultery. In every case, almost, the fact is inferred from circumstances, that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion; and unless this were the case, and unless this were so held, no protection whatever could be given to marital rights. What are the circumstances which lead to such a conclusion, cannot be laid down universally, though many of them, of a more obvious nature, and of more frequent occurrence, are to be found in the ancient books; at the same time, it is impossible to indicate them universally; because they may be infinitely diversified by the situation and character of the parties, by the state of general manners, and by many other incidental circumstances, apparently slight and delicate in themselves, but which may have most important bearings in decisions upon the particular case. The only general rule, that can be laid down upon the subject, is, that the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion; for it is not to lead a rash and intemperate judgment, moving upon appearances, that are equally capable of two interpretations, — neither is it to be a matter of artificial reasoning, judging upon such things differently from what would strike the careful and cautious consideration of a discreet man. The

facts are not of a technical nature; they are facts determinable upon common grounds of reason; and courts of justice would wander very much from their proper office of giving protection to the rights of mankind, if they let themselves loose to subtilties, and remote and artificial reasonings upon such subjects. Upon such subjects the rational and the legal interpetration must be the same."[1]

§ 41. The rule has been elsewhere more briefly stated to require, that there be such *proximate circumstances* proved, as by former decisions, or in their own nature and tendency, satisfy the legal conviction of the Court, that the criminal act has been committed.[2] And therefore it has been held, that *general cohabitation* excluded the necessity of proof of particular facts.[3] Ordinarily, it is not necessary to prove the fact to have been committed at any particular or certain time or place. It will be sufficient, if the circumstances are such

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[1] Loveden *v.* Loveden, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 2, 3. The husband's remedy against the seducer of his wife may be in trespass, or by an action on the case. The latter is preferable, where there is any doubt whether the fact of adultery can be proved, and there is a ground of action for enticing away or harboring the wife without the husband's consent; because a count for the latter offence may be joined with the former; and a count in trover for wearing apparel, &c., may also be added. James *v.* Biddington, 6 C. & P. 589.

The declaration for seduction may be as follows: — "For that whereas the defendant, contriving and wrongfully intending to injure the plaintiff, and to deprive him of the comfort, society, aid and assistance of S., the wife of the plaintiff, and to alienate and destroy her affection for him, heretofore, to wit, on" —— [inserting the day on or near which the first act of adultery can be proved to have been committed] "and on divers other days and times after that day and before the commencement of this suit, wrongfully and wickedly debauched and carnally knew the said S., she being then and ever since the wife of the plaintiff; by means whereof the affection of the said S. for the plaintiff was wholly alienated and destroyed; and by reason of the premises the plaintiff has wholly lost the comfort, society, aid and assistance of his said wife, which during all the time aforesaid he otherwise might and ought to have had." To the damage, &c.

[2] Williams *v.* Williams, 1 Hagg. Cons. R. 299.

[3] Cadogan *v.* Cadogan, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 4, note; Rutton *v.* Rutton, ib. 6, note.

as to lead the Court, travelling with every necessary caution, to this conclusion; which it has often drawn between persons living in the same house, though not seen in the same bed, or in any equivocal situation. It will neither be misled by equivocal appearances, on the one hand, nor, on the other, will it suffer the object of the law to be eluded by any combination of parties to keep without the reach of direct and positive proof.[1] And in examining the proofs, they will not be taken insulated and detached; but the whole will be taken together.[2] Yet, in order to infer adultery from general conduct, it seems necessary, that a *suspicio violenta* should be created.[3] But the adulterous disposition of the parties being once established, the crime may be inferred from their afterwards being discovered together in a bed-chamber, under circumstances authorizing such inference.[4]

§ 42. The nature of this crime has occasioned a slight departure, at least in the Ecclesiastical Courts, from the general rule of evidence as to matters of opinion; it being the course to interrogate the witnesses, who speak of the behavior of the parties, as to their *impression and belief*, whether the crime has been committed or not. For it is said, that in cases of this peculiar character, the Court, though it does not rely on the opinions of the witnesses, yet has a right to know their impression and belief.[5] On the other hand, in the Ecclesiastical Courts, it is reluctantly held that the testimony of one witness alone, though believed to be true, is not legally sufficient to establish the charge of adultery.[6] But in the Courts of Common Law, in America, no such rule is known

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1 Burgess *v.* Burgess, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 226, 227; Hammerton *v.* Hammerton, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 14; Rix *v.* Rix, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 74.

2 Durant *v.* Durant, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 748.

3 Such seems to have been the view of Ld. Stowell, in Loveden *v.* Loveden, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 7, 8, 9, 16, 17; and in Burgess *v.* Burgess, Ib. 227, 228.

4 Soilleaux *v.* Soilleaux, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 373.

5 Crewe *v.* Crewe, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 128.

6 Evans *v.* Evans, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 165; Simmons *v.* Simmons, 11 Jur. 830.

to have been adopted, even in cases of an Ecclesiastical nature.[1]

§ 43. Where criminal intercourse is once shown, it must be *presumed*, if the parties are still living under the same roof, that it *still continues*, notwithstanding those who dwell under the same roof are not prepared to depose to that fact.[2] The circumstance, that witnesses hesitate and pause about drawing that conclusion, will not prevent the Court, representing the law, from drawing the inference to which the proximate acts proved unavoidably lead.[3]

§ 44. Adultery of the *wife* may be proved by the birth of a child, and non-access of the husband, he being out of the realm;[4] and if adultery is alleged to have been continued, for many years, and with divers particular individuals, it is sufficient to prove a few of the facts, with identity of her person.[5] Adultery of the *husband*, on the other hand, may be proved by habits of adulterous intercourse, and by the birth, maintenance, and acknowledgment of a child.[6] A married man going into a known *brothel*, raises a suspicion of adultery, to be rebutted only by the very best evidence.[7] His going there, and remaining alone for some time in a room with a common prostitute, is sufficient proof of the crime.[8] The circumstance of a woman going to such a place with a man, furnishes similar proof of Adultery.[9] The venereal disease, long after marriage, is *primâ facie* evidence of this crime.[10]

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1 Ante, Vol. 1. § 260.

2 Turton *v.* Turton, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 350.

3 Elwes *v.* Elwes, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 278.

4 Richardson *v.* Richardson, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 6.

5 Ibid.

6 D'Aguilar *v.* D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 777, note.

7 Astley *v.* Astley, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 720; Loveden *v.* Loveden, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 24; Kenrick *v.* Kenrick, 4 Hagg. Eccl. R. 114, 124, 132.

8 Astley *v.* Astley, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 719.

9 Eliot *v.* Eliot, cited 1 Hagg. Con. R. 302; Williams *v.* Williams. Ib. 303.

10 Durant *v.* Durant, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 767.

§ 45. As to proof by the *confession* of the party, no difference of principle is perceived between this crime and any other. It has already been shown, that a *deliberate and voluntary confession of guilt* is among the most weighty and effectual proofs in the law.[1] Where the consequences of the confession are altogether against the party confessing, there is no difficulty in taking it as indubitable truth. But where these consequences are more than counterbalanced by incidental advantages, it is plain that they ought to be rejected. In suits between husband and wife, where the principal object is separation, these countervailing advantages are obvious, and the danger of collusion between the parties is great. This species of evidence, therefore, though not inadmissible, is regarded in such cases with great distrust, and is on all occasions to be most accurately weighed.[2] And it has been held, as the more rational doctrine, that confession, proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be perfectly free from all suspicion of a collusive purpose, though it may be sufficient to found a decree of divorce *a mensâ et thoro*, is not sufficient to authorize a divorce from the bonds of matrimony, so as to enable a party to fly to other connexions.[3] It is never admitted alone for this purpose ;[4] nor must it be ambiguous.[5] But it need not refer to any particular time or place ; it will be applied to all times and places, at which it appears probable, from the evidence that the fact may have been committed.[6] And it is admissible, when made under apprehension of death, though it be afterwards retracted.[7] Where, in cross libels for divorce

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1 Ante, VI. 1, § 214 - 219 ; Mortimer *v.* Mortimer, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 315.

2 Williams *v.* Williams, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 304.

3 Mortimer *v.* Mortimer, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 316.

4 Searle v. Price, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 189 ; Mortimer *v.* Mortimer, Ib. 316 ; Betts *v.* Betts, 1 Johns. Ch. 197 ; Baxter *v.* Baxter, 1 Mass. 346; Holland *v.* Holland, 2 Mass. 154 ; Doe *v.* Roe, 1 Johns. Cas. 25. But, where the whole evidence was such as utterly to exclude all suspicion of collusion, and to establish the contrary, a divorce has been decreed upon confession alone. Vance *v.* Vance, 8 Greenl. 132 ; Owen *v.* owen, 4 Hagg. Eccl. R. 261.

5 Williams *v.* Williams, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 304.

6 Burgess *v.* Burgess, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 227.

7 Mortimer *v.* Mortimer, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 317, 318.

a vinculo for adultery, each respondent pleaded in recrimination of the other it has been held, that these pleas could not be received as mutual admissions of the facts articulated in the libels.[1] But the record of the conviction of the respondent, upon a previous indictment for that offence, has been held sufficient proof of the libel, both as to the marriage, and the fact of adultery.[2]

§ 46. The paramour is an admissible witness; but being *particeps criminis*, his evidence is but weak.[3] His confession may be used in evidence against her, if connected with some act or confession of her own, in the nature of a joint acknowledgment; but independently and alone, it is inadmissible.[4]

§ 47. Where the fact of adultery is alleged to have been committed *within a limited period* of time, it is not necessary that the evidence be confined to that period; but proof of acts anterior to the time alleged may be adduced, in explanation of other acts of the like nature within that period. Thus, where the statute of limitations was pleaded, the plaintiff was permitted to begin with proof of acts of adultery, committed more than six years preceding, as explanatory of acts of indecent familiarity within the time alleged.[5] So, where one act of adultery was proved by a witness, whose credibility the defendant attempted to impeach, evidence of prior acts of improper familiarity between the parties, has been held admissible to corroborate the witness.[6] But, where the charge is of one act of adultery only, in a single count, to

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1 Turner *v.* Turner, 3 Greenl. 398.

2 Anderson *v.* Anderson, 4 Greenl. 100; Randall *v.* Randall, Ib. 326. The conviction could not have been founded upon the testimony of the party offering it in evidence.

3 Soilleaux *v.* Soilleaux, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 376; Croft *v.* Croft, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 318.

4 Burgess *v.* Burgess, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 235, note.

5 Duke of Norfolk *v.* Germaine, 12 Howell's St. Tr. 929, 945. It has, however, been held, that the proof of acts within the period must first be adduced. Gardiner *v.* Madeira, 2 Yeates, 466.

6 Commonwealth *v.* Meriam, 14 Pick. 518.

which evidence has been given, the prosecutor is not permitted afterwards to introduce evidence of other acts, committed at different times and places.[1]

§ 48. By the *Common Law*, the simple act of adultery is not punishable by *indictment*, but is left to the cognizance of the spiritual Courts alone. It is only the open lewdness or public indecency of the act which is indictable.[2] But in many of the United States it is now made *indictable, by statutes.* Whether, to constitute this crime, it is necessary that both the guilty parties be married persons, is a point not perfectly agreed by authorities;[3] but the better opinion seems to be, that the act of criminal intercourse, where only one of the parties is married, is adultery in that one, and fornication in the other.[4] Some of the statutes, upon a divorce *a vinculo* for adultery, disable the guilty party from contracting a lawful marriage, during the life of the other; but it has been held, that a second marriage does not, in such case, render the party guilty of the crime of adultery; but only exposes to a prosecution under the particular provisions of the statute, whatever they may be.[5] And if such second marriage is had in another State, where it is not unlawful, the parties may lawfully cohabit in either State.[6]

§ 49. Upon every charge of adultery, whether in an indictment or a civil action, the case for the prosecution is not made

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[1] Stante *v.* Pricket, 1 Campb. 473; Downes *v.* Skrymsher, 1 Brownl. 233; 19 H. 6, 47; The State *v.* Bates, 10 Conn. 372.

[2] Bl. Comm. 64, 65; Anderson *v.* The Commonwealth, 6 Rand. 627; The State *v.* Brunson, 2 Bayley, R. 149; The Commonwealth *v.* Isaaks, 5 Rand. 634.

[3] The State *v.* Pearce, 2 Blackf. 318; Respublica *v.* Roberts, 2 Dall. 124; 1 Yeates, 6.

[4] Bouvier's Law Dict. verb. Adultery. In The State *v.* Wallace, 9 N. Hamp. 515, it was held that adultery was committed whenever there was unlawful intercourse, from which spurious issue might arise; and that therefore it was committed by an unmarried man, by illicit connection with a married woman.

[5] Commonwealth *v.* Putnam, 1 Pick. 136.

[6] Putnam *v.* Putnam, 8 Pick. 433.

out without *evidence of the marriage.* And it must be proof of an actual marriage, in opposition to proof by cohabitation, reputation, and other circumstances, from which a marriage may be inferred, and which, in these cases, are held insufficient; for otherwise persons might be charged upon pretended marriages, set up for bad purposes.[1] Whether the *defendant's admission* of the marriage may be given in evidence against him has been doubted; but no good reason has been given to distinguish this from other cases of admission, where as we have already shown,[2] the evidence may be received, though it may not amount to sufficient proof of the fact. Thus, in a civil action for adultery, where the defendant, being asked where the plaintiff's wife was, replied, that she was in the next room, this was held insufficient to prove a marriage, for it amounted only to an admission, that she was reputed to be his wife.[3] But any recognition of a person standing in a given relation to others, is *primâ facie* evidence, against the person making such recognition, that such relation exists;[4] and if the defendant has seriously and solemnly admitted the marriage, it will be received as sufficient proof of the fact.[5] Thus, where the defendant deliberately declared, that he knew that the female was married to the plaintiff, and that with full knowledge of that fact he had seduced and debauched her, this was held sufficient proof of the marriage.[6]

§ 50. In indictments, and actions for criminal conversation,

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[1] Morris *v.* Miller, 4 Burr. 2059, expounded in 1 Doug. 174. In a libel for divorce, the Court will require proof of the marriage, even though the party accused makes default of appearance. Williams *v.* Williams, 3 Greenl. 135. In Massachusetts, in a libel for divorce, the marriage may be proved by any circumstantial evidence, competent to prove it in civil causes in general. Stat. 1840. ch. 84.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 209. In an indictment for adultery, where the defendant was married in a foreign country, his admission of that fact has been held sufficient proof of the marriage. Cayford's case, 7 Greenl. 57; Regina *v.* Simmonsto, 1 Car. & Kirw. 164, S. P.

[3] Bull. N. P. 28.

[4] Dickenson *v.* Coward, 1 B. & Ald. 679, per Ld. Ellenborough.

[5] Rigg *v.* Curgenven, 2 Wils. 399.

[6] Forney *v.* Hallacher, 8 S. & R. 159.

as the prosecution is against a wrongdoer, and not a claim of right, it is sufficient to prove the *marriage according to any form* of religion, as Jews, Quakers, and the like.[1] The evidence on this head will be treated hereafter, under the appropriate title. But in whatever mode the marriage was celebrated or is proved, there must be satisfactory proof of the identity of the parties.[2]

§ 51. In *defence of a libel for divorce*, or of an *action for criminal conversation*, it may be shown that the adultery was committed, or the act of apparent criminality was done, by *collusion* between the parties, for the purpose of obtaining a separation, or of supporting an action at law. For the law permits no such co-operation, and refuses a remedy for adultery committed with such intent.[3] But the non-appearance of the wife, and a judgment by default against the paramour, are held no proof of collusion.[4] *Passive sufferance*, or *connivance* of the husband, may also be shown in bar, both of a libel and a civil action. But mere negligence, inattention, confidence, or dullness of apprehension, are not sufficient for this purpose; there must be passive acquiescence and consent, with the intention and in the expectation that guilt will follow.[5] The proof, from the nature of the case, may be made out by a train of conduct and circumstances; but it is not necessary to show connivance at actual adultery, any more than it is necessary to prove an actual and specific fact of adultery; for if a system of connivance at improper familiarity, almost amounting to proximate acts, be established, the Court will infer a corrupt intent as to the result.[6] But if

[1] Bull. N. P. 28. But it must be actually, and not merely *primâ facie*, a valid marriage, according to the law under which it was celebrated. Catherwood *v* Caslon, 13 M. & W. 261.

[2] See post, tit. MARRIAGE.

[3] Crewe *v.* Crewe, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 128, 130.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Rogers *v.* Rogers, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 58; Timmings *v.* Timmings, Ib. 76; Lovering *v.* Lovering, Ib. 85; Pierce *v.* Pierce, 3 Pick. 299; Duberley *v.* Gunning, 4 T. R. 655; Bull. N. P. 27; Hodges *v.* Windham, Peake's Cas. 39; 1 Selw. N. P. 8, 9, (10th edit.)

[6] Moorsum *v.* Moorsum, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 95.

the evidence falls short of actual connivance, and only establishes negligence, or even loose and improper conduct in the husband, not amounting to consent, it is no bar to an action for criminal conversation, but goes only in reduction of the damages.[1] It is not always necessary, that the husband be proved to have connived at the particular acts of adultery charged; for if he suffers his wife to live as a prostitute, and criminal intercourse with a third person ensues, he can have no action; it is *damnum absque injuria*.[2] Nor will an action lie for criminal conversation, had after the husband and wife have separated by articles of agreement, and the husband has released all claim to the person of his wife; for the *gist* of this action is the loss of the comfort, society, and assistance of the wife.[3]

§ 52. *Recrimination* is also a good defence to a libel for divorce;[4] though it is no bar to an action for criminal conversation.[5] The principle on which this plea of *compensatio*

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[1] Foley *v.* Ld. Peterborough, 4 Doug. 294; Duberley *v.* Gunning, 4 T. R. 655.

[2] Smith *v.* Alison, Bull. N. P. 27, per Ld. Mansfield; Sanborn *v.* Neilson, 4 N. Hamp. 591. If the husband connive at adultery with A., he cannot have a divorce for an act of adultery, nearly contemporaneous, with B. Lovering *v.* Lovering, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 85.

[3] Weedon *v.* Timbrell, 5 T. R. 357; Chambers *v.* Cauldfield, 6 East, 244; Winter *v.* Henn, 4 C. & P. 494; Bartelot *v.* Hawker, Peake's Cas. 7; Wilton *v.* Webster, 7 C. & P. 198; Harvey *v.* Watson, 7 M. & G. 644. But if the separation was without any relinquishment by the husband of his right to the society of the wife, so that a suit for restitution of conjugal rights is still maintainable, it is no bar. Graham *v.* Wigley, 2 Roper on Husb. & Wife, 323, n. Some of the earlier cases seem to favor the idea, that if the separation was by deed, the action would not lie; but this notion is not now favored, the true question being, whether the husband has or has not released his right to her person and society.

[4] Beeby *v.* Beeby, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 789; Forster *v.* Forster, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 144. Cruelty is no answer to a charge of adultery; but it is pleadable together with a counter charge of adultery. Coxedge *v.* Coxedge, 8 Jur. 935.

[5] Bromley *v.* Wallace, 4 Esp. 237. It goes only to the damages, in the civil action; though Ld. Kenyon formerly held it good in bar. Wyndham *v.* Wycombe, 4 Esp. 16.

criminis is allowed, is, that the party cannot justly complain of the breach of a contract which he has himself violated.[1] This plea may be sustained on evidence, not as strong as might be necessary to sustain a suit for adultery;[2] and it makes no difference whether the offence, pleaded by way of compensation, were committed before or after the fact charged in the libel.[3] It has been questioned whether a single act of adultery is sufficient to support this plea, against a series of adulteries proved on the other side; but the better opinion seems to be that it is.[4]

§ 53. *Condonation* is a sufficient answer to the charge of adultery, in a *libel;* but it does not follow that it is a good answer to a recriminatory *plea;* for circumstances may take off the effect of condonation, which would not support an original suit for the same cause.[5] Thus, facts of cruelty will revive a charge of adultery, though they would not support an original suit for it.[6] Condonation is forgiveness, with an implied condition, that the injury shall not be repeated, and that the party shall be treated with conjugal kindness; and on breach of this condition, the right to a remedy for former injuries revives.[7] It must be free; for if obtained by force and violence, it is not binding; and if made upon an express condition, the condition must be fulfilled.[8] It must also appear, that the injured party had full knowledge, or, at least,

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1 Beeby *v.* Beeby, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 789; Forster *v.* Forster, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 153.

2 Forster *v.* Forster, supra; Astley *v.* Astley, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 714, 721.

3 Procter *v.* Procter, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 299; Astley *v.* Astley, supra. If the act pleaded by way of recrimination has been forgiven, the condonation is a sufficient answer to the plea. Anichini *v.* Anichini, 2 Curt. 210.

4 Astley *v.* Astley, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 722–724; Naylor *v.* Naylor, Ib. cit. Brisco *v.* Brisco, 2 Addams, R. 259.

5 Beeby *v.* Beeby, Supra; D'Aguilar *v.* D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 782.

6 Ibid.

7 Durant *v.* Durant, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 761; Ferrefs *v.* Ferrers, 1 Hagg. Con. R. 130.

8 Popkin *v.* Popkin, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 767, note.

an undoubting belief of all the adulterous connexion, and that there was a condonation subsequent to that knowledge.[1]

§ 54. Where the parties have separate beds, there must, in order to show condonation, be some *evidence of matrimonial connection*, beyond mere dwelling under the same roof.[2] But if a wife overlooks one act of human infirmity in the husband, it is not a legal consequence, that she pardons all others. It is not necessary for her to withdraw from cohabitation on the first or second instance of misconduct; on the contrary, it is legal and meritorious for her to be patient as long as possible; forbearance does not weaken her title to relief, especially where she has a large family, and endures in the hope of reclaiming her husband.[3] But, on the other hand, the situation and circumstances of the husband do not usually call for such forbearance; and a facility of condonation of adultery on his part leads to the inference, that he does not duly estimate the injury; and if he is once in possession of the fact of adultery, and still continues cohabitation, it is proof of connivance and collusion.[4] In either case, to establish a condonation, knowledge of the crime must be clearly and distinctly proved.[5]

§ 55. In proof of *damages on the part of the plaintiff* in a civil action for adultery, evidence is admissible, showing the state of domestic happiness, in which he and his wife had previously lived; and a marriage settlement, or other provision, if any, for the children of the marriage;[6] the rela-

[1] Turton *v.* Turton, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 351; Anon. 6 Mass. 147; Perkins *v.* Perkins, Ib. 69; North *v.* North, 5 Mass. 320; Backus *v.* Backus, 3 Greenl. 136.

[2] Beeby *v.* Beeby, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 794; Westmeath *v.* Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 118, supt.

[3] D'Aguilar *v.* D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 786; Durant *v.* Durant, Ib. 752, 768; Beeby *v.* Beeby, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 793; Turton *v.* Turton, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 351.

[4] Timmings *v.* Timmings, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 78; Dunn *v.* Dunn, 2 Phill. 411.

[5] Durant *v.* Durant, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 733.

[6] Bull. N. P. 27; 1 Stephen's N. P. 24. It has been said, that the rank

tions, whether of friendship, blood, confidence, gratitude, hospitality, or the like, which subsisted between him and the defendant;[1] and the circumstances attendant upon the intercourse of the parties.[2] But it seems, that evidence of the defendant's property cannot be given in chief, in order to acquire damages, the true question being, not how much money the defendant is able to pay, but how much damage the plaintiff has sustained.[3] The state of the affections and feelings entertained by the husband and wife towards each other, prior to the adulterous intercourse, may be shown by their previous conversations, deportment, and letters;[4] and the language and letters of the wife, addressed to other persons, have been received as evidence, for the same object.[5] Conversations also, and letters, between the wife and the defendant, and a draft of a letter from her to a friend, in the defendant's hand-writing, have been admitted in evidence against him.[6] But her confessions, alone, when not a part of the *res gestæ*, are not admissible.[7] If the wife dies, pending the suit, the husband is still entitled to damages for the shock which has been given to his feelings, and for the loss of the society of the wife, down to the time of her death; and this, though he was unaware of his own dishonor, until it was disclosed to him by the wife, upon her death-bed.[8]

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and circumstances of the plaintiff may be given in evidence by him; but this has been denied; for the character of the husband is not in issue, except merely as far as that relation is concerned. Norton *v.* Warner, 6 Conn. 172.

1 Ibid.

2 Duke of Norfolk *v.* Germaine, 12 How. State Tr. 927.

3 James *v.* Biddington, 6 C. & P. 589. But in an action for breach of promise to marry, such evidence is material, as showing what would have been the station of the plaintiff in society, if the defendant had not broken his promise. Ibid. See post, § 267.

4 Ante, Vol. 1, § 102.

5 Ante, Vol. 1, § 102; Jones *v.* Thompson, 6 C. & P. 415. Even though the letters contain other facts, which of themselves could not properly be submitted to the jury. Willis *v.* Bernard, 8 Bing. 376.

6 Baker *v.* Morley, Bull. N. P. 28; Wilton *v.* Webster, 7 C. & P. 198.

7 Ibid.; Aveson *v.* Ld. Kinnaird, 6 East, 188; Walter *v.* Green, 1 C. & P. 621; Winsmore *v.* Greenbank, Willes, 577.

8 Wilton *v.* Webster, 7 C. &. P. 198, per Coleridge, J.

§ 56. As the husband, by bringing the action, puts the wife's character in issue, the defendant may show, in what is called *mitigation of damages*,[1] the *previous* bad character and conduct of the wife, whether in general, or in particular instances of unchastity ;[2] her letters to, and deportment towards himself, tending to prove, that she made the first advances ;[3] the husband's connivance at the adulterous intercourse ;[4] his criminal connexion with other women ;[5] the bad terms on which he previously lived with his wife ; his improper treatment of her ; his gross negligence and inattention in regard to her conduct with respect to the defendant ; and any other facts tending to show either the little intrinsic value of her society, or the light estimation in which he held it.[6] The evidence produced by the husband to show the harmony previously subsisting between him and his wife, may be rebutted by evidence of her declarations, prior to the criminal intercourse, complaining of his ill-treatment ; and general evidence of similar complaints may also be given in reduction of damages.[7] But no evidence of the misconduct of the wife, subsequent to her connexion with the defendant, can be received.[8]

§ 57. The *letters* of the wife, in order to be admitted in favor of the husband, must have been written before any attempt at adulterous intercourse had been made by the defendant.[9] And whenever her letters are introduced as

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[1] See post, tit. DAMAGES, § 265 – 267.

[2] Bull. N. P. 296 ; Ibid. 27 ; Hodges *v.* Windham, Peake's Cas. 39 ; Gardiner *v.* Jadis, 1 Selw. N. P. 24 ; Ante, Vol. 1, § 54.

[3] Elsam *v.* Fawcett, 2 Esp. 562.

[4] 1 Steph. N. P. 26 ; Ante, § 51 ; 1 Selw. N. P. 23, 24. The representation made by the wife to her husband, on the eve of her elopement, is admissible, as part of the *res gestæ*, to repel the imputation of connivance. Hoare *v.* Allen, 3 Esp. 276.

[5] Bromley *v.* Wallace, 4 Esp. 237.

[6] Trelawney *v.* Coleman, 2 Stark. R. 191 ; 1 B. & Ald. 90 ; Jones *v.* Thomson, 6 C. & P. 415 ; Winter *v.* Wroot, 1 M. & Rob. 404.

[7] Winter *v.* Wroot, 1 M. & Rob. 404.

[8] Elsam *v.* Fawcett, 2 Esp. 562.

[9] Wilton *v.* Webster, 7 C. & P. 198.

expressive of her feelings, they must have been of a period anterior to the existence of any facts, tending to raise suspicions of her misconduct, and when there existed no ground to impute collusion.[1] But in all these cases, the time when the letters were written must be accurately shown; the dates not being sufficient for this purpose, though the post-marks may suffice.[2]

§ 58. Though the *general character of the wife* is in issue in this action, the plaintiff cannot go into general evidence in support of it, until it has been impeached by evidence on the part of the defendant, either in cross-examination, or in chief; but whether the plaintiff can rebut the proof of particular instances of misconduct, by proof of general good character, may be doubted; and the weight of authority seems against its admission.[3]

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1 Edwards *v.* Crock, 4 Esp. 39.

2 Edwards *v.* Crock, 4 Esp. 39; 1 Steph. N. P. 27.

3 Bamfield *v.* Massey, 1 Campb. 460; Dodd *v.* Norris, 3 Campb. 519; Doe, d. Farr *v.* Hicks, Bull. N. P. 296; 4 Esp. 51, S. C.; Stephenson *v.* Walker, 4 Esp. 50, 51; Bate *v.* Hill, 1 C. & P. 100; Ante, Vol. 1, § 54, 55; 1 Steph. N. P. 26.

AGENCY.

§ 59. An agent is one who acts in the place and stead of another. The act done, if lawful, is considered as the act of the principal. It is not always necessary, that the authority should precede the act; it may become in law the act of the principal, by his subsequent ratification and adoption of it.[1] The vital principle of the law of agency lies in the legal identity of the agent and the principal, created by their mutual consent. If the agent does an act within the scope of his authority, and at the same time does something more which he was not authorized to do, and the two matters are not so connected as to be inseparable, even though both may relate to the same subject; that which he had authority to do is alone binding, and the other is void.[2]

§ 60. The evidence of agency is either *direct* or *indirect.* Agency is directly proved by express words of appointment, whether orally uttered, or contained in some deed or other writing. It is indirectly established by evidence of the relative situation of the parties, or of their habit and course of dealing and intercourse, or it is deduced from the nature of the employment, or from subsequent ratification.[3]

§ 61. As a *general rule*, it may be laid down, that the authority of an agent may be proved by parol evidence, that is, either by words spoken, or by any writing not under seal, or by acts and implications.[4] But to this rule there are some

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[1] Maclean *v.* Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; Story on Agency, § 239–260.

[2] Hammond *v.* Michigan State Bank, 1 Walker, Ch. R. 214.

[3] Story on Agency, § 45; 2 Kent, Comm. 612, 613; Paley on Agency, p. 2.

[4] Story on Agency, § 47; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Man. p. 5; Coles *v.* Trecothick, 9 Ves. 250.

exceptions. Thus, whenever an act is required to be done *under seal*, the authority of the agent to do it, must also be proved by an instrument under seal. A writing without seal will not be sufficient at law, to give validity to a deed, though a Court of Equity might, in such case, compel the principal to confirm and ratify the deed.[1] The principle of this exception, however, is not entirely followed out in the Common Law; for an authority to sign or indorse promissory notes may be proved by mere oral communications, or by implication;[2] and even where the Statute of Frauds requires an engagement to be in writing, the authority of an agent to sign it may be verbally conferred.[3]

§ 62. Where a *corporation aggregate* is the principal, it was formerly held, that the authority of its agent could he proved only by deed, under the seal of the corporation. But this rule is now very much relaxed both in England and America; and however necessary it still may be to produce some act under the corporate seal, as evidence of the authority of a special agent, constituted immediately by the corporation, to transact business affecting its essential and vital interests; yet, in all matters of daily necessity, within the ordinary powers of its officers, or touching its ordinary operations, the authority of its agents may be proved as in the case of private persons.[4] And where a deed is signed by one

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[1] Story on Agency, § 49; Harrison *v.* Jackson, 7 T. R. 207; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 157, 158. If the deed is executed in the presence of the principal, no other authority is necessary. Story on Agency, § 51.

[2] Story on Agency, § 50.

[3] Maclean *v.* Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; Coles *v.* Trecothick, 9 Ves. 250; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 158–161; Emmerson *v.* Heelis, 2 Taunt. 48; Story on Agency, § 50.

[4] Story on Agency, § 53; East London Waterworks Co. *v.* Bailey, 4 Bing. 283; Bank of Columbia *v.* Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299–305; Smith *v.* The Birmingham Gas Light Co. 1 Ad. & El. 526; Bank of the United States *v.* Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 67–75; Randal *v.* Van Vetchen, 19 Johns. 60; Dunn *v.* St. Andrews Church, 14 Johns. 118; Perkins *v.* The Washington Ins. Co. 4 Cow. 645; Troy Turnp. Co. *v.* M'Chesney, 21 Wend. 296; Angell & Ames on Corp. 152, 153; Rex *v.* Bigg, 3 P. Wms. 427.

as the agent of a corporation, if the seal of the corporation is affixed thereto, it will be presumed, in the absence of contradictory evidence, that the agent was duly authorized to make the conveyance.[1]

§ 63. If the authority of the agent is in writing, the *writing* must be *produced* and proved; and if, from the nature of the transaction, the authority must have been in writing, parol testimony will not be admissible to prove it, unless as secondary evidence, after proof of the loss of the original.[2] Where the authority was verbally conferred, the agent himself is a competent witness to prove it;[3] but his declarations, when they are no part of the *res gestæ*, are inadmissible.[4]

§ 64. Where the agency is inferred from the *relative situation* of the parties, it is generally sufficient to establish the fact, that the relationship in question was actually created; and this must be proved by the kind of evidence appropriate to the case. Thus, where the sheriff was sued for the wrongful act of a bailiff, it was held not enough to prove him a general bailiff, by official acts done by him as such; but proof was required of the original warrant of execution, directed by the sheriff to the bailiff, which is the only source of a bailiff's authority, he not being the general officer of the sheriff.[5] If the relation is one which may be created by parol, it may be shown by evidence of the servant or agent, acting in that relation with the knowledge and acquiescence of the principal, whether express or implied.[6]

§ 64. *a.* The mere existence of the relation, however,

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[1] Flint *v.* Clinton Co. 12 N. Hamp. 430.

[2] Ante, Vol. I, § 86, 87, 88; Johnson *v.* Mason, 1 Esp. 89.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 416, 417, and cases there cited.

[4] Ante, Vol. 1, § 113; Clark *v.* Baker. 2 Whart. 340.

[5] Drake *v.* Sykes, 7 T. R. 113.

[6] Price *v.* Marsh, 1 C. & P. 60; Rex *v.* Almon, 5 Burr. 2686; Garth *v.* Howard, 5 C. & P. 346; 8 Bing. 451, S. C.; Story on Agency, § 55; White *v.* Edgman, 1 Overton's Tenn. R. 19.

establishes an agency no farther than is necessary for the discharge of the duties ordinarily belonging to it. Thus, the actual command of a ship, as master, renders the owner chargeable only for such acts as are done by the master in the ordinary course of his employment.[1] But the marital relation alone will not render a husband liable, by raising a presumption of agency in the wife, where her orders for goods are of an extravagant nature, disproportionate to the husband's apparent ability.[2]

§ 65. The most numerous class of cases of agency is that which relates to affairs of trade and commerce, where the agency is proved by inference from the *habit and course of dealing* between the parties. This may be such as either to show, that there must have been an original appointment, or a subsequent and continued ratification of the acts done; but in either case the principal is equally bound. Having himself recognized another as his agent, factor, or servant, by adopting and ratifying his acts done in that capacity, the principal is not permitted to deny the relation, to the injury of third persons, who have dealt with him as such.[3] Cases frequently occur, in which, from the habit and course of conduct and dealing adopted by the principal, the Jury have been advised and permitted to infer the grant of authority to one to act as his salesman,[4] broker,[5] servant,[6] or general agent,[7] and even to

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1 Story on Agency, § 116 – 123; Abbott on Shipping, Part ii. ch. 2, 3.

2 Lane *v.* Ironmonger, 1 New Pr. Cas. 105; Freestone *v.* Butcher, 9 C. & P. 643.

3 2 Kent, Comm. 614, 615. The decisions on implied agencies are collected and arranged, with just discrimination, in 1 Hare & Wallace's American Leading Cases, p. 398 – 404.

4 Story on Agency, § 55; Harding *v.* Carter, Park on Ins. p. 4; Prescott *v.* Flinn, 9 Bing. 19. Evidence that the defendant's son, a minor, had in three or four instances signed for his father, and had accepted bills for him, has been held sufficient *primâ facie* evidence of authority to sign a collateral guaranty. Watkins *v.* Vince, 2 Stark. R. 368.

5 Whitehead *v.* Tuckett, 15 East, 400.

6 Hazard *v.* Treadwell, 1 Stra. 506.

7 Burt *v.* Palmer, 5 Esp. 145; Peto *v.* Hague, 5 Esp. 134.

his wife,[1] to transact business in his behalf; and he has been accordingly held bound. A single payment, without disapprobation, for what a servant bought upon credit, has been deemed equivalent to a direction to trust him in future;[2] and the employer has been held bound in such case, though he sent him the second time with ready money, which the servant embezzled.[3] In regard to the payment of moneys due, the authority to receive payment is inferred from the possession of a negotiable security; and in regard to bonds and other securities not negotiable, the person who is entrusted to take the security and to retain it in his custody, is generally considered as entrusted with power to receive the money, when it becomes due.[4]

§ 66. Where the agency is to be proved by the *subsequent ratification* and adoption of the act by the principal, there must be evidence of previous knowledge, on the part of the principal, of all the material facts.[5] The Act of an unauthorized person, in such cases, is not void, but voidable;[6] but when the principal is once fully informed of what has been done in his behalf, he is bound, if dissatisfied, to express his dissatisfaction within a reasonable time; and if he does not, his assent will be presumed.[7] But where the act of the agent

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[1] Palethorp *v.* Furnish, 2 Esp. 511; Ante, Vol. 1, § 185, and cases there cited; Emerson *v.* Blondon, 1 Esp. 142; Anderson *v.* Sanderson, 2 Stark. R. 204; Clifford *v.* Burton, 1 Bing. 199; 1 Bl. Comm. 430; Fenner *v.* Lewis, 10 Johns. 38.

[2] 1 Bl. Comm. 430; Bryan *v.* Jackson, 4 Conn. 291; Story on Agency, § 56.

[3] Rusby *v.* Scarlett, 5 Esp. 76; Hazard *v.* Treadwell, 1 Stra. 506; Story on Agency, § 56.

[4] Story on Bills, § 415; Story on Agency, § 98, 104; Wolstenholm *v.* Davies, 2 Freem. 289; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 709; Duchess of Cleaveland *v.* Dashwood, 2 Freem. 249; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 708; Owen *v.* Barrow, 1 New Rep. 101; Kingman *v.* Pierce, 17 Mass. 247; Anon. 12 Mod. 564; Gerard *v.* Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 94.

[5] Owings *v.* Hull, 9 Pet. 607; Bell *v.* Cunningham, 3 Pet. 81; Courteen *v.* Touse, 1 Campb. 43, n. See also Wilson *v.* Tummon, 6 Scott, N. R. 894.

[6] Denn *v.* Wright, 1. Pet. C. C. R. 64.

[7] Cairnes *v.* Bleecker, 12 Johns. 300; Bradin *v.* Dubary, 14 S. & R.

was by deed, the ratification also must in general be by deed;[1] or, more generally speaking, wherever the adoption of any particular form or mode is necessary to confer the authority in the first instance, the same mode must be pursued in the ratification.[2] The acts and conduct of the principal, evincing an assent to the act of the agent, are interpreted liberally in favor of the latter; and slight circumstances will sometimes suffice to raise the presumption of a ratification; which becomes stronger, in proportion as the conduct of the principal is inconsistent with any other supposition.[3] Thus, if goods are sold without authority, and the owner receives the price, or pursues his remedy for it by action at law against the purchaser, or if any other act be done in behalf of another, who afterwards claims the benefit of it, this is a ratification.[4] Payment of a loss, upon a policy subscribed by an agent, is evidence that he had authority to sign it.[5] Proof that one was in the habit of signing policies in the name and as the agent of another, and with his knowledge, is evidence of his authority to sign the particular policy in question;[6] and if the principal has been in the habit of paying the losses upon policies so signed in his name, this has been held sufficient proof of the agency, though the authority was conferred by an instrument

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27; Amory *v.* Hamilton, 17 Mass. 103; Ward *v.* Evans, 2 Salk. 442. If he assents while ignorant of the facts, he may disaffirm when informed of them. Copeland *v.* Merchants' Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 198.

[1] Blood *v.* Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68; 12 Wend. 525, S. C.; Story on Agency, § 252.

[2] Despatch Line, &c. *v.* Bellamy Man. Co. 12 N. Hamp. 205; Boyd *v.* Dobson, 5 Humphr. 37.

[3] Story on Agency, § 253; Ward *v.* Evans, 2 Salk. 442.

[4] Peters *v.* Ballistier, 3 Pick. 495. But if the action is discontinued or withdrawn, on discovering that the remedy is misconceived, it is not a ratification. Ibid. See also Lent *v.* Padelford, 10 Mass. 230; Episcopal Charit. Soc. *v.* Episcopal Ch. in Dedham, 1 Pick. 372; Kupfer *v.* Augusta, 12 Mass. 185; Odiorne *v.* Maxcy, 13 Mass. 178; Herring *v.* Polley, 8 Mass. 113; Pratt *v.* Putnam, 13 Mass. 361; Fisher *v.* Willard, Ib. 379; Copeland *v.* Merchants' Ins. Co. 6. Pick. 198.

[5] Courteen *v.* Touse, 2 Campb. 43. n.

[6] Neal *v.* Erving, 1 Esp. 61.

in writing.[1] And an authority to sign a policy, is sufficient evidence of authority to adjust the loss.[2] Where the principal, in an action against himself on a policy signed by an agent, used the affidavit of the agent to support a motion to put off the trial, in which the agent stated, that he subscribed the policy for and on account of the defendant, this was held a ratification of the signature.[3]

§ 67. *Long acquiescence* of the principal, after knowledge of the act done for him by another, will also, in many cases, be sufficient evidence of a ratification. If an agency actually existed, the silence or mere acquiescence of the principal may well be taken as proof of a ratification. If there are peculiar relations between the parties, such as that of father and son, the presumption becomes more vehement, whether there was an agency in fact or not, and the duty of disavowal is more urgent. And if the silence of the principal is either contrary to his duty, or has a tendency to mislead the other side, it is conclusive. Such is the case among merchants, when notice of the act done is given by a letter, which is not answered in a reasonable time. Whether a mere voluntary intermeddler, without authority, is entitled to the benefit of the principal's silence, is not clearly agreed; but the better opinion is, that where the act was done in good faith, for the apparent benefit of the principal, who has full notice of the act, and has done nothing to repudiate it, the agent is entitled to the benefit of his silence, as a presumptive ratification.[4]

§ 68. If the act of the agent was in itself *unlawful, and directly injurious* to another, no subsequent ratification will

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[1] Haughton *v.* Ewbank, 4 Campb. 88. So of bills of exchange. Hooe *v.* Oxley, 1 Wash. 19, 23.

[2] Richardson *v.* Anderson, 1 Cambp. 43, n. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 614, 615.

[3] Johnson *v.* Ward, 6 Esp. 47; Ante, Vol. 1, § 196, 210.

[4] Story on Agency, § 255, 256, 257, 258, cum notis; Amory *v.* Hamilton, 17 Mass, 103; Kingman *v.* Pierce, Ib. 247; Frothingham *v.* Haley, 3 Mass. 70; Erick *v.* Johnson, 6 Mass. 193.

operate to make the principal *a trespasser;* for an authority to commit a trespass does not result by mere implication of law. The master is liable in trespass for the act of his servant, only in consequence of his previous express command; which may be proved, either by direct evidence of the fact, or by his presence at the time of the transaction, or by any other legal evidence, which will satisfy the jury. In the absence of such proof, the master is not liable in *tort;* for the only act of the master is the employment of the servant, from which no immediate prejudice can arise to any one; and the only authority presumed by the law, is an authority to do all lawful acts belonging to his employment.[1] But if the servant, in doing such acts, perpetrates a fraud upon another, or occasions a consequential injury, the master is liable, in an action on the case.[2] Thus, where the defendant, being the owner of a house, employed an agent to sell it, and the agent described it as free from rates and taxes, not knowing it to be otherwise; but it was in fact liable to certain rates and taxes, as the owner knew; and on the faith of the agent's representation, the plaintiff bought the house; it was held, that the purchaser, being actually deceived in his bargain, might maintain case for the deceit against the owner, though it did not appear that the latter had instructed the agent to make any representation as to rates and taxes.[3]

§ 68 *a*. The proof of agency, thereby charging the principal, may be rebutted by showing that his authority was *revoked* prior to the act in question. But if he was consti-

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[1] McManus *v.* Crickett, 1 East, 106; Middleton *v.* Fowler, 1 Salk. 282; Odiorne *v.* Maxcy, 13 Mass. 178; Salem Bank *v.* Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1; Wyman *v.* The Hal. & Augusta Bank, 14 Mass. 58; Wilson *v.* Tummon, 6 Scott, N. R. 894.

[2] Story on Agency, § 308; 1 Bl. Comm. 431; Foster *v.* The Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Gray *v.* The Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 264; Williams *v.* Mitchell, 17 Mass. 98; Lane *v.* Cotton, 12 Mod. 488; Shaw *v.* Reed, 9 Watts & Serg. 72. The sheriff, however, on grounds of public policy, is liable in *trespass*, for the act of his deputy. Campbell *v.* Phelps, 17 Mass. 244; 1 Pick. 62.

[3] Fuller *v.* Wilson, 3 Ad. & El. 56, N. S.

tuted by writing, and the written authority was left in his hands subsequent to the revocation, and he afterwards exhibits it to a third person, who deals with him on the faith of it without notice of the revocation, or the knowledge of any circumstances sufficient to have put him on his guard, the act of the agent, within the scope of the written authority, will bind the principal.[1]

[1] Beard *v.* Kirk, 11 N. Hamp. 377.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

§ 69. A SUBMISSION to arbitration may be by parol, with mutual promises to perform the award; or by deed; or by rule of Court; or by any other mode, pointed out by statute. In the first case, the remedy may be by an action of *assumpsit*, upon the promise to perform the award; in the second, it may be by *debt* for the penalty of the arbitration bond, or, by *covenant*, upon the agreement or indenture of submission; in the third case, it may be by *attachment*, or, by *execution* upon the judgment entered up pursuant to the rule of Court, or to the statute; and in any case it may be by an action of *debt upon the award.* An award, duly made and performed, may also be pleaded in bar of any subsequent action for the same cause.[1]

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[1] In the simplest form of arbitration, namely, a *verbal submission* to a single arbitrator, the declaration is as follows: — "For that on —— there were divers controversies between the plaintiff and the said D., concerning their mutual accounts, debts, and dealings, and thereupon they then, at —— by their mutual agreement, appointed one E. to hear and determine for them all the said controversies, and mutually promised each other to stand to, abide by, and perform the award of the said E. thereupon. And the said E. afterwards, on —— there heard the plaintiff and the said D., and adjudged upon the premises, and awarded that the said D. should pay to the plaintiff a balance of —— on demand, and published [and notified the said parties of] the same. Yet," &c.

The following form is proper, where the agreement is *in writing without seal*, and the submission is to *three persons*, with power in any two to make an award: — "For that whereas on —— there were divers controversies between the plaintiff and the said D. concerning their mutual accounts, debts, and dealings, and thereupon they then, by their mutual agreement in writing, submitted and referred said controversies [and all other mutual demands between them] to the final award and determination of A., B., and C., and in and by said writing further agreed [*here set out any other material parts of the agreement*] that the award of the said A., B., and C., or any two of them, being duly made in the premises, [in writing, and ready to be delivered to the said parties or either of them on or before ——, (*or*) and duly notified to the

§ 70. The action of *debt on the award* itself, is sometimes *preferable* to any other form of action, inasmuch as if judgment goes by default, it is final in the first instance, the sum to be recovered being ascertained through the medium of the award; whereas in debt on the bond, breaches must be suggested, and a hearing had pursuant to statutes; and in assumpsit, and in covenant, the judgment by default is but interlocutory.[1] But this is only where the award is for a single sum of money; for if it is to do any other thing, the remedy should be sought in some other mode. Where the submission is by deed, with a penalty, the best form of action is debt for the penalty; for by declaring on the award, the plaintiff takes upon himself the burden of proving a mutual

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parties, *as the case may have been*] should be binding and final; and the plaintiff and the said D. then and there mutually promised each other to stand to, abide by, and perform the award so made. And the plaintiff avers, that the said A., B., and C. afterwards heard the plaintiff and the said D. upon all the matters referred to them as aforesaid, and thereupon, on —— the said [A. and B. two of said] referees [the said C. refusing to concur therein] made and published their award [in writing] of and concerning the premises, [and then and there duly notified the said parties of the same] and did thereby award and finally determine, that there remained a balance due from the said D. to the plaintiff, of —— to be paid to the plaintiff [on demand,] (&c.) Yet," &c.

The count in *covenant* contains averments similar to that in *assumpsit*.

The count in *debton an award* is as follows: — "For that, whereas the said D. on —— was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of ——, upon and by virtue of an award made by one E., on a submission before that time made by the plaintiff and the said D. to the award and determination of the said E., concerning certain matters in difference then depending between the plaintiff and the said D., and upon which said reference the said E. awarded, that the said D. should pay to the plaintiff the sum of money aforesaid, upon request; whereby, and by reason of the non-payment whereof, an action has accrued to the plaintiff, to demand and have of and from the said D. the sum aforesaid. Yet the said D. has not paid the same, nor any part thereof. To the damage," &c. An allegation of mutual *promises* to abide the award would vitiate *this* declaration. Sutcliffe *v.* Brooke, 9 Jur. 1112; 14 M. & W. 855.

[1] 1 Steph. N. P. 180. In those of the United States, in which the damages, upon default, are made up forthwith by the Court, or by a jury impanelled on the spot, without a writ of inquiry, this mode of remedy does not seem to possess any practical advantage over others.

submission; but by declaring on the bond, he transfers the burden to the defendant, on whom it will then lie to discharge himself of the penalty, by showing a performance of the conditions.[1]

§ 71. In proving an award, it must first appear, that the arbitrators had *sufficient authority* to make it.[2] If the agreement of submission was in writing, it must be produced, and its execution by all the parties to the submission must be proved.[3] Therefore, where four persons being copartners, agreed to refer all matters in difference between them, or any two of them, to certain arbitrators, who made an award, in which they found several sums due to and from the partnership, and also divers private balances due among the partners from one to another; in an action between two of them upon the award to recover one of these private balances, it was held necessary to prove the execution of the deed of submission by them all; the execution of each being presumed to have been made upon the condition, that all were to be bound equally with himself.[4] If the submission was by rule of Court, an office copy of the rule will be sufficient proof of the Judge's order.[5] But if the agreement of submission is attested by witnesses, and its execution is denied; the rule or order by which the agreement was made a rule of Court, is not the proper evidence of the signature of the agreement, but it must be proved by the attesting witnesses.[6]

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1 Ferrer *v.* Oven, 7 B. & C. 427, per Bayley, J.

2 Antram *v.* Chace, 15 East, 209. An attorney has no sufficient authority to refer, on behalf of an infant plaintiff. Biddell *v.* Dowse, 6 B. & C. 255. Nor has one partner authority to bind the firm. Stead *v.* Salt, 3 Bing. 101. Proof of the submission has been held necessary, even after the lapse of forty years. Burghardt *v.* Turner, 12 Pick. 534.

3 Ferrer *v.* Oven, 7 B. & C. 427.

4 Antram *v.* Chace, 15 East, 209. See also Brazier *v.* Jones, 8 B. & C. 124.

5 Still *v.* Halford, 4 Campb. 17; Gisborne *v.* Hart, 5 M. & W. 50.

6 Berney *v.* Read, 9 Jur. 620; 7 Ad. & El. 79, N. S.

§ 72. If the *submission* was *by parol*, it is material to prove not only that both parties promised to abide by the award, but that the promises were concurrent and mutual; for otherwise each promise is but *nudum pactum*.[1]

§ 73. If the award was made by an *umpire*, his appointment must also be proved. The recital of his authority in the award, signed by himself and the arbitrators, is not sufficient.[2] He cannot be selected by the arbitrators by lot, without consent of the parties.[3] His appointment will be good, though made before the arbitrators enter on the business referred to them;[4] and they may well join with him in making the award.[5] And if the arbitrators appoint an umpire without authority, yet if the parties appear and are heard before him, without objection, this is a ratification of his appointment.[6]

§ 74. The next point in the order of evidence, is the *execution of the award;* which must be proved, as in other cases, by the subscribing witnesses, if there be any, and if not, then by evidence of the handwriting of the arbitrators.[7] If the award does not *pursue the submission*, it is inadmissible. If therefore the submission be to several, without any authority in the majority to decide, and the award is not signed by all,

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[1] Keep *v.* Goodrich, 12 Johns. 397; Livingston *v.* Rogers, 1 Caines, 583; Kingston *v.* Phelps, Peake's Cas. 227.

[2] Still *v.* Halford, 4 Campb. 17. Nor is such recital necessary. Semble. Rison *v.* Berry, Rand. 275.

[3] Young *v.* Miller, 3 B. & C. 407; Wells *v.* Cooke, 2 B. & A. 218; Harris *v.* Mitchell, 2 Vern. 485; In re Cassell, 9 B. & C. 624 (overruling Neale *v.* Ledger, 16 East, 51); Ford *v.* Jones, 3 B. & Ad. 248. But if the parties agree to a selection by lot, it will be good. In re Tunno, 5 B. & Ad. 488.

[4] Roe d. Wood *v.* Doe, 2 T. R. 644; Bates *v.* Cooke, 9 B. & C. 407; McKinstry *v.* Solomons, 2 Johns. 57; Van Cortlandt *v.* Underhill, 17 Johns. 405.

[5] Soulsby *v.* Hodgson, 3 Burr. 1474; 1 W. Bl. 463, S. C.; Beck *v.* Sargent, 4 Taunt. 232.

[6] Matson *v.* Trower, Ry. & M. 17; Norton *v.* Savage, 1 Fairf. 456.

[7] Ante, Vol. 1, § 569 – 581.

it is bad.[1] And though a majority have power to decide, yet, in an award by a majority only, it must appear that all the arbitrators heard the parties, as well those who did not, as those who did concur in the decision.[2] It will be presumed that all matters, included within the terms of the submission, were laid before the arbitrators, and by them considered; but this presumption is not conclusive, evidence being admissible to prove that a particular matter of claim was not in fact laid before them, nor considered in their award.[3]

§ 75. If the submission required, that *notice of the award* should be given to the parties, this notice, as it must in that case have been averred in the declaration, is the next point to be proved; but if it was not required by the submission, both the averment and the proof are superfluous.[4] It is essential, however, to allege, and therefore to prove, that the award was *published*;[5] and an award is published whenever the arbitrator gives notice, that it may be had on payment of his charges.[6] If the agreement is that the award shall be ready to be *delivered* to the parties by a certain day, this is satisfied by proof of the delivery of a *copy* of the award, if it be accepted without objection on that account;[7] and if it be only *read* to the losing party, who thereupon promises to pay the sum awarded,

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[1] Towne *v.* Jaquith, 6 Mass. 46; Baltimore Turnp. Case, 5 Binn. 481; Crofoot *v.* Allen, 2 Wend. 494.

[2] Short *v.* Pratt, 6 Mass. 496; Walker *v.* Melcher, 14 Mass. 148. But upon a rehearing, if one of the arbitrators refuses to attend, the others are competent to re-affirm the former award; Peterson *v.* Loring, 1 Greenl. 64; though not to revise the merits of the case. Cumberland *v.* North Yarmouth, 4 Greenl. 459.

[3] Martin *v.* Thornton, 4 Esp. 180; Ravee *v.* Farmer, 4 T. R. 146; Webster *v.* Lee, 5 Mass. 334; Hodges *v.* Hodges, 9 Mass. 320; Smith *v.* Whiting, 11 Mass. 445 (Rand's ed.), and cases cited in note (a), Bixby *v.* Whitney, 5 Greenl. 192.

[4] Juxon *v.* Thornhill, Cro. Car. 132; Child *v.* Horden, 2 Bulstr. 144; 2 Saund. 62 a, note (4), by Williams.

[5] Kingsley *v.* Bill, 9 Mass. 198.

[6] McArthur *v.* Campbell, 5 B. & Ad. 518; Musselbrook *v.* Dunkin, 9 Bing. 605. See also Munroe *v.* Allaire, 2 Caines, 320.

[7] Sellick *v.* Adams, 15 Johns. 197.

this is sufficient proof of the delivery of the award, or rather is evidence of a waiver of his right to the original or a copy, even though it was afterwards demanded and refused.[1]

§ 76. It is not necessary to allege, nor, of course, to prove, a *demand* of payment; except where the obligation is to pay a collateral sum upon request, as, where the defendant promised to pay a certain sum upon request, if he failed to perform an award; in which case an actual request must be alleged and proved. In all other cases, where the award is for money, which is not paid, the burden of proof is on the defendant, to show that he has paid the sum awarded, the bringing of the action being a sufficient request.[2] The averment of a promise to pay, will be supported by evidence of an agreement to abide by the decision of the arbitrators.[3]

§ 77. Where the thing, to be done by the defendant, depends on a *condition precedent*, to be performed by the plaintiff, such performance must be averred and proved by the plaintiff. And if, by the terms of the award, acts are to be done by both parties on the *same day*, as, where one is to convey land, and the other to pay the price, there, in an action for the money, the plaintiff must aver and prove a performance, or an offer to perform, on his part, or he cannot recover; for the conveyance, or the offer to convey, from the nature of the case, was precedent to the right to the price.[4]

§ 78. In *defence* of an *action* on an award, or for not performing an award, the defendant may avail himself of any material error or defect, apparent on the face of the award;

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[1] Perkins *v.* Wing, 10 Johns. 143.

[2] Birks *v.* Trippet, 1 Saund. 32, 33, and note (2), by Williams. If the reference is general, and the arbitrator directs the payment to be made at a certain time and place, this direction may be rejected as surplusage. Rees *v.* Waters, 4 D. & L. 567. 16 M. & W. 263.

[3] Efner *v.* Shaw, 2 Wend. 567.

[4] Hay *v.* Brown, 12 Wend. 591.

such as excess of power by the arbitrators;[1] defect of execution of power, as, by omitting to consider a matter submitted;[2] want of certainty to a common intent;[3] or plain mistake of law, as, allowing a claim of freight, where the ship had never broken ground;[4] and the like. In regard to corruption, or other misconduct or mistake of the arbitrators in making their award, the Common Law seems not to have permitted these to be shown in bar of an action at law for non-performance of the award; but the remedy must be pursued in Equity.[5] But in this country, in those States where the jurisdiction in Equity is not general, and does not afford complete relief in such cases, it has been held, that if arbitrators act corruptly, or commit gross errors or mistakes in making their award, or take into consideration matters not submitted to them, or omit to consider matters which were submitted, or the award be obtained by any fraudulent practice or suppression of evidence by the prevailing party, the defendant may plead and prove any of these matters in bar of an action at law to enforce the award.[6] And though arbitrators, ordinarily,

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[1] Morgan *v.* Mather, 2 Ves. 18; Fisher *v.* Pimbley, 11 East, 189; Macomb *v.* Wilber, 16 Johns. 227; Jackson *v.* Ambler, 14 Johns. 96. See also Commonwealth *v.* Pejepscot Propr's, 7 Mass. 399.

[2] Mitchell *v.* Stavely, 16 East, 58; Bean *v.* Farnam, 6 Pick. 269. But not unless the omission is material to the award. Davy *v.* Faw, 7 Cranch, 171; Harper *v.* Hough, 2 Halst. 187; Doe *v.* Horner, 8 Ad. & El. 235.

[3] Jackson *v.* Ambler, 14 Johns. 96.

[4] Kelly *v.* Johnson, 3 Wash. R. 45. See also, Gross *v.* Zorger, 3 Yeates, 521; Ross *v.* Overton, 3 Call, 309; Morris *v.* Ross, 2 H. & M. 408; Greenough *v.* Rolfe, 4 N. H. 357; Ames *v.* Milward, 8 Taunt. 637.

[5] Watson on Arbitrations, p. 153, in 11 Law Libr. 79; Shepherd *v.* Watrous, 3 Caines, 166; Barlow *v.* Todd, 3 Johns. 367; Cranston *v.* Kennedy, 9 Johns. 212; Cortlandt *v.* Underhill, 17 Johns. 405; Kleine *v.* Catara, 2 Gallis. 61; Sherron *v.* Wood, 5 Halst. 7; Newland *v.* Douglas, 2 Johns. 62. In practice, where no suit is pending, arbitrations are now generally entered into under the statutes, enacted for the purpose of making the submission a rule of Court; and in all cases where the submission is made a rule of Court, the Court will generally administer relief, wherever it could be administered in Equity.

[6] Bean *v.* Farnam, 6 Pick. 269; Brown *v.* Bellows, 4 Pick. 183; Parsons *v.* Hall, 3 Greenl. 60; The Boston Water Power Co. *v.* Gray, 6 Metc. 131; Williams *v.* Paschall, 3 Yeates, 564.

are not bound to disclose the grounds of their award,[1] yet they may be examined to prove that no evidence was given upon a particular subject;[2] or, that certain matters were or were not examined, or acted on by them, or that there is mistake in the award;[3] and also as to the time and circumstances under which the award was made,[4] and as to any facts which transpired at the hearing.[5] Fraud in obtaining the submission may be given in evidence under the plea of *non assumpsit*, or *nil debet*, by the Common Law.[6]

§ 79. The defendant may also show, that the authority of the arbitrators was *revoked* before the making of the award. And the *death* of either of the parties to a submission at Common Law, before the award made, will amount to a *revocation;*[7] unless it is otherwise provided in the submission.[8] Whether *bankruptcy* is a revocation, is not clearly settled.[9] Where the submission is at Common Law, and even where it is under the statute, but is not yet made a rule of Court; it seems that either *party may revoke* the authority of the arbitrators; though he may render himself liable to an action for

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 249.

[2] Martin *v.* Thornton, 4 Esp. 180.

[3] Roop *v.* Brubacker, 1 Rawle, 304; Alder *v.* Savill, 5 Taunt. 454; Zeigler *v.* Zeigler, 2 S. & R. 286. If, upon a submission of "all matters in difference," the parties omit to call the attention of the arbitrator to a matter not necessarily before him, they cannot object to the award on the ground that he has not adjudicated upon it. Rees *v.* Waters, 16 M. & W. 263.

[4] Woodbury *v.* Northy, 3 Greenl. 85.

[5] Gregory *v.* Howard, 3 Esp. 113.

[6] Sackett *v.* Owen, 2 Chitty, R. 39.

[7] Edmunds *v.* Cox, 2 Tidd's Pr. 877; 3 Doug. 406, S. C.; 2 Chitty, R. 422, S. C.; Cooper *v.* Johnson, 2 B. & Ald. 394: Potts *v.* Ward, 1 Marsh. 366; Toussaint *v.* Hartop, 7 Taunt. 571. But if the submission is under a rule of Court, and the action survives, it is not revoked by death. Bacon *v.* Crandon, 15 Pick. 79.

[8] Macdougall *v.* Robertson, 2 Y. & J. 11; 4 Bing. 435, S. C.

[9] Marsh *v.* Wood, 9 B. & C. 649; Andrews *v.* Palmer, 4 B. & Ald. 450; Ex parte Remshead, 1 Rose, 149.

so doing.[1] But if the submission is by two, a revocation by one only is void.[2] If the reference is made an order of a Court of Equity, the revocation of the authority of the arbitrators is a high contempt of the Court, and, upon application of the other party, will be dealt with accordingly.[3] If a feme sole, having entered into a submission to arbitration, takes husband, the marriage is a revocation of the submission; but it is also, like every other revocation by the voluntary act of the party, a breach of the covenant to abide by the award.[4]

§ 80. The defendant may also show, in defence, that one or more of the parties to the submission was a *minor*, or a *feme covert*, and that therefore the submission was void for want of mutuality.[5] So, he may show that the arbitrators, before making their award, declined that office; for thereupon they ceased to be arbitrators.[6]

§ 81. Where the action is *assumpsit upon a submission by parol*, the plea of *non assumpsit*, where it is not otherwise restricted by Rules of Court, puts in issue every material averment. Under this issue, therefore, the defendant

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[1] Skee *v.* Coxon, 10 B. & C. 483; Milne *v.* Gratrix, 7 East, 608; Clapham *v.* Higham, 1 Bing. 27; 7 Moore, 703; Greenwood *v.* Misdale, 1 McCl. & Y. 276; Brown *v.* Tanner, Ib. 464; 1 C. & P. 651, S. C.; Warburton, *v.* Storer, 4 B. & C. 103; Vynior's case, 8 Co. 162; Frets *v.* Frets, 1 Cow. 335; Allen *v.* Watson, 16 Johns. 205; Fisher *v.* Pimbley, 11 East, 187; Peters *v.* Craig, 6 Dana, R. 307; Marsh *v.* Bulteel, 5 B. & Ald. 507; Grazebrook *v.* Davis, 5 B. & C. 534, 538.

[2] Robertson *v.* McNeil, 12 Wend. 578.

[3] Haggett *v.* Welsh, 1 Sim. 134; Harcourt *v.* Ramsbottom, 1 Jac. & Walk. 511.

[4] Charnley *v.* Winstanley, 5 East, 266; Andrews *v.* Palmer, 4 B. & Ald. 252.

[5] Cavendish *v.* ———, 1 Chan. Cas. 279; Biddell *v.* Dowse, 6 B. & C. 255. But it is not a good objection, that one was an executor or administrator only, for he has authority to submit to arbitration. Coffin *v.* Cottle, 4 Pick. 454; Bean *v.* Farnam, 6 Pick. 269; Dickey *v.* Sleeper, 13 Mass. 244.

[6] Relyea *v.* Ramsay, 2 Wend. 602; Allen *v.* Watson, 16 Johns. 203.

may not only show those things, which affect the original validity of the submission, or of the award, such as infancy, coverture, want of authority in the arbitrators, fraud, revocation of authority, intrinsic defects in the award, and, if there is no other mode of relief, extrinsic irregularities also, such as want of notice, and the like ; but he may also show any thing, which at law would defeat and destroy the action, though it operate by way of confession and avoidance, such as, a release, payment, or performance.[1] And sometimes, where *assumpsit* has been brought upon the original cause of action, either party has been permitted to show the submission and award, under the general issue, as evidence of a statement of accounts and an admission of the balance due, or of a mutual adjustment of the amount in controversy.[2]

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[1] Stephen on Pleading, p. 179 – 182 (Am. edit. 1824 ;) Taylor *v.* Coryell, 12 S. & R. 243, 251 ; Allen *v.* Watson, 16 Johns. 203.

[2] Keen *v.* Batshore, 1 Esp. 194 ; Kingston *v.* Phelps, Peake's Cas. 228.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

§ 82. An *assault* is *defined* to be an inchoate violence to the person of another, with the present means of carrying the intent into effect.[1] Mere threats alone do not constitute the offence; there must be proof of violence actually offered.[2] Thus, if one ride after another, and oblige him to run to a place of security to avoid being injured;[3] or throw at him any missile capable of doing hurt, with intent to wound, whether it hit him or not;[4] or level a loaded gun, or brandish any other weapon, in a menacing manner, within such a distance as that harm might ensue;[5] or advance, in a threatening manner, to strike the plaintiff, so that the blow would have reached him in a few seconds, if the defendant had not been stopped;[6] in all these cases the act is assault. So, if he violently attack, and strike with a club, the horse, which is harnessed to a carriage, in which the plaintiff is riding.[7] But to stand in another's way, and passively to

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1 1 Steph. N. P. 208; Finch's Law, 202; Stephens *v.* Myers, 4 C. & P. 349.

2 Stephens *v.* Myers, 4 C. & P. 349; Tuberville *v.* Savage, 1 Mod. 3. The declaration for an assault and battery is thus: — "In a plea of trespass; For that the said (defendant) on the —— day of —— at —— in and upon the plaintiff, with force and arms made an assault, and him the said plaintiff then and there did beat, wound, and ill treat," [here may be stated any special matter of aggravation] "and other wrongs to the plaintiff then and there did against the peace. To the damage," &c. The material allegations in an indictment are the same as in a civil action.

3 Morton *v.* Shoppee, 3 C. & P. 373.

4 2 Hawk. P. C., B. 1, c. 62, § 1.

5 Ibid. If the gun is not loaded, it is no assault. Blake *v.* Barnard, 9 C. & P. 626; Regina *v.* James, 1 C. & K. 530.

6 Stephens *v.* Myers, 4 C. & P. 349, per Tindal, C. J.

7 De Marentille *v.* Oliver, 1 Penning. 380, per Pennington, J. Taking indecent liberties with a female pupil; Rex *v.* Nichol, Rus. & Ry. 130; or,

obstruct his lawful progress, as any inanimate object would, though done by design, is no assault.[1]

§ 83. The *intention to do harm*, is of the essence of an assault; and this intent is to be collected by the Jury, from the circumstances of the case. Therefore if the act of the defendant was merely an interference to prevent an unlawful injury, such as, to separate two combatants;[2] or if, at the time of menacing violence, he used words, showing that it was not his intention to do it at that time, as in the familiar example of one's laying his hand on his sword, and saying, that if it were not assize-time he would not take such language;[3] or if, being unlawfully set upon by another, he puts himself in a posture of defence, by brandishing his fists, or a weapon;[4] it is no assault. So, where one threw a stick, which struck the plaintiff, but it did not appear for what purpose it was thrown, it was presumed that it was thrown for a proper purpose, and that the striking of the plaintiff was merely an accident.[5]

§ 84. A *battery*, is the actual infliction of violence on the person. This averment will be proved by evidence of any unlawful touching of the person of the plaintiff, whether by the defendant himself, or by any substance put in motion by him. The degree of violence is not regarded in the law;[6] it is only considered by the Jury, in assessing the damages in a civil action, or by the Judge, in passing sentence, upon indictment. Thus, any touching of the person, in an angry, re-

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with a female patient; Rex *v.* Rosinski, Ry. & M. 19; though unresisted, is an assault.

[1] Jones *v.* Wylie, 1 C. & K. 257.

[2] Griffin *v.* Parsons, 1 Selw. N. P. 25, 26.

[3] Bull. N. P. 15; Tuberville *v.* Savage, 1 Mod. 3; 2 Keb. 545; Commonwealth *v.* Eyre, 1 S. & R. 347.

[4] Moriarty *v.* Brooks, 6 C. & P. 684.

[5] Alderson *v.* Waistell, 1 C. & K. 358.

[6] Leame *v.* Bray, 3 East, 602. Cutting off the hair of a parish pauper by the parish officers, against her will, was held a battery. Forde *v.* Skinner, 4 C. & P. 239.

vengeful, rude, or insolent manner;[1] spitting upon the person;[2] jostling him out of the way;[3] pushing another against him;[4] throwing a squib, or any missile, or water upon him;[5] striking the horse he is riding, whereby he is thrown;[6] taking hold of his clothes in an angry or insolent manner, to detain him;[7] it is a battery. So, striking the skirt of his coat, or the cane in his hand;[8] is a battery; for anything attached to the person, partakes of its inviolability.[9]

§ 85. And here, also, the plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show, either that the *intention* was unlawful, or, that the defendant was *in fault;* for if the injury was unavoidable, and the conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be liable.[10] Thus, if one intend to do a lawful act, as, to assist a drunken man, or prevent him from going without help, and in so doing a hurt ensue, it is no battery.[11] So, if a horse, by a sudden fright, runs away with his rider, not being accustomed so to do, and runs against a man;[12] or if a soldier, in discharging his musket by lawful military command, unavoidably hurts another;[13] it is no battery; and in such cases the defence may be made under the general issue.[14] But to make out a defence under this plea, it must be shown that the defendant was free from any

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[1] 2 Hawk. P. C., B. 1, c. 62, § 2; 4 Bl. Comm. 120.

[2] 1 East, P. C. 406; Regina *v.* Cotesworth, 6 Mod. 172.

[3] Bull. N. P. 16.

[4] Cole *v.* Turner, 6 Mod. 149.

[5] Scott *v.* Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892; 3 Wills. 403, S. C.; Pursell *v.* Horn, 8 Ad. & El. 605; Simpson *v.* Morris, 4 Taunt. 821.

[6] Dodwell *v.* Burford, 1 Mod. 24.

[7] United States *v.* Ortega, 4 Wash. 534; 1 Baldw. 600.

[8] Respublica *v.* De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 114, per McKean, C. J.; The State *v.* Davis, 1 Hill, S. Car. R. 46.

[9] Ibid.

[10] 1 Bing. 213, per Dallas, C. J.; 1 Com. Dig. 129, tit. Battery, A.; 1 Chitty on Pl. 120. See post, § 94, and tit. Damages, § 269, 271.

[11] Bull. N. P. 16.

[12] Gibbons *v.* Pepper, 4 Mod. 404; Bull. N. P. 16.

[13] Weaver *v.* Ward, Hob. 134.

[14] 4 Mod. 405.

blame, and that the accident resulted entirely from a superior agency. A defence, which admits that the accident resulted from an act of the defendant, must be specially pleaded.[1] Thus, if one of two persons fighting, unintentionally strikes a third;[2] or if one uncocks a gun without elevating the muzzle, or other due precaution, and it accidentally goes off and hurts a looker on;[3] or, if he drives a horse too spirited, or pulls the wrong rein, or uses a defective harness, and the horse taking fright, injures another;[4] he is liable for the battery. But if the injury happened by unavoidable accident, in the course of an amicable wrestling match, or other lawful athletic sport, if it be not dangerous, it may be justified.[5] If it were done in a boxing match, or fight, though by consent, it is an unjustifiable battery;[6] the proof of consent being admissible only in mitigation of damages.[7]

§ 86. Neither the *time* nor the *place*, laid in the declaration, are ordinarily, material to be proved. Evidence of the trespass committed previous to the commencement of the action is sufficient;[8] and it may be proved in any place, the action being personal and transitory.[9] But if the declaration contain only one count, and the plaintiff prove *one assault*, he cannot afterwards *waive* that, and prove another.[10] Nor can he give evidence of a greater number of assaults, than are laid in the declaration.[11] If the action is against several, for a joint tres-

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[1] Hall *v.* Fearnley, 3 Ad. & El. 919, N. S. See post, § 94, 622, 625; 1 Chitty, Pl. 437; Knapp *v.* Salsbury, 2 Campb. 500; Boss *v.* Litton, 5 C. & P. 407.

[2] James *v.* Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372.

[3] Underwood *v.* Hewson, Bull. N. P. 16; 1 Stra. 596, S. C. So, if he negligently discharges a gun. Dickerson *v.* Watson, T. Jones, 205; Taylor *v.* Rainbow, 2 Hen. & Munf. 423; Blin *v.* Campbell, 14 Johns. 432.

[4] Wakeman *v.* Robinson, 1 Bing. 213.

[5] 5 Com. Dig. 795, tit. Pleader, 3 M. 18; Foster, Cr. L. 259, 260.

[6] Boulter *v.* Clark, Bull. N. P. 16; Stout *v.* Wren, 1 Hawks, 420.

[7] Logan *v.* Austin, 1 Stew. 476. See post, tit. DAMAGES.

[8] 1 Saund. 24, note (1), by Williams; Bull. N. P. 86; Brownl. 233.

[9] Mostyn *v.* Fabrigas, Cowp. 161.

[10] Stante *v.* Pricket, 1 Campb. 473.

[11] Gillon *v.* Wilson, 3 Monr. 217.

pass, the plaintiff, having proved a trespass against some only, cannot afterwards be permitted to prove a trespass done at another time, in which all, or any others, were concerned; but he is bound, by the election which he has made, to charge some only; for, otherwise, some might be charged for a trespass, in which they had no concern.[1] So, if he prove a trespass against all the defendants, he cannot afterwards elect to go upon a separate trespass against one.[2] And if he prove a trespass against some, he is bound to elect, before the defendants open their case, against which defendants he will proceed.[3]

§ 87. Nor is it necessary to prove an *actual battery*, though it must be alleged in the declaration; for, upon proof of an assault only, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover.[4]

§ 88. If the plaintiff would recover for *consequential injuries*, they must be specially laid in the declaration, under a *per quod*.[5] Of these, the loss of the society of his wife, or of the services of his servant, are examples.[6] The relation of husband and wife is proved, in such cases, by evidence of a marriage *de facto*. If the action is for assaulting and beating the plaintiff's son,[7] or for seducing his daughter, *per quod*, it is sufficient to show that the child lived in the parent's family,

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1 Sedley *v.* Sutherland, 3 Esp. 202; Hitchen *v.* Teale, 2 M. & Rob. 30. But see Roper *v.* Harper, 5 Scott, 250.

2 Tait *v.* Harris, 1 M. & Rob. 282, per Ld. Lyndhurst, Ch. B. In Hitchen *v.* Teale, 2 M. & Rob. 30, Patterson, J. said he could not very well understand the principle on which this decision was founded.

3 Howard *v.* Newton, 2 M. & Rob. 509.

4 Bro. Abr. Tresp. pl. 40; 40 E. 3, 40; 1 Steph. N. P. 213; Lewis *v.* Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407.

5 Pettit *v.* Addington, Peake's Cas. 62. But the plaintiff cannot recover in this form for any injury for which a separate action lies, either by himself, or by another. 1 Chitty on Pl. 347–349; Wallace *v.* Hardacre, 1 Campb. 45, 49; Bull. N. P. 89.

6 Guy *v.* Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501; Woodward *v.* Walton, 2 New Rep. 476; 9 Co. 113, a; Ream *v.* Rank, 3 S. & R. 215.

7 Jones *v.* Brown, Peake's Cas. 233; 1 Esp. 217, S. C.

without proof of actual service;[1] or, if the child lived in a neighbor's family, it is sufficient to prove, that he also daily and ordinarily performed services for the parent.[2] If the daughter is emancipated, and resides apart from the parent's family, the parent cannot recover.[3] But if the daughter actually resides with her father, even though she be a married woman, if she lives apart from her husband, the father may maintain the action.[4] In all these cases, it is sufficient to prove the relation of master and servant *de facto;* and proof of very slight acts of service is sufficient.[5]

§ 89. It is not, however, necessary to state specially any matters, which are the *legal and natural consequence* of the tortious act; for all such consequences of his own actions every man is presumed to anticipate; and as one of the objects of the rule, which requires particularity of averment in pleading, is, to give the other party notice, that he may come prepared to meet the charge, such particularity is, in these cases, superfluous. The plaintiff, therefore, under the usual allegation of assault and battery, may give evidence of any damages naturally and necessarily resulting from the act complained of.[6] But where the law does not imply the damage, as the natural and necessary consequence of the assault and battery, it should be set forth with particularity; such, for

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[1] Maunder *v.* Venn, 1 M. & Malk. 323; Mann *v.* Barrett, 6 Esp. 32.

[2] 1 Steph. N. P. 214.

[3] Dean *v.* Peel, 5 East, 45; Anon. 1 Smith, 333; Postlethwaite *v.* Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878. If the daughter, being under age, is actually in the service of another, but the father has not divested himself of his right to reclaim her services, it has been held, that he may maintain this action. Martin *v.* Payne, 9 Johns. 387.

[4] Harper *v.* Luffkin, 7 B. & C. 387.

[5] Fores *v.* Wilson, Peake's Cas. 55; Bennett *v.* Allcott, 2 T. R. 166; Manvell *v.* Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303; Irwin *v.* Dearman, 11 East, 23; Nickleson *v.* Striker, 10 Johns. 115. See also, 1 Chitty on Pl. 50.

[6] Moore *v.* Adam, 2 Chitty, R. 198, per Bailey, J.; 1 Chitty on Pl. 346. The plaintiff may recover for the damage he is likely to sustain, after the trial, as the natural consequence of the injury; because, for these damages, he can have no other action. Fetter *v.* Beale, I Ld. Raym. 339; 1 Salk. 11, S. C.

example, as the general loss of health, or the contracting of a contagious disease, or being stinted in allowance of food, in an action for an assault and false imprisonment; or, an injury to his clothes, in a personal rencounter and the like.[1] The manner, motives, place, and circumstances of the assault, however, though tending to increase the damages, need not be specially stated, but may be shown in evidence. Thus, where the battery was committed in the house of the plaintiff, which the defendant rudely entered, knowing that the plaintiff's daughter-in-law was there sick, and in travail, evidence of this fact was held admissible, without a particular averment.[2] Nor are the Jury confined to the mere corporal injury, which the plaintiff has sustained; but they are at liberty to consider the malice of the defendant, the insulting character of his conduct, the rank in life of the several parties, and all the circumstances of the outrage, and thereupon to award such exemplary damages, as the circumstances may in their judgment require.[3]

§ 90. In proof of the trespass, the plaintiff may give in evidence a conviction of the defendant upon an indictment for the same offence, provided the conviction was upon the *plea of guilty;* but not otherwise.[4] And if it was a *joint trespass,* by several, the confessions and admissions of any of them, made during the pendency of the enterprise and in furtherance of the common design, may be given in evidence

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[1] Chitty on Pl. 346, 347; Lowden *v.* Goodrick, Peake's Cas. 46; Pettit *v.* Addington, Ib. 62; Avery *v.* Ray, 1 Mass. 12. See post, tit. DAMAGES, § 253, 255.

[2] Sampson *v.* Henry, 11 Pick. 379.

[3] Merest *v.* Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442. Heath, J., in this case remarked, that "it goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages." Bracegirdle *v.* Orford, 2 M. & S. 77; Tullidge *v.* Wade, 3 Wils. 19; Davenport *v.* Russel, 5 Day, 145; Shafer *v.* Smith, 7 Har. & J. 67. Previous threats of the defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff, may also be shown. Sledge *v.* Pope, 2 Hayw. 402. See post, tit. DAMAGES, § 267, &c. McNamara *v.* King, 2 Gilm. 432; Reed *v.* Davis, 4 Pick. 216.

[4] Ante, Vol. 1, § 537, note (1). Regina *v.* Moreau, 12 Jur. 626.

against the others, after a foundation has been laid by proving the fact of conspiracy by them all to perpetrate the offence.[1]

§ 91. The *alia enormia*, is an averment not essential to the declaration for an assault and battery; its office is merely to enable the plaintiff to give in evidence under it such circumstances belonging to the transaction, as could not conveniently be stated on the record.[2] Things which naturally result from the act complained of, may, as we have seen, be shown under the other averments.

§ 92. Matters of *defence* in this action are usually distributed under three heads, namely, first, *Inficiation*, or denial of the fact, which is done only by the plea of not guilty; secondly, *Excuse*, which is an admission of the fact, but saying it was done accidentally, or by superior agency, and without any fault of the defendant; and this may be either specially pleaded, or given in evidence under the general issue; and, thirdly, *Justification*, which must always be specially pleaded.[3] To these may be added matters in *discharge*, such as a *release*, *accord and satisfaction*, *arbitrament*, *former recovery*, the *statute of limitations*, and the like, which also must be specially pleaded.[4] But it should be observed, that these rules apply only to suits against private persons. For, where actions are brought against public officers, for acts done by virtue of their office, they are permitted, by statutes, to plead the general issue, with a brief statement in writing of the special matter of justification to be given in evidence.

§ 93. Under the *general issue*, the defendant, in mitigation of damages, may give in evidence a *provocation* by the plaintiff, provided it was so recent and immediate as to induce

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 111.

[2] 1 Chitty on Pl. 348; Lowden *v.* Goodrick, Peake's Cas. 45. See post, tit. Damages, § 276; Ante, § 85.

[3] Bull. N. P. 17.

[4] 1 Chitty on Pl. 441.

a presumption, that the violence was committed under the immediate influence of the passion thus wrongfully excited by the plaintiff.[1] Indeed, the defendant, in mitigation of damages, may, under this issue, rely on any part of the *res gestæ*, though, if pleaded, it would have amounted to a justification; notwithstanding the general rule, that, whatever is to be shown in justification must be specially pleaded; for every thing which passed at the time, is part of the transaction on which the plaintiff's action is founded, and therefore he could not be surprised by the evidence.[2] And it is also laid down, as a general rule, that whatever cannot be pleaded, may be given in evidence under this issue.[3] Therefore, where the beating in question was by way of punishment for misbehavior on board a ship, and for the maintenance of necessary discipline, this evidence was held not admissible in mitigation of damages, because the facts might have been pleaded in justification.[4] Where the action was for assault and false imprisonment, evidence of *reasonable suspicion of felony* has been held admissible, in mitigation of damages.[5]

§ 94. In the case of a mere assault, the *quo animo* is material, as, without an unlawful intention, there is no assault. Any evidence of *intention*, therefore, is admissible under the general issue.[6] But in the case of a battery, innocence of intention is not material, except as it may go in mitigation of

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[1] Dennis *v.* Pawling, 12 Vin. Abr. 159, tit. Evid. 1. b. pl. 16, per Price, B.; Lee *v.* Woolsey, 19 Johns. 319; Cushman *v.* Waddell, 1 Baldw. 58; Avery *v.* Ray, 1 Mass. 12; Matthews *v.* Terry, 10 Conn. 455; Fullerton *v.* Warrick, 3 Blackf. 219; Anderson *v.* Johnson, 3 Har. & J. 162. In Fraser *v.* Berkley, 2 M. & Rob. 3, Ld. Abinger admitted evidence of provocation, namely, a libel, published some time previous to the battery.

[2] Bingham *v.* Garnault, Bull. N. P. 17.

[3] 2 B. & P. 224, note (a).

[4] Watson *v.* Christie, 2 B. & P. 224.

[5] Chinn *v.* Morris, 2 C. & P. 361; 1 Ry. & M. 324, S. C. The law of damages, in actions *ex delicto*, in regard to evidence in aggravation or mitigation, is treated with great ability and just discrimination, in an article in 3 Am. Jurist, p. 287–313.

[6] Griffin *v.* Parsons, 1 Selw. N. P. 25, 26; Ante, § 83.

damages; unless it can be shown that the defendant was wholly free from fault; because every man, who is not entirely free from all blame, is responsible for any immediate injury, done by him to the person of another, though it were not wilfully inflicted. Therefore, if the act of the defendant was done by inevitable necessity, as, if it be caused by ungovernable brute force, his horse running away with him without his fault;[1] or, if a lighted squib is thrown upon him, and to save himself he strikes it off in a new direction;[2] in these and the like cases, the necessity may be shown under the general issue, in disproof of the battery. But if the plaintiff was himself guilty of incautious or improper conduct, he cannot recover, unless the case was such that, by the exercise of ordinary care, he could not have avoided the consequences of the defendant's neglect,[3] or was incapable, by want of understanding or discretion, of taking such care.[4] In other words, the defendant is answerable only for those consequences which the plaintiff, by ordinary care, could not have prevented.

§ 95. Under the plea of *son assault demesne*, in excuse, with the general replication of *de injuria*, &c., the burden of proof is on the defendant, who will be bound to show, that the plaintiff actually committed the first assault; and also, that what was thereupon done, on his own part, was in the necessary defence of his person.[5] And even violence may be justified, where the safety of the person was actually endan-

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[1] Wakeman *v.* Robinson, 1 Bing. 213; Gibbons *v.* Pepper, 4 Mod. 404; 1 Salk. 637; Bull. N. P. 16; Hall *v.* Fearnley, 3 Ad. & El. 919, N. S.; Vincent *v.* Stinehour, 7 Verm. 62.

[2] Scott *v.* Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403. See also Beckwith *v.* Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092; Davis *v.* Saunders, 2 Chitty, R. 639; Ante, § 85.

[3] Davis *v.* Mann, 6 Jur. 954; 10 M. & W. 546, S. C.; Kennard *v.* Burton, 12 Shepl. 39.

[4] Lynch *v.* Nurdin, 1 Ad. & El. 29, N. S.; 5 Jur. 797.

[5] Crogate's case, 8 Co. 66; Cockerill *v.* Armstrong, Willes, 99; Jones *v.* Kitchen, 1 B. & P. 79, 80; Reece *v.* Taylor, 4 Nev. & M. 469; Guy *v.* Kitchiner, 2 Str. 1271; 1 Wils. 171, S. C.; Phillips *v.* Howgate, 5 B. & Ald. 220; Timothy *v.* Simpson, 1 Cr. M. & R. 757.

gered.[1] If the defendant's battery of the plaintiff was excessive, beyond what was apparently necessary for self-defence, it seems, by the American authorities, that this excess may be given in evidence under the replication of *de injuria*, without either a special replication or a new assignment.[2] For, in such case, the only question is as to the degree and proportion of the beating, to the assault. But if the plaintiff's answer to the plea of *son assault demesne* consists of an admission of the fact, and a justification of it, this cannot, by the English authorities, be shown in evidence under the replication *de injuria*, but must always be specially replied.[3] If the declaration contains but one count, to which *son assault demesne* is pleaded, without the general issue, the defendant may give evidence of an assault by the plaintiff, on any day previous to the day alleged in the declaration; and if the plaintiff cannot answer the assault so proved, the defendant will be entitled to a verdict.[4] But if the general issue is pleaded, or the declaration contains charges of several assaults, the plaintiff is not thus restricted, and the defendant's evidence must apply to the assault proved.[5]

§ 96. In regard to the replication of *de injuria*, the general rule is, that, as it puts in issue only the matter alleged in the plea, nothing can be given in evidence under it, which is beyond and out of the plea. The plaintiff cannot go into

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[1] Cockcroft *v.* Smith, 2 Saulk. 642; Bull. N. P. 18.

[2] Curtis *v.* Carson, 2 N. Hamp. 539. So, where the plea is *moderatè castigavit;* Hannen *v.* Edes, 15 Mass. 347; or, *molliter manus imposuit;* Bennett *v.* Appleton, 25 Wend. 371. See also 1 Steph. N. P. 216, 220, 221; Dauce *v.* Luce, 1 Keb. 884; Sid. 246, S. C.; 1 Chitty on Pl. 512, n. 545, 627.

[3] Penn *v.* Ward, 2 Cr. Mees. & Rosc. 338; Dale *v.* Wood, 7 J. B. Moore, 33; Pigott *v.* Kemp, 1 Cr. & Mees. 197; Selby *v.* Bardons, 3 B. & Ad. 1; 1 Cr. & Mees. 500; Bowen *v.* Parry, 1 C. & P. 394; Lamb *v.* Burnett, 1 Cr. & Jer. 291; 2 Chitty's Prec. 731, 732; Oakes *v.* Wood, 3 M. & W. 150.

[4] Randle *v.* Webb, 1 Esp, R. 38; Gibson *v.* Fleming, 1 Har. & J. 483.

[5] Downs *v.* Skrymsher, Brownl. 233; Bull. N. P. 17; 1 Steph. N. P. 222.

proof of new matter, tending to show that the defendant's plea, though true, does not justify the actual injury. He cannot for example, show that the defendant, being in his house, abused his family and refused to depart, and upon his gently laying hands on him to put him out, the defendant furiously assaulted and beat him.[1] So, if the defendant justifies in defence of his master, the plaintiff cannot, under this issue, prove that his own assault of the master was justifiable.[2] So, if the defendant, being a magistrate, justifies an assualt and imprisonment as a lawful commitment for a bailable offence, the plaintiff cannot show, under this issue, that sufficient bail was offered and refused.[3]

§ 97. To support the plea of *moderatè castigavit*, the defendant must show that the plaintiff was his apprentice, by producing the indentures of apprenticeship. He must also produce evidence of misbehavior on the part of the plaintiff, sufficient to justify the correction given.[4] The same rules apply, where the relation is that of parent and child, or gaoler and prisoner, or schoolmaster and scholar,[5] or shipmaster and seaman. It must also be shown, that the correction was reasonable and moderate; though in the case of shipmasters, if the chastisement was salutary and merited, and there was no cruelty, or use of improper weapons, the Admiralty Courts will give to the terms "moderate correction" more latitude of interpretation.[6]

§ 98. Under the plea of *molliter manus imposuit*, the mat-

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[1] King *v.* Phippard, Carth. 280.

[2] Webber *v.* Liversuch, Peake's Add. Cas. 51.

[3] Sayre *v.* E. of Rochford, 2 Wl. Bl. 1165.

[4] 1 Saund. on Pl. & Ev. 107. In the case of a hired servant, the right to inflict corporal chastisement, by way of discipline or punishment, is denied. Matthews *v.* Terry, 10 Conn. 455. If the servant is a young child, placed with a master *in loco parentis*, the ordinary domestic discipline would probably be justifiable.

[5] 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 60, § 23.

[6] Watson *v.* Christie, 2 B. & P. 224; Brown *v.* Howard, 14 Johns. 119; Thorne *v.* White, 1 Pet. Adm. R. 173; Sampson *v.* Smith, 15 Mass. 365.

ters justified are of great variety; but they will be found to fall under one of these general heads, namely, the prevention of some unlawful act, or resistance, for some lawful cause. If the force was applied to put the plaintiff out of the defendant's house, into which he had unlawfully entered, or, to resist his unlawful attempt to enter by force, it is sufficient to show the unlawfulness of the entry, or of the attempt, without showing a request to depart. But if the entry was lawful, as if the house were public, or, being private, if he entered upon leave, whether given expressly or tacitly and by usage, there, it is necessary to show that he was requested to depart, and unlawfully refused so to do, before the application of force can be justified.[1] And in all these cases, to make good the justification, it must appear that no more force was employed than the exigency reasonably demanded.[2] If there was a wilful battery, and it is justified, the defendant must show that the plaintiff resisted by force, to repel which the battery was necessary. And whenever the justification is founded on a defence of the possession of property, it is, ordinarily, sufficient for the defendant to show his lawful possession at the time, without adducing proof of an indefeasible title;[3] and in such cases a temporary right of possession is sufficient. Thus, where no person dwelt in the house, but the defendant's servant had the key, to let himself in to work, this was held sufficient evidence of the defendant's possession, as against every one but the owner.[4] So, where a County Jail, the title to which was vested by statute in the Justices of the county,

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[1] Esp. on Evid. 155, 156; Gregory *v.* Hill, 8 T. R. 299; Bull. N. P. 18, 19; Green *v.* Goddard, 2 Salk. 641; Williams *v.* Jones, 2 Stra. 1049; Green *v.* Bartram, 4 C. & P. 308; Rose *v.* Wilson, 1 Bing. 353. 8 J. B. Moore, 362, S. C.; Weaver *v.* Bush, 8 T. R. 78; Tullay *v.* Reed, 1 C. & P. 6; Adams *v.* Freeman, 12 Johns. 408.

[2] Imason *v.* Cope, 5 C. & P. 193; Esp. on Evid. 156; Eyre *v.* Norsworthy, 4 C. & P. 502; Simpson *v.* Morris, 4 Taunt. 821; Bush *v.* Parker, 1 Bing. N. C. 72.

[3] Skevill *v.* Avery, Cro. Car. 138; Esp. on Evid. 156; 1 Saund. on Pl. & Evid. 107.

[4] Hall *v.* Davis, 2 C. &. P. 33.

was in the actual occupancy of the stewards of a musical festival, as it had been on similar occasions, as they occurred, for several years, but there was no evidence of any express permission from the Justices, yet this was held a sufficient possession, against a person intruding himself into the hall without leave.[1]

§ 99. If the assault and battery is justified, as done to *preserve the peace*, or to prevent a crime, the defendant must show that the plaintiff was upon the point of doing an act, which would have broken the peace, or would manifestly have endangered the person of another, or was felonious;[2] and if the interference was to prevent others from fighting, he must show that he first required them to desist.[3] If the trespass justified, consisted in arresting the plaintiff as a felon, without warrant, the defendant must prove, either that a felony was committed by the plaintiff, in his presence, or, that the plaintiff stood indicted of felony, or, that he was found attempting to commit a felony, or, that he had actually committed a felony, and that the defendant, acting with good intentions, and upon such information as created a reasonable and probable ground of suspicion, apprehended the party, in order to carry him before a magistrate.[4] It seems also to have been held, that the defendant may in like manner justify the detention of the plaintiff, as found walking about suspiciously in the night, until he give a good account of himself;[5] or, because he was a common and notorious cheat, going about the country and cheating by playing with false dice and other tricks, being taken in the fact, to be carried

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1 Thomas *v.* Marsh, 5 C. & P. 596.

2 Handcock *v.* Baker, 2 B. & P. 260.

3 Hawk. P. C. b. 1, ch. 31, § 49; 1 East, P. C. 304.

4 Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 12, § 18, 19; 4 Bl. Comm. 293; 1 East, P. C. 300, 301; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 723 – 725; 1 Deacon, Crim. Law, 48, 49; Ledwith *v.* Catchpole, Cald. 291, per Ld. Mansfield; Rex *v.* Hunt, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 93; Stonehouse *v.* Elliott, 6 T. R. 315.

5 Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 12, § 20. But this is now doubted, unless the defendant is a peace-officer. 1 East, P. C. 303; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 726, 727.

before a magistrate; or, that he was found in the practice of other offences, in the like manner scandalous and prejudicial to the public.[1]

§ 100. It is further to be observed, that, whenever the defendant justifies the laying of hands on the plaintiff, to take him into custody as an offender, he ought to be prepared with evidence to show, that he detained him only until an officer could be sent for to take charge of him, or that he proceeded without unnecessary delay to take him to a magistrate, or peace-officer, or otherwise to deal with him according to law.[2]

Defences by magistrates and other officers will be treated hereafter, under appropriate heads.

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[1] Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 12, § 20; Holyday *v.* Oxenbridge, Cro. Car. 234; W. Jones, 249, S. C.; 2 Roll. Abr. 546.

[2] Esp. on Evid. 158; Rose *v.* Wilson, 1 Bing. 353.

ASSUMPSIT.

§ 101. Under this head, it is proposed to consider only those matters, which pertain to this form of action, for whatever cause it may be brought, and to the common Counts; referring, for the particular causes of special *assumpsit*, such as Bills of Exchange, Insurance, Sales, &c., and for particular issues in this action, such as Infancy, Payment, and the like, to their appropriate titles.

§ 102. The distinction betwen general or *implied contracts* and special or *express contracts*, lies not in the nature of the undertaking, but in the mode of proof. The action of *assumpsit* is founded upon an undertaking or promise of the defendant, not under seal; and the averment always is, that he undertook and promised to pay the money sued for, or to do the act mentioned. The evidence of the promise may be direct, or it may be circumstantial, to be considered and weighed by the Jury; or the promise may be imperatively and conclusively presumed by law, from the existing relations proved between the parties; in which case, the relation being proved, the Jury are bound to find the promise. Thus, where the defendant is proved to have in his hands the money of the plaintiff, which, *ex æquo et bono*, he ought to refund, the law conclusively presumes that he has promised so to do, and the Jury are bound to find accordingly; and, after verdict, the promise is presumed to have been actually proved.

§ 103. The law, however, presumes a promise only where it does not appear that there is any special agreement between the parties.[1] For if there is a *special contract*, which is still

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[1] Toussaint *v.* Martinnant, 2 T. R. 105, per Buller, J.; Cutter *v.* Powell, 6 T. R. 320.

open and unrescinded, embracing the *same subject-matter* with the *common counts*, the plaintiff, though he should fail to prove his case under the special count, will not be permitted to recover upon the common counts.[1] Thus, where the plaintiff paid seventy guineas for a pair of coach horses, which the defendant agreed to take back if the plaintiff should disapprove them ; and being dissatisfied with them, he offered to return them, but the defendant refused to receive them back ; it was held that the plaintiff could not recover the amount paid in an action for money had and received, but should declare upon the special contract.[2] So, where a seaman shipped for a voyage out and home, with a stipulation that his wages should not be paid until the return of the ship, and he was wrongfully discharged in a foreign port; it was held, that he could not recover upon the common counts, but must sue for breach of the special contract, it being still in force.[3] But though there is a count on a special agreement, yet if the plaintiff fails altogether to prove its existence, he may then proceed upon the common counts.[4]

§ 104. The law on this subject may be reduced to these three *general rules*.[5] (1.) So long as the contract continues *executory*, the plaintiff must declare specially ; but when it has been *executed* on his part, and nothing remains but the

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[1] Cooke *v.* Munstone, 1 New Rep. 365 ; Bull. N. P. 139 ; Lawes on Assumpsit, p. 7, 12 ; Young *v.* Preston, 4 Cranch, 239 ; Russell *v.* South Britain Society, 9 Conn. 508 ; Clark *v.* Smith, 14 Johns. 326 ; Jennings *v.* Camp, 13 Johns. 94 ; Wood *v.* Edwards, 19 Johns. 205.

[2] Weston *v.* Downes, 1 Doug. 23 ; Power *v.* Wells, Cowp. 818 ; Towers *v.* Barrett, 1 T. R. 133.

[3] Hulle *v.* Heightman, 2 East, 145.

[4] Harris *v.* Oke, Bull. N. P. 139 ; Paine *v.* Bacomb, 2 Doug. 651 ; 1 New Rep. 355, 356.

[5] See Lawes on Assumpsit, p. 2–12. See also Mead *v.* Degolyer, 16 Wend. 637, 638, per Bronson, J. ; Cooke *v.* Munstone, 1 New Rep. 355 ; Bull. N. P. 139 ; Tuttle *v.* Mayo, 7 Johns. 132 ; Robertson *v.* Lynch, 18 Johns. 451 ; Linningdale *v.* Livingston, 10 Johns. 36 ; Keyes *v.* Stone, 5 Mass. 391 ; Jennings *v.* Camp. 13 Johns. 94 ; Clark *v.* Smith, 14 Johns. 326.

payment of the price in money, by the defendant, which is nothing more than the law would imply against him, the plaintiff may declare generally, using the common counts, or may declare specially on the original contract, at his election.[1] If the mode of payment was any other than in money, the count must be on the original contract. And if it was to be in money, and a term of credit was allowed, the action, though on the common counts, must not be brought until the term of credit has expired.[2] This election to sue upon the common counts, where there is a special agreement, applies only to cases where the contract has been fully performed by the plaintiff. (2.) Where the contract, though partly performed, has been either abandoned by mutual consent, or rescinded and extinct by some act on the part of the defendant. Here, the plaintiff may resort to the common counts alone, for remuneration for what he has done under the special agreement. But in order to this, it is not enough to prove, that the plaintiff was hindered by the defendant from performing the contract on his part; for we have just seen, that in such case, he must sue upon the agreement itself. It must appear, from the circumstances, that he was at liberty to treat it as at an end.[3] (3.) Where it appears, that what was done by the plaintiff, was done under a special agreement, but not in the stipulated time or manner, and yet was beneficial to the defendant, and has been accepted and enjoyed by him. Here, though the plaintiff cannot recover upon the contract, from which he has departed, yet he may recover, upon the common counts,[4] for the reasonable value of the benefit which,

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[1] Gordon *v.* Martin, Fitzg. 303; Paine *v.* Bacomb, 2 Doug. 651, cited 1 New Rep. 355, 356; Streeter *v.* Horlock, 1 Ming. 34, 37; Study *v.* Sanders, 5 B. & C. 628, per Holroyd, J.; Tuttle *v.* Mayo, 7 Johns. 132; Robertson *v.* Lynch, 18 Johns. 451; Felton *v.* Dickenson, 10 Mass. 287; Baker *v.* Corey, 19 Pick. 496; Pitkin *v.* Frink, 8 Met. 16.

[2] Robson *v.* Godfrey, 1 Stark. R. 220.

[3] Giles *v.* Edwards, 7 T. R. 181; Burn *v.* Miller, 4 Taunt. 745; Hulle *v.* Heightman, 2 East, 145; Linningdale *v.* Livingston, 10 Johns. 36; Raymond *v.* Bearnard, 12 Johns. 274; Mead *v.* Degolyer, 16 Wend. 632.

[4] Keck's case, Bull. N. P. 139; Burn *v.* Miller, 4 Taunt. 745; Streeter *v.* Horlock, 1 Bing. 34, 37; Jennings *v.* Camp, 13 Johns. 94; Jewell *v.*

upon the whole, the defendant has derived from what he has done.[1]

§ 105. In all actions upon contracts not under seal, except generally in suits by indorsees, it is incumbent on the plaintiff, under the general issue, to prove a *consideration*[2] for the alleged promise of the defendant; and this, in actions upon the common counts, can, ordinarily, be done only by proof of all the circumstances of the transaction. Thus, proof of the relation of landlord and tenant, is sufficient proof of consideration for a promise to manage the farm in a husband-like manner.[3] And this manner is proved by evidence of the prevalent course of husbandry in that neighborhood.[4] The same evidence will also, necessarily, disclose a *privity* existing between the defendant and the plaintiff; for if the plaintiff is a stranger to the consideration, he cannot recover.[5] And in all

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Schroeppel, 4 Cowen, R. 564. If the contract has been performed, as far as it extended, but something beyond it has been done, as, if a building were erected with some additions, not specified in the written agreement, the party must declare on the special agreement, as far as it goes, and in the common counts for the excess. Pepper *v.* Burland, Peake's Cas. 103; Dunn *v.* Body, 1 Stark. R. 175; Robson *v.* Godfrey, Ib. 220.

[1] Taft *v.* Montague, 14 Mass. 282.

[2] As to what constitutes a sufficient consideration, see 21 Amer. Jurist, 257 – 286; 1 Stephen's Nisi Prius, p. 240 – 260; Chitty on Contr. 22 – 55; 2 Kent, Comm. 463 – 468; Story on Contracts, ch. iv. That the entire consideration must be proved, see ante, Vol. 1, § 66, 67, 68.

[3] Powley *v.* Walker, 5 T. R. 373.

[4] Leigh *v.* Hewitt, 4 East, 154.

[5] The common counts are in this form: — "for that the said (defendant) on the —— day of —— was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of —— "[if for *goods sold*, say, — "for goods then sold and delivered," — or, "bargained and sold," if the case be so, — "by the plaintiff to the said (defendant) at his request,"] "and in consideration thereof, then and there promised the plaintiff to pay him that sum on demand. Yet," &c.
— [if for *work and materials*, say, — "for work then done and materials for the same provided, by the plaintiff for the said (defendant) at his request," —] —[if for *money lent*, say,—"for money then lent by the plaintiff to the said (defendant) at his request," —]

these cases the plaintiff may recover as much as he proves to be due to him, within the sum mentioned in the count. If the contract is in writing, and recites that a valuable consideration has been received, this is *primâ facie* evidence of the fact, and the burden of disproving it is devolved on the defendant. If the action is founded on a document or memorandum, usually circulating as evidence of property, such as a bank-check, or the like, proof of the usage and course of business may suffice as evidence of the consideration, until this presumption is outweighed by opposing proof.

— [if for *money paid*, say, — " for money then paid by the plaintiff for the use of the said (defendant) at his request," —]

— [if for *money received*, say, — " for money then received by the said (defendant) for the use of the plaintiff," —]

— [if upon an *insimul computassent*, say, — " for money found to be due from the said (defendant) to the plaintiff, upon an account then stated between them," —]

These counts may now, by the new rules of practice in the English Courts, and by those of some of the American States, be consolidated into one. Indeed it is conceived, that they may be consolidated by the general principles of the law of pleading ; and it has been so practised in Massachusetts, for more than twenty years. The consolidated count may be as follows : — " for that the said (defendant) on the —— day of —— was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of —— for goods then sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the said (defendant) at his request ; — and in the sum of —— for work then done, and materials for the same provided by the plaintiff for the said (defendant) at his request ; — and in the sum of —— for money then lent by the plaintiff to the said (defendant) at his request ; and in the sum of —— for money then paid by the plaintiff for the use of the said (defendant) at his request ; — and in the sum of —— for money then received by the said (defendant) for the use of the plaintiff ; — and in the sum of —— for money found to be due from the said (defendant) to the plaintiff, upon an account then stated between them ; and in consideration thereof then and there promised the plaintiff to pay him the several moneys aforesaid upon demand. Yet the said (defendant) has never paid any of said moneys, but wholly neglects so to do." See 1 Chitty's Prec. p. 43, a. b. ; Reg. Sup. Jud. Court. Mass. 1836, p. 44. Where the declaration alleges a debt for work and labor, and a debt for goods sold, &c., with one general promise to pay, the statement of each debt is regarded as a separate count ; but where there is only one statement of debt, though founded on several considerations, it is one count only. Morse *v.* James, 11 M. & W. 831.

§ 106. As the general issue is a traverse of all the *material allegations* in the declaration, it will be further necessary for the plaintiff, under this issue, to prove all the other material facts alleged; such as the performance of conditions precedent, if any, on his own part, notice to the defendant, request, where these are material, and the like; together with the amount of damages sustained by the breach of the agreement. Damages cannot, in general, be recovered beyond the amount of the *ad damnum* laid in the declaration; but in actions for torts to personal chattels, the Jury are not bound by the value of the goods, as alleged in the count, but may find the actual value, if it do not exceed the *ad damnum*.[1]

§ 107. In actions upon the common counts for goods sold, work and materials furnished, money lent, and money paid, a *request* by the defendant is material to be proved;[2] for, ordinarily, no man can make himself the creditor of another by any act of his own, unsolicited, and purely officious. Nor is a mere *moral obligation*, in the ethical sense of the term, without any pecuniary benefit to the party, or previous request, a sufficient consideration to support even an express promise; unless where a legal obligation once existed, which is barred by positive statute, or rule of law, such as the statute of limitations, or, of bankruptcy, or the law of infancy, coverture, or the like.[3] But where the act done is beneficial to the other

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[1] Steph. on Pl. 318; Hutchins *v.* Adams, 3 Greenl. 174; Pratt *v.* Thomas, Ware's Rep. 427; The Jonge Bastiaan, 5 Rob. Adm. 322.

[2] It has, however, recently been held, that in an *indebitatus assumpsit* for money lent, and perhaps in a count for goods sold and delivered, a request need not be alleged; though it is otherwise in a count for money paid. Victors *v.* Davis, 1 Dowl. & L. 984. In those cases, a request is involved of the nature of the transaction.

[3] Chitty on Contracts, p. 40–42; Story on Contr. § 143; 1 Steph. N. P. 246–249; Eastwood *v.* Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 438; Ferrers *v.* Costello, 1 Longf. & Towns. 292. So, where the drawer of a bill of exchange had not been duly notified of its dishonor, but nevertheless promised the holder that he would pay it, the promise was held binding. Rogers *v.* Stephens, 2 T. R. 713; Lundie *v.* Robertson, 7 East, 231; Story on Bills, § 320. See also Duhammel *v.* Pickering, 2 Stark. R. 90. The nature of the moral

party, whether he was himself legally bound to have done it or not, his subsequent express promise will be binding; and even his subsequent assent will be sufficient evidence, from which the Jury may find a previous request, and he will be bound accordingly.[1] Thus, where an illegitimate child was

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obligation referred to in the text, is thus stated in a lucid and highly instructive series of articles on the Law of Contracts, attributed to Mr. Metcalf. "It is frequently asserted in the books, that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for an express promise, though not for an implied one. The terms 'moral obligation,' however, are not to be understood in their broad ethical sense; but merely to denote those duties, which would be enforced at law, through the medium of an implied promise, if it were not for some positive rule, which, with a view to general benefit, exempts the party, in the particular instance, from legal liability.

"A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or discharged under a bankrupt law, falls into this class of cases. So of an adult's promise to pay a debt contracted during his infancy, and of a borrower's promise to pay principal and lawful interest of a sum loaned to him on a usurious contract; and of a widow to pay a debt, or fulfil other contracts made during coverture. So of a promise by the drawer of a bill of exchange, or the indorser of a bill or note, to pay it, though he has not received seasonable notice of the default of other parties. So of a promise by a lessor to pay for repairs made by a lessee, according to agreement, but not inserted in the lease; and a promise to refund money received in part payment of a debt, the evidence being lost, and the whole original debt having, in consequence of the loss, been recovered by suit at law.

"In the foregoing cases, there was a good and sufficient original consideration for a promise — a contract on which an action might have been supported, if there had not been a rule of law, founded on policy (but wholly unconnected with the doctrine of consideration), which entitled the promissor to exemption from legal liability. In most, if not all these cases, the rule, which entitled the party to exemption, was established for his benefit. Such benefit, or exemption, he may waive; and he does waive it, by an express promise to pay. The consideration of such promise is the original transaction, which was beneficial to him, or detrimental to the other party.

"These cases give no sanction to the notion, that an express promise is of any binding validity, where there was nothing in the original engagement, which the law regards as a legal consideration." See American Jurist, Vol. 21, p. 276 - 278.

[1] 1 Saund. 264, note (1), by Williams; Yelv. 41, note (1), by Metcalf. This principle will reconcile some cases, which seem to conflict with the general rule previously stated in the text. Thus, in Watson *v.* Turner, Bull. N. P. 129, 147, the overseers, who made the express promise, were legally bound to relieve the pauper, for whose benefit the plaintiff had furnished sup-

put at nurse by the mother's friends, after which the father promised to pay the expenses, it was held by Lord Mansfield, that, as he was under an obligation to provide for the child, his bare approbation should be construed into a promise, and bind him.[1] So, where two persons were bail for a debtor, in several actions, and one of them, to prevent being fixed for the debt, pursued the debtor into another State, into which he had gone, and brought him back, thereby enabling the other also to surrender him, after which the latter party promised the former to pay his proportion of the expense of bringing the debtor back, this promise was held binding; for the parties had a joint interest in the act done, and were alike benefited by it.[2]

§ 108. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove an express assent of the defendant, in order to enable the Jury to find a previous request; they may *infer it* from his *knowledge* of the plaintiff's act, and his silent *acquiescence*.[3] Thus, where the father knew where and by whom his minor daughter was boarded and clothed, but expressed no dissent, and did not take her away; this was held sufficient evidence, on the part of the plaintiff, to charge him for the expenses, unless he could

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plies. See 1 Selwyn, N. P. 50, note (11). So in Ld. Suffield *v.* Bruce, 2 Stark. R. 175, the money had really been paid to the defendant's house by mistake, and the defendant had received the benefit of the payment, and was legally liable with the others to refund it, at the time of the promise. And for aught that appears in the report, the promise of indemnity may have been made at the time of the payment, and afterwards repeated in the letter of the defendant. In Atkins *v.* Banwell, 2 East, 505, which was an action between two parishes, for relief afforded to a pauper settled in the defendant parish, there was neither legal nor moral obligation, nor express promise, nor subsequent assent, on the part of the defendants. See also Wing *v.* Mill, 1 B. & A. 104.

1 Scott *v.* Nelson, cited 1 Esp. N. P. 116.

2 Greeves *v.* McAllister, 2 Binn. 591. See also Seago *v.* Deane, 4 Bing. 459.

3 See 22 Am. Jurist, p. 2 - 11, where the doctrine of the obligation of promises, founded upon considerations executed and past, is very clearly and ably expounded, See also Yelv. 41, note (1), by Metcalf; Doty *v.* Wilson, 14 Johns. 378, 382, per Thompson, C. J.

show that they were incurred against his consent.[1] So, also, as is familiarly said, if one see another at work in his field, and do not forbid him, it is evidence of assent, and he will be holden to pay the value of his labor. And sometimes the Jury may *infer a previous request*, even *contrary to the fact*, on the ground of *legal obligation alone;* as, in an action against a husband for the funeral expenses of his wife, he having been beyond seas at the time of her burial; or, against executors, for the funeral expenses of the testator, for which they had neglected to give orders.[2] The law, however, does not ordinarily imply a promise, against the express declaration of the party. Thus, a promise will not be implied, on the part of a judgment debtor, to pay for the use and occupation of land taken from him by legal process, where he denies the regularity of the proceedings.[3] But where there is a legal duty, paramount to the will of the party refusing to perform it, there, as we have before intimated, he is bound, notwithstanding any negative protestation. Thus, if a husband wrongfully turns his wife out of doors, or a father wrongfully discards his child, this is evidence sufficient to support a count against him in *assumpsit*, for their necessary support, furnished by any stranger.[4] And if one commits a tort on the goods of another, by which he gains a pecuniary benefit, as if he wrongfully takes the goods and sells them, or otherwise applies them to his own use, the owner may waive the tort, and charge him in *assumpsit* on the common counts, as for goods sold or money received, which he will not be permitted to gainsay.[5]

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[1] Nichole *v.* Allen, 3 C. & P. 36.

[2] Jenkins *v.* Tucker, 1 H. Bl. 90; Tugwell *v.* Heyman, 3 Campb. 298; 10 Pick. 156. See also Alna *v.* Plummer, 4 Greenl. 258; Hanover *v.* Turner, 14 Mass. 227.

[3] Wyman *v.* Hook, 2 Greenl. 337.

[4] Robison *v.* Gosnold, 6 Mod. 171; Van Valkinburg *v.* Watson, 13 Johns. 480; 20 Am. Jurist, p. 9; 22 Am. Jurist, p. 2 – 11.

[5] The proposition in the text is stated in general terms by Jackson, J. in Cummings *v.* Noyes, 10 Mass. 436, and by Mellen, C. J. in Webster *v.* Drinkwater, 5 Greenl. 323. The propriety of its application against the administrator of the wrong-doer, was first established in Hambly *v.* Trott, Cowp. 372; and has since been admitted without hesitation. Cravath *v.* Plympton,

§ 109. In regard to the *privity* necessary to be established between the parties, it is in general true, that an *entire stranger* to the consideration, namely, one who has taken no trouble or charge upon himself, and has conferred no benefit upon the promissor, cannot maintain the action in his own name. But it has been said, and after some conflict of opinion it seems now to be settled, that, in cases of simple contract, if one person makes a promise to another, for the benefit of a third, the latter may maintain an action upon it, though the consideration did not move from him.[1] It seems, also, that the action may be maintained by either party.[2]

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13 Mass. 454. It has in several cases been said to apply only to the case of money actually received on sale of the property wrongfully converted. But in others it has been farther applied so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover for the *beneficial use* of the thing taken ; Chauncey *v.* Yeaton, 1 N. Hamp. R. 451 ; 5 Greenl. 323 ; and for the *services* of his apprentice, reduced by the defendant ; Lightly *v.* Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112 ; Foster *v.* Stewart, 3 M. & S. 191 ; and to the case where the defendant had received not money, but *a promissory note*, for the price of the goods sold. Miller *v.* Miller, 7 Pick. 133. And in other cases the owner has been permitted to recover in this form of action, where the goods had not been sold by the defendant, but had been *actually applied* and converted by him to his own *beneficial use*. Hitchin *v.* Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 827 ; 5 Pick. 285, note. Johnson *v.* Spiller, 1 Doug. 167, note. Smith *v.* Hodson, 4 T. R. 211 ; Hill *v.* Davis, 3 N. Hamp. R. 384. In Jones *v.* Hoar, 5 Pick. 285, where assumpsit was held not to lie for the value of timber trees cut down upon the plaintiff's land, and carried away, it does not appear that the defendant had either sold the trees, or in any manner applied them to his own benefit. In Appleton *v.* Bancroft, 10 Met. 231, the officer was held liable, in *assumpsit* for money had and received, where he had *sold* the goods, but had *received nothing in payment;* it being his duty to sell for ready money.

[1] 1 Com. Dig. 205, Action upon the Case upon Assumpsit, E ; 1 Vin. Abr. 333, pl. 5 ; Ibid. 334, 335, pl. 8 ; Dutton *v.* Poole, 1 Vent. 318, 332 ; 2 Lev. 210, S. C. ; T. Raym. 302, S. C., cited and approved by Ld. Mansfield, Cowp. 443 ; 3 B. & P. 149, note (a) ; Marchington *v.* Vernon, 1 B. & P. 101, note (c) ; Rippon *v.* Norton, Yelv. 1 ; Whorewood *v.* Shaw, Yelv. 25, and note (1), by Metcalf; Carnegie *v.* Waugh, 2 D. & R. 277 ; Garrett *v.* Handley, 4 B. & C. 664 ; Hall *v.* Marston, 17 Mass. 575, 579 ; Ibid. 404, per Parker, C. J. ; Cabot *v.* Haskins, 3 Pick. 83, 92. See also 8 Johns. 58 ; 13 Johns. 497 ; 22 Amer. Jurist, p. 16 – 19 ; 11 Mass. 152, note (a), by Rand ; Bull. N. P. 133 ; Chitty on Contr. p. 45 – 48.

[2] Bell *v.* Chaplain, Hardr. 321 ; 1 Chitty on Plead. p. 5 ; 22 Am. Jurist,

§ 110. Where there are *several plaintiffs*, it must be shown that the contract was made with them all; for if all the promisees do not join, it is a ground of nonsuit. So, if too many should join.[1] And where the plaintiff sues in a *particular capacity*, as assignee of a bankrupt,[2] or surviving partner,[3] he must, under the general issue, prove his title to sue in that capacity. But the plaintiff need not, under the general issue, be prepared to prove that the contract was made with all the defendants; as the nonjoinder of defendants can ordinarily, be taken advantage of only by a plea in abatement.[4]

§ 111. It must also appear, on the part of the plaintiff, that the contract was not *unlawful*. For if it appears to have for its object anything forbidden by the laws of God; or, contrary to good morals; or, if it appears to be a contract to do or omit, or to be in consideration of the doing or omission of any act, where such doing or omission is punishable by criminal process; or, if it appears to be contrary to sound public policy; or, if it appears to be in contravention of the provisions of any statute; in any of these cases, the plaintiff cannot recover, but, upon his own showing, may be nonsuited. For the law never lends its aid to carry such agreements into effect, but leaves the parties, as it finds them, *in pari delicto*.[5] But though the principal contract were illegal, yet if money has been advanced under it by one of the parties, and the contract still remains wholly *executory*, and not carried into effect, he may recover the money back upon the common money counts; for the policy of the law, in both cases, is to prevent the execution of illegal contracts; in the one case, by refusing to enforce them, and in the other, by encouraging the parties to repent and recede from the iniquitous enter-

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p. 19; Hammond on Parties, p. 8, 9; Skinner *v.* Stocks, 4 B. & Ald. 437. See also Story on Agency, § 393, 394.

[1] 1 Chitty on Plead. 6 – 8, 15; Brand *v.* Boulcott, 3 B. & P. 235.

[2] 1 Saund. on Plead. & Evid. 250 – 289.

[3] Wilson *v.* Hodges, 2 East, 312.

[4] 1 Chitty on Plead. 31 – 33, 52.

[5] See Chitty on Contracts, p. 513 – 561; 22 Am. Jurist, p. 249 – 277; 23

prise.[1] And the same rule is applied to cases, where, though the contract is executed, the parties are not *in pari delicto;* the money having been obtained from the plaintiff by some undue advantage taken of him, or other wrong practised by the defendant.[2]

§ 112. In proof of the count for *money lent*, it is not sufficient merely to show that the plaintiff delivered money, or a bank check, to the defendant; for this, *primâ facie*, is only evidence of the payment by the plaintiff of his own debt, antecedently due to the defendant.[3] He must prove that the transaction was essentially a loan of money. If it was a loan of stock, this evidence, it seems, would not support the count.[4] But money deposited with a banker, by a customer, in the usual way, has been held to be money lent.[5] A promissory note is sufficient evidence of a loan, between the original parties; even though it be payable on condition, if the condition has been performed; or be payable in specific articles, if the special promise is broken.[6] Indeed a bill of exchange or prom-

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Am. Jurist, p. 1 – 23; Story on Contracts, ch. v. vi.; Greenwood *v.* Curtis, 6 Mass. 381; Pearson *v.* Lord, Ib. 84; Worcester *v.* Eaton, 11 Mass. 368; Merwin *v.* Huntington, 2 Conn. 209; Babcock *v.* Thompson, 3 Pick. 446; Burt. *v.* Place, 6 Cow. 431; Best *v.* Strong, 2 Wend. 319.

[1] Chitty on Contracts, p. 498, 499; Tappenden *v.* Randall, 2 B. & P. 467; Aubert *v.* Walsh, 3 Taunt. 277; Perkins *v.* Savage, 15 Wend. 412; White *v.* Franklin Bank, 22 Pick. 181, 189.

[2] Ibid.; Worcester *v.* Eaton, 11 Mass. 376; Walker *v.* Ham, 2 N. Hamp. 241; Amesbury Man. Co. *v.* Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461; Preston *v.* Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Atwater *v.* Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Chase *v.* Dwinel, 7 Greenl. 134; Richardson *v.* Duncan, 3 N. Hamp. 508; Clinton *v.* Strong, 9 Johns. 370; Mathers *v.* Pearson, 13 S. & R. 258.

[3] Welch *v.* Seaborn, 1 Stark. R. 474; Cary *v.* Gerrish, 4 Esp. 9; Cushing *v.* Gore, 15 Mass. 74. If the money was delivered by a parent to a child, it will be presumed an advancement, or gift. Per Bayley, J. in Hick *v.* Keats, 4 B. & C. 71.

[4] Nightingal *v.* Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589; Jones *v.* Brinley, 1 East, 1.

[5] Pott *v.* Clegg, 11 Jur. 289; Pollock, C. B. dubitante. But see 11 Jur. 157, 158.

[6] Payson *v.* Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212; Smith *v.* Smith, 2 Johns. 235; Crandall *v.* Bradley, 7 Wend. 311.

issory note, seems now to be considered as *primâ facie* proof of the money counts, in any action between the immediate parties, whether they were original parties, or subsequent, as indorsees or bearers, claiming against the original drawers or makers.[1] So, if the plaintiff has become the assignee of a debt, with the assent of the debtor, this is equivalent to a loan of the money.[2] So, if A. owes a sum definite and certain to B., and B. owes the same amount to C., and the parties agree that A. shall be debtor to C. in B.'s stead, this is equivalent to a loan by C. to A.[3] This is an exception to the general rule of law, that a debt cannot be assigned; and is permitted only where the sum is ascertained and defined beyond dispute.[4]

§ 113. To sustain the count for *money paid*, the plaintiff must prove the actual payment, and the defendant's prior request so to do, or his subsequent assent and approval of the act, to be shown in the manner and by the methods already

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[1] Bayley on Bills, p. 390–393, and notes, by Phillips & Sewall; Young *v.* Adams, 6 Mass. 189; Pierce *v.* Crafts, 12 Johns. 90; Denn *v.* Flack, 3 G. & J. 369; Wilde *v.* Fisher, 4 Pick. 421; Ramsdell *v.* Soule, 12 Pick. 126; Olcott *v.* Rathbone, 5 Wend. 490; Ellsworth *v.* Brewer, 11 Pick. 316; Edgerton *v.* Brackett, 11 N. Hamp. 218; Fairbanks *v.* Stanley, 6 Shepl. 296; Goodwin *v.* Morse, 9 Metc. 278; Moore *v.* Moore, Ib. 417. But not if the note is not negotiable, and expresses no value received. Saxton *v.* Johnson, 10 Johns. 418. The defendant may make any defence to the note, when offered under the money counts, which would be open to him under any other count. Austin *v.* Rodman, 1 Hawks, 195. But he can have no other defence than would be open to him under a special count upon the note. Hart *v.* Ayres, 9 Ohio R. 5. It has been held that an I. O. U., though evidence of an account stated, is not evidence of money lent. Fessenmayer *v.* Adcock, 16 M. & W. 449.

[2] 1 Steph. N. P. 316; 2 Stark. Ev. 61. See Mowry *v.* Todd, 12 Mass. 281. If the contract assigned is a specialty, the rule is the same. Compton *v.* Jones, 4 Cow. 13. But it has been questioned, whether *assumpsit* lies, in such case, without an express promise to the assignee. Dubois *v.* Doubleday, 9 Wend. 317. In this case there was not sufficient evidence to raise even an implied promise.

[3] Wade *v.* Wilson, 1 East, 795; Wilson *v.* Coupland, 5 B. & Ald. 228.

[4] Fairlee *v.* Denton, 8 B. & C. 395.

stated.[1] And if the money has been paid by the defendant's request, with an undertaking express or implied, on his part, to repay the amount, it is immaterial whether the defendant has been relieved from liability or otherwise profited by the payment, or not.[2] Whether the plaintiff can recover under this count, without proof of the actual payment of money, and by only showing that he had become liable, at all events, to pay money for the defendant, is a point upon which there has been some apparent conflict of decisions. It has been held in England, that, where the plaintiff had given his own negotiable promissory note, which the creditor accepted as a substitute for the debt due by the defendant, he was entitled to recover the amount under this count, though the note still remained unpaid.[3] And it has also been held, that, where he had become liable for the debt by giving his bond, though he thereby procured the defendant's discharge, he could not recover the amount from the defendant, until he had actually paid the money due by the bond.[4] The latter rule has been adopted and followed by the American Courts, on the ground, that the bond is not negotiable, nor treated as money, in the ordinary transactions of business;[5] but they also hold, that the giving of a bill of exchange or negotiable note, by the plaintiff, which has been accepted by the creditor in satisfaction of the defendant's debt, is sufficient to support the count for money paid.[6] If, however, the plaintiff has obtained a discharge of his own liability by the payment of less than the full amount, it has been held, that he can recover only the sum

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[1] Ante, § 107, 108.

[2] Brittain *v.* Lloyd, 14 M. &. W. 762.

[3] Barclay *v.* Gouch, 2 Esp. 571.

[4] Taylor *v.* Higgins, 3 East, 169; Maxwell *v.* Jameson, 2 B. & Ald. 51; Power *v.* Butcher, 10 B. & C. 329, 346, per Parke, J.

[5] Cumming *v.* Hackley, 8 Johns. 202; 4 Pick. 447, per Wilde, J. And see Gardiner *v.* Cleaveland, 9 Pick. 334. The entry of judgment on the bond, and issuing of execution, does not vary the case. Morrison *v.* Berkey, 7 S. & R. 238. Whether being taken in execution would, *quære;* and see Parker *v.* The United States, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 266.

[6] Douglass *v.* Moody, 9 Mass. 553; Cornwall *v.* Gould, 4 Pick. 444; Pearson *v.* Parker, 3 N. Hamp. 366; 8 Johns. 206; Craig *v.* Craig, 5 Rawle,

actually paid.[1] And in regard to the mode of payment, proof of anything given and received as cash, whether it be land or personal chattels, is sufficient to support this count.[2] If incidental damages, such as costs, and the like, have been incurred by a surety, they can be proved only under a special count;[3] unless the suit was defended at the request of the principal debtor and for his sole benefit, the defendant being but a nominal party, such, for example, as an accommodation acceptor.[4]

§ 114. If the money has been paid to a third person, in compliance with a *written order* of the defendant in that person's favor, the possession of the order by the plaintiff will generally be *primâ facie* evidence, that he has paid the money.[5] Where *no express order* or request has been given, it will, ordinarily, be sufficient for the plaintiff to show, that he has paid money for the defendant for a *reasonable cause*, and *not officiously*.[6] Thus, this count has been sustained, for

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91, 98, per Gibson, C. J.; Lapham *v.* Barnes, 2 Verm. 213; McLellan *v.* Crofton, 6 Greenl. 331–333. And see Dole *v.* Hayden, 1 Greenl. 152; Ingalls *v.* Dennett, 6 Greenl. 80; Clark *v.* Foxcroft, 7 Greenl. 355; Van Ostrand *v.* Reed, 1 Wend. 424; Morrison *v.* Berkey, 7 S. & R. 238, 246; Beardsley *v.* Root, 11 Johns. 464.

[1] Bonney *v.* Seely, 2 Wend. 481.

[2] Ainslee *v.* Wilson, 7 Cowen, 662, 669; Bonney *v.* Seeley, 2 Wend. 481; Randall *v.* Rich, 11 Mass. 498, per Parker, C. J.

[3] Seaver *v.* Seaver, 6 C. & P. 673; Gillett *v.* Rippon, 1 M. & Malk. 406; Knight *v.* Hughes, Ib. 247; 3 C. & P. 467, S. C.; Smith *v.* Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 467.

[4] Howes *v.* Martin, 1 Esp. 162.

[5] Blunt *v.* Starkie, 1 Taylor, 110; 2 Hayw. 75, S. C.

[6] Brown *v.* Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 190, per Mansfield, C. J.; Skillin *v.* Merrill, 16 Mass. 40. "Whenever the consideration of a promise is *executory*, there must *ex necessitate rei* have been a request on the part of the person promising. For if A. promise to remunerate B., in consideration that B. will perform something specified, that amounts to a request to B. to perform the act for which he is to be remunerated. See King *v.* Sears, 2 C. M. & R. 53. Where the consideration is *executed*, unless there have been an antecedent request, no action is maintainable upon the promise; for a request must be laid in the declaration and proved, if put in issue, at the trial. Child *v.* Morley, 8 T. R. 610; Stokes *v.* Lewis, 1 T. R. 20; Naish

money paid to relieve a neighbor's goods from legal distraint, in his absence;[1] to defray the expenses of his wife's funeral;[2] to apprehend the defendant, for whom the plaintiff had become bail, and bring him to Court, so that he might be surrendered;[3] to discharge a debt of the defendant, for which the plaintiff had become surety;[4] or, for which the plaintiff's

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v. Tatlock, 2 H. Bl. 319; Hayes *v.* Warren, 2 Str. 933; Richardson *v.* Hall, 1 B. & B. 50; Durnford *v.* Messiter, 5 M. & S. 446. See Reg. Gen. Hil. 1832, pl. 8. For a mere voluntary courtesy is not sufficient to support a subsequent promise; but when there was previous request, the courtesy was not merely voluntary, nor is the promise *nudum pactum*, but couples itself with, and relates back to the previous request, and the merits of the party, which were procured by that request, and is therefore on a good consideration. Such a request may be either *express* or *implied*. If it have not been made in express terms, it will be implied under the following circumstances; — First, Where the consideration consists in the plaintiff's having been compelled to do that, to which the defendant was legally compellable. Jeffreys *v.* Gurr, 2 B. & Ad. 833; Pownall *v.* Ferrand, 6 B. C. 439; Exall *v.* Partridge, 8 T. R. 308; Toussaint *v.* Martinnant, 2 T. R. 100. Secondly, Where the defendant has adopted and enjoyed the benefit of the consideration, for in that case the maxim applies *omnis ratihibitio retrotrahitur et mandato æquiparatur*. Thirdly, Where the plaintiff *voluntarily* does that whereunto the defendant was legally compellable, and the defendant afterwards, in consideration thereof, *expressly* promises. Wennall *v.* Adney, 3 B. & P. 250, *in notis;* Wing *v.* Mill, 1 B. & A. 104; S. N. P. 8 ed. p. 57, n. 11; Paynter *v.* Williams, 1 C. & M. 818. But it must be observed, that there is this distinction between this and the two former cases, namely, that in each of the two former cases, the law will imply the *promise* as well as the *request*, whereas in this and the following case, the *promise* is not implied, and the *request* is only then implied when there has been an express promise. Atkyns *v.* Banwell, 2 East, 505. Fourthly, In certain cases, where the plaintiff *voluntarily* does that, to which the defendant is *morally*, though not *legally*, compellable, and the defendant afterwards, in consideration thereof, *expressly* promises. See Lee *v.* Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36; Watson *v.* Turner, B. N. P. 129, 147, 281; Trueman *v.* Fenton, Cowp. 544; Atkins *v.* Banwell, 2 East, 505. But every *moral* obligation is not perhaps sufficient for this purpose. See per Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Littlefield *v.* Shee, 2 B. & Adol. 811." See 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 70, note.

1 Per Ld. Loughborough, 1 H. Bl. 93.

2 Jenkins *v.* Tucker, 1 H. Bl. 90.

3 Fisher *v.* Fallows, 5 Esp. 171.

4 Exall *v.* Partridge, 8 T. R. 310, per Ld. Kenyon; Kemp *v.* Finden, 8 Jur. 65.

goods, being on the premises of the defendant, had been justly distrained by the landlord;[1] or, for money paid to indemnify the owner for the loss of his goods, which the plaintiff, a carrier, had by mistake delivered to the defendant, who had consumed them for his own use.[2] So, where a debt has been paid by one of several debtors, or by one of several sureties, the payment is sufficient evidence in support of this count, against the others, for contribution.[3] So, among merchants, where one has accepted a protested bill for the honor of one of the parties, which he has afterwards paid.[4] And, in general, where the plaintiff shows that he, either by compulsion of law, or to relieve himself from liability, or to save himself from damage, has paid money which the defendant ought to have paid, this count will be supported.[5]

§ 115. If the money appears to have been paid in consequence of the plaintiff's own voluntary breach of legal duty, or, for a tort committed jointly with the defendant, it cannot

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[1] Exall *v.* Partridge, 8 T. R. 308.

[2] Brown *v.* Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 189, per Mansfield, C. J. and Heath, J. But in Sills *v.* Laing, 4 Campb. 81, Ld. Ellenborough ruled that, in such case, the plaintiff ought to declare specially.

[3] 1 Steph. N. P. 324 – 326.

[4] Smith *v.* Nissen, 1 T. R. 259; Vandewall *v.* Tyrrell, 1 Mood. & Malk. 87; Story on Bills of Exchange, § 255, 256.

[5] 1 Steph. N. P. 324, 326; Lubbock *v.* Tribe, 3 M. & W. 607; Cowell *v.* Edwards, 2 B. & P. 268; Alexander *v.* Vane, 1 M. & W. 511; Grissell *v.* Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 10. "One of the cases in which an *express request* is unnecessary, and in which a promise will be *implied*, is that in which the plaintiff has been compelled to do that, to which the defendant was *legally* compellable. On this principle depends the right of a surety who had been damnified to recover an idemnity from his principal. Toussaint *v.* Martinnant, 2 T. R. 100; Fisher *v.* Fellows, 5 Esp. 171. Thus the indorser of a bill who has been sued by the holder, and has paid part of the amount, being a surety for the acceptor, may recover it back as money paid to his use and at his request. Pownall *v.* Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 439. But then the surety must have been *compelled*, *i. e.* he must have been under a reasonable obligation and necessity, to pay what he seeks to recover from his principal; for if he *improperly* defend an action and incur costs, there will be no implied duty on the part of his principal to reimburse him those,

be recovered.[1] The general *rule* is, that *wrong-doers* shall not have contribution one from another. The *exception* is, that a party may, with respect to innocent acts, give an indemnity to another, which shall be effectual; though the act, when it came to be questioned afterwards, would not be sustainable in a Court of law, against third persons who complained of it. If one person induce another to do an act which cannot be supported, but which he may do without any breach of good faith, or desire to break the law, an action on the indemnity, either express or implied, may be supported.[2] Thus, where the title to property is disputed, an agreement, by persons interested, to indemnify the sheriff for serving or neglecting to serve an execution upon the property, if made in good faith, and with intent to bring the title more conveniently to a legal decision, is clearly valid.[3] So, where a sheriff, having arrested the debtor on mesne process, discharged him on payment of the sum sworn to, but was afterwards obliged to pay the original plaintiff his interest, he was permitted to recover the latter sum from the debtor, under a count for money paid.[4] So, where the sheriff has been obliged to pay the debt, by reason of the negligent escape of the debtor, namely, an escape by the pure act of the prisoner, without the knowledge and against the consent of the officer, it seems he may recover the amount as money

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unless the action was defended at the principal's request. Gillett *v.* Rippon, 1 M. & M. 406; Knight *v.* Hughes, 1 M. & M. 247; see Smith *v.* Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 407. But if he make a reasonable and prudent compromise, he will be justified in doing so." 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 70. If there were several principals, and one surety has paid the debt, each is severally liable for the whole sum. Duncan *v.* Keiffer, 3 Binn. 126. And where there are several sureties, if one, by paying the debt too soon, has deprived the other of an opportunity to relieve himself, he cannot have contribution. Skillin *v.* Merrill, 16 Mass. 40.

[1] Capp *v.* Topham, 6 East, 392; Burdon *v.* Webb, 2 Esp. 527.

[2] Betts *v.* Gibbins, 4 Nev. & M. 77, per Ld. Denman, C. J.; 2 Ad. & El. 57, S. C.; Merryweather *v.* Nixan, 8 T. R. 186.

[3] Wright *v.* Ld. Verney, 3 Doug. 240; Watson on Sheriffs, p. 380.

[4] Cordron *v.* Ld. Masserne, Peake's Cas. 143.

paid for the debtor.[1] But if the escape were voluntary on the part of the officer, the money paid could not be recovered of the debtor.[2]

§ 116. Where the money, which is sought to be recovered under the count for money paid, has been *paid under a judgment* against the plaintiff, the record of the judgment, as we have heretofore shown,[3] is always admissible to prove the fact of the judgment, and the amount so paid. But it is not admissible in proof of the facts on which the judgment was founded, unless the debtor, or person for whose default the action was brought, had due notice of its pendency, and might have defended it; in which case the record is conclusive against the delinquent party, as to all the material facts recited in it.[4]

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[1] Eyles *v.* Faikney, Peake's Cas. 143, n. (a). Semble. Better reported in 8 East, 172, n.; 4 Mass. 373, per Parsons, C. J.; Appleby *v.* Clark, 10 Mass. 59.

[2] Pitcher *v.* Bailey, 8 East, 171; Eyles *v.* Faikney, Ibid. 172, n.; Peake's Cas. 143, n., S. C.; Martyn *v.* Blithman, Yelv. 197; Chitty on Contracts, p. 526, 527; Ayer *v.* Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; Denny *v.* Lincoln, 5 Mass. 385; Churchill *v.* Perkins, Ib. 541; Hodsdon *v.* Wilkins, 7 Greenl. 113.

[3] Ante, V. 1, § 527.

[4] Ante, Vol. 1, § 527, 538, 539; Smith *v.* Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 407. "It is always advisable," observes Mr. Smith, "for the surety to let his principal know when he is threatened, and request directions from him; for the rule laid down by the King's Bench in Smith *v.* Compton, is, that the effect of want of notice (to the principal), is to let in the party who is called upon for an indemnity, to show that the plaintiff has no claim in respect of the alleged loss, or not to the amount alleged; that he made an improvident bargain, and that the defendant might have obtained better terms, if an opportunity had been given him. . . . . The effect of notice to an indemnifying party is stated by Buller, J., in Duffield *v.* Scott, 3 T. R. 374. The purpose of giving notice is not in order to give a ground of action; but if a demand be made which the party idemnifying is bound to pay, and notice be given to him, and he refuse to defend the action, in consequence of which the person indemnified is obliged to pay the demand, that is equivalent to a judgment, and estops the other party from saying, that the defendant in the first action was not bound to pay the money." See 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 70, 71, note.

§ 117. The count for *money had and received*, which in its spirit and objects has been likened to a bill in equity, may, in general, be proved by any legal evidence, showing that the defendant has received or obtained possession of the money of the plaintiff, which, in equity and good conscience, he ought to pay over to the plaintiff. The subject of the action must either originally have been money; or, that which the parties have agreed to treat as money; or, if originally goods, sufficient time must have elapsed, with the concurrence of circumstances, to justify the inference, that they have been converted into money. It is a liberal action, in which the plaintiff waives all tort, trespass, and damages, and claims only the money which the defendant has actually received.[1] But if the defendant has any legal or equitable lien on the money, or any right of cross action upon the same transaction, the plaintiff can recover only the balance, after satisfying such counter demand.[2]

§ 118. In regard to *things treated as money*, it has been held, that this count may be supported by evidence of the defendant's receipt of bank-notes;[3] or, promissory notes;[4] or, credit in account, in the books of a third person;[5] or, a mortgage, assigned to the defendant as collateral security, and afterwards foreclosed and bought in by him;[6] or, a note payable in specific articles;[7] or, any chattel.[8] But not where

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[1] Anon. Lofft, R. 320; Feltham *v.* Terry. cit. Cowp. 419; Moses *v.* Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005; Eastwick *v.* Hugg, 1 Dall. 222; Lee *v.* Shore, 1 B. & C. 94; Cowp. 749, per Ld. Mansfield; 4 M. & S. 748, per Ld. Ellenborough.

[2] Simpson *v.* Swan, 3 Campb. 291; Eddy *v.* Smith, 13 Wend. 488; Clift *v.* Stockdon, 4 Litt. 217.

[3] Pickard *v.* Bankes, 13 East, 20; Lowndes *v.* Anderson, 13 East, 130; Mason *v.* Waite, 17 Mass. 560; Ainslie *v.* Wilson, 7 Cow. 662.

[4] Floyd *v.* Day, 3 Mass. 405; Hinkley *v.* Fowle, 4 Shepl. 285; Tuttle *v.* Mayo, 7 Johns. 132; Fairbanks *v.* Blackinton, 9 Pick. 93.

[5] Andrew *v.* Robinson, 3 Campb. 199.

[6] Gilchrist *v.* Cunningham, 8 Wend. 641.

[7] Crandall *v.* Bradley, 7 Wend. 311.

[8] Arms *v.* Ashley, 4 Pick. 71; Mason *v.* Waite, 17 Mass. 560.

the thing received was stocks,[1] goods,[2] or any other article; unless, in the understanding of the parties, it was considered and to be treated as money; or, unless it was intended to be sold by the receiver, and sufficient time has elapsed for that purpose.[3] If the defendant was the agent of the plaintiff, and the evidence of his receipt of the money is in his own account, rendered to his principal, this will generally be conclusive against him, unless he can clearly show, that it was unintentionally erroneous.[4] And if the agent or consignee of property to be sold, refuses to render any account, it will, after a reasonable time, be presumed, if the contrary do not appear, that he has sold the goods, and holds the proceeds in his hands.[5]

§ 119. Where the money was *delivered* to the defendant *for a particular purpose*, to which he refused to apply it, he cannot apply it to any other, but it may be recovered back by the depositor, under the count for money had and received.[6] If it was placed in his hands to be paid over to a third person, which he agreed to do, such person, assenting thereto, may

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[1] Nightingal *v.* Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589; Jones *v.* Brinley, 1 East, 1; Morrison *v.* Berkey, 7 S. & R. 246.

[2] Leery *v.* Goodson, 8 T. R. 687; Whitehall *v.* Bennett, 3 B. & P. 559.

[3] McLachan *v.* Evans, 1 Y. & Jer. 380; Longchamp *v.* Kenney, 1 Doug. 117.

[4] Shaw *v.* Picton, 4 B. & C. 715, 729; Shaw *v.* Dartnall, 6 B. & C. 56. Where a factor sold goods on credit, to a person notoriously insolvent, taking the note of the purchaser payable to himself, and passing the amount to his principal's credit in account, as money which he afterwards paid over, it was held, that he was not entitled, upon the failure of the purchaser, to recover this money back from the principal. Simpson *v.* Swan, 3 Campb. 291. But where, after the goods were consigned, but before the sale, the principal drew bills on the factor for the value, which he accepted; after which he sold the goods to a person in good credit, taking notes payable to himself, and rendered to the principal an account of the sale as for cash, not naming the purchaser, and the latter afterwards, and before the maturity of the notes, became insolvent; the principal was held liable to refund the money to the factor, in this action. Greely *v.* Bartlett, 1 Greenl. 172.

[5] 2 Stark. Ev. 63; Selden *v.* Beale, 3 Greenl. 178.

[6] De Bernales *v.* Fuller, 14 East, 590, n.

sue for it as money had and received to his own use.[1] But if the defendant did not consent so to appropriate it, it is otherwise, there being no privity between them; and the action will lie only by him, who placed the money in his hands.[2] If the money was delivered with directions to appropriate it in a particular manner for the use of a third person, it has been held, that the party depositing the money might countermand the order, and recover it back in this action, at any time before the receiver had paid it over, or entered into any arrangement with the other party, by which he would be injured, if the original order was not carried into effect.[3] But if the money has been deposited in the hands of a trustee, for a specific purpose, such as for the conducting of a suit by him, as the party's attorney, or, by two litigating parties, in trust for the prevailing party, it cannot be recovered back in this action till the trust is satisfied.[4] So, if money has been paid upon a condition which has not been complied with, it cannot be recovered as money had and received to the payer's use.[5]

§ 120. The count for *money had and received* may also be supported by evidence, that the defendant obtained the plaintiff's money *by fraud*, or false color or pretence.[6] Thus, where one, having a wife living, fraudulently married another, and received the rents of her estate, he was held liable to the latter, in this form of action.[7] And, where the defendant has tortiously taken the plaintiff's property, and sold it, or being law-

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1 1 Com. Dig. 205, 206, Assumpsit, E.

2 Williams *v.* Everett, 14 East, 582; Hall *v.* Marston, 17 Mass. 575, 579; Grant *v.* Austen, 3 Price, 58.

3 Gibson *v.* Minet, Ry. & M. 68; 1 C. & P. 247, S. C.; 9 Moore, 31, S. C.; 2 Bing. 7, S. C.; Lyte *v.* Peny, Dy. 49, a; Taylor *v.* Lendey, 9 East, 49.

4 Case *v.* Roberts, Holt's Cas. 500; Ker *v.* Osborne, 9 East, 378. See 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 793 *a*, 793 *b*.

5 Hardingham *v.* Allen, 5 C. B. 793; 17 Law J. 198. C. P.

6 1 Steph. N. P. 335; Bliss *v.* Thompson, 4 Mass. 488; Ante, § 108; Lyon *v.* Annable, 4 Conn. 350.

7 Hasser *v.* Wallis, 1 Salk. 28.

fully possessed of it, has wrongfully sold it, the owner may, ordinarily, *waive the tort*, and recover the proceeds of the sale under this count.[1] So, if the money of the plaintiff has in any other manner come to the defendant's hands, for which he would be chargeable in tort, the plaintiff may waive the tort, and bring assumpsit upon the common counts. But this rule must be taken with this qualification; that the defendant is not thereby to be deprived of any benefit, which he could have derived under the appropriate form of action in tort.[2] Thus, this count cannot be supported, for money paid for the release of cattle distrained *damage feasant*, though the distress was wrongful, where the right of common is the subject of dispute,[3] nor even where, though the distress was lawful, the sum demanded in damages was excessive, if there had been no tender of amends;[4] nor for money received for rent,

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[1] Ante, § 117. But the goods must have been sold, or this count cannot be maintained. Jones *v.* Hoar, 5 Pick. 285. And there must be a tort, to be waived, for which trespass or case would lie. Bigelow *v.* Jones, 10 Pick. 161.

[2] Lindon *v.* Hooper, Cowp. 414, 419; Anscomb *v.* Shore, 1 Campb. 285; Young *v.* Marshall, 8 Bing. 43.

[3] Lindon *v.* Hooper, Cowp. 414.

[4] Gulliver *v.* Cosens, 9 Jur. 666. The reason for this was stated by Coltman, J. in the following terms: — "The plaintiff, if he had desired to recover his cattle, should have replevied. It is true, that, if he had done so, there would have been an avowry by the defendant, which the plaintiff could not have successfully resisted; but he might have allowed judgment in the replevin suit to have passed against him for default of prosecution, upon which an award of a return to the other party would have been made, after which the parties would have been remitted to their former situation. It would then have been for the plaintiff to have tendered sufficient amends; and, if the defendant afterwards refused to deliver up the cattle, an action of detinue to recover them back would have been maintainable. That is the mode pointed out by the law, but, instead of following that, the plaintiff pays the sum demanded, under protest, and brings this form of action of money had and received, in order to recover it back. The objection to that is, that the law has cast on him the duty of tendering the proper amount of compensation, whereas the effect of allowing the present action to lie would be to cast the burden of ascertaining the right amount on the other party. This case is different from that of a carrier, where the action of money had and received has been held to lie, for there the carrier, by claiming more than he is entitled to, is the wrongdoer. Neither does this properly come within the case of money

where the title to the premises is in question between the parties ;[1] nor in any other case, where the title to real estate is the subject of controversy ; that being a question, which, ordinarily, cannot be tried in this form of action.[2]

§ 121. Under this count, the plaintiff may also recover back money proved to have been obtained from him by *duress*, *extortion*, *imposition*, or taking any *undue advantage* of his situation, or otherwise involuntarily and wrongfully paid ; as by demand of illegal fees or claims,[3] tolls,[4] duties, taxes, usury, and the like, where goods or the person were detained until the money has been paid.[5] So, where goods were illegally detained as forfeited ;[6] or, where money was unlawfully demanded and paid to a creditor, to induce him to sign a bankrupt's certificate ;[7] or, where a pawnbroker refused to

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paid under duress of goods, for duress implies an illegal detention; but here the defendant comes into and keeps possession of the cattle in a way which the law does not consider wrongful." See 1 Man. Gr. & Sc. 788, S. C. but not so fully reported.

[1] Cunningham *v.* Lawrents, 1 Bac. Abr. 260, n. ; Newsome *v.* Graham, 10 B.& C. 334.

[2] 1 Chitty on Pl. 95, 96, 121 ; Binney *v.* Chapman, 5 Pick 130 ; Miller *v.* Miller, 7 Pick. 133 ; Codman *v.* Jenkins, 14 Mass. 96 ; Baker *v.* Howell, 6 S. & R. 481. But the right to an office may be tried in this form of action, if the plaintiff has once been in possession. Allen *v.* McKeen, 1 Sumn. 317 ; Green *v.* Hewitt, Peake's Cas. 182 ; Rex *v.* Bp. of Chester, 1 T. R. 396. 403.

[3] Morgan *v.* Palmer, 2 B. & C. 729 ; Dew *v.* Parsons, 1 Chitty, R. 295 ; 2 B. & Ad. 562, S. C. ; Walker *v.* Ham, 2 N. Hamp. 238 ; Clinton *v.* Strong, 9 Johns. 370 ; Wakefield *v.* Newbon, 6 Ad. & El. 276, N. S. Even though the money were received and illegally claimed by a corporation. Hall *v.* Swansea, 5 Ad. & El. 526, N. S. See further, as to the principal point; Close *v.* Phillips, 7 M. & G. 586.

[4] Fearnley *v.* Morley, 5 B. & C. 25 ; Chase *v.* Dwinel, 7 Greenl. 134.

[5] Shaw *v.* Woodcock, 9 D. & R. 889 ; 7 B. & C. 73, S. C. ; Amesbury *v.* Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461 ; Perry *v.* Dover, 12 Pick. 206 ; Atwater *v.* Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223 ; Elliott *v.* Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137 ; Parker *v.* Great Western Railw. Co. 8 Jur. 194 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 835 ; 7 M. & G. 253, S. C. ; Valpy *v.* Manley, 9 Jur. 452 ; 1 M. G. & Sc. 594.

[6] Irving *v.* Wilson, 4 T. R. 485.

[7] Smith *v.* Bromley, 2 Doug. 696, n. ; Cockshott *v.* Bennett, 2 T. R. 763 ; Stock *v.* Mawson, 1 B. & P. 286. See Wilson *v.* Ray, 10 Ad. & El. 82.

GLEN BEHYMER

deliver up the pledge, until a greater sum than was due was paid to him.[1] So, if the money has been paid under an usurious, or other *illegal contract*, where the plaintiff is not *in pari delicto* with the defendant ;[2] or, for a *consideration* which has *failed ;*[3] or, where the goods of the plaintiff have been seized and sold by the defendant, under an execution to which he was a stranger ;[4] or, under a *conviction*, which has since been *quashed*, or, a *judgment*, which has since been *reversed*, the defendant having received the money ;[5] or, under *terror of legal process*, which, though regularly issued, did not authorize the collection of the sum demanded and paid.[6] So, where the *person is arrested* for improper purposes without just cause ; or, for a just cause, but without lawful authority ; or, for a just cause and by lawful authority, but for an improper purpose ; and pays money to obtain his discharge, it may be recovered under this count.[7]

§ 122. This count, ordinarily, may also be proved by evidence, that the plaintiff paid the money to the defendant upon a security, afterwards discovered to be a *forgery ;* provided the plaintiff was not bound to know the handwriting, or, the defendant did not receive the money in good faith. Thus, where the defendant, becoming possessed of a lost bill of exchange, forged the payee's indorsement, and thereupon ob-

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1 Astley *v.* Reynolds, 2 Str. 915 ; 1 Selw. N. P. 83, note.

2 1 Steph. N. P. 335 – 341 ; Ante, § 111 ; 1 Selw. N. P. 84 – 94 ; Worcester *v.* Eaton, 11 Mass. 376 ; Boardman *v.* Roe, 13 Mass. 105 ; Wheaton *v.* Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290 ; Merwin *v.* Huntington, 2 Conn. 209. And see Perkins *v.* Savage, 15 Wend. 412 ; White *v.* Franklin Bank, 22 Pick. 181, 186 – 189.

3 1 Steph. N. P. 330 – 333, 345.

4 Oughton *v.* Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241.

5 Feltham *v.* Terry, cit. Cowp. 419 ; 1 T. R. 387 ; Bull. N. P. 131 ; 1 Steph. N. P. 357 – 359. See the cases cited in 1 Metcalf & Perkins's Digest, p. 293, 294.

6 Snowdon *v.* Davis, 1 Taunt. 359. But see Marriott *v.* Hampton, 7 T. R. 269 ; 2 Esp. 546.

7 Bull. N. P. 172, 173 ; 5 Com. Dig. Pleader, 2 W. 19 ; Richardson *v.* Duncan, 3 N. Hamp. 508 ; Watkins *v.* Baird, 6 Mass. 506.

tained its acceptance and payment from the drawees, he was held liable to refund the money in this action, though the bill was drawn by a commercial house in one country, upon a branch of the same house in another.[1] An acceptor, however, is bound to know the handwriting of the drawer of the bill; and a banker is in like manner bound to know the handwriting of his own customers; so that, in general, where they pay money upon the forgery of such signatures, to an innocent holder of the paper, the loss is their own.[2] Yet where a banker paid a bill to a remote indorsee, for the honor of his customer, who appeared as a prior indorser, but whose signature was forged, and, on discovery of the forgery, he gave notice thereof, and returned the bill to the holder, in season for him to obtain his remedy against the prior actual indorsers, it was held, that he might, for this reason, recover back the money of the holder.[3] But where one wrote his check so carelessly as to be easily altered to a larger sum, so that the banker, when he paid it, could not discover the alteration, it was held to be the loss of the drawer.[4] So, if lost or stolen money, or securities, have come to the defendant's hands, *malâ fide*, the owner may recover the value in this form of action.[5]

§ 123. In this manner, also, money is recovered back, which has been *paid under a mistake of facts*. But here, the plaintiff must show, that the mistake was not chargeable to himself alone;[6] unless it was made through forgetfulness, in the hurry

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1 Cheap *v.* Harley, cit. 3 T. R. 127.

2 Price *v.* Neale, 3 Burr. 1354; Smith *v.* Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76.

3 Wilkinson *v.* Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428.

4 Young *v.* Grote, 4 Bing. 253.

5 1 Steph. N. P. 353–355. But a party receiving a stolen bank note *bonâ fide* and for value, may retain it against the former owner, from whom it has been stolen. Miller *v.* Race, 1 Burr. 452. So, in the case of any other negotiable instrument actually negotiated. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 258–263 (Am. edit.); 43 Law Lib. 362–368.

6 Milnes *v.* Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671, per Bayley, J.; Hamlet *v.* Richardson, 9 Bing. 647; Story on Contr. § 102–110. If one by mistake pay the debt of another, he may recover it back of him who received it, unless the latter was injured by the mistake. Tybout *v.* Thompson, 2 Browne, 27.

of business, in which case it may be recovered.[1] But if it was paid into Court, under a rule for that purpose, it is conclusive on the party paying, even though it should appear, that he paid it erroneously.[2] Nor can money paid under a mistake of facts be reclaimed, where the plaintiff has derived a substantial benefit from the payment;[3] nor, where the defendant received it in good faith, in satisfaction of an equitable claim;[4] nor, where it was due in honor and conscience.[5] The *laws of a foreign country* are regarded, in this connexion, as matters of fact; and therefore money paid under a mistake of the law of another State, may be recovered back. Juris ignorantia est, cum *jus nostrum* ignoramus.[6] But it is well settled that money, paid under a mistake or *ignorance of the law* of our own country, but with a knowledge of the facts, or the means of such knowledge, cannot be recovered back.[7]

§ 124. This count may also be supported by proof, that the defendant has received money of the plaintiff upon a *consideration which has failed;*[8] as, for goods sold to the plaintiff, but never delivered;[9] or, for an annuity granted, but afterwards set aside;[10] or, as a deposit on the purchase of an estate by the plaintiff, to which the defendant cannot make the title agreed for;[11] or, where payment has been innocently

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[1] Lucas *v.* Worswick, 1 M. & Rob. 293.

[2] 2 T. R. 648, per Buller, J.

[3] Norton *v.* Marden, 3 Shepl. 45.

[4] Moore *v.* Eddowes, 2 Ad. & El. 133.

[5] Farmer *v.* Arundel, 2 W. Bl. 824, per De Grey, C. J.

[6] Haven *v.* Foster, 9 Pick. 112, 118; Story on Contr. § 101.

[7] Chitty on Contr. 490, 491; Story on Contr. § 100; Elliot *v.* Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137.

[8] Chitty on Contr. 487–490; 1 Steph. N. P. 330–332; Spring *v.* Coffin, 10 Mass. 34. But in this form of action, no damages are recovered beyond the money actually paid, and the interest. Neel *v.* Deans, 1 Nott & M'C. 210.

[9] Anon. 1 Stra. 407.

[10] Shove *v.* Webb, 1 T. R. 732.

[11] Alpass *v.* Watkins, 8 T. R. 516; Elliot *v.* Edwards, 3 B. & P. 181; Eames *v.* Savage, 14 Mass. 425. The plaintiff in such case must show,

made in counterfeit bank notes, or coins, if the plaintiff has offered to return them, within a reasonable time.[1] So, where the money was paid upon an *agreement which has been rescinded*,[2] whether by mutual consent, or by reason of fault in the defendant; the plaintiff showing that the defendant has been restored to his former rights of property, without unreasonable delay.[3] But if the agreement has been partially executed, and the parties cannot be reinstated *in statu quo*, the remedy is to be had only under a special count upon the contract.[4] Thus, where A. was let into possession of a house belonging to B., under a parol agreement with the latter, that if A. would make certain repairs, he should receive a lease for twelve years; and he made the repairs, but B. refused to grant the lease; it was held, that A. could not recover in *assumpsit* for the value expended in repairs, because it did not appear that the agreement was mutually rescinded.[5]

§ 125. In regard to *money received by an agent*, the general rule is, that the action to recall it must be brought against the principal only, since, in legal contemplation, the receipt was by the principal, with whom the agent was identified. But the count for money had and received, against the agent alone, may be supported by proof that the principal was a foreigner, resident abroad; or, that the agent acted in his own name, without disclosing his principal; or, that the money was obtained by the agent through his own bad faith, or

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that he has tendered the purchase-money and demanded a title. Hudson *v.* Swift, 20 Johns. 24. See also Gillett *v.* Maynard, 5 Johns. 85.

[1] Young *v.* Adams, 6 Mass. 182; Markle *v.* Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455; Keene *v.* Thompson, 4 Gill & Johns. 463; Salem Bank *v.* Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1; Ibid. 33; Raymond *v.* Baar, 13 S. & R. 318.

[2] Gillett *v.* Maynard, 5 Johns. 85; Bradford *v.* Manley, 13 Mass. 139; Connor *v.* Henderson, 15 Mass. 319.

[3] Percival *v.* Blake, 2 C. & P. 514; Cash *v.* Giles, 3 C. &. P. 407; Reed *v.* McGrew, 5 Ham. Ohio R. 386; Warner *v.* Wheeler, 1 Chipm. 159.

[4] Hunt *v.* Silk, 5 East, 449; Beed *v.* Blanford, 2 Y. & J. 278.

[5] Hopkins *v.* Richardson, see Legal Obs. Nov. 21, 1846, p. 70.

wrong, whether alone, or jointly with the principal; or, that, at the time of paying the money into his hands, or, at all events, before he had paid it over, or had otherwise materially changed his situation or relations to the principal, in consequence of the receipt of the money, as, by giving a new credit to him, or the like, he had notice not to pay it over to the principal.[1] But though he has not paid over the money, yet, if he is a mere collector or receiver, the right of the principal cannot be tried in this form of action.[2]

§ 126. In support of the count upon an *account stated*, the plaintiff must show that there was a demand on his side, which was acceded to by the defendant. There must be a fixed and certain sum, admitted to be due ;[3] but the sum need not be precisely proved as laid in the declaration.[4] The admission must have reference to past transactions, that is, to a subsisting debt, or, to a moral obligation, founded on an extinguished legal obligation, to pay a certain sum ;[5] but if the amount is not expressed, but only alluded to by the defendant, it may be shown, by other evidence, that the sum referred to was of a certain and agreed amount.[6] The admission may be shown to have been made to the plaintiff's wife, or

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[1] Story on Agency, § 266, 267, 268, 300, 301; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 388–394; 3 Chitty on Com. & Manuf. 213.

[2] Ibid; Sadler *v.* Evans, 4 Burr. 1984; Allen *v.* McKeen, 1 Sumn, 277. 278, 317.

[3] Porter *v.* Cooper, 4 Tyrwh, 456, 464, 465; 1 C. M. & R. 387, S. C.; Knowles *v.* Michel, 13 East, 249; Arthur *v.* Dartch, 9 Jur. 118; Perry *v.* Slade, 10 Jur. 31; Mosely *v.* Reade, Ibid. 18. An I. O. U. is evidence of an account stated between the holder and the party signing it. Fessenmayer *v.* Adcock, 16 M. & W. 449.

[4] Bull N. P. 129. Proof of one item only, will support the count. Highmore *v.* Primrose, 5 M. & S. 65, 67; Knowles *v.* Michel, 13 East, 249; Pinchon *v.* Chilcott, 3 C. & P. 236.

[5] Clarke *v.* Webb, 4 Tyrwh. 673 ; 1 C. M. & R. 29, S. C.; Tucker *v.* Barrow, 7 B. & C. 623; 3 C. & P. 85, S. C.; Whitehead *v.* Howard, 2 B. & B. 372; Seagoe *v.* Dean, 3 C. & P. 170. An I. O. U. is admissible. Payne *v.* Jenkins, 4 C. & P. 324.

[6] Dixon *v.* Deverage, 2 C. & P. 109.

other agent,[1] but an admission in conversation with a third person, not the plaintiff's agent, is not sufficient.[2] The admission itself must be voluntary, and not made upon compulsion;[3] and it must be absolute, and not qualified.[4] But it need not be express and in terms; for if the account be sent to the debtor, in a letter, which is received but not replied to in a reasonable time, the acquiescence of the party is taken as an admission, that the account is truly stated.[5] So, if one item only is objected to, it is an admission of the rest.[6] So, if a third person is employed by both parties to examine the accounts in their presence, and he strikes a balance against one, which, though done without authority, is not objected to, it is sufficient proof of an account stated.[7] So, if accounts are submitted to arbitration, *by parol*, the award is sufficient proof of this count.[8]

§ 127. The *original form, or evidence of the debt*, is of no importance, under the count upon an *account stated;* for the stating of the account alters the nature of the debt, and is in the nature of a new promise or undertaking.[9] Therefore, if

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[1] Styart *v.* Rowland, 1 Show. 215; Bull. N. P. 129; Baynham *v.* Holt, 8 Jur. 963.

[2] Breckon *v.* Smith, 1 Ad. & El. 488.

[3] Tucker *v.* Barrow, 7 B. & C. 623; 3 C. & P. 85, S. C.

[4] Evans *v.* Verity, Ry. & M. 239.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 197.

[6] Chisman *v.* Count, 2 M. & Gr. 307.

[7] 1 Steph. N. P. 361.

[8] Keen *v.* Batshore, 1 Esp. 194. This case of Keen *v.* Batshore is said by Pollock, C. B., to have been decided chiefly on the ground that, as there were no arbitration bonds, and the parties must be presumed to have intended to do something, the arbitrator might well be regarded as their agent, examining and stating the accounts in their presence. Beyond this, its authority was denied in the recent case of Bates *v.* Townley, 12 Jur. 606, in which it was held, that an award, made under a regular submission in writing, was no evidence of an account stated by either of the parties.

[9] Anon. 1 Ventr. 268; Foster *v.* Allanson, 2 T. R. 479, 482, per Ashhurst, J.; Ibid. 483, per Buller, J.; Holmes *v.* D'Camp, 1 Johns. 36, per Spencer, J. Therefore an account stated with a new firm, may sometimes include debts due to a former firm, or to one of the partners. David *v.* El-

the original contract were void, by the Statute of Frauds, or the stamp act, or,[1] if the items of the account were rents, secured by speciality,[2] yet if, after the agreement is executed, there be an actual accounting and a promise express or implied to pay, it is sufficient. It is not necessary to prove the *items* of the account; for the action is founded, not upon these, but upon the defendant's consent to the balance ascertained.[3] And it is sufficient if the account be stated of what is due to the *plaintiff alone*, without deduction for any counter claim of the defendant.[4] But a *banker's pass-book* delivered to his customer, in which there are entries on one side only, is not evidence of an account stated between them, though the customer keeps the book in his custody, without making any objection to the entries contained in it.[5]

§ 128. It is not material *when the admission was made*, whether before or after action brought, if it be proved, that a debt existed before suit, to which the conversation related.[6] But whensoever such admission was made, it is *not* now held to be *conclusive;* but any errors may be shown and corrected under the general issue.[7] If the defendants were formerly

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lice, 5 B. & C. 196. And see Gough *v.* Davies, 4 Price, 200; Moor *v.* Hill, Peake's Add. Cas. 10.

1 Seagoe *v.* Dean, 3 C. & P. 170; 4 Bing. 459, S. C.; Pinchon *v.* Ghilcott, 3 C. & P. 236; Teal *v.* Auty, 2 B. & B. 99; Knowles *v.* Michel, 13 East, 249; Cocking *v.* Ward, 1 M. G. & Sc. 858.

2 Davison *v.* Hanslop, T. Raym. 211; Moravia *v.* Levy, 2 T. R. 483, n.; Danforth *v.* Schoharie, 12 Johns. 227; Foster *v.* Allanson, 2 T. R. 479; Arthur *v.* Dartch, 9 Jur. 118. But this doctrine was questioned in Gilson *v.* Stewart, 7 Watts, 100, and its application restricted to cases, where the account included other matters also, not arising by the speciality.

3 Bartlett *v.* Emery, 1 T. R. 42, n.; Bull. N. P. 129.

4 Styart *v.* Rowland, 1 Show. 215.

5 Ex parte Randleson, 3 Deac. & Chitty, 534. And see Tarbuck *v.* Bipsham, 2 M. & W. 2.

6 Allen *v.* Cook, 2 Dowl. P. C. 546.

7 Thomas *v.* Hawkes, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 140; Perkins *v.* Hart, 11 Wheat. 237, 256; Holmes *v.* D'Camp, 1 Johns. 36. Formerly it was otherwise. Trueman *v.* Hurst, 1 T. R. 40. See further, Harden *v.* Gordon, 2 Mason, 541, 561.

partners, and the admission was by one of them alone, in regard to things which were done before the dissolution of the firm, it seems to be considered sufficient.[1] And where A. admitted to an agent of B., that a balance was due from himself in respect to a bill of exchange, of which B. was then, but unknown to A., the holder; and afterwards, A., having been informed that B. held the bill, told the agent that he could not pay it; these two admissions, taken together, were held evidence of an account stated.[2] But the admission, however made, in order to constitute an account stated, must have been made to the opposite party or his agent.[3]

§ 129. If the plaintiff claims the money in a *particular character* or capacity, it will not be necessary for him to prove that character, under the count upon an account stated; for the defendant, by accounting with him in that character, without objection, has admitted it.[4]

§ 129 *a*. Under either of the money counts, where the plaintiff proves the payment or receipt of money, in coins or bank notes, without showing of what denomination, the Jury will be directed to presume the coins or notes to have been of the smallest denomination in circulation. Thus, where the delivery of a bank note was proved, the amount of which did not appear, it was held that the Jury were rightly directed to presume it a £5 note, that being the lowest denomination issued.[5]

§ 130. The *defendant's answer*, in an action of assumpsit, is either by a plea in *abatement*, or by the general issue, or by a special plea in bar. In abatement of the suit, the more

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1 Ante, Vol. 1, § 112, and note (5).

2 Baynham *v.* Holt, 8 Jur. 963.

3 Bates *v.* Townley, 2 Exch. R. 152; 12 Jur. 606.

4 Peacock *v.* Harris, 10 East, 104; Ante, Vol. 1, § 195.

5 Lawton *v.* Sweeney, 8 Jur. 964. And see Dry Dock Co. *v.* McIntosh, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 290.

usual pleas are those of misnomer,[1] coverture, and the omission to sue a joint contractor. Under the liberality with which amendments are permitted, the plea of *misnomer* is now rarely tried. The plea of *coverture* is sustained by evidence of general reputation and acknowledgment of the parties and reception of their friends, as man and wife, and of cohabitation as such.[2] If coverture of the plaintiff is pleaded, it seems that proof of a solemn and unqualified admission by her, that she was married, will be sufficient to support the plea; but that if the admission is coupled with the expression of doubts as to the validity of the marriage, it will not be sufficient.[3]

§ 131. If the defendant pleads in abatement, that he made the contract *jointly with other persons*, named in the plea, but *not joined in the suit*, the naming of these persons is taken as exclusive of any others; and therefore if it is shown, that there were more joint contractors, this will disprove the plea.[4] If to a declaration for work and labor, or upon several contracts, the defendant pleads in abatement the non-joinder of other contractors, it must be proved, that all the contracts were made by, or that all the work was done for, the persons named in the plea, and none others; for, if it should appear, that one contract was made by, or one portion of the work was done for, the defendant alone, the plaintiff will have judgment for the whole, though, as to the residue of the declaration, the plea is supported; for not being supported as to the whole declaration to which it is pleaded, it is no answer at all. Therefore, where, to a count for work done, the defendants pleaded that it was done for them and certain others, and the plaintiff proved, that it was done partly for

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[1] See Ante, tit. ABATEMENT, § 21.

[2] Leader *v.* Barry, 1 Esp. 153; Kay *v.* Duchesse de Pienne, 3 Campb. 123; Birt *v.* Barlow, 1 Doug. 171. See Post, tit. MARRIAGE.

[3] Mace *v.* Cadell, Cowp. 233; Wilson *v.* Mitchell, 3 Campb. 393.

[4] Godson *v.* Good, 6 Taunt. 587; 2 Marsh. 299, S. C.; Ela *v.* Rand, 4 N. Hamp. 307.

them, and the residue for them and the others, he had judgment for the whole, the plea not being supported to the extent pleaded.[1] But where the suit was against A. B. and C. for work done for them, and the defendants pleaded the non-joinder of D., and it appeared that one portion of the work was done for A. alone, another portion for A. B. C. and D., a third portion for A. B. and D., and a fourth for A. and B., but none for A. B. and C. only; the plea was held supported, as an answer to the action, the plaintiff failing to prove any claim against the particular parties sued.[2] If the persons not joined are described in the plea as assignees of a bankrupt contractor, the assignment itself must be proved, unless the fact has been admitted by the other party; proof of their having acted as such not being deemed sufficient.[3] And in the trial of this issue of the want of proper parties defendant, the contracting party not sued, though ordinarily incompetent as a witness for the defendant, by reason of his interest, may be rendered competent by a release.[4]

§ 132. This plea, to a count for goods sold, may be supported by proof they were ordered by the defendant jointly with the other person named; or, that such had been the previous and usual course of dealing between the parties; or, that partial payments had been made on their joint account.

§ 133. If one of two joint contractors is *dead*, and the survivor is sued, as the sole and several contractor, it will not be

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[1] Hill *v.* White & Williams, 6 Bing. N. C. 26; 8 Scott, 249, S. C.; 8 Dowl. P. C. 13, S. C.; 3 Jur. 1078. In this case, the case of Colson *v.* Selby, 1 Esp. 452, was overruled.

[2] Hill *v.* White, Williams, & Boulter, 6 Bing. N. C. 23; 8 Scott, 245, S. C.; 8 Dowl. P. C. 63, S. C.; 3 Jur. 1077. If some confess the action by default, yet the plaintiff cannot have judgment unless he proves a contract by all. Robeson *v.* Ganderton, 9 C. & P. 476; Elliott *v.* Morgan, 7 C. & P. 334.

[3] Pasmore *v.* Bousfield, 1 Stark. R. 296. See further as to this plea, Ante, tit. ABATEMENT, § 24, 25.

[4] Ante, Vol. 1, § 395, 426, 427.

sufficient for the plaintiff, in answer to a plea of non-joinder, to *reply* the fact of his death, for this would contradict his declaration upon a separate contract, by admitting a joint one.[1] In all actions upon contract, the defendant has a right to require that his co-debtor should be joined with him; and the plaintiff cannot so shape his case, as to strip him of that right, or of the benefit, whatever it may be, of having his discharge stated on the record. The plaintiff is not at liberty, in the first instance, to anticipate what may ultimately perhaps be a discharge. The practice has ever been to join all the contracting parties on the record; thus giving to the party, who is joined, notice at the time, and enabling him at any future time to plead the judgment recovered on the joint debt, without the help of averments; and likewise advancing him one step in the proof, necessary in an action for contribution. Such was the judgment of Ld. Ellenborough, in a case in which it was held, that, though one of the joint contractors had become *bankrupt* and obtained his discharge, a replication of this fact was no answer to a plea of non-joinder in abatement; for though he was discharged by law, he was not bound to take the benefit of it.[2] If he pleads the discharge, the plaintiff may enter a *nolle prosequi* as to him, and proceed against the other.[3] It has been held in England, that this course was proper only in cases of bankruptcy; and that a replication of infancy or coverture of the person not sued, was a good answer to a plea of non-joinder; for that the plaintiff could not, in such case, enter a *nolle prosequi* as to one joint contractor, without discharging all, and therefore, that he had no remedy but in this mode.[4] But in the American Courts, the entry of a *nolle prosequi*, and its effect, have been regarded as matters of practice, resting in the discretion of the Court; and accordingly, wherever one defendant pleads

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[1] Bovill *v.* Wood, 2 M. & S. 25, per Le Blanc, J.

[2] Bovill *v.* Wood, 2 M. & S. 23; 2 Rose, 155; Hawkins *v.* Ramsbottom, 6 Taunt. 179.

[3] Noke *v.* Ingham, 1 Wils. 89.

[4] Chandler *v.* Parks, 3 Esp. 76; Jaffray *v.* Frebain, 5 Esp. 47. See also Burgess *v.* Merrill, 4 Taunt. 468; 1 Chitty on Plead. 49, 52.

a plea, which goes merely to his personal discharge, the contract, as to him, being only voidable, and not utterly void, the plaintiff has been permitted to enter a *nolle prosequi* as to him, and proceed against the others.[1] It would seem, therefore, that, in the American Courts, the replication of *infancy*, or other personal immunity of the party not joined, would not be a good answer to a plea of non-joinder in abatement, unless such party had already made his election and avoided the contract.[2]

§ 134. Where the joint liability pleaded arises from *partnership* with the defendant, it must be proved to have openly existed, not only at the time of making the contract, but in the same business to which the contract related. The partnership may be proved by evidence of any of the outward acts and circumstances, which usually belong to that relation, brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiff. But if the partnership is dormant, and unknown to the plaintiff, or, if it is known, but the omitted party is a secret partner, this, as we have heretofore seen, is no objection to the suit.[3]

§ 135. Almost all the *defences to the action* of *assumpsit*, in the United States, and, until a late period, in England, have been made under the *general issue*. This plea, on strict principle, operates only as a denial in fact of the express contract or promise, where one is alleged, or, of the matters of fact from which the contract or promise alleged may be implied by law. But by an early relaxation of the principle, the defendant, in actions on express contracts, was admitted, under the general issue, to the same latitude of defence, which was open to him in actions upon the common counts, and was permitted

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[1] Woodward *v.* Newhall, 1 Pick. 500; Hartness *v.* Thompson, 5 Johns. 160; Minor *v.* Mechanics Bank, 1 Peters, R. 46; Salmon *v.* Smith, 1 Saund. 207, note (2), by Williams.

[2] Gibbs *v.* Merrill, 3 Taunt. 313, 314, per Mansfield, C. J.

[3] Ante, tit. ABATEMENT, § 25; Story on Partnership, § 241; Collyer on Partnership, p. 424, 425.

to adduce evidence, showing that, on any ground common to both kinds of *assumpsit*, he was under no legal liability to the plaintiff for that cause, at the time of pleading.[1] The practice in the English Courts, by the recent rules, has been brought back to its original strictness and consistency with principle. In the United States, it remains, for the most part, in its former relaxed state; and accordingly, where it has not been otherwise regulated by statutes, the defendant, under this issue, may give in evidence any matters, showing that the plaintiff *never had* any cause of action; such as, the non-joinder of another promisee; the defendant's infancy; lunacy; drunkenness, or other mental incapacity; or coverture at the time of contracting; duress; want of consideration; illegality; release or parol discharge or payment before breach; material alteration of the written contract; that the plaintiff was an alien enemy at the time of contracting; or, that the contract was void by statute, or by the policy of the law; non-performance of condition precedent, by the plaintiff; or, that performance on his own part was prevented by the plaintiff, or by law, or, in certain cases, by the act of God; or any the like matters of defence.[2] He may also *give in evidence* many *matters in discharge* of his liability to the plaintiff, such as, bankruptcy of the plaintiff, where this would defeat the action; coverture of the plaintiff, where she sues alone, and has no interest in the contract; payment; accord and satisfaction; former recovery; higher security given; discharge by a new contract; release; and the like.[3] So, in *assumpsit* for use and occupation, the defendant under this issue may show that he has been evicted by one who had recovered judgment

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[1] Stephen on Pleading, p. 179 – 182.

[2] 1 Chitty on Plead. 417 – 420; Gould on Plead. ch. 6, § 46 – 50; Young *v.* Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Craig *v.* Missouri, 4 Pet. 426; Wilt *v.* Ogden, 13 Johns. 56; Wailing *v.* Toll, 9 Johns. 141; Hilton *v.* Burley, 2 N. Hamp. 193; Sill *v.* Rood, 15 Johns. 230; Mitchell *v.* Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Osgood *v.* Spencer, 2 H. & G. 133.

[3] Ibid.; Edson *v.* Weston, 7 Cow. 278; Drake *v.* Drake, 11 Johns. 531; Dawson *v.* Tibbs, 4 Yeates, 349; Young *v.* Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Offut *v.* Offut, 2 H. & G. 178; Wright *v.* Butler, 6 Wend. 284.

against his lessor, by virtue of a paramount title, to whom he has attorned and paid the rent subsequently accruing.[1] Yet there are *some matters in discharge*, which admit the debt, but go in denial of the remedy only, that *must be pleaded;* namely, bankruptcy or insolvency of the defendant; tender; set-off; and the statute of limitations.[2] It is only where the special plea amounts to the general issue, that is, where it alleges matter, which is in effect a denial of the truth of the declaration, that such plea is improper and inadmissible.[3]

These defences, being for the most part applicable to other actions on contracts, will be treated under their appropriate titles.

§ 136. In regard to the admissibility of evidence of failure, or *want of consideration*, as a defence to an action of *assumpsit*, there is an embarrassing conflict in the decisions. A distinction, however, has been taken between those cases, where the consideration was the conveyance of real property, and those, where it was wholly of a personal nature, such as goods or services; and also between a total and a partial failure of the consideration. Where the consideration is personal in its nature, and the *failure is total*, or, the defendant has derived *no benefit* at all from the services performed, or none beyond the amount of money which he has already advanced, it seems agreed, that this may be shown in bar of the action.[4] If, in an express contract for a stipulated price, the failure of a similar consideration is *partial only*, the defendant having derived some benefit from the consideration, whether goods or services, and the count is special, upon the express contract, the English rule seems to be, not to admit it to be shown in bar *pro tanto*,

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1 Newport *v.* Hardy, 10 Jur. 333.

2 1 Chitty on Plead. 420; Gould on Plead. ch. 6, § 51.

3 Gould on Plead. ch. 6, § 78; Steph on Plead. 412.

4 Jackson *v.* Warwick, 7 T. R. 121; Templer *v.* McLachlan, 2 New R. 136, 139; Farnsworth *v.* Garrard, 1 Campb. 38; Dax *v.* Ward, 1 Stark. R. 409; Morgan *v.* Richardson, 1 Campb. 40, n.; 9 Moore, 159; Tye *v.* Gwinne, 2 Campb. 346.

but to leave the defendant to his remedy by action;[1] unless the quantum to be deducted is matter susceptible of definite computation.[2] But where the plaintiff proceeds upon general counts, the value of the goods or services may be appreciated by evidence for the defendant.[3] The American Courts, to

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[1] Templer *v.* McLachlan, 2 New R. 136; Franklin *v.* Miller, 4 Ad. & El. 599; Grimaldi *v.* White, 4 Esp. 95; Denew *v.* Daverell, 3 Campb. 451; Basten *v.* Butter, 7 East, 483, per Ld. Ellenborough; Sheels *v.* Davies, 4 Campb. 119; Crowninshield *v.* Robinson, 1 Mason, 93, acc. But see contra, Okell *v.* Smith, 1 Stark. R. 107; Chapel *v.* Hickes, 2 Cr. & M. 214; 4 Tyrwh. 43; Cutler *v.* Close, 5 C. & P. 337.

[2] Day *v.* Nix, 9 Moore, 159. See also Parish *v.* Stone, 14 Pick. 198, 210.

[3] Denew *v.* Daverell, 3 Campb. 451; Basten *v.* Butter, 7 East, 479; Farnsworth *v.* Garrard, 1 Campb. 38; Fisher *v.* Samuda, Ib. 190; Kist *v.* Atkinson, 2 Campb. 63; Bilbie *v.* Lumley, 2 East, 469; 1 Mason, 95, per Story, J. acc.; Miller *v.* Smith, Ib. 437; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 14, 15. In the second American edition of the last cited work, the doctrine recognized in this country, which seems to accord in its main principles with that of Westminster Hall, is well stated in the notes of Mr. Wallace, as follows: — "Where there has been a special contract, and the plaintiff's duty has been executed and closed, he may either declare specially on the contract, or maintain general *assumpsit*. It is important to observe the different ground on which these two actions rest, and the difference in the proceedings to which they give rise. The special assumpsit is brought upon the express contract. Unless the plaintiff can show that he has fulfilled with legal exactness all the terms of the contract, he can recover nothing. See Morford *v.* Mastin & Ambrose, 6 Monroe, 609; and compare with it S. C. in 3 J. J. Marshall, 89; Taft *v.* The Inhabitants of Montague, 14 Mass. 282; Gregory *v.* Mack, 3 Hill, N. Y. 380. But if his performance has been according to the terms of the contract, and has resulted in an available and practical work of the kind required, so that the plaintiff is capable of maintaining his special action at all, he is entitled, at common law, to recover the whole compensation fixed by the contract, and the defendant must resort to a cross action, to recover damages for faults in the manner of performance, or for breaches of a warranty. See Everett *v.* Gray et al., 1 Mass. 101, where there was a special count. It is true that in such case, a recovery may be defeated by proof of fraud, for fraud vitiates every sale; but upon a contract of sale, where performance has been accepted, the defendant cannot set up this defence, unless he has returned the article or given notice as soon as the variance is discovered, for thereby he rescinds his acceptance of the performance; if he does not, he cannot set up this defence, for the plaintiff should have been allowed an opportunity to make other use of the article, and the defendant's delay and silence would be a counter-fraud in him; unless

avoid circuity of action, have of late permitted a partial failure of consideration to be shown in defence *pro tanto*, in all

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he can show that the plaintiff could not possibly have been injured by the non-return, which is only where the article is wholly useless; therefore, on a sale, a special count can only be defeated for fraud, where the article has been returned, or is proved to be wholly worthless. Burton *v.* Stewart, 3 Wend. 236; Van Epps *v.* Harrison, 5 Hill, 64. See Thornton *v.* Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Case *v.* John, 10 Watts, 107.

"But if the plaintiff, having executed his part of the contract, brings general *assumpsit*, the ground of his recovery is *not* the defendant's special contract or promise, but he rests wholly on the implied legal liability of the defendant, to recompense him for a service which has been done at the defendant's request; the defendant not being allowed to defeat the plaintiff by setting up a special contract which he himself has broken, by not paying at the appointed time. The nature of the action, and the legal ground of the recovery, therefore, are precisely the same as they are where there has been in fact no special contract at all: the rule that the plaintiff cannot recover beyond the rates of recompense fixed by the contract, being merely a rule of evidence, founded not only upon those rates being necessarily the most reasonable measure of values in the particular case, but upon the consideration that the defendant's previous request, or subsequent acceptance, which is relied upon, was conditioned upon the charges being at those specified rates. Accordingly it results necessarily from the ground and nature of the action, that, when the plaintiff declares generally, the defendant may show, in reduction of damages, every thing that goes directly to the consideration, and immediately affects the value of the work; for the assumpsit which the law implies, whether in *quantum meruit*, or *indebitatus*, is always commensurate with the actual final value of the article or work. This principle, in respect to *indebitatus assumpsit*, is decided in Heck *v.* Shener, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 249, the distinction being between those torts or breaches of contract which go entirely to the consideration, and those which are *dehors*, and collateral to it; the latter not being admissible. Gogel *v.* Jacoby, 5 Ib. 117. The defendant, therefore, may show defects in the work or service, and if the plaintiff refers to the contract as evidence of the fair price of the work or article, the defendant may show that this price was predicated upon a *warranty* of quality which has proved false; in short, from the very nature of the claim which the plaintiff has chosen to make, the defendant may prevent his recovering more than the real, inherent value of the consideration. This is not an anomaly or innovation of the law; at least, the law has necessarily been thus, ever since it has been settled that general assumpsit is maintainable after the performance of a special contract; it is evident from the cases cited in Basten *v.* Butter, 7 East, 479, and notes, that Ld, Kenyon had previously more than once ruled the point differently from Buller, even if Broom *v.* Davis ruled by the latter, was not, what it probably was, a special count; and Ld. Kenyon was not very greatly

suits on contracts respecting personal property or services;[1] only taking care, that the defence shall not take the plaintiff

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given to innovation. The cases of Mills and others *v.* Bainbridge, and Temple *v.* McLachlan, in 2 New Reports, 136, 137, accord entirely with the distinction above noted; the neglects there complained of, did not go to the consideration of the assumpsits there declared upon, the service for which the assumpsit was brought, having been, in both cases, completely performed; but were collateral torts. In this country it may be considered as perfectly settled, that when the plaintiff brings general assumpsit, when there has been a special contract, the defendant may give in evidence, in reduction of damages, a breach of warranty, or a fradulent misrepresentation, without a return of the article. McAllister *v.* Reab, 4 Wend. 483, affirmed on error, in 8 Wend. 109; Still *v.* Hall, 20 Wend. 51; Batterman *v.* Pierce, 3 Hill, N. Y. 172; Steigleman *v.* Jeffries, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 477, &c. In like manner, defects in the work or article must be given in evidence if this form of action be brought. Grant *v.* Button, 14 Johns. 377; King & Mead *v.* Paddock, 18 Johns. 141." See 2 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 27, 28, 2d Am. ed.

[1] 22 Am. Jur. 26; 2 Kent, Comm. 473, 474; Barker *v.* Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430; Parish *v.* Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Folsom *v.* Mussey, 8 Greenl. 400; Reed *v.* Prentiss, 1 N. Hamp. 174; Shepherd *v.* Temple, 3 N. Hamp. 455; Hills *v.* Banister, 8 Cowen, 31; McAllister *v.* Reab, 4 Wend. 483; Reab *v.* McAllister, 8 Wend. 109; Todd *v.* Gallagher, 16 S. & R. 261; Christy *v.* Reynolds, Ib. 258; Evans *v.* Gray, 12 Martin, 475, 647; Spalding *v.* Vandercook, 2 Wend. 431; Hayward *v.* Leonard, 7 Pick. 181; Cone *v.* Baldwin, 12 Pick. 545; Pegg *v.* Stead, 9 C. & P. 636. In the case of Parish *v.* Stone, above cited, the jury found that a part of the consideration of the note declared upon was for services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant's testator, and that the residue was intended as a mortuary gift; and the question was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover for that part only which was good and valid in law. In delivering the judgment of the Court upon this question, the law was thus stated by Shaw, C. J.: — "Had the note been taken for two distinct liquidated sums, consolidated, and the consideration had been wholly wanting, or wholly failed as to one, it seems quite clear, that according to well established principles, supported by authorities, the note, as between the original parties, and all those who stand in such relation, as to allow the defence of want of consideration, it would be competent to the Court to apportion the note, and consider it good in part, and void in part, and to permit the holder to recover accordingly.

"In Bayley on Bills, (Phillips and Sewall's ed.) 340, and in most other text books, it is laid down, that want or failure of consideration, is a good defence as between immediate parties, or holders without value, either total or *pro tanto*, as the failure goes to the whole, or part of the consideration. Barber *v.* Backhouse, Peake's R. 61. Where there was originally no consideration, for part of the sum expressed in the bill, the jury may apportion the damages; per Ld. Kenyon. Darnell *v.* Williams, 2 Stark. R. 166.

by surprise.[1] But where the consideration consists of real estate, conveyed by deed, with covenants of title, promissory

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"That the holder in such case recovers on the note, and not on the original consideration, is rendered manifest by another series of decisions, thereby showing that the note is good *pro tanto*, as a negotiable instrument, upon which a holder by indorsement may sue and recover; whereas the right to recover upon the original consideration would not be negotiable, and would not vest in the holder of the note by indorsement.

"It being held that when a bill or note is made without value, or as an accommodation note, this may be shown as a good defence, against the payee; it is also held as a principle absolutely essential to the currency of bills and notes, that where an indorsee takes a bill for valuable consideration, or derives title through any one who has paid value for it, he shall recover to the amount, notwithstanding it was originally made without value, and as an accommodation bill. It follows, as a necessary consequence from these two principles, that where an indorsee of an accommodation bill has taken it for value, but for less than the amount expressed by the bill, there the holder shall recover only to the amount for which he has given value. Jones *v.* Hibbert, 2 Stark. R. 304. In that case the defendant accepted a bill for £415, to accommodate Phillips & Co., who indorsed it to their bankers for value, and became bankrupt; the bankers knew it to be an accommodation acceptance, and their demand against Phillips & Co. was £265 only; it was held that they could only recover the £265, and they had a verdict accordingly.

"So where a bill accepted as a gift to the payee is indorsed for a small consideration, the indorser can recover only to that extent. Nash *v.* Brown, Chitty on Bills, (5th edit.) 93.

"From these cases it is manifest, that the plaintiff recovers on the bill, and not on the original consideration; otherwise the right to sue and recover *pro tanto* would not pass to the indorsee by the negotiation of the bill. They therefore establish the proposition, that where the parts of a bill are divisible, making an aggregate sum, and as to one liquidated and definite part there was a valuable consideration, and as to the other part there was no consideration; the bill, as such, may be apportioned, and a holder may recover for such part as was founded on a good consideration.

"But it is contended, that where the parts of the bill are not liquidated, and distinguishable by computation, a different rule prevails, and several English cases are relied on, to show that though the consideration fails in part, the whole bill is recoverable. Moggridge *v.* Jones, 14 East, 486; Morgan *v.* Richardson, 1 Campb. 40, note; Tye *v.* Gwynne, 2 Campb. 346; Grant *v.* Welchman, 16 East, 206. In these cases it was held, that where the note was given for an entire thing, and the consideration afterwards failed in part, the whole bill was recoverable, and the defendant was left to his cross action.

[1] Runyan *v.* Nichols, 11 Johns. 547; The People *v.* Niagara C. P. 12 Wend. 246; Reed *v.* Prentiss, 1 N. Hamp. 174, 176.

notes being given for the purchase money, the better opinion seems to be, that on Common Law principles, the covenants

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As where the note was given for a lease, and the lease was not completed according to contract; or for a parcel of hams, and they proved bad and unmarketable; or for goods, and they were of a bad quality and improperly packed; or for an apprentice fee, and the apprentice was not kept by his master.

"In this respect there seems to be some distinction between the English decisions and those of New York. In the latter it was held, that upon a suit between original parties, upon a note given upon a contract to manufacture casks, the defendant might go into evidence to show that the casks were unskilfully manufactured, to reduce the amount of damages.

"But without relying upon this difference, we think the English decisions may be well reconciled, by a reference to the known distinction between failure of consideration, and want of consideration.

"All the cases put, are those of failure of consideration, where the consideration was single and entire, and went to the whole note, and was good and sufficient at the time the note was given, but by some breach of contract, mistake or accident, had afterwards failed. There the rule is, if the consideration has wholly failed, or the contract been wholly rescinded, it shall be a good defence to the note. But if it have partially failed only, it would tend to an inconvenient mode of trial and to a confusion of rights, to try such question in a suit on the note, as a partial defence, and therefore the party complaining shall be left to his cross action. This distinction, and the consequence to be drawn from it, is alluded to by Ld. Ellenborough in Tye *v.* Gwynne, 2 Campb. 346. He says, 'there is a difference between want of consideration, and failure of consideration. The former may be given in evidence to reduce the damages; the latter cannot, but furnishes a distinct and independent cause of action.' It seems therefore very clear, that want of consideration, either total or partial, may always be shown by way of defence; and that it will bar the action, or reduce the damages, from the amount expressed in the bill, as it is found to be total or partial respectively. It cannot therefore in such case depend upon the state of the evidence, whether the different parts of the bill were settled and liquidated by the parties or not. Where the note is intended to be in a great degree gratuitous, the parties would not be likely to enter into very particular stipulations as to what should be deemed payment of a debt, and what a gratuity. The rule to be deduced from the cases, seems to be this, that where the note is not given upon any one consideration, which, whether good or not, whether it fail or not, goes to the whole note at the time it is made, but for two distinct and independent considerations, each going to a distinct portion of the note, and one is a consideration which the law deems valid and sufficient to support a contract, and the other not, there the contract shall be apportioned, and the holder shall recover to the extent of the valid consideration, and no further. In the application of this principle, there seems to be no reason

in the deed constitute a sufficient consideration for the notes, and that the failure of title constitutes no ground of defence to an action upon them.[1] In some of the United States, however, this defence has been allowed.[2]

§ 136*a*. Where the *contract is entire*, the general rule is, that if the plaintiff has failed to perform the whole on his part, he can recover nothing; for being entire, it cannot be apportioned. And this rule has been often applied to contracts for labor and service for a certain term of time, where the party had served only a part of the time. But it is also conceded, that if the part performance of a contract is beneficial to the promisee, and has been accepted by him, though the other party can maintain no action upon the original contract, his part of which he has failed to perform, yet he may maintain a general *assumpsit* for the actual value of his labor and materials which the promisee has accepted and enjoyed. Whether the defence of failure of performance of the entire contract, can be sustained in an action for the value of labor and services, upon the common counts, is a question upon which Judges are not perfectly agreed. On the one hand, it

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why it shall depend upon the state of the evidence, showing that these different parts can be ascertained by computation; in other words, whether the evidence shows them to be respectively liquidated or otherwise. If not, it would seem that the fact, what amount was upon one consideration, and what upon the other, like every other questionable fact, should be settled by a jury upon the evidence. This can never operate hardly upon the holder of the note, as the presumption of law is in his favor, as to the whole note; and the burden is upon the defendant to show, to what extent the note is without consideration." See 14 Pick. 208 – 211.

In New York the right of recoupment of damages is allowed, though the damages result from a mere breach of contract, and are unliquidated; and though the action be upon a specialty; under the provision of Rev. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 504, § 96 [77]. See Van Epps *v.* Harrison, 5 Hill, 63; Batterman *v.* Pierce, 3 Hill, 171; Ives *v.* Van Epps, 22 Wend. 155.

[1] Lloyd *v.* Jewell, 1 Greenl. 132; Howard *v.* Witham, 2 Greenl. 390; Knapp *v.* Lee, 3 Pick. 452; Vibbard *v.* Johnson, 19 Johns. 77; Whitney *v.* Lewis, 21 Wend. 131, 134; Greenleaf *v.* Cook, 2 Wheat. 13; Fulton *v.* Griswold, 7 Martin, R. 223; 22 Am. Jur. 26; 2 Kent, Comm. 471 – 473.

[2] 2 Kent, Comm. 472, 473; 22 Am. Jur. 26.

has been maintained with great force of reason, and so adjudged, that the party contracting for labor merely, for a certain period, does so with full knowledge that he must, from the nature of the case, be accepting part performance from day to day, if performance is commenced; and with knowledge also, that the other may eventually fail of completing the entire term; and that, therefore, he ought to pay the reasonable value of the benefit, which, upon the whole, he has thus derived, over and above the damage which may have accrued to him from the non-performance of the original contract.[1] But the general current of decisions is to the contrary; the Courts holding that this case is not to be distinguished in principle from other cases of failure to perform an entire contract.[2]

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[1] See Britton *v.* Turner, 6 N. Hamp. 481.

[2] See Stark *v.* Parker, 2 Pick. 267, (2d ed.), notes; Olmstead *v.* Beale, 19 Pick. 528; Pordage *v.* Cole, 1 Saund. 320, n. (4); Peeters *v.* Opie, 2 Saund. 352, n. (3), by Williams; Badgley *v.* Heald, 5 West. Law Jour. 392.

ATTORNEYS.

§ 137. Under this title, it is proposed to treat only of attorneys at law, and of the remedies in general, and at Common Law, between them and their clients; the subject of attorneys in fact having been already treated under the head of Agency. The peculiar remedies, given by statutes and rules of Court, in England, and in some few of the United States, being not common to all the American States, and applicable to but few, will not here be mentioned.

§ 138. Actions by attorneys, as such, are ordinarily brought either to recover payment for *fees*, disbursements, and professional services, or to recover damages for *slander* of their professional character. In the latter case, it seems generally necessary for the plaintiff to prove, by the book of admissions, or by other equivalent record or documentary evidence, that he has been regularly admitted and sworn; with proof that he has practised in his profession.[1] But where the slanderous words contained a threat by the defendant, that he would move the Court to have the plaintiff struck off the roll of attorneys, this was held an admission that the plaintiff was an attorney, sufficient to dispense with further proof.[2]

§ 139. Where the suit is by an attorney, *for fees*, &c., he must prove his retainer, and the fees and services charged. The *retainer* may be proved by evidence, that the defendant attended upon the plaintiff, at his office, in regard to the business in question; or, that he personally left notices or executed other directions of the plaintiff; or, that he was present

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[1] Jones *v.* Stevens, 11 Price, 235. And see Green *v.* Jackson, Peake's Cas. 236.

[2] Berryman *v.* Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Ante, Vol. 1, § 195, note.

and assisting at the trial, while the plaintiff was managing the cause in his behalf; or, that he has spoken of the plaintiff, or otherwise recognized him, as his attorney.[1] If the retainer was to commence a suit, which was afterwards abated by a plea of non-joinder, this is sufficient evidence of authority to commence another suit against the parties named in the plea.[2] So, after an award made against a party, a retainer to "do the needful," is an authority to do all that is necessary, on the part of the client, to carry the award into complete effect.[3] So, where money was placed in the attorney's hands to invest for his client, with discretionary power "to do for her as he thought best," and he lent the money on mortgage, but, discovering that the security was bad, sued out a bailable writ against the borrower, in his client's name, it was held a sufficient retainer for this purpose.[4] It has, however, been laid down as a general rule, that a special authority must be shown to institute a suit, though a general authority is sufficient, to defend one; and accordingly, where one, acting under a general retainer, as solicitor, undertook to defend a suit at law brought against his client, upon certain promissory notes, and filed a bill in Chancery to restrain proceedings in that suit, the bill was ordered to be dismissed, with costs, to be paid by the solicitor, as having been filed without authority.[5] If two attorneys occupy the same office, one being ostensibly the principal, and the other his clerk, under an agreement, that the latter shall receive all the benefit of the common Law business, those who employ the persons in the office, will be presumed to employ them upon

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[1] Hotchkiss *v.* Le Roy, 9 Johns. 142. Sworn to an answer signed by the attorney. Harper *v.* Williamson, 1 McCord, 156. But where one attorney does business for another, it is presumed to be done on the credit of the attorney who employed him, and not of the client. Scrace *v.* Whittington, 2 B. & C. 11.

[2] Crook *v.* Wright, Ry. & M. 278.

[3] Dawson *v.* Lawley, 4 Esp. 65.

[4] Anderson *v.* Watson, 3 C. & P. 214. But see Tabram *v.* Horn, 1 M. & R. 228.

[5] Wright *v.* Castle, 3 Meriv. 12.

the terms, on which business is there done; and therefore, in a suit by the clerk for the fees of Common Law business, those terms are competent evidence of a retainer of him alone.[1] So, where two attorneys dissolved an existing partnership between them, but a client, with means of knowledge of that fact, continued to instruct one of them in a matter originally undertaken by the firm, this was held sufficient evidence, that the joint retainer had ceased.[2]

§ 140. But where solicitors are in *partnership*, they cannot dissolve their partnership, as against the client, without his consent, so as to discharge the retiring partner from liability; much less can the retiring partner, in such case, accept a retainer from the opposite party.[3]

§ 141. The *effect of a retainer* to prosecute or defend a suit, is to confer on the attorney all the powers exercised by the forms and usages of the Court, in which the suit is pending.[4] He may receive payment;[5] may bring a second suit after being nonsuited in the first for want of formal proof;[6] may sue a writ of error on the judgment;[7] may discontinue the suit;[8] may restore an action after a *non pros.*;[9] may claim an ap-

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1 Pinley *v.* Bagnall, 3 Doug. 155. So, if both, being partners, were in fact employed, but only one was an attorney of the Court, and did the business there, yet both may jointly recover. Arden *v.* Tucker, 4 B. & Ad. 815; 5 C. & P. 248. Unless the other was but a nominal partner. Kell *v.* Nainby, 10 B. & C. 20. And see Ward *v.* Lee, 13 Wend. 41; Simon *v.* Bradshear, 9 Rob. R. 59. (Louis.)

2 Perrins *v.* Hill, 2 Jurist, 858.

3 Cholmondeley (Earl of) *v.* Ld. Clinton, Coop. Ch. Ca. 80; 19 Ves. 261, 273, S. C.; Cook *v.* Rhodes, 19 Ves. 273, note.

4 Smith *v.* Bossard, 2 McCord, Ch. 409.

5 Langdon *v.* Potter, 13 Mass, 320; Lewis *v.* Gamage, 1 Pick. 347; Brackett *v.* Norton, 4 Conn. 517; Gray *v.* Wass, 1 Greenl. 257; Erwin *v.* Blake, 8 Pet. 18; Com's *v.* Rose, 1 Desaus. 469; Hudson *v.* Johnson, 1 Wash. 10.

6 Scott *v.* Elmendorf, 12 Johns. 315.

7 Grosvenor *v.* Danforth, 16 Mass. 74.

8 Gaillard *v.* Smart, 6 Cow. 385.

9 Reinhold *v.* Alberti, 1 Binn. 469.

peal, and bind his client by a recognizance in his name for the prosecution of it;[1] may submit the suit to arbitration;[2] may sue out an alias execution;[3] may receive livery of seisin of land taken by extent;[4] may waive objections to evidence, and enter into stipulations for the admission of facts, or conduct of the trial;[5] and for release of bail;[6] may waive the right of appeal, review, notice, or the like, and confess judgment.[7] But he has no authority to execute any discharge of a debtor, but upon the actual payment of the full amount of the debt,[8] and that in money only;[9] nor to release sureties;[10] nor to enter a *retraxit;*[11] nor to act for the legal representatives of his deceased client;[12] nor to release a witness.[13]

§ 142. In regard to the *conduct of business* by the attorney for his client, he must show, that he has done all that he ought to have done.[14] Though he is generally bound to follow the instructions of his client, yet he is not bound to do

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1 Adams *v.* Robinson, 1 Pick. 462.

2 Somers *v.* Balabrega, 1 Dall. 164; Holker *v.* Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Buckland *v.* Conway, 16 Mass. 396.

3 Cheever *v.* Mirrick, 2 N. Hamp. 376.

4 Pratt *v.* Putnam, 13 Mass. 363.

5 Alton *v.* Gilmanton, 2 N. Hamp. 520.

6 Hughes *v.* Hollingsworth, 1 Murph. 146.

7 Pike *v.* Emerson, 5 N. Hamp. 393; Talbott *v.* McGee, 4 Monr. 377; Union Bank of Georgetown *v.* Geary, 5 Pet. 99.

8 Savory *v.* Chapman, 8 Dowl. 656; Jackson *v.* Bartlett, 8 Johns. 361; Kellogg *v.* Gilbert, 10 Johns. 220; 5 Pet. 113; Gullet *v.* Lewis, 3 Stew. 23; Carter *v.* Talcott, 10 Verm. 471; Kirk *v.* Glover, 5 Stew. & Port. 34; Tankersly *v.* Anderson, 4 Desaus. 45; Simonton *v.* Barrell, 21 Wend. 362.

9 Com's *v.* Rose, 1 Desaus. 469; Treasurers *v.* McDowell, 1 Hill, S. Car. Rep. 184.

10 Givens *v.* Briscoe, 3 J. J. Marsh. 532.

11 Lambert *v.* Sandford, 3 Blackf. 137.

12 Wood *v.* Hopkins, 2 Penningt. R. 689; Campbell *v.* Kincaid, 3 Monr. 566.

13 Marshall *v.* Nagel, 1 Bailey, 308.

14 Allison *v.* Rayner, 7 B. & C. 441; 1 M. & R. 241, S. C.; Gill *v.* Lougher, 1 Cr. & J. 170; 1 Tyrwh. 121, S. C.; Godefroy *v.* Jay, 7 Bing. 413.

what was intended merely for delay, or is otherwise in violation of his duty to the Court.[1] Generally speaking, the contract of an attorney or solicitor, retained to conduct or defend a suit, is an entire and continuing contract to carry it on until its termination; and if, without just cause, he quits his client before the termination of the suit, he can recover nothing for his bill.[2] But he may refuse to go on, without an advance of money, or without payment of his costs in arrear, upon giving reasonable notice to his client; or, for just cause, and upon reasonable notice, he may abandon the suit; and in either case he may recover his costs up to that time.[3] But he cannot insist upon the payment of moneys due on any other account.[4]

§ 143. In the *defence* of an action for professional fees and services, besides denying and disproving the retainer, the defendant may show, that the plaintiff has not exercised the reasonable diligence and skill, which he was bound to employ; and may depreciate the value of the services, upon a *quantum meruit*, by any competent evidence. Whether *negligence* can be set up as a defence to an action for an attorney's bill of fees, is a point which has been much questioned. If the services have proved entirely useless, it has long been agreed, that this may be shown in bar of the whole action; and, after some conflict of opinions, the weight of authority seems in favor of admitting any competent evidence of negligence, ignorance, or want of skill, as a defence to an action

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[1] Johnson *v.* Alston, 1 Campb. 176; Pierce *v.* Blake, 2 Salk. 515; Vincent *v.* Groome, 1 Chitty, R. 182; Anon. 1 Wend. 108; Gilbert *v.* Williams, 8 Mass. 51.

[2] Harris *v.* Osbourn, 4 Tyrwh. 445; 2 Cr. & M. 629, S. C.; Creswell *v.* Byron, 14 Ves. 271; Anon. 1 Sid. 31, pl. 8; 1 Tidd's Pr. 86, 9th edit.; Love *v.* Hall, 3 Yerg. 408.

[3] Lawrence *v.* Potts, 6 C. & P. 428; Wadsworth *v.* Marshall, 2 C. & J. 665; Vansandau *v.* Browne, 9 Bing. 402; Rowson *v.* Earle, Mood. & M. 538; Hoby *v.* Built, 3 B. & Ad. 350; Gleason *v.* Clark, 9 Cowen, 57; Castro *v.* Bennett, 2 Johns. 296.

[4] Heslop *v.* Metcalfe, 8 Sim. 622.

for professional services, as well as for any other work and labor.[1]

§ 144. An attorney undertakes for the employment of a degree of skill, ordinarily adequate and proportionate to the business he assumes. *Spondet peritiam artis. Imperitia culpæ adnumeratur.*[2] *Reasonable skill* constitutes the measure of his engagement.[3] "Attorneys," said Ld. Mansfield, "ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted, that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake, and to be punished for it by being charged with the debt, which he was employed to recover for his client, from the person who stands indebted to him. A *counsel* may mistake, as well as an attorney. Yet no one will say that a counsel, who has been mistaken, shall be charged with the debt. The counsel, indeed, is honorary in his advice, and does *not demand* a fee;[4] the attorney *may demand* a compensation. But neither of them ought to be charged with the debt for a mistake."[5] In a more recent case, the law on this subject was thus stated by Ld. Brougham: — "It is of the very essence of this kind of action that

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[1] See Ante, ASSUMPSIT, § 136, and cases there cited; Kannen *v.* McMullen, Peake's Cas. 59; Chapel *v.* Hicks, 2 C. & M. 214; 4 Tyrwh. 43; Cutler *v.* Close, 5 C. & P. 337; Cousens *v.* Paddon, 5 Tyrwh. 535; Hill *v.* Featherstonhaugh, 7 Bing. 569; Montriou *v.* Jefferys, 2 C. & P. 113; Huntley *v.* Bulwer, 6 Bing. N. C. 111; Grant *v.* Button, 14 Johns. 377; Brackett *v.* Norton, 4 Conn. 517. But see Templer *v.* McLachlan, 2 New Rep. 136; Runyan *v.* Nichols, 11 Johns. 547.

[2] Story on Bailm. § 431.

[3] Story on Bailm. § 432, 433: Reece *v.* Rigby, 4 B. & A. 202; Ireson *v.* Pearman, 3 B. & C. 799; Hart *v.* Frame, 3 Jur. 547; 6 Cl. & Fin. 193; Lanphier *v.* Phipos, 8 C. & P. 475; Davies *v.* Jenkins, 11 M. & W. 745.

[4] In the United States, the offices of attorney and counsellor are so frequently exercised by the same person, that they have become nearly blended into one; and actions for compensation for services performed in either capacity are freely sustained in most if not all the States of the Union.

[5] Pitt *v.* Yalden, 4 Burr. 2061. And see Compton *v.* Chandless, cited 3 Campb. 19; Kemp. *v.* Burt, 4 B. & Ad. 424; Shilcock *v.* Passman, 7 C. & P. 289.

it depends, not upon the party having been advised by a solicitor or attorney in a way in which the result of the proceeding may induce the party to think he was not advised properly, and may, in fact, prove the advice to have been erroneous; — not upon his having received, if I may so express it in common parlance, bad law, from the solicitor; nor upon the solicitor or attorney having taken upon himself to advise him, and, having given erroneous advice, advice which the result proved to be wrong, and in consequence of which error, the parties suing under that mistake were deprived and disappointed of receiving a benefit. But it is of the very essence of this action that there should be a negligence of a crass description, which we shall call *crassa negligentia*, that there should be gross ignorance, that the man who has undertaken to perform the duty of attorney, or of a surgeon, or an apothecary (as the case may be), should have undertaken to discharge a duty professionally, for which he was very ill qualified, or, if not ill qualified to discharge it, which he had so negligently discharged as to damnify his employer, or deprive him of the benefit which he had a right to expect from the service. That is the very ground Ld. Mansfield has laid down in that case,[1] to which my noble and learned friend on the woolsack has referred a little while ago, and which is also referred to in the printed papers. It was still more expressly laid down by Ld. Ellenborough in the case of Baikie *v.* Chandless,[2] because there Ld. Ellenborough uses the expression, 'an attorney is only liable for *crassa negligentia*;' therefore, the record must bring before the Court a case of that kind, either by stating such facts as no man who reads it will not at once perceive, although without its being alleged in terms, to be *crassa negligentia* — something so clear that no man can doubt of it; or, if that should not be the case, then he must use the very averment that it was *crassa negligentia*;"[3]

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1 Pitt *v.* Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060.

2 3 Campb. 17.

3 Purves *v.* Landell, 12 Clark & Fin. 91, 98, 99. This was an action in Scotland, against a writer to the signet, for advising and conducting an

§ 145. More particularly, an attorney is held liable for the consequence of ignorance or non-observances of the rules of practice of the Court; for the want of proper care in the preparation of a cause for trial, or of attendance thereon, and the

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improper and irregular mode of procedure aaginst a debtor, which proved fruitless and expensive to the plaintiff, and resulted in large damages recovered against him in an action for false imprisonment. The action ultimately failed, for want of any allegation and proof of gross ignorance or gross negligence on the part of the attorney or law agent. Ld. Campbell, in delivering his opinion, in which the other lords concurred, expressed himself as follows: — "In an action such as this, by the client against the professional adviser, to recover damages arising from this misconduct of the professional adviser, I apprehend there is no distinction whatever between the law of Scotland and the law of England. The law must be the same in all countries where law has been considered as a science. The professional adviser has never been supposed to guarantee the soundness of his advice. I am sure I should have been sorry when I had the honor of practising at the Bar of England, if barristers had been liable to such a responsibility. Though I was tolerably cautious in giving opinions, I have no doubt that I have repeatedly given erroneous opinions; and I think it was Mr. Justice Heath, who said that it was a very difficult thing for a gentleman at the Bar to be called upon to give his opinion, because it was calling upon him to conjecture what twelve other persons would say upon some point that had never before been determined. Well then, this may happen in all grades of the profession of the law. Against the barrister in England, and the advocate in Scotland, luckily no action can be maintained. But against the attorney, the professional adviser, or the procurator, an action may be maintained. But it is only if he has been guilty of gross negligence, because it would be monstrous to say that he is responsible of even falling into what must be considered a mistake. You can only expect from him that he will be honest and diligent; and if there is no fault to be found either with his integrity or diligence, that is all for which he is answerable. It would be utterly impossible that you could ever have a class of men who would give a guarantee, binding themselves, in giving legal advice and conducting suits at law, to be always in the right.

"Then, my Lords, as *crassa negligentia* is certainly the gist of an action of this sort, the question is, whether in this summons that negligence must not either be averred or shown? This is not any technical point in which the law of Scotland differs from the law of England. I should be very sorry to see applied, and I hope this House would be very cautious in applying, technical rules which prevail in England to proceedings in Scotland. But I apprehend that, in this respect, the laws of the two countries do not differ, and that the summons ought to state, and must state, what is necessary to maintain the action; this summons must either allege negligence, or must

use of due means for procuring the attendence of the witnesses; and for the mismanagement of so much of the cause, as is usually and ordinarily alloted to his department of the profession. But he is not answerable for error in judgment upon points of new occurrence, or of nice and doubtful construction, or of a kind usually entrusted to men in another or higher branch in the profession.[1] If he undertakes the collection of a debt, he is bound to sue out all process necessary to that object. Thus, he is bound to sue out the proper process against bail;[2] and against the officer, for taking insufficient bail, or for not delivering over the bail bond;[3] and to deliver an execution to the officer, in proper season after judgment, to perfect and preserve the lien created by the attachment of property on mesne process;[4] but not to attend in person to the levy of the execution.[5] If he doubts the expediency of farther proceeding, he should give notice to his client, and request specific instructions;[6] without which, it seems, he would be justified in not prosecuting, in cases were he is influenced by a prudent regard to the interests of his client.[7]

§ 146. For every violation of his duty, an *action lies immediately* against the attorney, even though merely nominal damages are sustained at the time; for it is a breach of his contract; but actual *damages* may be recovered for the direct

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show facts which inevitably prove that this person has been guilty of gross negligence." Ibid. p. 102, 103.

[1] Godefroy *v.* Dalton, 6 Bing. 467, per Tindall, C. J. And see Lynch *v.* The Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 368.

[2] Dearborn *v.* Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Crooker *v.* Hutchinson, 1 Verm. 73.

[3] Crooker *v.* Hutchinson; 1 Verm. 73; Simmons *v.* Bradford, 15 Mass. 82.

[4] Phillips *v.* Bridge, 11 Mass. 246. And see Pitt *v.* Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060; Russell *v.* Palmer, 2 Wils. 325.

[5] Williams *v.* Reed, 3 Mason, 405.

[6] Dearborn *v.* Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316.

[7] Crooker *v.* Hutchinson, 2 Chipm. 117.

consequences of the injury, even up to the time of the verdict.[1] The damages do not necessarily extend to the nominal amount of the debt lost by the attorney's negligence, but only to the loss actually sustained.[2]

§ 147. An attorney, being an officer of the Court in which he is admitted to practice, is held amenable to its *summary jurisdiction*, for every act of official misconduct.[3] The matter is shown to the Court by petition or motion, ordinarily supported by affidavit; and the order of the Court, after hearing, is enforced either by attachment, or by striking his name from the roll. If he neglects or refuses to perform any stipulation or agreement entered into by him with the counsel or attorney of the other party respecting the management or final disposition of the cause, or touching the trial, or the proofs; or fails to pay or perform anything, which he has personally undertaken that his client shall pay or perform; or improperly refuses to deliver up documents to his client, who entrusted them to him; or to pay over to his client any moneys, which he has collected for him; he is liable to this summary mode of proceeding, as well as to an action at law.[4] But for mere negligence in the conduct of his client's business, the Courts

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[1] Wilcox *v.* Plummer, 4 Peters, R. 172. And see Marzetti *v.* Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415.

[2] Dearborn *v.* Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Crooker *v.* Hutchinson, 2 Chipm. 117; Huntington *v.* Rumnill, 3 Day, 390.

[3] In several of the American States, persons of full age, and qualified as the statutes of those States prescribe, are *entitled* to admission to practice as attorneys in any of the Courts, and it is made the *duty* of the Judges to admit them accordingly. Whether persons of this class are amenable to the summary jurisdiction of the Courts, has been doubted. If they are not, this fact shows the great impolicy of popular interference with the forms of administering justice, since in this case the legislatures will have unconsciously deprived the people of the benefit of one of the strongest securities for professional good conduct.

[4] 1 Tidd's Practice, 85–90, (9th edit.); Sharp *v.* Hawker, 3 Bing. N. C. 66; De Woolfe *v.* ———, 2 Chitty, R. 68; In re Fenton, 3 Ad. & El. 404; In re Aitkin, 4 B. & A. 47.

will not interfere in this manner, but will leave the party to his remedy by action.[1]

§ 148. Where the remedy against an attorney is pursued by *action at law*, and the misconduct has occasioned the loss of a debt, the existence of the debt is a material fact to be shown by the plaintiff. If it were a judgment, this is proved by a copy of the record, duly authenticated.[2] If not, and an arrest of the debtor upon mesne process is a material allegation, the writ must be proved by itself, or by secondary evidence, if lost; unless it has been returned; in which case the proof is by copy. If the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned by departure from the known and usual course of practice, this should be shown by the evidence of persons conversant with that course of practice.[3] The fact of indebtment to the plaintiff, by his debtor, must also be proved by other competent evidence, where it has not yet passed into judgment. In short, the plaintiff has to show, that he had a valid claim, which has been impaired or lost by the negligence or misconduct of the defendant.[4] And if the attorney, having received money for his client, mixes it with his own, in a general deposit with a banker in his own name, and the banker fails, the attorney is liable for the loss. He should have deposited it in his client's name, or otherwise designated it as money held by him in trust for his client, so ear-marked as to be capable of precise identification.[5]

§ 149. If the injury to the plaintiff resulted from the attorney's neglect in regard to a *conveyance of title*, or in the examination of evidences of title, it is, ordinarily, necessary to produce the deeds or documents in question; whether the neglect were in a case drawn up, for the opinion of counsel, in

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[1] Brazier *v.* Bryant, 2 Dowl. P. C. 600; In re Jones, 1 Chitty, R. 651.
[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 501 – 514.
[3] Russell *v.* Palmer, 2 Wils. 325, 328.
[4] 1 Steph. N. P. 434.
[5] Robinson *v.* Ward, 2 C. & P. 59.

which certain deeds materially affecting the title were omitted;[1] or, in the insertion of unusual and injurious covenants of title in a lease, without informing him of the consequences;[2] or, in advising him, or acting for him, in the investment of money under a will, upon the perusal of only a partial extract from the will, and not of the entire will itself;[3] or, were any other misfeasance or neglect as a professional agent in the conveyance of title. And if the client has thereby been evicted from the land, he should prove the eviction by a copy of the judgment, and by the writ of possession duly executed;[4] or, if he has peaceably submitted to an entry and ouster without suit, he must show that it was in submission to an elder and better title.[5]

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[1] Ireson *v.* Pearman, 3 B. & C. 799.

[2] Stannard *v.* Ullithorne, 10 Bing. 491.

[3] Wilson *v.* Tucker, 3 Stark. R. 154.

[4] 1 Steph. N. P. 434. And see Gore *v.* Brazier, 3 Mass. 543.

[5] Hamilton *v.* Cutts, 4 Mass. 349; Sprague *v.* Baker, 17 Mass. 586, 590.

BASTARDY.

§ 150. By the Common Law, children born out of lawful wedlock are bastards. By the Roman Law, if the parents afterwards intermarried, this rendered the issue legitimate. The rule of the Common Law prevails in the United States, except where it has been altered by statutes; which in several of the States have been enacted, introducing, under various modifications not necessary here to be mentioned, the rule of the Roman Law.[1] The modern doctrine of the Common Law on this subject is this; there where a child is born during lawful wedlock, the husband not being separated from the wife by a sentence of divorce *à mensâ et thoro*, it is presumed that they had sexual intercourse, and that the child is legitimate; but this presumption may be rebutted by any competent evidence, tending to satisfy a jury, that such intercourse did not take place at any time, when, by the laws of nature, the husband could have been the father of the child.[2] If the

[1] In New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, the rule of the Common Law is understood to prevail. A subsequent marriage of the parents renders their prior issue legitimate, in Kentucky, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Missouri. Beside the marriage, a subsequent acknowledgment of the child by the father is requisite, in Indiana, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia, Maine, and Massachusetts. In Maine, other issue must have been born, after the marriage. In Massachusetts, the child can inherit only from its parents. In North Carolina, a decree of legitimacy in favor of ante-nuptial issue is obtained from the Courts, on application of the father, after the marriage. See 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. 29, ch. 2, § 8, note, (Greenleaf's ed.) where the laws of the several States on this subject are more particularly stated.

[2] See the opinions of the Judges in the Banbury Peerage case, in Nicholas on Adulterine Bastardy, p. 183, 184; and of Ld. Redesdale and Ld. Ellenborough, Ibid. p. 458, 488; Morris *v.* Davies, 3 C. & P. 427; 5 C. & Fin. 163; Rex *v.* Luffe, 8 East, 193; Goodright *v.* Saul, 4 T. R. 356; Pendrel *v.* Pendrel, 2 Stra. 924; Stegall *v.* Stegall, 2 Brock. 256; Head *v.* Head, 1 Turn. & Rus. 138; 1 Sim. & Stu. 150; Cope *v.* Cope, 5 C. & P. 604;

husband and wife have had opportunity for intercourse, this merely strengthens the presumption of legitimacy; but it may still be rebutted by opposing proof.[1] And if they have cohabited together, yet this does not exclude evidence, that the husband was physically incapable of being the father.[2] But if the child was begotten during a separation of the husband and wife *á mensâ et thoro* by a decree, it will be presumed illegitimate; it being presumed, until the contrary is shown, that the sentence of separation was obeyed. But no such presumption is made, upon a voluntary separation.[3]

§ 151. The *husband and wife* are alike *incompetent wit-*

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1 M. & Rob. 269. The presumption, mentioned in the text, is not to be rebutted by circumstances which only create doubt and suspicion; but it may be wholly removed by showing that the husband was — 1st. impotent; — 2dly, constantly absent, so as to have no intercourse or communication of any kind with the mother; — 3dly, absent during the entire period in which the child must, in the course of nature, have been begotten; — 4thly, present, but under such circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual intercourse. Such evidence as this puts an end to the question, and establishes the illegitimacy of the child of a married woman.

It is, however, very difficult to conclude against the legitimacy in cases where there is no impotency, and where some society or communication is continued between the husband and wife, during the time in question, so as to have afforded opportunities for sexual intercourse. If such opportunities have occurred, no evidence can be admitted to show that any man, other than the husband, may have been the father of the wife's child, whatever probabilities may exist that it was the child of another man. Throughout the investigation, the presumption in favor of legitimacy is to have its weight and influence, and the evidence against it ought to be strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive. Hargrave *v.* Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552. This case is valuable for the observations it contains on the nature and extent of the proof necessary to establish a case of adulterine bastardy, and the kind of evidence which is admissible in such cases.

[1] Ibid. See also Commonwealth *v.* Striker, 1 Browne, App. p. xlvii; 3 Hawks, 63; 1 Ashmead, 269.

[2] Per Ld. Ellenborough in Rex *v.* Luffe, 8 East, 205, 206; Foxcroft's case, Ib. 200, n. 205. This case, however, is more fully stated and explained in Nicholas on Adulterine Bastardy, p. 557–564. In case of access of the husband, nothing short of physical impotency on his part, will serve to convict a third person of the paternity of the offspring. Commonwealth *v.* Shepard, 6 Binn. 283.

[3] St. George's *v.* St. Margaret's Parish, 1 Salk. 123; Bull. N. P. 112.

nesses, to prove the fact of non-access while they lived together. But they *are competent* to testify, in cases between third parties, as to the time of their own marriage, the time of the child's birth, the fact of access, and any other independent facts, affecting the question of legitimacy.[1] The husband's declarations, however, that the child is not his, are not sufficient to establish its illegitimacy, though it were born only three months after marriage, and thereupon he and his wife had separated, by mutual consent.[2]

§ 152. In regard to the *period of gestation*, no precise time is referred to, as a rule of law, though the term of two hundred and eighty days or forty weeks, being nine calendar months and one week, is recognized as the usual period. But the birth of a child being liable to be accelerated or delayed by circumstances, the question is purely a matter of fact, to be decided upon all the evidence, both physical and moral, in the particular case.[3]

§ 153. Bastardy may also be proved by showing, that the party was the issue of a *marriage absolutely void;* as, if the husband or wife were already married to another person, who was alive at the time of the second marriage. So, by showing that the child was begotten after a degree of divorce *à vinculo matrimonii*. But if the marriage were only voidable, and not *ipso facto* void, the issue are deemed legitimate, unless the marriage was avoided by the parties themselves, in the lifetime of both.[4] After the lapse of thirty years, and after the death of all the parties, legitimacy will be presumed on slight proof.[5]

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[1] Ante, Vol. I, § 28, 344; Standen *v.* Standen, Peake's Cas. 32; Rev. *v.* Bramley, 6 T. R. 330; Goodright *v.* Moss, Cowp. 591.

[2] Bowles *v.* Bingham, 2 Munf. 442; 3 Munf. 599, S. C.

[3] See 1 Beck's Med. Jurisp. ch. 9; Hargrave & Butler's note (2), to Co. Lit. 123, b.; 4 Law Mag. 25–49; Nicholas on Adulterine Bastardy, p. 212, 213; The Banbury Peerage case, Ib. 291–554; The Gardner Peerage case, Ib. 209.

[4] Co. Litt. 33, a.; 1 Bl. Comm. 424.

[5] Johnson *v.* Johnson, 1 Desaus. 595.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

§ 153. *a.* In treating this subject, the rules of the common law-merchant, recognized in the Courts of England and the United States of America, will alone be stated. But it is to be remembered, that as between the holder of a bill of exchange, and the drawer or indorser, the *lex loci contractûs* of the drawer and of the indorser, and not of the acceptor, governs the liabilities of the drawer and of the indorser, respectively. Thus, A. drew a bill in favor of B. (both being residents of Demarara,) upon C., resident in Scotland, who accepted it, making it payable in London; and B. indorsed it to D., who afterwards became bankrupt. When C.'s acceptance became due, he held a bill of exchange, accepted by D. An action being brought in Demarara, by D.'s assignees, against A. and B. upon the bill, it was held, that the Roman-Dutch law, prevalent in Demarara, and not the law of England, must govern the case; and that, according to that law, the defendants were at liberty to plead D.'s bill as a compensation, *pro tanto*, of the bill in suit.[1]

§ 154. As the acceptor of a bill of exchange, and the maker of a promissory note, stand in the same relation to the holder, the note being of the nature of a bill drawn by a man on himself, and accepted at the time of drawing, the rules of evidence are, in both cases, the same. The liabilities of the parties to these instruments, are of three general classes; — (1.) Primary and absolute liability; such as that of the acceptor of a bill or maker of a note, to the payee, indorsee, and bearer; — (2.) Secondary and conditional liability; such as that of the drawer of a bill, to the payee or indorsee, and of

[1] Allen *v.* Kemble, 13 Jur. 287. Priv. Coun.

the indorser to the indorsee; — (3.) Collateral and contingent liability; such as that of the acceptor to the drawer or indorser; and of the drawer to the acceptor. And, accordingly, the action upon a bill or note, will be brought, either, (1.) by the payee or bearer, against the acceptor or maker; or (2.) by the indorsee against the acceptor or maker; or (3.) by the payee, against the drawer of a bill; or (4.) by the indorsee, against the drawer of a bill, or against the indorser of a bill or note; or (5.) by the drawer or indorser of a bill against the acceptor; or (6.) by the acceptor, against the drawer.

§ 155. In these forms of remedy, the material allegations on the part of the plaintiff involve four principal points, which, if not judicially admitted, he must prove; namely, *first*, the existence of the instrument, as described in the declaration; — *secondly*, how the defendant became party to it, and his subsequent contract; — *thirdly*, the mode by which the plaintiff derived his interest in and right of action upon the instrument; — and *fourthly*, the breach of the contract by the defendant. The plaintiff will not be holden to prove a *consideration*, unless in special cases, where his own title to the bill is impeached, as will be shown hereafter. In treating this subject, therefore, it is proposed to consider these four principal points, in their order.[1]

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[1] In this order, that of Mr. Chitty has been followed; whose treatise on Bills, chap. 5, (9th edit.) and the Treatise of Mr. Justice Story on Bills, have been freely resorted to, throughout this Title.

The usual declarations on bills and notes are in the following forms, according to the present practice in England and in the most of the United States, where the Common Law remedies are pursued.

(1.) *Payee* v. *Acceptor*, of a foreign bill. "For that one E. F. at —— in the kingdom (or *State*) of —— on —— made his bill of exchange in writing directed to the said [*defendant*] at ——, and thereby required the said [*defendant*] in —— days [or, *months*, &c.] after sight [or, *date*] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay to the plaintiff —— [*here insert the sum as expressed in the bill; and if the currency mentioned in the bill is one, which has not been recognized and its value established by statute, the value in the national currency should be averred,*] —— and the said [*defendant,*] on —— accepted the said

§ 156. And FIRST, as to *the existence of the instrument, as described in the declaration.* Ordinarily, the bill must be pro-

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bill, and promised the plaintiff to pay the same, according to the tenor and effect thereof and of his said acceptance. Yet," &c.

In this case, the proposition of fact, to be maintained by the plaintiff, involves, first, the existence of such a bill as he describes, and secondly, that the defendant accepted it as alleged.

(2.) *Payee* v. *Maker*, of a negotiable promissory note. "For that the said (*defendant*) on —— by his promissory note in writing, for value received, promised the plaintiff to pay him or his order —— dollars —— in —— days [or, *months*, &c.] after the date thereof. Yet," &c.

Here, the plaintiff's case is made out by the production and proof of the note.

(3.) *Indorsee* v. *Acceptor*, of a foreign bill. "For that one E. F. at —— in the kingdom, &c. on —— made his bill of exchange in writing, and directed the same to the said (*defendant*) at —— and thereby required the said defendant in —— days [or, *months*, &c.] after sight [or, *date*] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay to one G. H. or his order —— [*as in No.* 1] and the said [*defendant*] then accepted the said bill; and the said G. H. then indorsed the same to the plaintiff; [*or*, indorsed the same one to J. K., and the said J. K. then indorsed the same to the plaintiff:] of all which the said (*defendant*) then had notice, and in consideration thereof then promised the plaintiff to pay him the amount of said bill, according to the tenor and effect thereof and of his said acceptance. Yet," &c.

In this action, the plaintiff's case is made out by proof of the acceptance, and of the indorsements; the acceptance being an admission that the bill was duly drawn.

(4.) *Indorsee* v. *Maker*, of a promissory note. "For that the said (*defendant*) on —— by his promissory note in writing, for value received, promised one E. F., to pay him or his order ——in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] from said date; and the said E. F. then indorsed the said note to the plaintiff; of which the said [*defendant*] then had notice, and in consideration thereof then promised the plaintiff to pay him the amount of said note according to the tenor thereof. Yet," &c.

Here the plaintiff's case is made out by proof of the maker's signature, and of the indorsement.

(5.) *Bearer* v. *Maker*, of a promissory note. "For that the said (*defendant*) on —— by his promissory note in writing, for value received, promised one E. F. to pay him or the bearer of said note —— in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] from said date; and the said E. F. then assigned and delivered the said note to the plaintiff, who then became and is the lawful owner and bearer thereof; of which the said (*defendant*) then had notice, and in consideration thereof then promised the plaintiff to pay him the amount of said note, according to the tenor thereof. Yet," &c.

duced at the trial, in all the parts or sets in which it was drawn.[1] If the bill, or other *negotiable security, be lost*, there

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This declaration is proved by production of the note, and proof of its execution by the defendant.

(6.) *Payee* v. *Drawer*, of a foreign bill, on non-acceptance. "For that the said [*defendant*] at —— on —— made his bill of exchange in writing, and directed the same to one E. F. at —— in the kingdom of ——, and thereby required the said E. F. in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] after sight [*or*, date] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay to the plaintiff —— [*as in No.* 1]; and the said bill, on —— at said —— was presented to the said E. F. for acceptance, and he refused to accept the same; of all which the said [*defendant*] on —— had due notice, and thereby became liable to pay to the plaintiff the amount of said bill on demand, and in consideration thereof promised the plaintiff to pay him the same accordingly. Yet," &c.

Here, the plaintiff must prove, if traversed, the drawing of the bill, its presentment to the drawee for acceptance, and his refusal to accept it, and notice thereof to the defendant; together with the protest, it being a foreign bill. See Salomons *v.* Staveley, 3 Doug. 298.

(7.) *Indorsee* v. *Drawer*, of a foreign bill, on non-acceptance. "For that the said (*defendant*) at —— on —— made his bill of exchange in writing, and directed the same to one E. F., at —— in the kingdom of —— and thereby required the said E. F. in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] after sight [*or*, date] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay one to G. H. or his order —— [*as in No.* 1] and the said G. H. then indorsed the same to ——, [*as in No.* 3] and the said bill, on —— at said —— was presented to the said E. F. for acceptance, and he refused to accept the same; of all which the said [*defendant*] on —— had due notice, and thereby became liable to pay to the plaintiff the amount of said bill on demand, and in consideration thereof promised the plaintiff to pay him the same accordingly. Yet," &c.

A traverse of this declaration puts the plaintiff to prove the drawing of the bill, — the payee's indorsement, and all the subsequent indorsements declared upon, — presentment to the drawee, — his default, — and notice to the defendant of the dishonor of the bill; together with the protest, as before.

(8.) *Indorsee* v. *Indorser*, being payee of a foreign bill, on non-acceptance. "For that one E. F. at —— on —— made his bill of exchange, and directed the same to one G. H. at —— in the kingdom of —— and thereby required the said G. H. in —— days [*or*, months,] after sight [*or*, date] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay to the said [*defendant*] or his order, —— [*here describe the bill as in No.* 1] —— and the said [*defendant*] then indorsed the same [*as in No.* 3]; and the said bill on —— at said —— was presented to the said G.

[1] 2 Stark. Ev. 203; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 616.

can be no remedy upon it at law, unless it was in such a state, when lost, that no person but the plaintiff could have acquired

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H. for acceptance, and he refused to accept the same; of all which the said [*defendant*] on —— had due notice, and thereby became liable to pay to the plaintiff the amount of said bill on demand, and in consideration thereof promised the plaintiff to pay him the same accordingly. Yet," &c.

The proof of this declaration is the same as in the preceding case.

(9.) *Drawer* v. *Acceptor*. "For that the plaintiff on —— made his bill of exchange in writing, and directed the same to said [*defendant*] and thereby required him, in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] after sight [*or*, date] of that his first of exchange, the second and third of the same tenor and date not paid, to pay to one E. F. or his order —— [*as in No.* 1] and delivered the same to the said E. F. and the said [*defendant*] then accepted the same, and promised the plaintiff to pay the same, according to the tenor and effect thereof, and of his said acceptance; yet he did not pay the amount thereof, although the said bill was presented to him on the day when it became due, and thereupon the same was then and there returned to the plaintiff, of which the said [*defendant*] had notice."

In this case, the plaintiff may be required to prove the acceptance of the bill by the defendant, — its presentment for payment, and his refusal, — payment of the bill by the plaintiff, — and, that the defendant had effects of the plaintiff in his hands; of which, however, the acceptance of the bill is *primâ facie* evidence. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to make out a title to the bill under the payee. Kingman *v.* Hotaling, 25 Wend. 423.

(10.) *Indorser* v. *Acceptor*. In this case, the plaintiff may declare specially, as in the preceding case, *mutatis mutandis*; but the more usual course is to declare upon his original relation of payee or indorsee, as in Nos. 1 and 3.

(11.) *Acceptor* v. *Drawer*, of an accommodation-bill. "For that the said [*defendant*] on —— in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the said [*defendant*] and for his accommodation, had then accepted a certain bill of exchange of that date drawn by the said [*defendant*] upon the plaintiff for the sum of —— payable to one E. F. or his order in —— days [*or*, months, &c.] after sight [*or*, the date] of said bill, promised the plaintiff to furnish him with money to pay said bill at the time when the same should become payable. Yet the said [*defendant*] never did furnish the plaintiff with said money, by reason whereof the plaintiff has been compelled with his own money to pay the amount of said bill to the holder thereof, of which the said defendant had due notice."

In this case, the plaintiff must prove the drawing of the bill, and its acceptance; he must rebut the presumption that he had effects of the drawer in his hands, which results from his acceptance, by some evidence to the contrary; and he must prove that he has paid the bill. This last fact is not established by production of the bill, without proof that it has been put into circulation since the acceptance; nor will a receipt of payment on the back

a right to sue thereon. Otherwise, the defendant would be in danger of paying it twice, in case it has been negotiated. It is also his voucher, to which he is entitled, by the usage of merchants, which requires its actual presentation for payment, and its delivery up when paid.[1] Therefore, wherever the danger of a double liability exists, as, in the case of a bill or note, either actually negotiated in blank, or payable to bearer, and lost or stolen, the claim of the indorsee or former holder has been rejected.[2] And whether the loss was before or after the bill fell due, is immaterial.[3] On the other hand, if there is no danger that the defendant will ever again be liable on the bill or note, as, if it be proved to have been actually destroyed, while in the plaintiff's own hands,[4] or, if the indorsement were specially restricted to the plaintiff only,[5] or, if the instrument was not indorsed,[6] or, has been given up by mistake,[7] the plaintiff has been permitted to

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of the bill suffice, without showing that it was signed by some person entitled to demand payment. Pfiel *v.* Vanbatenburg, 2 Campb. 439.

It is to be observed, that where, by the course of practice, the precise time of filing the declaration does not judicially appear, it may be necessary, and is certainly expedient, to insert an averment that the time of payment of the bill or note is elapsed. But where the declaration is required to be inserted in the writ, or filed at the time of commencing the action, as is the case in several of the United States, this averment is unnecessary.

[1] Pierson *v.* Hutchinson, 2 Campb. 211; Hansard *v.* Robinson, 7 B. & C. 90; 9 D. & R. 860; Ry. & M. 404, n.; Poole *v.* Smith, Holt's Cas. 144; Rowley *v.* Ball, 3 Cowen, 303; Story on Bills, § 448, 449; Ramuz *v.* Crowe, 11 Jur. 715; 1 Exch. R. 167; in which the cases are examined, Hansard *v.* Robinson confirmed, and the question put at rest.

[2] Davis *v.* Dodd, 4 Taunt. 602; Poole *v.* Smith, Holt's Cas. 144; Rowley *v.* Ball, 3 Cowen, 303; Mayor *v.* Johnson, 3 Campb. 324; Bullet *v.* Bank of Pennsylvania, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 172; Champion *v.* Terry, 3 B. & B. 295.

[3] Ibid.; Kirby *v.* Sisson, 2 Wend. 550.

[4] Pierson *v.* Hutchinson, 2 Campb. 211; Swift v. Stevens, 8 Conn. 431; Anderson *v.* Robson, 2 Bay, R. 495; Rowley *v.* Ball, 3 Cowen, 303. The destruction of the bill may be inferred from circumstances. Pintard *v.* Tackington, 10 Johns. 104; Peabody *v.* Denton, 2 Gal. 351; Hinsdale *v.* Bank of Orange, 6 Wend. 378, 379.

[5] Long *v.* Bailie, 2 Campb. 214; Ex parte Greenway, 6 Ves. 812.

[6] Rolt *v.* Watson, 4 Bing. 273; 12 Moore, 510, S. C.

[7] Eagle Bank *v.* Smith, 5 Conn. 71.

recover, upon the usual secondary evidence. So, if the bill was lost after it had been produced in Court and used as evidence in another action.[1] By cutting a bill, or a bank note, into two parts, as is often done for safety of transmission by post, its negotiability, while the parts are separate, is destroyed; in which case, the holder of one of the parts, on proof of ownership of the whole, has been held entitled to recover.[2] If the loss of a promissory note is proved, the plaintiff, if he is the payee, may recover, unless it is affirmatively proved to have been negotiable; for, in the absence of such proof, the Court will not presume that it was negotiable.[3]

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[1] Renner *v.* Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 396. This may have been decided upon the ground, that the loss was by the officers of the Court, while the document was in the custody of the law. The same rule has been applied, where the bill had been used before commissioners in bankruptcy. Pooley *v.* Millard, 1 C. & J. 411; 1 Tyrwh. 331, S. C. In the case of a lost bill, the general and appropriate remedy is in Equity, upon the offer of a bond of indemnity. 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 81, 82; Ex parte Greenway, 6 Ves. 812; Pierson *v.* Hutchinson, 2 Campb. 211; Mossop *v.* Eadon, 16 Ves. 430; Cockell *v.* Bridgman, 4 Beav. 499. In England, however, by Stat. 9 & 10 W. 4, c. 17, § 3, if any inland bill be lost or miscarried within the time limited for payment, the drawee is bound to give another of the same tenor to the holder, who, if required, must give security to idemnify him in case the lost bill should be found. But in some cases, the Courts of Law have sustained an action by the payee, for the original consideration, where the note or bill was not received in extinguishment of the original contract; — Rolt *v.* Watson, 4 Bing. 273; — or, upon the ground that the defendant, being the drawer of the bill, had prevented the indorsee from obtaining the money of the drawee, by refusing to enable him so to do. Murray *v.* Carrett, 3 Call, R. 373. And in other cases, the owner of a bill, lost before its maturity, has been permitted to recover at law, on giving the defendant an indemnity; — Miller *v.* Webb, 8 Louis. R. 516; Lewis *v.* Peytarin, 4 Martin, 4, N. S.; — but if lost after it had become due, and had been protested, no indemnity was held requisite. Brent *v.* Erving, 3 Martin, 303, N. S.

[2] Hinsdale *v.* Bank of Orange, 6 Wend. 378; Bullet *v.* Bank of Pennsylvania, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 172; Patton *v.* State Bank, 2 N. & McC. 464; Bank of United States *v.* Sill, 5 Conn. 106; Farmers' Bank *v.* Reynolds, 4 Rand. 186.

[3] McNair *v.* Gilbert, 3 Wend. 344; Pintard *v.* Tackington, 10 Johns. 104, 105. See further, Bayley on Bills, 413–418. In a suit by the payee against the maker of a promissory note, if the note be so mutilated that the payee's name is illegible; the plaintiff must prove that the note was made to him, and was in his possession at the commencement of the suit; and that it was mutilated under circumstances not affecting its validity. Hatch *v.* Dickinson, 7 Blackf. 48.

§ 157. This amount of proof is incumbent on the plaintiff, in order to recover his damages, whatever may be the point in issue. But where the *general issue* is pleaded, the plaintiff must also prove every other material averment in his declaration. If the issue is upon a point specially pleaded, all other averments are admitted, and the evidence is confined to that point alone.

§ 158. After the note or bill is produced, the next step is to *prove the signature* of the defendant, where, by the nature of the action, or by the state of the pleadings, or the course of the Court, this proof may be required.[1] If the signature is not attested, the usual method of proof is by evidence of the person's handwriting, or, of his admission of the fact.[2] If it is attested by a subscribing witness, that witness must be produced, if he is to be had, and is competent.[3] Some evidence has also been held requisite of the identity of the party with the person whose signature is thus proved; but slight evidence to this point will suffice.[4] If it is alleged in the declaration, that the bill was drawn, or accepted, or, that the note was made by the party, "his own proper hand being thereunto subscribed," it has been thought, that this unnecessary allegation bound the plaintiff to precise proof, and that

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[1] See Ante, § 16.

[2] Where the plaintiff relies on the defendant's verbal admission that he made the note in question, the identity of the note referred to must be satisfactorily established. Therefore, where the agent of the holder of a note, payable to bearer, called on the defendant with the alleged note in his pocket, which he did not exhibit, but told him he had a note for that amount against him, and requested payment of it for the plaintiff; and the defendant replied that he had given such a note, and would pay it if the plaintiff would make a small deduction, and indulge him as to time; it was held, that the note declared on and produced at the trial was not sufficiently identified with that to which the admission referred, and that the proof was insufficient. Palmer *v.* Manning, 4 Denio, 131.

[3] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 569 – 574, where the proof the execution of instruments is more fully treated.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 575; Felson *v.* Whittall, 1 B. & Ald. 19; Page *v.* Mann, 1 M. & M. 79; Mead *v.* Young, 4 T. R. 28; Bulkeley *v.* Butler, 2 B. & C. 434; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, 641, 642, (9th edit.) Sometimes identity of name will suffice. Roden *v.* Ryde, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 630 – 634.

if the signature appeared to have been made by another, by procuration, it was a fatal variance.[1] But the weight of later authority is otherwise; and accordingly it is now held, that those words may be rejected as surplusage.[2] If the instrument was executed by an agent, his authority must be proved, together with his handwriting; and if he was authorized by deed, the deed must be produced, or its absence legally accounted for, and its existence and contents shown by secondary evidence.[3] If the instrument is in the hands of the adverse party, or his agent, notice must be given to the party to produce it.[4]

§ 159. If there are *several signatures*, they must all be proved; and an admission by one, will not, in general, bind the others.[5] But where the acceptors are partners, it will suffice to prove the partnership, and the handwriting of the partner who wrote the signature.[6] If the signature is not at-

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[1] 2 Stark. Ev. 203; 2 Phil. Ev. 4.

[2] This point was first raised before Ld. Ellenborough, in 1804, in Levey *v.* Wilson, 5 Esp. 180, when he held it matter of substance, and nonsuited the plaintiff for the variance. Afterwards, in 1809, in Jones *v.* Mars & al., 2 Campb. 305, which was against partners, as drawers of a bill, "their own *hands* being thereto subscribed," and the proof being, that the name of their firm of "Mars & Co." was subscribed by one of them only, the same learned Judge refused to nonsuit the plaintiff for that cause. In the following year, the original point being directly before him in Helmsley *v.* Loader, 2 Campb. 450, he said it would be too narrow a construction of the words "own hand," to require that the name should be written by the party himself. And of this opinion was Ld. Tenterden, who accordingly held the words mere surplusage, in Booth *v.* Grove, 1 M. & Malk. 182; 3 C. & P. 335, S. C. See also Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 570, 627, (9th edit.) If the party signed by the initials only of his name, intending thereby to be bound, it is sufficient. Palmer *v.* Stephens, 1 Denio, R. 471.

[3] Johnson *v.* Mason, 1 Esp. 89.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 560 – 563. Notice to the agent is unnecessary. Burton *v.* Paye, 2 C. & P. 520.

[5] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 174; Gray *v.* Palmer, 1 Esp. 135; Sheriff *v.* Wilkes, 1 East, 48; Carvick *v.* Vickery, 2 Doug. 653, note.

[6] See Ante Vol. 1, § 177. As to admissions by partners, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 112, and note (5). In the modern English practice, under the issue of *non acceperunt*, though it be shown, in defence, that the acceptance was

tested by a subscribing witness, the *admission* of the party is sufficient proof of it; otherwise the subscribing witness must be called;[1] but the admission of the party that the signature is his, if not solemnly made, does not estop him from disproving it.[2] Payment of money into Court, partial payments made out of Court, promises to pay, a request of forbearance, and for further time of payment, and a promise to give a new security, have severally been deemed sufficient to dispense with proof of the signature.[3] A promise by the maker to pay a note to an indorsee, made after it fell due, has been held an admission not only of his own signature, but of all the indorsements, superseding the necessity of further proof.[4]

§ 160. The bill or note produced, must conform in all respects to the instrument described in the declaration; for every part of a written contract is material to its identity, and a *variance* herein will be fatal.[5] But where it is alleged that the party on such a day *made* his promissory note, but it is not alleged that the note *bore date* on that or any other day, this is not considered as giving a date to the note, so as

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given by one partner in fraud of the firm, yet such proof does not require the plaintiff to show that he gave a consideration for the bill, unless the evidence of the defendants affects him with knowledge of the fraud. Musgrave *v.* Drake, 5 Ad. & El. 185, N. S. In the American Courts, where the older rules of practice are still observed, it is otherwise. See post, § 172. A signature by the names and surnames of the several members of the firm, is sufficient to charge the partnership. Norton *v.* Seymour, 3 C. B. 792.

[1] See Ante, Vol 1, § 569 – 572.

[2] Hall *v.* Huse, 10 Mass. 39; Salem Bank *v.* Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1; Ante, Vol. 1, § 27, 186, 205, 572.

[3] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 205; Israel *v.* Benjamin, 3 Campb. 40; Bosanquet *v.* Anderson, 6 Esp. 43; Helmsley *v.* Loader, 2 Campb. 450; Jones *v.* Morgan, 1b. 474.

[4] Keplinger *v.* Griffith, 2 Gill & Johns. 296.

[5] See Vol. 1, § 56, 61, 63, 64, and Ante, § 11 *b*, 11 *d*, as to the law of variance. A note made payable to the maker's own order, and by him indorsed in blank, will support a count on such a note as made payable to the bearer. Hooper *v.* Williams. 12 Jur. 270. But prior to its indorsement, it is not a promissory note, within the St. 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9. Brown *v.* De Winton, 12 Jur. 678.

to cause a variance by proof of a note bearing date on a different day.[1] If there be any alteration apparent on the instrument, tending to render it suspected, the plaintiff must be prepared with evidence to explain it.[2] And if the plaintiff sue as payee of a bill or note, which purports to be payable to a person of a different name, this also may be explained by evidence *aliundè*, if the record contains the proper averments.[3] So, if the drawer and drawee of a bill are of the same name, and the record does not assert that they are two persons, parol evidence is admissible, that they are one and the same person, and of course that the bill amounts, in effect, to a mere promissory note.[4] If the action is by the indorsee against the indorser of a bill, dishonored on presentment for payment, the allegation of its acceptance is not descriptive of the instrument, but is wholly immaterial, and therefore need not be proved.[5] And in an action against the acceptor, if his acceptance be unnecessarily stated to have been made to pay the bill at a particular place, and there is an averment of presentment there, this averment also, is immaterial, and need not be proved.[6] If the currency mentioned in the bill is foreign, and its equivalent value has not been established and declared by law, the value will of course be alleged in the declaration, and must be proved, including the rate of exchange when the bill became due; together with the duration of the usances, if any are stated in the bill.

§ 161. Secondly, the plaintiff must show *how the defendant was a party to the bill or note*, and the *nature of his*

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[1] Smith *v.* Lord, 9 Jur. 450: 2 Dowl. & L. 759, S. C.

[2] See Vol. 1, § 564.

[3] Willis *v.* Barret, 2 Stark. R. 29.

[4] Roach *v.* Ostler, 1 Man. & Ry. 120. If the declaration is on a bill of exchange, as drawn by S. S. and made payable "to S. S. or order," and the bill produced in evidence reads, "Pay to my order," it is no variance. Smith *v.* McClure, 5 East, 476; Bluett *v.* Middleton, 1 Dowl. & L. 376.

[5] Tanner *v.* Bean, 4 B. & C. 312, overruling Jones *v.* Morgan, 2 Campb. 474, as to this point.

[6] Freeman *v.* Kennell, Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 616.

contract. If the action is *against the acceptor*, the acceptance must be proved. And an acceptance, where it is not otherwise qualified or restrained by the local law, may be either verbal or in writing; or may be either by express words, or by reasonable implication.[1] By the French Law, every acceptance must be in writing. By the English law, the acceptance of a foreign bill may be verbal or in writing; but that of an inland bill must be only in writing, on the bill itself. In all other cases, an acceptance by letter or other writing, is good; though it is usually made on the bill.[2] If the acceptance is by an agent, his authority as we have seen in other cases, must be shown.[3] Where the action is against some of several acceptors *or makers*, the others are competent witnesses for the plaintiff, to prove the handwriting of the defendants.[4] So, if the action is against *partners*, after proof

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1 Story on Bills, § 242, 243.

2 Story on Bills, § 242; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 314 – 333, (9th ed.) A promise to accept an existing bill, specifically described, is a good acceptance; Grant *v.* Hunt, 1 M. G. & S. 44; 10 Jur. 228; Story on Bills, § 244; but whether a promise to accept a non-existing bill, to be drawn at a future day, is a good acceptance, is a point not universally agreed. As between the drawee and a third person, who has taken the bill upon the faith of the promise to accept it, the doctrine was for a long time maintained in England, that it amounted to an acceptance of the bill. But this doctrine has recently been re-examined and explicitly overruled, in The Bank of Ireland *v.* Archer, 11 M. & W. 383. "But the rule," says Mr. Justice Story, "as formerly held, always included the qualification, that the paper, containing the promise, should describe the bill to be drawn, in terms not to be mistaken, so as to identify and distinguish it from all others; that the bill should be drawn within a reasonable time after the paper was written; and it should be received, by the person taking it, upon the faith of the promised acceptance; and, if either of these circumstances should fail, the promise would not amount to an acceptance. Under these qualifications, the rule seems to be firmly established in America upon the footing of the old authorities. But the rule is applicable only to the cases of bills payable on demand, or at a fixed time after date, and not to bills payable at or after sight; for it is obvious, that, to constitute an acceptance in the latter cases, a presentment is indispensable, since the time that the bill is to run cannot otherwise be ascertained." Story on Bills, § 249. And see Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 284, 285 – 297; Ulster County Bank *v.* McFarlan, 3 Hill, N. Y. R. 432.

3 Ante, § 59 – 68.

4 York *v.* Blott, 5 M. & S. 71; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p, 627, (9th edit.) See Ante, Vol. 1, § 399; Poole *v.* Palmer, 9 M. & W. 71.

of the partnership, the admissions of one of the firm are good, against all.[1] A signature by the names and surnames of the respective partners is sufficient to charge the partnership; and it seems that such signature made by one of the partners will suffice.[2] If the bill is drawn payable *after sight*, it is in general necessary to prove the precise time of acceptance; but if the acceptance is dated, this is sufficient evidence of the time; and though the date is in a hand different from that of the acceptor, it will be presumed to have been written by his authority, by a clerk, according to the usual course of business.[3] If the acceptance was *by parol*, the person who heard it must be called; and if the answer relied on was given by a clerk, his authority to accept bills for his master must also be proved.[4]

§ 162. In an action *against the drawer, maker, or indorser* of a bill or note, the same proof of signature, and of agent's authority is requisite, as in the case of an acceptor.[5]

§ 163. In the THIRD PLACE, *the plaintiff must prove his interest in the bill or note*, or, *his title to sue thereon.* Where the action is between the immediate parties to the contract, as payee and maker of a note, or payee and acceptor of a bill, the plaintiff, ordinarily, has only to produce the instrument and prove the signature.[6] But where the plaintiff was not

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[1] See Ante Vol. 1, § 172, 174, 177.

[2] Norton *v.* Seymour, 3 M. G. & Sc. 792.

[3] Glossop *v.* Jacob, 4 Campb. 227; 1 Stark. R. 69, S. C.; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 292, (9th edit.) An acceptance by the wife of the drawee, by writing her own name on the bill, is sufficient to bind him as acceptor, if she had authority to accept the bill. Lindus *v.* Bradwell, 17 Law Journ. 121; 9 Law Mag. N. S. 146; 12 Jur. 230; 5 M. G. & Sc. 583.

[4] Sayer *v.* Kitchen, 1 Esp. R. 209. As to what conduct or words amount to a verbal acceptance, see Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 288, 289, (9th ed.); Story on Bills, § 243–247.

[5] As to the proof of handwriting, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 576–581. As to proof by the subscribing witness, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 569–575. And as to admissions by the party, or by one of several parties, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 27, 172–205.

[6] King *v.* Milsom, 2 Campb. 5. See also Peacock *v.* Rhodes, 2 Doug. 633.

an original party to the contract, but has derived his title by means of some intermediate transfer, the steps of this transfer become, to some extent, material to be proved. The extent to which the proof must be carried, will generally depend upon the extent of the allegations in the declaration. Thus, if a note, made payable to A. B. or bearer, is indorsed in blank by the payee, and the holder, in an action against the maker, declares upon the indorsement, he must prove it; although the allegation of the indorsement was unnecessary; for he might have sued as bearer only, in which case the indorsement need not be proved.[1] If the name of the payee in the bill or note was left blank, and the plaintiff has filled it by inserting his own name, he must show either, that he was intended as the original payee, or, that the bill came regularly into his possession.[2] If there are several persons of the same name with the payee, the possession of the bill or note is *primâ facie* evidence, that the plaintiff was intended; but if there be two, father and son, in the absence of other proof, it will be presumed that the father was intended.[3] And, where the bill or note is made payable to a firm by the name of A. & *Co.*, the payees, in a suit in their own names, must prove that they were the persons who composed the firm.[4]

§ 164. But though the plaintiff must furnish the proof of his own title, yet this proof may consist of *admissions* by the defendant, apparent upon the bill or note. For every

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[1] Waynam *v.* Bend, 1 Campb. 175. And see Ante, Vol. 1. § 60. If he sues as bearer only, the indorsement need not be proved. Wilbour *v.* Turner, 5 Pick. 526. See also Blakely *v.* Grant, 6 Mass. 386. Every indorsement of a promissory note will be presumed to have been made at the place of making the note, until the contrary appears. Duncan *v.* Sparrow, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 167.

[2] Crutchly *v.* Mann. 5 Taunt. 529; 1 Marsh. 29, S. C. Where the payee indorsed the note, but did not deliver it, and after his death it was delivered by his executor to the plaintiff, it was held that the plaintiff had no title to sue on the note. Bromage *v.* Lloyd, 1 Exch. R. 32.

[3] Sweeting *v.* Fowler, 1 Stark. R. 106.

[4] Waters *v.* Paynter, Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 637, note (l), (9th edit.)

person, giving currency to commercial paper, is understood thereby to assert the genuineness of all such signatures, and the regularity of all such previous transactions as he was bound to know. Thus, the acceptor of a bill, after sight, whether in general, or for honor, or *supra protest*, by the act of *acceptance*, admits that the drawer's signature is genuine, that he had a right to draw, that he was of proper age, and otherwise qualified to contract, and that he bears the character, in which he assumes to draw, such as executor, partner, and the like. But there is no implied admission, in such case, of the genuineness of the signature of the payee, or of any other indorser.[1] So, also, the *indorsement* of a bill or note, is an admission of the genuineness of the signature of the drawer, or maker.[2] And if the bill is drawn by *procuration*, the acceptance admits the procuration.[3]

§ 165. These *admissions*, however, by the act of acceptance or indorsement, are strictly *limited* to those things, which the party was bound to know. Therefore, though a bill is drawn payable to the drawer's own order, and is indorsed with the same name, whether by procuration or not, yet the acceptance is not in itself an admission of the indorsement, but only of the drawing;[4] though probably the Jury would

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[1] Wilkinson *v.* Lutwidge, 1 Stra. 648; Smith *v.* Seare, Bull. N. P. 270. Porthouse *v.* Parker, 1 Campb. 82; Taylor *v.* Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Bass *v.* Clive, 4 M. & S. 13; Vere *v.* Lewis, 3 T. R. 182; Parminter *v.* Symons, 2 Bro. P. C. 182; 1 Wils. 185; Aspinal *v.* Wake, 10 Bing. 51; Story on Bills, § 113, 262; Schultz *v.* Astley, 2 Bing. N. C. 544; Pitt *v.* Chappelow, 8 M. & W. 616; Braithwaite *v.* Gardiner, 10 Jur. 591; Halifax *v.* Lye, 18 Law Journ. 197. C. P.

[2] Free *v.* Hawkins, Holt's Cas. 550; Young *v.* Patterson, 11 Rob. Louis. R. 7.

[3] Robinson *v.* Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455; Story on Bills, § 262, 263, 412, 451.

[4] Robinson *v.* Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455; Story on Bills, § 262, 263, 412, 451; Smith *v.* Chester, 1 T. R. 654. But where the bill is made payable to the drawer's own order and by him is indorsed, the acceptance, though it may not be an admission of the genuineness of his indorsement, (a distinction which Mr. Justice Story thought very nice and not very satisfactory,

be warranted in inferring the one, from the admitted genuineness of the other.[1] So, though the bill has been shown to the drawer, with the indorsement of the payee upon it, and his objection to paying it was merely because it was drawn without consideration, yet this will not dispense with proof of the indorsement.[2] But where there are successive indorsements, which are all laid in the declaration, and are therefore generally necessary to be proved,[3] yet, if the defendant apply to the holder for further time, and offer terms, this is an admission of the plaintiff's title, and a waiver of proof of all the indorsements except the first.[4] So, if the payee delivered it, with his name indorsed on it, to another, the proof of this fact will dispense with direct proof of the indorsement.[5] So, if the drawee, at the time of acceptance of an indorsed bill, expressly promises to pay it, this has been held an admission of the indorsements.[6]

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see Story on Bills, § 412,) yet is an admission of his authority to transfer the bill to the *bonâ fide* holder. Thus, where, in an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of such a bill, it appeared upon demurrer, that the drawer, at the time of drawing the bill, was an uncertificated bankrupt, and so had no right to control the funds, yet it was held, that the defendant, by the acceptance, had conclusively admitted his right so to do, and *as against the indorsee*, was estopped to set up such a defence. Pitt *v.* Chappelow, 8 M. & W. 616; Braithwaite *v.* Gardiner, 10 Jur. 591. And see Story on Bills, § 85, note.

1 See Ante, Vol. 1, § 578, 581; Allport *v.* Meek, 4 C. &. P. 267. In this case, as it appeared, by the plaintiff's own showing, that neither of the signatures was in the handwriting of the nominal drawer, for the want of further explanatory evidence, he was non-suited. See also Jones *v.* Turnour, 4 C. & P. 204.

2 Duncan *v.* Scott, 1 Campb. 101.

3 Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 642, (9th ed.); Ante, Vol. 1, § 60.

4 Bosanquet *v.* Anderson, 6 Esp. 43.

5 Glover *v.* Thompson, Ry. & M. 403. But where the acceptor negotiated the bill with the drawer's name indorsed, he was not allowed, as against the indorsee, to *plead* that it was not indorsed by the drawer to the plaintiff, in addition to a plea denying the acceptance. Gilmore *v.* Hague, 4 Dowl. P. C. 303.

6 Hankey *v.* Wilson, Sayer, R. 223. And see Sidford *v.* Chambers, 1 Stark. R. 326.

§ 166. The plaintiff is *not bound* to allege, nor of course, *to prove any indorsements but such as are necessary to convey title* to himself. All others, therefore, may be stricken out; even after the bill has been read in evidence, and after an objection has been taken on account of variance.[1] And in an action against a subsequent indorser, it is not necessary to prove any indorsement prior to his own, even though alleged.[2] If the action is against the drawer or acceptor, and the first indorsement was in blank, it will be unnecessary to prove any of the subsequent indorsements, though they were in full; they may therefore be stricken out at the time of trial, unless set out in the declaration; which, however, may in that case be amended.[3] If the bill or note was made payable to the order of a *fictitious person*, and the party sued knew that fact when he became party to the bill or note, or before he transferred it, this will dispense with proof of the handwriting of the fictitious indorser.[4] It may here be added, that where the indorser of a bill or note is not a party to the suit, he is generally a competent witness to prove his own indorsement;[5] and, that the indorsement of an infant;[6] or, of a feme

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[1] Mayer *v.* Jadis, 1 M. & Rob. 247. And see Dollfus *v.* Frosch, 1 Denio, R. 367.

[2] Critchlow *v.* Parry, 2 Campb. 182; Lambert *v.* Pack, 1 Salk. 127; Chaters *v.* Bell, 4 Esp. 210.

[3] Walwyn *v.* St. Quintin, 1 B. & P. 658; 2 Esp. 515, S. C.; Chaters *v.* Bell, 4 Esp. 210; Smith *v.* Chester, 1 T. R. 654. If the note or bill, though indorsed and transferred, gets back again into the hands of the payee, he is *primâ facie* the legal owner, Dugan & al. *v.* The United States, 3 Wheat. 172. The holder may derive title to himself from any preceding indorser, striking out the intermediate indorsements. Emerson *v.* Cutts, 12 Mass. 78; Tyler *v.* Binney, 7 Mass. 479; Watervliet Bank *v.* White, 1 Den. 608.

[4] Minet *v.* Gibson, 3 T. R. 481; Bennett *v.* Farnell, 1 Campb. 180 *c.*; Chitty and Hulme on Bills, p. 157, 158, (9th edit.); Story on Bills, § 200; Cooper *v.* Meyer, 10 B. & C. 468.

[5] Richardson *v.* Allan, 2 Stark. R. 334; Ante, Vol. 1, § 190, 383, 385.

[6] Taylor *v.* Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Nightingale *v.* Withington, 15 Mass. 273; Jones *v.* Darch, 4 Price, 300.

covert,[1] she being the agent of her husband; or, of a trader, after an act of bankruptcy,[2] if he received the value, are alike sufficient to convey title to the indorsee.

§ 167. In an action against the drawer or acceptor of a bill payable to the order of several *partners*, it is in general necessary to prove the partnership and the handwriting of the partner or agent of the firm by whom it was indorsed.[3] But if the partnership has been dissolved, it is not necessary in an action upon a bill, drawn and indorsed by one partner in the name of the firm, to prove, that the bill was drawn and indorsed before the dissolution; for the bill will be presumed to have been drawn on the day of its date, and the Jury will be at liberty to infer, that the indorsement, if without date, was made at the same time.[4] If the plaintiffs sue as indorsees of a bill indorsed in blank, they need not prove their partnership, nor that the bill was indorsed or delivered to them jointly; for the indorsement in blank conveys a joint right of action to as many as agree in suing on the bill.[5] But if a bill or note is payable or indorsed specially to a firm, by their partnership name, and they sue thereon, strict proof must be made, that the firm consists of the persons who sue.[6]

§ 168. The like effect is given to a *blank indorsement* in other cases; for in pleading, it is sufficient, *primâ facie*, to convey a title to the actual holder, and of course nothing more need be proved. Thus, where a promissory note, indorsed in blank, was delivered to one to get it discounted, and he

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1 Cotes *v.* Davis, 1 Campb. 485; Barlow *v.* Bishop, 1 East, 434; Miller *v.* Delamater, 12 Wend. 433.

2 Smith *v.* Pickering, Peake's Cas. 50.

3 Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 37–61, 643, (9th edit.)

4 Anderson *v.* Weston, 5 Bing. N. C. 296.

5 Ord *v.* Portal, 3 Campb. 239, per Ld. Ellenborough; Attwood *v.* Rattenbury, 6 Moore, 579, per Park, J.; Rordasnz *v.* Leach, 1 Stark. R. 446.

6 3 Campb. 240, note; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 644, (9th edit.) In such case, the names of the partners may be suggested to the witness by whom the partnership is proved. Ante, Vol. 1, § 435.

shortly afterwards returned with the money, which he paid over, this was held sufficient to entitle him as executor to recover judgment upon the note as indorsed to his testator.[1] But in an action by the executor of the payee, against the acceptor, it is necessary to allege and prove, that the acceptance was in the testator's lifetime.[2] If the note, after being indorsed in blank, is delivered in pledge by the payee, as collateral security for a debt, this will not prevent the payee from suing upon it in his own name, or again transferring it, subject only to be defeated by the claim of the pledgee.[3]

§ 169. If the action is by the *drawer against the acceptor* of a bill which, having been dishonored, he has been obliged to pay to the holder, and these facts are alleged in the declaration, the plaintiff must prove the return of the bill, and the payment by him; but it is not necessary to prove, that the acceptor held funds of the drawer, this being admitted by the acceptance.[4] And if a prior indorser, who has been obliged to pay a subsequent indorsee, sues the acceptor, it has been held, that he must prove such payment.[5] But in all these actions, founded on the return of a bill, if it is shown that the instrument was once in circulation, it will be presumed that it came back into the plaintiff's hands by payment, in the regular course, by which dishonored paper goes back to the original parties.[6]

§ 170. Where the action is by an *accommodation acceptor*, against the drawer, either for money paid, or specially for not indemnifying the plaintiff, in addition to proof of the drawing

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[1] Godson *v.* Richards, 6 C. & P. 188.

[2] Anon. 12 Mod. 447, per Holt, C. J. And see Sarell *v.* Wine, 3 East, 409.

[3] Fisher *v.* Bradford, 7 Greenl. 28; Bowman *v.* Wood, 15 Mass. 534.

[4] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 537, 647, (9th edit.); Vere *v.* Lewis, 3 T. R. 182.

[5] Mendez *v.* Carreroon, 1 Ld. Raym. 742.

[6] Pfiel *v.* Vanbatenburg, 2 Campb. 439; Dugan *v.* The United States, 3 Wheat. 172; Baring *v.* Clark, 19 Pick. 220.

of the bill, and of the absence of consideration, the plaintiff should prove payment of the bill by himself, or some special damage, or liability to costs, by reason of his acceptance.[1] But here, also, the mere production of the bill by the plaintiff is not sufficient proof that he has paid it, unless he shows, that it was once in circulation after it was accepted. And, generally, payment will not be presumed, from a receipt indorsed on the bill ,unless it is shown to be in the handwriting of one entitled to demand payment.[2]

§ 171. In regard to *the consideration*, two things are to be noted; *first*, as to *the parties* between whom it may be impeached; and *secondly*, as to the *burden of proof*. And here it is *first* to be observed, that the consideration of a bill or note, as well as of any other unsealed instrument of contract, is impeachable by the immediate or original parties; between whom, the general rule is, that the want of it may always be set up by the defendant, in bar of the action. Thus, it may be insisted on by the drawer, against the payee; by the payee against his indorsee; and by the acceptor against the drawer. The same rule is applied to all persons standing precisely in the situation of the original parties, and identified with them, in equity; such as, their agents; purchasers of paper dishonored by being over-due; persons who have given no value for the bill; purchasers with notice that the instrument is void in the hands of the assignor,[3] whether from fraud, or from want, failure, or illegality of consideration. These parties are regarded as taking the bill or note, subject to all the equities attaching to the particular bill in the hands of the holder; but not to equities, which may

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[1] Chilton *v.* Whiffin & al. 3 Wils. 13; Bullock *v.* Lloyd, 2 C. & P. 119; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 647, (9th edit.)

[2] Pfiel *v.* Vanbatenburg, 2 Campb. 439; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, ub. supra. And see Scholey *v.* Walsby, Peake's Cas. 25; Phillips *v.* Warren, 14 M. & W. 379.

[3] But if a promissory note or bill is available to the holder, and he transfers it to another, the want of consideration cannot be set up against the latter, though he had notice that it was given without consideration, before it came to his hands. Dudley *v.* Littlefield, 8 Shepl. 418.

exist between the parties, arising from other transactions.[1] But, on the other hand, no defect or infirmity of consideration, either in the creation or in the transfer of a negotiable security, can be set up against a mere stranger to the transaction, such as a *bonâ fide* holder of the bill or note, who received it for a valuable consideration, at or before it became due, and without notice of any infirmity therein. The same rule will apply, though the present holder has such notice, if he derives his title to the bill from a prior *bonâ fide* holder for value. Every such holder of a negotiable instrument is entitled to recover upon it, notwithstanding any defect of title in the person from whom he derived it; and even though he derived it from one who acquired it by fraud, or theft, or robbery.[2]

§ 172. *Secondly*, as to the *burden of proof*, it is to be observed, that bills of exchange enjoy the privilege, conceded to no unsealed instruments not negotiable, of being *presumed* to be founded upon a valid and valuable consideration. Hence, between the original parties, and, *à fortiori*, between others who became *bonâ fide* holders, it is wholly unnecessary to establish, that the bill was given for such consideration; the burden of proof resting upon the other party to establish the contrary, and rebut the presumption of value, which the law raises for the protection of all negotiable paper.[3] The same

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[1] Story on Bills, § 187; Burrough *v.* Moss, 10 B. & C. 558. Hughes *v.* Large, 2 Barr, 103. In the United States, the defendant has in many instances been allowed to claim a set-off in such cases, founded on other transactions. See Bayley on Bills, p. 544–548, the cases in Phillips & Sewall's notes. See post, § 199. In an action by an indorsee against a remote indorser, it is a good defence, that the defendant, at the time when he indorsed the bill, was so intoxicated and under the influence of liquor, and thereby so deprived of the use of his reason, as to be unable to understand the nature or effect of the indorsement; provided the plaintiff, at the time of the indorsement, was aware of his being in that state. Gore *v.* Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; 9 Jur. 140, S. C.

[2] Story on Bills, § 187–194; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 68–81, (6th edit.)

[3] Story on Bills, § 178.

principle applies to the consideration paid by each successive holder of the bill. But, even in an action by the indorsee against an original party to a bill, if it be shown, on the part of the defendant, that the bill was made under *duress*, or, that he was *defrauded* of it, or, if a strong *suspicion of fraud* be raised, the plaintiff will then be required to show under what circumstances and for what value he became the holder.[1] It is, however, only in *such* cases, that this proof will be demanded of the holder; it will not be required, where the defendant shows nothing more than a mere absence or want of consideration on his part.[2] Nor will it suffice for the acceptor to show, that the drawer procured all the indorsements to be made without consideration, in order that the action might be brought by any indorsee, under an agreement between the plaintiff and the drawer, to share the money when recovered;[3] nor, that the bill was accepted in order to raise money for his own use, of which the payee had subsequently defrauded him.[4]

§ 173. The burden of proof is somewhat affected by the *form of the issue.* Thus, in an action by the drawer against the acceptor of a bill, if the consideration of the acceptance is impeached under the general issue, as is ordinarily the course in the American Courts, the burden of proof is on the acceptor. And so it is, where the plaintiff, in his replication, merely alleges that there was a valid consideration for the

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[1] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 648, 649, (9th edit.); Duncan *v.* Scott, 1 Campb. 100; Rees *v.* Marq. of Headfort, 2 Campb. 574; Heydon *v.* Thompson, 1 Ad. & El. 210; Whitaker *v.* Edmunds, 1 M. & Rob. 366, per Patteson, J.; 1 Ad. & El. 638, S. C.; Heath *v.* Sansom, 2 B. & Ad. 291, as limited and explained by Patteson, J. in 1 M. & Rob. 367, and by Tindal, C. J. in 1 Bing. N. C. 267; Munroe *v.* Cooper. 5 Pick. 412; Story on Bills, § 193, 191; Musgrave *v.* Drake, 5 Ad. & El. 185, N. S.; Small *v.* Smith, 1 Denio, R. 583.

[2] Ibid.; Lowe *v.* Chifney, 1 Bing. N. C. 267; 1 Scott, 95, S. C.

[3] Whitaker *v.* Edmunds, 1 M. & Rob. 367.

[4] Jacob *v.* Hungate, 1 M. & Rob. 445. See further, Chitty & Hulme on Bills, 649–651, (9th edit.)

acceptance, without specifying what it was; or, where he states the kind of consideration under a *videlicet*, so as not to confine himself to precise proof of the allegation. But, where he chooses specially to allege the sort of consideration on which he relies, concluding with a verification, so that the defendant has an opportunity to traverse it, and does so, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, precisely to maintain his replication.[1]

§ 174. In the FOURTH PLACE, *the plaintiff must show a breach of contract, by the defendant.* And here it is to be observed, that the engagement of the defendant is either direct and absolute, or conditional. In the former case, as, in an action against the maker of a promissory note, or, against the acceptor of a bill, upon general acceptance to pay the bill according to its tenor, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a *presentment for payment*, it being not essential to his right to recover.[2] Where the bill is drawn generally, but the *acceptance* is made *payable at a particular place*, it has been much questioned, whether it was necessary for the holder to prove a presentment for payment at the place named in the acceptance, in order to show the acceptor's default. In England it was formerly held, that, in such case, a presentment at the place must be shown;[3] but subsequently, by statute,[4] such acceptance has been declared to be a general acceptance, unless restrictive words are added, making the bill payable at that place alone. But in the Supreme Court of the United States, it is held, that as between the holder and the acceptor, no demand at the place named in the acceptance is necessary, to entitle the plaintiff

[1] Batley *v.* Catterall, 1 M. & Rob. 379, and note (a). See also Lacey *v.* Forrester, 2 C. M. & R. 59; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 648, 649, (9th edit.); Ante, Vol. 1, § 58, 59, 60.

[2] In Maine, if a promissory note is payable at a place certain upon demand, or upon demand after a certain day, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless he proves a demand made at the place. Stat. 1846, ch. 218.

[3] Rowe *v.* Young, 3 B. & C. 165. And see Picquet *v.* Curtis, 1 Sumn. 478.

[4] 1 & 2 Geo. 4, cap. 78.

to recover; though the want of such demand may affect the amount of damages and interest; but that to charge the drawer or indorsers of the bill, a demand at the place, at the maturity of the bill is indispensable.[1]

§ 175. But in the latter case, as, in actions against the drawer or indorser of a bill, or the indorser of a note, the *undertaking* of the defendant being *conditional*, namely, to pay in case the party primarily liable does not, the default of such party must be proved, or the proof be dispensed with by the introduction of other evidence. The receiver of a bill or note is understood thereby to contract with every other party, who would be entitled to bring an action on paying it, that he will present in proper time to the drawee for acceptance, when acceptance is necessary, and to the acceptor for payment, when the bill has arrived at its maturity and is payable; to allow no extra time for payment, to the acceptor; and to give notice in a reasonable time, and without delay, to every such person, of a failure in the attempt to procure a proper acceptance or payment. Any default or neglect in any of these respects will discharge every such person from responsibility on account of a non-acceptance or non-payment; and will make it operate, generally, as a satisfaction of any debt, demand, or value for which it was given.[2]

§ 176. Thus, in an action by the *payee* of a bill, or the *indorsee* of a bill or note, *against the drawer or indorser*, it is necessary to prove a *presentment* to the drawee for payment. If the bill is payable at sight, or in so many days after sight, or after demand, or upon any other contingency, a presentment, in order to fix the period of payment, must be made, and of course be proved. But if the bill is payable on demand, or in so many days after date, or the like, it need not be presented merely for acceptance; but if it is so

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[1] Wallace *v.* McConnel, 13 Peters R. 136; Story on Bills, § 239; 3 Kent, Comm. 99, note, (5th edit.)

[2] Story on Bills, § 112, 227; Bayley on Bills, p. 217, 286, (5th edit.)

presented, and is not accepted, the holder must give notice of the dishonor in the same manner as if the bill were payable at sight.[1] The presentment for acceptance must be shown to have been made by the holder or his agent, if acceptance was refused; but if the bill was accepted on presentment by a stranger, it is available to the holder. If it is drawn on partners, a presentment to one of them is sufficient; but if drawn on several persons not partners, it has been said, that it should be presented to each; but the better opinion seems otherwise, for if one of the drawers should refuse to accept, the holder would not be bound to take the acceptance of the others alone.[2] It is not necessary to prove, that the presentment was made *by the person named* in the declaration, the material fact being the presentment alone, by some proper person.[3] Nor is it necessary for the plaintiff, in an action against the indorser, for non-payment of an accepted bill, to show any demand of or inquiry after the drawer.[4]

§ 177. Presentment of the bill for acceptance is *not excused* by the drawee's death, bankruptcy, insolvency, or absconding. If he is dead, it should be presented to his personal representatives, if any, or at his last domicil; and if he has absconded, it should be presented at his last domicil or place of business.[5]

§ 178. Whenever it is essential to prove a *presentment* for acceptance or a demand of payment, it must appear to have been made at the *proper time*. No drawee can be required to accept a bill on any day which is set apart by the laws or ob-

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[1] Story on Bills, § 112, 227, 228; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 653, 654. (9th edit.)

[2] Story on Bills, § 229; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 272 – 274, (9th ed.)

[3] Boehm *v.* Campbell, 1 Gow, R. 55; 3 Moore, 15, S. C.

[4] Heylin *v.* Adamson, 2 Burr. 669; Bromley *v.* Frazier, 1 Stra. 441; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 653, (9th edit.)

[5] Story on Bills, § 260; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 279, 280, (9th edit.); Groton *v.* Dalheim, 6 Greenl. 476; Greely *v.* Hunt, 8 Shepl. 455.

servances or usages of the country or place, for religious or other purposes, and is not deemed a day for the transaction of secular business; such as a *Sunday*, *Christmas day*, or a day appointed by public authority for a solemn *fast* or *thanksgiving*, or any other general *holiday;* or a *Saturday*, where the drawee is a Jew.[1] And in all cases, the presentment must have been made at a *reasonable hour* of the day. If made at the place of business, it must be made within the usual hours of business, or, at farthest, while some person is there, who has authority to receive and answer the presentment. If made at the dwelling house of the drawee, it may be at any seasonable hour, while the family are up.[2]

§ 179. The presentment of a *promissory note* for payment should be made at its maturity, and not before, nor generally after.[3] But where the maker lived two hundred miles from the holder, a demand made six days afterwards has been held sufficient.[4] If the note is payable at a certain day *after sight* the payment of interest, or of part of the principal, duly indorsed thereon, is *primâ facie* evidence that it was presented for sight before the time of such payment, and that it became due on the day when the payment was made.[5] If it is payable *on demand*, or is indorsed after it is over-due, payment should be demanded within a reasonable time, in order to charge the indorser.[6] A *banker's check* may be presented on

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[1] Story on Bills, § 233, 340.

[2] Story on Bills, § 236; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 454, 455, 654, (9th edit.); Parker *v.* Gordon, 7 East, 385; Wilkins *v.* Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 155; Garnett *v.* Woodcock, 6 M. & S. 44.

[3] Henry *v.* Jones, 8 Mass. 453; Farnum *v.* Fowle, 12 Mass. 88; Woodbridge *v.* Brigham, Ib. 403; Barker *v.* Parker, 6 Pick. 80, 81.

[4] Freeman *v.* Boynton, 7 Mass. 483.

[5] Way *v.* Bassett, 5 Hare, 55.

[6] Chitty and Hulme on Bills, p. 379 - 386, (9th edit.); Colt *v.* Barnard, 18 Pick. 260. Seven days after the date, has been held sufficient; Seaver *v.* Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267; and eight months an unreasonable delay. Field *v.* Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131; Thayer *v.* Brackett, 12 Mass. 450. See also Sylvester *v.* Crapo, 15 Pick. 92; Thompson *v.* Hale, 5 Pick. 259; Martin *v.* Winslow, 2 Mason, 241. See post, § 199, note, as to the time, when a note payable on demand is to be considered as dishonored.

the next day after the date, this being considered a reasonable time.[1]

§ 180. It must also appear, that the *presentment* was made at the *proper place;* and this, in general, is the town or municipality of the domicil of the drawee. If he dwells in one place, and has his place of business in another, whether it be in the same town, or in another town, the bill may be presented for acceptance at either place, at the option of the holder; and this, even though a particular place be designated as the place of payment.[2] If the bill is addressed to the drawee at a place where he never lived, or if he has removed to another place, the presentment should be at the place of his actual domicil, if, by diligent inquiries, it can be ascertained; and if it cannot be ascertained, or if the drawee has absconded, the bill may be treated as dishonored.[3]

§ 180 *a*. Where the bill or note is made *payable at a particular place*, as, at a bank, or a banker's, the question, whether a presentment for payment must be made at that place, in

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[1] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 385, (9th edit.)

[2] Story on Bills, § 236; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 365, 366, (9th edit.); Ante, § 174.

[3] Story on Bills, § 235. The *place* at which a promissory note is dated, is *primâ facie* evidence of the residence of the maker at that place; but it is no indication of the place of payment, nor does it authorize a demand there, for the purpose of charging an indorser. If the maker of a note has absconded; or, being a seaman and without a domicil in the State, is absent on a voyage; and, also, if he has no known residence or place of business at which a demand can be made; a presentment for payment is excused, and the indorser will be liable, on receiving notice of the facts constituting the excuse. So, if the maker, after making the note, transfers his domicil permanently to another State, the holder need not follow him, but a demand at his former place of residence will suffice. If the note is made and dated at one place, the maker having and continuing to have a known residence at another, the demand must be made at the latter place, and not at the former. Taylor *v.* Snyder, 3 Denio, 145. And see Gilmore *v.* Spies, 1 Barbour, 158. To enable the holder to charge an indorser, without a demand on the maker, the facts, excusing the demand, must be distinctly proved. Taylor *v.* Snyder, *supra*.

order to entitle the holder to recover, has been held diversely in England and in the United States. In a recent work of the highest merit,[1] the law in the two countries is thus stated. "According to the commercial law of England, if a promissory note is made payable at any particular place, as, for example, at a bank, or a banker's, a presentment should be there made for payment.[2] Before the statute of 1 and 2 Geo. 4, ch. 78, a bill of exchange, as well as a promissory note, payable at a bank or banker's, was required to be presented at the bank or banker's for payment, before the acceptor or maker was bound to pay the same.[3] That statute changed the antecedent responsibility of the acceptor of a bill of exchange, by providing that an acceptance payable at a banker's or other specified place, without adding the words, 'and not otherwise or elsewhere,' should be deemed a general acceptance of the bill to all intents and purposes, so that no presentment or demand of payment at such banker's or other specified place, was thereafter necessary to be made, in order to charge the acceptor.[4] But the statute did not touch the rights of the drawers or indorsers of any such bill, but left them to be governed by the antecedent general law. Hence, so far as the drawer and indorsers are concerned, a due presentment and demand of payment is still necessary to be made at the banker's, or other specified place, in order to

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[1] Story on Promissory Notes, § 227, 228.

[2] Story on Bills, § 239, and note; Id. § 355; Chitty on Bills, ch. 7, p. 321, 322, (8th edit.); Id. ch. 9, p. 391, 392; Bayley on Bills, ch. 1, § 9, p. 29, 30 (5th edit.); Id. ch. 9, § 1, p. 199, 200; Id. ch. 7, § 1, p. 219 – 222; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, ch. 2, § 4, p. 412, 413 (5th edit.); Gibb *v.* Mather, 2 Cromp. & Jerv. 254; S. C. 8 Bing. R. 214.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.; Chitty on Bills, ch. 4, p. 172 – 174 (8th edit.); Id. ch. 7, p. 321 – 323; Id. ch. 9, p. 391, 393, 396, 397; Bayley on Bills, ch. 1, § 9, p. 29 (5th edit.); Id. ch. 6, § 1, p. 199 – 201; Gibb *v.* Mather, 2 Cromp. & Jerv. 254; S. C. 8 Bing. R. 214; Fayle *v.* Bird, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 531; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 44, p. 97, and note (*e*), and Id. p. 99, note (*b*), (5th edit.); Story on Bills, § 355; Thomson on Bills, ch. 6, § 2, p. 420 – 428. (2d edit.)

found any right of action against them.[1] The statute does not comprehend promissory notes payable at a banker's or other specified place; and therefore it is indispensable, in order to charge the maker or indorsers of a promissory note, that a due presentment and demand of payment should be made at the banker's or other specified place. If a due presentment is not so made, the indorsers are discharged from all liability.[2] The maker, indeed, is not so discharged; but he is in no default, and is under no obligation to pay the note, until presentment and demand has been actually made at the banker's, or other specified place;[3] and if he has suffered any loss or injury by the want of a due presentment, to the extent of that loss or injury he will be discharged as against the holder." [4]

§ 180 *b*. "In America a doctrine somewhat different prevails, if not universally, at least to a great extent. It was probably in the first instance adopted from the supposed tendency of the English authorities to the same result; and there certainly was much conflict in the authorities, until the doctrine was put at rest by the final decision in the House of Lords, a decision which seems founded upon the most solid principles, and to be supported by the most enlarged public

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[1] Gibb *v.* Mather, 2 Cromp. & Jerv. 254; S. C. 8 Bing. 214. Ambrose *v.* Hopwood, 2 Taunt. R. 61. — This whole subject was very much discussed in the House of Lords in the case of Rowe *v.* Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. R. 165; S. C. 2 Bligh, R. 391. See, also, Gibb *v.* Mather, supra. In Indiana the English doctrine is adopted. Palmer *v.* Hughes, 4 Black. R. 329.

[2] Bayley on Bills, ch. 7, § 1, p. 219–222 (5th edit.); Chitty on Bills, ch. 9, p. 396, 397 (8th edit.); Sanderson *v.* Bowes, 14 East, 500; Roche *v.* Campbell, 3 Campb. 247; Gibb *v.* Mather, 2 Cromp. & Jerv. 254; S. C. 8 Bing. 214; Dickinson *v.* Bowes, 16 East, 110; Howe *v.* Bowes, 16 East, 112; S. C. in Error, 5 Taunt. 30; Trecothick *v.* Edwin, 1 Stark. 468; Emblen *v.* Dartnell, 12 Mees & Wels. 830.

[3] Chitty on Bills, ch. 5, p. 174 (8th edit.); Turner *v.* Hayden, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 1.

[4] Rhodes *v.* Gent, 5 Barn. & Ald. 244; Turner *v.* Hayden, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 1.

policy, as to the rights and duties of parties. The received doctrine in America seems to be this, that as to the acceptor of a bill of exchange, and the maker of a promissory note, payable at a bank, or other specified place, the same rule applies, that is, that no presentment or demand of payment need be made at the specified place, on the day when the bill or note becomes due, or afterwards in order to maintain a suit against the acceptor, or maker; and of course, that there need be no averment in the declaration in any suit brought thereon, or any proof at the trial, of any such presentment or demand. But that the omission or neglect is a matter of defence on the part of the acceptor or maker. If the acceptor or maker had funds at the appointed place, at the time, to pay the bill or note, and it was not duly presented, he will, in the suit, be exonerated, not, indeed, from the payment of the principal sum, but from the payment of all damages and costs in that suit. If by such omission or neglect of presentment and demand, he has sustained any loss or injury, as if the bill or note were payable at a bank, and the acceptor or maker had funds there at the time, which have been lost by the failure of the bank, then, and in such case, the acceptor or maker will be exonerated from liability to the extent of the loss or injury so sustained."[1]

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[1] Story on Promissory Notes, § 227, 238; Wallace *v.* McConnell, 13 Pet. 36. "The ground," says Mr. Justice Story, "upon which the American doctrine is placed, is, that the acceptor or maker is the promissory debtor, and the debt is not as to him discharged by the omission or neglect to demand payment, when the debt became due, at the place where it was payable. Assuming this to be true, it by no means follows, that the acceptor or maker is in default, until a demand of payment has been made at the place of payment; for the terms of his contract import an express condition, that he will pay upon due presentment, at that place, and not that he will pay upon demand elsewhere; and the omission or neglect of duty, on the part of the holder, to make presentment at that place, ought not to change the nature or character of the obligations of the acceptor or maker. Now, the right to bring an action presupposes a default on the part of the acceptor or maker; and it may, after all, make a great difference to him, not only in point of convenience, but in point of loss by exchange, as well as of expense, whether, if he agrees to pay the money in Mobile, or in New Orleans, he may be required, without any default on his own part, notwithstanding he has funds there, to

§ 181. Where the bill is *not* made payable in so many days *after sight*, it is sufficient to prove a *presentment for payment at the maturity* of the bill, and a refusal of payment. And it suffices to show a presentment for acceptance, and a *refusal* to accept at any time previous to the maturity of the bill; for upon its dishonor, the drawer becomes liable immediately.[1] It also suffices to show, that the drawee refused to accept according to the tenor of the bill, notwithstanding the defendant should offer to prove, that the drawee offered a different acceptance equally beneficial to the holder.[2] But the plaintiff must show that the refusal, in all cases, proceeded from the drawee; a declaration by some unauthorized person that the bill would not be accepted is not sufficient.[3]

§ 182. Presentment for payment, as well as notice of dishonor, may be proved by entries in the books of a deceased notary, clerk, messenger of a bank, or other person, whose duty or ordinary course of business it was to make such entries.[4]

§ 183. In an action *against the drawer or indorser* of a

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pay the same money in New York or in Boston. He may well say; *Non in hæc fœdera veni*." Story on Promissory Notes, § 229; 3 Kent, Comm. 97, note (*e*); Ibid. 99, note (*b*). "The learned commentator," he says, "holds the English rule to be the true one, and adds; 'This is the plain sense of the contract, and the words "accepted, payable at a given place," are equivalent to an exclusion of a demand elsewhere.' Story on Bills, § 356. See, also, North Bank *v.* Abbot, 13 Pick. 465; Payson *v.* Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212; Church *v.* Clark, 21 Pick. 310; Carley *v.* Vance, 17 Mass. 389; Ruggles *v.* Patten, 8 Mass. 480; Mellon *v.* Croghan, 15 Martin 423; Smith *v.* Robinson, 2 Miller, Louis. R. 405; Palmer *v.* Hughes, 1 Blackf. 328; Gale *v.* Kemper, 10 Louis. R. 208; Warren *v.* Allnutt, 12 Louis. R. 454; Thompson *v.* Cook, 2 McLean, 125; Ogden *v.* Dobbin, 2 Hall, N. Y. R. 112; Picquet *v.* Curtis, 1 Sumner, 478." See also Story on Bills, p. 263, note (2).

[1] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 654, (9th edit.); Ballingalls *v.* Gloster, 3 East, 481.

[2] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 654, 655, (9th edit.); Boehm *v.* Garcias, 1 Camph. 425, note.

[3] Cheek *v.* Roper, 5 Esp. 175.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 116.

foreign bill, (and even of an inland bill, if a protest is alleged,) the plaintiff must prove, beside the presentment and notice of dishonor, a *protest* for non-acceptance, or non-payment.[1] The proper evidence of the protest is the production of the notarial act itself;[2] and if this was made abroad, the seal is a sufficient authentication of the act, without farther proof;[3] but it is said, that, if the protest was made within the jurisdiction, it must be proved by the notary who made it, and by the attesting witness, if any.[4]

§ 184. But the *want of protest is excused* by proof, that the defendant requested that, in case of the dishonor of the bill, no protest should be made; or, that the defendant, being the drawer, had no funds in the drawee's hands, or had no right to draw the bill; or, that the protest was prevented by inevitable casualty, or by superior force.[5] So, if the defendant has admitted his liability, by a partial payment, or a promise to pay, a protest need not be proved.[6]

§ 185. In regard to *inland bills*, a protest is not in general necessary to be proved, unless it is made so by the local municipal law.[7]

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[1] Story on Bills, § 273, 281; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 455, 655, (9th edit.) Protest of an inland bill is not necessary. Ibid.; Young *v.* Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146.

[2] Lenox *v.* Leverett, 10 Mass. 1; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 445, 655 (9th edit.)

[3] Townsley *v.* Sumrall, 2 Peters, R. 170; Halliday *v.* McDougall, 20 Wend. 85.

[4] Chesmer *v.* Noyes, 4 Campb. 129; Marin *v.* Palmer, 6 C. & P. 466; In some of the United States, the *certificate* of the notary, under his hand and official seal, is by statute made competent evidence, *primâ facie*, of the matters by him transacted, in relation to the presentment and dishonor of the bill, and of notice thereof to the parties liable. LL. New York, 1833, ch. 271, § 8; Smith *v.* McManus, 7 Yerg. 477; LL. Mississippi, 1833, ch. 70; 2 Kent, Comm. 93, note; Rev. LL. Maine, ch. 44, § 12; Beckwith *v.* The St. Croix Man. Co. 10 Shepl. 284. See also Clark *v.* Bigelow, 4 Shepl. 246; Warren *v.* Warren, Ib. 259.

[5] Story on Bills, § 275, 280; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 452.

[6] Gibbon *v.* Coggon, 1 Campb, 188; Taylor *v.* Jones Ib. 105; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 456, 655, (9th edit.); Campbell *v.* Webster, 9 Jur. 992.

[7] Story on Bills, § 281.

§ 186. In an action against the drawer of a bill, or the indorser of a bill or note, it is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove, that the defendant had *due notice of the dishonor* of the bill or note. To constitute a sufficient notice, it must contain such a description of the bill or note as will serve to identify it, to the understanding of the party addressed; and must state in substance, or by natural implication, that it has been presented for acceptance or payment, as the case may be, and has been dishonored; and, where a protest is by law or usage required, that it has been protested.[1] And if the notice proceeded, as it now seems it may in some cases, from a person who was not at that time the holder of the bill, it must clearly intimate that the party addressed is looked to for payment.[2] But if it proceeded from the holder, the American Courts do not require any formal declaration to that effect, it being the natural inference from the nature of the notice.[3] It must appear that the notice was given within a reasonable time after the dishonor, and protest, if there be one, and that due diligence was exercised for this purpose. When the facts are ascertained, the question whether they prove due diligence, or notice within reasonable time, is a question of

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[1] See Story on Bills, § 301, 390; Story on Promissory Notes, § 348–354. Notice to the indorser of a foreign bill, that the bill, describing it, has been *protested* for non-payment, and that the holder looks to him for payment thereof, is sufficient notice of dishonor; the term *protested*, when thus used, implying that payment had been demanded and refused. Spies *v.* Newbury, 2 Doug. Mich. R. 425. So, where the notice merely stated that the bill was due and unpaid, requesting immediate payment of the amount; adding thus, —"Amount of bill, £98 15*s.* noting 5*s.*;" it was held that the word "*noting*," implied presentment, and non-payment, and rendered the notice sufficient. Armstrong *v.* Christiani, 17 Law Jour. 181, C. P. 5 C. B. 687. See for other examples, Bromage *v.* Vaughan, 9 Ad. & El. 608; N. S. Chard *v.* Fox, 13 Jur. 960. Caunt *v.* Thompson, Ib. 495.

[2] East *v.* Smith, 11 Jur. 412. 4 Dowl. & L. 744.

[3] Bank of United States *v.* Carneal, 2 Pet. 543, 553; Story on Promissory Notes, § 354; Mills *v.* Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 431, 437. And the same view is taken by Coleridge, J. in East *v.* Smith, 11 Jur. 412. 16 Law Jour. N. S. 292. The holder of a bill may take advantage of a notice of dishonor, given by any person who is himself liable to be sued on the bill; if it were given in sufficient time to maintain an action in favor of such party. Harrison *v.* Ruscoe, 15 M. & W. 231; 10 Jur. 142.

law.[1] Where this reasonable time is positively fixed by the law of the particular country, it must be strictly followed. Thus, though the protest must be made according to the law of the place of acceptance, yet notice to the drawer must be given according to the law of the place where the bill was drawn, and to the indorsers, according to the law of the place where the indorsements were respectively made.[2] In other cases, the reasonableness of the time of notice depends on the particular circumstances of each case; but in general it may be remarked, that, where there is a regular intercourse carried on between the two places, whether by post or by packet ships, sailing at stated times, the notice should be sent by the next post or ship, after the dishonor and protest, if a reasonable time remains for writing and forwarding the notice; and where there are none but irregular communications, that which is most probably and reasonably certain and expeditious should be resorted to.[3] If the usual mercantile intercourse is by post or mail, that mode alone should be adopted, though others may concurrently exist.[4] But whatever be the mode of notice, the *time* of its transmission should be proved with sufficient precision; for, where a witness testified that he gave notice in two *or* three days after the dishonor, notice in two days being in time, but notice on the third day being too late, it was held not sufficient evidence to go to the Jury, and the plaintiff was nonsuited; for the burden of proof of seasonable notice is on him.[5]

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[1] Bank of Columbia *v.* Lawrence, 1 Pet. S. C. R. 578, 583.

[2] Story on Bills, § 284, 285, 382 – 385; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 167 – 171, (9th edit.) A promissory note, payable by instalments, is negotiable, and the indorser is entitled to a presentment upon the last day of grace after each day of payment, and to notice, if each particular instalment is not paid when due. Oridge *v.* Sherborne, 11 M. & W. 374.

[3] Story on Bills, § 286, 382, 383. Notice sent by the post, will be considered as notice from the time at which, by the regular course of the post, it ought to be received. Smith *v.* Bank of Washington, 5 S. & R. 385.

[4] Ibid. § 287, 382, 383.

[5] Lawson *v.* Sherwood, 1 Stark. R. 314.

§ 186 *a*. If the bill or note has been received by the holder merely as a *collateral security*, the party from whom he received it being neither drawer nor indorser, nor the transferrer of it by delivery, if payable to the bearer ; the holder is not bound to prove a strict presentment of the bill or note ; nor will the other party be exonerated from the debt collaterally secured by the delivery of such bill or note, unless he can show that he has actually sustained some damage or prejudice by such non-presentment. And the same rule applies to a party who is a mere *guarantor* of a bill or note ; the burden of proof being in both these cases on the debtor, or the guarantor, to show an actual loss, or prejudice to his remedy over.[1]

§ 187. Where the notice is sent by post, it need not be sent on the day of the dishonor, but it should go by the *next practicable post after that day*, having due reference to all the circumstances of the case.[2] But if the action is commenced on the same day on which the notice is sent, (as it well may be,[3]) the burden of proof being on the plaintiff to show that the right of action was complete before the suit was commenced, he must prove, not only that the notice was sent, but that it reached its destination before process was sued out. For the rule of law is that, where there is a doubt which of two occurrences took place first, the party who is to act upon the assumption that they took place in a particular order, is to make the inquiry.[4] The same rule applies

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[1] Story on Bills, § 372 ; Story on Promissory Notes, § 485 ; Hitchcock *v.* Humfrey, 5 M. & G. 559; Oxford Bank *v.* Haynes, 8 Pick. 423 ; Talbot *v.* Gay, 18 Pick. 534 ; Gibbs *v.* Cannon, 9 S. & R. 202 ; Phillips *v.* Astling, 2 Taunt. 206. Where notice to a guarantor is requisite, it will be seasonable if given at any time before action brought, if he has not been prejudiced by the want of earlier notice. Ibid. ; Babcock *v.* Bryant, 12 Pick. 133 ; Salisbury *v.* Hale, Ibid. 416 ; Walton *v.* Mascall, 13 M. & W. 72.

[2] If the notice be put in the post-office in due time, the holder of the bill or note is not prejudiced, if, through mistake or delay of the post-office, it be not delivered in due time. Woodcock *v.* Houldsworth, 16 M. & W. 124.

[3] Greely *v.* Thurston, 4 Greenl. 479.

[4] Castrique *v.* Bernabo, 6 Ad. & El. 498, N. S.

to *successive indorsers;* each one being generally entitled to at least one full day after he has received the notice, before he is required to give notice to any antecedent indorser, who may be liable to him for payment of the bill or note.[1] Sunday, not being a business day, is not taken into the account, and notice on Monday, of a dishonor on Saturday, is sufficient.[2]

§ 187 *a.* If the bill or note has been transmitted to an *agent* or *banker*, for the purpose of obtaining acceptance or payment, he will be entitled to the same time, to give notice to his principal or customer, and to the other parties to the instrument, as if he were himself the real holder, and his principal or customer were the party next entitled to notice; and the principal or customer will be entitled, after such notice, to the like time, to give notice to the antecedent parties, as if he received notice from a real holder, and not from his own banker or agent. In short, in all such cases, the banker or agent is treated as a distinct holder.[3] And a central or principal bank, and its different branches, are also treated as distinct holders, in regard to bills and notes transmitted from the one to the other for presentment or collection.[4]

§ 188. If the parties *reside in* or near the *same town* or

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[1] Story on Bills, § 288, 291, 297, 298, 384, 385; Bayley on Bills, p. 268, 270, (5th edit.); Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 337, 482, (9th edit.) If there are two mails on the same day, notice by the latest of them is sufficient. Whitwell *v.* Johnson, 17 Mass. 449, 454. See also Chick *v.* Pillsbury, 11 Shepl. 458. And if there are two post-offices in the same town, notice sent to either is, *primâ facie*, sufficient. Story on Bills, § 297; Yeatman *v.* Erwin, 3 Miller's Louis. R. 264. So is notice sent to any post-office, to which the party usually resorts for letters. Bank of Geneva *v.* Howlett, 3 Wend. 328; Reid *v.* Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Cuyler *v.* Nellis, 4 Wend. 398.

[2] Eagle Bank *v.* Chapin, 3 Pick. 180; Story on Bills, § 288, 293, 308, 309.

[3] Story on Bills, § 292; Story on Promissory Notes, § 326.

[4] Clode *v.* Bayley, 12 M. &. W. 51.

place where the dishonor occurs, the notice, whether given verbally, or by a special messenger, or by the local or penny post, should be given on the day of the dishonor, or, at farthest, upon the following day, early enough for it to be actually received on that day.[1] But where both parties reside in the same town or city, the rule is, that the notice must be personal; that is, must be given to the individual, in person, or be left at his domicil or place of business; for in such case it is not competent for the holder to put a letter into the post office and insist upon that as a sufficient notice, unless he also proves that it did in fact reach the other party in due season; for it will not be presumed.[2] And a custom among the notaries of a city to give notice in such cases through the post office will not control this rule.[3] But a by-law or usage of a bank, establishing this mode of giving notice, will bind parties to bills or notes made payable to such bank.[4]

§ 189. It will be sufficient if the note or bill described in the notice, *substantially* corresponds with that described on the record. A *variance* in the notice, to be fatal, must be such as conveys to the party no sufficient knowledge of the particular note or bill, which has been dishonored. If it does not mislead him, but conveys to him the real fact without any doubt, the variance cannot be material, either to guard his rights, or to avoid his responsibility.[5] Thus, where the

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[1] Story on Bills, § 289; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 337, 472, 473, (9th edit.); Grand Bank *v.* Blanchard, 23 Pick. 305; Seaver *v.* Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267.

[2] Story on Promissory Notes, § 322; Eagle Bank *v.* Hathaway, 5 Metc. 215; Pierce *v.* Pendar, Ibid. 352; 3 Kent, Comm. 107, (5th edit.); 1 Hare & Wallace's Leading Cases, p. 254. In respect to this rule, the term "*holder*" includes the *bank* at which the note is payable, and the *notary* who may hold the note as the agent of the owner, for the purpose of making demand and protest. Bowling *v.* Harrison, 6 How. S. C. Rep. 248.

[3] Wilcox *v.* McNutt, 2 How. Mis. R. 776.

[4] Renner *v.* Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; Jones *v.* Fales, 4 Mass. 245; 1 Hare & Wallace's Leading Cases, p. 254–256; Chicopee Bank *v.* Eager, 9 Metc. 583.

[5] Mills *v.* Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. 431, 435.

written notice, given on the 22d of September, described the note as dated on the 20th of the same month, payable in sixty days, whereas in fact it bore date on the 20th of July, but it appeared, that there was no other note between the parties, this was held sufficient, the note being otherwise correctly described.[1] So, where the bill was payable at the London Joint-Stock Bank, but in the notice it was described as payable at the London *and Westminster* Joint-Stock Bank, which was shown to be a different bank, yet it was held sufficient.[2] So, where there was but one note between the parties to which the notice could apply, but the sum was erroneously stated in the notice, it was held sufficient.[3] And in such cases, the question is for the Jury to determine, whether the defendant must or may not have known to what note the notice referred.[4]

§ 190. The plaintiff, however, need not prove notice of the dishonor of a bill or note if the defendant has *waived* his right to such notice, or has admitted it. This may be shown, not only by an express waiver, or admission, but, as against the drawer, it may be inferred from circumstances amounting to it, such as an express promise to pay the amount of the bill or note, even though conditional as to the mode of payment; or, a partial payment; or, any acknowledgment, by the drawer, of his liability to pay.[5] But the promise or par-

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[1] Mills *v.* Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. 431, 435.

[2] Bromage *v.* Vaughan, 10 Jur. 982. See also, Bailey *v.* Porter, 14 M. & W. 44; Rowlands *v.* Springett, Ibid. 7; 9 Jur. 356.

[3] Bank of Alexandria *v.* Swann, 9 Pet. 33, 46, 47; Stockman *v.* Parr, 1 C. & K. 41; 11 M. & W. 809.

[4] Smith *v.* Whiting, 12 Mass. 6; Bank of Rochester *v.* Gould, 9 Wend. 279; Reedy *v.* Seixas, 2 Johns. Cas. 337.

[5] Story on Bills, § 320; Hopkins *v.* Liswell, 12 Mass. 52; Thornton *v.* Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Martin *v.* Ingersoll, 8 Pick. 1; Creamer *v.* Ferry, 17 Pick. 332; Central Bank *v.* Davis, 19 Pick. 373; Warden *v.* Tucker, 7 Mass. 449; Boyd *v.* Cleaveland, 4 Pick. 525; Farmer *v.* Rand, 2 Shepl. 225; Ticonic Bank *v.* Johnson, 8 Shepl. 426; Levy *v.* Peters, 9 S. & R. 125; Fuller *v.* McDonald, 8 Greenl. 213; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 660, (9th edit.); Lawrence *v.* Ralston, 3 Bibb, 102; Richter *v.* Selin, 8 S. & R.

tial payment, to have this effect, must be made with a full knowledge of all the facts, must be unequivocal, and amount to an admission of the right of the holder.[1] So, the acceptance, by the indorser, of adequate *collateral security* from the maker, or accepting an assignment of all the maker's property, for this purpose, though it be inadequate, has been held a waiver of notice, if taken before the maturity of the note;[2] but not if taken afterwards.[3] Nor is an *assignment* of property to *trustees*, for the security, among others, of an indorser, sufficient to dispense with proof of a regular demand and notice.[4] And even an express waiver of notice, will not amount to a waiver of a demand on the maker of the note.[5] A known *usage* may also affect the general law on this subject. Thus, if a note is made payable at a particular bank, the usage of that bank, as to the mode and time of demand and notice, will bind the parties, whether they had knowledge of it or not; and if the note is discounted at a bank, its usages, known to the parties, are equally binding.[6]

§ 190 *a*. Proof of notice will also be *dispensed with*, where it was morally or physically impossible to give it; as, by the

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438; Pierson *v.* Hooker, 3 Johns. 71; Martin *v.* Ingersoll, 8 Pick. 1; Campbell *v.* Webster, 2 M. G. & S. 258, and cases there cited. Whether the evidence establishes the fact of a waiver, or admission, is a question for the Jury. Union Bank of Georgetown *v.* Magruder, 7 Pet. 287. Parol evidence of statements verbally made by the indorser, at the time of the blank indorsement of a note, though not admissible to vary the contract which the law implies from the indorsement, are admissible to show a waiver of a demand and notice. Sanborn *v.* Southard, 12 Shepl. 409.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Bond *v.* Farnham, 5 Mass. 70; Andrews *v.* Boyd, 3 Metc. 434; Mead *v.* Small, 2 Greenl. 207.

[3] Tower *v.* Durell, 9 Mass. 332.

[4] Creamer *v.* Perry, 17 Pick. 332.

[5] Berkshire Bank *v.* Jones, 6 Mass. 524; Backus *v.* Shipherd, 11 Wend. 629.

[6] Lincoln & Kennebec Bank *v.* Page, 9 Mass. 155; Blanchard *v.* Hilliard, 11 Mass. 85; Smith *v.* Whiting, 12 Mass. 6; City Bank *v.* Cutter, 3 Pick. 414.

absconding of the party, or where the holder was justifiably ignorant of the place of his abode; or, by the general prevalence of a malignant disease; or the sudden illness or death of the holder; or any other inevitable casualty or obstruction. The omission of notice is also excused, where the holder of the bill stands in the relation of an accommodation-holder or indorser to the drawer or other indorser, the latter being the real debtors. So, if the drawer of a bill had no right to draw, and no reasonable ground to expect that the bill would be honored by the drawee; as, if he had drawn it without funds in the hands of the drawee, or any expectation of funds in his hands to meet it, or any arrangement or agreement on his part to accept it; for in these cases he would have no remedy against any one in consequence of the dishonor of the bill. But if he were a mere accommodation drawer, or would be entitled to some remedy over against some other party, or would otherwise be exposed to loss and damage, he is entitled to notice. So, if having funds in the hands of the drawee, or on the way to him, the drawer has withdrawn, or stopped them, no proof of notice is requisite. Nor is it required in an action against the indorser of a bill or note, where he is the real debtor, for whose accommodation the instrument was created, and no funds have been provided in the hands of other parties for its payment. Nor, where, being an accommodation-indorser, he has received funds sufficient for the payment of the bill or note in full, and to secure him an ample indemnity. Nor, where, by arrangement between any of the parties, the necessity of notice has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with.[1]

§ 191. If the *notice* has been given *by letter* or other *writing*, it is now held, that secondary evidence of the contents of the letter or writing is admissible, without any previous notice to the defendant to produce the original; for the rule, which requires proof of notice to produce a paper, in order to let in secondary evidence of its contents, is not capable of applica-

[1] Story on Bills, § 308–317. Story on Promissory Notes, § 355–357.

tion to that, which is itself a notice, without opening an interminable inquiry.[1] But, where the secondary evidence is uncertain or doubtful, or without sufficient precision as to dates or the like, it is always expedient to give due notice to the defendant to produce the paper. And whenever notice to produce a paper is given, it should particularly specify the writing called for.[2]

§ 192. But the rule of not requiring notice to produce a written notice of the dishonor of a bill or note, is *restricted* to the bill or note, on which the *action is brought;* for if the question is upon notice of the dishonor of *other bills or notes*, notice to produce the letters giving such notice must be given and proved, as in ordinary cases.[3] And if notice to produce has been given, the attorney of the adverse party may be called, to testify whether he has in his possession the paper sought for; in order to let in secondary evidence of its contents.[4]

§ 193. When notice of the dishonor of a bill or note has been *given by letter*, it will in general suffice to show that a letter, containing information of the fact, and properly directed, was in due time put into the proper post-office, or left at the defendant's house.[5] It is ordinarily sufficient, that

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 561; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 656, 657, (9th edit.); Ackland *v.* Pierce, 2 Campb. 601; Roberts *v.* Bradshaw, 1 Stark. R. 28; Eagle Bank *v.* Chapin, 3 Pick. 180; Lindenberger *v.* Beall, 6 Wheat. 104.

[2] France *v.* Lucy, Ry. & M. 341; Jones *v.* Edwards, 1 M'Cl. & Y. 139; Morris *v.* Hauser, 2 M. & Rob. 392; Ante, Vol. 1, § 560 – 563; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 657, 658.

[3] Lanauze *v.* Palmer, 1 M. & Malk. 31; Aflalo *v.* Fourdrinier, Ibid. 335, n.

[4] Bevan *v.* Waters, 1 M. & Malk. 235; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 658, (9th edit.)

[5] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 658, (9th edit.); Story on Bills, § 297, 298, 300; Shed *v.* Brett, 1 Pick. 401; Hartford Bank *v.* Hart, 3 Day, 491. Delivery to the bell-man is sufficient. Pack *v.* Alexander, 3 M. & Scott, 789. And any delay in the post-office will not prejudice the holder who has sent the notice. Dobree *v.* Eastwood, 3 C. & P. 250; Woodcock *v.* Houldsworth, 15 M. & W. 124. It is not necessary that the notice should reach

it be directed to the town in which the party resides, though there may be several post-offices in it; unless it is known to the holder that he usually receives his letters at a particular office; in which case it should be directed to such office; the rule being, that the notice should be sent to the place where it will be most likely promptly to reach the party for whom it is intended.[1] In civil cases,[2] but not in criminal,[3] the *post-mark* on the letter will be sufficient *primâ facie* evidence of the time and place of putting it into the post-office. And if there is any doubt of the genuineness of the post-mark, it may be established by the evidence of any person in the habit of receiving letters with that mark, as well as by a clerk in the post-office.[4] The fact of sending the letter to the post-office, after evidence has been given that it was written, may be shown by proof of the general and invariable course of the plaintiff's business or office, in regard to the transmission of his letters to the post-office, with the testimony of all the persons, if living, whose duty it was to hand over the letters, or to carry them thither, that they invariably handed over, or carried all that were delivered to them, or were left in a certain place for that purpose; and if books and entries were kept, of such letters sent, they should be produced, with proof of the handwriting of deceased clerks, who may have made the entries. The mere proof of the course of the office or business, without calling the persons actually employed, if living, will not ordinarily suffice.[5]

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the party before the action is brought; it is sufficient that it is seasonably sent. New England Bank *v.* Lewis, 2 Pick. 128.

[1] See 1 Hare & Wallace's Leading Cases, p. 256, 257, and the authorities there cited.

[2] Arcangelo *v.* Thompson, 2 Campb. 623; New Haven County Bank *v.* Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206.

[3] Rex *v.* Watson, 1 Campb. 215.

[4] Abbey *v.* Lill, 5 Bing. 299; Woodcock *v.* Houldsworth, 15 M. & W. 124.

[5] Sturge *v.* Buchanan, 2 M. & Rob. 90; 10 Ad. & El. 598, S. C.; 2 Per. & Dav. 573, S. C.; Hetherington *v.* Kemp, 4 Campb. 193; Toosey *v.* Williams, 1 M. & Malk. 129; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 659, (9th edit.); Hawkes *v.* Salter, 4 Bing. 715; 1 M. & P. 750.

§ 194. As to the *place* to which *notice* may be sent, this may be either at the party's counting-room, or other place of business, or at his dwelling-house; or, at any other place agreed on by the parties. And if a verbal notice is sent to the place of business during the usual business hours, and no person is there to receive it, nothing more is required of the holder.[1]

§ 195. If no notice of dishonor has been given, or no presentment or protest has been made, the plaintiff may *excuse his neglect* by proof of facts, showing that presentment or notice was not requisite.[2] Thus, where the defendant was drawer of the bill, the want of presentment is excused by proving, that he had *no effects* in the hands of the drawee, and no reasonable grounds to expect that the bill would be honored, from the time it was drawn until it became due.[3] So if, having funds in the hands of the drawee, or on the way to him, the drawer has withdrawn or stopped them.[4] So, the want of notice of dishonor is excused, in an action against the drawer, by proof that the bill was accepted merely for the *accommodation* of the drawer, who was therefore bound at all events to pay it; and this fact may well be inferred by the Jury, if the bill is made payable at the drawer's own house.[5]

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[1] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 454, (9th edit.); Crosse *v.* Smith, 1 M. & S. 545; Whitwell *v.* Johnson. 17 Mass. 449; The State Bank *v.* Hurd, 12 Mass. 172. Allen *v.* Edmondson, 2 C. & K. 547.

[2] Where a note is payable at a certain place, and on demand after a certain time, no averment or proof of a demand is necessary to the maintenance of the action. Gammon *v.* Everett, 12 Shepl. 66.

[3] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 436, 437, (9th edit.); Story on Bills, § 308–317, 329, 367–369; Rucker *v.* Hiller, 16 East, 43; Legge *v.* Thorpe, 12 East, 171; Bickerdike *v.* Bollman, 1 T. R. 405; Hammond *v.* Dufrene, 3 Campb. 145. So, as to the indorser of a note. Corney *v.* Da Costa, 1 Esp. 302. See also Campbell *v.* Pettengill, 7 Greenl. 126; French *v.* Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch, 141; Austin *v.* Rodman, 1 Hawks, 194; Robinson *v.* Ames, 20 Johns. 146. And see Dollfus *v.* Frosch, 1 Denio, R. 367.

[4] Bayley on Bills, p. 296; Story on Bills, § 313.

[5] Sharp *v.* Bailey, 9 B. & C. 44; 4 M. & Ry. 4; Callott *v.* Haigh, 3 Campb. 281. If the transaction between the drawer and drawee is illegal,

And the want of effects in the drawee's hands, he being the drawer's banker, may be shown by the banker's books; the production and verification of which by one of his clerks is sufficient, though the entries are in the handwriting of several.[1] Nor is proof of notice requisite in an action against the indorser of a bill or note, where he is the real debtor, for whose accommodation the instrument was created, and no funds have been provided in the hands of other parties for its payment.[2] So, if the holder was *ignorant of the drawer's residence*, this excuses the want of notice to him, if he has made diligent inquiry for the place of his residence; of which fact the Jury will judge.[3] So, if the notice was *sent to the wrong person*, the mistake having arisen from indistinctness in the drawer's writing on the bill;[4] or, if the drawer verbally *waives* the notice, by promising to pay the bill, or to call and see if the bill is paid;[5] or, if the indorser himself informs the holder that the maker has absconded, and negotiates for further time of payment;[6] the want of notice is excused. If the agent of a corporation draws a bill in its name on its treasurer, payable to its own order, and indorses it in the name of the corporation; a presentment to the treasurer, and his refusal to honor the bill, is of itself notice to the corporation of both those facts.[7] So, if the presentment in season was impossible, by reason of unavoidable accident, a subse-

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the payee being the indorser, and conusant of the illegality, is liable without notice. Copp *v.* McDougall, 9 Mass. 1.

[1] Furness *v.* Cope, 5 Bing. 114.

[2] Story on Bills, § 314–316.

[3] Browning *v.* Kinnear, Gow, R. 81; Bateman *v.* Joseph, 12 East, 433; Harrison *v.* Fitzhenry, 3 Esp. 240; Siggers *v.* Brown, 1 M. & Rob. 520; Hopley *v.* Dufresne, 15 East, 275; Holford *v.* Wilson, 1 Taunt. 15; Whittier *v.* Graffham, 3 Greenl. 82.

[4] Hewitt *v.* Thomson, 1 M. & Rob. 541.

[5] Phipson *v.* Kneller, 4 Camp. 285; 1 Stark. R. 116; Chapman *v.* Annett, 1 C. & K. 552. Or if, before maturity of the note or bill, the indorser promises to pay, upon the agreement of the holder to enlarge the time. Norton *v.* Lewis, 2 Conn. 478.

[6] Leffingwell *v.* White, 1 Johns. Cas. 99.

[7] Commercial Bank *v.* St. Croix Man. Co. 10 Shepl. 280.

quent presentment, when it becomes possible, will excuse the delay.[1] But the actual insolvency of the maker of a note at the time when it fell due, does not excuse the want of notice to the indorser;[2] even though the fact was known to the indorser, who indorsed it to give it currency.[3] Nor does the insolvency of the acceptor excuse the want of notice to the drawer.[4]

§ 195 *a*. But in the case of a *banker's check*, the drawer is treated as in some sort the principal debtor; and he is not discharged by any laches of the holder, in not making due presentment, or in not giving him due notice of the dishonor, unless he has suffered some injury or loss thereby; and then only *pro tanto*. And the burden of proof is on the holder, to show, as part of his case, that no damage has accrued or can accrue to the drawer by his omission of any earlier demand or notice; or, in other words, that his situation, as regards the drawer, remains as it was at the time of the dishonor.[5]

§ 196. So, as we have already seen, if the drawer of a bill, after full notice of the laches of the holder, *pays part* of the bill, *or promises* to pay it, this excuses the want of evidence of due presentment, protest, and notice.[6] The *like evidence suffices* in an action against the *indorser* of a bill or note.[7]

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[1] Scholfield *v.* Bayard, 3 Wend. 488; Patience *v.* Townley, 2 Smith, R. 223.

[2] Groton *v.* Dalheim, 6 Greenl. 476; Jackson *v.* Richards, 2 Caines, 343; Crossen *v.* Hutchins, 9 Mass. 205; Sandford *v.* Dillaway, 10 Mass. 52.

[3] Nicholson *v.* Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 609; Buck *v.* Cotton, 2 Conn. 126; Gower *v.* Moore, 12 Shepl. 16.

[4] Whitfield *v.* Savage, 2 B. & P. 277; May *v.* Coffin, 4 Mass. 341.

[5] Story on Promissory Notes, § 492, 498; 3 Kent. Comm. 104, note (*a*), 5th edit.; Little *v.* Phenix Bank, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 425; Kemble *v.* Mills, 1 M. & Gr. 757.

[6] Ante, § 190; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 660, (9th edit.); Duryee *v.* Dennison, 5 Johns. 248; Miller *v.* Hackley, Ibid. 375; Crain *v.* Colwell, 8 Johns. 384.

[7] Ibid.; Taylor *v.* Jones, 2 Campb. 105. See also Trimble *v.* Thorn, 16 Johns. 152; Jones *v.* Savage, 6 Wend. 658; Leonard *v.* Gary, 10 Wend. 504.

But it has been considered, that, though the waiver, by the *drawer*, of his right to presentment and notice, may be inferred from circumstances and by implication, yet that an *indorser* is not chargeable after laches by the holder, unless upon his *express promise* to pay.[1]

§ 197. It may be proper here to add, that, where *matter in excuse* of the want of demand and notice is relied upon, it is *usual to declare* as if there had been due presentment and notice, some latitude in the mode of proof being allowed, and the evidence being regarded not strictly as matter in excuse, but as proof of a qualified presentment and demand, or of acts which, in their legal effect, and by the custom of merchants, are equivalent thereto. Moreover, in all cases, where a note is given in evidence upon the money counts, any proof which establishes the plaintiff's right to recover upon the note, supports the count.[2]

§ 198. The DEFENCE to an action on a bill of exchange or a promissory note, most frequently is founded on some defect of proof on the part of the plaintiff, in making out his own title to recover; which has already been considered. Several other issues, such as *Infancy Tender*, the *Statute of Limitations*, &c., which are common to all actions of Assumpsit, will be treated under those particular titles. It will therefore remain to consider some defences, which are peculiar to actions on bills and notes.

§ 199. In regard to the *consideration*, it is well settled in

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[1] Borradaile *v.* Lowe, 4 Taunt. 93. And see Wilkinson *v.* Jadis, 1 M. & Rob. 41; 2 B. & Ad. 188; Lord *v.* Chadbourne, 8 Greenl. 198; Fuller *v.* McDonald, Ibid. 213.

[2] North Bank *v.* Abbot, 13 Pick. 465, 469, 470; Hill *v.* Heap, 1 D. & R. 57. — And see Cory *v.* Scott, 3 B. & Ald. 619, 625, per Holroyd, J. acc. But Bailey, J. was inclined to think, that the excuse for want of notice should be specially alleged. Id. p. 624. See also, in accordance with the text, Norton *v.* Lewis, 2 Conn. R. 478; Williams *v.* Matthews, 3 Cowen, 252.

the law merchant, that, in negotiable securities, in the hands of innocent third persons, a valid and sufficient consideration for the drawing or acceptance is conclusively presumed. But, as between the original parties, and those identified in equity with them, this presumption is not conclusive but disputable, and the consideration is open to inquiry. Wherever, therefore, the plaintiff, being an indorsee, is shown to stand in the place of the original promisee or party, as, by receiving the security after it was dishonored, or the like, the defendant, as we have already seen,[1] may set up the defence of illegality or insufficiency in the consideration; in which case he must be prepared with evidence to prove the circumstances under which the bill or note was drawn, and that it was transferred after its dishonor.[2] Thus, in an action against the acceptor of a bill, given for the price of a horse, warranted sound, it appearing that the holder of the bill and the original payee were identical in interest, the breach of the warranty, with

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[1] Ante, § 170. At what time a note, payable on demand, is to be considered by the purchaser as a dishonored security, merely from its age, is not perfectly clear, and perhaps the case does not admit of determination by any fixed period, but must be left to be determined upon its own circumstances. In Barough *v.* White, 4 B. & C. 325, the time of the transfer of the note does not appear; but it was payable *with interest*, which Bayley, J. mentioned as indicating the understanding of the parties, that it would remain for some time unpaid. See also Sanford *v.* Mickles, 4 Johns. 224; Losee *v.* Dunkin, 7 Johns. 70; Thurston *v.* McKown, 6 Mass. 76. In the last case, the note had been running seven days from the date, and was held not dishonored. But the lapse of eight months, and upwards, has been held sufficient evidence of dishonor. Ayer *v.* Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; see also Freeman *v.* Haskins, 2 Caines, 368; Sylvester *v.* Crapo, 15 Pick. 92; Sice *v.* Cunningham, 1 Cowen, 397, 408–410. In this case the lapse of five months was held to discharge the indorser. See 3 Kent, Comm. p. 91, 92. By a statute of Massachusetts, respecting notes payable on demand, a demand made at the end of sixty days from the date, without grace, or at any earlier period, is to be deemed made in reasonable time; but after sixty days it is deemed over-due. Stat. 1839, ch. 121.

[2] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 648, 662, (9th edit.); Webster *v.* Lee, 5 Mass. 334; Ranger *v.* Carey, 1 Metc. 369; Wilbour *v.* Turner, 5 Pick. 526. Thus he may show that the note or bill was void, by the statute of the State, being made and delivered on Sunday. Lovejoy *v.* Whipple, 3 Washb. 379. And see Story on Contracts, § 616–620, 2d edit.

an offer to return the horse, were held to constitute a good defence.[1] If the consideration has only *partially* failed, and the deficiency is susceptible of definite computation, this may be shown in defence *pro tanto.* But if the precise amount to be deducted is *unliquidated*, this cannot be shown in reduction of damages, but the defendant must resort to his cross action.[2] Mere *inadequacy* of consideration cannot be shown simply to reduce the damages, though it may be proved as evidence of fraud, in order to defeat the entire action.[3]

§ 200. How far *other equities* between the original parties may be set up in defence, against an indorsee affected with actual or constructive notice, is a question on which the decisions are not perfectly uniform. It has already been intimated,[4] that in the law merchant, the equities thus permitted to be set up, are those only which attach to the particular bill, and not those arising from other transactions. But in the Courts of several of the United States, the defendant has been permitted, in many cases, to claim any set-off, which he might have claimed against the original party, though founded on other transactions.[5] In all cases, where the plaintiff is identified with the original contracting party,

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[1] Lewis *v.* Cosgrave, 2 Taunt. 2.

[2] See Ante, tit. ASSUMPSIT; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 76–79, 662, (9th edit.)

[3] Solomon *v.* Turner, 1 Stark. R. 51.

[4] Ante, § 171; Burrough *v.* Moss, 10 B. & C. 558; Story on Bills, § 187, and note (3); Story on Promissory Notes, § 178. Though the note is made payable to the maker's own order, he will be entitled to the same defence against an indorsee who received it when over-due, as if it were made payable to and indorsed by a third person. Potter *v.* Tyler, 2 Metc. 58.

[5] Sargent *v.* Southgate, 5 Pick. 312; Ayer *v.* Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; Holland *v.* Makepiece, 8 Mass. 418; Shirley *v.* Todd, 9 Greenl. 83. See also the cases cited in Bayley on Bills, p. 544–548, Phillips & Sewall's notes, 2d Am. edit.; Tucker *v.* Smith, 4 Greenl. 415; Sylvester *v.* Crapo, 15 Pick. 92. By a statute of Massachusetts, the maker of a note payable on demand, is admitted to any defence against the indorsee, which would be open to him in a suit brought by the payee. Stat. 1839, ch. 121.

the declarations of the latter, made while the interest was in him, are admissible in evidence for the defendant.[1] But, where the plaintiff does not stand on the title of the prior party, but on that acquired by the *bonâ fide* taking of the bill, it is otherwise.[2]

§ 201. The acceptor of a bill may also show as a defence, that his *acceptance* has been *discharged* by the holder; as, if the holder informs him that he has settled the bill with the drawer, and that he need give himself no further trouble; or, where the holder knowing him to be an accommodation acceptor, and having goods of the drawer, from the proceeds of which he expects payment, informs him that he shall look to the drawer alone, and shall not come upon the acceptor; or, if he should falsely state to the acceptor, that the bill was paid, or otherwise discharged, whereby the acceptor should be induced to give up any collateral security; or, if he should expressly agree to consider the acceptance at an end, and make no demand on the acceptor for several years.[3] And whatever discharges the acceptor, will discharge the indorser; as, indeed, whatever act of the holder discharges the principal debtor, will also discharge all others contingently liable, upon his default;[4] and, more generally speaking, the release of any party, whether drawer or indorser, will discharge from payment of the bill every other party to whom the party released would have been liable; if such party released should have paid the bill.[5]

202. If the defendant is not the principal and absolute

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 190; Beauchamp *v.* Parry, 1 B. & Ad. 89; Welstead *v.* Levy, 1 M. & Rob. 138; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 664, 665, (9th ed.); Shirley *v.* Todd, 9 Greenl. 83; Hatch *v.* Dennis, 1 Fairf. 244; Pocock *v.* Billings, 2 Bing. 269; Hackett *v.* Martin, 8 Greenl. 77.

[2] Smith *v.* De Wruitz, Ry. & M. 212; Shaw *v.* Broom, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 730.

[3] Story on Bills, § 252, 265–268, 430–433.

[4] Story on Bills, § 437, 269, 270.

[5] Story on Bills, § 270; Sargent *v.* Appleton, 6 Mass. 85.

debtor, but is a party collaterally and *contingently liable*, upon the principal debtor's default, as is the drawer or indorser, he may set up in defence any valid *agreement* between the holder of the security and the principal debtor, founded upon an adequate consideration, and made without his own concurrence, whereby a *new and further time of payment* is given to the principal debtor; and this, though the liability of the drawer or indorser had previously become fixed and absolute, by due presentment, protest, and notice.[1] But mere neglect to sue the principal debtor, or a receipt of part payment from him, will not have this effect.[2] This defence, however, may be rebutted on the part of the plaintiff, by proof that the agreement was made with the assent of the defendant; or, that after full notice of it, he promised to pay;[3] or, that the agreement was without consideration, and therefore not binding.[4]

§ 203. The *competency* of the *parties* to a bill or note, as *witnesses*, in an action upon it between other parties, has been briefly considered in the preceding volume;[5] where it has been shown that they are generally held admissible or not, like any other witnesses, according as they are or are not interested in the event of the suit. Thus, in an action against the acceptor of a bill, *the drawer* is a competent witness for either party; for if the plaintiff recovers, he pays the bill by the hands of the acceptor, and if not, then he is liable himself for the amount.[6] So, if a bill has been drawn by

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[1] Story on Bills, § 425, 426, 427; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 408-415, (9th ed.); Philpot *v.* Bryant, 4 Bing. 717, 721; Bank of United States *v.* Hatch, 6 Peters, R. 250.

[2] Ibid.; Kennedy *v.* Motte, 3 McCord, 13; Walwyn *v.* S. Quintin, 1 B. & P. 652; Frazier *v.* Dick, 5 Rob. Louis. R. 219.

[3] Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 415, 416, (9th edit.); Story on Bills, § 426.

[4] McLemore *v.* Powell, 12 Wheat. 554.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 399. Whether a party to a negotiable instrument, which he has put into circulation, is a competent witness to prove it void in its creation, *quære;* and see Ante, Vol. 1, § 383, 384, 385.

[6] Dickinson *v.* Prentice, 4 Esp. 32; Rich *v.* Topping, Peake's Cas. 224;

one *partner* in the name of the firm, to pay his own private debt, another member of the firm is a competent witness for the acceptor, to prove that the bill was drawn without authority.[1] But if the acceptance was given for the accommodation of the drawer, he is not a competent witness for the acceptor, to prove usury in the discounting of the bill, without a release.[2] Nor is he competent, where the amount of his liability over, in either event of the suit, is not equal.[3]

§ 204. So, also, in an action against one of several *makers of a note*, another *maker* of the same note is a competent witness for the plaintiff, as he stands indifferent;[4] but not for the defendant, to prove illegality of consideration.[5] The maker is also a competent witness for the plaintiff, in an action by the indorsee against the indorser.[6] But it seems, that he is not competent for the defendant in such action, if the note was made and indorsed for his own accommodation; for a verdict for the plaintiff, in such case, would be evidence against him.[7]

§ 205. The *acceptor*, or *drawee* of a bill is also a competent witness, in an action between the holder and the drawer, to prove that he had no funds of the drawer in his hands; for this evidence does not affect his liability to the drawer.[8]

Lowber *v.* Shaw, 5 Mason, 241; Humphrey *v.* Moxon, Peake's Cas. 72; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 673, (9th edit.); Storer *v.* Logan, 9 Mass. 55.

1 Ridley *v.* Taylor, 13 East, 176.

2 Hardwick *v.* Blanchard, Gow, R. 113; Burgess *v.* Cuthil, 6 C. & P. 282.

3 Scott *v.* McLellan, 2 Greenl. 199; Jones *v.* Brooke, 4 Taunt. 463; Ante, Vol. 1, § 401; Faith *v.* McIntyre, 7 C. & P. 44.

4 York *v.* Blott, 5 M. & S. 71.

5 Slegg *v.* Phillips, 4 Ad. & El. 852.

6 Venning *v.* Shuttleworth, Bayley on Bills, 422, [536,] [593]; Fox *v.* Whitney, 16 Mass. 118; Baker *v.* Briggs, 8 Pick. 122; Levi *v.* Essex, 2 Esp. Dig. 707; Ante Vol. 1, § 329, 400; Skelding *v.* Warren, 15 Johns. 270.

7 Pierce *v.* Butler, 14 Mass. 303; Van Schaack *v.* Stafford, 12 Pick. 565; Hubbly *v.* Brown, 16 Johns. 70.

8 Staples *v.* Okines, 1 Esp. 332; Legge *v.* Thorpe, 2 Campb. 310.

And even the declaration of the drawee to the same effect, if made at the time of presentment and refusal to accept the bill, is admissible as *primâ facie* evidence of that fact, against the drawer.[1] But it has been held, that a joint acceptor is not competent to prove a set-off, in an action by the holder against the drawer, because he is answerable to the latter for the amount which the plaintiff may recover.[2] Nor is he a competent witness for the drawer, to prove that he received it from the drawer to get it discounted, and delivered it to the plaintiff for that purpose, but, that the plaintiff had not furnished the money; for being absolutely bound, by his acceptance, to pay the bill, he is bound to indemnify the drawer against the costs of the suit.[3]

§ 206. In an action by the indorsee against the drawer of a bill, the *payee* is a competent witness to prove the consideration for the indorsement.[4] The payee of a note, who has indorsed it without recourse, is also a competent witness to prove its execution by the maker.[5] But where the note was payable to the payee *or bearer*, the payee has been held inadmissible to prove the signature of the maker, on the ground, that he was responsible upon an implied guaranty, that the signature was not forged.[6]

§ 207. In an action by the indorsee against the drawer or acceptor, an *indorser* is in general a competent witness for

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[1] Prideaux *v.* Collier, 2 Stark. R. 57; Ante, Vol. 1, § 108, 109, 111, 113.

[2] Mainwaring *v.* Mytton, 1 Stark. R. 83; Ante, Vol. 1, § 401. *Sed quære;* for it seems that the acceptor would be liable to the drawer for the whole amount of the bill which he had not paid to the holder. Reid *v.* Furnival, 5 C. & P. 499; 1 C. & M. 538, S. C.; Johnson *v.* Kennison, 2 Wils. 262.

[3] Edmonds *v.* Lowe, 8 B. & C. 407; 2 M. & R. 427, S. C.

[4] Shuttleworth *v.* Stephens, 1 Campb. 407, 408.

[5] Rice *v.* Stearns, 3 Mass. 225. Or, that the note had been fraudulently altered; Parker *v.* Hanson, 7 Mass. 470; or, fraudulently circulated; Woodhull *v.* Holmes, 10 Johns. 231.

[6] Herrick *v.* Whitney, 15 Johns. 240; Shaver *v.* Ehle, 16 Johns. 201.

either party, as he stands indifferent between them.[1] But an intermediate indorser of a bill is not a competent witness, in a suit on the bill by a subsequent indorsee against a prior indorser, to prove notice of its non-acceptance.[2] Thus, under the general rule that the indorser, standing indifferent, is a competent witness, he has been admitted to prove payment;[3] time of negotiation by indorsement;[4] alteration of date by fraud;[5] want of interest in the indorsee;[6] usury;[7] and the fact of his own indorsement.[8] So, to prove that the claim, which the defendant insisted on by way of set-off, was acquired by him after he had notice of the transfer of the note to the plaintiff.[9] And generally the payee, after having indorsed the note is competent to prove any matters arising after the making of the note, which may affect the right of the holder to recover against the maker.[10]

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[1] Richardson *v.* Allan, 2 Stark. R. 334; Stevens *v.* Lynch, 2 Campb. 332; 12 East, 38, S. C.; Birt *v.* Kershaw, 2 East, 458; Charrington *v.* Milner, Peake's Cas. 6; Reay *v.* Packwood, 7 Ad. & El. 917; Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 674, (9th edit.) But see Barkins *v.* Wilson, 6 Cowen, 471. See further, Ante, Vol. 1, § 385, n. (1), and § 399–401.

[2] Talbot *v.* Clark, 8 Pick. 51; Cropper *v.* Nelson, 3 Wash. 125. But a prior indorser has been held a competent witness for the defendant, in an action against a subsequent indorsér. Hall *v.* Hale, 8 Conn. 336.

[3] Warren *v.* Merry, 3 Mass. 27; White *v.* Kibling, 11 Johns. 128; Bryant *v.* Ritterbush, 2 N. H. 212. So, in Louisiana, if the indorser has not been charged with notice. Bourg *v.* Bringier, 20 Martin, R. 507.

[4] Baker *v.* Arnold, 1 Caines, 258; Baird *v.* Cochran, 4 S. & R. 397; Smith *v.* Lovett, 11 Pick. 417.

[5] Parker *v.* Hanson, 7 Mass. 470; Shamburg *v.* Commagere, 10 Martin, R. 18.

[6] Barker *v.* Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430.

[7] Tuthill *v.* Davis, 20 Johns. 287.

[8] Richardson *v.* Allan, 2 Stark. R. 334.

[9] Zeigler *v.* Gray, 12 S. & R. 42.

[10] See the cases already cited in this section. Also, Powell *v.* Waters, 17 Johns. 176; McFadden *v.* Maxwell, Ib. 188.

CARRIERS.

§ 208. There is no distinction, in regard to their duties and liabilities, between carriers of goods by water and carriers by land, nor between carriers by ships, steamboats, and barges, and by railroad cars and wagons. The action against a carrier in any of these modes, is usually in *assumpsit* upon the contract; and this is generally preferable, as the remedy in this form survives against his executor or administrator. The declaration involves three points of fact, which the plaintiff must establish, upon the general issue; namely, the contract; the delivery of the goods, or, in the case of a passenger, his being in the carriage; and the defendant's breach of promise or duty. Carriers are also liable in trover, for the goods, and in case, sounding in tort, for malfeasance or misfeasance; but though the remedy in tort is on some accounts preferable to *assumpsit*,[1] the form of action does not very materially affect the evidence necessary to maintain it.

§ 209. In any form of action, the *contract* must be proved as laid in the declaration.[2] If the contract is stated as absolute, proof of a contract in the alternative will not support the allegation, even though the option has been determined;[3] neither will it be supported by proof of a contract containing an exception from certain classes of liability; as, for example, that the carrier will not be responsible for losses by fire, perils of the seas, or the like.[4] But if the exception does not extend

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[1] See 1 Chitty on Plead. 161, 162, (7th edit.), [125, 126]; Govett *v.* Radnidge, 3 East, 70.

[2] Ireland *v.* Johnson, 1 Bing. N. C. 162; Bretherton *v.* Wood, 3 B. & B. 54; Max *v.* Roberts, 12 East, 89.

[3] Penny *v.* Porter, 2 East, 2; Yate *v.* Willan, Ib. 128; Ante, Vol. 1, § 58, 66; Hilt *v.* Campbell, 6 Greenl. 109.

[4] Latham *v.* Rutley, 2 B. & C. 20. And see Smith *v.* Moore, 6 Greenl. 274; Ferguson *v.* Cappeau, 6 H. & J. 394.

to the obligation of the contract itself, but only affects the damages to be recovered, the declaration may be general, without any mention of the exception, the proof of which at the trial will be no *variance*. Thus, where the action was in the common form of *assumpsit*, and the evidence was, that the carrier had given notice, that he would not be accountable for a greater sum than £5 for goods, unless they were entered as such and paid for accordingly, the variance was held immaterial.[1] And if, in a like form of action by the consignor of goods, the allegation is, that the consideration or hire was to be paid by the plaintiff, and the evidence is, that it was to be paid by the consignee, it is no variance ; the consignor being still in law liable.[2] A variance between the allegation and proof of the *termini*, will be fatal.[3] But here, the place, mentioned as the *terminus*, is to be taken in its popular extent, and not strictly according to its corporate and legal limits ; and therefore an averment of a contract to carry from London to Bath, is supported by evidence of a contract to carry from Westminster to Bath.[4] But in an action on the case for non-delivery of goods, the *terminus a quo* is not material.[5]

§ 210. If the defendant is alleged and proved to be a *common carrier*, the law itself supplies the proof of the contract, so far as regards the extent or degree of his liability. But if he is not a common carrier, the terms of his undertaking must be proved by the plaintiff. And in either case,

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[1] Clark *v.* Gray, 6 East, 564.

[2] Moore *v.* Wilson, 1 T. R. 659; Turney *v.* Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340; Moore *v.* Sheridine, 2 H. & McH. 453. If the declaration is on a loss by negligent carrying, it will not be supported by proof of a loss in the defendant's warehouse, before the goods were taken to the coach to be carried. Roskell *v.* Waterhouse, 2 Stark. R. 461; In re Webb, 8 Taunt. 443; 2 Moore, 500, S. C.

[3] Tucker *v.* Cracklin, 2 Stark. R. 385.

[4] Beckford *v.* Crutwell, 1 M. & Rob. 187; 5 C. & P. 242, S. C.; Ditcham *v.* Chivis, 4 Bing. 706; 1 M. & Payne, 735, S. C. See also Burbige *v.* Jakes, 1 B. & P. 225.

[5] Woodward *v.* Booth, 7 B. & C. 301.

where there is an express contract, that alone must be relied on, and no other can be implied.[1] If it appear that the goods were delivered by the owner to one common carrier, and that he, without the owner's knowledge or authority, delivered them over to another, to be carried, this evidence will support an action brought directly against the latter, with whom the contract will be deemed to have been made through the agency of the former, ratified by bringing the action.[2]

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[1] Robinson *v.* Dunmore, 2 B. & P. 416; 2 Steph. N. P. 994, 995.

[2] Sanderson *v.* Lamberton, 6 Binn. 129. The declaration against a common carrier is as follows — "For that whereas the said (*defendant*) on —— was a common carrier of goods and chattels for hire, from —— to ——; and being such carrier, the plaintiff then, at the request of the said (*defendant*) caused to be delivered to him certain goods of the plaintiff, to wit, [*here describe them*] of the value of —— to be taken care of and safely and securely conveyed by the said (*defendant*) as such carrier, from said —— to said ——, there to be safely and securely delivered by said (*defendant*) to the plaintiff, (*or*, to ——, *if the case is so*,) for a certain reward to be paid to the said (*defendant*); in consideration whereof the said (*defendant*) as such carrier then received said goods accordingly, and became bound by law and undertook and promised the plaintiff to take care of said goods, and safely and securely to carry and convey the same from said —— to said ——, and there to deliver the same safely and securely, to the plaintiff (*or*, to ——,) as aforesaid. Yet the said (*defendant*) did not take care of said goods, nor safely and securely carry and convey and deliver the same as aforesaid; but on the contrary, the said (*defendant*) so negligently conducted and so misbehaved in regard to said goods in his said calling of common carrier, that by reason thereof the said goods became and were wholly lost to the plaintiff."

Against a private carrier, charged with the loss of goods by negligence, the declaration in *assumpsit* is as follows: —

— "For that on —— in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the said (*defendant*) had delivered to him certain goods and chattels, to wit, [*here describe them*], of the value of ——, to be safely conveyed by him from —— to ——, for a certain reward to be paid to the said (*defendant*), he the said (*defendant*) promised the plaintiff to take due care of said goods, while he had charge of the same, and with due care to convey the same from —— to —— aforesaid, and there safely to deliver the same to the plaintiff, (*or*, to ——, *as the case may be*.) Yet the said (*defendant*) did not take due care of said goods while he had charge of the same as aforesaid, nor did he with due care convey and deliver the same as aforesaid; but on the contrary so carelessly and improperly conducted in regard to said goods, that by reason thereof they became and were wholly lost to the plaintiff."

§ 211. The defendant is *proved* to be a *common carrier*, by evidence that he undertakes to carry for persons generally, exercising it as a public employment, and holding himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of money or goods for hire, as a business, and not as a casual occupation.[1] This description includes both carriers by land and by water; namely, proprietors of stage wagons, coaches, and railroad cars, truckmen, wagoners, teamsters, cartmen, and porters; as well as owners and masters of ships and steamboats, carrying on general freight, and lightermen, hoymen, barge-owners, ferrymen, canal-boatmen, and others, employed in like manner.[2] But hackney coachmen, and others, whose employment is solely to carry passengers, are not regarded as common carriers in respect of the persons of the passengers, but only as to their baggage, and the parcels which they are in the practice of conveying.[3] Nor is evidence that the defendant kept a booking-office for a considerable number of coaches and wagons, sufficient of itself to prove him a common carrier.[4]

§ 212. The *contract* must also appear to have been made *with the plaintiff* and *by the defendant*. If, therefore, the goods were sent by the vendor to the vendee, at the risk of the latter, the contract of the carrier is with the vendee, whose agent he becomes by receiving the goods, and who alone is entitled to sue; unless the vendor expressly contracted with the carrier, in his own behalf, for the payment of the freight; or the property was not to pass to the vendee until the goods reached his hands; in which case the vendor is the proper plaintiff.[5] If goods are ordered by the vendee, but

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[1] Story on Bailm. § 495.

[2] Story on Bailm. § 496, 497.

[3] Story on Bailm. § 498, 499, 500, 590–604.

[4] Upston *v.* Slark, 2 C. & P. 598.

[5] Dawes *v.* Peck, 8 T. R. 330, 332; Hart *v.* Sattley, 3 Campb. 528; Moore *v.* Wilson, 1 T. R. 659; Davis *v.* James, 5 Burr. 2680; Sargent *v.* Morris, 3 B. & Ald. 277.

no order at all is given in regard to sending them; and yet the vendor sends them by a common carrier, by whom they are lost; the carrier in such case is the agent of the vendor alone, and the action for the loss is maintainable by him only.[1] So, where the goods were obtained of the vendor by a pretended purchase, by a swindler, who got possession of them by the negligence of the carrier; as no property had legally passed to the consignee, the carrier's implied contract was held to be with the vendor alone.[2] If the transaction was had with the mere servant of the carrier, such as a driver, or porter, the contract is legally made with the master; unless the servant expressly undertook to carry the parcel on his own account, in which case he is liable.[3] And it is sufficient if the goods were delivered to a person, and at a house, where parcels were in the habit of being left for the carrier.[4]

§ 213. If a *receipt* was given for the goods, it should be produced; and notice should be given to the defendant to produce his book of entries, and way-bill, if any, in order to show a delivery of the goods to him.[5] The plaintiff should also prove what orders were given at the time of delivery, as to the carriage of the goods, and the direction written upon the package.[6] If the *loss or non-delivery* of the goods is alleged, the plaintiff must give some evidence in support of the allegation, notwithstanding its negative character.[7] And in proof of the loss, the declaration of the defendant's coach-

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1 Coats *v.* Chaplin, 3 Ad. & El. 483, N. S. And see Freeman *v.* Birch, Ibid. 491, n.

2 Duff *v.* Budd, 3 B. & B. 177; Stephenson *v.* Hart, 4 Bing. 476.

3 Williams *v.* Cranston, 2 Stark. R. 82.

4 Burrell *v.* North, 2 C. & K. 681.

5 Where there are several owners, but the receipt mentions some of them only, it is still admissible evidence for them all, accompanied by proof of title in them all. Day *v.* Ridley. 16 Verm. R. (1 Washb.) 48.

6 2 Stark. Ev. 200.

7 Tucker *v.* Cracklin, 2 Stark. R. 385; Griffith *v.* Lee, 1 C. & P. 110; Day *v.* Ridley, 1 Washb. 48.

man or driver, in answer to an inquiry made of him for the goods, is competent evidence for the plaintiff.[1] In proof of the *contents* of a lost trunk or box, it has been held that the plaintiff's own affidavit is admissible, where the case, from its nature, furnishes no better evidence.[2]

§ 214. If several are *jointly interested* in the profits of a coach or wagon, whether it be owned by one or all, they are jointly liable, though, by agreement among themselves, one finds the horses and driver for one part of the road only, and another for another.[3] If the declaration is in *assumpsit*, a joint contract by all the defendants must be proved, by evidence of their joint ownership, or otherwise. And if the action is in *tort*, setting forth the contract, the contract itself must be proved as laid; though, where the action is founded on a breach of Common Law duty, which is a misfeasance, and is several in its nature, as in an action against common carriers, upon the custom, judgment may be rendered against some only, and not all of the defendants.[4]

§ 215. It is now well settled, that a common carrier may *qualify his liability*, by a *general notice* to all who may employ him, of any reasonable requisition to be observed on their part, in regard to the manner of delivery and entry of parcels, and the information to be given to him of their con-

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[1] Mayhew *v.* Nelson, 6 C. & P. 58. But proof of a loss will not alone support a count in trover. Ross *v.* Johnson, 5 Burr. 2825.

[2] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 348; David *v.* Moore, 2 Watts & Serg. 230. And see Butler *v.* Basing, 2 C. & P. 613. In Clark *v.* Spence, 10 Watts, 335, it was thought by Rogers, J., that this rule applied with peculiar force to wearing apparel, and other articles convenient for a traveller, which, in most cases, are packed by the party himself, in his own trunk, and which would therefore admit of no other proof. But it has been decided, in a recent case against a railroad company, for the loss of a traveller's trunk, that the plaintiff could not be a witness. Snow *v.* Eastern R. R. Co. 12 Metc. 44.

[3] Waland *v.* Elkins, 1 Stark. R. 272; Fromont *v.* Coupland, 2 Bing. 170. And see Barton *v.* Hanson, 2 Taunt. 49; Helsby *v.* Mears, 5 B. & C. 504.

[4] Bretherton *v.* Wood, 3 B. & B. 54; Bank of Orange *v.* Brown, 3 Wend. 158. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 64.

tents, the rates of freight, and the like; as, for example, that he will not be responsible for goods above the value of a certain sum, unless they are entered as such, and paid for accordingly. But the right of a common carrier, by a general notice to *limit*, *restrict*, or *avoid the liability* devolved on him by the Common Law on the most salutary grounds of public policy, has been denied in American Courts, after the most elaborate consideration; and therefore a public notice by stage coach proprietors, that "all baggage" was "at the risk of the owners," though the notice was brought home to the plaintiff, has been held not to release them from their liability as common carriers.[1] Nor does such a notice apply at all to goods not belonging to any passenger in the coach.[2]

§ 216. But in every case of public notice, the *burden of proof* is on the *carrier*, to show that the person with whom he deals, is fully informed of its tenor and extent.[3] And therefore, if any advertisement is posted up, emblazoning in large letters the advantages of the conveyance, but stating the limit of his liability in small characters, at the bottom, it is not sufficient.[4] It must be in such characters and situation, that a person delivering goods at the place could not

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[1] Hollister *v.* Newlen, 19 Wend. 234; Jones *v.* Voorhees, 10 Ohio R. 145; Cole *v.* Goodwin, Ib. 251; Story on Bailm. § 554, (2d edit.) note. Fisk *v.* Chapman, 2 Kelly, 349. The right of a common carrier in England to limit or affect his liability at Common Law, is now restricted, by Stat. 11 Geo. 4, & 1 W. 4, ch. 68, to certain enumerated articles, exceeding £10 in value, the nature and value of which must be declared at the time of delivery, and an increased charge paid or engaged; the notice to that effect to be conspicuously posted up in the receiving house, which shall conclusively bind the parties sending, without further proof of its having come to their knowledge. But this statute, it seems, does not protect the carrier from the consequences of his own gross negligence. Owen *v.* Burnett, 2 C. & M. 353.

[2] Dwight *v.* Brewster, 1 Pick. 50. And see Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. *v.* Burke, 13 Wend. 611.

[3] Butler *v.* Heame, 2 Campb. 415, per Ld. Ellenborough; Kerr *v.* Willan, 2 Stark. R. 53; Macklin *v.* Waterhouse, 5 Bing. 212.

[4] Ibid.

fail to read it, without gross negligence; and even then, it affects only those whose goods are received at that place; for if received at a distance from the carrier's office, though at an intermediate point between the *termini* of his route, he must prove notice to the owner through some other medium.[1] And in an action against a carrier, the defendant must satisfy the Jury, that the notice was actually communicated to the plaintiff. If it was posted up, or advertised in a newspaper, it must appear that he read it. In the latter case, the advertisement affords no ground for an inference of notice, unless it be proved, that the plaintiff was in the habit of taking or reading the newspaper, in which it was inserted; and even then, the Jury are not bound to find the fact.[2] In the case of notice posted up in the carrier's office, proof that the plaintiff's servant, who brought the goods, looked at the board on which the notice was painted, is not sufficient, if the servant himself testifies that he did not read it.[3]

§ 217. Where there are *several notices*, the carrier must take care that they are all of the same tenor; for if they differ from each other, he will be bound by that which is least favorable to himself.[4]

§ 218. If such *notice* is proved by the carrier, and brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiff, its effect may be *avoided* by evidence on the part of the plaintiff, that the loss was occasioned by the *malfeasance*, *misfeasance*, or *negli-*

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[1] Clayton *v.* Hunt, 3 Campb. 27; Gouger *v.* Jolly, Holt's Cas. 317.

[2] Rowley *v.* Horne, 3 Bing. 2; 10 Moore, 247; Leeson *v.* Holt, 1 Stark. R. 186.

[3] Kerr *v.* Willan, 2 Stark. R. 53; 6 M. & S. 150; Davis *v.* Willan, 2 Stark. R. 279. The printed conditions of a line of public coaches are sufficiently made known to passengers by being posted up, in conspicuous characters, at the place where they book their names. And where the handbill, containing such conditions had been posted up four years before, and could not now be found, parol evidence of its contents was held admissible. Whitesell *v.* Crane, 8 W. & S. 369.

[4] Munn *v.* Baker, 2 Stark. R. 256; Cobden *v.* Bolton, 2 Campb. 108; Gouger *v.* Jolly, Holt's Cas. 317; Story on Bailm. § 558.

gence of the carrier or his servants; for the terms are uniformly construed not to exempt him from such losses.[1] Thus, if he converts the goods to a wrong use, or delivers them to the wrong person, he is liable, notwithstanding such notice.[2] So, though there be notice by a passenger-carrier, that "all baggage is at the risk of the owner," he will still be liable for any loss occasioned to the baggage by a culpable defect in the vehicle.[3] The effect of the notice may also be avoided by proof of a *waiver* of it, on the part of the carrier; as, if he is informed of the value of the parcel, and is desired to charge what he pleases, which shall be paid if the parcel is taken care of; and he charges only the ordinary freight;[4] or, if he expressly undertakes to carry a parcel of more than the limited value, for a specified compensation.[5] But in all such cases of notice, the *burden of proof* of the negligence, malfeasance, or misfeasance, or of the waiver, is on the party who sent the goods.[6]

§ 219. It is ordinarily a good *defence* for a *private* carrier, that the loss or injury to the goods was occasioned by inevitable accident; but a *common* carrier is responsible for all losses and damages, except those caused by the act of God or by public enemies. By the *act of God*, is meant a natural necessity, which could not have been occasioned by the intervention of man, but proceeds from physical causes alone; such as, the violence of the winds or seas, lightning, or other

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[1] Story on Bailm. § 570, 571, 3d ed.; Wild *v.* Pickford, 8 M. & W. 461; Newborn *v.* Just, 2 C. & P. 76.

[2] Ibid.; Wild *v.* Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443; Hawkins *v.* Hoffman, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 586.

[3] Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. *v.* Burke, 13 Wend. 611, 627, 628; Story on Bailm. § 571 *a*.

[4] Story on Bailm. § 572; Wilson *v.* Freeman, 5 Campb. 527. In this case, however, the carrier declared his intention to charge at a higher rate than for ordinary goods.

[5] Helsby *v.* Mears, 5 B. & C. 564. Mere notice of the value of the parcel, is not of itself sufficient to do away the effect of the general notice. Levi *v.* Waterhouse, 1 Price, 280.

[6] Harris *v.* Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Marsh *v.* Horne, 5 B. & C. 322.

natural accident.[1] Therefore, if the loss happened by the wrongful act of a third person ;[2] or, by an accidental fire, not caused by lightning ;[3] or, by the agency of the propelling power in a steam-ship ;[4] or, by striking against the mast of a sunken vessel, carelessly left floating ;[5] or, by mistaking a light ;[6] the carrier is liable. And if divers causes concur in the loss, the act of God being one, but not the proximate cause, it does not discharge the carrier.[7] But where the loss was occasioned by the vessel being driven against a bridge, by a sudden gust of wind ;[8] or, by a collision at sea, without fault ;[9] or, by being upset in a sudden squall ;[10] or, by the vessel getting aground by a sudden failure of wind while

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[1] Per Ld. Mansfield, in Forward *v.* Pittard, 1 T. R. 27 ; Story on Bailm. § 25, 511 ; Propr's Trent Nav. *v.* Wood, 3 Esp. 127, 131 ; Gorden *v.* Little ; 8 S. & R, 553, 557 ; Colt *v.* McMechen, 6 Johns. 160 ; Hodgdon *v.* Dexter, 1 Cranch. 360 ; Abbot on Shipping, p. 250 ; 1 Bell, Comm. 489.

[2] 3 Esp. 131, per Ashhurst, J.

[3] Hyde *v.* Trent & Mersey Nav. Co. 5 T. R. 387 ; Forward *v.* Pittard, 1 T. R. 27.

[4] Hale *v.* The New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. 15 Conn. R. 539.

[5] Smith *v.* Shepherd, Abbott on Shipping, p. 252, 253. The owner of a vessel sunk while in his possession, so as to obstruct a public navigable river, who has without any wrongful act relinquished the possession, is not, in all cases, and for an indefinite time, bound to give notice, or take other means, to prevent damage from coming thereby to other vessels ; though it seems there may be circumstances in which the owner, even after a blameless relinquishment of the possession, may still be required to take care that other vessels be not injured by striking against a sunken vessel. Brown *v.* Mallett, 12 Jur. 204. *Quære*, therefore, whether, if the owner has abandoned the possession and property, and taken all due care, but nevertheless a carrier vessel is lost by striking upon the sunken one, it is the act of God, or not.

[6] McArthur *v.* Sears, 21 Wend. 190.

[7] Ewart *v.* Street, 2 Bailey, R. 157 ; Richards *v.* Gilbert, 5 Day, R. 415 ; Campbell *v.* Morse, 1 Harper's Law R. 468 ; Hahn *v.* Corbett, 2 Bing. 205. And see Gordon *v.* Little, 8 S. & R. 533 ; Hart *v.* Allen, 2 Watts, 114 ; Jones *v.* Pitcher, 3 Stew. & Port. 135 ; Sprowl *v.* Kellar, 4 Stew. & Port. 382.

[8] Amies *v.* Stephens, 1 Stra. 128.

[9] Buller *v.* Fisher, Peake, Add. Cas. 183.

[10] Spencer *v.* Daggett, 2 Verm. R. 92. So, if thrown over in a storm, for preservation of the ship and passengers. Smith *v.* Wright, 1 Caines, R. 43.

tacking;[1] or, by striking against a sunken rock, or snag, unknown to pilots;[2] in these and the like cases, the carrier, if he is not in fault,[3] has been held not liable. In regard to losses *occasioned by force*, it must have been the act of *public enemies;* for if the goods were taken by robbers, or destroyed by a mob, though by force which he could not resist, a common carrier is held responsible for the loss.[4] In all cases of loss by a *common carrier*, the *burden of proof* is on him, to show that the loss was occasioned by the act of God, or by public enemies.[5] And if the acceptance of the goods was special, the burden of proof is still on the carrier, to show, not only that the cause of the loss was within the terms of the exception, but also that there was on his part no negligence or want of due care.[6] Thus, where goods were received on board a steamboat, and the bill of lading contained an exception of "the dangers of the river," and the loss was occasioned by the boat's striking on a sunken rock; it was held incumbent on the carrier to prove that due diligence and proper skill were used to avoid the accident.[7]

§ 220. A carrier may repel the charge of the plaintiff, by evidence of *fraud in the plaintiff* himself, in regard to the goods; or by proof, that the loss resulted from the negligence of the plaintiff in regard to their packing or delivery; or from internal defect without his fault.[8] Thus where the

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1 Colt *v.* McMechen, 6 Johns. 160.

2 Williams *v.* Grant, 1 Conn. R. 487; Smyrl *v.* Niolon, 2 Bailey, R. 421; Turner *v.* Wilson, 7 Yerger, R. 340.

3 Williams *v.* Branson, 1 Murph. 417; Spencer *v.* Daggett, 2 Verm. 92; Marsh *v.* Blythe, 1 McCord, 360.

4 3 Esp. 131, 132, per Lord Mansfield, and Buller, J.

5 Murphy *v.* Staton, 3 Munf. 239; Bell *v.* Reed, 4 Binn. 127; Ewart *v.* Street, 2 Bailey, 157.

6 Swindler *v.* Hilliard, 2 Rich, R. 286.

7 Whiteside *v.* Russell, 8 W. & S. 44. And see Slocum *v.* Fairchild, 7 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 292.

8 Story on Bailm. § 563, 565, 566, 576; Leech *v.* Baldwin, 5 Watts, 446.

plaintiff had just grounds to apprehend the seizure of his goods by rioters, which he concealed from the carrier when the goods were received by him for transportation, and they were seized and lost, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.[1] So, where a parcel, containing two hundred sovereigns, was enclosed in a package of tea, and paid for as of ordinary value, and it was stolen; it was held that the carrier was not liable.[2] And where the plaintiff, being a bailee of goods to be booked and conveyed by the coach in which he was a passenger, placed them in his own bag, which was lost, it was held that the loss was not chargeable to the carrier, but was imputable to the plaintiff's own misfeasance.[3] And if the injury is caused partly by the negligence of the plaintiff, and partly by that of the defendant, or of some other person, it seems that the plaintiff cannot maintain the action; unless, perhaps, in a case where, by ordinary care, he could not have avoided the consequence of the defendant's negligence.[4] The question of unfair or improper conduct in the plaintiff, in these cases, is left to the determination of the Jury.[5]

§ 221. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS are not held responsible to the same extent with common carriers, except in regard to the baggage.[6] But they are bound to the utmost care and dili-

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[1] Edwards *v.* Sharratt, 1 East, 604.

[2] Bradley *v.* Waterhouse, 1 M. & Malk. 154; 3 C. & P. 318, S. C. See also Bull, N. P. 71. The owner, ordinarily, is not obliged to state the value of a package, unless inquiry is made by the carrier; but if, being asked, he deceives the carrier, the latter, though a common carrier, is not liable without his own default. Phillips *v.* Earle, 8 Pick. 182.

[3] Miles *v.* Cattle, 6 Bing. 743.

[4] Williams *v.* Holland, 6 C. & P. 23; Pluckwell *v.* Wilson, 5 C. &. P. 375; Hawkins *v.* Cooper, 8 C. &. P. 473; Davies *v.* Mann, 10 M. &. W. 546.

[5] Batson *v.* Donovan, 4 B & Ald. 21. And see Mayhew *v.* Eames, 3 B. & C. 601; 1 C. & P. 550, S. C.; Clay *v.* Willan, 1 H. Bl. 298; Izett *v.* Mountain, 4 East, 370.

[6] Whether a large sum of money, in an ordinary travelling trunk, will be considered as baggage, beyond an ordinary amount of travelling expenses, *quære;* and see Orange Co. Bank *v.* Brown, 9 Wend. 85. In a later case it

gence of very cautious persons; and of course they are responsible for any, even the slightest neglect.[1] Their contract

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was thought, that the term "baggage" does not include even money for travelling expenses; but this was not the point in judgment. It was trover against the owner of a steamboat, as a common carrier of passengers, for the loss of one of the plaintiff's two trunks, containing samples of merchandise, carried as part of his personal baggage, by the plaintiff's travelling agent. The Court held, that the carrier was not liable on that ground; the learned Judge expressing himself as follows: — "Although I do not find it stated in the case that Mason, (the agent,) paid any thing to the boat-owner, either for freight or passage, yet the whole argument on both sides went upon the ground that he had paid the usual fare of a passenger, and nothing more; that he neither paid, nor intended to pay any thing for the trunk; but designed to have the same pass as his baggage. It was formerly held, that the owner of the boat or vehicle was not answerable as a carrier for the luggage of the passenger, unless a distinct price was paid for it. But it is now held, that the carrying of the baggage is included in the principal contract in relation to the passenger; and the carrier is answerable for the loss of the property, although there was no separate agreement concerning it. A contract to carry the ordinary luggage of the passenger is implied from the usual course of the business; and the price paid for fare is considered as including a compensation for carrying the freight. But this implied undertaking has never been extended beyond ordinary baggage, or such things as a traveller usually carries with him for his personal convenience in the journey. It neither includes money, nor merchandise. Orange Co. Bank *v.* Brown, 9 Wend. 85; Pardee *v.* Drew, 25 id. 459. It was suggested in the first case that money to pay travelling expenses might perhaps be included. But that may, I think, be doubted. Men usually carry money to pay travelling expenses about their persons, and not in their trunks or boxes; and no contract can be implied beyond such things as are usually carried as baggage. It is going far enough to imply an agreement to carry freight of any kind from a contract to carry the passenger; for the agreement which is implied is much more onerous than the one which is expressed. The carrier is only answerable for an injury to the passenger, where there has been some want of care or skill; but he must answer for the loss of the goods, though it happened without his fault. Still, an agreement to carry ordinary baggage may well be implied from the usual course of business; but the implication cannot be extended a single step beyond such things as the traveller usually has with him as a part of his luggage. It is undoubtedly difficult to define with accuracy what shall be deemed baggage within the rule of the carrier's liability. I do not intend to say that the articles must be such as every man deems essential to his comfort; for some men carry nothing, or very little with them when they travel, while others consult their convenience by carrying many things. Nor do I intend to say that the rule is confined to wearing apparel,

[1] Story on Bailm. § 601, 602; 2 Kent, Comm. 600.

to carry safely, means, not that they will ensure the limbs of the passengers, but that they will take due care, as far as competent skill and human foresight will go, in the performance of that duty.[1] This extreme care is to be used in regard to the original construction of the coach or vehicle, frequent examination to see that it is safe, the employment of good and steady horses and careful drivers, and the use of all the ordinary precautions for the safety of passengers on the road.[2] The carrier is also bound to give them notice of danger, if any part of the way is unsafe.[3] Accordingly, where the injury resulted from negligent driving,[4] insufficiency of the vehicle,[5] overloading the coach,[6] improper stowage of the

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brushes, razors, writing apparatus, and the like, which most persons deem indispensable. If one has books for his instruction or amusement by the way, or carries his gun or fishing tackle, they would undoubtedly fall within the term baggage, because they are usually carried as such. This is, I think, a good test for determining what things fall within the rule.

"In this case the plaintiff sent out Mason as his 'traveller' or agent to seek purchasers for his goods, and the trunk in question contained samples of the merchandise which he wished to sell. The samples were not carried for the personal use, convenience, instruction, or amusement of the passenger in his journey; but for the purpose of enabling him to make bargains in the way of trade. Although the samples were not themselves to be sold, they were used for the sole purpose of carrying on traffic as a merchant. They were not baggage within the common acceptation of the term; and as they were not shipped or carried as freight, the Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff could not recover." Hawkins *v.* Hoffman, 6 Hill's N. Y. Rep. 586. *Sed quære*, whether prudent travellers do not ordinarily carry part of their necessary funds in the trunk.

[1] Harris *v.* Costar, 1 C. & P. 636; Stokes *v.* Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Story on Bailm. § 601, 602.

[2] Story on Bailm. § 592, 593, 594, 598, 599, 601, 602, (3d edit.)

[3] Dudley *v.* Smith, 1 Campb. 167; Christie *v.* Griggs, 2 Campb. 79.

[4] Aston *v.* Heaven, 2 Esp. 533; Crofts *v.* Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 319. If the driver, having a choice of two ways, elects the most hazardous, the owner is responsible at all events for any damage that ensues. Mayhew *v.* Boyce, 1 Stark. R. 423.

[5] Christie *v.* Griggs, 2 Campb. 79; Bremner *v.* Williams, 1 C. & P. 414; Sharp *v.* Grey, 9 Bing. 457; Ware *v.* Gay, 11 Pick. 106; Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. *v.* Burke, 13 Wend. 611; Curtis *v.* Drinkwater, 2 B. & Ad. 169.

[6] Israel *v.* Clark, 4 Esp. 259.

luggage,[1] drunkenness of the driver,[2] want of due inspection of the coach previous to the journey, or upon the road,[3] or the like, the proprietor has been held liable. He is also liable for an injury occasioned by leaping from the coach, where the passenger was justly alarmed for his safety, by reason of something imputable to the proprietor.[4]

§ 222. It is only on the ground of *negligence*, that the carrier of passengers is held liable. This is therefore a material point for the plaintiff to make out in evidence, and without which he cannot recover. He must also prove the defendant's engagement to carry him, and that he accordingly took his place in the vehicle. But where the injury resulted from the breaking of the harness, or the breaking or overturning of the coach or car, or any other accident, occurring on the road, while the vehicle or machinery and railway were in the hands

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[1] Curtis *v.* Drinkwater, 2 B. & Ad. 169.

[2] Stokes *v.* Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181.

[3] Sharp *v.* Grey, 9 Bing. 457; Bremner *v.* Williams, 1 C. & P. 414; Ware *v.* Gay, 11 Pick. 106.

[4] Jones *v.* Boyce, 1 Stark. R. 493; Stokes *v.* Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181. The following count in *assumpsit* against a passenger-carrier, for bad management of a sufficient coach, it is conceived would be good.

"For that the said (*defendant*) on —— was the proprietor of a coach for the carriage of passengers with their luggage between —— and —— for hire and reward; and thereupon, on the same day, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the said (*defendant*), would engage and take a seat and place in said coach, to be conveyed therein from said —— to —— for a reasonable hire and reward to be paid to him by the plaintiff, the said (*defendant*) undertook and promised the plaintiff to carry and convey him in said coach, from —— to ——, with all due care, diligence, and skill. (*) And the plaintiff avers that, confiding in the said undertaking, he thereupon engaged and took a seat in said coach and became a passenger therein, to be conveyed as aforesaid, for such hire and reward to be paid by him to the said (*defendant*). But the said (*defendant*) did not use due care, diligence, and skill, in carrying and conveying the plaintiff as aforesaid; but on the contrary so overloaded, and so negligently and unskilfully conducted, drove and managed said coach, that it was overturned; by means whereof the plaintiff was grievously bruised and hurt, [*here state any other special injuries*] and was sick and disabled for a long time, and was put to great expense for nursing, medicines, and medical aid."

If the injury arose from insufficiency in the coach, or horses, insert at (*) as follows: — "and that the said coach was sufficiently stanch and strong,

and exclusive management of the defendants or their agents,[1] this is itself presumptive evidence of negligence, and the *onus probandi* is on the proprietor of the vehicle to establish that there has been no negligence whatever, and that the damage has resulted from a cause which human care and foresight could not prevent.[2] Where the breaking down of the carriage was occasioned by an original defect in the iron axle, which, though concealed by the wooden part of the axle, might have been discovered by unscrewing and separating them, the proprietor has been held chargeable with negligence, in not causing such examination to be made, previously to any use of the vehicle.[3] But that he is liable for such an accident, where the fracture was caused by an original internal defect in the forging of the bar, undiscoverable by the closest inspection, and unavoidable by human care, skill, and foresight, is a point which no decision has yet sustained. On the contrary, in a recent action to recover damages occasioned by precisely such a defect, where the defendant moved the Court below to instruct the Jury, that if he had used all possible care, and the accident happened without any fault on his part, but by reason of a defect which he could not discover, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, but the Court refused to do so, and instructed the Jury that the defendant was answerable at all events; it was held by the Court above, that this instruction was erroneous, the law being stated, in conclusion, in these words. "The result to which we have arrived, from the examination of the case before us, is this: That carriers of passengers for hire are bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the providing of safe, sufficient, and suitable coaches, harnesses, horses, and

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and that the horses drawing the same were and should be well broken, and manageable, and of competent strength;" — and assign the breach accordingly.

[1] Carpue *v.* London Railway Co. 5 Ad. & El. 747, N. S.

[2] Story on Bailm. § 601 *a*, 602; McKinney *v.* Neil, 1 McLean, R. 540; Christie *v.* Griggs, 2 Campb. 79; Ware *v.* Gay, 11 Pick. 106.

[3] Sharp *v.* Grey, 9 Bing. 457.

coachmen, in order to prevent those injuries which human care and foresight can guard against; and that if an accident happens from a defect in the coach, which might have been discovered and remedied upon the most careful and thorough examination of the coach, such accident must be ascribed to negligence, for which the owner is liable in case of injury to a passenger happening by reason of such accident. On the other hand, where the accident arises from a hidden and internal defect, which a careful and thorough examination would not disclose, and which could not be guarded against by the exercise of a sound judgment and the most vigilant oversight, then the proprietor is not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be borne by the sufferer, as one of that class of injuries for which the law can afford no redress in the form of a pecuniary recompense. And we are of opinion that the instructions, which the defendants' counsel requested might be given to the Jury in the present case, were correct in point of law, and that the learned Judge erred in extending the liability of the defendants further than was proposed in the instructions requested." [1]

§ 222 *a*. Where the action is against a common carrier of passengers, for refusing to receive and convey the plaintiff, the carrier may prove, as a good defence, that the plaintiff was a person of bad or doubtful character, or of bad habits; or, that his object was to interfere with the defendant's interests, or to disturb his line of patronage; or, that he refused to obey the reasonable regulations made for the government of passengers in that line or mode of conveyance. And such carrier may rightfully inquire into the habits or motives of persons who offer themselves as passengers.[2] But if the plaintiff has been received as a passenger and conveyed a part of the way, it seems he cannot be turned out, on the ground that he is not a person of good character, so long as he was not guilty of any impropriety during the passage.[3]

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[1] Ingalls *v.* Bills, 9 Metc. 1, 15.

[2] Jenks *v.* Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221.

[3] Coppin *v.* Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875.

CASE.

§ 223. Under this head it is proposed only to mention some general principles of evidence, applicable to the action of Trespass on the Case, in any of its forms; referring to the appropriate titles of Adultery, Carriers, Libel, Malicious Prosecution, Nuisance, Trover, &c., for the particular rules relating to each of these heads.

§ 224. The distinction between the actions of Trespass *vi et armis*, and Trespass on the Case, is clear, though somewhat refined and subtle. By the former, redress is sought for an injury accompanied with actual force; by the latter, it is sought for a wrong without force. The criterion of Trespass *vi et armis*, is force, directly applied, or, *vis proxima*. If the proximate cause of the injury is but a continuation of the original force, or, *vis impressa*, the effect is immediate, and the appropriate remedy is Trespass *vi et armis*. But if the original force, or *vis impressa*, had ceased to act, before the injury commenced, the effect is mediate, and the appropriate remedy is Trespass on the Case. Thus, if a log, thrown over a fence, were to fall on a person in the street, he might sue in Trespass; but if, after it had fallen to the ground, it caused him to stumble and fall, the remedy could be only by Trespass on the Case.[1] The intent of the wrong-doer is not material to the form of the action; neither is it generally important, whether the original act was or was not legal. Thus, though the act of sending up a balloon was legal, yet Trespass *vi et armis* was held maintainable, for damage done by the accidental alighting of the balloon in the plaintiff's garden.[2]

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[1] Chitty on Plead, 115–120; Smith *v.* Rutherford, 2 S. & R. 358.
[2] Guille *v.* Swan, 19 Johns. 381.

§ 225. For injuries to *relative rights*, the Action on the Case is the appropriate remedy. If the injury was without force, as, for example, enticing away a servant, Case is the only proper remedy ; but if it be done with force, such as the battery of one's servant, or the like, the action may be in Case, or in Trespass *vi et armis*, at the plaintiff's election ; and in the latter form, he may join a count for a battery of himself.[1]

§ 226. Where the injury is not to relative, but to *absolute rights*, the question, whether the party may waive the force, and sue in Trespass on the Case, for the mere consequential damages, has been much discussed, with no little conflict of opinion. Where the tortious act was done to the property of the plaintiff, and the defendant has derived a direct pecuniary benefit therefrom, as, if he seized the plaintiff's goods and sold them as his own, it is clear that the plaintiff may waive the tort entirely, and sue in *assumpsit* for the price of the goods. So, though the property was forcibly taken, the force may be waived, and *trover*, which is an action on the case, may be sustained, for the value of the goods. It is also agreed, that, where an injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant, but not wilfully, as, by driving his cart against the plaintiff's carriage, Trespass on the Case may be maintained, notwithstanding the injury was occasioned by force, directly applied.[2] And it has also been laid down, upon consideration, as a general principle, that where an injury has been done, partly by an act of trespass, and partly by that which is not an act of trespass, but the proper subject of an action on the Case, both acts being done at the same time, and causing a common injury, the party may sue in

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1 Chitty on Plead. 128, [153], 181, [229] ; Ditcham *v.* Bond, 2 M. & S. 436 ; Woodward *v.* Walton, 2 New Rep. 476.

2 Williams *v.* Holland, 10 Bing. 112 ; Rogers *v.* Imbleton, 3 New. Rep. 117 ; Moreton *v.* Hardern, 4 B. & C. 223 ; Blinn *v.* Campbell, 14 Johns. 432 ; McAllister *v.* Hammond, 6 Cow. 342 ; Dalton *v.* Favour, 3 N. Hamp. 465.

either form of action, at his election. This rule has been illustrated by the case of a weir, or a dam, erected partly on the plaintiff's ground, and partly on that of another riparian proprietor.[1] It has also been held, that Case would lie for a distress, illegally made, after tender of the rent due ;[2] and for a tortious taking, under pretence of a distress for rent, where there was no right to distrain.[3] In this last case, Lord Denman, C. J. proceeded upon the general ground, that, though the taking of the goods was a trespass, the owner was at liberty to waive it, and bring Case for the consequential injury arising from the unlawful detention. Indeed, it is difficult to discern any reason why the party may not, in all cases, waive his claim to vindictive damages, and proceed in Case, for only those actually sustained; or why he may not as well waive his claim for a part of the injury, and go for the residue, as to forgive the whole.[4] There are, however, several decisions, both English and American, to the effect that, where the injury is caused by force, directly applied, the remedy can be pursued only in Trespass.[5]

§ 227. In this action, as in others, if there are *several plaintiffs*, they must prove a joint cause of action, such as damage

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[1] Wells *v.* Ody, 1 M. & W. 459, per Ld. Abinger ; Ib. 462, per Parke, B.; Moore *v.* Robinson, 2 B. & Ad. 817 ; Knott *v.* Digges, 6 H. & J. 230.

[2] Branscom *v.* Bridges, 1 B. & C. 145 ; 3 Stark. R. 171 ; Holland *v.* Bird, 10 Bing. 15.

[3] Smith *v.* Goodwin, 4 B. & Ad. 413.

[4] See Scott *v.* Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 897; Pitts *v.* Gaince, 1 Salk. 10; Chamberlain *v.* Hazlewood, 5 M. & W. 515 ; 3 Jur. 1079 ; Muskett *v.* Hill, 5 Bing. N. C. 694 ; Parker *v.* Elliott, 6 Munf. 587 ; Van Horn *v.* Freeman, 1 Halst. 322 ; Haney *v.* Townsend, 1 McCord, 207 ; Ream *v.* Rank, 3 S. & R. 215 ; Parker *v.* Bailey, 4 D & R. 215 ; Moran *v.* Dawes, 4 Cowen, R. 412.

[5] These decisions are referred to in 1 Met. & Perk. Dig. p. 69, 70; 1 Harrison's Dig. 42-47. But in some of the United States, the distinction between the two forms of action has been abolished by statute. Thus, in Maine it is enacted, that "the declaration shall be equally good and valid, to all intents and purposes, whether the same shall be in form a declaration in trespass, or trespass on the case." Revised Statutes, ch. 115, § 13.

to their joint property, slander of both in their joint trade or employment, and the like, or they will be non-suited.[1] If their interests are several, but the damage is joint, it has been held sufficient.[2]

§ 228. If the action is founded *in tort*, it is not necessary to prove all the defendants guilty; for as torts are several in their nature, judgment may well be rendered against one alone, and the others acquitted. But if the action is founded on a breach of an express contract, it seems that the plaintiff must prove the contract against all the defendants.[3]

§ 229. The *particular day* on which the injury is alleged to have been committed, is not material to be proved. Originally, every declaration in trespass seems to have been confined to a single act of trespass; and if it was continuous in its nature, it might be so laid; in which case it was considered as one act of trespass. Subsequently, to save the inconvenience of distinct counts for each tortious act, the plaintiff was permitted to consolidate into one count, the charge of trespasses done on divers days between two days specifically mentioned; in which case it is considered as if it were a distinct count for every different trespass. In the proof of such a declaration, the plaintiff may give evidence of any number of trespasses within the time specified. But he is not obliged to avail himself of this privilege; for he may still consider his declaration as containing only one count, and for a single trespass. When it is considered in this light, the time is immaterial; and he may prove a trespass done at any time before the commencement of the action, and within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. But the plaintiff is not permitted to avail himself of the declaration in both these forms at the same time. He is therefore bound to make his

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1 Cook *v.* Batchellor, 2 B. & P. 150; 2 Saund. 116 a, note (2); Solomons *v.* Medex, 1 Stark. R. 191.

2 Coryton *v.* Lithebye, 2 Saund. 115; Weller *v.* Baker, 2 Wils. 414.

3 Ireland *v.* Johnson, 1 Bing. N. C. 162; Bretherton *v.* Wood, 3 B. & B. 54; Max *v.* Roberts, 12 East, 89; Ante, § 214.

election, before he begins to introduce his evidence; and will not be permitted to give evidence of one or more trespasses within the time alleged, and of another at another time.[1]

§ 230. If the plaintiff charges both *malice and negligence* upon the defendant, in doing the act complained of, the count will be supported by evidence of the negligence only.[2] And where the action is against a *carrier*, or an *innkeeper*, for the negligent keeping of the goods in his care, whereby they were lost; proof of the loss affords presumptive evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier or innkeeper or his servants.[3] So, where the action is against a railway corporation, for the destruction of property by sparks emitted from their engine, the fact of the premises having been fired by sparks from the passing engine is *primâ facie* evidence of negligence on the part of the company.[4]

§ 230 *a*. Where the damage, for which the action is brought, has resulted from the *misrepresentation of a fact* by the defendant, it is necessary to prove not only that the statement was false in fact, but that it was made fraudulently, or without probable cause; for if it was not known to be false by the party making it, but on the contrary was made honestly, and in the full belief that it was true, he is not liable at law. Thus, where the allegation was, that the defendant falsely represented to the sheriff, that one J. W. then in custody, was the same J. W. against whom the sheriff (plaintiff) had another process; it was held a good defence, that the defendant believed upon good and probable grounds, that the

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[1] Pierce *v*. Pickins, 16 Mass. 472, per Jackson, J.; Brook *v*. Bishop, 2 Ld. Raym. 823; 7 Mod. 152; 2 Salk. 639; Monckton *v*. Pashley, 2 Ld. Raym. 974, 976; Hume *v*. Oldacre, 1 Stark. R. 351; 1 Saund. 24, note (1) by Williams.

[2] Panton *v*. Holland, 17 Johns. 92.

[3] Dawson *v*. Chamney, 5 Ad. & El. 164, N. S.: Story on Bailments, § 472, 529. See Ante, § 219, 222.

[4] Piggot *v*. Eastern Railroad Co. 3 M. Gr. & Sc. 229.

representation was true.[1] So, if an agent assume to act as such after the death of his principal, but in justifiable ignorance of that fact, he is not liable for such misrepresentation of his agency.[2]

§ 231. Under the *general issue*, the defendant is ordinarily permitted to give evidence of any matters *ex post facto*, which show that the cause of action has been discharged, or that in equity and conscience the plaintiff ought not to recover.[3] Thus, a *release*, a *former recovery* or a *satisfaction*, may be given in evidence.[4] So also in an action for enticing away a servant, the defendant may, under this issue, give evidence that the plaintiff has already recovered judgment for damages against the servant, for departing from his service, and that, since the commencement of the present action, this judgment had been satisfied.[5] So, in an action on the Case for beating the plaintiff's horse, the defendant may show that it was done to drive the horse from his own door, which he obstructed.[6] And in an action for obstructing ancient lights, by the erection of a house, a customary right so to do, may be given in evidence.[7] So, in an action for hindering the plaintiff in the exercise of his trade, it may be shown, under this issue, that the trade was unlawful;[8] and in an action

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[1] Collins *v.* Evans, 8 Jur. 345. But in the sale of real estate, if the vendor make representations respecting the land which are materially erroneous, going to the basis of the contract, Equity will rescind the purchase, though the vendor had no intention to deceive. Taylor *v.* Fleet, 1 Barbour, 471. And see Doggett *v.* Everson, 3 Story R. 733. 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 193. As to goods, see Johnson *v.* Peck, 1 Woodb. & Minot, 334.

[2] Smout *v.* Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1. And see Story on Agency, § 265 *a*; Pasley *v.* Freeman, 3 T. R. 57; Haycraft *v.* Creasy, 2 East, 92; Wilson *v.* Fuller, 3 G. & D. 570.

[3] Bird *v.* Randull, 3 Burr 1353, per Ld. Mansfield.

[4] Ibid.; Yelv. 174 *a*, note (1), by Metcalf; Stephen on Plead. 182, 183, (Am. edit. 1824); Stafford *v.* Clark, 2 Bing. 377; Anon. 1 Com. R 273.

[5] Bird *v.* Randall, 3 Burr. 1345.

[6] Slater *v.* Swann, 2 Stra. 872.

[7] Anon. 1 Com. R. 273.

[8] Tarleton *v.* McGawley, Peake's Cas. 207, per Ld. Kenyon.

for destroying a rookery, it may be shown that it was a nuisance.[1] And in general, wherever an act is charged in this form of action to have been fraudulently done, the plea of not guilty puts in issue both the doing of the act, and the motive with which it was done.[2]

§ 232. But to this rule there are some *exceptions;* such as the *statute of limitations;* justification, in slander, by alleging the *truth* of the words; *re-taking* on fresh pursuit of a prisoner escaped; which cannot be given in evidence, unless specially pleaded.[3]

§ 232 *a.* Where the injury complained of was occasioned by the negligence of a person in the defendant's employ, it has often been found extremely difficult to determine whether the relation of master and servant existed, so as to charge the defendant or not. But by comparing the adjudged cases, the principle to be deduced from them seems to be this; that where the person employed is in the exercise of a distinct and independent employment, the owner parting, for the time, with all control over that which is the subject of the bailment or contract, and having no control over the conduct of the person employed or his servants, such person stands in the relation of a sub-contractor only, and the persons whom he employs are his own servants, and not those of the principal party; and therefore the latter is not liable for their negligence or misdoing. It is to this point, therefore, that the evidence on each side should be directed.[4] Thus, the trustees under a public road-act, were held not responsible for the negligence of the men employed in making the road, the work being carried on by a regular surveyor, in their

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[1] Hannam *v.* Mockett, 2 C. & B. 924.

[2] Mummery *v.* Paul, 8 Jur. 986. So, in an action on the case for wrongfully keeping a ferocious dog, knowing him to be of such a disposition, the plea of not guilty is hold to put in issue the *scienter.* Card *v.* Case, 12 Jur. 247.

[3] 1 Chitty on Pl. p. 433, 434.

[4] Story on Agency, § 454 *a*, 2d edit.

absence, whom they had no right to turn out of employ.[1] So, where a licensed drover undertook to drive an ox to the slaughter-house, and sent him by his own servant, through whose negligence the ox did damage; it was held that the drover, and not the owner of the ox, was liable for the damage, as he was in the exercise of an independent employment, and had the exclusive control of the subject of the contract.[2]

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[1] Duncan *v.* Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 910.

[2] Milligan *v.* Wedge, 12 Ad & El. 737. And see Burgess *v.* Gray, 14 Law Journ. 184, N. S.; Quarman *v.* Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Rapson *v.* Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; White *v.* Hague, 2 Dowl. & Ry. 33. Earl *v.* Hall, 2 Metc. 353. These and other cases cited in them, devolve the liability on the person who was the master of the enterprise. Other cases, apparently nearly similar in the facts, have held the general owner liable; but it will be found, on examination, that in those cases the general owner of the subject was also the master of the work, retaining the management and control, and rendering the contract in essence but a case of mere day labor, or ordinary service. See Littledale *v.* Ld. Lonsdale, 2 H. Bl. 267, 299; Stone *v.* Codman, 15 Pick. 297; Wanstall *v.* Pooley, 6 Cl. & Fin. 910, note; Randleson *v.* Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109; Sly *v.* Edgeley, 6 Esp. 6; Matthews *v.* W. Lond. Waterw. Co., 4 Campb. 403; Leslie *v.* Rounds, 4 Taunt. 649. The case of Bush *v.* Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404, in which the owner of a house was held liable for the negligence of laborers employed by a contractor, who had undertaken to repair the house *by the job*, was disapproved as an extreme case, by the Ld. Chancellor, in Duncan *v.* Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin. 903, and by Ld. Brougham, Ibid. 909; and was doubted by Ld. Denman, in Milligan *v.* Wedge, *supra*, and it has since been overruled in Reedie *v.* N. West. Railw. Co. 13 Jur. 659. By the Assizes Act of 11 Geo. 4, & 1 W. 4, c. 68, § 8, common carriers are rendered liable for the felonious acts of *servants in their employment*. Under this statutory provision, a railway corporation is held liable for the acts of the servants of those who had undertaken, by special contract, to do this part of their business. Machu *v.* the London & Southwestern Railw. Co. 12 Jur. 501.

COVENANT.

§ 233. In this action, by the Common Law, there is *no general issue* or plea, which amounts to a general traverse of the whole declaration, and of course obliges the plaintiff to prove the whole ;[1] but the evidence is strictly confined to the particular issue raised by a special plea, such as, *non est factum*, which will be treated under the head of Deed, and Duress, Infancy, Release, &c., which will be considered under those titles. The liability of an heir, on the covenant of his ancestor, will be treated under the head of Heir.

§ 234. If the deed is not put in issue by the plea of *non est factum*, the defendant, by the rules of the Common Law, is understood to *admit so much of the deed* as is spread upon the record. If the plaintiff would avail himself of any other part of the deed, he must prove the instrument, by the attesting witnesses, or by secondary evidence, in the usual way.[2]

§ 235. If the plaintiff's right of action depends on the performance of a *condition precedent*, which is put in issue, he must prove a performance according to the terms of the covenant. It will not suffice, in an action on a specialty, to show that other terms have been substituted by parol, although the substituted agreement has been fully performed.[3] Thus,

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[1] 1 Chitty on Pl. 428. In some of the United States, under statutes for the abolishment of special pleading, the plea of *non est factum* has been adopted in practice, as being in effect a general traverse of the declaration. Granger *v.* Granger, 6 Hamm. Ohio R. 41; Provost *v.* Calder, 2 Wend. 517.

[2] Williams *v.* Sills, 2 Campb. 519 ; Ante, Vol. 1, § 569–582.

[3] 1 Chitty on Pl. 280 ; 3 T. R. 592. But if the original agreement was not under seal, evidence of a parol enlargement of the time, with performance accordingly, is admissible. Ante, Vol. 1, § 304.

where the plaintiff sued in covenant for the agreed price for building two houses, which he bound himself to finish by a certain day, and averred performance in the terms of the covenant; proof of a parol enlargement of the time, and of performance accordingly, was held inadmissible.[1]

§ 236. The *breach*, also, must be proved as laid in the declaration. And here it is a general principle, that where the party destroys that which was the subject of his agreement, or voluntarily puts it out of his power to perform that which he engaged to perform, it is a breach of his covenant.[2] Thus, if he covenant to deliver the grains, made in his brewery, and before delivery he renders them unfit for use by mixing hops with them;[3] or, to deliver up a certain obligation of the covenantee, and before delivery he recovers judgment upon it;[4] or, to permit the covenantee to sue in his name, agreeing to assign to him the judgment when recovered, and before assignment he releases the judgment debtor;[5] or, that certain goods of a debtor shall be forthcoming to the officer, and in the mean time he causes them to be seized on process in his own favor;[6] the covenant is broken. And in regard to covenants of *indemnity*, this distinction has been taken; that where the covenant is to indemnify against a liability already

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[1] Littler *v.* Holland, 3 T. R. 590. And see Maryon *v.* Carter, 4 C. & P. 295; Paradine *v.* Jane, Aleyn, 26; Campbell *v.* Jones, 6 T. R. 571.

[2] Hopkins *v.* Young, 11 Mass. 302. But if the covenantor involuntarily becomes unable to perform, but the disability is removed before the day of performance arrives, it is no breach. Heard *v.* Bowers, 23 Pick. 455. A covenant to *keep* in repair is broken if the lessee pull down the buildings; but a covenant to *leave* the premises in repair is not, provided he rebuilds them within the term. Shep. Touchst. p. 173.

[3] Griffith *v.* Goodhand, T. Raym. 464. And see Mayne's case, 5 Co. 21.

[4] Teat's case, Cro. El. 7.

[5] Hopkins *v.* Young, 11 Mass. 302.

[6] Whiteman *v.* Slack, 1 Harringt. 144. The neglect of an officer to return an execution, under which he has sold an equity of redemption, has been held a breach of the covenant in his deed of sale, that he had obeyed all the requisitions of law in the proceeding. Wade *v.* Merwin, 11 Pick. 280.

incurred, it is not broken till the covenantee is sued upon that liability; but where the debt or duty may accrue in future, the covenant is broken whenever the liability to a suit arises.[1]

§ 237. It will be sufficient, as we have already seen,[2] to prove the breach *substantially* as laid; but it must also appear, that the covenant is *substantially broken*. If the allegation is of a total loss or destruction, it will be supported by proof of a partial loss; for it is the loss or damage, and not the extent of it, which is the substance of the allegation.[3] So, where the tenant covenanted to keep the trees in an orchard whole and undefaced, reasonable use and wear only excepted, the cutting down of trees past bearing, was held to be no breach; for the preservation of the trees for fruit was the substance of the covenant.[4] But where the breach assigned was, that the tenant had not used the farm in a husband-like manner, but, on the contrary, had committed waste, evidence of acts not amounting to waste, was held inadmissible; for the waste was the substance of the allegation.[5]

§ 238. In regard to the averment or proof of *notice* to the defendant, a distinction is taken between things lying more properly in the knowledge of the plaintiff, and things lying in the knowledge of the defendant, or common to them both. In the former case, the plaintiff must aver and prove notice to the defendant. But where the party bound has the same means of ascertaining the event on which his duty arises, as the party to whom he is bound, neither notice nor request are necessary to be proved.[6]

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[1] 3 Com. Dig. 110, Condition, I; Lewis *v.* Crockett, 3 Bibb, 196.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 56 - 74.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 61.

[4] 2 Stark. Ev. 248, cites Good *v.* Hill, 2 Esp. 690.

[5] Harris *v.* Mantle, 3 T. R. 307. And see Ante, Vol. 1, § 52.

[6] 1 Chitty on Plead. 286; Keys *v.* Powell, 2 A. K. Marsh. 253; Peck *v.* McMurtry, Ib. 358; Muldrow *v.* McCleland, 1 Littell, 1.

§ 239. Where the *defendant is sued as assignee of the original covenantor*, and the issue is on the assignment, it will be sufficient for the plaintiff to give evidence of any facts from which the assignment may be inferred; such as possession of the premises leased, or payment of rent to the plaintiff.[1] For it is never necessary either to allege or prove the title of the adverse party with as much precision as in stating one's own. Yet if the plaintiff does allege the particulars of the defendant's title, he must prove them as laid.[2] Under an issue on the assignment, the defendant may show

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[1] Williams *v.* Woodward, 2 Wend. 487; Ib. 563; Derisley *v.* Custance, 4 T. R. 75; Platt on Cov. 64; Holford *v.* Hatch, Doug. 178; Hare *v.* Cator, Cowp. 766. On the liability of an assignee, see Platt on Cov. 465–405. In the declaration against an assignee, the assignment is alleged as in the following precedent of a declaration *by a lessor, against the assignee of his lessee* for non-payment of rent.

"In a plea of covenant. For that whereas heretofore, to wit, on the —— day of —— by a certain indenture then made between the plaintiff of the one part and one C. D. of the other part, one part whereof, sealed with the seal of the said C. D., the plaintiff now brings here into Court, the plaintiff demised and leased to the said C. D. a certain messuage, lands and premises situated in —— to have and to hold the same to the said C. C. and his assigns, from the —— day of —— for the full term of —— years then next ensuing; yielding and paying therefor to the plaintiff the clear yearly rent of —— payable [*here describe the mode and times of payment*], which rent the said C. D. did thereby for himself and his assigns, covenant to pay to the plaintiff accordingly. By virtue of which demise, the said C. D. on the —— day of —— entered into the same premises, and was possessed thereof for the term aforesaid. (*) And after the making of said indenture, and during the term aforesaid, to wit, on the —— day of —— [*naming any day before the breach*] all the estate and interest of the said C. D. in said term, then unexpired, by an assignment thereof then made, came to and was vested in the defendant, who thereupon entered into the said demised premises and became possessed thereof, and continued so possessed from thence hitherto, [*or*, "until the —— day of ——."] Now, the plaintiff in fact says, that after the making of said assignment, and during the said term, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the —— day of —— the sum of —— of the rent aforesaid became due and was owing to the plaintiff from the said defendant, and still is in arrear and unpaid, contrary to the covenant aforesaid."

[2] Stephen on Pleading, p. 337, 338; Turner *v.* Eyles, 3 B. & P. 456, 461; 2 Phil. Ev. 151, (7th edit.); Ante, Vol. I, § 60.

that he holds as an under-tenant, and not as an assignee ;[1] or, that he is an assignee, not of all, but only of a part of the premises.[2] He may also show in defence, under a proper plea, that the covenant was broken, not by himself, but by another person, to whom he had previously assigned all his interest in the premises ; and in such case, it is not necessary for him to prove either the assent of the assignee, or notice to his own lessor, of the assignment.[3] It has been held, that where the lessee of a term of years assigns his interest by way of mortgage, the mortgagee is not liable to the landlord, as assignee, until he has entered upon the demised premises ;[4] but this doctrine has since been overruled, and the mortgagee held liable as assignee, before entry.[5] But an executor is not liable as assignee, without proof of an actual entry.[6]

§ 240. But where the *plaintiff claims as assignee*, he must precisely allege and prove the conveyances, or other mediums of title, by which he is authorized to sue.[7] If he claims as

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[1] Holford *v.* Hatch, 1 Doug. 182 ; E. of Derby *v.* Taylor, 1 East, 502.

[2] Hare *v.* Cator, Cowp. 766.

[3] Pitcher *v.* Tovey, 1 Salk. 81 : Taylor *v.* Shum, 1 B. & P. 21.

[4] Eaton *v.* Jaques, 2 Doug. 455. It is still held, that the mortgagee of a ship is not liable as owner, until he takes possession. Brooks *v.* Bondsey, 17 Pick. 441 ; Colson *v.* Bonzey, 6 Greenl. 474 ; Abbott on Shipping, p. 19 ; Briggs *v.* Wilkinson, 7 B. & C. 30.

[5] Williams *v.* Bosanquet, 1 B. & Bing. 238 ; 4 Kent, Comm. 145 ; Woodfall's Law of Landl. & Ten. p. 183, (5th edit. by Wollaston.) *Sed quære ;* and see Astor *v.* Hoyt, 5 Wend. 603 ; Astor *v.* Miller, 2 Paige, R. 68 ; Bourdillon *v.* Dalton, 1 Esp. 234 ; Cook *v.* Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 367 ; Co. Lit. 46 *b* ; Rex *v.* St. Michaels, 2 Doug. 630, 632 ; Blaney *v.* Bearce, 2 Greenl. 132 ; McIver *v.* Humble, 16 East, 109.

[6] Buckley *v.* Pirk, 1 Salk. 316 ; Jevens *v.* Harridge, 1 Saund. 1, note (1). by Williams.

[7] Steph. on Plead. p. 338. In an action by an assignee, his title is set forth as in the following precedent of a declaration by a *grantee of the reversion, against the lessee of his grantor*, for nonpayment of rent.

" In a plea of covenant. For that whereas heretofore, to wit, on the —— day of —— one J. S. was seised in his demesne as of fee of and in the following described messuage lands and tenements situated in —— [*here de-*

assignee of a covenant real, he must show himself grantee of the land, by a regular legal conveyance, from a person having capacity to convey.[1] And in regard to *covenants real*, on which any grantee of the land may sue the grantor in his own name, or may be sued, it may not be improper here to observe, (1.) that they are always such as have real estate for their subject-matter; and (2.) that they run with the land, that is, that they accompany the lawful seisin, and are prospective in their operation. If there is no seisin, the covenant remains merely personal.[2] The object of these covenants is threefold. (1.) To preserve the inheritance; such as covenants to keep

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scribe the premises.] And being so seised, on the same day, by a certain indenture made between him of the one part and the defendant of the other part, one part whereof, sealed with the seal of the said defendant, the plaintiff now here brings into Court, [*or*, which indenture, being in neither part in the possession, custody, or control of the plaintiff, he cannot produce in Court,] the said J. S. demised the same premises to the defendant, [*here proceed, mutatis mutandis, as far as this mark* (*) *in the preceding form.*] And after the making of said indenture, to wit, on the —— day of —— the said J. S., being seised of the reversion of said estate, by his deed of bargain and sale, [*or, if in any other form of conveyance, state it,*] duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, and now here by the plaintiff produced in Court, for a valuable consideration therein mentioned, [bargained, sold] and conveyed the said reversion of and in the said premises to the plaintiff, to have and to hold the same with the appurtenances to the plaintiff and his heirs and assigns forever: by virtue of which deed the plaintiff thereupon became seised of the said reversion according to the tenor of the same, and has ever since continued to be so seised thereof. Now the plaintiff in fact says, that after the making of said deed [of bargain and sale] and during the said term, [*conclude as in the preceding form.*] "

[1] Milnes *v.* Branch, 5 M. & S. 411; Roach *v.* Wadham, 6 East, 289; 2 Sugd. Vend. 479, 489 - 491; Randolph *v.* Kinney, 3 Rand. 394; Beardsley *v.* Knight, 4 Verm. R. 471. The action for breach of a covenant real, lies only for him who held the land at the time of the breach. A mesne covenantee or owner has no right of action for damages, until he has paid them to those who have come in under himself. Chase *v.* Weston, 12 N. Hamp. 413.

[2] Platt on Covenants, p. 63; Shep. Touchst. 171; Spencer's case, 5 Co. 16; Norman *v.* Wells, 17 Wend. 136; Nesbit *v.* Nesbit, Cam. & Nor. R. 324; Slater *v.* Rawson, 1 Met. 450. The nature of covenants real is discussed in 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 26, § 23, note. Greenleaf's ed.

in repair;[1] and covenants to keep the buildings insured against fire, and if they are burnt, to reinstate them with the insurance-money.[2] (2.) To continue the relation of landlord and tenant, &c.; such as, to pay rent;[3] to do suit to the lessor's mill,[4] or, to grind the tenant's corn;[5] and for renewal of leases.[6] (3.) To protect the tenant in the enjoyment of the land. Of this class are, the covenant to warrant and defend the premises to him and his heirs and assigns, against all lawful claims and demands;[7] to make farther assurance;[8] to remove incumbrances;[9] to release suit and service;[10] to produce title deeds, in any action, in support or defence of the grantee;[11] for quiet enjoyment;[12] never to claim or assert title to the premises;[13] to supply the pre-

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[1] Platt on Cov. 65, 267; Lougher *v.* Williams, 3 Lev. 92; Demarest *v.* Willard, 8 Cow. 206; Norman *v.* Wells, 17 Wend. 148; Pollard *v.* Shaaffer, 1 Dall. 210; Shelby *v.* Hearne, 6 Yerg. 512; Kellogg *v.* Robinson, 6 Verm. 276; Sampson *v.* Easterby, 9 B. & C. 505.

[2] Vernon *v.* Smith, 5 B. & Ad. 1, per Best, J.; Platt on Cov. 185; Thomas *v.* Von Kapff, 6 G. & J. 372.

[3] Stevenson *v.* Lambard, 5 East, 575; Holford *v.* Hatch, 1 Doug. 183; Hurst *v.* Rodney, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 375.

[4] This is a real covenant as long as the lessor owns both the mill and the reversion. Vivyan *v.* Arthur, 1 B. & C. 410; 42 E. 3, 3; 5 Co. 18.

[5] Dunbar *v.* Jumper, 2 Yeates, 74; Kimpton *v.* Walker, 9 Verm. 191.

[6] Spencer's case, Moor, 159; Platt on Cov. 470; 12 East, 469, per Ld. Ellenborough; Isteed *v.* Stonely, 1 And. 82.

[7] Shep. Touchst. 161; Marston *v.* Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433; Wiltby *v.* Mountfort, 5 Cow. 137; Van Horne *v.* Crain, 1 Paige, 455.

[8] Middlemore *v.* Goodale, Cro. Car. 503.

[9] Sprague *v.* Baker. 17 Mass. 586. But a covenant that the land is not incumbered, is personal only. Clark *v.* Swift, 3 Met. 390.

[10] Co. Lit. 384 *b*.

[11] 4 Cruise Dig. 480, tit. 32, ch. 25, § 99; Barclay *v.* Raine, 1 Sim. & St. 449; Platt on Cov. 227; 10 Law. Mag. 353 - 357.

[12] Noke *v.* Awder, Cro. El. 373, 436; Campbell *v.* Lewis, 3 B. & Ald. 392; Platt on Cov. 470; Markland *v.* Crump, 1 Dev. & Bat. 94; Heath *v.* Whidden, 11 Shepl. 383; Williams *v.* Burrell, 1 M. G. & S. 402.

[13] Fairbanks *v.* Williamson, 7 Greenl. 97. And if the subject of the conveyance be an estate in expectancy, by an heir or devisee, and the conveyance is lawful, it attaches to the estate when it comes to the grantor, in whose hands it instantly enures to the benefit of the grantee, and thereupon

mises with water;[1] to open a street on which the land granted is bounded;[2] not to establish or permit another mill on the same stream, which propels the mill granted;[3] not to erect a building on grounds dedicated by the covenantor to the public, in front of lands conveyed by the covenantor to the assignor of the plaintiff;[4] or to use the land in a particular manner, for the advantage of the grantor;[5] and the like. When any of these covenants are broken, after the land has been conveyed to the assignee, the general rule is, that he alone has the right to sue for the damages; but if, by the nature and terms of the assignment, the assignor is bound to indemnify the assignee against the breach of such covenants, it seems that the assignor may sue in his own name.[6]

§ 241. To prove a breach of the *covenant of seisin*, it is necessary to show, that the covenantor was not seised in fact; for this covenant is satisfied by any seisin in fact, though it were by wrong, and defeasible.[7] But though the covenantor was in possession of the land at the time of the conveyance, yet if he did not exclusively claim it as his own, the covenant

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the covenant becomes a covenant real. Trull *v.* Eastman, 3 Met. 121; Somes *v.* Skinner, 3 Pick. 52.

[1] Jordain *v.* Wilson, 4 B. & Ald. 266. So a covenant by the grantor of a mill-pond and land, to draw off the water six days in the year, upon request, is a covenant real. Morse *v.* Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449.

[2] Dailey *v.* Beck, 6 Penn. Law Journ. 383.

[3] Norman *v.* Wells. 17 Wend. 136.

[4] Watertown *v.* Cowen, 4 Paige, 510. And see Mann *v.* Stephens, 10 Jur. 650, S. P.

[5] Hemmingway *v.* Fernandez, 13 Sim. 228.

[6] Griffin *v.* Fairbrother, 1 Fairf. 81; Bickford *v.* Page, 2 Mass. 460; Kane *v.* Sanger, 14 Johns. 89; Niles *v.* Sawtel, 7 Mass. 444.

[7] Marston *v.* Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433; Bearce *v.* Jackson, 4 Mass. 408; Twombly *v.* Henley, 1b. 441; Prescott *v.* Trueman, 1b. 627; Chapel *v.* Bull, 17 Mass. 213; Wait *v.* Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217; Wheaton *v.* East, 5 Yerg. 41; Willard *v.* Twitchell, 1 N. Hamp. 177; Backus *v.* McCoy, 3 Ohio R. 220. But see Richardson *v.* Dorr, 5 Verm. 21; Lackwood *v.* Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 385. And see, as to this covenant, 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 26, § 48, note, Greenleaf's ed.

is broken.[1] So, if there was a concurrent seisin, by another, as tenant in common;[2] or, if there was an adverse seisin of a part of the land, within the boundaries described in the deed.[3] But if the possession by a stranger was not adverse, it is no breach.[4]

§ 242. The covenant of *freedom from incumbrances* is proved to have been broken, by any evidence, showing that a third person has a right to, or an interest in the land granted, to the diminution of the value of the land, though consistent with the passing of the fee by the deed of conveyance.[5] Therefore, a public highway over the land;[6] a claim of dower;[7] a private right of way;[8] a lien by judgment;[9] or by mortgage, made by the grantor to the grantee,[10] or any mortgagee, unless it be one which the covenantee is bound to pay;[11] or any other outstanding elder and better title;[12]

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[1] Wheeler *v.* Hatch, 3 Fairf. 389.

[2] Sedgwick *v.* Hollenback, 7 Johns. 376.

[3] Wilson *v.* Forbes, 2 Dev. 30.

[4] Commonwealth *v.* Dudley, 10 Mass. 403.

[5] Prescott *v.* Trueman, 4 Mass. 627, 629, per Parsons, C. J. See, as to this covenant, 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 26, § 59, note, Greenleaf's ed.

[6] Kellogg *v.* Ingersoll, 2 Mass. 97, 101; Pritchard *v.* Atkinson, 3 N. Hamp. 335; Hubbard *v.* Norton, 10 Conn. 431.

[7] 4 Mass. 630. Even though inchoate only. Porter *v.* Noyes, 2 Greenl. 22; Shearer *v.* Ranger, 22 Pick. 447.

[8] Harlow *v.* Thomas, 15 Pick. 68; Mitchell *v.* Warner, 5 Conn. 497.

[9] Jenkins *v.* Hopkins, 8 Pick. 346; Smith *v.* M'Campbell, 1 Blackf. 100; Hall *v.* Dean, 13 Johns. 105.

[10] Bean *v.* Mayo, 5 Greenl. 94.

[11] Watts *v.* Welman, 2 N. Hamp. 458; Tufts *v.* Adams, 8 Pick. 547; Funk *v.* Voneida, 11 S. & R. 109; Stewart *v.* Drake, 4 Halst. 139; Wyman *v.* Ballard, 12 Mass. 304.

[12] Prescott *v.* Trueman, 4 Mass. 627; Chapel *v.* Bull, 17 Mass. 213, 220; Potter *v.* Taylor, 6 Verm. 676; Garrison *v.* Sandford, 7 Halst. 261.

The declaration *by a grantee* by deed of bargain and sale, *against his grantor* for breach of the *covenant of freedom from incumbrance*, by the existence of a paramount title, is in this form: —

"—— in a plea of covenant; for that the said defendant, on the —— day of —— by his deed, [*if by indenture, it should be so set forth,*] duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded, and by the plaintiff now here produced in Court, for a valuable consideration therein mentioned, bargained, sold, and conveyed

is an incumbrance, the existence of which is a breach of this covenant. In these and the like cases, it is the existence of the incumbrance which constitutes the right of action; irrespective of any knowledge on the part of the grantee, or of any eviction of him, or of any actual injury it has occasioned to him. If he has not paid it off, nor bought it in, he will still be entitled to nominal damages, but to nothing more;[1] unless it has ripened into an indefeasible estate; in which case he may recover full damages.[2]

§ 243. The covenant for *quiet enjoyment* goes to the possession, and not to the title; and therefore, to prove a breach, it is ordinarily necessary to give evidence of an entry upon the grantee, or of expulsion from, or some actual disturbance in the possession;[3] and this, too, by reason of some adverse right existing at the time of making the covenant, and not of one subsequently acquired.[4] But it will not suffice to prove

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to the plaintiff [*here describe the premises*] to have and to hold the same with the appurtenances to the plaintiff and his heirs and assigns forever: and therein, among other things, did covenant with the plaintiff, (*) that the said premises were then free from all incumbrance whatsoever. Now the plaintiff in fact says that, at the time of making the said deed, the premises, aforesaid, were not free from all incumbrance; but on the contrary the plaintiff avers that, at the time of making said deed, one E. F. had the paramount and lawful right and title to the same premises; by reason whereof the plaintiff has been obliged to expend and has expended a great sum of money, to wit, the sum of —— in extinguishing the said paramount and lawful right and title of the said E. F. to said premises."

[1] Ibid.; Delavergne *v.* Norris, 7 Johns. 358; Stanard *v.* Eldridge, 16 Johns. 254; Bean *v.* Mayo, 5 Greenl. 94; Wyman *v.* Ballard, 12 Mass. 304.

[2] Chapel *v.* Bull, 17 Mass. 213.

[3] Fraunces's case, 8 Co. 89; Anon. 1 Com. R. 228; Waldron *v.* McCarty, 3 Johns. 471; Kortz *v.* Carpenter, 5 Johns. 120; Webb *v.* Alexander, 7 Wend. 281; Coble *v.* Wellborn, 2 Dev. 388. And see Safford *v.* Annis, 7 Greenl. 168; 2 Sugd. Vend. 514–522, (10th edit.); 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 26, § 51, note, Greenleaf's ed.

[4] Ellis *v.* Welch, 6 Mass. 246; Tisdale *v.* Essex, Hob. 34; Hurd *v.* Fletcher, 1 Doug. 43; Evans *v.* Vaughan, 4 B. & C. 261; Spencer *v.* Marriott, 1 B. & C. 457.

The declaration by a grantee against his grantor, for breach of the general *covenant for quiet enjoyment*, recites the conveyances as in the preceding form, as far as this mark, (*) and proceeds as follows: —

a demand of possession, by one having title;[1] nor a recovery in ejectment;[2] or in trespass;[3] unless there has also been an actual ouster. If, however, the covenantor himself enters tortiously, claiming title, it is a breach.[4]

§ 244. The covenant of *warranty* extends only to lawful claims and acts; and not to those which are tortious;[5] and it is restricted to evictions under titles existing at the date of the covenant.[6] A breach of this covenant is proved only by evi-

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—"that the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns should and might, at all times forever thereafter, peaceably and quietly have, hold, possess and enjoy said premises, without let, suit denial, hindrance, molestation, or interruption by any person lawfully claiming any right, title, or interest in the same. Now the plaintiff in fact says, that he has not been permitted so to possess and enjoy the said premises; but on the contrary he avers, that, after the making of said deed, to wit, on the —— day of ——, one E. F., who, at the time of making said deed, had, and ever since, until the molestation of the plaintiff hereinafter mentioned, continued to have lawful right and title to said premises, did enter into the same, and did thence eject, expel and remove the plaintiff, and hold him out of possession of the same, contrary to the form and effect of the covenant aforesaid." &c.

[1] Cowan *v.* Silliman, 2 Dev. 46. Nor, a mere forbidding to pay rent. Witchcot *v.* Nine, 1 Brownl. 81. And see Hodgskin *v.* Queensborough, Willes, 129.

[2] Kerr *v.* Shaw, 13 Johns. 236.

[3] Webb *v.* Alexander, 7 Wend. 281. And see Cushman *v.* Blanchard, 2 Greenl. 266.

[4] Sedgwick *v.* Hollenback, 7 Johns. 376; 2 Sugd. Vend. 512, (10th edit.) But not if the entry was without claim of title. Seddon *v.* Senate, 13 East, 72; Penn *v.* Glover, Cro. El. 421.

[5] 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 26, § 51, note, Greenleaf's ed; Vaugh. 122; 2 Sugd. Vend. 510, 511, (10th edit.); Dudley *v.* Follett, 3 T. R. 587.

[6] Ellis *v.* Welch, 6 Mass. 246.

Where the *assignee of the grantee* sues *the grantor* for a breach of the covenant of warranty, by an eviction, the declaration will be in this form;—"in a plea of covenant: for that the said defendant heretofore, to wit, on the —— day of —— by his deed, by him duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, which deed, not being in the possession, custody or control of the plaintiff, he is unable to produce in Court, for a valuable consideration therein mentioned, bargained, sold and conveyed to one J. S. a certain parcel of land [*describing it*] to hold the same with the appurtenances, to him the said J. S. and his heirs and assigns forever; and in and by said deed the said defendant, among other

dence of an actual ouster or eviction; but it need not be with force; for if it appears that the covenantee has quietly yielded to a paramount title, whether derived from a stranger, or from the same grantor, either by giving up the possession, or by becoming the tenant of the rightful claimant, or has purchased the better title,[1] it is sufficient. So, a formal entry by a mort-

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things, covenanted with the said J. S., and his heirs and assigns, to warrant and defend the same premises to the said J. S. and his heirs and assigns forever, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons. And the said J. S. afterwards, on the same day, lawfully entered into said premises, and by virtue of said deed became lawfully seised of the same; and being so seised, the said J. S. afterwards, to wit, on the —— day of —— by his deed, by him duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, and now here by the plaintiff produced in Court, for a valuable consideration therein mentioned, bargained, sold, and conveyed the same premises to the plaintiff, to hold the same, with the appurtenances to the plaintiff, and his heirs and assigns forever; by force of which deed the plaintiff, afterwards, and the same day lawfully entered into the same premises and became lawfully seised thereof accordingly. But the plaintiff in fact says, that the said defendant has not warranted and defended the said premises to the plaintiff as by his said covenant he was bound to do, but on the contrary the plaintiff avers that one E. F., lawfully claiming the same premises by an elder and better title, afterwards, by the consideration of the Justices of the —— Court, begun and holden [*here describe the term &c.*] recovered judgment against the plaintiff for his seisin and possession of said premises, and for his costs; and afterwards, to wit, on the —— day of ——, under and by virtue of a writ of execution duly issued upon said judgment, the said E. F. lawfully entered into said premises, and thereof evicted the plaintiff, and still lawfully holds him out of the same."

The breach may be assigned more generally, as an ouster, in the following form: —

— "but on the contrary, the plaintiff avers that one E. F., lawfully claiming the same premises by an elder and better title, afterwards, to wit, on the —— day of ——, lawfully entered into the same premises, and ousted the plaintiff thereof, and still lawfully holds him out of the same."

[1] Emerson *v.* Propr's of Minot, 1 Mass. 464; Kelly *v.* Dutch Church of Schenectady, 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 105; Hamilton *v.* Cutts, 4 Mass, 349; Sprague *v.* Baker, 17 Mass. 586; Clarke *v.* McAnulty, 3 S. & R. 364; Mitchel *v.* Warner, 5 Conn. 497; Stewart *v.* Drake, 4 Halst, 139; Rickert *v.* Snyder, 9 Wend. 416; Tufts *v.* Adams, 8 Pick. 547; Bigelow *v.* Jones, 4 Mass. 512. See further, 4 Kent, Comm. 471; 10 Ohio R. by Wilcox, p. 330–332, note. If the covenantee yields peaceably to a dispossession, the burden of proof is on him, to show that the dispossession was by one having a better title. 4 Mass. 349.

gagee, for foreclosure, though made under a statute, which does not require that the possession of the mortgagee should be continued, is a breach.[1] And if the grantor covenants against all incumbrances, except a certain mortgage, which he engages to discharge, and also covenants generally to warrant the premises against the lawful claims of all persons, he is liable on the latter covenant, if the grantee is obliged himself to remove this incumbrance.[2] A judgment in ejectment, recovered by a stranger, against the covenantee, and an entry under it, with proof that the covenantor had due notice of the pendency of the action, and was requested by the covenantee to defend it, is also sufficient evidence of a breach of this covenant.[3] So if the grantor subsequently conveys to a stranger, who enters without notice of the prior deed, it is a breach.[4]

§ 245. A covenant by a lessee, against *assigning and under-letting*, is not broken by any involuntary transfer of the possession; as, if it be sold by a sheriff, on execution, or by assignees in bankruptcy, or by an executor;[5] unless the assignment is effected by fraud of the lessee, as, by confessing judgment, to the intent that the creditor may seize the premises in execution.[6] Ordinarily, therefore, the plain-

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[1] White *v.* Whitney, 3 Met. 81. See also Burrage *v.* Smith, 16 Pick. 56; Norton *v.* Babcock, 2 Met. 510; Ingersoll *v.* Jackson, 9 Mass 495.

[2] Bemis *v.* Smith, 10 Met. 194.

[3] Hamilton *v.* Cutts, 4 Mass. 349; Prescott *v.* Trueman, Ib. 627. In such case, an actual ouster by writ of possession has been held immaterial. Williams *v.* Wetherbee, 1 Aiken, R. 233. The notice of the suit may be verbal. Collingwood *v.* Irwin, 3 Watts, 306; Miner *v.* Clark, 15 Wend. 425. After which, it seems, the covenantee is not bound to defend. Jackson *v.* Marsh, 5 Wend. 44.

[4] Curtis *v.* Deering, 3 Fairf. 499. The covenantee is not bound to buy in an outstanding paramount title or incumbrance, though it is offered to him on moderate terms. Miller *v.* Halsey, 2 Green, N. J. Rep. 48; Clark *v.* McAnulty, 3 S. & R. 364.

[5] Doe *v.* Carter, 8 T. R. 57; Doe *v.* Bevan, 3 M. & S. 353; Seers *v.* Hind, 1 Ves. 295.

[6] Doe *v.* Carter, 8 T. R. 57. And see, on this covenant, Platt on Cov. ch. 12, p. 404 – 443.

tiff must prove a transfer of the possession by some voluntary act of the defendant. Evidence of the mere fact, that a stranger is in possession of the land is not alone sufficient proof of a breach of this covenant;[1] but if the stranger claims to hold as under-tenant of the defendant, it has been held sufficient, *primâ facie*, to maintain the allegation on the part of the plaintiff.[2]

§ 245. *a.* Upon a *covenant to repair*, and issue joined on a general traverse of the breach, the plaintiff must prove the actual state of the premises, so as to show that they were substantially out of repair; and in doing this, he will be confined to the matters expressly alleged as constituting the breach. If the covenant is general, to repair and keep in repair, the tenant is not obliged to put in new floors, or the like, but only to repair the old; and it is sufficient if, by a timely expenditure of money, he keep the premises in substantial repair, and, as nearly as may be, in the same state in which they were at the time of the demise.[3] He is bound, however, under a general covenant "to repair, uphold and maintain" a house, to keep up the painting of inside doors, shutters, &c.;[4] and also to rebuild it if destroyed by fire, unless such casualty is excepted in the covenant, either expressly or by implication.[5] Besides proving the want of repair, the plaintiff should also prove the damages thereby sustained; which is usually done by the evidence of surveyors, carpenters, &c., who have examined the premises, and estimated the cost of putting them into the state in which the tenant ought to have left them.[6] And the Jury

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[1] Doe *v.* Payne, 1 Stark. R. 86.

[2] Doe *v.* Rickarby, 5 Esp. 4.

[3] Soward *v.* Leggatt, 7 C. & P. 613; Harris *v.* Jones, 1 M. & Rob. 173; Stanley *v.* Towgood, 3 Bing. N. C. 4; Gutteridge *v.* Munyard, 7 C. & P. 129; 1 M. & Rob. 334.

[4] Monk *v.* Noyes, 1 C. & P. 265.

[5] Bullock *v.* Dommitt, 6 T. R. 650; Digby *v.* Atkinson, 4 Campb. 265; Phillips *v.* Stephens, 16 Mass. 238; Fowler *v.* Bott, 6 Mass. 63; Weigall *v.* Waters, 6 T. R. 488; Loader *v.* Kemp, 2 C. & P. 375.

[6] Penley *v.* Watts, 7 M. & W. 601.

may also allow the owner some compensation for the actual loss of use or profit of the premises, while they were undergoing such repairs.[1]

§ 246. The plea of *non est factum*, to a declaration on an indenture of lease, is an admission of the plaintiff's title to demise.[2] And generally, under this plea, the defendant may prove that the deed was fraudulent ;[3] or, that it was delivered as an escrow ;[4] or, may show any personal incapacity, such as lunacy,[5] or coverture ;[6] and after production of a counterpart, executed by all the plaintiffs, he may produce the demising part, to prove that it was not executed by them all.[7]

§ 247. Where issue is joined on a plea of *performance*, the defendant assumes the burden of proof, and therefore is ordinarily entitled to open and close the case.[8]

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1 Wood *v.* Pope, 1 Bing. N. C. 467.
2 Friend *v.* Eastabrook, 2 W. Bl. 1152.
3 Anon. Lofft, R. 457.
4 Stoytes *v.* Pearson, 4 Esp. 255.
5 Faulder *v.* Silk, 3 Campb. 126.
6 Lambert *v.* Atkins, 2 Campb. 272.
7 Wilson *v.* Woolfryes, 6 M. & S. 341.
8 Scott *v.* Hull, 8 Conn. 296. And see Ante, Vol. 1, § 74.

CUSTOM.

§ 248. Custom is unwritten law, established by common consent and uniform practice, from time immemorial; and it is local, having respect to the inhabitants of a particular place or district. It differs from Prescription, in this, that prescription is a personal right, belonging to one or a few persons, by particular designation, as for example, the owners of a certain parcel of land. The term, Usage, in its broadest sense, includes them both; but is ordinarily applied to trade; designating the habits, modes, and course of dealing, which are generally observed, either in any particular branch of trade, or in all mercantile transactions.

§ 249. We have already seen,[1] that, in general, when a local custom, of a public or general nature, is once established by a judgment, the judgment is competent evidence of the existence of the custom, in all other cases, though the parties may be different. Hence no person is a competent witness to prove a local custom, stated on the record, who would derive a benefit from its establishment.[2] But in regard to the proof of usages in any particular trade, persons employed in the particular trade are held competent witnesses, as standing indifferent; the usage in question generally affecting alike both their rights and their liabilities. These usages also, when once put in issue and found by a Jury, are afterwards recognized on production of the record; and after having been frequently proved, in the course of successive legal investigations, they are taken notice of by the Courts, without farther proof.[3]

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 405.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 5; Smith *v.* Wright, 1 Caides, 43; Consequa *v.* Willing, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 230; Thomas *v.* Graves, 1 Const. Rep. 150, [308.]

They are not, however, permitted to have effect, when they contravene any established general rule of the law; and therefore evidence, in proof of any such usage, is ordinarily inadmissible.[1] The general law-merchant, being part of the Common Law, is recognized by the Courts without proof.[2]

§ 250. In proof of a local *custom*, it must be shown to have existed from time immemorial; to have continued, without any interruption of the right, though the possession may have been suspended; to have been peaceably acquiesced in; and to be reasonable, certain, consistent with law and with other acknowledged customs, and compulsory on all.[3] The existence of a custom, in one place, is not admissible in proof of its existence in another; unless where the custom has respect to some general subject common to them both, to which it is merely an incident, such as a general tenure, and the like.[4] But where the question is upon the manner of conducting a particular branch of trade at one place, evidence of the manner of conducting the same branch at another place is admissible; being deemed to fall within the exception to the rule, as it concerns a matter, in its nature common to both places.[5] So, evidence as to the profits of mines, or the right to dig turf in fenny lands, in

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[1] Edie *v.* The East India Co. 2 Burr. 1216, 1222; Homer *v.* Dorr, 10 Mass. 26, 29; Lewis *v.* Thacher, 15 Mass. 431; Higgins *v.* Livermore, 14 Mass. 106; Randall *v.* Rotch, 12 Pick. 107; Eager *v.* The Atlas Ins. Co. 14 Pick. 141; Perkins *v.* The Franklin Bank, 21 Pick. 483; Bryant *v.* Com'th Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 131; The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 568; Bolton *v.* Colder, 1 Watts, 360; Newbold *v.* Wright, 4 Rawle, 195; Stoever *v.* Whitman, 6 Binn. 417; Brown *v.* Jackson, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 24; Prescott *v.* Hubbell, 1 McCord, 94.

[2] 2 Burr. 1216, 1222.

[3] 1 Bl. Comm. 76–78. And see Freary *v.* Cook, 14 Mass. 488; Clayton *v.* Corby, 8 Jur. 212; 2 Ad. & El. 813, N. S.; Carr *v.* Foster, 3 Ad. & El. 581, N. S.; Hilton *v.* E. of Granville, Dav. & Mer. 614; 5 Ad. & El. 701, N. S.; Elwood *v.* Bullock, 6 Ad. & El. 383, N. S.

[4] Furneaux *v.* Hutchins, Cowp. 808; D. of Somerset *v.* France, 1 Stra. 654, 661, 662.

[5] Noble *v.* Kennoway, 2 Doug. 510.

one manor, has been admitted in proof of the same right claimed in another, the subject being the same.[1]

§ 251. But in regard to the *usage of trade*, it is not necessary that it should have existed immemorially; it is sufficient if it be established, known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law.[2] These usages, many Judges are of opinion, should be sparingly adopted by the Courts, as rules of law, as they are often founded in mere mistake, or in the want of enlarged and comprehensive views of the full bearing of principles.[3] Their true office is, to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts arising not from express stipulation, but from mere implications and presumptions, and acts of a doubtful and equivocal character; and to fix and explain the meaning of words and expressions of doubtful or various senses.[4] On this principle, the usage or habit of trade or conduct of an individual, which is known to the person who deals with him, may be given in evidence to prove what was the contract between them.[5]

§ 252. Both customs and usages must be *proved by evi-*

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[1] Dean, &c. of Ely *v.* Warren, 2 Atk. 189, per Ld. Hardwicke.

[2] 1 Bl. Comm. 75; Todd *v.* Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Collings *v.* Hope, 3 Wash. 150; Rapp *v.* Palmer, 3 Watts, 178; Trott *v.* Wood, 1 Gall. 443; Stultz *v.* Dickey, 5 Binn. 287; Winthrop *v.* Union Ins. Co. 2 Wash. C. C. R. 7; United States *v.* M'Daniel, 7 Pet. 1; Lowry *v.* Russell, 8 Pick. 360; Parrott *v.* Thacher, 9 Pick. 426; Stevens *v.* Reeves, Ib. 198; Thomas *v.* Graves, 1 Const. Rep. 150, [308.]

[3] 2 Sumn. R. 377, per Story, J.

[4] The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 569; Macomber *v.* Parker, 13 Pick. 182; Shaw *v.* Mitchell, 2 Met. 65; Coit *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 385; Harris *v.* Nicholas, 5 Munf. 483; Allegre *v.* Maryland Ins. Co. 2 G. & J. 136. See also Ante, Vol. 1, § 292; Powley *v.* Walker, 5 T. R. 373; Roe *v.* Charnock, Peake's Cas. 5; Rex *v.* Navestock, 6 Burr. 719, (Set. Cas.) Evidence of usage is also admissible to establish a right above and beyond the contract; even though the contract is by deed. Wigglesworth *v.* Dallison, 1 Doug. 201.

[5] Loring *v.* Gurney, 5 Pick. 15; Naylor *v.* Semmes, 4 G. & J. 274; Noble *v.* Kennoway, 2 Doug. 510.

dence of facts, not of mere speculative opinions; and by witnesses who have had frequent and actual experience of the custom or usage, and do not speak from report alone.[1] The witnesses must speak as to the course of the particular trade; they cannot be examined to show what is the law of that trade.[2] And though a usage is founded on the laws or edicts of the government of the country where it prevails, yet still it may be proved by parol.[3] It has also been held, that the testimony of one witness alone, is not sufficient to establish a usage of trade, of which all dealers in that line of trade are bound to take notice.[4]

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[1] Edie *v.* E. Ind. Co. 2 Burr. 1228, per Wilmot, J.; Savill *v.* Barchard, 4 Esp. 54, per Ld. Kenyon; Austin *v.* Taylor, 2 Ohio R. 282.

[2] Ruan *v.* Gardiner, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 145; Winthrop *v.* Union Ins. Co. Wash. C. C. R. 7; Austin *v.* Taylor, 2 Ohio R. 282.

[3] Livingston *v.* The Maryland Ins. Co. 7 Cranch, 500, 539; Drake *v.* Hudson, 7 H. & J. 399.

[4] Wood *v.* Hickok, 2 Wend. 501; Parrott *v.* Thacher, 9 Pick. 426; Thomas *v.* Graves, 1 Const. Rep. 150, [308.]

DAMAGES.

§ 253. Damages are given as a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury actually received by him from the defendant. They should be precisely commensurate with the injury; neither more, nor less;[1] and this, whether it be to his person or estate.[2] Damages are never

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[1] Co. Lit. 257 a; 2 Bl. Comm. 438; Rockwood *v.* Allen, 7 Mass. 256, per Sedgwick, J.; Bussy *v.* Donaldson, 4 Dall. 207, per Shippen, C. J.; 3 Amer. Jur. 257.

[2] Since the first edition of this volume, Mr. Sedgwick has given to the profession a valuable treatise on the Law of Damages, in which he denies the soundness of the general rule here stated; and lays down the broad proposition that, "wherever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression mingle in the controversy, the law, instead of adhering to the system, or even the language of compensation, adopts a wholly different rule. It permits the Jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interest of society and of the aggrieved individual, and gives damages *not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender.*" Sedgwick on Damages, p. 39. However this view may appear to be justified by the general language of some Judges, and by remarks gratuitously made in delivering judgment on other questions, it does not seem supported to that extent by any *express decision on the point*, and is deemed at variance not only with adjudged cases, but with settled principles of law. This will be apparent from an examination of the authorities on which the learned author relies.

In the first case cited, in support of his position, that of Huckle *v.* Money, 2 Wils. 205, which was an action to try the legality of an arrest under a general warrant issued by the Secretary of State, the Jury found a verdict for £300, which the defendant moved the Court to set aside as excessive. But the motion was denied, on the ground that the damages were properly left at large to the Jury; with instructions that they were not bound to any certain rule, but were at liberty to consider all the circumstances of oppression and arbitrary power by which the great constitutional right of the plaintiff was violated, in this attempt to destroy the liberty of the kingdom. All which the Jury were thus permitted to consider, were circumstances, going in aggravation of the injury itself which the plaintiff had received, and so were admissible under the rule as stated in § 266, 272, of the text.

given in real actions; but only in personal and mixed actions. In some of the American States, the Jury are authorized by

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The case of Tullidge *v.* Wade, 3 Wils. 18, was of the same class. It was trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house, and debauching his daughter; and the Jury were instructed to take into consideration the plaintiff's loss of her service, and the expenses of her confinement in his house. The verdict, which was for £50, was complained of, as excessive; but the Court thought otherwise, "*the plaintiff having received this insult in his own house*, where he had civilly received the defendant, and permitted him to make his addresses to his daughter." And it was observed by Bathurst, J., that "In actions of this nature, and of assaults, *the circumstances* of time and place, when and where *the insult* is given, require different damages; as it is a *greater insult* to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than in a private room." It thus appears that in this case, the damages were limited to the extent of the *injury received by the plaintiff;* and that the remark of Wilmot, C. J., relied on by the learned author, was altogether *gratis dictum.* In Doe *v.* Filliter, 13 M. & W. 47, which was trespass for mesne profits, the only question was, whether in estimating the costs of the ejectment, as part of the plaintiff's damages, the plaintiff was confined to the costs taxed, or might be allowed the costs as between attorney and client. The remark of Pollock, C. B. respecting "what are *called* vindictive damages," though wholly gratuitous is explained by himself to mean only that the Jury may "take *all the circumstances* into their consideration," namely, the circumstances of *the injury inflicted*, so far as they affected the plaintiff. The like may be observed of what Mr. Justice Washington said in Walker *v.* Smith, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 152; which was an action against the plaintiff's factor, to recover the balance due to the plaintiff for goods which the factor had sold without taking collateral security, in violation of orders, the purchaser proving insolvent, and partial payment only having been obtained. The question was, whether the Jury might assess damages in their discretion, for less than the plaintiff's actual loss, taking into consideration all the favorable circumstances on the defendant's part; or whether they were bound to give the plaintiff the precise sum which he had lost by the violation of his orders. And the Judge instructed them that the latter was the sole measure of damages; remarking, passingly, that in suits for vindictive damages the Jury acted without control, because there was no legal rule by which to measure them. His meaning apparently was, that in actions "sounding in damages" the Court had *no control* over the sound discretion of the Jury; but that where the damages were susceptible of a fixed and certain rule, the Jury were bound by the instructions of the Court. The case of Tillotson *v.* Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, is also relied upon. This was case for a libel; in which the Jury were instructed by Kent, C. J., "that the charge contained in the libel was calculated not only to *injure the feelings* of the plaintiff, but to *destroy all confidence in him* as a public officer; and in his opinion demanded from the Jury exem-

statutes, to assess, in real actions, the damages which, by the Common Law, are given in an action of trespass for mesne profits; but this only converts the real into a mixed action.

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plary damages, as well *on account of the nature of the offence charged* against the plaintiff, as for the *protection of his character as a public officer*, which he stated as a strong circumstance for the increase of damages;" adding "that he did not accede to the doctrine that the Jury ought not to punish the defendant, in a civil suit, for the pernicious effects which a publication of this kind was calculated to produce in society." Here the grounds of damages, positively stated to the Jury, were expressly limited to the degree of *injury to the plaintiff*, either in his feelings, or in his character as a public officer. The rest is mere negation. The Jury were not instructed to consider any other circumstances than those which affected the plaintiff himself; though *these*, they were told, demanded exemplary damages. In this view, all damages, in actions *ex delicto*, may be said to be *exemplary*, as having a tendency to deter others from committing the like injuries. These instructions therefore were in accordance with the rule already stated. In support of them, the Chief Justice relies on Huckle *v.* Money, and Tullidge *v.* Wade. He also refers to Pritchard *v.* Papillon, 3 Harg. St. Tr. 1071; 10 Howell, St. Tr. 319, 370, S. C., which was essentially a controversy between the crown and the people, before "the infamous Jeffries;" who told the Jury that "the government is a thing that is infinitely concerned in the case, that makes it so *popular* a cause;" and pressed them, with disgraceful zeal, to find large damages for that reason, and for their compliance in finding £10,000, which was the amount of the *ad damnum*, he praised them as men of sense, to be greatly commended for it. The ruling of that Judge, in favor of the crown, will hardly be relied upon at this day as good authority. But in Tillotson *v.* Cheetham, the learned Chief Justice, in saying that the actual pecuniary damages in actions for tort, are never the sole rule of assessment, probably meant no more than this, that the Jury were at liberty to consider all the damages accruing to the plaintiff from the wrong done, without being confined to those which are susceptible of arithmetical computation. The remark of Spencer, J., beyond this was extrajudicial. In Woert *v.* Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352, which was trespass, for beating the plaintiff's horse to death, with circumstances of great barbarity, the Jury were told that they "had a right to give *smart-money;*" by which nothing more seems to have been meant than that they might take into consideration the circumstances of the cruel act, as enhancing the injury to the plaintiff by the laceration of his feelings. In the Boston Manufacturing Company *v.* Fiske, 2 Mason, R. 119, the only question was whether in case for infringing a patent, the plaintiff might recover, as part of his actual damage, the fees paid to his counsel for vindicating his right in that action. The observations of the learned Judge, quoted by Mr. Sedgwick, were made with reference to the practice in Admiralty, in cases of marine torts and prize, where a broader

§ 224. All damages must be *the result* of the injury complained of; whether it consist in the withholding of a legal

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discretion is exercised than in Courts of Common Law, the Court frequently settling in one suit all the equities between the parties in regard to the subject-matter. The next case adduced is that of Whipple *v.* Walpole, 10 New Hamp. R. 130, which was case, against the town of Walpole, to recover damages, for an injury arising from the defective state of a bridge, which the defendants had grossly neglected to keep in repair. The bridge had broken down while the plaintiff's stage coach was passing over, in consequence of which his horses were destroyed. The Jury were instructed "that for ordinary neglect the plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages; but that such damages might be allowed in the discretion of the Jury, in case they believed there had been gross negligence on the part of the defendants." The question seems in fact to have been, whether the Jury were confined to the value of the horses, or might take into consideration all the circumstances of the injury. The sole question before the Court in bank was, whether the above instruction was correct; and they held that it was. The remark that the Jury might give "damages *beyond the actual injury sustained*, for the sake of the example," though gratuitous and uncalled for, seems qualified by the subsequent observation that the Jury, in cases of gross negligence, "were not bound to be *very exact* in estimating the amount of damages;" and probably the learned Judges meant to say no more than that, in such cases, the Court would not control the discretion of the Jury, but would leave them at liberty to consider all the circumstances of the injury, and award such damages as they thought proper. In Linsley *v.* Bushnell, 15 Conn. R. 225, which was case for an injury to the plaintiff's person, occasioned by an obstruction left in the highway by the wanton negligence of the defendant, the question was, whether the Jury, in the estimation of damages, were restricted to the loss of the plaintiff's time, and the expenses of his cure, &c., or might also allow, as part of his damages, the necessary trouble and expenses incurred in the prosecution of his remedy by action. And the Court held that these latter were fair subjects for their consideration. "The circumstances of aggravation or mitigation," said the Court, — "the bodily pain; the mental anguish; the injury to the plaintiff's business and means of livelihood, past and prospective; all these, and many other circumstances may be taken into consideration by the Jury, in guiding their discretion in assessing damages for a wanton personal injury. But these are not all that go to make up the amount of damage sustained. The bill of the surgeon, and other pecuniary charges, to which the plaintiff has been necessarily subjected by the misconduct of the defendant, are equally proper subjects of consideration." And it is in express reference to the propriety of allowing the trouble and expense of the remedy, that the observation respecting vindictive damages, or smart-money, quoted by Mr. Sedgwick, seems to have been made. For the learned Judge immediately cites, in support of his remark, certain authorities, which will hereafter be mentioned, not one of which warrants the broad doctrine

right, or the breach of a duty legally due to the plaintiff. Those which *necessarily* result, are termed *general damages*,

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which is now under consideration; and he concludes by quoting from one of them, with emphasis, the admission that "where an important right is in question, in an action of trespass, the Court have given damages to *indemnify the party for the expense of establishing it.*" This is conceived to be the extent to which the law goes, in civil actions for damages, beyond the circumstances of the transaction.

The learned author further observes, that the doctrine he lays down has been fully adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States; and cites Tracy *v.* Swartwout, 10 Peters, R. 80. That was an action of trover against a collector of the revenue, for certain casks of syrup of sugar-cane, which the importer had offered to enter and bond at the rate of fifteen per cent. ad valorem, but the collector, acting in good faith, required bond for a duty of three cents per pound. The importer refusing to do this, the goods remained in the hands of the defendant for a long time, waiting the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury; who being of opinion that the lighter duty was the legal one, they were accordingly delivered up to the importer at that rate of duty; but in the mean time had become deteriorated by growing acid. The Judge of the Circuit Court instructed the Jury, that the circumstances of the dispute ought not to subject the collector to more than nominal damages; to which exceptions were taken. The sole question on this subject was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the damages he had *actually sustained;* and the Supreme Court held, that he was so entitled. It was in reference to this question only, that the terms *exemplary* and *compensatory* damages were used; the question whether, in any case, damages could be given by way of punishment alone, not appearing to have crossed the minds either of the Judges or the counsel.

The last case cited by the author is that of the Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, which was a libel for a marine tort, brought by neutrals against the owners of an American privateer for illegally capturing their vessel as prize, and for plundering the goods on board. The question was, whether the *owners* of the privateer, not having in any respect participated in the wrong, were liable for any damages beyond the prime cost or value of the property lost, and in case of injury, for the diminution in its value, with interest thereon; and the Court held, that they were not; and accordingly rejected the claim for all such damages as rested in mere discretion. To what extent the immediate wrong-doers might have been liable, was a question not before the Court; yet it is to be noted, that, in the passing allusion which the learned Judge makes to their liability, he merely says that, in a suit against them, it *might* be proper to go yet farther, in the shape of exemplary damages, but does not say that it *would* be; for his attention was not necessarily drawn to that point.

The case also of Grable *v.* Margrave, 3 Scam. 372, has been elsewhere adduced in support of the rule now controverted. It was an action upon the

being shown under the *ad damnum*, or general allegation of damages, at the end of the declaration; for the defendant must

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case, for seduction of the plaintiff's daughter; in which the Judge permitted the plaintiff to offer evidence both of his own poverty and of the pecuniary ability of the defendant; to which ruling the defendant took exception. And the Court held the ruling right; observing, that the father was entitled to recover not only for the loss of service, and the actual expenses, but for the dishonor and disgrace *cast upon him and his family*, and for the loss of the society and comfort of his daughter. Clearly this decision was in perfect consonance with the doctrine in the text, § 269; but the remark of the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court, that "In vindictive actions, the Jury are always permitted to give damages, for the double purpose of setting an example, and of punishing the wrong-doer," was uncalled for by the case in judgment, and therefore cannot be imputed to the Court. In Cook *v.* Ellis, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 466, the question seems to have been between *actual* and *exemplary* damages, in the popular sense of those words. It was an action of trespass, for an assault and battery. The defendant had already been indicted and fined $250 for the act; and he insisted that this was a bar to all further claim of the plaintiff, "beyond *actual* damages;" but the Judge told the Jury, that, "these proceedings did not prevent them from giving *exemplary* damages, if they chose; though the fine and payment were proper to be considered, in fixing the amount to be allowed the plaintiff." The judgment is reported in a *per curiam* opinion; but it appears that the motion of the defendant for a new trial was denied; and the Court are reported as saying among other things, that "smart-money allowed by a Jury, and a fine imposed at the suit of the people, depend on the same principle. Both are penal, and intended to deter others from the commission of the like crime. The former, however, becomes incidentally *compensatory for damages*, and at the same time *answers the purposes* of punishment." From this and other expressions, it may well be inferred, that by *actual* damages the Court meant those which were susceptible of computation; and that by *exemplary* damages, or smart-money, they intended those damages which were given to the plaintiff for the circumstances of aggravation attending the injury *he had received*, and going to enhance its amount, but which were left to the discretion of the Jury, not being susceptible of any other rule. But as a decision, the case extends no farther than this, that in an action for trespass to the person, the payment of a fine, upon a criminal conviction for the same offence, cannot go in mitigation of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. The case of Johnson *v.* Weedman, 4 Scam. 495, sometimes also cited, is still less to the point. It was trover for a horse, bailed to the defendant for agistment, and used by him without leave, but under circumstances entitling the plaintiff to no more than nominal damages. And the Jury having found for the defendant, the Court refused to disturb the verdict. To these may be added the case of McNamara *v.* King, 2 Gilm. 432.

From this examination of the authorities, adduced in support of the posi-

be presumed to be aware of the necessary consequences of his conduct, and therefore cannot be taken by surprise in the proof

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tion that, in the cases alluded to, damages may be given purely by way of punishment, irrespective of the degree and circumstances of injury to the plaintiff, it is manifest that it has not the countenance of any express decision upon the point, though it has the apparent support of several *obiter dicta*, and may seem justified by the terms "exemplary damages," "vindictive damages," "smart-money," and the like, not unfrequently used by Judges, but seldom defined. But taken in the connection in which these terms have been used, they seem to be intended to designate in general those damages only which are incapable of any fixed rule, and lie in the discretion of the Jury; such as damages for mental anguish, or personal indignity and disgrace, &c., and these, so far only as the sufferer is himself affected. If more than this was intended, how is the party to be protected from a double punishment? For after the Jury shall have considered the injury *to the public*, in assessing damages for an aggravated assault, or for obtaining goods by false pretences, or the like, the wrong-doers are still liable to indictment and fine as well as imprisonment, for the same offence.

This view of the true meaning of those terms was taken by Smith, J., in Churchill *v.* Watson, 5 Day, R. 144. It was trespass *de bonis asportatis*, committed with malice, and with circumstances of peculiar aggravation, to prevent the plaintiff from completing a contract for building a vessel. And the question was, whether the Jury were confined to the value of the property taken, and presumptive damages for the force only; or whether they might consider all the aggravating circumstances attending the trespass, and the plaintiff's actual damage sustained by it. The Court held the latter. The learned Judge remarked that, "in actions founded in tort, the first object of a Jury should be to remunerate the injured party for all the real damage he has sustained. In doing this the value of the article taken or destroyed forms one item; there may be others, and in this case I think there were others." He then mentions the interruption and delay, which occurred in building the vessel, as of the class of damages to which he alludes, and adds that he shall not attempt to draw the line between consequences which may properly influence a Jury in assessing damages, and those which are so far remote and *dependent on other causes*, that they *cannot* be taken into consideration. "In addition," he observes, "to the *actual* damage," [meaning doubtless, from the connection, the direct pecuniary damage above alluded to,] "which the party sustains in actions founded in *tort*, the Jury are at liberty to give a further sum, which is sometimes called *vindictive*, sometimes *exemplary*, and at other times *presumptive* damages. These, from their nature, cannot be governed by any precise rule, but are assessed by the Jury, upon a *view of all the circumstances attending the transaction.*" He afterwards says, "Indeed I know of no such thing as *presumptive* damages for *force*. It is a wrong, for which the law presumes

of them. Some damages are always presumed to follow from the violation of any right or duty implied by law; and there-

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damages, and the amount will depend on the *nature, extent and enormity of the wrong;* but force partakes not of the nature of right or wrong, in such a manner that the law can raise any presumption." A similar view of the rule of damages in *torts* had previously been taken by the Court in Edwards *v.* Beach, 3 Day, R. 447, which was trespass for destroying a tavern-keeper's sign; the plaintiff claiming damages *commensurate with the injury*, and the defendant resisting all but the value of the sign. So, in Denison *v.* Hyde, 6 Conn. R. 508, which was trespass for carrying away the plaintiff's vessel, the rule was held to be, that in tort, "not only the direct damage, but the probable or inevitable damages, and *those which result from the aggravating circumstances attending the act*, are proper to be estimated by the Jury." So, in Treat *v.* Barber, 7 Conn. R. 274, which was trespass, the defendant having broken open the plaintiff's chest, containing her wearing apparel, and used language, in relation to the contents of it, that wounded her feelings; it was held, that these circumstances were proper to be considered by the Jury, as *aggravating the injury*, and *so* increasing the damages. In Merrills *v.* The Tariff Manuf. Co., 10 Conn. R. 384, which was an action on the case, the Court referred to the malice, wantonness, and spirit of revenge and ill-will, with which the act was done, and observed, that "these circumstances of aggravation may, with great propriety, be considered, in fixing the *remuneration to which the plaintiff is entitled.*" The same view of the true meaning and limit of the term "*vindictive damages*" was taken by Ld. Abinger, C. B., in Brewer *v.* Dew, 11 M. & W. 625, which was trespass for groundlessly seizing and taking the plaintiff's goods, *per quod* he was annoyed and injured in his business, and believed to be insolvent, and certain lodgers left his house, &c. The defendant pleaded the bankruptcy of the plaintiff in bar of the action; to which the plaintiff demurred; thus raising the question, whether the damages passed to the assignees. And the Ld. Ch. Baron said, "The substantial ground on which this case is to be decided is this, — whether, on this declaration as it stands, the Jury could give *vindictive* damages *for the seizing and taking* of the goods *beyond their value.* For the *breaking and entering* it is admitted they might give damages beyond the amount of the actual injury" — (evidently meaning, beyond the injury to the *property.*) "Now I think, that under this declaration the plaintiff might give evidence to show, that the entering and the seizure of the goods were made under a false and unfounded pretence of a legal claim, and that *thereby the plaintiff was greatly annoyed and disturbed* in carrying on his business, and was believed to be insolvent, and that *in consequence*, his lodgers left him. Might not the Jury then give vindictive damages *for such an injury, beyond the mere value of the goods?*" Here it is plain, that by "vindictive damages" the learned Judge intended only the damages *which the plaintiff had sustained*, beyond the value of his goods; and

fore the law will in such cases award *nominal* damages, if none greater are proved.[1] But where the damages, though

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not those, if any, for any supposed injury to the public at large. Such also was plainly the sense in which Mr. Justice Story used this term, in Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 483. "By the terms 'actual damage,' said he, "in the statute, (referring to the patent act,) are meant such damages as the plaintiffs can actually prove, and have in *fact* sustained, as contradistinguished to mere imaginary or exemplary damages, which, in personal torts, are sometimes given. In mere personal torts, as, assaults and batteries, defamation of character, &c., the law has, in proper cases, allowed the party to recover, not merely for any actual injury, but for the *mental anxiety*, the *public degradation* and *wounded sensibility*, which honorable men *feel at violations of the sacredness of their persons and characters*." It seems superfluous to state at large the particular cases in which a similar rule has been laid down. It was emphatically but briefly stated by Williams, C. J. in Bateman *v.* Goodyear, 12 Conn. R. 580, which was trespass for an aggravated forcible entry, in these words: "What then is the principle upon which damages are given, in an action of trespass? The *party is to be indemnified* for what he has actually suffered; and then all those circumstances, *which give character to the transaction*, are to be weighed and considered." He cites the above case of Churchill *v.* Watson, and refers to Bracegirdle *v.* Orford, 2 M. & S. 77, where the circumstances of the entry into the plaintiff's house, namely, upon a false charge of concealment of stolen goods, to the injury of her reputation, were held proper for the consideration of the Jury; Le Blanc, J. remarking, that "it is always the practice to give in evidence the circumstances which accompany and *give a character to the trespass*." The party is to be *indemnified;* nothing more. But every circumstance of the transaction *tending to his injury*, is to be considered. At this limit the Jury are to stop; — a limit carefully marked by the Court in Coppin *v.* Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875. They may weigh every fact which goes to his injury, whether in *mind*, *body*, or *estate*; but are not at liberty to consider facts which do not relate to the injury itself, nor to its consequences to the plaintiff. In other words, they cannot go beyond the issue; which is the guilt of the defendant, and the damage it did to the plaintiff; for this only did the defendant come prepared to meet. Such plainly was the principle of the decision in the cases already cited; as it also was in Hall *v.* Conn. R. Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. R. 320, which was case for an inhuman injury to a passenger; in Southard *v.* Rexford, 6 Cowen, R. 264, which was for breach of a promise of marriage; in Major *v.* Pulliam, 3 Dana, R. 592, which was trespass *quare clausum fregit;* and in Rockwood *v.* Allen, 7 Mass. 254, which was case for the default of the sheriff's deputy.

[1] Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 433, per Story, J. And see Sedgwick on Damages, ch. ii.

the *natural* consequences of the act complained of, are *not* the *necessary* result of it, they are termed *special damages ;*

In all these cases there were circumstances of misconduct and gross demerit on the part of the defendant, richly deserving punishment in the shape of a pecuniary *mulct*, and fairly affording a case for damages on that ground alone ; yet in none of them do the Court intimate to the Jury that they may assess damages for the plaintiff to any amount more than commensurate with the injury which he sustained. See also, Matthews *v.* Bliss, 22 Pick. 48.

The most approved text writers, also, justify this rule of damages. Thus Blackstone, 2 Bl. Comm. 438, defines *damages* as the money "given to a man by a Jury, as *a compensation or satisfaction for some injury sustained;* as for a battery, for imprisonment, for slander, or for trespass." Hammond, Law of Nisi Prius, p. 33, limits the remedy, by an action of trespass, to the recovery of "*a compensation for the injury sustained.*" Ib. p. 43 - 48. And it is worthy of remark, that Ch. Baron Comyns, in treating expressly of damages, nowhere intimates a power to assess them, beyond this. 3 Com. Dig. Damages, E. The same opinion was entertained by Ld. Denman, who observed that "The principle, on which actions are maintainable, is not the punishment of guilty persons, but compensation to innocent sufferers." Fillites *v.* Phippond, 12 Jur. 202, 204. Dr. Rutherforth, also, defines "damages" with equal strictness. "By damage, we understand every loss or diminution of *what is a man's own*, occasioned by the fault of another." 1 Rutherf. Inst. b. 1, ch. 17, § 1, p. 385, Phil. edit. 1799. He follows Grot. De Jur. Bel. lib. 2, cap. 17, § II. This chapter of Rutherforth is a precise and luminous statement of the principles on which damages ought to be computed ; but nowhere countenances the position of Mr. Sedgwick. In the only passage which he has cited, as looking that way, viz., a paragraph in § xiv. p. 400, the author is speaking of the rule of reparation where there is no malice; and in stating the degrees of fault, he thinks that the grossest faults may well deserve punishment; but he does not *there* intimate *how* the punishment should be inflicted. The whole passage is as follows ; — "The obligation, to make reparation for damages done by our means, is not confined to those actions only, which are criminal enough to subject us to punishment. Though there is no degree of malice in an action, by which another is injured, yet it may arise from some faulty neglect or imprudence in him, who does it, or is the occasion of its being done : and when any person has suffered damage, for want of his taking such care, as he ought to have taken, the same law, which obliged him, as far as he was able, to avoid doing harm to any man, cannot but oblige him, when he has neglected this duty, to undo, as well as he can, what harm he has been the occasion of; that is, to make amends for the damage, which another has sustained through his neglect.

"Those faults, which consist in neglect, are sometimes divided into

which the law does not imply; and therefore, in order to prevent a surprise upon the defendant, they must be particu-

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three degrees; a great fault, which is such a neglect, as all men may well be supposed and ought to guard against; a small fault, which is such a neglect, as discreet and diligent men are not usually guilty of; and the smallest fault, which is such a neglect, as the most exact and most prudent take care to avoid.

"Indeed in many instances of gross faults, it is so difficult to distinguish between the mere neglect and a malicious design, that, besides the demand of reparation for damages done, some punishment may reasonably be inflicted upon the person so offending.

"Sometimes, and especially in what may seem faults of the lower degrees, the damage, which arises from our supposed neglect, will be found upon inquiry to have been rather owing to the neglect of the person, who suffers it; and then we are not only clear from all guilt that may subject us to punishment, but from all blame, that might oblige us to make reparation." See Sedgwick on Damages, p. 488, note.

On the contrary, Dr. Rutherforth, a little farther ownard, in the same book, ch. 18, expressly denies the right of the party injured to any thing more than compensation for the damages he has sustained. He says — "As the heirs of the criminal have no claim to such goods, as he loses in the way of punishment; so neither has the injured person any, considered merely as the injured person. He has indeed a right to so much of the criminal's goods, as will make him amends for the damage, which he has suffered: but no reason can be given, why he should have a right to more; unless some positive law has given him such a right. The ends which justify punishment, will by no means extend his claim any farther than this. The criminal, by suffering in his goods, may be discouraged or prevented from offending again: but a design to discourage or prevent him from offending again can be no ground for that person, whom he has injured by offending once, to claim property in the goods, which he is deprived of. The ends of punishment may be answered by taking the criminal's goods from him: but these ends do not require, that the property, which he loses, should be vested in the person, whom he has injured." See 1 Rutherforth's Institutes, b. 1, ch. 18, § xiv. p. 434.

It was solely upon this ground of compensation to the plaintiff, for the injury to his feelings by the very insulting conduct of the defendant, that the verdict was held good in Merest *v.* Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442. Ld. Kenyon has sometimes been quoted as having said, that though a plaintiff may not have sustained an injury by adultery, to a given amount, yet that large damages, for the sake of public example, should be given. And this supposed opinion of his was alluded to in the case of Markham *v.* Fawcett. But Mr. Erskine, who was for *the plaintiff* in that action, protested that "he never said any such thing." "He said that every plaintiff had a right

larly specified in the declaration, or the plaintiff will not be permitted to give evidence of them at the trial.[1] But where

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to recover damages *up to the extent of the injury he had received;* and that public example stood in the way of showing *favor* to an adulterer, by reducing the damages *below* the sum which the Jury would otherwise consider as the lowest *compensation for the wrong.*" 2 Erskine's Speeches, p. 9. The general rule, as thus limited, was recognized in Gunter *v.* Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, p. 12, where the defendants, who were rival manufacturers in the same trade with the plaintiff, had invited his company of servants to a dinner, got them intoxicated, and induced them to sign an agreement to leave the plaintiff's service and enter their own, which they did. The action was in case, for conspiracy; and Ld. C. J. Dallas "left it to the Jury to give damages *commensurate with the injury the plaintiff had sustained.*" A new trial was moved for, on the ground, that as the plaintiff's men worked by the piece only, and not by a contract on time, the plaintiff was entitled to damages only for the half day they spent at the dinner; whereas the Jury had given £1600, being the proved value of two years' profits. But the motion was denied, on the ground, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for the loss he actually sustained by their leaving him at that critical period, of which the Jury were the proper and exclusive judges. Here was a case of gross fraud and aggravated wrong, particularly dangerous in a manufacturing community; and yet no one pretended that the plaintiff had a right to greater damages than he had himself sustained, however deserving the defendants might be of a heavy pecuniary *mulct*, by way of example. See also Sears *v.* Lyons, 2 Stark. R. 317, which was trespass for breaking the plaintiff's close and poisoning his fowls; where the Jury were cautioned to guard their feelings against the impression likely to have been made by the defendant's conduct.

The rule of damages, as limited by the extent of the injury to the plaintiff, was the same in the Roman Civil Law. See 1 Domat's Civil Law, p. 426, 427, book 3, tit. 5, sec. 2, n. 8, and notes; Wood's Institute of the Civil Law, book 3, ch. 7, p. 258–264, and the places there cited.

The broad doctrine stated by Mr. Sedgwick finds more countenance from

[1] 1 Chitty on Plead. 328, 346, 347, (4th edit.); Baker *v.* Green, 4 Bing. 317; Pindar *v.* Wadsworth, 2 East, 154; Armstrong *v.* Percy, 5 Wend. 538, 539, per Marcy, J.; 2 Stark. on Slander, 55–58, [62–66,] by Wendell; Dickinson *v.* Boyle, 17 Pick. 78. In an action for breach of a special agreement respecting the assignment of a certain lease and fixtures, under the allegation that the plaintiff "had been necessarily put to great expenses," he was permitted to give evidence of charges which he had become liable to pay an attorney, and a value for work done in respect to the premises in question, though the charges were not paid until after the action was commenced. Richardson *v.* Chassen, 34 Leg. Obs. 383.

the special damage is properly alleged, and is the natural consequence of the wrongful act, the Jury may infer it from

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the bench of Pennsylvania, than in any other quarter; and yet even there, it can hardly be said to have been *adjudged* to be the law, as may be seen by the cases decided. The earliest, usually referred to, is Sommer *v.* Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19, which was an action on the case to recover damages for the malicious abuse of legal process, in which the Jury found for the plaintiff, assessing damages at $ 9500. The case came before the Court in bank, on a motion to set aside the verdict, on the ground, that the damages were excessive; but the motion was refused for the express reason, that "all the facts and circumstances" of the case "were fairly submitted to the Jury, to draw their own conclusions;" and that "there were circumstances from which the Jury might have inferred malice, and evidence which satisfied them that *the ruin of the plaintiff* was occasioned by an act of oppression, and many *aggravating circumstances* of useless severity." This case, therefore, is in strict accordance with the rule as we have stated it, the damages being referred to the extent of the wrong done to the plaintiff. When, therefore, the learned Judge, in the course of his judgment, remarked, that the standard of damages in actions of that nature was "not even a matter of mere compensation to the party, but an example to deter others," the remark was not called for by the question before him, but was entirely extrajudicial. This case was cited and its principle approved, in Kuhn *v.* North, 10 S. & R. 399, 411; in which the Court granted a new trial because of excessive damages, in an action against the sheriff, where he honestly intended to perform his duty, and the Jury were plainly mistaken.

The strongest case in favor of giving damages to the plaintiff beyond what he has sustained, is that of McBride *v.* McLaughlin, 5 Watts, 375, which was trespass against a judgment creditor, for a wilful and malicious abuse of process, in the levy of his execution against two joint debtors, "under circumstances of peculiar injustice and oppression." It appeared that the oppression was in fact meditated not against the present plaintiff, but against the other debtor, to whom the property taken was supposed to belong; and that the present plaintiff had been joined in the judgment by mistake; and it was set aside as to him. The question was, whether the defendant's malice and misconduct in the transaction could be taken into the estimation of damages, inasmuch as it was not intended against the plaintiff. The Judge ruled that it might; and his ruling was sustained by the Court in bank. There was no discovery of error or mistake by the creditor, and consequent apology, during the oppressive transaction; but the whole was carried out to its final consummation, in the most insolent and cruel manner. The case therefore falls within our rule, that the Jury may consider all the circumstances affecting the plaintiff, either in mind, body, or estate, and award him damages to the extent of the injury done *to him* in either of those respects. Surely, if A. spits in B.'s face, on 'change, it does not diminish

the principal fact. Thus, where the injury consisted in firing guns so near the plaintiff's decoy pond as to frighten away

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the disgrace, nor, of course, the extent of the injury, for him afterwards to say that he mistook B. for C. The crowd that saw the indignity may never come to the knowledge of this fact, nor does it lessen the pain inflicted upon his feelings at the time. In both cases, as in all others, the evidence is confined to the principal fact, with all its attending circumstances, stamping its character, and affecting the party injured. In the case we have just cited, however, the learned Judge does seem to place the decision of the Court on the ground that, in certain offences against morals, which would otherwise pass without reprehension, "the providence of the *Courts*" permits the private remedy to become an instrument of public correction. We say *seems* to place it; for he also uses expressions which equally indicate a reliance upon the rule which confines the Jury to the evidence affecting the plaintiff alone. Such, for example, is the concluding sentence of his judgment: — "The defendant was guilty of *wilful oppression*, and he is properly punished for *it*." Oppression, of whom? clearly the plaintiff, and no other. Our limits will not permit an extended examination of all that fell from the Court on this occasion; but with the profound respect we sincerely entertain for that learned bench, we may be allowed to question the accuracy of the assertion, that, in an action for seduction of a daughter, the loss of service is the only legal ground of damages to the plaintiff. It is true, it was stated by Ld. Ellenborough, in 1809, to be difficult to perceive the legal propriety of extending the rule beyond that; yet he confessed the practice of so extending it had become inveterate; and accordingly he instructed the Jury also to consider the injury to the plaintiff's parental feelings; and the rule has for many years been well settled, that in this, as in other wrongs, the wounded feelings, the loss of comfort, and the dishonor of the plaintiff, resulting from the act of the defendant, form a legal ground of damages, as part of the transaction complained of. The grounds of the action for seduction were recently examined in England, in Grinnel v. Wells, 7 M. & G. 1033, and the damages explicitly admitted to be given as *compensation*; not limited, however, to the actual expenditure of the plaintiff's money, but given according to all the circumstances of aggravation in the particular case. These are consequences of the defendant's wrongful act, done to the plaintiff, to his injury; and it is for these, and not for the outrage to the public, that damages are given. See post, § 579, and cases there cited. Andrews *v.* Askey, 8 C. & P. 7. The case of Benson *v.* Frederick, 3 Burr. 1845, cited in McBride *v.* McLaughlin, was not a case of damages given for the sake of example. It was an action against a colonel, for ordering a private to be whipped, out of spite to his major, who had given the man a furlough. The Jury gave him £150; and the Court refused to set aside the verdict for excessiveness of damages, because the man, "though not much hurt, indeed, was *scandalized and disgraced* by such a punishment."

It is worthy of remark, that in Wynn *v.* Allard, 5 Watts & Serg. 524,

the wild fowls, or prevent them from coming there; or, in maliciously firing cannon at the natives, on the coast of

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which was trespass for a collision of vehicles on the road, the same learned Court of Pennsylvania very properly held, that the drunkenness of the defendant was admissible in evidence to determine the question of negligence, where the proof was doubtful; but "not to inflame the damages." Why not, if it was "an offence against morals?" For it certainly must have been deemed such an offence. And in Rose *v.* Story, 1 Barr, R. 190, 197, in trespass *de bonis asportatis*, where the Jury had been allowed, in addition to the value of the property, to give such further damages as "*under all the circumstances of the case* as argued by the counsel, they might think the plaintiff entitled to demand;" the same Court held the instruction wrong, as giving the Jury "discretionary power, without stint or limit, highly dangerous to the rights of the defendant," and "leaving them without any rule whatever."

The subject of vindictive damages has recently been before several other American tribunals. In the Circuit Court of the United States, in Taylor *v.* Carpenter, 10 Law Reporter, p. 35, 188, which was case, for counterfeiting the plaintiff's marks on goods of the defendant, in which Sprague, J. had instructed the Jury to give exemplary damages, for the sake of public example; the verdict was allowed to stand, as it appeared that the Jury had not given more damages than, upon computation, the plaintiff had actually sustained. But Woodbury, J., in giving judgment, referred to the doctrine as stated in the text of this work, and in 3 Am. Jur. 287–308, without disapprobation; and Sprague, J., with great candor declared, that he had become satisfied that his ruling upon this point, at the trial, was wrong. And it is worthy of note, that in a similar case, namely, an action on the case for counterfeiting the plaintiff's trade marks, recently determined in England, it was held, that the proper rule of damages was the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff; and it was observed by Coltman, J., that it would not have been at all unreasonable for the Jury to have found damages to the amount of the profit made by the defendant upon the transaction in question. But there was no intimation that it was in any view of the case lawful to go farther. Rodgers *v.* Nowill, 11 Jur. 1039. So, in a later case, which was trespass against two, one of whom had acted from bad motives, and the other had not, it was held that the damages ought not to be assessed with reference to the act and motives of the most guilty or the most innocent, but *according to the whole injury which the plaintiff had sustained* from the joint trespass. Clark *v.* Newsam, 1 Exch. R. 131. In the Supreme Court of New York, in Hitchcock *v.* Whitney, (see 10 Law Rep. 189), which was case, by a father, for an atrocious assault and battery upon his young daughter, the question directly in judgment was, whether, in the case of a wrong punishable criminally, by indictment, the plaintiff, in a civil action for the wrong, was entitled to recover greater damages than he could prove himself to have sustained; and the Court, having before it such of the foregoing

Africa, whereby they were prevented from coming to trade with the plaintiff; these consequences were held to be well inferred from the wrongful act.[1]

§ 255. In trials at Common Law, the Jury are the proper judges of damages; and where there is no certain measure of damages, the Court ordinarily, will not disturb their verdict, unless on grounds of prejudice, passion, or corruption in the Jury.[2] If they are unable to agree, and the plaintiff has evidently sustained some damages, the Court will permit him to take a verdict for a nominal sum.[3] Generally, in actions upon contract, where the plaintiff fails in proving the amount due, or the precise quantity, he can recover only the lowest sum indicated by the evidence. Thus, where delivery of a bank note was proved, but its denomination was not shown, the Jury were rightly instructed to presume it to be of the lowest denomination in circulation.[4] So, in *assumpsit* by a liquor merchant, where the delivery of several hampers of full bottles was proved, but their contents were not shown, the Jury were directed to presume that they contained porter, that being the cheapest liquor in which the plaintiff dealt.[5]

§ 256. The damage to be recovered must always be the *natural and proximate consequence* of the act complained of. This rule is laid down in regard to special damage; but it applies to all damage.[6] Thus, where the defendant had

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discussions, as were published in the Law Reporter, vol. 9, p. 529–542, decided that he was not. The point was also incidentally ruled in the same manner by Cushing, J., in Meads *v.* Cushing, in the Court of Common Pleas in Boston. See 10 Law Rep. 238.

[1] Carrington *v.* Taylor, 11 East, 571; Keeble *v.* Hickeringill, Ib. 574, n.; 11 Mod. 74, 130; 3 Salk. 9; Holt, 14, 17, 19, S. C.; Tarleton *v.* McGawley, Peake's Cas. 205.

[2] Gilbert *v.* Birkinsham, Lofft, R. 771; Cowp. 230; Day *v.* Holloway, 1 Jur. 794.

[3] Feize *v.* Thompson, 1 Taunt. 121.

[4] Lawton *v.* Sweeney, 8 Jur. 964.

[5] Clunnes *v.* Pezzy, 1 Campb. 8.

[6] See Sedgwick on Damages, ch. iii.

libelled a performer at a place of public entertainment, in consequence of which she refused to sing, and the plaintiff alleged that by reason thereof the receipts of his house were diminished, this consequence was held too remote to furnish ground for a claim of damages.[1] So, where the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had cut his master's cordage, and the plaintiff alleged that his master, believing the assertion, had thereupon dismissed him from his service; it was held, that the discharge was not a ground of action, since it was not the natural consequence of the words spoken.[2] So also, it has been held that, in *assumpsit* for breach of a promise to marry, evidence of seduction is not admissible, in aggravation of damages.[3] And in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, for destroying the plaintiff's fences, it was held that the measure of damages was the cost of repairing the fences, and not the injury resulting to the subsequent year's crop from the defect in the fences, long after the plaintiff had knowledge of the fact.[4]

§ 257. In cases of contract, if the parties themselves have *liquidated the damages*, the Jury are bound to find the amount thus agreed. But whether the sum, stipulated to be paid upon breach of the agreement, is to be taken as liquidated damages, or only as a penalty, will depend upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained by a just interpretation of the contract. And here it is to be observed, that the policy of the law does not regard penalties or forfeitures with favor; and that Equity relieves against them. And therefore, because, by treating the sum as a mere penalty, the case is open to relief in

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[1] Ashley *v.* Harrison, 1 Esp. R. 48; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 64, 65. And see Armstrong *v.* Percy, 5 Wend. 538, 539, per Marcy, J.; Crain *v.* Petrie, 6 Hill, N. Y. R.; 522; Downer *v.* Madison Co. Bank, Ibid. 648.

[2] Vickars *v.* Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. This case, however, is said to have been doubted. 8 Jur. 876, per Parke, B. See also 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 302–304, and cases there cited; 1 Stark. on Slander, p. 205.

[3] Weaver *v.* Bachert, 2 Barr, R. 230. And see Hay *v.* Graham, 8 W. & S. 27.

[4] Loker *v.* Damon, 17 Pick. 284.

Equity, according to the actual damages, the sum will generally be so considered; and the burden of proof will be on him who claims it as liquidated damages, to show that it was intended as such by the parties.[1] This intent is to be ascertained from the whole tenor and subject of that agreement; the mere use of the *words* "penalty," "forfeiture," or "liquidated damages," not being regarded as at all decisive of the question, if the instrument discloses upon the whole, a different intent.[2]

§ 258. The *cases*, in which the sum has been *treated as a penalty*, will be found to arrange themselves into five classes, furnishing certain *rules* by which the *intention* of the parties is *ascertained*. (1.) Where the parties, in the agreement, have *expressly declared* the sum to be intended as a forfeiture, or penalty, and no other intent is to be collected from the instrument.[3] (2.) Where it is *doubtful* whether it was intended as a penalty, or not; and a certain damage, or debt, less than the penalty, is made payable, on the face of the instrument.[4] (3.) Where the agreement was evidently made

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[1] Tayloe *v.* Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 17, per Marshall, C. J. Mr. Evans seems to have been of the contrary opinion. 2 Poth. Obl. 71, 82, 86, by Evans. Wherever there is an agreement to do a certain thing, under a penalty, the obligee may either sue in debt for the penalty; in which case he cannot recover more than the penalty and interest, but may, upon a hearing in Equity, recover less; or, he may sue in covenant, upon the agreement, for the breach thereof, disregarding the penalty; in which case he may generally recover more, if he has suffered more. Harrison *v.* Wright, 13 East, 342; Bird *v.* Randall, 1 Doug. 373; Winter *v.* Trimmer, 1 Bl. Rep. 395; Astley *v.* Weldon, 2 B. & P. 346. If the sum is claimed as liquidated damages, it must be sued for in debt, or *indebitatus assumpsit*. Davies *v.* Penton, 6 B. & C. 221; Bank of Columbia *v.* Patterson, 7 Cranch, 303.

[2] Davies *v.* Penton, 6 B. & C. 224, per Littledale, J.; Kemble *v.* Farren, 6 Bing. 141; 2 Story on Eq. § 1318.

[3] Astley *v.* Weldon, 2 B. & P. 346, 350; Smith *v.* Dickenson, Ib. 630; Tayloe *v.* Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 14; Wilbeam *v.* Ashton, 1 Campb. 78; Orr *v.* Churchill, 1 H. Bl. 227; Stearns *v.* Barrett, 1 Pick. 451; Denn *v.* Cumming, 3 Johns. Cas. 297; Brown *v.* Bellows, 4 Pick. 179.

[4] Astley *v.* Weldon, 2 B. & P. 350, per Ld. Eldon. And see the observations of Best, C. J. in Crisdee *v.* Bolton, 3 C. & P. 240.

for the attainment of another object, to which the sum specified is *wholly collateral.* This rule has been applied, where the principal agreement was, not to trade on a certain coast;[1] to let the plaintiff have the use of a certain building;[2] or, of certain rooms;[3] and not to sell brandy, within certain limits;[4] but the difference between these and some other cases, which have been regarded as liquidated damages, is not very clear. (4) Where the agreement contains *several matters, of different degrees of importance,* and yet the sum named is payable for the breach of any, even the least. Thus, where the agreement was, to play at Covent Garden, and to conform to *all* the rules of the establishment, and to pay one thousand pounds for *any* breach of them, as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, it was still held as a penalty only.[5] (5.) Where the contract is *not under seal,* and the *damages are capable of being certainly known* and estimated; and this, though the parties have expressly declared the sum to be as liquidated damages.[6]

§ 259. On the other hand, it will be inferred that the parties intended the sum as *liquidated damages,* (1.) Where

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[1] Perkins *v.* Lyman, 11 Mass. 76.

[2] Merrill *v.* Merrill, 15 Mass. 488.

[3] Sloman *v.* Walter, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 418.

[4] Hardy *v.* Martin, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 419.

[5] Kemble *v.* Farren, 6 Bing. 141; Boys *v.* Ancell, 5 Bing. N. C. 390; 7 Scott, 364; Charrington *v.* Laing, 6 Bing. 242. There are, however, some cases in which it has been said that, where the parties expressly declare, that the sum is to be taken as liquidated damages, it shall be so taken. See Hasbrouck *v.* Tappen, 15 Johns. 200; Slosson *v.* Beale, 7 Johns. 72; Reilly *v.* Jones, 1 Bing. 302; Goldsworthy *v.* Strutt, 35 Leg. Obs. 540. But this rule, it is conceived, ought to be applied only where the meaning is not otherwise discoverable; since it runs counter to the general policy of the law of Equity, and to the statutes which provide for relief against forfeitures and penalties in the Courts of Common Law.

[6] Pinkerton *v.* Caslon, 2 B. & Ald. 704; Davies *v.* Penton, 6 B. & C. 216; Randall *v.* Everest, 1 M. & Malk. 41; Barton *v.* Glover, 1 Holt, Cas. 43; Spencer *v.* Tilden, 5 Cow. 144; Graham *v.* Bickham, 4 Dall. 150.

the *damages* are uncertain, and are *not capable of being ascertained* by any satisfactory and known rule; whether the uncertainty lies in the nature of the subject itself, or in the particular circumstances of the case. This rule has been applied, where the agreement was, to pay a certain sum for each week's neglect to repair a building;[1] for each year's neglect to remove a lime-kiln;[2] for not marrying the plaintiff;[3] for running a stage on a certain road, in violation of contract;[4] for breach of a contract not to trade, or practice, within certain limits;[5] and for not resigning an office, agreeably to a previous stipulation.[6] (2.) Where, from the nature of the case, and the tenor of the agreement, it is apparent, that the damages have already been the subject of actual and fair calculation and adjustment between the parties.[7] Of this sort are agreements to pay an additional rent for every acre of land, which the lessee should plough up;[8] not to permit a stone weir to be enlarged, "under the penalty of double the yearly rent, to be recovered by distress or otherwise;"[9] to convey land, or, instead thereof, to pay a certain sum;[10] to pay a higher rent, if the lessee should cease to reside on the premises;[11] that a security should become void,

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[1] Fletcher *v.* Dyche, 2 T. R. 32.

[2] Huband *v.* Grattan, 1 Alcock & Napier, R. 389.

[3] Lowe *v.* Peers, 2 Burr. 2225; Cock *v.* Richards, 10 Ves. 429.

[4] Leighton *v.* Wales, 3 M. & W. 545; Pierce *v.* Fuller, 8 Mass. 223.

[5] Noble *v.* Bates, 7 Cow. 307; Smith *v.* Smith, 4 Wend. 468; Crisdee *v.* Bolton, 3 C. & P. 240. In this case, the sum was declared by the parties to be liquidated damages. Goldsworthy *v.* Strutt, 35 Leg. Obs. 540.

[6] Legh *v.* Lewis, cited 2 Poth. Obl. 85, by Evans.

[7] See observations of Best, C. J. in Crisdee *v.* Bolton, 3 C. & P. 240; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1318; Leland *v.* Stone, 10 Mass. 459, 462.

[8] Rolfe *v.* Peterson, 6 Bro. P. C. 436; Birch *v.* Stephenson, 3 Taunt. 473; Farrant *v.* Olmius, 3 B. & Ald. 692; Jones *v.* Green, 3 Y. & J. 298; Aylet *v.* Dodd, 2 Atk. 238; Woodward *v.* Giles, 2 Vern. 119.

[9] Gerrard *v.* O'Reilly, 2 Connor & Lawson, 165.

[10] Slosson *v.* Beale, 7 Johns. 72. And see Hasbrouck *v.* Tappen, 15 Johns. 200; Reilly *v.* Jones, 1 Bing. 302; Knapp *v.* Maltby, 13 Wend. 507; Tingley *v.* Cutler, 7 Conn. 291. Mead *v.* Wheeler, 13 N. Hamp. R. 351.

[11] Ponsonby *v.* Adams, 6 Bro. P. C. 418.

if put in suit before the time limited in a letter of license granted to the debtor;[1] and, to pay a sum of money, in goods, at an agreed price.[2]

§ 260. In the proof of damages, the plaintiff is *not confined to the precise number, sum, or value*, laid in the declaration; nor is he bound to prove the breach of a contract to the full extent alleged. Thus, though he cannot recover greater damages than he has laid in the *ad damnum* at the conclusion of his declaration, yet the Jury may find damages for the value of goods tortiously taken, beyond the value alleged in the body of the count.[3] So, under a count for a total loss of property insured, it is sufficient to prove an average or partial loss.[4] And in covenant, or *assumpsit*, proof of part of the breach alleged, is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover.[5]

§ 261. The *measure of damages* will, ordinarily, be ascertained by reference to the rule already stated, namely, the natural and proximate consequences of the act complained of. Thus, the drawers, and indorsers of *bills of exchange*, upon the dishonor thereof, are ordinarily liable to the holder for the principal sum and the common mercantile damages, such as interest, expenses, re-exchange, &c. consequent upon the dishonor of the bill. For, having engaged that the bill shall be paid at the proper time and place, the holder is entitled to expect the money there; and if it is not paid accordingly, he is entitled to re-draw on them for such a sum, as at the

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[1] White *v.* Dingley, 4 Mass. 433. And see Wafer *v.* Mocato, 9 Mod. 113.

[2] Brooks *v.* Hubbard, 3 Conn. 58. If the agreed price is unconscionable, the Court will not adopt it as the rule of damages. Cutler *v.* How, 8 Mass. 257; Cutler *v.* Johnson, Ib. 266; Baxter *v.* Wales, 12 Mass. 365.

[3] Hutchins *v.* Adams, 3 Greenl. 174; Pratt *v.* Thomas, 1 Ware, R. 147. The Jonge Bastiaan, 5 Rob. 322.

[4] Gardiner *v.* Croasdale, 2 Burr. 904; 1 W. Bl. 198, S. C.; Nicholson *v.* Croft, 2 Burr, 1188, per Ld. Mansfield.

[5] 1 Chitty on Pl. 297; Sayer, Law of Dam. p. 45; Van Rensselaer *v.* Platner, 2 Johns. 18.

market rate of exchange at the place, would put him in funds to the amount of the dishonored bill, and interest, with the necessary incidental expenses.[1] Upon a *contract to deliver goods*, the general rule of damages for non-delivery is the market value of the goods at the time and place of the promised delivery, if no money has yet been paid by the vendee;[2] but if the vendee has already paid the price in advance, he may recover the highest price of such goods in the same place, at any time between the stipulated day of delivery, and the time of trial.[3] If in the latter case, the market price is lower at the stipulated time of delivery, than at the date of the contract, the measure of damages is the money advanced, with interest.[4] So, upon a *contract to replace stock*, the measure of damages is the price or value on the day when it ought to have been replaced, or, at the time of trial, at the option of the plaintiff. But if afterwards, and while the stock was rising, the defendant offered to replace it, the plaintiff cannot recover more than the price on the day of tender.[5] In an action for a breach of warranty upon the sale of goods, the measure of damages is the difference of value

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1 Story on Bills, § 399, 400; 3 Kent, Comm. 115, 116.

2 Gainsford *v.* Carroll, 2 B. & C. 624; Boorman *v.* Nash, 9 B. & C. 145; Shaw *v.* Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; Swift *v.* Barnes, 16 Pick. 194, 196; Shepherd *v.* Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200, 204; Douglass *v.* McAllister, 3 Cranch, 298; Chitty on Contr. 352, n. (2), by Perkins; Dey *v.* Dox, 9 Wend. 129.

3 Clark *v.* Pinney, 7 Cow. 681; Chitty on Contr. 352, n. (2), by Perkins. But in Massachusetts, the damages are restricted to the value at the agreed time of delivery. Kennedy *v.* Whitwell, 4 Pick. 466; Sargent *v.* Franklin Ins. Co. 8 Pick. 90. In an action for breach of contract in the sale of goods, it has been held that the measure of damages is not merely the amount of difference between the contract price and the price at which the goods could have been bought at the moment when the contract was broken, but likewise a compensation for such profit as might have been made by the purchaser, had the contract been duly performed. Dunlop *v.* Higgins, 12 Jur. 295; 1 H. L. Ca. 381. *Sed quære.*

4 Ibid.; Bush *v.* Canfield, 2 Conn. 485.

5 Shepard *v.* Johnson, 2 East, 211; McArthur *v.* Ld. Seaforth, 2 Taunt. 257; Harrison *v.* Harrison, 1 C. & P. 412. But in Massachusetts, the rule is confined to the price at the agreed day of transfer, and is not extended to any subsequent period. Gray *v.* Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 390.

between the article in a sound and in an unsound state, without regard to the price given.[1] And generally, in other cases of special contract, where one party agrees to do a certain thing, or to perform specific services, for a stipulated sum of money, as, for example, to perform a piece of mechanical work, for an agreed price, or, to occupy a tenement for a certain time at a specified rent, and deserts the undertaking before it is completed, or is turned away and forbidden to proceed by the other party; the measure of damages is not the entire contract-price, but a just recompense for the actual injury which the party has sustained.[2] And in all cases of breach of such specific contracts, it is to be observed, that, if the party injured can protect himself from damage at a trifling expense, or by any reasonable exertions, he is bound so to do. He can charge the delinquent party only for such damages, as, by reasonable endeavors and expense, he could not prevent.[3]

§ 261 *a.* A distinction, however, has been taken between contracts for specific work by the piece, and the like, and *contracts for the hire* of clerks, agents, laborers, and domestic servants for a year or shorter *determinate period;* and it is held in the latter class of cases, that if the person so employed is improperly dismissed before the term of service is expired, he is entitled to recover for the whole term; unless the defendant, on whom the burden of proof lies, can show, either that the plaintiff was actually engaged in other profitable service during the term, or, that such employment was offered to him and rejected.[4] The same principle has also been ap-

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[1] Cotters *v.* Keever, 4 Barr, 168.

[2] Clark *v.* Mersiglia, 1 Denio, R. 317; Wilson *v.* Martin, Ibid. 602; Spencer *v.* Halsted, Ibid. 606.

[3] Miller *v.* The Mariner's Church, 7 Greenl. 57. So, in trespass. Loker *v.* Damon, 17 Pick. 284. See *contra*, Heaney *v.* Heeney, 2 Denio, R. 625.

[4] Costigan *v.* M. & H. Railroad Co., 2 Denio, R. 609. In this case, which was for a full year's salary, where the plaintiff had been improperly dismissed after two months' service, the law was thus stated by Beardsley, J. "As a general principle, nothing is better settled than that upon these facts

plied in suits for the recovery of dead freight, where the quantity agreed to be put on board by the shipper has not been furnished.[1]

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the plaintiff is entitled to recover full pay for the entire year. He was ready during the whole time to perform his agreement, and was in no respect in fault. The contract was in full force in favor of the plaintiff, although it had been broken by the defendants. In general, in such cases, the plaintiff has a right to full pay. The rule has been applied to contracts for the hire of clerks, agents and laborers, for a year or a shorter time, as also to the hire of domestic servants, where the contract may usually be determined by a month's notice, or on payment of a month's wages. The authorities are full and decisive upon this subject. (Chitty on Cont. 5th Am. edit. 575–581; 1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 72–83; Browne on Actions at Law, 181–185, 504, 505; Beeston *v.* Collyer, 4 Bing. 309; Fawcett *v.* Cash, 5 Barn. & Ad. 904; Williams *v.* Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177; French *v.* Brookes, 6 Bing. 354; Gandell *v.* Pontigny, 4 Campb. 375; Robinson *v.* Hindman, 3 Esp. 235; Smith *v.* Kingsford, 3 Scott, 279; Smith *v.* Hayward, 7 Ad. & El. 544.) The rule of damages against the employer for the breach of a contract to perform mechanical work by the piece is different. (See Clark *v.* Marsiglia, 1 Denio, 317.) In no case which I have been able to find, and we were referred to none of that character, has it ever been held or even urged by counsel, that the amount agreed to be paid should be reduced, upon the supposition that the person dismissed might have found other employment for the whole or some part of the unexpired term during which he had engaged to serve the defendant. And yet this objection might be taken in every such case, and in most of them the presumption would be much more forcible than in the case at bar. The entire novelty of such a defence affords a very strong if not a decisive argument against its solidity. (The Duke of Newcastle *v.* Clark, 8 Taunt. 602.) Nor do I find any case in which it was proved that other employment was offered to the plaintiff after his dismissal, and that his recovery was defeated or diminished because he refused to accept of such proffered employment.

"It has, however, been held, and rightly so, as I think, that where a seaman hired for the outward and return voyage, was improperly dismissed by the captain before the service was completed, a recovery of wages by the seaman, for the whole time, was proper, deducting what he had otherwise received for his services after his dismissal and during the time for which his employer was bound to make payment. (Abbott on Ship. 4th Am. edit. 442, 443; Hoyt *v.* Wildfire, 3 John. 518; Ward *v.* Ames, 9 Id. 138; Emerson *v.* Howland, 1 Mason, 51, 52.)

"And upon the same principle, where a merchant engages to furnish a

[1] Abbott on Shipping, by Shee, p. 242–245; Sedgwick on Damages, p. 377; Heckscher *v.* McCrea, 24 Wend. 304; Shannon *v.* Comstock, 21 Wend. 457.

§ 262. In *assumpsit* upon the *warranty of goods*, the measure of damages is the difference between the value of

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given quantity of freight for a ship, for a particular voyage, and fails to do so, he must pay dead freight, to the amount so agreed by him, deducting whatever may have been received from other persons, for freight taken in lieu of that which the merchant had stipulated to furnish. (Abbott, 277, 278; Puller *v.* Staniforth, 11 East, 232; Puller *v.* Halliday, 12 Id. 494; Kleine *v.* Catara, 2 Gall. 66, 73.) Upon this principle, as I understand, the case of Shannon *v.* Comstock, 21 Wend. 457, was decided. The defendants there engaged to pay the plaintiffs fifty-five dollars for the transportation of a certain number of horses, on the canal, from Whitehall to Albany, but failed to comply with their agreement. An action was thereupon brought to recover the fifty-five dollars, and the contract and its violation having been shown, 'the defendants offered to prove that the damages sustained by the plaintiffs did not exceed five dollars.' What facts were offered to be given in evidence in order to establish this result, cannot be collected with absolute certainty, from the report of the case, but it does not appear that any objection was made to the form of the offer, and the report shows that *the evidence was objected to and excluded.* I infer, then, that the offer of the defendants was to show, by competent evidence, that the plaintiffs took other freight on board their boat instead of their horses, so that their loss, by the violation of this contract, was but small. Upon the ground already stated, that loss was the amount the plaintiffs were in law and justice entitled to recover. So this Court held, and as the evidence had been rejected in the Court below, the judgment was reversed. The views of the Chancellor, as stated in the case of Taylor *v.* Read, 4 Paige, 571, are to the same effect, and the propriety of the rule seems to me too apparent to admit of doubt.

"In these cases it appeared, or was offered to be shown, that the plaintiffs had in fact performed services for others, and for which they have been paid, in lieu of those they had bound themselves to perform for their defendants, and which the latter had refused to receive. In Heckscher *v.* McCrea, 24 Wend. 304, the Court went a step further. That case arose in the Superior Court of the city of New York, where McCrea was plaintiff. It was an action for dead freight which the plaintiff claimed under a special contract with the defendants. They had agreed with the plaintiff to furnish a given number of tons of freight, at a certain price, for a return cargo from China to New York, in the plaintiff's ship. A part of the freight was furnished by the defendants, as agreed, but they fell short about one hundred and thirty tons. The agents for the defendants at Canton, where the ship then was, having no more freight to put on board for the defendants, offered to supply the deficiency, from the goods of other persons in their hands, which the agents were authorized to ship to the United States; such shipment to be made at a reduced, although the then current rate, but with an express agreement that receiving this freight on such reduced terms should not interfere with the original arrangement between the parties to this suit. This

the goods at the time of sale, if the warranty were true, and the actual value in point of fact.[1] If goods are warranted

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offer was declined, and to the extent of this deficiency the ship came home empty. The action was to recover for this deficient freight. The Court held that the plaintiff should have taken the freight offered, although at a rate below what the defendants had agreed to pay; that so far it would have relieved the defendants without doing injury to the plaintiff, and by which about two thirds of the amount now claimed might have been saved.

"In all the cases I have cited, the facts on which the delinquent party sought to bring the amount to be recovered, below the sum agreed to be paid, were proved or offered to be proved on the trial. Nothing was left to inference or presumption, and it was virtually conceded that the *onus* of the defence rested on the defendant. They are also cases in which the plaintiffs had either earned and received money from others, during the time when they must have been employed in fulfilling their contract with the defendants, or in which they might have earned it in a business of the same character and description with that which they had engaged with the defendants to perform.

"The principles established by the cases referred to, seem to me just, and although I have found no case in which they have been applied to such an engagement as that between these parties, still I should have no hesitation, where the facts would allow it to be done, to apply them to such a case as this.

"But first of all, the defence set up should be proved by the one who sets it up. He seeks to be benefited by a particular matter of fact, and he should therefore prove the matter alleged by him. The rule requires him to prove an affirmative fact, whereas the opposite rule would call upon the plaintiff to prove a negative, and therefore the proof should come from the defendant. He is the wrongdoer, and presumptions, between him and the person wronged, should be made in favor of the latter. For this reason therefore the *onus* must in all such cases be upon the defendant.

"Had it been shown, in the case at bar, that the plaintiff, after his dismissal, had engaged in other business, that might very well have reduced the amount which the defendants otherwise ought to pay. For this, the cases I have referred to would furnish sufficient authority. But here, it appears that the plaintiff was not occupied during any part of the time from the period of dismissal to the close of the year.

"Again, had it been shown on the trial, that employment of the same general nature and description with that which the contract between these parties contemplated, had been offered to the plaintiff, and had been refused by him, that might have furnished a ground for reducing the recovery below

[1] Caswell *v.* Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; Fielder *v.* Starkin, 1 H. Bl. 17; Curtis *v.* Hannay, 3 Esp. 83; Buchanan *v.* Parnshaw, 2 T. R. 745; Egleston *v.* Macauly, 1 McCord, 379; Armstrong *v.* Percy, 5 Wend. 539.

as fit for the particular purpose which they are asked for, the purchaser is entitled to recover what they would have been worth to him, had they been so.[1] If they have been received back by the vendor, the plaintiff may recover the whole price he paid for them; otherwise, he may re-sell them, and recover the difference between the price he paid and the price received.[2] And if, not having discovered the unsoundness or defects of the goods, he sells them with similar warranty, and is sued thereon, he may recover the costs of that suit, as part of the damages he has sustained by breach of the warranty made to himself, if he gave seasonable notice of the suit, to the original vendor.[3]

§ 263. In *debt on bond*, interest, beyond the penalty, may be recovered as damages.[4] If the damages actually sustained are greater than the penalty and interest, the only remedy is by an action of covenant, which may be maintained where the condition discloses an agreement to perform any specific act; in which case, if it be other than the payment of money, the Jury may, ordinarily, award the damages actually sustained, without regard to the amount of the penalty.

§ 264. In an action of *covenant* upon any of the *covenants of title*, in a deed of conveyance, except the covenant of

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the stipulated amount. It should have been business of the same character and description, and to be carried on in the same region. The defendants had agreed to employ the plaintiff in superintending a railroad from Albany to Schenectady, and they cannot insist that he should, in order to relieve their pockets, take up the business of a farmer or a merchant. Nor could they require him to leave his home and place of residence, to engage in business of the same character with that in which he had been employed by the defendants."

[1] Bridge *v.* Wain, 1 Stark. R. 504.

[2] Caswell *v.* Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; Buchanan *v.* Parnshaw, 2 T. R. 745.

[3] Lewis *v.* Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; Armstrong *v.* Percy, 5 Wend. 535.

[4] Lonsdale *v.* Church, 2 T. R. 388; Wilde *v.* Clarkson, 6 T. R. 303; McClure *v.* Dunkin, 1 East, 436; Francis *v.* Wilson, Ry. & M. 105; Harris *v.* Clap, 1 Mass. 308; Pitts *v.* Tilden, 2 Mass. 118; Warner *v.* Thurlo, 15 Mass. 154.

warranty, the ordinary measure of damages is the consideration-money, or the proper proportion of it, with interest.[1] But for breach of the *covenant of warranty*, though, in some of the United States, the same rule prevails as in covenants of title ; yet, in others, the course is to award damages to the value of the land at the time of eviction. In the former States, the Courts regard the modern covenant of warranty as a substitute for the old real covenant, upon which, in a writ of *warrantia chartæ*, or upon voucher, the value of the other lands to be recovered was computed as it existed at the time when the warranty was made; and accordingly they retain the same measure of compensation for the breach of the modern covenant. But in the latter States, the Courts view the covenant as in the nature of a personal covenant of indemnification, in which, as in all other cases, the party is entitled to the full value of that which he has lost, to be computed as it existed at the time of the breach.[2]

§ 265. In general, as we have already seen, damages are

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[1] 4 Kent, Comm. 474, 475 ; Dimmick *v.* Lockwood, 10 Wend. 142.

[2] The consideration money and interest is adopted as the measure of damages in *New York;* Staats *v.* Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, R. 111; Pitcher *v.* Livingston, 4 Johns. 1 ; Bennett *v.* Jenkins, 13 Johns. 50 ; — and in *Pennsylvania* ; Bender *v.* Fromberger, 4 Dall. 441 ; — and in *Virginia ;* Stout *v.* Jackson, 2 Rand. 132 ; —and in *North Carolina ;* Cox *v.* Strode, 2 Bibb, 272 ; Phillips *v.* Smith, 1 N. Car. Law Repos. 475 ; Wilson *v.* Forbes, 2 Dev. R. 30 ; — and in *South Carolina ;* Henning *v.* Withers, 2 S. Car. Rep. 584 ; Ware *v.* Weathnall, 2 McCord, 413 ; — and in *Ohio :* Backus *v.* McCoy, 3 Ohio R. 211, 221 ; — and in *Kentucky ;* Hanson *v.* Buckner, 4 Dana, 253 ; — and in *Missouri ;* Tapley *v.* Lebeaume, 1 Mis. R. 552 ; Martin *v.* Long, 3 Mis. R. 391 ; — and in *Illinois ;* Buckmaster *v.* Grundy, 1 Scam. 310. In *Indiana*, the question has been raised, without being decided. Blackwell *v.* Justices of Lawrence Co. 2 Blackf. 147.

The value of the land at the time of eviction, has been adopted as the measure of damages in *Massachusetts* ; Gore *v.* Brazier, 3 Mass. 523 ; Caswell *v.* Wendell, 4 Mass. 108 ; Bigelow *v.* Jones, Ib. 512 ; Chapel *v.* Bull, 17 Mass. 213 ; — and in *Maine ;* Swett *v.* Patrick, 3 Fairf. 1 ; — and in *Connecticut ;* Sterling *v.* Peet, 14 Conn. 245 ; — and in *Vermont ;* Drury *v.* Strong, D. Chipm. R. 110 ; Park *v.* Bates, 12 Verm. 481 ; — and in *Louisiana ;* Bissell *v.* Erwin, 13 Louis. R. 143. See also 4 Kent, Comm. 474, 475.

estimated by the *actual injury* which the party has received. But to this rule there are some *exceptions*. For, if the plaintiff has concurrent remedies, such as trespass and trover, he may elect one, which, by legal rules, does not admit of the assessment of damages to the extent of the injury. Thus, if he elects to sue in trover, he can ordinarily recover no more than the value of the property, with interest; whereas, if he should bring trespass, he may recover not only the value of the goods, but the additional damages occasioned by the unlawful taking. And if he waives the tort, and brings *assumpsit* for money had and received, he can recover only what the goods were actually sold for by the defendant, though it were less than their real value.[1] So, if the plaintiff sue in debt, for the escape of a debtor in execution, he will recover the whole amount of the judgment and costs, if he recovers at all, though the debtor were insolvent; whereas, if he sue in trespass on the case, he will recover only his actual damages.[2]

§ 266. It is frequently said that, in actions *ex delicto*, evidence is admissible in *aggravation*, or, in *mitigation of damages*.[3] But this, it is conceived, means nothing more than that evidence is admissible of facts and circumstances, which go in aggravation or in mitigation of the *injury itself*. The circumstances, thus proved, ought to be those only which belong to the act complained of. The plaintiff is not justly

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[1] See 3 Amer. Jurist, p. 288; Lindon *v.* Hooper, Cowp. 419; Parker *v.* Norton, 6 T. R. 695; Lamaine *v.* Dorrell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216; Laugher *v.* Brefitt. 5 B. & Ald. 762; Bull. N. P. 32; Jacoby *v.* Laussatt, 6 S. & R. 300; Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356, 361; Barnes *v.* Bartlett, 15 Pick. 78; Otis *v.* Gibbs, MSS. cited 15 Pick. 207; Whitwell *v.* Kennedy, 4 Pick. 466; Johnson *v.* Sumner, 1 Met. 172; Rogers *v.* Crombie, 4 Greenl. 274.

[2] Bonafous *v.* Walker, 2 T. R. 126; Porter *v.* Sayward, 7 Mass. 377; 3 Am. Jur. 289.

[3] What is here said on the subject of evidence in aggravation or mitigation of damages is chiefly drawn from a masterly discussion of this subject by Theron Metcalf, Esq. in 3 Amer. Jur. p. 287 - 313.

entitled to receive compensation beyond the extent of his injury, nor ought the defendant to pay to the plaintiff more than the plaintiff is entitled to receive.[1] Thus, in trespass on the case for an escape, the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff is the measure of damages, whether the escape were voluntary or negligent; and in cases of voluntary trespass, the innocent intentions of the party cannot avail to reduce the damages below the amount of the injury he has inflicted.

§ 267. *Injuries to the person* or to the *reputation*, consist in the pain inflicted, whether bodily or mental, and in the expenses and loss of property which they occasion. The Jury, therefore, in the estimation of damages, are to consider not only the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff, but the loss of his time, his bodily sufferings, and, if the injury was wilful, his mental agony also;[2] the injury to his reputation, the circumstances of indignity and contumely under which the wrong was done, and the consequent public disgrace to the plaintiff, together with any other circumstances belonging to the wrongful act, and tending to the plaintiff's discomfort.[3] And, on the other hand, they are to consider any circum-

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[1] "There would seem to be no reason, why a plaintiff should receive greater damages from a defendant who has intentionally injured him, than from one who has injured him accidentally, his loss being the same in both cases. It better accords, indeed, with our natural feelings, that the defendant should suffer more in one case than in the other; but points of mere sensibility and mere casuistry are not allowable to operate in judicial tribunals; and if they were so allowed, still it would be difficult to show, that a plaintiff ought to receive a compensation beyond his injury. It would be no less difficult, either on principles of law or ethics, to prove that a defendant ought to pay more than the plaintiff ought to receive. It is impracticable to make moral duties and legal obligations, or moral and legal liabilities, coextensive. The same principles will apply to the mitigation of damages. If the law awards damages for an injury, it would seem absurd (even without resorting to the definition of damages) to say that they shall be for a part only of the injury." 3 Amer. Jur. 292, 293.

[2] If the act were not wilfully done, it seems that the mere mental suffering resulting from it forms no part of the actionable injury. Flemington *v.* Smithers, 2 C. & P. 292.

[3] Coppin *v.* Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875.

stances of recent and immediate misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, in respect to the same transaction, tending to diminish the degree of injury, which on the whole, is fairly to be attributed to the defendant.[1] Thus, if the plaintiff himself provoked the assault complained of by words or acts so recent as to constitute part of the *res gestæ;*[2] or, if the injury were an arrest without warrant, and he were shown to be justly suspected of felony;[3] or, in an action for seduction, if it appear, that the crime was facilitated by the improper conduct or connivance of the husband or father;[4] these circumstances may well be considered as reducing the real amount of the plaintiff's claim of damages.

§ 268. It seems, therefore, that, in the proof of damages, both parties must be confined to the *principal transaction* complained of, and to its *attendant circumstances* and natural *results;* for these alone are put in issue. But where the act complained of was done in the execution of a contract with the State, for a work of public benefit, as, for example, the taking of stone and gravel from the plaintiff's land, to build a lock on a public canal, which the defendant had undertaken to construct; the defendant is entitled to stand in the same position as the State would, in the estimation of damages, and to set off, against the direct value of the materials taken, any general and incidental benefit resulting

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[1] This principle is freely applied in actions on the case for negligence, where the rule is, that though there may have been negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet, unless he might by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequence of the defendant's negligence, he is entitled to recover; but if, by ordinary care, he might have avoided them, he is the author of his own wrong. Bridge *v.* Grand Junction Railway Co. 3 M. & W. 244, per Parke, B.; Butterfield *v.* Forrester, 11 East, 60; Holding *v.* Liverpool Gas Co. 10 Jur. 883; Kennard *v.* Burton, 12 Shepl. 39; New Haven Steamboat Co. *v.* Vanderbilt, 16 Conn. 420. See Ante, § 220.

[2] Lee *v.* Woolsey, 19 Johns. 329; Fraser *v.* Berkley, 2 M. & Rob. 3; Avery *v.* Ray, 1 Mass. 12.

[3] Chinn *v.* Morris, Ry. & M. 24; Simpson *v.* McCaffrey, 13 Ohio R. 508.

[4] See Ante, tit. ADULTERY, § 51.

to the owner of the land from the work to which they were applied.[1]

§ 268. *a.* The *natural results* of a wrongful act, are understood to include all the damage to the plaintiff, of which such act was the efficient cause, though, in point of time, the damage did not occur until some time after the act done. Thus, in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, where the defendant had broken and dug away the bank of a river in the plaintiff's close, the Jury were properly directed to assess the damages occurring three weeks afterwards, by a flood, which rushed in at the breach, and carried away the soil.[2] So, where the trespass consisted in pulling down the plaintiff's fence, whereby his cattle escaped and were lost; it was held that the defendant was liable for the value of the cattle, as the natural consequence of the trespass.[3] And it is further to be observed, that the proof of actual damages may extend to all facts which occur and grow out of the injury, even up to the day of the verdict; excepting those facts which not only happened since the commencement of the depending suit, but do of themselves furnish sufficient cause for a new action.[4] Upon this general principle it is, that interest is computed up to the time of the verdict, in an action for the non-payment of a sum of money.

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[1] May *v.* Kornhaus, 9 Watts & Serg. 121.

[2] Dickinson *v.* Boyle, 17 Pick. 78. See Ante, § 55, 56. In an action of *assumpsit* for the breach of an agreement, whereby "the plaintiff has been unnecessarily *put* to great expenses," it was held competent for the plaintiff, under this allegation, to prove and recover for the amount of bills which he had become legally liable to pay, though he had not yet paid them. Richardson *v.* Chassen, 34 Legal Obs. 883; 11 Jur. 890. And see Dixon *v.* Bell, 1 Stark. R. 387. But in trespass for seizing the plaintiff's goods under color of a judgment, by means whereof he was forced to pay large costs in setting aside the judgment, it was held, that these costs were not recoverable. Holloway *v.* Turner, 9 Jur. 160; 6 Ad. & El. 928, N. S. So, counsel fees have been rejected. Young *v.* Tustin, 4 Blackf. 277.

[3] Damron *v.* Roach, 4 Humph. 134.

[4] Wilcox *v.* Plummer, 4 Pet. 172, 182; 3 Com. Dig. 343, tit. Damages, D. See Post, § 273. See Sedgwick on Damages, p. 106 – 108.

§ 268. *b.* The damages may also, in a certain sense, be *prospective* beyond the time of trial. Thus, in trespass for breaking the plaintiff's leg, it was held proper to show the probable future condition of the limb; but not the consequences of a hypothetical second fracture.[1] So, in an action by the members of a commercial firm, for a libel concerning their trade, it was held that the jury might estimate the damages likely to result to their trade, as the probable consequences of the slander.[2]

§ 269. The *character* of the parties is immaterial; except in actions for slander, seduction,[3] or the like, where it is necessarily involved in the nature of the action. It is no matter how bad a man the defendant is, if the plaintiff's injury is not on that account the greater; nor how good he is, if that circumstance enhanced the wrong. Nor are damages to be assessed merely according to the defendant's *ability to pay;* for whether the payment of the amount due to the plaintiff, as compensation for the injury, will or will not be convenient to the defendant, does not at all affect the question as to the extent of the injury done, which is the only question to be determined. The Jury are to inquire, not, what the defendant can pay, but what the plaintiff ought to receive.[4] But so far as the defendant's *rank and influence* in society, and *therefore* the *extent of the injury*, are increased by his wealth, evidence of the fact is pertinent to the issue.[5]

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1 Lincoln *v.* Saratoga Railroad Co. 23 Wend. 425.

2 Gregory *v.* Williams, 1 C. & K. 568. And see Ingram *v.* Lawson, 9 C. & P. 139, 140, per Maule, J.; 8 Scott, 471, 477, S. C. per Bosanquet, J.; Hodsall *v.* Stallbrass, 9 C. & P. 63.

3 See Post, § 274.

4 See Lofft, R. 774, Ld. Mansfield's allusion to Berkeley *v.* Wilford. See also Stout *v.* Prall, Coxe, N. J. Rep. 80; Coryell *v.* Colbaugh, lb. 77, 78; 6 Conn. R. 27; Ante, § 265.

5 Bennett *v.* Hyde, 6 Conn. R. 24, 27; Shute *v.* Barrett, 7 Pick. 86, per Parker, C. J. See Ante, § 89; Post, § 579; Grable *v.* Margrave, 3 Scam. 372. Reed *v.* Davis, 4 Pick. 216.

§ 270. Whether evidence of *intention* is admissible, to affect the amount of damages, will, in like manner, depend on its materiality to the issue. In actions of trespass *vi et armis*, the secret intention of the defendant is wholly immaterial. For, if the act was voluntarily done, that is, if it might have been avoided, the party is liable to pay some damages, even though he be an infant, under seven years of age, or a lunatic, and therefore legally incapable of any bad intention.[1] And where an authority or license is given by law, and the party exceeds or abuses it, though without intending so to do, yet he is trespasser *ab initio;* and damages are to be given for all that he has done, though some part of it, had he done nothing more, might have been lawful.[2] His secret intention, whether good or evil, cannot vary the amount of injury to the plaintiff. So it is, if one set his foot upon his neighbor's land, without his license or permission; or, if he injure him beyond, or even contrary to his intention, if it might have been avoided.[3] And where, to an action of trespass, a plea of *per infortunium* was pleaded in bar, it was held bad, on demurrer, the Court declaring that damages were recoverable "according to the hurt or loss."[4] In all such cases of voluntary act, the intent is immaterial, the only question being, whether the act was injurious, and to what extent.[5]

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[1] Weaver *v.* Ward, Hob. 134; Bessey *v.* Olliot, T. Raym. 467; Gilbert *v.* Stone, Aleyn, 35; Sty. 72, S. C.; Sikes *v.* Johnson, 16 Mass. 289; Bingham on Infancy, p. 110, 111; 3 Com. Dig. 627, tit. Enfant, D. 4; Macpherson on Infants, p. 481; Shelford on Lunatics, p. 407; Stock on Non Compotes Mentis, p. 76; 3 Am. Jur. 291, 297.

[2] Six Carpenters' case, 8 Co. 146; Bagshaw *v.* Gaward, Yelv. 96; Sackrider *v.* McDonald, 10 Johns. 253, 256; 3 Am. Jur. 297, 298; Kerbey *v.* Denby, 1 M. & W. 336.

[3] Russell *v.* Palmer, 2 Wils. 325; Varrill *v.* Heald, 2 Greenl. 92, per Mellen, C. J.; Brooks *v.* Hoyt, 6 Pick. 468; Bacon's Elements, p. 31; 2 East, 104, per Ld. Kenyon.

[4] Weaver *v.* Ward, Hob. 134.

[5] Underwood *v.* Hewson, 1 Stra. 596; 1 Chitty on Plead. 120; Weaver *v.* Ward, Hob. 134; Taylor *v.* Rainbow, 2 Hen. & Munf. 423; Wakeman *v.* Robinson, 1 Bing. 213. The rule is, that, under the general issue, any evidence is admissible, which tends to show that the accident resulted

§ 271. In certain other actions, such as case, for a *malicious prosecution*,[1] or, for *false representations* of another person's credit in order to induce one to trust him,[2] or for *slander*, the *intention* of the defendant is of the gist of the action, and must therefore be shown to be malicious; not to effect the amount of damages, but to entitle the plaintiff to recover any damages whatever. Thus, in an action for a libel, either party may give evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a malicious intent, even though such evidence consist of other libellous writings; but if they contain matter actionable in itself, the Jury must be cautioned not to increase the damages on account of them.[3]

§ 272. But where an evil *intent* has *manifested itself in acts* and circumstances, accompanying the principal transaction, they constitute part of the injury, and, if properly alleged, may be proved, like any other facts material to the issue. Thus, in trespass for taking goods, besides proof of their value, the inconvenience and injury occasioned to the plaintiff by taking them away, under the particular circumstances of the case, and the abusive language and conduct of the defendant at the time,[4] are admissible in evidence to the Jury, who may give damages accordingly. And evidence of improper language or conduct of the defendant is also admissible, under proper allegations, in an action of trespass on the case, or of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, as constituting part of the injury.[5] And, generally, whenever the wrongful act of

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entirely from a superior agency; for then it was no trespass; but that any defence, which admits that the trespass complained of was the act of the defendant, must be specially pleaded. Hall *v.* Fearnley, 3 Ad. & El. 919, N. S.

[1] 1 Chitty on Pl. 404, 405, (7th edit.); Sutton *v.* Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493, 545; 3 Am. Jur. 295; Stone *v.* Crocker, 24 Pick. 81, 83; Grant *v.* Duel, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 17.

[2] Vernon *v.* Keys, 12 East, 632, 636; Young *v.* Covell, 8 Johns. 23.

[3] Pearson *v.* Lemaitre, 5 M. & G. 700; 7 Jur. 748.

[4] Churchill *v.* Watson, 5 Day, 140; Tilden *v.* Metcalf, 2 Day, 259; Johnson *v.* Courts, 3 Har. & McHen. 510. Ratliff *v.* Huntley, 5 Ired. 545.

[5] Bracegirdle *v.* Orford, 2 M. & S. 77; Coppin *v.* Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875; Cox *v.* Dugdale, 12 Price, 708, 718; Meerest *v.* Harvey, 5 Taunt.

the defendant was accompanied by aggravating circumstances of indignity and insult, whether in the time, place, or manner, though they may not form a separate ground of action, yet being properly alleged, they may be given in evidence, to show the whole extent and degree of the injury.[1] Thus, in an action upon an agreement to carry the plaintiff to a certain place, assigning a breach in causing him to be disembarked at an intermediate place, in a disgraceful manner and with contemptuous usage and insulting language, whereby he sustained damage; it was held that the allegation was proper, and that evidence of such circumstances was rightly received.[2] So, also, where to an action of trespass for false imprisonment the defendant pleaded by way of justification, that the plaintiff had committed a felony, but abandoned the plea at the trial, and exonerated the plaintiff from the charge, it was held that the Jury might lawfully consider the putting of such a plea on the record as persisting in the charge, and estimate the damages accordingly.[3] So, where in an assault and

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442. In this case, Gibbs, C. J. expressed himself in these terms; "I wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every principle, which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages? To be sure, one can hardly conceive worse conduct than this. What would be said to a person in a low situation of life, who should behave himself in this manner? I do not know upon what principle we can grant a rule in this case, unless we were to lay it down that the Jury are not justified in giving more than the absolute pecuniary damage that the plaintiff may sustain. Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window, and that a man intrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house, and looks in while the owner is at dinner, is the trespasser to be permitted to say, 'here is a halfpenny for you, which is the full extent of all the mischiefs I have done?' Would that be a compensation? I cannot say that it would be." 5 Taunt. 443. In trespass for entering the plaintiff's house, evidence may be given of keeping the plaintiff out, for that is a consequence of the wrongful entry. Sampson *v.* Coy, 15 Mass. 493. So, in trespass for destroying a mill-dam, damages may be recovered for the interruption of the use of the mill. White *v.* Moseley, 8 Pick. 356.

[1] Sears *v.* Lyons, 2 Stark. R. 282, [317]; 3 Am. Jur. 303, 312; 3 Wils. 19, per Bathurst, J.; Woert *v.* Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352; Pratt *v.* Ayler, 4 H. & J. 448.

[2] Coppin *v.* Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875.

[3] Warwick *v.* Foulkes, 12 M. & W. 507.

battery, the defendant avowed an intent to kill the plaintiff.[1] And, on the other hand, the defendant may show any other circumstances of the transaction, in mitigation of the injury done by his trespass. Thus, where the defendant shot the plaintiff's dog soon after he had been worrying the defendant's sheep, this fact, and the habits of the animal, were held admissible in evidence for the defendant in the estimation of damages.[2] And in trespass *de bonis asportatis*, he may show that the goods did not belong to the plaintiff, and that they have gone to the use of the owner;[3] or, that belonging to the plaintiff, they have lawfully gone to his use.[4] So, where the defendant had seized and destroyed the plaintiff's game cocks, under a warrant to search for gaming implements, it was held, that the Jury might consider, in mitigation of the injury, the good motives of the defendant, and his belief that he was acting in the due execution of legal process; in which case the measure of damages was the actual value of the animals, as articles of merchandise.[5]

§ 273. It may here also be remarked, that if the defendant, while he is an actual trespasser in the plaintiff's house or close, commit any *other acts of trespass* against the person of the plaintiff, his wife, children, or servants, these acts and their consequences may be alleged and proved in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, as matters in aggravation of the injury.[6] It is on this ground that the plaintiff, in an action of trespass for breaking and entering his house, has been permitted to allege and recover full damages for the debauching of his daughter and servant. It makes no differ-

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1 Pratt *v.* Ayler, 4 H. & J. 448.

2 Wells *v.* Head, 4 C. & P. 568.

3 Squire *v.* Hollenbeck, 9 Pick. 551. And see Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 361.

4 Kaley *v.* Shed, 10 Met. 317. See Post, § 276, 635, a.; Anthony *v.* Gibbert, 4 Blackf. 348.

5 Coolidge *v.* Choate, S. J. Mass., 9 Law Rep. 205. See also, Reed *v.* Bias, 8 Watts & Serg. 189.

6 Bennett *v.* Alcott, 2 T. R. 166; Shafer *v.* Smith, 7 H. & J. 68.

ence that the plaintiff may have a separate action for these additional wrongs, provided it be an action of trespass, or of trespass on the case; and not a remedy in another form. If he sues in trespass, and alleges the debauching of his servant in aggravation, the breach and entry of the house, being the principal fact complained of, must be proved, or the action will not be maintained.[1] And so it is, in regard to any other consequential damages alleged in an action of trespass; for wherever the principal trespass, namely, the entry into the house or close, is justified, it is an answer to the whole declaration.[2]

§ 274. But, though the plaintiff may generally show all the circumstances of the trespass tending in aggravation of the injury, it does not therefore follow, that the *defendant may*, in all cases, show them in mitigation; for he may *preclude himself* by his mode of defence, as well as the plaintiff may, as we have already seen, by his election of remedy. Thus, it is a sound rule in pleading, that matter, which goes in complete justification of the charge, must be specially pleaded, in order that the plaintiff may be prepared to meet it; and cannot be given in evidence under the general issue, for this would be a surprise upon him.[3] If, therefore, the defendant pleads the general issue, this is notice to

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[1] Bennett *v.* Alcott, 2 T. R. 166; Ream *v.* Rank, 3 S. & R. 215; 2 Stark. Ev. 813; 3 Am. Jur. 298; Dean *v.* Peale, 5 East, 45; Woodward *v.* Walton, 2 New R. 476; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, [219], Am. edit., notes. See 43 Law Lib. 328, 330. Any other consequential damage to the plaintiff may be alleged and proved as matter of aggravation. 1 Chitty on Plead. 347, 348; Anderson *v.* Buckton, 1 Stra. 192; Heminway *v.* Saxton, 3 Mass. 222; Sampson *v.* Coy, 15 Mass. 493. But the proof must be restricted to damages resulting to the plaintiff alone, and not to another, nor to himself jointly with another. Edmonson *v.* Machell, 2 T. R. 4. See Ante, § 268.

[2] Taylor *v.* Cole, 3 T. R. 292; 1 H. Bl. 555; Bennett *v.* Alcott, 2 T. R. 166; Monprivatt *v.* Smith, 2 Campb. 175; Phillips *v.* Howgate, 5 B. & Ald. 220; Ropes *v.* Barker, 4 Pick. 239.

[3] Co. Lit. 282 *b*, 283 *a*; 1 Chitty on Plead. 415; Trials per Pais, p. 403, (6th edit.); 3 Amer. Jur. 301; Watson *v.* Christie, 2 B. & P. 224, and note (a).

the plaintiff that he has nothing to offer in evidence, which amounts to a justification of the charge; and hence no evidence of matter which goes in justification will be received, even in mitigation of damages. Thus, in trespass for an assault and battery, where the defendant, under the general issue, offered to prove that the beating was inflicted by way of correcting the misconduct of the plaintiff, who was a seaman, on board a ship of which the defendant was master, the evidence was held inadmissible; and the Jury were instructed, that they could neither increase the damages beyond a compensation for the injury actually sustained, nor lessen them on account of the circumstances under which the beating was given.[1] And in trespass by an apprentice against his master, for an assault and battery, the defendant cannot, under this issue, give evidence of an admission by the plaintiff, that his master had beaten him for misconduct.[2] So, in an action of slander, the defendant cannot, under the general issue, give the truth of the words in evidence, even in mitigation of damages;[3] nor can he, for this purpose, show that the plaintiff has for a long time been hostile to him, and has proclaimed that he did not wish to live with him on terms of peace.[4]

§ 275. In actions of *slander*, it is well settled that the plaintiff's *general character* is involved in the issue; and that therefore evidence, showing it to be good or bad, and consequently of much or little value, may be offered on either side, to affect the amount of damages.[5] But whether

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1 Watson *v.* Christie, 2 B. & P. 224; Bull. N. P. 16; 1 Salk. 11, per Holt, C. J.

2 Pujolas *v.* Holland, 1 Longf. & Towns. 177.

3 Underwood *v.* Parkes, 2 Stra. 1200; Mullett *v.* Hulton, 4 Esp. 248; 1 Chitty on Plead. 433; Shepard *v.* Merrill, 13 Johns. 475. Nor can the plaintiff prove the speaking of other slanderous words, in aggravation of the damages; though he may offer such evidence, in proof that the words charged were spoken maliciously. See 3 Am. Jur. 293, 294; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 48 – 51, [54 – 57], Wendell's edit.

4 Andrews *v.* Bartholomew, 2 Met 509.

5 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 77 – 86, [88 – 97], by Wendell; 3 Am. Jur. 294, 295; Wolcott *v.* Hall, 6 Mass. 514, 518. If the declaration states,

the defendant will be permitted, under the general issue, to prove *general suspicions*, and *common reports* of the guilt of the plaintiff, in mitigation of damages, is not universally agreed.[1] It seems, however, that, where the evidence goes to prove, that the defendant did not act wantonly and under the influence of actual malice, or is offered solely to show the real character and degree of the malice, which the law implies from the falsity of the charge, all intention of proving the truth being expressly disclaimed, it may be admitted, and of course be considered by the Jury.[2] Evidence of any *misconduct of the plaintiff*, giving rise to the charge, such as, an *attempt* by him to *commit the crime*,[3] or, *opprobrious language* addressed by him to the defendant, either verbally or in writing, contemporaneously with the charge complained of, or tending to explain its meaning, may also be shown in mitigation of damages.[4] So, if, through the misconduct of the plaintiff, the defendant was led to believe that the charge was true, and to plead in justification accordingly,

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that the plaintiff had never been suspected to be guilty of the crime imputed to him, the defendant, under the general issue, may show that he was so suspected, and that in consequence of such suspicions his relatives and acquaintance had ceased to visit him. Earl of Leicester *v.* Walter, 2 Campb. 251.

[1] In England, and in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Kentucky, and South Carolina, such evidence is admissible. In Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, it is not. See 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 84, note (1), by Wendell; Wolcott *v.* Hall, 6 Mass. 514; Alderman *v.* French, 1 Pick. 1; Bodwell *v.* Swan, 3 Pick. 376; Root *v.* King, 7 Cowen, 613; Matson *v.* Buck, 5 Cowen, 499; McAlexander *v.* Harris, 6 Munf. 465. See also Boies *v.* McAllister, 3 Fairf. 310; Rigden *v.* Wolcott, 6 G. & J. 413.

[2] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 88, note (1), by Wendell; Root *v.* King, 7 Cowen, 613; Gilman *v.* Lowell, 8 Wend. 582; Mapes *v.* Weeks, 4 Wend. 659, 662.

[3] Anon. cited arg. 2 Campb. 254; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 83, note (1), by Wendell.

[4] Hotchkiss *v.* Lathrop, 1 Johns. 286; May *v.* Brown, 3 B. & C. 113; Wakley *v.* Johnson, Ry. & M. 422; Child *v.* Homer, 13 Pick. 503; Larned *v.* Buffinton, 3 Mass, 553; Watts *v.* Frazer, 7 Ad. & El. 223; Beardsley *v.* Maynard, 4 Wend. 336; 7 Wend. 560; Gould *v.* Weed, 12 Wend. 12; Davis *v.* Griffith, 4 G. & J. 342.

this may be shown to reduce the damages.[1] And if the charge was made under a *mistake*, upon discovering of which, the defendant forthwith retracted it in a public and proper manner, and by way of atonement, this also may be shown in evidence, for the same purpose.[2] So, the extreme youth, or partial insanity of the defendant, may be shown to convince the Jury, that the plaintiff has suffered but little injury.[3]

§ 276. In *trover*, the value of the property at the time of the conversion, if it has not been restored and accepted by the plaintiff, with interest on that amount, is ordinarily the measure of damages.[4] It has further been held, that the Jury may, in their discretion, find the value at a subsequent time. Thus, in trover for East India Company's warrants for cotton, where the value at the time of the conversion was six pence the pound, but it afterwards rose to upwards of ten pence, the Jury were left at liberty to find the latter price as the value; for though the plaintiff might with money have replaced the goods at the former price, yet he might not have been in funds for that purpose.[5] And in England, the plaintiff is permitted to recover any special damage which he may

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[1] Larned *v.* Buffinton, 3 Mass. 546. But see Alderman *v.* French, 1 Pick. 1, 19. The fact of the defendant's taking depositions to prove the truth of the words, and afterwards declining to justify them, is inadmissible in evidence for the plaintiff, to enhance the damages. Bodwell *v.* Osgood, 3 Pick. 379. See also Bradley *v.* Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

[2] Larned *v.* Buffinton, 3 Mass. 546, as qualified in 1 Pick. 19; Mapes *v.* Weeks, 4 Wend. 663; Hotchkiss *v.* Oliphant, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 515; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 95, note, by Wendell; O'Shaughnessy *v.* Haydn, 2 Fox & Sm. 329.

[3] Dickinson *v.* Barber, 9 Mass. 225, 228; 3 Am. Jur. 297. But the defendant will not be permitted to offer in mitigation of damages, any evidence impeaching his own character for veracity. Howe *v.* Perry, 15 Pick. 506.

[4] 3 Campb. 477, per Ld. Ellenborough; Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356, 361; Parks *v.* Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 206, 207; Stone *v.* Codman, Ibid. 297, 300; Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt, 17 Pick. 1; Hepburn *v.* Sewell, 5 H. & J. 212. See Sedgwick on Damages, ch. xix.

[5] Greening *v.* Wilkinson, 1 C. & P. 625.

allege and be able to prove as the result of the wrongful act of the defendant. Thus, under a count in trover for the conversion of tools, by means whereof the plaintiff was prevented from working at his trade of a carpenter, and was greatly impoverished, they being the implements of his trade; it was held, that the special damage directly flowing from the detention of his tools was recoverable.[1] But in the United States, upon consideration of the rule, it has been held safer to adhere to the value at the time of the conversion, with interest. But if the defendant has enhanced the value of the goods by his labor, as, for example, if he has taken logs, and converted them into boards, the plaintiff is permitted to recover the enhanced value, namely, the value of the boards, and is not confined to the value of the material, either at the place of taking, or of manufacture.[2] Where the subject is a written security, the damages are usually assessed to the amount of the principal and interest due upon it.[3] If the plaintiff has himself recovered the property, or it has been restored to him and accepted, the actual injury occasioned by the conversion, including the expenses of the recovery, will form the measure of damages;[4] and if the property, in whole or in part, has been applied to the payment of the plaintiff's debt, or otherwise to his use, this may be considered by the Jury as diminishing the injury and consequently the damages.[5]

§ 277. In all actions for a *joint tort*, against *several defendants*, the Jury are to assess damages against all the defendants jointly, according to the amount which, in their judg-

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[1] Bodley *v.* Reynolds, 10 Jur. 310. See also Davis *v.* Oswell, 7 C. & P. 804.

[2] Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt, 17 Pick. 3; Baker *v.* Wheeler, 8 Wend. 505.

[3] Mercer *v.* Jones, 3 Campb. 477.

[4] Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt, 17 Pick. 3; Hepburn *v.* Sewell, 5 H. & J. 212.

[5] Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356, 361; Kaley *v.* Shed, 10 Metc. 317.

ment, the most culpable of the defendants ought to pay.[1] And if several damages are assessed, the plaintiff may elect which sum he pleases, and enter judgment *de melioribus damnis*, against them all.[2] But if several trespasses are charged in the declaration, and the defendants plead severally, and are found severally guilty of *distinct trespasses*, the damages ought to be severed and assessed, for each trespass, against him who committed it.[3]

§ 278. The averment of *alia enormia*, at the end of a declaration in trespass, seems to have been designed to enable the plaintiff to give evidence of circumstances, belonging to the transaction, which were not in themselves actionable, and which could not conveniently be put upon the record. And it has frequently been said, that, under this averment, things may be proved, which could not be put upon the record because of their indecency; and that, therefore, in trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house, he might under this averment prove that the defendant, while there, debauched his daughter. When this doctrine was first advanced, it was generally understood that no action would lie for this latter injury, unless as an aggravation of the former; and hence the Judges may have been led to find a special reason for admitting this evidence. But since it is

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[1] Brown *v.* Allen, 4 Esp. 158; Lowfield *v.* Bancroft, 2 Stra. 910; Bull. N. P. 15; Austen *v.* Willward, Cro. El. 860; Heydon's case, 11 Co. 5; Onslow *v.* Orchard, 1 Stra. 422; Smithson *v.* Garth, 3 Lev. 324; 3 Com. Dig. 348, tit. Damages, E. 6; Elliot *v.* Allen, 1 M. G. & S. 18.

[2] Heydon's case, 11 Co. 5; Headley *v.* Mildmay, 1 Roll. R. 395, pl. 17; 7 Vin. Abr. 303, pl. 5, S. C.; Johns. *v.* Dodsworth, Cro. Car. 192; Doune *v.* Estevin de Darby, 44, E. 3, 7; F. N. B. [107,] E.; Walsh *v.* Bishop, Cro. Car. 243; Rodney *v.* Strode, Carth. 19; 2 Tidd's Pr. 896, (9th edit.); Halsey *v.* Woodruff, 9 Pick. 455.

[3] Propr's of Kennebec Purchase *v.* Bolton, 4 Mass. 419. Where an injury was done by two dogs jointly, who belonged to several owners, it was held that each owner was liable only for the mischief done by his own dog. Buddington *v.* Shearer, 20 Pick. 477; Russell *v.* Tomlinson, 2 Conn. R. 206.

well settled, and has become the ordinary course, to sue specially for this injury to a daughter and servant, as well as for criminal conversation with a wife, and to allege the main facts upon the record, no reason is perceived for retaining this anomaly in practice. There is no injury, however indecent in its circumstances, but may be substantially stated with decency on the record; the law permitting and even requiring parties, as well as witnesses, to state in general terms and with indirectness, those things which cannot otherwise be expressed with decency; and to this extent, at least, every party is entitled, by the settled rules of pleading, as well as by the reason of the thing, to be informed of that which is to be proved against him. The circumstances and necessary results of the defendant's wrongful act may be shown without this averment; and as to those consequences, which, though natural, did not necessarily follow, they must, as we have seen,[1] be specially alleged.[2]

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[1] See Ante, § 253.

[2] See the observations of Mr. Peake, Evid. p. 505, by Norris; Mr. Phillips, 2 Phil. Evid. 189, Cowen & Hill's edit.; and Mr. Starkie, 2 Stark. Evid. 815; 1 Chitty on Pl. 412, (7th edit.); Chitty's Precedents, p. 716, note (k); Bull. N. P. 89; Lowden *v.* Goodrick, Peake's Cas. 46; Pettit *v.* Addington, Ib. 62.

DEBT.

§ 279. The action of debt lies for a sum certain; whether it have been rendered certain by contract between the parties, or by judgment, or by statute, as, when this remedy is given for a penalty, or, for the escape of a judgment debtor.[1]

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[1] The *common consolidated count* in Debt, is as follows: — "For that the said (*defendant*) on —— was indebted to the plaintiff in —— dollars, for [*here state what the debt is for, as in Assumpsit, which see,*] which moneys were to be paid to the plaintiff upon request; whereby, and by reason of the nonpayment thereof, an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to demand and have from the said (*defendant*), the sums aforesaid, amounting in all to the sum of ——. Yet the said (*defendant*) has never paid the same," &c.

On a *promissory note*, between the original parties, the declaration is as follows: — "For that the said (*defendant*) on ——, made his promissory note and delivered the same to the plaintiff, and thereby, for value received, promised the plaintiff to pay him the sum of —— in —— months, (*as the case may be*) and by reason of the nonpayment thereof an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to demand and have from the said (*defendant*) the sum aforesaid. Yet," &c.

In *debt on a judgment*, the count is thus — "For that the plaintiff, at the —— Court [*here describe the Court by its proper title*] begun and holden at —— within and for the [*county or district*] of —— on [*here state the day appointed by law for holding the term*] by the consideration of the Justices of said Court, recovered judgment against the said (*defendant*) for the sum of —— debt or damage and the further sum of —— for costs of suit, as by the record thereof in the same Court remaining appears; which said judgment remains in full force unreversed, and unsatisfied; whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff, to demand and have from the said (*defendant*) the sums aforesaid, amounting to the sum of ——. Yet the said (*defendant*) has not paid the same, (*nor any part thereof*)," &c.

The following is the usual count in *debt upon a bond:* — "For that the said (*defendant*) on —— by his writing obligatory of that date, which the plaintiff here produces in Court, bound and acknowledged himself indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of —— to be paid to the plaintiff on demand. Yet the said (*defendant*) has not paid the same," &c.

In *debt for rent*, founded upon the defendant's occupancy, and not upon the indenture, the count is as follows: — "For that the plaintiff, on ——

Where the contract is by a specialty, the execution of the deed is put in issue by the plea of *non est factum*, which, as it may also be made in an action of covenant, will hereafter be considered, under the title of Deed. The liability of an heir, on the bond of his ancestor, will be treated under the title of Heir.

§ 280. When this action is brought upon a *parol contract*, or for an *escape*, or for a *penalty* given by statute, the general issue is *nil debet;* under which, as it is a traverse of the plaintiff's right to recover, he must prove every material fact alleged in the declaration. And, on the other hand, as the defendant alleges that he does not owe, this plea enables him to give in evidence any matters, tending to deny the existence of any debt, such as, a release, satisfaction, arbitrament, non-delivery of goods, and the like. And, generally, when the action is upon a matter of fact, though the fact be proved by a specialty, or by a record, the plea of *nil debet* is good, and will open the whole declaration, as well as admit the defendant to make any defence, showing that he is not indebted. But if the specialty is itself the foundation of the action, though extrinsic facts be mixed with it, the rule is otherwise. Thus, in *debt for rent, due by indenture*, the action is founded on the fact of occupation of the premises, and pernancy of the profits, by the defendant, the lease being alleged only by way of inducement; and, therefore, the plea

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demised to the said (*defendant*) a certain messuage and premises with the appurtenances, situated in —— to have and to hold the same to the said (*defendant*) for the term of —— thence next ensuing, yielding and paying therefor, to the plaintiff, during the said term, the yearly rent of —— to be paid [*here insert the times of payment*,] by equal portions; by virtue of which demise the said (*defendant*) entered into said demised premises, and was possessed thereof thenceforth and until the —— day of —— when a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of —— of the rent aforesaid, accruing up to the day last aforesaid, was due and payable from said (*defendant*) to the plaintiff; whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff to demand and have from the said (*defendant*) the said sum last mentioned. Yet the said (*defendant*) has never paid the same," &c.

of *nil debet* puts the plaintiff upon proof of the whole declaration; and under it, the defendant may give in evidence a release; payment; or, that possession was withheld by the lessor; or, that he was subsequently ousted or evicted by the lessor, or by a stranger having a better title. If the ouster or eviction was by the lessor, and was of only a part of the premises, it will bar the whole action, for, being a wrongdoer, no apportionment will be made in his favor; but if it were by a stranger, the rent will be apportioned. So, in debt for an escape, or upon a *devastavit*, the judgment is but inducement, the action being founded on the fact of the escape, or of the waste.[1]

§ 281. In *debt for rent*, founded upon a *demise by deed*, if the defendant pleads *nil habuit in tenementis*, the plaintiff may estop him by replying the deed; but if, instead of so doing, he takes issue upon the plea, the deed is no estoppel, and the Jury may find according to the truth, upon the whole matter. And if he pleads *nil debet*, he cannot, under this issue, give in evidence that the plaintiff had no interest in the demised premises; because, if he had pleaded it specially, the plaintiff might have replied the deed, by way of estoppel; of which right he shall not be deprived, but by his own laches.[2] Nor, can the defendant, under this plea, give evidence of any disbursement for necessary repairs, where the plaintiff is bound to repair; for his remedy is by an action of covenant.[3] But if it be part of the covenant

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1 Steph. on Plead. 177; 1 Chitty on Plead. 423; Tyndal *v.* Hutchinson, 3 Lev. 170; Bullis *v.* Giddens, 8 Johns. 83; Minton *v.* Woodworth, 11 Johns. 474; Jansen *v.* Ostrander, 1 Cowen, 670; Stilson *v.* Tobey, 2 Mass. 521; 2 Saund. 187 *a*, note (2), by Williams. See, as to apportionment, Woodfall's Landlord & Tenant, p. 301, (5th edit.) by Wollaston; Vaughan *v.* Blanchard, 1 Yeates, 175; Gilb. Evid. 283, 284. In debt for a statute penalty, a former recovery by another person cannot be given in evidence under *nil debet*, but must be specially pleaded. Bull. N. P. 197; Bredon *v.* Harman, 1 Stra. 701.

2 Bull. N. P. 170; Trevivan *v.* Lawrence, 1 Salk. 277.

3 Bull. N. P. 176, 177; Taylor *v.* Beal, Cro. El. 222.

that the tenant may make repairs out of the rent, the evidence is admissible.[1]

§ 281 *a*. In debt upon a *parol contract*, also, the suit being founded upon the facts of the transaction, whether the contract be express or implied, the plaintiff must allege, and under the general issue must prove, all the material facts from which the obligation arises; the proof being generally the same as in *assumpsit* for the like causes of action.[2] And under this issue, the defendant may be admitted to any defence, which shows that the plaintiff never had a cause of action; such as, infancy, mental incapacity, coverture, duress, want or illegality of consideration, release, or payment before breach, term of credit unexpired,[3] or the like; and may also show many matters which go in discharge of his liability which once existed, such as payment, accord and satisfaction, release, and other matters already noticed in the action of *assumpsit*.[4]

§ 282. The *Statute of Limitations* cannot be given in evidence under the plea of *nil debet;* it must be specially pleaded. Nor can a *former recovery* by another person be given in evidence under this plea, when pleaded to an action of debt for a penalty given by statute; for if it could be so shown, the plaintiff might be deprived of the opportunity of pleading *nul tiel record*, or of proving that the recovery was by fraud.[5] But in debt upon a parol contract, under the plea of *nil debet*, the defendant may take advantage of the *Statute of Frauds;* for the plaintiff, under that issue, is bound to prove his case by such evidence as the statute requires.[6]

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1 Clayton *v.* Kynaston, 1 Ld. Raym. 420, per Holt, C. J.

2 See Ante, tit. Assumpsit, § 112 – 129.

3 Broomfield *v.* Smith, 1 M. & W. 542.

4 See Ante, § 135 – 136 *a*.

5 Bull. N. P. 197; Bredon *v.* Harman, 1 Stra. 701.

6 Fricker *v.* Thomlinson, 1 M. & G. 772. So, in assumpsit, the same defence is open under the general issue. Buttemere *v.* Hayes, 5 M. & W. 456; Eastwood *v.* Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 438.

§ 283. In *debt for a penalty* given by statute, and in every other case, where a criminal omission of duty is charged, whether official or otherwise, we have already seen that the allegation, though negative in its character, must be proved by the plaintiff.[1] But if the action is founded on the doing of an act without being duly licensed or qualified, the burden of proving the license or qualification lies on the defendant, because it is a matter lying peculiarly within his own knowledge.[2]

§ 284. The *plaintiff, in such action,* besides proving the *corpus delicti* as alleged, must also show that the action has been regularly commenced within the limited time, if the statute has made this essential to his right to recover; and in the right county, if any is designated by law.[3] If the time of the commencement of the action does not appear on the record, it may be shown by the writ, or *aliundè*, by any other competent evidence.[4] And if part of the penalty is given to the town or parish, where the offence was committed, or to the poor thereof, it must be proved that the offence was committed in that town or parish.[5]

§ 285. The *defendant, in a penal action,* may, under the general issue, avail himself of any statutory provision exempting him from the penalty, whether it be contained in the same statute on which the action is founded, or in any other.[6] He may also, under this issue, take advantage of any variance between the allegation and the proof on the part of the plaintiff; for, as we have already seen, the plaintiff is held to the

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1 Ante, Vol. 1, § 78, 80.

2 Ante, Vol. 1, § 79.

3 Bull. N. P. 194, 195. And see, as to the place where the offence was committed, Scott *v.* Brest, 2 T. R. 238; Butterfield *v.* Windle, 4 East, 385; Pope *v.* Davies, 2 Campb. 266; Scurry *v.* Freeman, 3 B. & P. 381; Pearson *v.* McGowran, 3 B. & C. 700.

4 Johnson *v.* Smith, 2 Burr. 950; Granger *v.* George, 5 B. & C. 149.

5 Evans *v.* Stephens, 4 T. R. 226; Frederick *v.* Lookup, 4 Burr. 2018.

6 Rex *v.* St. George, 3 Campb. 222.

same strictness of proof in a penal action, or in an action founded in tort, where a contract is set forth, as in an action upon the contract itself.[1]

§ 286. In an action of debt for *bribery* at an election, the material fact is, that the party was bribed to vote; and the plaintiff must therefore prove some bribe, promise, or agreement, according to the statute, previous to voting. But though several candidates are mentioned in the declaration, it will not be necessary to prove, that the party was bribed to vote for more than one; nor, that they were all candidates; nor will it be necessary to prove that the party bribed was a voter, the offer of a bribe by the defendant being conclusive evidence, against him, of that fact.[2] A *wager* with the voter, by a person who is not one, that he will not vote for a particular candidate, is an offer or agreement to bribe; and in any case is competent evidence for the plaintiff, the intent being for the consideration of the Jury.[3]

§ 287. The *defendant* in such action, may, under the general issue, show that the money was a mere loan; but though a note be given, the question whether it was a loan or a gift will still be for the Jury.[4] It is no defence that the party did not vote as he was requested; nor that he never intended so to do;[5] nor, that the party corrupted had no right to vote, if he claimed such right, and the party offering the bribe thought he had such right.[6]

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[1] Ante Vol. 1, § 58, 65; Parish *v.* Burwood, 5 Esp. 33; Everett *v.* Tindall, Ib. 169; Patridge *v.* Coates, 1 C. & P. 534; Ry. & M. 153, S. C.

[2] Combe *v.* Pitt, 3 Burr. 1586; Rigg *v.* Curgenven, 2 Wils. 395.

[3] Allen *v.* Hearn, 1 Tr. 56, 60; Anon. *v.* Lofft, R. 552; United States *v.* Worrall, 2 Dall. 384. See also Commonwealth *v.* Chapman, 1 Virg. Cas. 138. Whether an agreement to vote for each other's candidates for different offices, amounts to bribery, *quære*; and see Commonwealth *v.* Callaghan, 2 Virg. Cas. 460.

[4] Sulston *v.* Norton, 1 W. Bl. 317, 318.

[5] Ib.; 3 Burr. 1235, S. C.; Henslow *v.* Faucett, 3 Ad. & El. 51; Harding *v.* Stokes, 2 M. & W. 233.

[6] Lilly *v.* Corne, 1 Selw. N. P. 650, note.

§ 288. In *debt for an escape*, the plaintiff must prove, (1.) the judgment by a copy of record; (2.) the issuing and delivery of the writ of execution to the officer; (3.) the arrest of the debtor; and (4.) the escape. The process may be proved by its production, or, if it has been returned, by a copy. If the defendant has made the return, this is conclusive evidence against him, both of the delivery of the precept to him, and of the facts stated in the return. If the process is not returned, after proof of notice to the defendant to produce it, secondary evidence of it is admissible.[1] The escape, if voluntary, may be proved by the party escaping; for though the whole amount of the debt may be recovered against the sheriff, yet this will be no defence for the debtor in an action by the creditor against him.[2]

§ 289. Where *breaches* of covenant are *assigned on the record*, the plaintiff should be prepared to prove the breaches as assigned or suggested, and the amount of damages.[3] And if the condition of the bond declared on, is for the performance of the covenants in some other deed, he must prove the execution of that deed also, as well as the breaches alleged.[4] If the condition of the bond is not set out in the pleadings, but is only suggested on the record after a judgment on demurrer, the plaintiff, in proving his damages, must produce the bond, and prove its identity with the bond declared on; but of this fact, slight evidence, it seems, will ordinarily suffice.[5]

§ 290. The plea of *solvit ad diem*, to an action of debt on a bond, payable on a certain day, will be supported by evidence of payment *before* the day; for if the money were

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[1] Cook *v.* Round, 1 M. & Rob. 512.

[2] Bull. N. P. 67; Hunter *v.* King, 4 B. & Ald. 210, per Abbott, C. J.; Ante, Vol. 1, § 404.

[3] 2 Saund. 187 *a*, note (2); 2 Phil. Evid. 169.

[4] 2 Phil. Evid. 169.

[5] Hodgkinson *v.* Marsden, 2 Campb. 121.

paid before the day, the obligee held it in trust for the obligor until the day, and then it became his own.[1] But if the bond was payable on or before a certain day, the payment before the day may be so pleaded and proved.[2] This plea may be supported by the lapse of twenty years, without any payment of interest on the bond within that period. But as the payment of any interest after the day will falsify this plea,[3] the plaintiff, where interest or part of the principal has been so paid, should plead *solvit post diem;* in which case the lapse of twenty years since the last payment, will, in the absence of opposing proof, warrant the Jury in finding for the defendant.[4] This presumption of payment, arising from the lapse of twenty years, is not conclusive; and, on the other hand, the Jury may infer the fact of payment from the lapse of a shorter period, with corroborating circumstances.[5]

§ 291. This *presumption*, arising from lapse of time, may be *repelled* by evidence of the defendant's recent admission of the debt or duty; such as the payment of interest, and the like.[6] But an indorsement of part payment, made on the bond by the obligee, is not alone evidence of that fact; the indorsement must be proved to have been made at a time when the presumption of payment could not have arisen, and when, therefore, the indorsement was contrary to the interest of the obligee.[7] This presumption may also be repelled by

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[1] Tryon *v.* Carter, 7 Mod. 231; 2 Stra. 994, S. C.; Dyke *v.* Sweeting, Willes, 585. If one only, of several joint and several obligors, is sued, he may give evidence of any payment made by his co-obligors. Mitchell *v.* Gibbes, 2 Bay, R. 475.

[2] 2 Saund. 48 *b.*

[3] Moreland *v.* Bennett, 1 Stra. 652; Denham *v.* Crowell, Coxe, R. 467.

[4] 2 Saund. 48 *b*; Bull. N. P. 174; Moreland *v.* Bennett, 1 Stra. 652; 2 Steph. N. P. 1259. The plea of *solvit post diem* was bad at Common Law, but was permitted by Stat. 4 Ann. c. 16, § 12.

[5] Oswald *v.* Leigh, 1 T. R. 271; Colsell *v.* Budd, 1 Campb. 27. See also 4 Burr. 1963.

[6] 1 T. R. 271.

[7] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 121, 122. See also Roseboom *v.* Billington, 17

evidence of other circumstances, such as, the plaintiff's absence abroad, and the like, explanatory of his neglect to demand his money.[1]

§ 291 *a*. In *debt on a judgment*, it has been held, that satisfaction of the judgment may be proved by parol, even though the payment was of a less sum than the whole amount due, provided it was actually received and accepted in full satisfaction of the judgment.[2]

§ 292. Under the plea of *non est factum*, to an action of debt on bond, the defendant cannot give in evidence, as a defence, any thing arising under the condition of the bond;[3] nor can he show, under this issue, that the bond was not taken conformably to the requisitions of a statute.[4] And if the action is against one obligor alone, as jointly *and severally* bound, the plaintiff cannot, under this plea, give in evidence a *joint* bond of the defendant and the other person mentioned, though it agrees in date and amount with the bond described in the declaration.[5] So, if the declaration is against one as principal and the other as surety, and the evidence is a bond given by the two as sureties only, it is a *variance*, equally fatal.[6]

Johns. 182; Rose *v.* Bryant, 2 Campb. 321. The creditor's indorsement alone, is now rendered insufficient by Stat. 9, Geo. 4, c. 14, and by the statutes of several of the United States. See Mass. Rev. St. ch. 120, § 17; Maine Rev. St. ch. 146, § 23.

[1] Newman *v.* Newman, 1 Stark. R. 101; Willaume *v.* Gorges, 1 Campb. 317. See Best on Presumptions, p. 187–189. The whole subject of Presumptive Evidence has been treated with much ability and clearness, by Mr. Best, in his *Treatise on Presumptions of Law and Fact*. The lapse of twenty years is now made a bar, by Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42. See also Mass. Rev. St. ch. 120, § 7; Maine Rev. St. ch. 146, § 11.

[2] Tarver *v.* Rankin, 3 Kelley, 210. And see Sewall *v.* Sparrow, 16 Mass. 24; 9 Johns. 221; 7 Wend. 301.

[3] Rice *v.* Thompson, 2 Bailey, R. 339.

[4] Commissioners *v.* Hanion, 1 Nott & McC. 554.

[5] The Postmaster General *v.* Ridgway, Gilpin, R. 135.

[6] Bean *v.* Parker, 17 Mass. 605.

DEED.

§ 293. When a deed or specialty is the foundation of the action, whether it be an action of covenant or of debt, and the defendant would deny the genuineness or legal formality of execution of the instrument, this fact is put in issue by the plea of *non est factum*. Under this plea, the plaintiff need not prove the other averments in his declaration.[1]

§ 294. The *burden of proof* of the formal execution of a deed, whether it is put in issue by a special plea, or is properly controverted under any other issue, is upon the party claiming under it. This proof consists in producing the deed, removing any suspicions arising from alterations made in it, and showing that it was signed, sealed, and delivered by the obligor; and where any particular formalities are required by statute, as essential to its validity, such as a stamp, or the like, the party must show that these have been complied with.

§ 295. The subject of the *production* of deeds, and of the nature and effect of *alterations* in them, has been treated in the preceding volume.[2] The cases in which the evidence of the subscribing witnesses is dispensed with, have also been considered.[3] In the proof of *signing* and *sealing*, it is not necessary that the witnesses should have seen this actually done; it is sufficient if the party showed it to them as his hand and seal, and requested them to subscribe the instrument

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[1] 1 Chitty on Pl. 424, 428; Kane *v.* Sanger, 14 Johns. 89; Gardiner *v.* Gardiner, 10 Johns. 47.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 559 – 563, 564 – 568.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 569 – 575. As to the proof of the formal execution of deeds, see 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 2, Greenleaf's notes.

as witnesses.[1] So, where the witness was requested to be present at the execution of the writings, and saw the money paid, and proved the handwriting of the obligor, but did not see him sign, seal, or deliver the instrument, this was held sufficient proof, to admit the instrument to go to the Jury.[2] If the attesting witness has no recollection of the facts, but recognizes his own signature as genuine, and from this, and other circumstances, which he states to the Jury, has no doubt that he witnessed the execution of the instrument, this also, uncontradicted, has been held sufficient.[3] And if the witness recollects seeing the signature only, but the attestation-clause is in the usual form, the Jury will be advised, in the absence of controlling circumstances, also to find the sealing and delivery.[4] Indeed, if there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove the formal execution of the instrument, it is held sufficient to entitle it to go to the Jury.[5] If the signa-

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[1] Munns *v.* Dupont, 3 Wash. 42; Ledgard *v.* Thompson, 11 M. & W. 41; Post, tit. WILLS, § 676.

[2] Lesher *v.* Levan, 2 Dall. 96.

[3] Pigott *v.* Holloway, 1 Binn. 436. See also, Dewey *v.* Dewey, 1 Metc. 349; Quimby *v.* Buzzell, 4 Shepl. 470; New Haven Co. Bank *v.* Mitchell, 15 Conn. R. 206; Ante, Vol. 1, § 572; Pearson *v.* Wightman, 1 Const. Rep. 344; Denn *v.* Mason, 1 Coxe, R. 10; Currie *v.* Donald, 2 Wash. 58; Russell *v.* Coffin, 8 Pick. 143.

[4] Burling *v.* Paterson, 9 C. & P. 570; Curtis *v.* Hall, 1 South, 148; Long *v.* Ramsey, 1 S. & R. 72.

[5] Berks Turnp. Co. *v.* Myers, 6 S. & R. 12; Sigfried *v.* Levan, Ib. 308; Scott *v.* Galloway, 11 S. & R. 347; Churchill *v.* Speight, 2 Hayw. 338. In *New Hampshire*, (Rev. St. ch. 130, § 3); *Connecticut*, (Rev. St. 1838, p. 390; Coit *v.* Starkweather, 8 Conn. R. 293); *Ohio*, (3 Ohio, R. 89, Walk. Introd. 354); *Vermont*, (Rev. St. 1839, ch. 60, § 4); *Georgia*, (Prince's Dig. p. 160, § 6); *Florida*, (Thomps. Dig. p. 177); *Michigan*, (Rev. St. 1846, ch. 65, § 8); and *Arkansas*, (Rev .St. 1837, ch. 81, § 12); two witnesses are required, to the validity of a deed of conveyance of lands. In *Indiana*, (Rev. Stat. 1838, ch. 44, § 7); *New Jersey*, (Elmer's Dig. p. 83, § 12); *Illinois*, (Rev. Stat. 1833, p. 131, § 9); and in *Alabama*, (Aikin's Dig. p. 88,) the deed must be either acknowledged before a magistrate, or be proved by one or more of the attesting witnesses, before it is admissible in evidence. But in the latter State, the statute is not considered as excluding the proof by evidence *aliundè*. Robertson *v.* Kennedy, 1 Stew. 245. See further, as to witnesses, 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 2, § 77, note, Greenleaf's ed. Whether a deed, invalid to pass the estate, for want of witnesses, can

ture of the obligor's name is made by a stranger, in his presence and at his request, it is a sufficient signing.[1]

§ 296. In regard to *sealing*, where there are several obligors, or grantors, it is sufficient if there be several impressions, though there be but one piece of wax.[2] And in the sale of lands by a committee of a corporation, it is sufficient if the deed have but one seal, if it be signed by all the members of the committee.[3] If the deed bears on its face a declaration that it was signed and sealed, and there is a seal upon it, proof of the signature is evidence to be left to a Jury that the party sealed and delivered it, even though the witness does not recollect whether or not it had a seal, at the time of attestation.[4] And if the party, on being inquired of, acknowledge his signature without objection, this also is sufficient,[5] though it were signed without his authority.[6]

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be read to support an action of covenant, on proof of its execution at Common Law, *quære*; and see French *v.* French, 3 N. Hamp. R. 234; Pritchard *v.* Brown, 4 N. Hamp. R. 397; Merwin *v.* Camp, 3 Conn. R. 35, 41.

[1] Rex *v.* Longnor, 1 Nev. & Man. 576. So, the party's *mark* is a sufficient signature. Pearcy *v.* Dicker, 13 Jur. 997.

[2] Perk. § 134. See, as to seals, 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 2, § 54, note, Greenleaf's ed. In Kentucky, obligatory writings without seal are placed on the footing of specialties; by Stat. 1812, ch. 375, § 8; Hughes *v.* Parks, 4 Bibb. R. 60; Handley *v.* Rankin, 4 Monr. 556.

[3] Decker *v.* Freeman, 3 Greenl. 338. So, if a bond be executed by a private agent of several obligors, one seal is sufficient. Martin *v.* Dortch, 1 Stew. 479. It has also been held, that many obligors may adopt one seal. Hollis *v.* Pond, 7 Humph. 222.

[4] Talbot *v.* Hodson, 7 Taunt. 251; 2 Marsh. 527, S. C.; Ball *v.* Taylor, 1 C. & P. 417. In some modern cases it is held, that proof of the signature alone is sufficient proof of the seal, though there be no mention of the seal in the body of the instrument. Merritt *v.* Cornell, 5 N. York Leg. Obs. p. 300; Taylor *v.* Glaser, 2 S. & R. 504; Sicard *v.* Davis, 6 Pet. 137; Lesher *v.* Levan, 2 Dal. 96.

[5] Byers *v.* McClanahan, 6 Gill & J. 250.

[6] Hill *v.* Scales, 7 Yerg. 410. In several of the American States, south of New York, a scroll, made with a pen, denoting the place of a seal, is held a sufficient sealing. 4 Kent, Comm. 453; M'Dill *v.* M'Dill, 1 Dall. 63; Long *v.* Ramsey, 1 S. & R. 72; Taylor *v.* Glaser, 2 S. & R. 504. But in some States, it is necessary that the instrument should in such cases contain some expression, showing an intent to give it the effect of a sealed instru-

§ 297. The *delivery* of a deed is complete, when the grantor or obligor has parted with his dominion over it, with intent that it shall pass to the grantee or obligee; provided the latter assents to it, either by himself or his agent. It follows, therefore, that no form of words is necessary, if the act is done; and that the delivery may be complete, without the presence of the other party, or any knowledge of the fact by him, at the time, if it be made to his previously constituted agent, or if, being made to a stranger, the transaction is subsequently ratified.[1] The receipt of the purchase-money, or bringing an action to recover it, is evidence of the delivery of the deed.[2] So, where the obligor, after signing and sealing a bond, held it out to the obligee, saying "here is your bond; what shall I do with it?"—this has been held a sufficient delivery, though it never came to the actual possession of the obligee.[3] So, if the parties meet, read, sign

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ment. Baird *v.* Blaigrove, 1 Wash. 170; Austin *v.* Whitlock, 1 Munf. 487; Anderson *v.* Bullock, 4 Munf. 442; or, at least, that the obligor acknowledged it as his seal; U. States *v.* Coffin, Bee, R. 140. In New Jersey, the scroll is restricted to money bonds. Hopewell *v.* Amwell, 1 Halst. 169. See also Newbold *v.* Lamb, 2 South. 449. But it seems that such an instrument, in States where the Common Law rule prevails, would still be regarded only as a simple contract. Adam *v.* Kerr, 1 B. & P. 360; Warren *v.* Lynch, 5 Johns. 239.

[1] Porter *v.* Cole, 4 Greenl. 25, 26, per Mellen, C. J.; Ante, Vol. 1, § 568, note (8); 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 2, § 46, 64, notes, Greenleaf's ed.; Mills *v.* Gore, 20 Pick. 28, 36; Hatch *v.* Hatch, 9 Mass. 307; Maynard *v.* Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Harrison *v.* Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 456; Chapel *v.* Bull, 17 Mass. 213, 220; Woodman *v.* Coolbroth, 7 Greenl. 181; Goodrich *v.* Walker, 1 Johns. Cas. 256; Barnes *v.* Hatch, 3 N. Hamp. R. 304; Ward *v.* Lewis, 4 Pick. 588; Goodright *v.* Gregory, Lofft, R. 339. Though the grantor die before the deed reaches the hands of the grantee, it is still a good delivery. Wheelright *v.* Wheelright, 2 Mass. 447. And it is not necessary that the delivery be made to an agent of the grantee or obligee. Doe *v.* Knight, 5 B. & C. 671. It may remain in the grantor's own custody, as bailee. Ibid.; Scrugham *v.* Wood, 15 Wend. 545; Hall *v.* Palmer, 8 Jur. 459; Hope *v.* Harman, 11 Jur. 1097. See further, Verplank *v.* Sterry, 12 Johns. 536; Ruggles *v.* Lawson, 13 Johns. 285; Gardiner *v.* Collins, 3 Mason, R. 398.

[2] Porter *v.* Cole, 4 Greenl. 20.

[3] Folly *v.* Vantuyl, 4 Halst. 153. See also Byers *v.* McClanahan, 6 G. & J. 250.

and acknowledge the deed before the proper officer, this has been held sufficient evidence of delivery, though the deed remained afterwards in the possession of the grantor.[1] Putting the deed in the post-office, addressed to the grantee, is also held sufficient.[2] If the effect of the instrument is beneficial to the party to whom it is made, as, for example, if it be an absolute conveyance of land in fee simple, or an assignment to pay a debt, his assent to it will be presumed.[3] The possession of a deed by the grantee or obligee, is, in the absence of opposing circumstances, *primâ facie* evidence of delivery.[4] So also is the registration of a deed, by the grantor, if it be done for the use of the grantee.[5] And where the instrument was executed in the presence of a witness, who signed his name to the attestation clause, which was in the usual formula of "signed, sealed, and delivered," but the deed had never been out of the actual possession of the grantor; it has been held that in the absence of opposing circumstances, the jury might properly find that it was delivered.[6] And a deed duly executed and acknowledged will be presumed to have been delivered on the day of its date, unless the contrary is proved; the burden of proof being on the party alleging a delivery on another day.[7]

§ 298. If the instrument is formally executed in a foreign country, and the execution is *authenticated by a notary public*, this is sufficient proof to entitle it to be read.[8] But if

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[1] Scrugham *v.* Wood, 15 Wend. 545.

[2] McKinney *v.* Rhoades, 5 Watts, 343.

[3] Camp *v.* Camp, 5 Conn. R. 291; Jackson *v.* Bodle, 20 Johns. 184; Halsey *v.* Whitney, 4 Mason, R. 206.

[4] Mallory *v.* Aspinwall, 2 Day, R. 280; Clark *v.* Ray, 1 H. & J. 323; Ward *v.* Lewis, 4 Pick. 518; Union Bank *v.* Ridgley, 1 H. & Gill, 324; Hare *v.* Horton, 2 B. & Ad. 715; Maynard *v.* Maynard, 10 Mass. 456, 458.

[5] Hedge *v.* Drew, 12 Pick. 141; Chess *v.* Chess, 1 Penn. 32. And see Powers *v.* Russell, 13 Pick. 69; Elsey *v.* Metcalf, 1 Denio, R. 323.

[6] Hope *v.* Harmann, 11 Jur. 1097.

[7] McConnell *v.* Brown, Lit. Sel. Cas. 459; Elsey *v.* Metcalf, 1 Denio, R. 323.

[8] Ld. Kinnaird *v.* Lady Saltoun, 1 Madd. R. 227.

the authentication was before the *mayor of a foreign town*, it is not received without some evidence of his holding that office.[1]

§ 299. Where the instrument is required by law to be *acknowledged* and *registered*, or to be examined and *approved* by a Judge or other public officer, as is the case of some official bonds, such acknowledgment, or other official act, duly authenticated, is in some Courts considered as *primâ facie* evidence of all the circumstances necessary to give validity to the instrument, and of course will entitle it to be read.[2] But the practice, in this particular, is not sufficiently uniform to justify the statement of it as a general rule.

§ 300. Under the issue of *non est factum*, the defendant may prove that the deed was delivered and still remains as an *escrow*;[3] or, he may take advantage of any material *variance* between the deed as set forth by the plaintiff, and the deed produced at the trial;[4] or may give any evidence showing that the deed either (1.) was originally void, or (2.) was made void by matter subsequent to its execution and before the time of pleading; for it is to the time of

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[1] Garvey *v.* Hibbert, 1 Jac. & W. 180.

[2] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 573; Craufurd *v.* The State, 6 H. & J. 231. In the following States, a deed duly acknowledged, seems admissible in evidence, without further proof; namely, *New York*, (See 1 Rev. Stat. p. 759, § 16); *New Jersey*, (Elmer's Dig. p. 83, § 12); *Pennsylvania*, (Purdon's Dig. 1837, p. 251, § 5); *Virginia*, (Rev. Code, 1819, Vol. 1, p. 363, § 6); *North Carolina*, (Rev. Stat. 1837, Vol. 1, p. 226, § 6); *Georgia*, (Prince's Dig. 1837, p. 212, § 10); *Alabama*, Aiken's Dig. 1833, p. 88, § 1); *Illinois*, (Rev. Stat. 1833, p. 135, 136, § 17); *Mississippi*, (Alden & Van Hoesen's Dig. 1839, p. 297, § 1); and *Missouri*, (Rev. Stat. 1835, p. 123, § 35.) As to the acknowledgment of deeds, see 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 2, § 80, note, Greenleaf's ed.

[3] Bull. N. P. 172; 1 Chitty, Pl. 424; Stoytes *v.* Pearson, 4 Esp. 255; Union Bank of Maryland *v.* Ridgely, 1 H. & G. 324.

[4] 1 Chitty, Pl. 268, 269, 316; Ante, Vol. 1, § 69; Howell *v.* Richards, 11 East, 633; Swallow *v.* Beaumont, 1 Chitty, R. 518; Horsefall *v.* Testar, 7 Taunt. 385; Morgan *v.* Edwards, 6 Taunt. 394; 2 Marsh. 96, S. C.; Bowditch *v.* Mawley, 1 Campb. 195; Birch *v.* Gibbs, 6 M. &. S. 115.

pleading that the averment relates. Thus, the defendant may show, under this issue, that the deed is a forgery; that it was obtained by fraud; or was executed while he was insane, or so intoxicated as not to know what he was about; or, that it was made by a feme covert; or, to her, but her husband disagreed to it; or, that it was delivered to a stranger for the use of the plaintiff, who refused it; or, that it was never delivered at all.[1] Or, he may show that since its execution, it has become void by being materially *altered* or *cancelled* by tearing off the seal.[2] But matters which do not impeach the execution of the deed, but go to show it *voidable* by Common Law, or by statute, such as usury, infancy, duress, gaming, or, that it was given for ease and favor, or the like, must be specially pleaded.[3] And here it may be observed that, under a general plea of *non est factum*, the burden of proving the deed lies upon the plaintiff; but that under any special plea of matter in avoidance of the deed, the burden of proving the plea lies upon the defendant.[4]

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[1] Bull. N. P. 172; 1 Chitty, Pl. 425; Whelpdale's case, 5 Co 119; Pitt *v.* Smith, 3 Campb. 33; Dorr *v.* Munsell, 13 Johns. 430; Van Valkenburg *v.* Rouk, 12 Johns. 337; Roberts *v.* Jackson, 1 Wend. 478; Jackson *v.* Perkins, 2 Wend. 308; Wigglesworth *v.* Steers, 1 Hen. & Munf. 69; Curtis *v.* Hall, 1 South. 361. As to the principles on which Chancery acts in setting aside deeds on the ground of the intoxication of the grantor, see Nagle *v.* Baylor, 3 Dru. & War. 60.

[2] Leyfield's case, 10 Co. 92. The intent with which the cancellation was made, is a fact, to be found by the Jury. Gummer *v.* Adams, 13 Law Journal, 40, N. S.

[3] 1 Chitty, Pl. 425; Harmer *v.* Wright, 2 Stark. R. 35; Colton *v.* Goodridge, 2 W. Bl. 1108; Bull. N. P. 172.

[4] Snell *v.* Snell, 4 B. & C. 741; Bushell *v.* Pasmore, 6 Mod. 218, per Holt, C. J.; 5 Com. Dig. Pleader, 2 W. 18.

DURESS.

§ 301. By *Duress*, in its more extended sense, is meant that degree of severity, either threatened and impending, or actually inflicted, which is sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.[1] The Common Law has divided it into two classes, namely, duress *per minas*, and duress of imprisonment. Duress *per minas* is restricted to fear of loss of life, or of mayhem, or loss of limb; or, in other words, of remediless harm to the person. If, therefore, duress *per minas* is pleaded in bar of an action upon a deed, the plea must state a threat of death or mayhem, or loss of limb; and a threat to this specific extent must be proved. A fear of mere battery, or of destruction of property, is not, technically, duress, and therefore is not pleadable in bar;[2] but facts of this kind, it is conceived, are admissible in evidence, to make out a defence of *fraud* and *extortion* in obtaining the instrument.[3]

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[1] Non suspicio vel cujuslibet vani vel meticulosi hominis, sed talis qui cadere possit in virum constantem; talis enim debet esse metus, qui in se contineat mortis periculum, et corporis cruciatum. Bracton, lib. 2, c. 5, par. 14.

[2] 1 Bl. Comm. 131. In Louisiana, any threats will invalidate a contract, if they are "such as would naturally operate on a person of ordinary firmness, and inspire a just fear of great injury to person, *reputation*, or *fortune*." Civil Code Louis. Art. 1845. And the age, sex, health, and disposition, and other circumstances of the party threatened, are taken into consideration. Id. The contract is equally invalidated by a false report of threats, if it were made under a belief of their truth; and by threats of injury to the wife, husband, descendant or ascendant of the party contracting. Ibid. Art. 1846, 1847. These rules apply to cases where there may be some other motive for making the contract besides the threats. But if there is no other motive or cause, then any threats, even of slight injury, will invalidate it. Ibid. Art. 1853.

[3] See Evans *v.* Huey, 1 Bay, R. 13; Collins *v.* Westbury, 2 Bay, R. 211; Sasportas *v.* Jennings, 1 Bay, R. 470, 475. In this last case the

§ 302. The plea of *Duress of imprisonment* is supported by any evidence, that the party was unlawfully restrained of his liberty, until he would execute the instrument. If the imprisonment was lawful, that is, if it were by virtue of legal process, the plea is not supported;[1] unless it appear that the arrest was upon process sued out maliciously and without probable cause; or, that, while the party was under lawful arrest, unlawful force, constraint, or severity was inflicted upon him, by reason of which the instrument was executed.[2] But in all cases, the duress must affect the party himself; for if there be two obligors, one of whom executed the bond by duress, the other cannot take advantage of this, to avoid the bond as to himself.[3]

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rule is broadly laid down, that where assumpsit would lie to recover back the money, had it been paid under restraint of goods, a promise to pay it, made under the like circumstances, may be avoided by plea of duress.

[1] 1 Bl. Comm. 136, 137; Hob. 266, 267; 2 Inst. 482; Anon. 1 Lev. 68, 69; Wilcox *v.* Howland, 23 Pick. 167.

[2] Anon. Aleyn, 92; Watkins *v.* Baird, 6 Mass. 506.

[3] Huscombe *v.* Standing Cro. Jac. 187; Thompson *v.* Lockwood, 15 Johns. 256.

EJECTMENT.

§ 303. This, which was originally a personal action of trespass, is now a mixed action, for the recovery of land and damages, and is become the principal, and in some States the only action, by which the title to real estate is tried and the land recovered. In several of the United States, the remedy for the recovery of land is by an action frequently called an ejectment, but in form more nearly resembling the writ of entry on disseisin, in the nature of an assise.[1] But in all the forms of remedy as they are now used in practice, the essential principles are the same, at least so far as the law of evidence is concerned. The real plaintiff, in every form, recovers only on the strength of *his own title*;[2] and he must show that he has the *legal interest*, and a *possessory title*, not barred by the statute of limitations.[3]

§ 304. When the title of the real plaintiff in ejectment is controverted under the *general issue*, he must prove, (1.) that he had the *legal estate* in the premises, at the time of the demise laid in the declaration; (2.) that he also had the *right of entry*; and, (3.) that the defendant, or those claiming under him, were in *possession* of the premises at the time when the declaration in ejectment was served.[4]

§ 305. If a *privity* in estate has subsisted between the parties,

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[1] Jackson on Real Actions, 2, 4.

[2] Roe *v.* Harvey, 4 Burr. 2484, 2487; Jackson on Real Actions, p. 5; Adams on Eject. p. 32, 285, by Tillinghast; 1 Chitty on Pl. 173; Williams *v.* Ingell, 21 Pick. 288; Martin *v.* Strachan, 5 T. R. 108, n.; Goodtitle *v.* Baldwin, 11 East, 488, 495; Lane *v.* Reynard, 2 S. & R. 65; Covert *v.* Irwin, 3 S. & R. 288.

[3] 1 Chitty on Pl. 172; Ib. 209, (7th edit.)

[4] Adams on Eject. p. 247, by Tillinghast.

proof of title is ordinarily unnecessary; for a party is not permitted to dispute the original title of him by whom he has been let into the possession.[1] This rule is extended to the case of a tenant, acquiring the possession by wrong against the owner, and to one holding over after the expiration of his lease.[2] And when the relation of landlord and tenant is once established by express act of the parties, it attaches to all who may succeed to the possession through or under the tenant, whether immediately or remotely; the succeeding tenant being as much affected by the acts and admissions of his predecessor in regard to the title, as if they were his own.[3] Even an agreement to purchase the lands, if made deliberately, estops the purchaser from denying the title of the vendor.[4] But evidence of an agreement for a lease, if none was ever executed, is not alone sufficient to establish this relation, against a tenant already holding adversely.[5] Nor

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 24, 25; Adams on Eject. p. 247, by Tillinghast; Wood *v.* Day, 7 Taunt. 646; 1 Moore, 389; Jackson *v.* Reynolds, 1 Caines, 444; Jackson *v.* Whitford, 2 Caines, 215; Jackson *v.* Vosburg, 7 Johns. 186; Williams *v.* Annapolis, 6 H. & J. 533; Jackson *v.* Stewart, 6 Johns. 34; Jackson *v.* De Walts, 7 Johns. 157; Jackson *v.* Hinman, 10 Johns. 292; Doe *v.* Edwards, 6 C. & P. 208. The lessee of a close in severalty, demised to him by one of several tenants in common, cannot set up an adverse title, in bar of an action by his lessor. Doe *v.* Mitchell, 1 B. & B. 11; Jackson *v.* Creal, 13 Johns. 116.

[2] Jackson *v.* Styles, 1 Cowen, 575; Doe *v.* Baytup, 3 Ad. & El. 188; 4 N. & M. 837. So, though the landlord's title was acquired by wrong. Parry *v.* House, Holt's Cas. 489. Or, was only an equitable title. Doe *v.* Edwards, 6 C. & P. 208.

[3] Taylor *v.* Needham, 2 Taunt. 278; Doe *v.* Mills, 2 Ad. & El. 17; Doe *v.* Lewis, 5 Ad. & El. 577; Jackson *v.* Davis, 5 Cowen, 123; Jackson *v.* Harsen, 7 Cowen, 323; Jackson *v.* Scissam, 3 Johns. 499; Graham *v.* Moore, 4 S. & R. 467; Jackson *v.* Walker, 7 Cowen, 637; Cooper *v.* Blandy, 4 M. & Scott, 562; Doe *v.* Mizen, 2 M. & Rob. 56; Barwick *v.* Thompson, 7 T. R. 488. The purchaser at a sheriff's sale is privy to the debtor's title, and is therefore equally estopped, with him. Jackson *v.* Graham, 3 Caines, 188; Jackson *v.* Bush, 10 Johns. 223.

[4] Whiteside *v.* Jackson, 1 Wend. 418; Jackson *v.* Walker, 7 Cowen, 637; Jackson *v.* Norris, Ib. 717; Hamilton *v.* Taylor. Litt. Sel. Cas. 444.

[5] Jackson *v.* Cooley, 2 Johns. Cas. 223.

is the tenant precluded from showing that an agreement to purchase from the plaintiff, was made by him under a mistake, or that the title was in himself, or out of the lessor;[1] or, that a lease, which he has taken while in possession, was unfairly imposed upon him, by misrepresentation and *fraud*.[2] The same principle applies to any other act of acknowledgment, amounting to an admission of tenancy or title.[3] But the tenant may always show that his *landlord's title has expired;*[4] or, that he has sold his interest in the premises;[5] or, that it is alienated from him by judgment, and operation of law.[6]

§ 306. One of the ordinary methods of establishing a privity in estate, is by proof of the *payment of rent;* which is always *primâ facie* evidence of the title of the landlord, and is conclusive against the party paying, and all others claiming under and in privity with him.[7] And the payment of rent, after an occupancy of many years, is sufficient evidence, if unexplained, to show that the occupancy began by permission of the party to whom it was paid.[8]

§ 307. Where both parties *claim under the same third person*, it is sufficient to prove the derivation of title from him, without proving his title. So, if either has held under such

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[1] Jackson *v.* Cuerden, 2 Johns. Cas. 353.

[2] Brown *v.* Dysinger, 1 Rawle, R. 408; Miller *v.* M'Brier, 14 S. & R. 382; Hamilton *v.* Marsden, 6 Binn. 45; Jackson *v.* Ayres, 14 Johns. 224; Jackson *v.* Norris, 7 Cowen, 717.

[3] Gregory *v.* Doidge, 3 Bing. 474; 11 Moore, 394, S. C.

[4] Neave *v.* Moss, 1 Bing. 360; 8 Moore, 389, S. C.; England *v.* Slade, 4 T. R. 682; Doe *v.* Whitroe, 1 Dowl. & R. 1; Brook *v.* Briggs, 2 Bing. N. C. 572.

[5] Doe *v.* Watson, 2 Stark. R. 230.

[6] Jackson *v.* Davis, 5 Cowen, 123, 135; Camp *v.* Camp, 5 Conn. 291.

[7] Doe *v.* Pegge, 1 T. R. 758, 759, n.; Doe *v.* Clarke, Peake, Add. Cas. 239; Hall *v.* Butler, 10 Ad. & El. 204; 2 P. & D. 374, S. C.; Jew *v.* Wood, 1 Craig & Phil. 185; 5 Jur. 954.

[8] Doe *v.* Wilkinson, 3 B. & C. 413.

third person, as his tenant, and is thereby estopped to deny his title.[1]

§ 308. The *identity* of the lands, and the *possession* of them by the defendant, may be proved by the payment of rent, or by the defendant's admission of his tenancy, or by any other competent evidence of the fact; it being merely a matter of fact, provable, like other facts, by parol evidence.[2]

§ 309. The party claiming as *lineal heir*, must prove that the ancestor, from whom he derives title, was the person last seised of the premises, as his inheritance, and that he is the heir of such ancestor.[3] This seisin may, in the first instance, be proved, by showing that the ancestor was either in actual possession of the premises, at the time of his death, and within the period of the Statute of Limitations, or, in the receipt of rent from the tertenant; possession being *primâ facie* evidence of a seisin in fee.[4] If he claims as *collateral heir*, he must show the descent of himself, and the person last seised, from some common ancestor, together with the extinction of all those lines of descent which would claim before him. This is done by proving the marriages, births, and deaths, necessary to complete his title, and the identity of the persons.[5]

§ 310. Where the plaintiff claims as *devisee* of a freehold,

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[1] Adams on Eject. p. 248, by Tillinghast. But, in the former case, a mere possessory title, which would be good against a stranger, and may have been gained by a tortious entry, is not always sufficient. Sparhawk *v.* Bullard, 1 Met. 95; Oakes *v.* Marcy, 10 Pick. 195.

[2] Adams on Eject. p. 248, by Tillinghast; Jackson *v.* Vosburg, 7 Johns. 186.

[3] Adams on Eject. p. 253, by Tillinghast; Jackson on Real Actions, p. 157; Co. Litt. 11 b; Jenkins *v.* Pritchard, 2 Wils. 45.

[4] Adams on Eject. p. 254, by Tillinghast; Bull. N. P. 102, 103.

[5] Ibid.; 2 Bl. Comm. 208, 209; Roe *v.* Lord, 3 W. Bl. 1099. For the proof of pedigree, see Vol. I. § 103–105, 134; and Post, tit. Heir. See further, Richards *v.* Richards, 15 East, 294, note.

he must prove the seisin and death of the devisor, and the due execution of the will; unless it is thirty years old, in which case it may be read without farther proof; and the age of the will is to be reckoned from the day of its date, and not from the death of the testator.[1]

§ 311. The *seisin* of the ancestor or devisor[2] may be proved by his receipt of rent, or by his actual possession of the premises; either of which is *primâ facie* evidence of title in fee;[3] or, by proof of an *entry* into one of several parcels of the land, if they were all in the same county, and there was no adverse possession at the time, for this gives a seisin of them all.[4] If there was an adverse possession, and the owner's right of entry was not barred, his entry, in order to revest the seisin in himself, should have been an open and notorious entry into that particular parcel; and in every case, an entry, to revest an estate, must be made with that intention, sufficiently indicated either by the act, or by words accompanying it.[5]

§ 312. The *entry*, to gain a seisin need not be made by the very *person entitled;* but may be made by another in his behalf, even if it be by a *stranger*, without any precedent command, or express subsequent agreement. By the Common Law, the entry of one joint-tenant, tenant in common, or coparcener, is deemed the entry of all; and the entry of a guardian, tenant for years, tenant by elegit, or younger brother or sister, inures to the benefit of the ward, lessor, or other person entitled.[6] So, the possession of the mother,

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[1] Adams on Eject. p. 259; Ante, Vol. 1, § 570, n. (3); Doe *v.* Wolley, 3 B. & C. 22; McKenire *v.* Fraser, 9 Ves. 5; Jackson *v.* Laroway, 3 Johns. Cas. 283, 386; Jackson *v.* Christman, 4 Wend. 277, 282. For the proof of Wills, see Post, tit. WILL.

[2] See Post, § 555.

[3] Bull. N. P. 103; Jayne *v.* Price, 5 Taunt. 326; 1 Marsh. 68, S. C.; 2 Phil. Evid. 282.

[4] Co. Lit. 15 *a*, *b*, 252 *b*; 1 Cruise, Dig. by White, p. 50, § 21, 22.

[5] Co. Lit. 245 *b*; Robison *v.* Swett, 3 Greenl. 316; Ante, § 23.

[6] Co. Lit. 15 *a*, 245 *b*, 258 *a*; 2 Cruise's Dig. by White, p. 377, § 63; Ibid. p. 402, § 14.

becomes the seisin of her posthumous son.[1] And it seems that the heir may acquire an actual seisin, without any entry by himself, by making a lease for years or at will, if his possession in law is unrebutted by the actual seisin of any other person.[2]

§ 313. There can be no mesne seisin of a *remainder* or *reversion* expectant on an estate of *freehold*, while such remainder or reversion continues in a regular course of descent; for if it be granted over, it vests immediately in the grantee, making him the new stock of descent for any subsequent claimant; the exertion of such ownership being equivalent to the actual seisin of an estate, which is capable of being reduced to possession by entry. He, therefore, who claims an estate in remainder or reversion by descent, must make himself heir, either to him in whom such estate first vested by purchase, or to the person to whom it was last granted by the owner.[3]

§ 314. Where the plaintiff claims as *legatee of a term of years*, he must show the probate of the will, and prove the assent of the executor to the legacy, without which he cannot take. But allowing the legatee to receive the rents, or applying them to his use, or any other slight evidence of assent on the part of the executor, such as, on the part of a tenant, would amount to an attornment, will be sufficient; and such assent, once given, is irrevocable.[4] He must also show that the testator had a chattel and not a freehold interest in the premises; because we have already seen that his possession, unexplained, will be presumed a seisin in fee. Of this fact, the lease itself will be the most satisfactory evidence; but it may be proved by any solemn admission of the other party, as, for example, by his answer as defendant, to a bill in

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[1] 3 Cruise, Dig. by White, p. 345, § 64, 65, 66; Ibid. p. 348; Goodtitle *v.* Newman, 3 Wils. 516; 3 Cruise, Dig. by White, p. 391, § 28, 29, 30.

[2] Watkins on Descents, p. 67, 68, [49,] [50.]

[3] Ibid. p. 137, 138, 151, [110,] [118.]

[4] 1 Roper on Legacies, 250, 251.

Equity, in which he stated that "he believed that the lessor was possessed of the leasehold premises in the bill mentioned."[1]

§ 315. If the plaintiff claims a chattel real as *executor* or *administrator*, he must prove the grant of the letters of administration, or the probate of the will, in addition to the evidence of the testator's or intestate's title. And where no formal record of the grant of letters of administration or letters testamentary is drawn up, they may be proved by the book of Acts, or other brief official memorial of the fact.[2] If the plaintiff claims as *guardian*, he must in like manner prove, not only the title of the ward, and his minority at the time of the demise laid in the declaration, but also the due execution of the deed or will, appointing him guardian, if such was the source of his authority; or the due issue of letters of guardianship, if he was appointed by the tribunal having jurisdiction of that subject.[3]

§ 316. Where the plaintiff claims as *purchaser, under a sheriff's sale*, made by virtue of an execution *against the defendant in ejectment*, it is sufficient to show the execution, and the proceedings under it,[4] without producing a copy of the record of the judgment itself; for the debtor might have applied to have the execution set aside, if it had been issued without a valid judgment to support it; but not having done so, it will be presumed, in an action against him, that the

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[1] Doe *v.* Steel, 3 Campb. 115.

[2] Bull. N. P. 246; Elden *v.* Keddel, 8 East, 187; Ante, Vol. 1, § 519; Adams on Eject. p. 271, by Tillinghast. A Court of Common Law takes no notice of a will, as a title to personal property, until it has been proved in the Court having jurisdiction of the probate of wills. Stone *v.* Forsyth, 2 Doug. 707. An executor may lay a demise before probate of the will. Roe *v.* Summersett, 2 W. Bl. 694.

[3] Adams on Eject. by Tillinghast, p. 275.

[4] The sheriff's return is itself conclusive evidence between the parties and those in privity with them, of all the facts it recites, which relate to his own doings by virtue of the precept. Bott *v.* Burnell, 11 Mass. 163; Whitaker *v.* Sumner, 7 Pick. 551, 555; Lawrence *v.* Pond, 17 Mass. 433.

judgment is right. But where the action of ejectment is against a *stranger*, no such presumption is made, and the plaintiff will be required to prove the judgment, as well as the execution.[1] In some of the United States, the freehold estate of a judgment debtor may be taken on execution, in the nature of an extent, and set off to the creditor, at an appraised value; in which case an actual seisin is vested in the creditor; by virtue of which he may maintain a real action, even against the debtor himself.[2]

§ 317. If a *joint demise* is laid in the declaration, evidence must be given of a joint interest in the lessors. But if *several demises* are laid, the declaration will be supported by proof of several demises, even by joint-tenants; for a several demise severs a joint-tenancy.[3] So, if four joint-tenants jointly demise, such of them as give notice to quit, may recover their several shares, in an ejectment on their several demises.[4] By the Common Law, tenants in common cannot recover upon a joint demise; but must sue separately, each for his share, in whatever form of real action the remedy is sought.[5] But in some of the United States, this rule has been changed by statute, and in others it has been broken in upon, by a long course of practice in the Courts, permitting tenants in common and all others claiming as joint-tenants, or as coparceners, to join or sever in suits for the recovery of their lands.[6] If the

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[1] Doe *v.* Murless, 6 M. & S. 110; Hoffman *v.* Pitt, 5 Esp. R. 22, 23; Cooper *v.* Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 546. But this point was otherwise decided, and the judgment was required to be proved in an ejectment against the debtor himself, in Doe *v.* Smith, 1 Holt's Cas. 589, n.; 2 Stark. R. 199, n.; Fenwick *v.* Floyd, 1 H. & Gill, 172.

[2] Gore *v.* Brazier, 3 Mass. 523; Blood *v.* Wood, 1 Met. 528, 534.

[3] Doe *v.* Read, 12 East, 57; Doe *v.* Fenn, 3 Campb. 190; Doe *v.* Lonsdale, 12 East, 39.

[4] Doe *v.* Chaplin, 3 Taunt. 120.

[5] Co. Litt. 197; Hammond on Parties, p. 251; 1 Chitty on Pl. 14, (7th edit.); Innis *v.* Crawford, 4 Bibb, 241; Taylor *v.* Taylor, 3 A. K. Marsh. 18; White *v.* Pickering, 12 S. & R. 435.

[6] Maine Rev. St. ch. 145, § 12; Mass. Rev. St. ch. 101, § 10; Jackson

declaration is for a certain quantity of land, or for a certain fractional part, and the plaintiff proves title to a part only of the land, or to a smaller fraction, the declaration is supported for the quantity or fraction proved, and he may accordingly recover.[1] But whether, if an entirety is demanded, the plaintiff may recover an undivided part, is not uniformly agreed; though the weight of authority is clearly in favor of his recovery.[2]

§ 318. If the action is by a joint-tenant, parcener, or tenant in common, *against his companion*, the consent-rule, if it is in the common form, will be sufficient evidence of an *ouster;* but if it is special, to confess lease and entry only, the ouster must be proved.[3] Possession alone, will not be sufficient proof of an ouster by one owner, against his companion; for where both have equal right to the possession, each will be presumed to hold under his lawful title, till the contrary appears. An ouster in such case, therefore, must be proved by acts of an adverse character, such as, claiming the whole for himself; denying the title of his companion; or, refusing to permit him to enter; and the like. A bare perception of the whole profits does not, of itself, amount to an ouster; yet an undisturbed and quiet possession for a long time, is a fact from which an ouster may be found by the Jury.[4]

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v. Bradt, 2 Caines, 169; Jackson *v.* Sample, 1 Johns. Cas. 231; Jackson *v.* Sidney, 12 Johns. 185: Doe *v.* Potts, 1 Hawks, R. 469.

[1] Denn *v.* Purvis, 1 Burr. 326; Guy *v.* Rand, Cro. El. 12; Santee *v.* Keister, 6 Binn. 36.

[2] Doe *v.* Wippel, 1 Esp. R. 360; Roe *v.* Lonsdale, 12 East, 39; Dewey *v.* Brown, 2 Pick. 387; Somes *v.* Skinner, 3 Pick. 52; Holyoke *v.* Haskins, 9 Pick. 259; Gist *v.* Robinet, 3 Bibb, 2; Ward *v.* Harrison, Ibid. 304; Larue *v.* Slack, 4 Bibb, 358; *Contra*, Carroll *v.* Norwood, 1 H. & J. 100, 167; Young *v.* Drew, 1 Taylor, R. 119.

[3] Doe *v.* Cuff, 1 Camp. 173; Oakes *v.* Brydon, 3 Burr. 1895; Doe *v.* Roe, 1 Anstr. 86.

[4] Doe *v.* Prosser, Cowp. 217; Fairclaim *v.* Shackleton, 5 Burr. 2604; Bracket *v.* Norcross, 1 Greenl. 89; Doe *v.* Bird, 11 East, 49. And see 2 Cruise's Dig. Tit. 20, § 14, note, by Greenleaf.

§ 319. Where the action is brought by a *landlord against his tenant*, or is between persons in privity with them, the claimant must show that the *tenancy is determined;* otherwise, being once recognized, it will be presumed still to subsist. It may be determined, either by efflux of time; or, by notice; or, by forfeiture for breach of condition.[1]

§ 320. If the tenancy is determined by *lapse of time*, this may be shown by producing and proving the counterpart of the lease. And if it depended on the happening of a particular event, the event also must be proved to have happened.[2] If the demise was by parol, or the lease is lost, it may be proved by a person who was present at the demise; or, by evidence of the payment of rent; or, by admissions of the defendant, or other competent secondary evidence.[3]

§ 321. Where it is determined by *notice to quit*, or by notice from the tenant that he will no longer occupy, the tenancy must be proved, with the tenor and service of the notice given, the authority of the person who served it, if served by an agent, and that the time mentioned in the notice was contemporaneous with the expiration of the tenancy, or with the period when the party was at liberty so to terminate it. And if a custom is relied on, as entitling the party so to do, this also must be shown.[4] If the tenant, on application of his landlord to know the time when the lease com-

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[1] Adams on Eject. by Tillinghast, p. 276, 277.

[2] Ibid. p. 278.

[3] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 560, as to laying a foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of a written instrument, by notice to the adverse party to produce it.

[4] Adams on Eject. by Tillinghast, p. 120, 131, 278, 279. By the Common Law, a parol notice is sufficient. Doe *v.* Crick, 5 Esp. 196; Legg *v.* Benion, Willes, 43. If the party has disclaimed or denied the tenancy, no notice is necessary. Doe *v.* Grubb, 10 B. & C. 816; Doe *v.* Pasquali, Peake's Cas. 196; Bull. N. P. 96. And a new notice, or receipt of rent, or a distress for rent, subsequently accrued, is evidence of a waiver of a prior notice. Doe *v.* Palmer, 16 East, 53; Zouch *v.* Willingale, 1 H. B. 311; Doe *v.* Batten, Cowp. 243.

menced, states it erroneously, and a notice to quit is served upon him according to such statement, the tenant is estopped to prove a different day.[1] He is also concluded by the time stated in the notice, if, at the time of service, he assents to its terms.[2] But if the tenant, being personally served with notice, made no objection to it at the time, this is *primâ facie* evidence to the Jury, that the term commenced at the time mentioned in the notice.[3] If, however, the notice was not personally served, or was not read by the tenant, nor explained to him, no such presumption arises from his silence.[4]

§ 322. The *service of the notice* may be proved by the person who delivered it; but if there was a subscribing witness, he also must be called, as in other cases of documentary evidence. The *contents* of the notice may be shown by a copy; or, if no copy was taken, it may be proved by a witness; and in either case, no previous notice to produce the original will be required.[5]

§ 323. The *form of notice* must be explicit and positive, truly giving to the party, in itself, all that is material for him to know upon the subject. A misdescription of the premises, or a misstatement of dates, which cannot mislead, will not vitiate the notice;[6] nor need it be directed to the person.[7] Even if directed by a wrong name, yet if he keeps it without objection, the error is waived.[8] A notice as to part only of the demised premises, is bad;[9] but a notice by one of sev-

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1 Doe *v.* Lambly, 2 Esp. 635.

2 Adams on Eject. p. 280.

3 Doe *v.* Forster, 13 East, 405; Doe *v.* Woombwell, 2 Campb. 559; Thomas *v.* Thomas, 2 Campb. 647; Oakapple *v.* Copous, 4 T. R. 361.

4 Doe *v.* Harris, 1 T. R. 161; Doe *v.* Calvert, 2 Campb. 387.

5 Ante, Vol. 1, § 561, 569; Adams on Eject. by Tillinghast, p. 279; Jory *v.* Orchard, 2 B. & P. 39, 41; Doe *v.* Durnford, 2 M. & S. 62.

6 Doe ex dem. Cox, 4 Esp. 185; Doe *v.* Kightley, 7 T. R. 63.

7 Doe *v.* Wrightman, 4 Esp. 5.

8 Doe *v.* Spiller, 6 Esp. 70.

9 Doe *v.* Archer, 14 East, 245.

eral joint-tenants, will enable him to recover his share.[1] The notice, however, must be such as the tenant may act upon at the time when it is given. Where, therefore, two only of three executors gave notice, "acting on the part and behalf of themselves and the said J. H." the other executor, this was held insufficient, though it was afterwards recognized by the third; the lease requiring a notice in writing, under the hands of the respective parties; for at the time when it was served, the tenant could not know that it would be ratified and adopted by the other.[2] But where the notice was signed by an agent professing to act as the agent of all the lessors, it was held sufficient to enable the tenant to act upon with certainty, though in fact the letter of attorney was not signed by all the lessors until a subsequent day.[3]

§ 324. *Service of notice* at the dwelling-house of the party is sufficient, whether upon the party in person, or his wife, or servant.[4] And if there are two joint lessees, service on one of them is *primâ facie* evidence of a service on both.[5] If the lessee has assigned his interest to one, between whom and the landlord there is no privity, the notice should be served on the original lessee.[6]

§ 325. *Notice to quit* is not necessary, where the relation of landlord and tenant is at an end, as, in the case of a tenant holding over by *sufferance;*[7] nor, where the person in possession is but a *servant* or *bailiff* to the owner;[8] nor, where he has either never admitted the relation of landlord

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1 Doe *v.* Chaplin, 3 Taunt. 120.

2 Right *v.* Cuthell, 5 East, 491, 499, per Lawrence, J.

3 Goodtitle *v.* Woodward, 3 B. & Ald. 689.

4 Widger *v.* Browning, 2 C. & P. 523; Doe *v.* Dunbar, 1 M. & Malk. 10; Jones *v.* Marsh, 4 T. R. 464; Doe *v.* Lucas, 5 Esp. 153.

5 Doe *v.* Crick, 4 Esp. 196; Doe *v.* Watkins, 7 East, 553.

6 Roe *v.* Wiggs, 2 New R. 330; Pleasant *v.* Benson, 14 East, 234.

7 Jackson *v.* Parkhurst, 5 Johns. 128; Thunder *v.* Belcher, 3 East, 449, 451; Jackson *v.* McLeod, 12 Johns. 182.

8 Jackson *v.* Sample, 1 Johns. Cas. 231.

and tenant, as, if he claims in fee, or adversely to the plaintiff;[1] or, has subsequently disclaimed and repudiated it, as, for example, by attorning to a stranger, or the like.[2] But such notice is deemed necessary only where the relation of landlord and tenant does exist, whether it be created by an express demise, or is incidentally admitted, either by the acceptance of rent, or by entering under an agreement to purchase, or the like.[3] And notice, if given, is *waived* on the part of the landlord, by a subsequent new notice to quit; or, by the receipt of rent before the bringing of an ejectment; or, by a distress for rent accruing subsequently to the expiration of the notice to quit; or, by an action for subsequent use and occupation; or, by any other act on the part of the lessor, after knowledge by him of the tenant's default, recognizing the tenancy as still subsisting.[4]

§ 326. Where the ejectment is founded upon the *forfeiture* of a lease for *non-payment of rent*, and the case is not governed by any statute, but stands at Common Law, the plaintiff must prove that he demanded the rent, and that the precise sum due, and neither more nor less, was demanded; that the demand was precisely upon the day when the rent became due and payable; that it was made at a convenient time before sunset on that day; that it was made upon the land, and at the most notorious place upon it, and if there be

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[1] Jackson *v.* Deyo, 3 Johns. 422; Jackson *v.* Cuerden, 2 Johns. Ch. 353; Doe *v.* Williams, Cowp. 622; Doe *v.* Creed, 5 Bing. 327.

[2] Bull. N. P. 96; Doe *v.* Frowd, 4 Bing. 557, 560; Jackson *v.* Wheeler, 6 Johns. 272; Doe *v.* Grubb, 10 B. & C. 816; Doe *v.* Whittick, Gow, 195.

[3] Jackson *v.* Wilsey, 9 Johns. 267; Jackson *v.* Rowan, Ibid. 330; Ferris *v.* Fuller, 4 Johns. 213; Jackson *v.* Deyo, 3 Johns. 422.

[4] Doe *v.* Palmer, 16 East, 53; Doe *v.* Inglis, 3 Taunt. 54; Arnsby *v.* Woodward, 6 B. & C. 519; Roe *v.* Harrison, 2 T. R. 425; Goodright *v.* Davids, Cowp. 803; Doe *v.* Batten, Cowp. 243; Doe *v.* Meaux, 1 C. & P. 346; 4 B. & C. 606, S. C.; Doe *v.* Johnson, 1 Stark. R. 411. By the Common Law, the receipt of the rent previously due, is a waiver of the forfeiture occasioned by its non-payment. 1 Saund. 287, note (16), by Williams.

a dwelling-house on it, then at the front or principal door, though it is not necessary to enter the house, even if the door be open; and that a demand was in fact made, although no person was there to pay it. But if any other place was appointed, where the rent was payable, the demand must be proved to have been made there. A demand made after or before the last day of payment, or not upon the land, or at the place, will not be sufficient to defeat the estate.[1]

§ 327. If the lease contained an express *limitation*, that upon non-payment, or other breach, the lease should become *absolutely void*, then no entry by the landlord need be made, but an ejectment lies immediately, upon the breach with proof of demand of rent as before stated, if the breach was by non-payment. But where the terms of the lease are, that upon non-payment or other breach, it shall be lawful for the lessor to *re-enter*, there, by the Common Law, the plaintiff must show an entry, made in reasonable time, and because of such breach; unless the entry is confessed in the consent-rule, which is now held sufficient. And in this latter class of cases, if the lessor, after notice of the forfeiture, (which is an issuable fact,) accepts rent subsequently accruing, or distrains for the rent already due, or does any other act which amounts to a recognition of the relation of landlord and tenant as still subsisting, or to a dispensation of the forfeiture, the lease, which before was voidable is thereby affirmed; and this will constitute a good defence to the action.[2] If the tenant, after demand of the rent, but before

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[1] See 1 Saund. 287, note (16), by Williams, and cases there cited. The strictness of the Common Law, in the particulars mentioned in the text, has been abated, and the subject otherwise regulated by statutes, both in England and several of the United States; but as these statutory provisions are various in the different States, rendering the subject purely a matter of local law, they are not here particularly stated.

[2] 1 Saund. 287, note (16,) by Williams, and cases there cited; Doe *v.* Banks, 4 B. & Ald. 401; Fawcett *v.* Hall, 1 Alcock & Napier, R. 248; Zouch *v.* Willingale, 1 H. Bl. 311. But the rent must have been received as between landlord and tenant, and not upon any other consideration. Right *v.* Bawden, 3 East, 260.

the expiration of the last day, tenders the sum due, this also will save the forfeiture.[1]

§ 328. If the breach consisted in assigning or *under-letting without the consent of the lessor*, it has been held sufficient for the plaintiff to show that another person was found in possession, acting and appearing as tenant, this being *primâ facie* evidence of an under-letting, and sufficient to throw upon the defendant the burden of proving in what character such person held possession of the premises. And in such case, the declarations of the occupant are admissible against the defendant, to show the character of the occupancy.[2]

§ 329. Where the action is between a *mortgagee and the mortgagor*, the mortgagee's case is ordinarily made out by the production and proof of the mortgage deed, which the defendant is estopped to deny. If the action is against a tenant of the mortgagor, the determination of the tenancy must be proved; unless it commenced subsequent to the mortgage, and has not been acknowledged by the mortgagee; in which case no notice to quit need be shown.[3] And where the mortgage deed contains a proviso that the mortgagor may remain in possession until the condition is broken, it will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove a breach.[4] Whether, in general, a mortgagor is entitled to notice to quit, seems not to be perfectly clear by the authorities. In England, he is held not entitled to such notice;[5] but in some of the United States it has been held otherwise.[6]

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1 Co. Litt. 202, a.

2 Doe *v.* Rickarby, 5 Esp. 4. per Ld. Alvanley; Ante, Vol. 1, § 108, 109.

3 Thunder *v.* Belcher, 3 East, 449; Keech *v.* Hall, 1 Doug. 21; Jackson *v.* Chase, 2 Johns. 84; Jackson *v.* Fuller, 4 Johns. 215; Birch *v.* Wright, 1 T. R. 378, 383. But if the mortgagee or the assignee of the mortgage has acknowledged the tenancy by the receipt of rent, a notice to quit is necessary to be proved. Ibid.; Clayton *v.* Blackey, 8 T. R. 3. See also Jackson *v.* Stackhouse, 1 Cowen, 122.

4 Hall *v.* Doe, 5 B. & Ald. 687.

5 Keech *v.* Hall, 1 Doug. 21; Thunder *v.* Belcher, 3 East, 449; Patridge *v.* Beere, 5 B. & Ald. 604.

6 Jackson *v.* Laughead, 2 Johns. 75; Jackson *v.* Green, 4 Johns. 186.

§ 330. *Payment* of the mortgage debt, is a good defence to an action at law, brought by the mortgagee, against the mortgagor, to obtain possession of the mortgaged premises; but if the mortgagee is already in possession, the remedy of the mortgagor, where no other is provided by statute, is by bill in equity.[1] And where *usury* renders the security void, this also may be shown in defence, against an action brought by the mortgagee, upon the mortgage.[2]

§ 331. As the claimant in ejectment, or other real action, can recover only upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that of the tenant, *the defence* will generally consist merely in rebutting the proofs adduced by the plaintiff.[3] For possession is always *primâ facie* evidence of title; and the party cannot be deprived of his possession by any person but the rightful owner, who has the *jus possessionis*.[4] The defendant, therefore, need not show any title in himself, until the plaintiff has shown some right to disturb his possession. Thus if the plaintiff claims as heir, and proves his heirship, the defendant may show a devise by the ancestor to a stranger; or, that, by the local law, some other person, is entitled as heir; or, that the claimant is illegitimate, or the like. So, if he claims as devisee, the defendant may prove that the will was obtained by fraud, or may impeach its validity on any other grounds, not precluded by

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[1] Gray *v.* Jenks, 3 Mason, R. 520; Gray *v.* Wass, 1 Greenl. 260; Vose *v.* Handy, 2 Greenl. 322; Perkins *v.* Pitts, 11 Mass. 125; Erskine *v.* Townsend, 2 Mass. 493; Wade *v.* Howard, 11 Pick. 289; Howard *v.* Howard, 3 Metc. 548, 557; Hitchcock *v.* Harrington, 6 Johns. 290, 294; Jackson *v.* Stackhouse, 1 Cowen, R. 122; Deering *v.* Sawtel, 4 Greenl. 191.

[2] Holton *v.* Button, 4 Conn. R. 436; Deering *v.* Sawtel, 4 Greenl. 191; Chandler *v.* Morton, 5 Greenl. 174; Richardson *v.* Field, 6 Greenl. 35.

[3] See Post, § 555 - 558.

[4] Adams on Eject. p. 285, 286, by Tillinghast; Hall *v.* Gittings, 2 Har. & Johns. 122; Lane *v.* Reynard, 2 S. & R. 65; Ante, § 303, 304. As to the *presumption of a conveyance* from the trustee to the *cestui que trust*, see 1 Cruise's Dig. tit. 12, ch. 2, § 39, note, Greenleaf's ed.

the previous probate of the will.[1] And he may also defeat the plaintiff's claim, by showing that the real title is in another, without claiming under it, or deducing it to himself, either by legal conveyance, or operation of law.[2] But he cannot set up a merely equitable title or lien, to defeat a legal title, under which the plaintiff claims.[3]

§ 332. As the *damages* given in an action of ejectment are now merely nominal, the title alone being the subject of controversy, the plaintiff is permitted to recover his real damages in an action of TRESPASS FOR MESNE PROFITS; in which he complains of his having been ejected from the possession of the premises by the defendant, who held him out and took the rents and profits, during the period alleged in the declaration.[4] And as this remedy is one of the incidents and consequences of an ejectment, it is usually considered under that head. We have heretofore seen[5] that the law considers

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[1] Adams on Eject. p. 286, by Tillinghast.

[2] Ibid. p. 29, 30, 31; Hunter *v.* Cochran, 3 Barr, 105. But if he entered under a contract to purchase from the plaintiff, he is estopped to deny the plaintiff's title. Norris *v.* Smith, 7 Cowen, R. 717; 1 Cruise's Dig. tit. 12, ch. 2, § 36, note, Greenleaf's ed.; 2 Wheat. 224, note (*a*).

[3] Adams on Eject. p. 32; 1 Cruise's Dig. *ubi supra.* Ibid. § 38, note; Roe *v.* Reed, 8 T. R. 118, 123; Jackson *v.* Sisson, 2 Johns. Cas. 321; Jackson *v.* Harrington, 9 Cowen, R. 88; Jackson *v.* Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 369; Sinclair *v.* Jackson, 8 Cowen, R. 543; Heath *v.* Knapp, 4 Barr, 230. But in Pennsylvania, it seems that an ejectment is regarded as an equitable remedy, and judgment is rendered at law, upon any principles which would require a decree in Chancery. Peebles *v.* Reading, 8 S. & R. 484. Delancy *v.* McKean, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 354; Thomas *v.* Wright, 9 S. & R. 87, 93.

[4] There is some diversity in the different American States, as to the remedy for mesne profits, which it is not within the plan of this treatise to consider. See Gill *v.* Cole, 1 Har. & J. 403; Lee *v.* Cooke, Gilmer, R. 331; Coleman *v.* Parish, 1 McCord, R. 264; Sumter *v.* Lehie, 1 Const. R. 102; Cox *v.* Callender, 9 Mass. 533. See Post, § 548–552. Where provision is made by statute for an allowance to the tenant in a real action for the value of his lasting improvements, of which he avails himself at the trial, the value of the mesne profits is generally taken into the estimate, by special provisions for that purpose.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 535.

the lessor of the plaintiff, and the actual tenant, as the real parties, in an action of ejectment; and therefore the action for mesne profits may be brought by the lessor of the plaintiff, as well as by the nominal plaintiff himself. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff, consists of proof of his possessory title; the defendant's wrongful entry; the time of his occupation; the value of the mesne profits; and any other damages and expenses recoverable in this action.

§ 333. Where this action is between the parties to the prior action of ejectment, and the plaintiff proceeds only for profits accruing subsequent to the alleged date of the demise, the *record of the judgment* in that case will be conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's title, and of the defendant's *entry* and *possession*, from the day of the demise laid in the declaration.[1] If the plaintiff would claim for profits antecedent to that time, he must prove his title as in other cases, and the defendant will not be estopped to gainsay it.[2] So, if the suit is against a precedent occupant, the judgment in ejectment is no proof of the plaintiff's title.[3] And if the suit is against the landlord of the premises, a judgment in ejectment against the casual ejector is not evidence of the plaintiff's title, unless the landlord had notice of the ejectment.[4]

§ 334. The plaintiff must also prove his *possession* of the premises. If the judgment in ejectment was rendered after verdict against the tenant in possession, the *consent-rule*, if it was entered into, will be sufficient proof of possession by the plaintiff. But if no consent-rule was entered into, the judgment being rendered against the casual ejector by de-

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[1] Adams on Eject. 334; Dodwell *v.* Gibbs, 2 C. & P. 615; Dewey *v.* Osborn, 4 Cowen, R. 329, 335; Van Alen *v.* Rogers, 1 Johns. Cas. 281; Benson *v.* Matsdorf, 2 Johns. 369; Chirac *v.* Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280; Lion *v.* Burtis, 5 Cowen, R. 408.

[2] Bull. N. P. 87; Aslin *v.* Parkin, 2 Burr. 668; Jackson *v.* Randall, 11 Johns. 405; West *v.* Hughes, 1 Har. & J. 574.

[3] Bull. N. P. 87.

[4] Hunter *v.* Britts, 3 Camp. 455.

fault, the plaintiff's possession must be proved, either by the writ of possession and the sheriff's return thereon, or, by evidence that the plaintiff has been admitted to the possession by the defendant.[1] The entry of the plaintiff, it seems, will relate back to the time when his title accrued, so as to entitle him to recover the mesne profits from that time.[2]

§ 335. It will also be incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the duration of the *occupancy by the defendant*, or by his tenant, if he be the landlord; and in the latter case, if the judgment in ejectment was against the casual ejector, by default, it must be shown that the defendant was landlord when the ejectment was brought, which may be done by proof of his receipt of rent accruing subsequent to the time of the demise. The plaintiff must also prove that the landlord had due notice of the service of the declaration in ejectment upon the tenant in possession; but if he has subsequently promised to pay rent and the costs of the ejectment, this will suffice.[3]

§ 336. The plaintiff in this action may recover the *costs* incurred by him in a Court of Error, in reversing a judgment in ejectment obtained by the defendant, as part of his damages, sustained by his having been wrongfully kept out of possession by the act of the defendant; and the Jury will be instructed to consider the costs between attorney and client as the measure of this item of damages.[4] He also may recover in this form the costs of the ejectment;[5] and also,

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[1] Bull. N. P. 87. It would seem that a judgment in ejectment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant, estops the latter from controverting the plaintiff's possession, as well as his title, of which possession is a part. See Adams on Eject. 336, note (q); Calvart *v.* Horsfall, 4 Esp. 167; Brown *v.* Galloway, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 291, 299; Jackson *v.* Combs, 7 Cowen, R. 36.

[2] Bull. N. P. 87, 88; Adams on Eject. 335.

[3] Hunter *v.* Britts, 3 Campb. 455; Adams on Eject. 337.

[4] Nowell *v.* Roake, 7 B. & C. 404. And see Doe *v.* Huddart, 5 Tyrwh. 846; 2 C. M. & R. 316, S. C.; Denn *v.* Chubb, 1 Coxe, N. J. Rep. 466.

[5] Doe *v.* Davis, 1 Esp. R. 358; Baron *v.* Abeel, 3 Johns. 481; Symonds

under proper averments, the amount of any injury done to the premises, in consequence of the misconduct of the defendant or his servants, and any *extra damages* which the circumstances of the case may demand.[1]

§ 337. The defendant, in this action for mesne profits, if he has in good faith made *lasting improvements* on the land, may be allowed the value of them, against the rents and profits claimed by the plaintiff.[2] But he cannot set up any matter in defence, which would have been a bar to the action of ejectment.[3] Nor is bankruptcy a good plea in bar of this action;[4] unless the case is such that the damages were capable of precise computation, without the intervention of a Jury, and might have been proved under the commission.[5]

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v. Page, 1 C. & J. 29; Doe *v.* Hare, 4 Tyrwh. 29. For the defendant was but nominal, in the ejectment. Anon. Lofft, 451.

[1] Goodtitle *v.* Tombs, 3 Wils. 118, 121; Adams on Eject. 337; Dewey *v.* Osborn, 4 Cowen, 329; Dunn *v.* Large, 3 Doug. 335. In *Maryland*, the action for mesne profits is only for the use and occupation, and is no bar to an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, for any other injuries done to the premises during the same period. Gill *v.* Cole, 1 Har. & J. 403.

[2] Jackson *v.* Loomis, 4 Cowen, 168; Hylton *v.* Brown, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 165; Cawdor *v.* Lewis, 1 Y. & C. 427. But see Russell *v.* Blake, 2 Pick. 505.

[3] Baron *v.* Abeel, 3 Johns. 481; Jackson *v.* Randall, 11 Johns. 405; Benson *v.* Matsdorf, 2 Johns. 369.

[4] Goodtitle *v.* North, 2 Doug. 584.

[5] Utterson *v.* Vernon, 3 T. R. 539.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

§ 338. The evidence, under this title, relates to the official character of the parties, and to the cases and manner in which it must be proved. Where the executor or administrator is plaintiff, and sues upon a contract made with the testator, or for any other cause of action accruing in his lifetime, he makes *profert* of the letters testamentary, or of the letters of administration;[1] for he must declare in that character, in order to entitle himself upon the record, to recover judgment for such a cause; and if the defendant would controvert the representative character of the plaintiff, in such case, by reason of any extrinsic matter, not appearing on the face of the letters, such as the want of *bona notabilia*, or the like, he must put it in issue by a plea in abatement, or, as it seems, by a plea in bar;[2] and cannot contest it under the general issue, this being a conclusive admission of the plaintiff's title to the character in which he sues.[3] But in regard to causes of action accruing subsequent to the decease of the testator or intestate, such as in trover, for a subsequent conversion of his goods, or in assumpsit, for his money subsequently received by the defendant, and the like, though it is

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[1] 1 Chitty on Plead. 420. The practice in the United States, in this respect is not uniform; the profert, in some of the States, being omitted. Langdon *v.* Potter, 11 Mass. 313; Champlin *v.* Tilley, 3 Day, 305; Amer. Prec. Decl. p. 91. The rule, requiring profert of letters testamentary, is itself an exception from the general rule, that profert is required of deeds only. Gould on Pleading, p. 442, § 43.

[2] Langdon *v.* Potter, 11 Mass. 313, 316; 1 Chitty on Plead. 489, [358]; 1 Saund. 274, note (3), by Williams.

[3] Loyd *v.* Finlayson, 2 Esp. 564; Marshfield *v.* Marsh, 2 Ld. Raym. 824; Gidley *v.* Williams, 1 Salk. 37, 38; 5 Com. Dig. tit. Pleader, 2 D. 10, 14; Watson *v.* King, 4 Campb. 272; Stokes *v.* Bate, 5 B. & C. 491; Yeomans *v.* Bradshaw, Carth. 373; Hilliard *v.* Cox, 1 Salk. 37.

always proper for the plaintiff to sue in his representative character, wherever the money, when recovered, will be assets in his hands, yet it is not always necessary that he should do so. For where the action is upon a personal contract made with himself, respecting the property of the deceased, or is for a violation of his actual possession of the assets, he may sue either in his private or in his representative capacity.[1] But in other cases, where the cause of action accrued in his own time, he must sue in his representative capacity, and must prove this character, under the general issue, which raises the question of title.[2]

§ 339. The *proof* of the plaintiff's *representative character*, is made by producing the probate of the will, or the letters of administration, which, *primâ facie*, are sufficient evidence for the plaintiff, both of the death of the testator or intestate, and of his own right to sue.[3] Where an oath of office and the giving of bonds, are made essential, by statute, to his right to act, these also must be proved. The *probate* itself is the only legitimate ground of the executors right to sue for the personalty; and is conclusive evidence, both of his appointment, and of the contents of the will; and if granted at any time previous to the declaration, it is sufficient, for the probate relates back to the death of the testator.[4] The

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[1] Hunt *v.* Stevens, 3 Taunt. 113, 115; Hollis *v.* Smith, 10 East, 293; Blackham's case, 1 Salk. 290; 2 Saund. 47 *c*, note by Williams; Heath *v.* Chilton, 12 M. & W. 632. The allegation of his representative character, in these two cases, will be regarded as surplusage, and need not be proved. Crawford *v.* Whittal, 1 Doug. 4, n. See also Powley *v.* Newton, 6 Taunt. 453, 457; Clark *v.* Hougham, 2 B. & C. 149.

[2] Smith *v.* Barrow, 2 T. R. 476, 477, per Ashhurst, J.; Crawford *v.* Whittal, 1 Doug. 4, note (1); Hunt *v.* Stevens, 3 Taunt. 113.

[3] In an action on a promissory note made payable "to the executors of the late W. B.," it was held necessary for the plaintiffs to produce both the probate of the will and the grant of administration annexed to it. Hamilton *v.* Aston, 1 C. & K. 679, per Rolfe, B.

[4] Smith *v.* Milles, 1 T. R. 475, 480; Woolley *v.* Clark, 5 B. & Ald. 744; Wankford *v.* Wankford, 1 Salk. 299, 301, 306, 307; Loyd *v.* Finlayson, 2 Esp. R. 564; 1 Com. Dig. 340, 341, tit. Administration, B. 9, 10; Dublin

same principle governs in the case of an administrator; whose title, though it does not exist until the grant of administration, relates back to the time of the death of the intestate, so as to enable him to maintain an action for an injury to the goods of the intestate, or for the price, if they have been sold by one who had been his agent.[1] But the defendant may show that the probate itself, or the letter of administration, is a forgery;[2] or that it was utterly void, for want of jurisdiction over the subject, by the Court which granted it;[3] whether because the person was still living, or because he had no domicil within the jurisdiction of the Court, where this is essential;[4] or for any other sufficient cause.

§ 340. The plaintiff's character as *administrator* may also be shown by an exemplified copy of the record of the grant of the letters, or by a copy of the book of Acts or original minutes of the grant, as has already been stated.[5] If letters of administration have been granted to the wrong person, they are only voidable, and liable to be repealed; but if granted by the wrong Court, they are void.

§ 341. Where the plaintiff is bound to prove his representative character of executor, under the general issue, as part of his title to sue, and it appears that there are *several executors*, some of whom have not joined in the suit, it is fatal, though all have not proved the will; unless they have renounced the trust.[6] And where the plaintiff sues as administrator *de bonis non*, it is sufficient to prove the grant

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v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433. The probate will be presumed to have been rightly made. Brown *v.* Wood, 17 Mass. 68, 72; Ante, Vol. 1, § 550.

[1] Foster *v.* Bates, 12 M. & W. 226; Tharpe *v.* Stallwood, 6 Scott, N. R. 715.

[2] Bull. N. P. 247; Chichester *v.* Phillips, T. Raym. 405.

[3] Bull. N. P. 143, 247; Noell *v.* Wells, 1 Lev. 235, 236.

[4] Harvard College *v.* Gore, 5 Pick. 370.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 519.

[6] Munt *v.* Stokes, 4 T. R. 565, per Buller, J.

of administration to himself, which recites the letters granted to the preceding administrator, without other proof of the latter.[1]

§ 342. If the action is upon promises made to the deceased, to which the *statute of limitations* is pleaded, the declaration, according to the English practice, will not be supported by evidence of a new promise made to the executor or administrator; but in the American Courts this rule is not universally recognized; and where the plea is *actio non accrevit infra sex annos*, the weight of argument seems in favor of admitting the evidence.[2] In both countries, leave will be granted to amend the declaration, by adding a new count on a promise to the executor.

§ 343. If the *defendant* is sued as *executor*, his representative character may be shown, either by the evidence already mentioned as proof of that character in the plaintiff,[3] or, by

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[1] Catherwood *v.* Chabaud, 1 B. & C. 155.

[2] 2 Saund. 63, f. g. note, by Williams. In Green (or Dean) *v.* Crane, 2 Ld. Raym. 1101, 6 Mod. 309, 1 Salk. 28, which is the leading case on this subject, the plea was *non assumpsit infra sex annos*, and to this issue, it was held that the evidence of a new promise to the executor would not apply. So, in Hickman *v.* Walker, Willes, 27. In Sarell *v.* Wine, 3 East, 409, Jones *v.* Moore, 5 Binn. 573, and Beard *v.* Cowman, 3 Har. & McHen. 152, the form of the issue is not stated. In Fisher *v.* Duncan, 1 Hen. & Munf. 563, and in Quarles *v.* Littlepage, 2 Hen. & Munf. 401, the action was against the executor; and the point in question was therefore not before the Court. On the other hand, in Heylin *v.* Hastings, Carth. 470, it was held, upon the issue of *non assumpsit infra sex annos*, that evidence of a new promise to the executor within six years was admissible, as well as sufficient to take the case out of the statute. And such also is the practice in Massachusetts, and in Maine. Baxter *v.* Penniman, 8 Mass. 133, 134; Emerson *v.* Thompson, 16 Mass. 428; Brown *v.* Anderson, 13 Mass. 201; Sullivan *v.* Holker, 15 Mass. 374. Where the issue is *actio non accrevit infra sex annos*, the technical reason for not admitting evidence of an acknowledgment or promise to the executor, entirely fails; and indeed, in any case, a promise to the executor amounts only to an admission, that the debt, due to the testator, has never been paid, but is still subsisting, and therefore is not barred by the statute of limitations. See 5 Binn. 582, 583, per Brackenridge, J.; Angell on Limitations, p. 278.

[3] After notice to produce the probate of the will, an office copy, and an

proof of such acts of intermeddling in the estate, as estop him to deny the title, constituting him what is termed an executor *de son tort.* Very slight acts of intermeddling have formerly been held sufficient for this purpose ; but the material fact for the Jury to find, is, that the party has intruded himself into the office of executor ; and this may well be inferred from such acts as are lawful for an executor alone to do, such as taking and claiming possession of the goods of the deceased, or selling them, or converting them to his own use ; collecting, releasing, or paying debts ; paying legacies ; or any other acts, evincing a claim of right to dispose of the effects of the deceased. But if the acts of intermeddling appear to have been done in kindness, merely for the preservation of the goods or property, or for the sake of decency or charity, such as, in the burial of the dead, or the immediate support and care of his children, or in the feeding and care of his cattle ; or, as the servant of one having the actual custody of the goods, and in ignorance of his title ; or, in execution of orders received from the deceased as his agent, in favor of the vested rights of a third person ; or the like ; the party will not thereby be involved in the responsibilities of an executorship.[1] So, if he, in good faith sets up a colorable title to the possession of the goods of the deceased, though he may not be able to establish it as a completely legal title in every respect, he will not be deemed an executor *de son tort.*[2] And in all these cases the question, whether the party

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extract from the Act-book, have been held admissible, without proof that the probate was in the defendant's possession, or of the signature of the registrar. Waite *v.* Gale, 9 Jur. 782.

[1] Williams on Executors, p. 136 – 146 ; 1 Dane's Abr. ch. 29, art. 6 ; Givers *v.* Higgins, 4 McCord, 286 ; Toller on Ex'rs, p. 37 – 41. But if the agent after the decease of his principal, continues to deal with the property on his own responsibility, or as the agent of another, he may be charged as executor. Cottle *v.* Aldrich, 4 M. & S. 175 ; 1 Stark. 37, S. C. ; Turner *v.* Child, 1 Dever. 331. See also Mitchell *v.* Lunt, 4 Mass. 654, 658 ; Hobby *v.* Ruel, 1 C. & K. 716. So, if the agent continues to act as such, after the death of his principal, and in the belief that he is still alive, he has been held liable to a creditor of the deceased, as executor *de son tort.* White *v.* Maun, 13 Shepl. 361.

[2] Femings *v.* Jarratt, 1 Esp. 335 ; Turner *v.* Child, 1 Dever. 25. The

is chargeable as executor *de son tort*, is a mixed question of law and fact, similar to the question of probable cause, in an action for a malicious prosecution ; the province of the Jury being only to say whether the facts are sufficiently proved.[1]

§ 344. If the defendant would controvert the fact of the representative character, this is done by the plea of *ne unques* executor, or, administrator; in which case the burden of proving the affirmative is on the plaintiff; who must prove, not only the appointment of the defendant to that office, but that he has taken upon himself the trust; and this may be by his proving the will, or taking the oaths, and giving bond, or, if he is charged as executor *de son tort*, by proving acts of intermeddling with the estate. The plaintiff should always take the precaution, where this plea is pleaded to serve the defendant with notice to produce the letters testamentary, or letters of administration, at the trial, they being presumed to be in his possession ; in order to lay a foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.[2] He must also give some evidence of the identity of the party, with the person described in the letters as executor or administrator. If the evidence shows the defendant liable as an executor *de son tort*, by intermeddling, he may discharge himself by proof that he delivered the goods over to the rightful executor before action brought, but not afterwards ;[3] or, that he subsequently took out letters of administration, and has administered the estate according to law.[4] If he has received the

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party who knowingly receives goods from an executor *de son tort*, and deals with them as his own, does not himself thereby become an executor *de son tort*. Paull *v.* Simpson, 9 Ad. & El. 365, N. S.

[1] Padget *v.* Priest, 2 T. R 99, per Buller, J.

[2] 2 Saund. on Plead. & Evid. 511, 512 ; 2 Stark. Evid. 320 ; Douglas *v.* Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, 704 ; Atkins *v.* Tredgold, 2 B. & C. 23, 30 ; Cottle *v.* Aldrich, 4 M. & S. 175. *Sed quære* as to this presumption, and see Waite *v.* Gale, 2 Dowl. & Lowndes, 925 ; 9 Jur. 782.

[3] Curtis *v.* Vernon, 3 T. R. 587 ; Vernon *v.* Curtis, 2 H. Bl. 18 ; Andrews *v.* Gallison, 15 Mass. 325.

[4] Shillaber *v.* Wyman, 15 Mass. 322 ; Andrews *v.* Gallison, Ibid. 325.

money of third persons, *assumpsit* for money had and received will lie against him, without declaring against him as executor.[1]

§ 345. By pleading *ne unques executor*, the defendant, if the issue is found against him, will be charged with the whole debt;[2] without being allowed to retain the amount of a debt due from the deceased to himself, even if it is of a higher nature, and he has the assent of the rightful executor, after action brought.[3] But an executor *de son tort* is, in general, liable to creditors only for the amount of the assets in his hands at the time of the action; and, therefore, if he pleads *plene administravit*, he may give in evidence payment of the just debts of the deceased, to any creditors in the same or a superior degree;[4] or, as we have just seen, he may show that, before action brought, he had delivered over the goods in his hands, to the rightful executor or administrator.[5]

§ 346. If the plaintiff traverses the plea of *plene administravit*, in its material allegation of the want of assets in the defendant's hands, the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff, to show that the defendant had assets in his hands at the commencement of the action.[6] If the assets have come to his hands since the pendency of the suit, this should be specially replied, or the proof will not be admissible.[7] If the action is

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1 Waite *v.* Gale, 9 Jur. 782; 2 Dowl. & L. 925.

2 Anon. Cro. El. 472; Mitchell *v.* Lunt, 4 Mass. 658; Hob. 49 *b*, note by Williams; Bull. N. P. 144.

3 Ireland *v.* Coalter, Cro. El. 630; Curtis *v.* Vernon, 3 T. R. 587; 2 H. Bl. 18.

4 Mountford *v.* Gibson, 4 East, 441, 445; Toller, Ex'rs, p. 474. And it seems that he may make his defence even against the rightful administrator. Weeks *v.* Gibbs, 9 Mass. 74, 77.

5 Anon. 1 Salk. 313; Hob. 49 *b*, note by Williams; Curtis *v.* Vernon, 3 T. R. 587; Vernon *v.* Curtis, 2 H. Bl. 18; Andrews *v.* Gallison, 15 Mass. 325.

6 Bentley *v.* Bentley, 7 Cowen, 701. And see Fowler *v.* Sharp, 15 Johns. 323; 2 Phil. Evid. 366, (Cowen & Hill's edit.)

7 Mara *v.* Quin, 6 T. R. 1, 10, 11.

debt, the plea of *plene administravit* is an admission of the whole debt, which therefore the plaintiff will not be bound to prove; but if the action is *assumpsit*, this plea is only an admission that something is due, but not the amount; and therefore the plaintiff must come prepared to prove it.[1]

§ 347. The fact of *assets* in the hands of a defendant executor or administrator, may be shown by the inventory returned by him under oath, pursuant to law; which devolves on him the burden of discharging himself from the items which it contains.[2] So, if he has repeatedly paid interest on a bond, or on a legacy, this is *primâ facie* evidence of assets.[3] So, if he has given his own promissory note for a debt of the deceased.[4] So, if he has submitted to arbitration, without protesting at the time against its being so taken.[5] So, if he confess judgment, or suffer it to go by default, or it be rendered against him on demurrer to the declaration; or, if he plead a judgment, without averring that he has no assets *ultra;* or plead payment without also pleading *plene admin-*

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[1] Bull. N. P. 140; Saunderson *v.* Nicholl, 1 Show. 81; Shelley's case, 1 Salk. 296.

[2] Weeks *v.* Gibbs, 9 Mass. 74; Bull. N. P. 142, 143; Hickey *v.* Hayter, 1 Esp. 313; 6 T. R. 384, S. C.; Giles *v.* Dyson, 1 Stark. 32. But the schedule or inventory, offered by the executor in the Ecclesiastical Court, for the purpose of obtaining probate, is not generally any evidence that he has received the effects therein mentioned. Stearn *v.* Mills, 4 B. & Ad. 657.

[3] Corporation of Clergymen's Sons *v.* Swainson, 1 Ves. 75; Cleverly *v.* Brett, 5 T. R. 8, n.; Campbell's case, Lofft, 68; Atto. Gen. *v.* Higham, 2 Y. & C. 634. But it is not conclusive. Savage *v.* Lane, 6 Hare, 32; 17 Law J. 89, Chan.; Postlethwaite *v.* Mounsey, 6 Hare, 33, n. Whether the probate stamp on a will is admissible, in England, as *primâ facie* evidence of assets in the hands of the executor to the amount indicated by the stamp, is not clearly agreed. See Foster *v.* Blakelock, 5 B. & C. 328; Curtis *v.* Hunt, 1 C. & P. 180; Stearn *v.* Mills, 4 B. & Ad. 657; Mann *v.* Lang, 3 Ad. & El. 699.

[4] Bank of Troy *v.* Hopping, 13 Wend. 577; Holland *v.* Clark, 2 Y. & C. 319.

[5] Barry *v.* Rush, 1 T. R. 691; Worthington *v.* Barlow, 7 T. R. 453; Riddle *v.* Sutton, 5 Bing. 200. But see Pearson *v.* Henry, 5 T. R. 5. *contra.*

istravit; this is an admission of assets, and may be used against him in a subsequent action on the judgment, suggesting a *devastavit.*[1] But an award in favor of the estate is no evidence that the executor has received the money;[2] nor is a judgment assets, until the amount is levied and paid.[3] And if there are several executors, and some are shown to have assets in their hands, and others are not, the latter will be entitled to a verdict.[4]

§ 347 *a.* A *devastavit* may be proved by evidence of any act of direct abuse, by the executor or administrator, of the funds intrusted to his management, such as, selling, embezzling, or converting them to his own use; or by releasing a claim without payment, or selling property below its known value; or by improperly submitting a claim to arbitration, or improperly compounding a debt, having no authority by law so to do; or, by payment of usury; or the like; or by proof of any other act, showing mal-administration or negligence, whereby a loss or deterioration of assets has ensued.[5]

§ 348. Under the issue of *plene administravit*, the defendant may *rebut the proof of assets*, by showing that he has exhausted them in the payment of other debts of the deceased, not inferior in degree to that of the plaintiff, before the commencement of the action.[6] And if debts of an inferior

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[1] Skelton *v.* Hawling, 1 Wils. 258; 1 Saund. 219, note (8), by Williams; Roberts *v.* Wood, 3 Dowl. P. C. 797; Ewing *v.* Peters, 3 T. R. 685; Rock *v.* Layton, 1 Ld. Raym. 589; better reported in 3 T. R. 690–694, from Ld. Holt's own notes.

[2] Williams *v.* Innes, 1 Campb. 364.

[3] Jenkins *v.* Plume, 1 Salk. 207.

[4] Parsons *v.* Hancock, 1 M. & Malk. 330.

[5] See Toller, Ex. b. 3, ch. ix.; 3 Bac. Abr. tit. Executors and Administrators, L.; 2 Kent, Comm. 416, notes (a), (a), 5th edit. And see Cooper *v.* Taylor, 8 Jur. 450; Stroud *v.* Dandridge, 1 C. & K. 445.

[6] 6 T. R. 388, per Lawrence, J.; Smedley *v.* Hill, 2 W. Bl. 1105. In the United States, provision is made by statutes, for the settlement of insolvent estates, by a liquidation of all the claims, and a *pro rata* distribution of the assets. The application of the plea of *plene administravit*, to such cases, is thus stated by Mr. Justice Story. "It does not appear to me, that upon

degree have been paid before the commencement of the action, or if debts of a superior degree have been paid while the action was pending, this also may be shown under a special plea; but in the former case, it must be averred and proved that the payment was made without notice of the plaintiff's claim.[1] By the Common Law, an executor or

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principle any special plea of *plene administravit* is necessary, where the assets have been in fact paid according to the directions of the statute of insolvency; for if the assets are rightfully applied, the mode is matter of evidence and not of pleading. A special *plene administravit* can only be necessary, where the administrator either admits assets to a limited extent, or he sets up a right of retainer for the payment of other debts, to which they are legally appropriated, or he has paid debts of an inferior nature, without notice of the plaintiff's claim. And so is the doctrine of the Common Law, according to the better authorities. In the next place, it seems to me, that there may be cases, where the estate may be insolvent, and yet the administrator would not be bound to procure a commission, and proceed under the statute of insolvency. If, for example, the assets were less than the privileged or priority debts, a commission of insolvency would be utterly useless to the other creditors; and surely the law would not force the administrator to nugatory acts. In such a case it seems to me, that a general *plene administravit* would be good, if the administrator had in fact applied the assets in discharge of such debts. If he had not so applied them, then he might specially plead these debts and no assets ultra. Other cases may be put of an analogous nature; and unless some stubborn authority could be shown, founded in our local jurisprudence (and none such has been produced), I should not be bold enough to overrule what I consider a most salutary doctrine of the Common Law. Judgments, bonds, and some other debts at the Common Law are privileged debts, and are entitled to a priority of payment. And yet, if the administrator have no notice, either actual or constructive, of such privileged debts, he will be justified in paying debts of an inferior nature, provided a reasonable time has elapsed after the decease of the intestate. And in principle there cannot be any just distinction, whether such payment be voluntary or compulsive. But in such case, if he be afterwards sued for such privileged debt, he cannot plead *plene administravit* generally, but is bound to aver, that he had fully administered before notice of such debt." United States *v.* Hoar, 2 Mason, 317, 318.

[1] Sawyer *v.* Mercer, 1 T. R. 690; Anon. 1 Salk. 153; Toller, Ex'r, 269. But where the executor, more than a year after the decease of the testator, had paid all the debts and legacies, and paid over the remainder of the estate to the residuary legatee, without notice of any other claim, this was held admissible and sufficient, under the plea of *plene administravit*. Gov. &c. of Chelsea Water-Works *v.* Cowper, 1 Esp. 275, per Ld. Kenyon.

administrator will be presumed to have notice of judgments of a court of record, and of all other debts of record; but of other debts, actual notice must be proved.[1] Where *plene administravit* is pleaded to an action of debt on bond, the defendant must prove that the debts paid were due by bonds sealed and delivered, or, that they were of higher degree, and entitled to priority of payment; but where this issue arises in an action for a debt due by simple contract, it is sufficient to prove the prior payment of a debt of any sort, without proof of the instrument by which it was secured; for it is a good payment, in the course of administration.[2] In either case, the creditor is a competent witness, to prove both the existence of his debt, and the payment of the money;[3] but where the debt is said to have been due by bond, which has been destroyed, it has been thought that the attesting witnesses, or some other evidence of the existence of the bond ought to be produced.[4]

§ 349. Under this issue, the defendant, by the Common Law, may in certain cases give in evidence a *retainer* of assets to the amount of a debt of the same or a higher degree, due to himself;[5] or, to the amount of the expenses of administration, for which he has made himself personally responsible;[6] or, to the amount of debts of the same or a higher degree, which he has paid, out of his own money, before the commencement of the action.[7] But if the payment was made to a co-executor, to be paid over to the plaintiff, which he has not done, it is no defence; the receiver being in that

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1 1 Com. Dig. 352, tit. Administration, C. 2; Dyer, 32, a. By statute 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 20, all judgments not docketed, or abstracted and entered in a book kept for that purpose, are reduced to the footing of simple contract debts. Hickey *v.* Hayter, 6 T. R. 384; Toller, Ex'r, 268.

2 Bull. N. P. 143; Saunderson *v.* Nicholl, 1 Show. 81.

3 Bull. N. P. 143; Kingston *v.* Gray, 1 Ld. Raym. 745.

4 Gillies *v.* Smither, 2 Stark. 528; Ante, Vol. 1, § 84, note 2, ad calc.

5 Bull. N. P. 140, 141; Co. Litt. 283 *a;* Plumer *v.* Marchant, 3 Burr. 1380; 1 Saund. 333, note (6), by Williams.

6 Gillies *v.* Smither, 2 Stark. 528.

7 Bull. N. P. 140; Smedley *v.* Hill, 2 W. Bl. 1105.

case made the agent of the defendant himself, and not of the plaintiff.[1] But in most of the United States, the right of an executor or administrator to retain for a debt due to himself, or for moneys which he has paid for expenses of administration, has been qualified by statutes, not necessary here to be stated; so that, ordinarily, he cannot retain for his own debt, until it has been proved and allowed in the Court where the estate is settled, and then only under its decree, upon the settlement and allowance of his account of administration.

§ 350. In order to sustain the claim of *retainer*, it is necessary for the party to show that he has been rightfully constituted executor or administrator; and for this cause, as well as to prevent strife among creditors, an *executor de son tort* cannot retain for his own debt, even though it be of higher degree, unless he has since duly received letters of administration. But under the plea of *plene administravit*, he may show that he has paid other debts, in their order; or that, before action brought, he had delivered all the assets in his hands to the rightful executor or administrator.[2]

§ 351. If the defendant would give in evidence the existence of outstanding *debts of a higher nature*, entitled on that account to be preferred, but not yet paid, he can do this only under a special plea. If the debts are due by obligations already forfeited, the penalties are ordinarily to be taken as the amount of the debts; unless, by a proper replication, it is made to appear that the penalty is kept on foot by fraud. But if the obligation is not yet forfeited, the sum in the condition is to be regarded as the true debt, and assets can be retained only to that amount; for the executor, by payment of this sum, may save the penalty; and if he does not, it will be a *devastavit*.[3] In these cases, when the defendant

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[1] Crosse *v.* Smith, 7 East, 246, 258.

[2] Bull. N. P. 143; Chitty's Prec. p. 301; Curtis *v.* Vernon, 3 T. R. 587, 590; Anon. 1 Salk. 313; Oxenham *v.* Clapp, 2 B. & Ad. 309.

[3] United States *v.* Hoar, 2 Mason, 311; Bull. N. P. 141; 1 Saund.

seeks to retain the assets in his hands to meet debts of a higher nature, whether by bond or judgment, though the plea, in point of form, contains an averment of the precise value of the goods in his hands, yet the substance of the issue is, that the value of the goods, whatever it be, is not greater than the amount actually due on the bond or judgment.[1] And where an outstanding judgment is pleaded, with a replication of *per fraudem*, the judgment creditor is not a competent witness for the defendant to disprove the fraud.[2] If several judgments or debts are pleaded, and the plea is falsified as to any of them, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover.[3]

§ 352. Where there are *several* executors or administrators, an *admission by one of them* that the debt is still due, is held not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against the others; though it may be properly admissible, as a link in the chain of testimony against them.[4] Nor is such admission by one, sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations as to all.[5]

333, n. (7), (8), by Williams; Ib. 334, n. (9); Parker *v.* Atfield, 1 Salk. 311. If a bond creditor, after forfeiture, would have taken less than the penalty, and the executor had assets to the amount required, which he did not pay, it is evidence of fraud. Ibid. And if a judgment is confessed for more than is actually due, this is *primâ facie* evidence of fraud; but the defendant may rebut it by proof that it was done by mistake. Pease *v.* Naylor, 5 T. R. 80.

[1] Moon *v.* Andrews, Hob. 133; 1 Saund. 333, n. (7), by Williams.

[2] Campion *v.* Bentley, 1 Esp. 343.

[3] Ibid.; Bull. N. P. 142; Parker *v.* Atfield, 1 Salk. 311; 1 Ld. Raym. 678. But see 1 Saund. 347, n. (1), by Williams.

[4] James *v.* Hackley, 15 Johns. 277; Forsyth *v.* Ganson, 5 Wend. 558; Hammon *v.* Huntley, 4 Cowen, 493.

[5] Tullock *v.* Dunn, Ry. & M. 416; Ante, Vol. 1, § 176. But see Hammon *v.* Huntley, 4 Cowen, 493.

HEIR.

§ 353. The rules of evidence, applicable to the proof of *pedigree* in general, having been considered in the preceding volume,[1] the present title will be confined to the evidence of heirship, where this fact is particularly put in issue, as the foundation of a claim of right, or of liability.

§ 354. Where A. claims as the heir of B., it will be necessary to establish, first, affirmatively, their relationship through a common ancestor; and secondly, negatively, that no other descendant from the same ancestor exists, to impede the descent to A. Thus, in ejectment, where it was incumbent on the lessor of the plaintiff to prove that a younger brother of the person last seised, from whom he deduced his title, was dead, without issue, the testimony of an elderly lady, a member of the family, that the younger brother had many years before gone abroad when a young man, and according to repute in the family had died abroad, and that she never had heard in the family of his having been married; this was held *primâ facie* evidence of his having died without issue.[2] But where the death only is proved in such case, without some negative proof of the existence of issue, it is not sufficient; the plaintiff being bound to remove every possibility of title in another, before he can recover against the person in possession.[3] Thus also, if it were requisite to establish the title of A., as heir at law to his cousin-german, B., it would be necessary to prove the marriage and death of their common grandparents, and of their respective parents, through whom the title was deduced; that these were the legitimate

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 103 – 107, 131 – 134.
[2] Doe *v.* Griffin, 15 East, 293.
[3] Richards *v.* Richards, 15 East, 293, note.

children of the common ancestor, and that A. and B. were also the lawful issue of their parents; with evidence to show that no other issue existed, who would take the preference to A. But in charging one as heir, general evidence of heirship will be sufficient to be adduced on the part of the plaintiff, it being a matter more peculiarly within the defendant's own knowledge.[1] Thus, if he is in possession of the property of the deceased, or has received rents from his tenants, it is to be presumed that he claims them as heir.[2]

§ 355. After a *long lapse of time* since the death of one who might have been entitled, without any adverse claim, it may be presumed that he died without issue.[3] The fact of the death of a party, but not the time of it, will be presumed after the expiration of *seven years* from the time when he was last known to be living.[4] And it may be inferred from the grant of *letters of administration* on his estate, in the absence of any controlling circumstances; since it is not the course to grant administration, without some evidence of the death.[5]

§ 356. The *liability of an heir* generally arises upon the obligation of the ancestor by deed, in which the heir is expressly bound. He is liable at Common Law, to an action of debt on the bond of his ancestor, if specially named;[6] and in England, by statute, to an action of covenant. The like remedies have also been given against devisees, by statutes. But the remedy, in effect, is rather against the lands of the obligor, in the hands of the heir, than against the person of

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 79.

[2] Derisley *v.* Custance, 4 T. R. 75.

[3] Doe *v.* Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22; 3 C. & P. 402, S. C.

[4] Doe *v.* Jesson, 6 East, 85, per Ld. Ellenborough; Ante, Vol. 1, § 41. The time of the death is to be inferred from the circumstances. Doe *v.* Nepean, 5 B. & Ad. 86; Rust *v.* Baker, 8 Sim. 443.

[5] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 550; Succession of Hamblin, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 130.

[6] Co. Lit. 209 *a.*

the heir; and it cannot be extended beyond the value of the assets descended, unless the heir, by neglecting to show the certainty of them, should render himself personally liable.[1] For if he should plead that he has nothing by descent, and the Jury should find that he has any thing, however small in amount, the plea will be falsified, and the plaintiff will be entitled to a general judgment for his entire debt; whereas if he should confess the debt, and show the amount of the assets in his hands, he will be answerable only to this amount.[2]

§ 357. In the *United States*, the entire property of the deceased, real as well as personal, constitutes a *trust fund* for the payment of his debts. The modes in which this trust is carried into effect, are various, and are usually prescribed by statutes; but in some States, the forms of remedy are left at Common Law. The general feature, that the personalty must first be resorted to, is uniformly preserved; and in several of the States, the executor or administrator is empowered by license from the Courts, after exhausting the personal assets, to enter upon and sell the real estate, whether devised or not, to an amount sufficient to discharge the debts. Ordinarily, therefore, in the first instance, the creditor must resort to the personal representative, and not to the heir, for the payment of the debt; unless the cause of action, as in the case of a covenant of warranty, not previously broken, did not accrue, until all remedy against the executor or administrator was barred by the statute of limitations.[3]

§ 358. Wherever the executor or administrator, by the statutes alluded to, is authorized to apply to the Courts for leave

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[1] 2 Saund. 7, note (4), by Williams.

[2] Ibid.; Plowd. 440; 2 Roll. Abr. 71; Buckley *v.* Nightingale, 1 Stra. 665. The plea of *non est factum*, if found against the heir, is not such a false plea as will render him liable *de bonis propriis*. 2 Saund. 7, note (4); Jackson *v.* Rosevelt, 13 Johns. 97.

[3] 4 Kent, Comm. 421, 422; Hutchinson *v.* Stiles, 3 N. Hamp. 404; Webber *v.* Webber, 6 Greenl. 127; Royce *v.* Burrell, 12 Mass. 395; Hall *v.* Bumstead, 20 Pick. 2.

to sell the land of the deceased, for the payment of his debts, the heir takes the land subject to that right and contingency; and when the land is thus sold, the title of the heir is defeated, and he has nothing by descent, and may well plead this plea in bar of an action, brought against him by a creditor, upon the bond of his ancestor.[1]

§ 359. The plea of *riens per descent* admits the obligation; but the proof of assets is incumbent on the plaintiff. And the substance of this issue is, whether the defendant had assets or not. The place, therefore, is not material to be proved; nor is it material whether the land was devised by the ancestor, or not, nor whether it was charged with the payment of debts or legacies, or not, provided the heir takes the same estate which would have descended to him without the will, its nature and quality not being altered by the devise.[2] But it is material for the plaintiff, where he declares against the defendant as the immediate heir of the obligor, to show that the assets came to the defendant as heir of the obligor, and not of another person. For where the obligor died seized of the lands, leaving issue, and the issue died without issue, whereupon the lands descended to the defendant as heir, not of the obligor, but of the obligor's son, the plea of *riens per descent* directly from the obligor, was held maintained.[3] And where the ancestor of the obligor died seised of a reversion expectant on a lease for years, leaving the obligor his heir, but no rent was paid to the obligor, the lands being supposed to have passed to a stranger by devise from the ancestor: yet it was held, that the possession of the tenant was in law the possession of the heir, and so the obligor was seised in fact, and the land became assets in the hands of his heir, whose plea of *riens per descent* from the

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[1] Covell *v.* Weston, 20 Johns. 414. And see Gibson *v.* Farley, 16 Mass. 280.

[2] Bull. N. P. 175; Allam *v.* Heber, 2 Stra. 1270.

[3] Jenks's case, Cro. Car. 151; Kellow *v.* Rowden, 3 Mod. 253; Chappel *v.* Lee, 3 Mod. 256; Duke *v.* Spring, 2 Roll. Abr. 709, pl. 62.

obligor was therefore falsified.[1] But if the intermediate heir was never seised, his successor in the same line of descent would take as heir to the obligor, who was last seised, and be liable accordingly.[2] Under this plea, by the Common Law, the heir might show that, prior to the commencement of the suit, he had in good faith aliened the lands; but this has been changed by statute.[3]

§ 360. In *proof of assets*, it will be sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the defendant is entitled, as heir, to a reversion in fee after a mortgage or lease for years; or, to a reversion expectant upon an estate tail, provided the limitation in tail has expired, and the reversion has vested in possession, in the heir. But a reversion after a mortgage in fee is not assets at law, though it is in Equity.[4] A reversion expectant upon an estate for life is also assets; but it must be pleaded specially.[5]

§ 361. Whether lands lying in a *foreign State* or country, can be regarded as assets, so as to charge the heir, is a point not perfectly clear. In one American case it has been decided that they were not. No reasons were given for the decision; but cogent arguments were urged by the learned counsel for the creditor, showing that, upon principle, as well as by analogy of law, the heir was chargeable.[6]

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1 Bushby *v.* Dixon, 3 B. & C. 298.

2 Kellow *v.* Rowden, 2 Mod. 253; 1 Show. 244, S. C.

3 2 Saund. 7, n. (4), by Williams; Bull. N. P. 175.

4 2 Saund. 7, n. (4), by Williams; Plunkett *v.* Penson, 2 Atk. 294; Bushby *v.* Dixon, 3 B. & C. 298.

5 Bull. N. P. 176; Kellow *v.* Rowden, 3 Mod. 253; Carth. 126, S. C.; Anon. Dyer, 373 b.

6 Austin *v.* Gage, 9 Mass. 395. See Dowdale's case, 6 Co. 46; Covell *v.* Weston, 20 Johns. 414. The reference in 1 Vern. 419, to Evans *v.* Ascough, Latch, 234, that lands in Ireland were assets against the heir in England, but that lands in Scotland were not, is erroneous; no such point being mentioned in that case, which was only a question of chancery jurisdiction. The mistake has arisen from a misprint of *and* for *as*.

INFANCY.

§ 362. Infancy is a personal privilege or exception, to be taken advantage of only by the person himself; and the *burden of proof* rests on him alone, even though the issue is upon a ratification of his contract, after he came of age.[1] The trial by Common Law, is either upon inspection by the Court, or, in the ordinary manner of other facts, by the Jury; but in the United States the latter course only is practised.[2]

§ 363. The *fact of the party's age* may be proved by the testimony of persons acquainted with him from his birth; or, by proof of his own *admissions;* for these are receivable, even in criminal cases, the infant being regarded as competent to confess the truth in fact, though he may lack sufficient discretion to make a valid contract.[3] An entry of his *baptism* in the Register, is not of itself proof of his *age;* but if it is shown to have been made on the information of the parents, or others similarly interested, it may be admitted as a declaration by them; and in the Ecclesiastical Courts, it is strong adminicular evidence of minority.[4] If the action

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[1] Borthwick *v.* Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648; Leader *v.* Barry, 1 Esp. 353; Jeune *v.* Ward, 2 Stark. 326.

[2] Sliver *v.* Shelback, 1 Dall. 165.

[3] Haile *v.* Lillie, 3 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 149; McCoon *v.* Smith, Ibid. 147; Mather *v.* Clark, 2 Aikens, 209. But his admissions should be weighed cautiously, with reference to his age and understanding. The State *v.* Guild, 5 Halst. 163, 189, 190.

[4] Wihen *v.* Law, 3 Stark. 63; Burghart *v.* Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690; Agg *v.* Davies, 2 Phil. 345; Jeune *v.* Ward, 2 Stark. 326; Rex *v.* Clapham, 4 C. & P. 29. In the United States, where births are required by law to be recorded, a copy of the record is usually received as sufficient evidence of the facts it recites, which it was the officer's duty to record.

is against the acceptor of a bill, the defendant upon the issue of infancy, must distinctly prove not only his real age, but also the day on which he accepted the bill; unless he is proved to have been under age at the commencement of the action; for otherwise, it does not appear that he was an infant at the time he entered into the contract, the date of the bill not being even presumptive evidence of the time of acceptance.[1]

§ 364. The defence of *infancy*, to an action of assumpsit, is *avoided* by showing either, (1.) that the consideration of the promise was *necessaries* furnished to him; or, (2.) a ratification of the contract, by a *new promise* after he came of age. Upon the issue of necessaries or not, when specially pleaded, no evidence of minority is requisite, it being admitted by the course of pleading. The burden of proving the issue of necessaries is on the plaintiff.

§ 365. *Necessaries* are such things as are useful and suitable to the party's state and condition in life, and not merely such as are requisite for bare subsistence.[2] And of this the Jury are to judge, under the advice and control of the Court.[3] Money lent to an infant, to supply himself with necessaries, is not recoverable;[4] though if the necessaries were previously specified and were actually purchased, it seems that an action for the goods, as furnished by the plaintiff through the agency

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[1] Israel *v.* Argent, 1 Chitty's Prec. 314, note (b); Blyth *v.* Archbold, Ibid.

[2] Peters *v.* Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42; Burghart *v.* Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690; Wharton *v.* Mackenzie, 5 Ad. & El. 606, 611, N. S.

[3] Ibid.; Harrison *v.* Fane, 4 Jur. 508; 1 Scott, N. R. 287; 1 M. & G. 550, S. C.; Brayshaw *v.* Eaton, 5 Bing. N. C. 231; Peters *v.* Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42; Stanton *v.* Wilson, 3 Day, 57; Beeler *v.* Young, 1 Bibb, 519. If, upon the trial of this issue, any part of the articles are proved to be necessaries, the evidence ought to be left to the Jury. Maddox *v.* Miller, 1 M. & S. 738.

[4] Probart *v.* Knouth, 2 Esp. 472, n.; Bull. N. P. 154. An infant is liable for such goods furnished to him to trade with, as were consumed as necessaries in his own family. Tuberville *v.* Whitehouse, 1 C. & P. 94.

of the infant himself, might be maintained.[1] And payments of wages to an infant, in order to purchase necessaries, have been held valid payments.[2] Regimentals for an infant member of a volunteer military company;[3] and a livery for a minor captain's servant;[4] and a horse for an infant nearly of age, advised by his physician to take exercise on horseback; have been held necessary.[5] A chronometer, ordered by a lieutenant in the navy, has been held otherwise.[6]

§ 366. The evidence of necessaries may be *rebutted* by proof that the party lived under the roof of his parent, who provided him with such things as in his judgment appeared proper;[7] or, that he had already supplied himself with the like necessaries, from another quarter;[8] or, that a competent allowance was made to him by his guardian, for his support;[9] or, that he was properly supplied by his friends.[10] It is ordinarily incumbent on the tradesman, before he trusts an infant for goods apparently necessary for him, to inquire whether competent provision has not already been made for him by

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[1] Ellis *v.* Ellis, 1 Ld. Raym. 344; 3 Salk. 197, pl. 11; 12 Mod. 197; Marlow *v.* Pitfield, 1 P. Wms. 558; Earle *v.* Peale, 1 Salk. 386; Crantz *v.* Gill, 2 Esp. 472, note (1), by Mr. Day; Randall *v.* Sweet, 1 Denio, 460, per Bronson, J. Money advanced to procure his liberation from lawful arrest on civil process, is necessary. Clarke *v.* Leslie, 5 Esp. 38. An infant widow is bound by her contract for the expenses of her husband's funeral, he having left no assets. Chapple *v.* Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252.

[2] Hedgley *v.* Holt, 4 C. & P. 104.

[3] Coates *v.* Wilson, 5 Esp. 152.

[4] Hands *v.* Slaney, 8 T. R. 578.

[5] Hart *v.* Prater, 1 Jur. 623. But generally a horse is not necessary. Rainwater *v.* Durham, 2 Nott & McC. 524.

[6] Berolles *v.* Ramsay, Holt's Cas. 77. And see Charters *v.* Bayntun, 7 C. & P. 52.

[7] Borrinsale *v.* Greville, 1 Selw. N. P. 128; Bainbridge *v.* Pickering, 2 W. Bl. 1325; Cook *v.* Deaton, 3 C. &. P. 114.

[8] Burghart *v.* Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690.

[9] Mortara *v.* Hall, 6 Sim. 465; Burghart *v.* Hall, 4 M. & W. 727.

[10] Story *v.* Pery, 4 C. & P. 526; Angell *v.* McLellan, 16 Mass. 31; Wailing *v.* Toll, 9 Johns. 141.

others ;[1] but there is no inflexible rule of law, rendering inquiries into the infant's situation and resources absolutely indispensable, as a condition precedent to the right to recover.[2] And the necessity for any inquiry, where otherwise it would be incumbent on the tradesman, may be done away by the conduct of the other parties ; as, for example, if the goods were delivered with the knowledge of the parent, and without objection from him.[3]

§ 367. Upon the issue of a subsequent ratification of the contract by a *new promise*, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, the fact of infancy being admitted by the pleadings. But proof of the promise is sufficient, without proof that the party was then of full age.[4] The contracts and acts of an infant are in general voidable, and capable of confirmation when he comes of age ; those alone being treated as absolutely void, which are certainly and in their nature prejudicial to his interest. Thus, his negotiable promissory note, though formerly considered void, is now held voidable only ;[5] and his statement of an account, is also now held capable of ratification after he comes of age.[6] There is, however, a distinction between those acts and words which are necessary to ratify an executory contract, and those which are sufficient to ratify an executed contract. In the latter case, any act, amounting to an explicit acknowledgment of liability, will operate as a ratification ; as, in the case of a purchase of land or goods, if after coming of age, he continues to hold the

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[1] Ford *v.* Fothergill, Peake's Cas. 229; 1 Esp. 211, S. C.; Cook *v.* Deaton, 3 C. & P. 114.

[2] Brayshaw *v.* Eaton, 5 Bing. N. C. 231; 7 Scott, 183, S. C.; 3 Jur. 222.

[3] Dalton *v.* Gib, 5 Bing. N. C. 198; 7 Scott, 117, S. C.; 3 Jur. 43.

[4] Hartley *v.* Wharton, 11 Ad. & El. 934; 3 P. & D. 539, S. C.; Borthwick *v.* Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648.

[5] Goodsell *v.* Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Reed *v.* Batchelder, 1 Met. 559; Lawson *v.* Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405; Fisher *v.* Jewett, 1 Berton's R. (New Bruns.) p. 35; Story on Contr. § 38; Boody *v.* McKenney, 10 Shepl. 517.

[6] Williams *v.* Moor, 11 M. & W. 256, 265. An infant's bond has been held voidable only, and not void. Hunter *v.* Agnew, 1 Fox & Smith, 15.

property and treat it as his own.[1] But in order to ratify an executory agreement made during infancy, there must be

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[1] Hubbard *v.* Cummings, 1 Greenl. 11; Lawson *v.* Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405; Dana *v.* Coombs, 6 Greenl. 89; Chitty on Contracts, p. 125, a; 1 Roll. Abr. 731, l. 45; Evelyn *v.* Chichester, 3 Burr. 1719; Tucker *v.* Moreland, 10 Peters, 75, 76; Jackson *v.* Carpenter, 11 Johns. 542; Boston Bank *v.* Chamberlain, 15 Mass. 220; Boyden *v.* Boyden, 9 Metc. 519; Armfield *v.* Tate, 7 Ired. 258; Van Dorens *v.* Everett, 2 South. 460; Boody *v.* McKenney, 10 Shepl. 517. This case was *assumpsit* upon a promissory note, given by an infant for personal property, which, after coming of age, he had sold; and he was held liable as having thereby affirmed the contract. Shepley, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, reconciled the apparently conflicting decisions upon the liability of an infant on his contracts, by reference to the different situations and circumstances in which he was placed in regard to the subject-matter; classifying them as follows: —

"1. When he has made a conveyance of real estate during infancy, and would affirm or disaffirm it, after he becomes of age. In such case the mere acquiescence for years to disaffirm it affords no proof of a ratification. There must be some positive and clear act performed for that purpose. The reason is, that by his silent acquiescence he occasions no injury to other persons, and secures no benefits or new rights to himself. There is nothing to urge him as a duty towards others to act speedily. Language, appropriate in other cases, requiring him to act within a reasonable time, would become inappropriate here. He may, therefore, after years of acquiescence, by an entry or by a conveyance of the estate to another person, disaffirm and avoid the conveyance made during his infancy. Jackson *v.* Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539; Curtis *v.* Patton, 11 S. & R. 311; Tucker *v.* Moreland, 10 Peters, 58.

"2. When during infancy he has purchased real estate or has taken a lease of it subject to the payment of a rent, or has granted a lease of it upon payment of a rent. In such cases it is obvious, when he becomes of age, that he is under a necessity, or that common justice imposes it upon him as a duty, to make his election within a reasonable time. He cannot enjoy the estate after he becomes of age for years, and then disaffirm the purchase and refuse to pay for it, or claim the consideration paid. Or thus enjoy the leased estate, and then avoid payment of the stipulated rent. Or receive rent on the lease granted, and then disaffirm the lease. When he will receive a benefit by silent acquiescence, he must make his election within a reasonable time, after he arrives at full age, or the benefits so received will be satisfactory proof of a ratification. Ketsey's case, Cro. Jac. 320; Evelyn *v.* Chichester, 3 Burr. 1765; Hubbard *v.* Cummings, 1 Greenl. 11; Dana *v.* Coombs, 6 Greenl. 89; Barnaby *v.* Barnaby, 1 Pick. 221; Kline *v.* Beebe, 6 Conn. 494. In the case of Benham *v.* Bishop, 9 Conn. 330, it appeared, that the defendant and his mother and sisters were in possession and owned land in common, and that defendant, while an infant, made his

not only an acknowledgment of liability, but an express confirmation, or new promise, voluntarily and deliberately made

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note to another sister for a conveyance to him of her undivided share of the same estate and that they continued to occupy the land in the same manner several years after he became of age; and it was decided not to amount to a ratification of the note. This case can only be regarded as correctly decided by considering the defendant as having occupied only by virtue of his own previous title as a tenant in common.

"3. When he has during his infancy sold and delivered personal property. When the contract was executed by his receiving payment, it is obvious, that he can receive no benefit by acquiescence; and it alone does not confirm the contract. When the contract remains unexecuted, and he holds a bill or note taken in payment for the property, if he should collect or receive the money due upon it, or any part of it, that would affirm the contract. Should he disaffirm the contract and reclaim the property, the bill or note would become invalid. He cannot disaffirm it until after he becomes of age. And if he then does it, there are cases, which assert, when the contract has become executed, that he must restore the consideration received. Badger *v.* Phinney, 15 Mass. R. 363; Roof *v.* Stafford, 7 Cowen, 179.

"4. When he has purchased and received personal property during infancy. When the contract has been executed by a payment of the price, if he would disaffirm it, he should restore the property received. When the contract remains unexecuted, the purchase having been made upon credit, he may avoid the contract by plea during infancy, or after he becomes of age, before he has affirmed it. It has been asserted in such case, that he should be held to refund the consideration received for the contract avoided. Reeve's Dom. Rel. 243. He admits, however, that the current of English authorities is otherwise. If he had received property during infancy, and had spent, consumed, wasted, or destroyed it; to require him to restore it, or the value of it, upon avoiding the contract, would be to deprive him of the very protection, which it is the policy of the law to afford him. There might be more ground to contend for the right to reclaim specific articles remaining in his hands unchanged at the time of the avoidance of the contract. When he continues to retain the specific property, or any part of it, after he becomes of full age, it becomes his duty within a reasonable time to make his election. If such were not the rule, he might continue to use for years a valuable machine until nearly worn out, and thus derive benefit from it, and yet avoid the contract and refuse to pay for it. And when after a reasonable time he continues to enjoy the use of the property, and then sells it, or any part of it, and receives the money for it, he must be considered as having elected to affirm the contract; and he cannot afterwards avoid payment of the consideration. This, as before shown, is the well settled rule in relation to real estate purchased or leased; and the principles applied in those decisions appear to be equally applicable here. Such was the decision in Lawson *v.* Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405; Chesire *v.* Barrett, 4 McCord, 241; Dennison *v.*

by the infant, upon his coming of age, and with the knowledge that he is not legally liable. An explicit acknowledgment of indebtment, whether in terms, or by a partial payment, is not alone sufficient; for he may refuse to pay a debt which he admits to be due. But an express confirmation of the agreement, as still obligatory, is sufficient.[1] And if the promise be express, to pay when he is able, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's ability to pay, or, at least, that ostensibly he is so; but he is not bound to prove that the payment can be made without inconvenience.[2] The new promise must in all cases, be shown to have been made prior to the commencement of the action.[3]

§ 368. Infancy is no defence to an action *ex delicto;* but an action in that form cannot be maintained, where the foundation of it appears to have been a contract, which the infant has tortiously violated. Thus, if he hired a horse, which he injured by treating negligently, or by riding immoderately, the plaintiff cannot charge the infant in tort, by a mere change of the form of action, where he would not have been chargable in *assumpsit.* To such an action, the plea of infancy in bar is held good.[4] But if the contract was wholly abandoned

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Boyd, 1 Dana, 45; Delano *v.* Blake, 11 Wend. 85." See 10 Shepl. 523–526. See also 1 Hare & Wallace's Am. Leading Cases, p. 109–115, where the cases on this subject are cited and classified.

[1] Story on Contracts, § 49; Chitty on Contr. 124, (4th Am. edit.) and cases there cited; Smith *v.* Mayo, 9 Mass. 62; Ford *v.* Phillips, 1 Pick. 202; Whitney *v.* Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 461; Thrupp *v.* Fielder, 2 Esp. 628; Harmer *v.* Killing, 5 Esp. 102. By Stat. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 14, § 5, it is now necessary, in England, that the new promise or ratification be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged. And it is held, that any written instrument, signed by the party, which, if signed by a person of full age, would have amounted to an adoption of the act of a party acting as an agent, will, in the case of an infant who has attained his majority, amount to a ratification of his promise. Harris *v.* Wall, 1 Exch. R. 122. And see Hartley *v.* Wharton, 11 Ad. & El. 934.

[2] Thomson *v.* Lay, 4 Pick. 48; Cole *v.* Saxby, 3 Esp. 160. And see Davies *v.* Smith, 4 Esp. 36; Besford *v.* Saunders, 2 H. Bl. 116.

[3] Thornton *v.* Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824; 4 D. & R. 525, S. C.

[4] Jennings *v.* Rundall, 8 T. R. 337.

by the infant, as if he hire a horse to go to a certain place, and goes to a different place, or wantonly beats the animal to death, he is liable in trover or trespass.[1] On the other hand, if the action is brought in *assumpsit* but the foundation is in tort, as, for money which he has fraudulently embezzled, the plea of infancy is not a good bar.[2]

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[1] Vasse *v.* Smith, 6 Cranch, 226; Campbell *v.* Stakes, 2 Wend. 137.

[2] Bristow *v.* Eastman, 1 Esp. 172; Vasse *v.* Smith, 6 Cranch, 226. See Story on Contracts, § 45.

INSANITY.

§ 369. WHETHER lunacy, or insanity of mind, is in all cases a valid bar, *per se*, to an action on the contract of the party, has been much controverted, both in England and America. The rule, that a man shall not be permitted to stultify himself, is now entirely exploded; and the question is reduced to this, namely, whether a person *non compos mentis* can make any contract which shall bind him. This has led to a distinction, taken between contracts executed and contracts executory; and it seems now to be generally agreed, that the *executed contract* of such person is to be regarded very much like that of an infant; and that therefore, when goods have been supplied to him which were necessaries, or were suitable to his station and employment, and which were furnished under circumstances, evincing that no advantage of his mental infirmity was attempted to be taken, and which have been actually enjoyed by him, he is liable, in law as well as equity, for the value of the goods.[1] Thus, a person of unsound mind has been held liable in *assumpsit* for work and labor,[2] and for carriages, suitable to his rank and condition.[3]

§ 370. On the other hand, insanity of mind is generally admitted, as a valid bar to an action upon an *executory contract* of the party;[4] though in England it has in some cases

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[1] Chitty on Contr. 108 – 112; Story on Contr. § 23, 24, 25; Stock on Non Compotes Mentis, p. 25 – 30, and cases there cited; Thompson *v.* Leach, 3 Mod. 310; Seaver *v.* Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; Neill *v.* Morley, 9 Ves. 478; Stiles *v.* West, cited 1 Sid. 112.

[2] Brown *v.* Joddrell, 3 C. & P. 30.

[3] Baxter *v.* Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; 7 D. & R. 614, S. C.; 2 C. & P. 178, S. C.

[4] Sentance *v.* Poole, 3 C. & P. 1; Stock on Non Compotes Mentis, p. 30;

been held insufficient as a defence, *per se*, but admissible evidence to support a defence grounded upon undue advantage taken, or fraud practised upon the party, by reason of his want of common discernment.[1]

§ 371. The state and condition of mind of the party is proved like other facts, to the Jury; and evidence of the state of his mind, both before and after the act done, is admissible.[2] An *inquisition*, taken under a commission of lunacy, is admissible evidence, but not conclusive in the party's own favor.[3] It has, however, been held conclusive against other persons, subsequently dealing with the lunatic, instead of dealing with his guardian, who seek collaterally to avoid the guardian's authority, by showing that the lunatic has been restored to his reason.[4] Insanity, once proved to have existed, is presumed to continue, unless it was accidental and temporary in its nature; as, where it was occasioned by the violence of disease.[5]

§ 371 *a*. *What constitutes insanity* of mind, is a question which has been very much discussed, especially of late years; and the opinions of learned Judges seem at first view to be conflicting. But much of the apparent discrepancy may be reconciled, by adverting to the nature of the cases respectively in judgment. The degree of unsoundness or imbecility of mind sufficient to invalidate the acts of the party in

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Mitchell *v*. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Seaver *v*. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; Chitty on Contracts, p. 112; Story on Contr. § 23, 24, 25.

[1] Ibid.; Dane *v*. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P. 679.

[2] Grant *v*. Thompson, 4 Conn. R. 203. Insanity is shown by the proof of acts, declarations, and conduct, inconsistent with the character and previous habits of the party. The opinions of the witnesses, as to the sanity or insanity of the person, are not admissible, unless they are medical men, or experts. McCurry *v*. Hooper, 12 Ala. R. 823; *Ante*, Vol. 1, § 440.

[3] Faulder *v*. Silk, 3 Campb. 126; Dane *v*. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P. 679.

[4] Leonard *v*. Leonard, 14 Pick. 280; Ante, Vol. 1, § 551, 556.

[5] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 42; Hix *v*. Whittemore, 4 Met. 545; 1 Collinson on Lunacy, 55; Shelford on Lunatics, 275; Swinburne on Wills, Part II. § iii. 5, 6, 7; 1 Hal. P. C. 30.

some cases, may not suffice in others. But in regard to insanity, where there is no phrenzy or raving madness, the legal and true character of the disease is *delusion*, or, as the physicians express it, illusion or hallucination. And this insane delusion consists in a belief of facts, which no rational person would believe.[1] It is distinguished from *moral* insanity, which consists in the perversion or disordered state of the affections or moral powers of the mind, in contradistinction to the powers of the understanding or intellect. This latter state of the mind is held not sufficient to invalidate a will, unless it is accompanied by that delusion in matters of fact which is the test of legal insanity.[2]

§ 372. In *criminal cases*, in order to absolve the party from guilt, a higher degree of insanity must be shown, than would be sufficient to discharge him from the obligations of his contracts. In these cases, the rule of law is understood to be this; that "a man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. In order to be responsible, he must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty. On the contrary, although he may be laboring under partial insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its consequences, if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment,

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[1] Dew *v.* Clark, 3 Addams, Eccl. R. 79.

[2] Ibid.; Frere *v.* Peacocke, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 442, 445. And see Pritchard on Insanity in relation to Jurisprudence, p. 16, 19, 30. Commonwealth *v.* Mosler, 4 Barr, 264.

such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts. If then it is proved to the satisfaction of the Jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree, that, for the time being, it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; if so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it." [1]

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[1] See The Trial of Abner Rogers, p. 276, 277, per Shaw, C. J. The whole of this lucid exposition of the Criminal Law of Insanity, by the learned Chief Justice, was as follows: — "The great object of punishment by law is to afford security to the community against crimes, by punishing those who violate the laws; and this object is accomplished by holding out the fear of punishment, as the certain consequences of such violation. Its effect is to present to the minds of those who are tempted to commit crime, in order to some present gratification, a strong counteracting motive, in the fear of punishment.

"But this object can only be accomplished when such motive acts on an intelligent being, capable of remembering that the act about to be committed is wrong, contrary to duty, and such as in any well-ordered society would subject the offender to punishment. It might, in some respects, be more accurate to say, that the party thus acting under a temptation, must have memory and intelligence, to recollect and know that the act he is about to commit is a violation of the law of the land. But this mode of stating the rule might lead to a mistake of another kind, inasmuch as it would seem to hold up the idea, that before a man can be justly punished, it must appear that he knew that the act was contrary to the law of the land. But the law assumes that every man has knowledge of the laws prohibiting crimes; an assumption not strictly true in fact, but necessary to the security of society, and sufficiently near the truth for practical purposes. It is expressed by the well known maxim, *ignorantia legis neminem excusat*, — ignorance of the law cannot be pleaded as an excuse for crime. The law assumes the existence of the power of conscience in all persons of ordinary intelligence; a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, in reference to particular actions; a sense of duty and of right. It may also be safely assumed, that every man of ordinary intelligence knows that the laws of society are so framed and administered, as to prohibit and punish wrong acts, violations of duty towards others, by penalties in some measure adapted to the nature and aggravation of the wrong and injurious acts thus done. If therefore it hap-

§ 373. In all such cases, the Jury are to be told that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient

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pens to be true in any particular case, that a person, tempted to commit a crime, does not know that the particular act is contrary to positive law, or what precise punishment the municipal law annexes to such act; yet if the act is palpably wrong in itself, if it be manifestly injurious to the rights of another, as by destroying his life, maiming his person, taking away his property, breaking into or burning his dwelling-house, and the like, there is no injustice in assuming that every man knows that such acts are wrong, and must subject him to punishment by law; and therefore it may be assumed, for all practical purposes, and without injustice, that he knows the act is contrary to law. This is the ground upon which the rule has been usually laid down by Judges, when the question is, whether a person has sufficient mental capacity to be amenable for the commission of a crime; that he must have sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, as applied to the act he is about to commit, and to be conscious that the act is wrong; instead of saying that he must have sufficient capacity to know that it is contrary to the law of the land; because this power to distinguish between right and wrong, as applied to the particular act, — a power which every human being, who is at the same time a moral agent, and a subject of civil government, is assumed to possess, — is the medium by which the law assumes that he knows that the same act which is a violation of high moral duty, is also a violation of the law of the land. Whereas, if it were stated that a person must have sufficient mental capacity to know and understand that the act he is about committing is a violation of the law of the land, it might lead to a wrong conclusion, and raise a doubt in regard to persons ignorant of the law. There is no doubt that many a man is held responsible for crime, and that rightfully, who might not know that the act he was about committing was contrary to the law of the land, otherwise than as a moral being he knows that it is wrong, a violation of the dictates of his own natural sense of right and wrong.

"To recur, then, to what has been already stated; In order that punishment may operate by way of example, to deter others from committing criminal acts, when under temptation to do so, by presenting a strong counteracting motive, the person tempted must have memory and intelligence, to know that the act he is about to commit is wrong, to remember and understand, that if he commits the act, he will be subject to the punishment, and reason and will, to enable him to compare and choose between the supposed advantage or gratification to be obtained by the criminal act, and the immunity from punishment which he will secure by abstaining from it.

"A person, therefore, in order to be punishable by law, or in order that his punishment by law may operate as an example to deter others from committing criminal acts, under like circumstances, must have sufficient memory, intelligence, reason, and will, to enable him to distinguish between right and

degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish

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wrong, in regard to the particular act about to be done, to know and understand that it will be wrong, and that he will deserve punishment by committing it.

"This is necessary on two grounds:

"1st. To render it *just* and reasonable to inflict the punishment on the accused individual; and

"2d. To render his punishment, by way of example, of any utility to deter others in like situation from doing similar acts, by holding up a counteracting motive in the dread of punishment, which they cannot feel and comprehend."

With more immediate reference to the case, the Chief Justice proceeded as follows:

"In order to constitute a crime, a man must have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he has no will, no conscience, or controlling mental power, or if, through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not punishable for criminal acts.

"But these are extremes easily distinguished, and not to be mistaken. The difficulty lies between these extremes, in the cases of partial insanity, where the mind may be clouded and weakened, but not incapable of remembering, reasoning, and judging, or so perverted by insane delusion as to act under false impressions and influences. In these cases, the rule of law, as we understand it, is this; — [Here follows the passage already quoted in the text.]

"The character of the mental disease relied upon to excuse the accused in this case, is partial insanity, consisting of *melancholy*, accompanied by delusion. The conduct may be in many respects regular, the mind acute, and the conduct apparently governed by rules of propriety, and at the same time there may be insane delusion by which the mind is perverted. The most common of these cases is that of monomania, when the mind broods over *one idea* and cannot be reasoned out of it. This may operate as an excuse for a criminal act in one or two modes: — Either the delusion is such that the person under its influence has a real and firm belief of some fact, not true in itself, but which if it were true, would excuse his act; as where the belief is, that the party killed had an immediate design upon his life, and under that belief the insane man killed him in supposed self-defence. A common instance is where he fully believes that the act he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he acts under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior power, which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of nature: or

"2d. This state of delusion indicates to an experienced person that the mind is in a diseased state, that the known tendency of that diseased state of

a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the Jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the Jury, is not deemed so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged.[1]

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the mind, is to break out into sudden paroxysms of violence, venting itself in acts of homicide, or other violent acts towards friend or foe indiscriminately, so that although there were no previous indications of violence, yet the subsequent act, connecting itself with the previous symptoms and indications, will enable an experienced person to say, that the outbreak was of such a character, that for the time being it must have overborne memory and reason; that the act was the result of the disease, and not of a mind capable of choosing; in short, that it was the result of uncontrollable impulse, and not of a person acted upon by motives, and governed by the will." Ibid. p. 273, – 279. The test of insanity is delusion. See Freer *v.* Peacocke, 11 Jur. 247; Commonwealth *v.* Mosler, 4 Barr, 264.

[1] Per Tindal, C. J., in McNaghten's case, 10 Clark & Fin. 210. In that case, the following questions were propounded to the learned Judges, by the House of Lords: —

"1st. What is the law respecting alleged crimes, committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?

"2d. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the Jury, when a person, alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder for example,) and insanity is set up as a defence?

"3d. In what terms ought the questions to be left to the Jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?

"4th. If a person, under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused!

§ 374. In regard to *drunkenness*, it is now settled, that incapacity from that cause is a valid defence to an action upon

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"5th. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previous to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law; or whether he was laboring under any and what delusion at the time?"

The joint opinion of all the Judges, except Mr. Justice Maule, was delivered by Ld. Chief Justice Tindal, as follows: — "My Lords, Her Majesty's Judges, with the exception of Mr. Justice Maule, who has stated his opinion to your Lordships, in answering the questions proposed to them by your Lordships' House, think it right in the first place to state that they have forborne entering into any particular discussion upon these questions, from the extreme and almost insuperable difficulty of applying those answers to cases in which the facts are not brought judicially before them. The facts of each particular case must of necessity present themselves with endless variety, and with every shade of difference in each case, and it is their duty to declare the law upon each particular case on facts proved before them, and after hearing argument of counsel thereon. They deem it at once impracticable, and at the same time dangerous to the administration of justice if it were practicable, to attempt to make minute applications of the principles involved in the answers given them by your Lordships' questions; they have therefore confined their answers to the statements of that which they hold to be the law upon the abstract questions proposed by your Lordships; and as they deem it unnecessary in this particular case to deliver their opinions *seriatim*, and as all concur in the same opinion, they desire me to express such their unanimous opinion to your Lordships. In answer to the first question, assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion, that, notwithstanding the party accused did the act complained of, with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law, — by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean the law of the land. As the third and fourth questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we have to submit our opinion to be, that the Jury ought to be told, in all cases, that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that, at the time of com-

the contract of the party, made while under its influence, as well where it was voluntary and by the fault of the defendant, as where it was caused by the fraud or procurement of

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mitting the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the Jury on these occasions, has generally been, whether the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong; which mode, though rarely if ever leading to any mistake with the Jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the Jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is administered upon the principle, that every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused were conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course, therefore, has been, to leave the question to the Jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think is correct accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require. The answer to the fourth question must of course depend on the nature of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he labors under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation, as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment. In answer to the last question, we state to your Lordships, that we think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the Jury to decide; and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are admitted, or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." Ibid. p. 200 – 212.

the plaintiff.[1] In criminal cases, though *insanity*, as we have just seen, is *ordinarily an excuse*, yet an *exception* to this rule, is when the crime is committed by a party while in a fit of intoxication; the law not permitting a man to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice and misconduct, to shelter himself from the legal consequences of such crime. But the crime, to be within the exception, and therefore punishable, must take place and be the *immediate result* of the fit of intoxication, and *while it lasts*, and not the result of insanity, remotely occasioned by previous habits of gross indulgence in spirituous liquors. The law looks to the immediate and not the remote cause; to the actual state of the party, and not to the causes which remotely produced it.[2]

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[1] Chitty on Contracts, p. 112, (4th Am. ed.); Story on Contracts, § 27, and cases there cited.

[2] United States *v.* Drew, 5 Mason, R. 28, per Story, J.; 1 Russell on Crimes, p. 7, 8, (3d ed.) See Ray on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, ch. 24. In the Jurisprudence of Continental Europe, drunkenness is generally distinguished into three kinds,—(1.) *Intentional*, voluntarily induced in order to the commission of a crime while in that state,—(2.) *Culpable*, by drinking without any intention to become drunken, but where the party might easily have foreseen that he would naturally become so;—(3.) *Inculpable*, where such consequence could not easily have been foreseen, or, where the party took due precautions against any injurious effects, as, by directing his servants to confine him if he should become drunk, or, where the drunkenness was justly attributable to others, or, was the result of disease. In the first case, it is no excuse; in the second, it reduces the degree of criminality and mitigates the punishment; in the third, the liability to punishment ceases. See Professor Mittermaier's learned Treatise on the Effect of Drunkenness upon Criminal Responsibility, § vi. vii. viii. ix.

INSURANCE.

§ 375. The ordinary subjects of the contract of Insurance are, (1.) Marine Risks; (2.) Losses by fire; (3.) Lives; all which will be considered in their order.

§ 376. In an action on a policy of Insurance, whatever may be the subject, the declaration [1] contains the following

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[1] The following forms of counts, in the simplest cases arising upon marine policies, established in Massachusetts, are well adapted to the brevity of modern practice at Common Law in any of the United States:

1. On a SHIP, for a TOTAL LOSS. "In a plea of the case, for that on ——, the plaintiff was owner of the ship John, then lying in the harbor of —— aforesaid; and the said —— Company, in consideration of a premium therefor paid to them by the plaintiff, made a policy of insurance upon the said ship for a voyage from the said —— to Cadiz in Spain, and at and from said Cadiz to her port of discharge in the United States; and thereby promised to insure for the plaintiff ten thousand dollars upon the said ship for the said voyage, against the perils of the seas, and other perils in the said policy mentioned; (*a*) and the plaintiff avers that the said ship did on —— sail from said —— on the voyage described in said policy, and whilst proceeding therein, was, by the perils of the seas, wrecked and totally lost; of which the said Insurance Company, on ——, had notice, and were bound to pay the same on demand; (or in sixty days); yet they have never paid the said sum of ten thousand dollars, though requested, (or though sixty days have elapsed.) To the damage, &c."

2. Count for a PARTIAL LOSS, and for CONTRIBUTION TO A GENERAL AVERAGE. [State the plaintiff's interest, the voyage, and the insurance, as in the last precedent, to (*a*), and proceed as follows.]

"—— and the said Company did, in and by the same policy, further promise, that in case of any loss or misfortune to the said ship, it should be lawful for the plaintiff and his agents to labor for and in the defence and recovery of the said ship, and that the said Company would contribute to the charges thereof, in proportion as the said sum assured by them should be to the whole sum at risk; and the plaintiff avers, that the said ship did, on ——, sail from said —— on the voyage aforesaid; and whilst proceeding therein was, by the perils of the seas, dismasted, and otherwise damaged in her hull, rigging, and appurtenances; insomuch that it was necessary, for the preserva-

allegations, which must be proved by the plaintiff, if not admitted by the pleadings; — (1.) the Policy; (2.) the plaintiff's Interest in the subject insured, and the payment of the premium; (3.) the Inception of the Risk; (4.) the Perform-

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tion of the said ship and her cargo, to throw over a part of the said cargo; and the same was accordingly thrown over for that purpose; by means of all which, the plaintiff was obliged to expend two thousand dollars in repairing the said ship at ——, and also (*or*, and is also liable to pay) the sum of five hundred dollars as a contribution to and for the loss occasioned by the said throwing over of a part of the said cargo; and the said ship also suffered much damage that was not repaired in said Cadiz; of all which the said Company on ——, had notice, and became bound to pay the same in sixty days; yet, though said sixty days have elapsed, they have never paid the said sum of ten thousand dollars, nor any part thereof. To the damage, &c."

3. Count for a TOTAL LOSS OF CARGO BY FIRE. "In a plea of the case, for that on ——, a certain brigantine, called the William, was lying at ——, and the plaintiff was the owner of the cargo, (or of certain goods) then laden or about to be laden on board of the said vessel; and the said C. D., in consideration of a certain premium therefor paid to him by the plaintiff, made a certain policy of insurance in writing upon the said cargo, (or goods) at and from said —— to Hamburgh, or any other port or ports in the north of Europe, and at and from thence to said ——, or her port of discharge in the United States; and the said C. D. by said policy promised to insure for the plaintiff —— dollars on the said cargo (*or* goods) for the voyage aforesaid, against the perils of fire, and other perils in the said policy specified; and the plaintiff avers, that the said vessel, with the said cargo (*or* goods) on board, did on —— sail from said —— on the voyage aforesaid; and afterwards, during the said voyage, whilst the said vessel, with the said cargo on board, was lying at the port of Altona, in the north of Europe, the said cargo (or goods) was burned, and wholly destroyed by fire; of which the said C. D. on —— had notice, and became bound to pay the same in sixty days; yet he has not paid the sum of —— dollars, nor any part thereof. To the damage, &c."

4. Count for a TOTAL LOSS OF FREIGHT, BY RESTRAINT, DETAINMENT, &c. "—— for that on —— the plaintiff was interested in the freight of a vessel called the George, then bound on a voyage hereinafter described; and the said Insurance Company, in consideration of a premium therefor, paid to them by the plaintiff, made a policy of insurance upon the said freight for the voyage from —— to one or more ports beyond the Cape of Good Hope, one or more times, for the purpose of disposing of her outward, and procuring a return cargo, and at and from thence to ——, and thereby promised to insure for the plaintiff three thousand dollars upon the said freight, for the voyage aforesaid, against the perils of enemies, pirates, assailing thieves, restraints,

ance of any precedent Condition, or Warranty, contained in the policy; and (5.) the Loss, within the terms and meaning of the policy.

§ 377. And FIRST, as to MARINE INSURANCE. In an action by the assured, the *first* step in the trial is the *proof of the policy*. The instrument itself, being the best evidence, must be produced and proved; or its loss must be accounted for, and its contents proved by secondary evidence.[1] If it was signed by another person, as the agent of the defendant, his agency must be proved.[2] And proof of the signature by an agent will satisfy an allegation of signature by the defendant himself.[3] Parol evidence of what passed at the time of making the policy, is, as we have heretofore shown, inadmissible to affect the written agreement.[4] But the general usage of merchants may be shown, to explain ambiguities or define the terms of the policy, though not to contradict its plain language.[5] The general usage of trade, in the city where the insurance is effected, may also be proved for this purpose; but not the usage or practice in a particular office, or among a particular class of underwriters, where or to whom the party was not in the habit of resorting to effect insur-

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and detainments of all kings, princes, or people, of what nation or quality soever, and against other perils in the said policy mentioned; and the plaintiff avers, that the said vessel did on —— sail from said —— on the voyage aforesaid, and afterwards, during said voyage, was forcibly taken on the high seas (*or*, at the Island of Sumatra, in the Indian Ocean) by certain persons to the plaintiff unknown, and detained and prevented from performing the said voyage, and thereby the said freight was wholly lost to the plaintiff; of all which the said Insurance Company, &c."

[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 557, 558.

[2] For the proof of agency, see Ante, tit. AGENCY, § 59–67. See also Ante, Vol. 1, § 416, 417; Brockelbank *v.* Sugrue, 5 C. & P. 21. Proof of a general agency is sufficient proof of authority to effect insurance on behalf of the assured. Barlow *v.* Leckie, 4 J. B. Moore, 8.

[3] See Ante, tit. BILLS OF EXCHANGE, § 158; Nicholson *v.* Croft, 2 Burr. 1188.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 275–305.

[5] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 292–294; Robertson *v.* Money, Ry. & M. 75; Uhde *v.* Walters, 3 Campb. 16.

ance,[1] and which, therefore cannot be presumed to have been known and referred to by both parties, as the basis of the contract; for it is on this ground only that evidence of usage is admitted.[2]

§ 378. *Secondly*, as to the *proof of Interest.* The plaintiff's interest in a *ship* may be shown, *primâ facie*, by proof of possession, and acts of ownership; which may be made by the captain or other officer, or by any person having competent knowledge of the facts, without the production of any documentary evidence.[3] But whenever the title to a ship comes strictly in question, no claim can be received in opposition to the modes of conveyance required by the statutes.[4] Thus where the plaintiff claimed for a total loss as sole owner of a ship, whose *register* stood in the names of himself and another, parol evidence, offered to show that she was in fact purchased by himself, as sole owner, was held inadmissible.[5] Where the interest is derived from a *bill of sale*, this document must be produced and proved as in other cases;[6] accompanied by evidence of the registry, where this is required by statute, in order to render the other evidence admissible.[7] But the certificate of registry is not alone sufficient to prove the plaintiff's interest in the ship, without proof of some correspondent act of ownership.[8] Whether it is conclusive against the legal ownership of persons claiming title, but whose names are not found therein, seems to depend on the registry acts. In England it has been held conclusive; but

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[1] Gabay *v.* Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793; Astor *v.* Union Ins. Co. 7 Cowen, 202; Coit *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 385.

[2] Eager *v.* Atlas Ins. Co. 14 Pick. 141.

[3] Robertson *v.* French, 4 East, 130; Sutton *v.* Buck, 2 Taunt. 302; Wendover *v.* Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308; Amery *v.* Rogers, 1 Esp. 207; Thomas *v.* Foyle, 5 Esp. 88.

[4] Abbott on Shipping, p. 78, by Shee.

[5] Ohl *v.* The Eagle Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 172.

[6] Woodward *v.* Larkin, 3 Esp. 287.

[7] 4 Taunt. 657, per Gibbs, J.

[8] Pirie *v.* Anderson, 4 Taunt. 652; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 487; Flower *v.* Young, 3 Campb. 240.

in the United States, an insurable interest has been held sufficiently proved by evidence of a title at Common Law, in a plaintiff whose name did not appear in the register.[1] This document, however, is not of itself evidence to charge a defendant as owner of the ship, without proof that he sanctioned and adopted it.[2] Where the registry of a ship is required by law to be recorded in the custom-house, a certified copy of the record is, as we have seen, admissible in evidence.[3]

§ 379. It is not material, whether the interest of the assured be *legal* or *equitable*. The interest of a trustee, *cestui que trust*, mortgagor, mortgagee, and of the owner of a qualified property, or of a lien, is sufficient for this purpose. So, of a lender on bottomry; or of the borrower, so far as regards the surplus value; or, of a captor; or, of one entitled to freight, or commissions; or, of the owner, notwithstanding the charterer has covenanted either to return the ship, or pay her value.[4] And under a general averment of interest, the assured may prove any species of interest, either in the whole or in any part, and recover accordingly.[5]

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1 Camden *v.* Anderson, 5 T. R. 709; Abbott on Shipping, p. 63, n. (1), by Story, J.; Ibid. p. 34, n. (2); Bixby *v.* The Franklin Ins. Co. 8 Pick. 86; Lamb *v.* Durant, 12 Mass. 54; Taggard *v.* Loring, 16 Mass. 336; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 488; Sharp *v.* United Ins. Co. 14 Johns. 201.

2 Abbott on Shipping, p. 63, Story's edit.; Frazer *v.* Hopkins, 2 Taunt. 5; Smith *v.* Fuge, 3 Campb. 456; Sharp *v.* United Ins. Co. 14 Johns. 201.

3 Ante, Vol. 1, § 484.

4 Marshall on Ins. p. 101 – 116, 719 – 721 (3d edit.); Higginson *v.* Dall, 13 Mass. 96; Oliver *v.* Greene, 3 Mass. 133; Gordon *v.* Mass. Ins. Co. 2 Pick. 249, 259; Rider *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 259; Bartlett *v.* Walter, 13 Mass. 267; Kenny *v.* Clarkson, 1 Johns. 385; Locke *v.* N. Amer. Ins. Co. 13 Mass. 61; Strong *v.* Manuf. Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 40; Holbrook *v.* Brown, 2 Mass. 280; Smith *v.* Williams, 2 Caines, Cas. 110. The interest of a *respondentia* or bottomry creditor must be specially insured as such. Glover *v.* Black, 3 Burr. 1394; Pouverin *v.* Lousiana State Ins. Co. 4 Rob. Louis. R. 234; Putnam *v.* Mercantile Ins. Co. 5 Met. 386.

5 Marshall on Ins. p. 719, (3d edit.) See also Crowley *v.* Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478.

§ 380. The interest of the assured in the *goods*, may be proved by any of the usual mercantile documents of title, such as bills of sale; or of parcels; bills of lading, whether the holder be the shipper or the indorsee; invoices, with proof that the goods were on board; bills of charges of outfit, clearances, and the like.[1] Evidence of possession, also, and of other acts of ownership, may be received in proof of interest in the goods on board, as well as of interest in the ship.[2] And it is sufficient that the plaintiff was interested when the risk commenced, though he had no interest when the policy was effected.[3] If the defendant *pays money into Court*, this is a conclusive admission of the contract, and of the plaintiff's interest as alleged.[4]

§ 381. Where the insurance is effected by an *open policy*, the value of the plaintiff's interest must be proved *aliundè;* but if it be a *valued policy*, the policy alone is *primâ facie* evidence of the value of the property insured.[5] The usual recital in the policy, of payment of the premium, is also sufficient proof of that fact; but in the absence of such recital, the plaintiff must prove it by other evidence.[6]

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[1] Marshall on Ins. p. 718, 724, (3d edit.); Russell *v.* Boehm, 2 Str. 1127; Dickson *v.* Lodge, 1 Stark. R. 226; McAndrew *v.* Bell, 1 Esp. 373; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 489 – 491. See, as to the indorsee of a bill of lading, Newsom *v.* Thornton, 6 East, 41, per Ld. Ellenborough. But a bill of lading of the outward cargo is not sufficient proof of interest in the return cargo. Beal *v.* Pettit, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 241. Nor is a bill of lading, "contents unknown," any evidence of the quantity of goods or of property in the consignee. Haddow *v.* Parry, 3 Taunt. 303. An authenticated copy of an official report of the cargo of a ship, made pursuant to law, by an officer of the customs, is evidence of the shipment. Flint *v.* Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45, 48; Johnson *v.* Ward, 6 Esp. 47.

[2] Ante, § 378; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 489.

[3] Rhind *v.* Wilkinson, 2 Taunt. 237.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 205; Bell *v.* Ansley, 16 East, 141, 146.

[5] Marshall on Ins. p. 719, (3d edit.); 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 206 – 223, 491; Lewis *v.* Rucker, 2 Burr. 1171; Alsop *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 451.

[6] De Gaminde *v.* Pigou, 4 Taunt. 246; Dalzell *v.* Mair, 1 Campb. 532.

§ 382. *Thirdly*, as to the *Inception of the Risk.* This applies to insurance upon a voyage named, and is proved by any competent evidence, that the *ship* actually sailed, within a reasonable time, upon the voyage intended.[1] If the insurance is for one voyage, but the ship actually sails upon another, the course of both voyages being the same to a certain point, the policy is discharged, though the loss happened before the ship reached the dividing point.[2] But if the ship sails on the voyage insured, a deviation meditated, but not carried into effect, will not vitiate the policy.[3] And the sailing must be voluntary; for if the ship, before the lading is completed, be driven from her moorings by a storm, and be lost, the averment of sailing is not considered as proved.[4] The risk on *goods* does not commence until goods are put on board, at the place named;[5] but the risk on *freight* may be shown to have commenced, by evidence of a contract to put the goods on board, the performance of which was prevented by some of the perils insured against.[6] If the risk never commenced, the plaintiff, in an action upon the policy, and in the absence of fraud, may recover back the premium, upon the common counts.[7]

§ 383. *Fourthly*, as to the performance of *precedent Conditions* and compliance with *Warranties.* All express warranties, and all affirmative averments, are in the nature of conditions precedent to the plaintiff's right to recover; and

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1 Koster *v.* Inness, Ry. & M. 336; Cohen *v.* Hinckley, 2 Campb. 51.

2 Wooldridge *v.* Boydell, 1 Doug. 16; Marsden *v.* Reid, 3 East, 572; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 148; Seamans *v.* Loring, 1 Mason, 127.

3 Foster *v.* Wilmer, 2 Stra. 1249; Hare *v.* Travis, 7 B. & C. 14. See 2 Phillips on Ins. ch. xi. xii.; Marshall on Ins. p. 260, 278, (3d edit.); Lee *v.* Gray, 7 Mass. 349; Coffin *v.* Newburyport Ins. Co. 9 Mass. 436; Hobart *v.* Norton, 8 Pick. 159.

4 Abithol *v.* Bristow, 6 Taunt. 464.

5 Marshall on Ins. p. 244, 245, 278, 724, (3d edit.)

6 Flint *v.* Fleming, 1 B. & Ad. 45; Davidson *v.* Willasey, 1 M. & S. 313.

7 Penson *v.* Lee, 2 B. & P. 330; Penniman *v.* Tucker, 11 Mass. 66; Foster *v.* United States Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 85.

therefore must be strictly proved. Such are, warranties that the property is neutral; that the ship sailed at the time specified; that she departed with convoy; that she was of the force named; and the like. The first of these, namely, the *neutral character* of the property, being partly negative in its nature, is proved, *primâ facie*, by general evidence, leaving the contrary to be shown by the defendant.[1] The acts of the captain, in carrying neutral colors, and in addressing himself to the neutral consul while in port, and the like, are also admissible for the shipper, as *primâ facie* evidence of the neutral character of the ship.[2] If the warranty is that the ship shall *sail on or before a certain day*, stress of weather, or, an embargo by the order of government, is no excuse for non-compliance with the engagement.[3] It must also appear that the ship actually set forward on the voyage, in complete readiness for sea. Therefore, an attempt to sail, and proceeding a mile or two and then putting back, by reason of unfavorable weather; or, proceeding with only part of the crew, the remainder being engaged and ready to sail; or, dropping a few miles down the river; is no compliance with this warranty.[4]

§ 384. Compliance with a warranty to *sail with convoy*, may be proved by the official letters of the commander of the convoy; or, by the log-book of the convoying ship of

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[1] Marshall on Ins. p. 722, 723, (3d edit.); 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 498 - 502.

[2] Archangelo *v.* Thompson, 2 Campb. 620. And see Bernardi *v.* Motteaux, 2 Doug. 575.

[3] Nelson *v.* Salvador, 1 M. & Malk. 309; Sanderson *v.* Busher, 4 Campb. 54, n.; Hore *v.* Whitmore, Cowp. 784. If the averment is that the ship sailed after making the policy, and the proof is that she sailed before, the variance is not material, provided the averment does not arise out of the contract. Peppin *v.* Solomons, 5 T. R. 406. An embargo at the place of rendezvous of a convoy, after the ship has actually sailed from her port, saves the warranty. Earle *v.* Harris, 1 Doug. 357.

[4] Moir *v.* Royal Ex. Ass. Co. 4 Campb. 84; 6 Taunt. 241; Graham *v.* Barras, 3 N. & M. 125; 5 B. & Ad. 1011; Pettigrew *v.* Pringle, 3 B. & Ad. 514; Bowen *v.* The Hope Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 275; Robinson *v.* Manufacturing Ins. Co. 1 Met. 143.

war.[1] And where the non-performance of this warranty would have involved a breach of law, it will be *presumed* that the law has been obeyed, until the contrary has been shown.[2] *Sailing orders* are generally necessary to the performance of this warranty, if, by due diligence on the part of the master, they could have been obtained.[3] But the state of the weather is not a sufficient excuse for not joining the convoy.[4]

§ 385. *Fifthly*, as to the *Loss*. The plaintiff must also prove, that the property insured was lost, and that the loss was not remotely but *immediately caused* by one of the *perils insured against*. Whether the loss, which is proved, will satisfy the averment, is a qeustion for the Court; but the averment itself must be proved.[5] The certificate of a Vice-Consul abroad is no evidence of the amount of the loss;[6] nor is the protest of the captain admissible as original evidence of the fact of loss, though it may be read to contradict his testimony.[7] If there is no proof of the amount of the loss, the plaintiff will be entitled to nominal damages only.[8]

§ 386. The loss of a ship may be shown not only by direct proof, but by evidence of any circumstances inconsistent with the hypothesis of her safety; such as that, having sailed upon the voyage insured,[9] no intelligence has been received concerning her, either at her port of departure, or at her port of destination, both of which should be

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1 Watson *v.* King, 4 Campb. 275; D'Israeli *v.* Jowett, 1 Esp. 427.

2 Thornton *v.* Lance, 4 Campb. 231.

3 Webb *v.* Thompson, 1 B. &. P. 5; Hibbert *v.* Pigou, 3 Doug. 224; Anderson *v.* Pitcher, 2 B. & P. 164; Sanderson *v.* Busher, 4 Campb. 54 note.

4 Sanderson *v.* Busher, 4 Campb. 54, note.

5 Abitbol *v.* Bristow, 6 Taunt. 464.

6 Waldron *v.* Coombe, 3 Taunt. 162.

7 Senat *v.* Porter, 7 T. R. 158; Christian *v.* Coombe, 2 Esp. 489.

8 Tanner *v.* Bennet, Ry. & M. 182.

9 Koster *v.* Jones, Ry. & M. 333; Cohen *v.* Hinckley, 2 Camp. 51.

resorted to,[1] although a reasonable time has elapsed; in which case the Jury will be advised to presume that she foundered at sea.[2] If it has been reported, that she foundered, but that the crew were saved, yet it will not be necessary to call any of the crew.[3]

§ 387. It must be shown, that the peril insured against was the *immediate*, and not the remote *cause of the loss*. *Causa proxima non remota spectetur*. The loss must directly arise from, and not remotely be occasioned or brought about by, the peril.[4] Thus, where a peril of the sea occasioned damage to the ship, which rendered repairs necessary, and funds to provide these repairs, and in order to raise funds, the master, having no other resource, sold part of the goods on board, it was held that the underwriter on the goods was not liable as for a loss by a peril of the sea; the want of funds, and not the peril of the sea, being the immediate cause of the loss.[5] On the other hand, underwriters against perils of the sea are liable for any loss immediately arising from those perils, such as shipwreck, or collision, though it were remotely occasioned by the mismanagement, negligence, or barratry of the master or mariners;[6] or by the negligent loading of

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[1] Twemlow *v.* Oswin, 2 Campb. 85. But see Marshall on Ins. p. 25. (3d edit.)

[2] Newby *v.* Read, Park on Ins. 106; Houstman *v.* Thornton, Holt's Cas. 242; Paddock *v.* Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227.

[3] Koster *v.* Reed, 6 B. & C. 19.

[4] Marshall on Ins. 491, (3d edit.); 1 Phillips on Ins. 283 – 290; 2 Phillips on Ins. 194, 195; Peters *v.* The Warren Ins. Co. 14 Peters, R. 99; Columbian Ins. Co. *v.* Lawrence, 10 Peters, R. 507.

[5] Powell *v.* Gudgeon, 5 M. & S. 431, 437. So the extraordinary expense of provisions, occasioned by delay during the making of repairs, or during an embargo, is not recoverable against underwriters on the ship only. Marshall on Ins. 730, (3d edit.); Robertson *v.* Ewer, 1 T. R. 127. Yet a direct loss of provisions would be covered by a policy on the ship, of which they are ordinarily deemed a part. Marshall on Ins. 731; 1 Phillips on Ins. 71; 2 Phillips on Ins. 218.

[6] Walker *v.* Maitland, 5 B. & Ald. 171; Smith *v.* Scott, 4 Taunt. 126; Bishop *v.* Pentland, 7 B. & C. 214; Heyman *v.* Parish, 2 Campb. 149;

the cargo.[1] And if a ship, by stress of weather, be driven ashore upon an enemy's coast, and there captured, it is a loss by capture, as the immediate cause, and not by perils of the sea.[2]

§ 388. A loss by *capture* is proved by first showing a capture in fact, and then producing the sentence of condemnation; the latter generally not being admissible until the former is proved.[3] And if it appear, that the capture was by collusion between the master of the ship and the enemy, so that a charge of barratry might be supported, yet it is still also a loss by capture.[4] An averment of loss by capture by enemies unknown, is not supported by proof of seizure for breach of the revenue laws of a foreign government.[5] But a general averment of loss by seizure and confiscation by a foreign government, is proved by evidence of the seizure by the officers of the government, without putting in the sentence of condemnation.[6] And in the case of seizure of the goods by a foreign government for a cause not affecting the ship, the incidental and consequent detention of the ship is not prova-

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Columbian Ins. Co. *v.* Lawrence, 10 Peters, R. 507; Patapsco Ins. Co. *v.* Coulter, 3 Peters, R. 222. As to what constitutes a loss by perils of the sea, see Marshall on Ins. 487 – 494, (3d edit.); 1 Phillips on Ins. 245 – 256; 2 Phillips on Ins. 189 – 191. The exception of "perils of the river," in inland navigation, is equivalent to that of perils of the sea, in commerce on the ocean; and is held to include losses occasioned by running on hidden snags, and sawyers, and by collisions rendered inevitable by the narrowness of the channel. Eveleigh *v.* Sylvester, cited in 1 Harp. Law R. 263, 266; Charleston & Col. Boat Co. *v.* Bason, Ib. See also Gordon *v.* Little, 8 S. & R. 533; Gordon *v.* Buchanan, 5 Yerg. 71; Smyrl *v.* Niolon, 2 Bailey, 421; Williams *v.* Grant, 1 Conn. R. 487; Turner *v.* Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340.

1 Redman *v.* Wilson, 14 M. & W. 476.

2 Green *v.* Elmslie, Peake's Cas. 212.

3 Marshall *v.* Parker, 2 Camp. 69; Visger *v.* Prescott, 2 Esp. 184. Lloyd's books are evidence of a capture, though not alone proof of notice to the assured. Abel *v.* Potts, 3 Esp. 242.

4 Archangelo *v.* Thompson, 2 Campb. 620. See also Goldschmidt *v.* Whitmore, 3 Taunt. 508.

5 Matthie *v.* Potts, 3 B. & P. 23.

6 Carruthers *v.* Gray, 3 Campb. 142.

ble against the underwriters on the ship only, as a loss by capture and detention.[1]

§ 389. If the voyage was legalized or protected by a *license*, the license, if existing, must be produced and proved, and shown to apply to the voyage in question.[2] If this document is lost, it may be proved by secondary evidence, as in other cases.[3] If it was granted upon condition, the plaintiff must show, that the condition has been performed.[4] And if it was a foreign license, it is a necessary part of the secondary evidence not only to show, that the party had a paper, purporting to be such a document, but to give some circumstantial proof that it was genuine ; such as, that it was received from the hands of a proper officer, or, that it had been seen and respected by the officers of the government which issued it.[5]

§ 390. A loss by *barratry* is proved by evidence of any species of fraud, knavery, or criminal conduct, or wilful breach of duty in the master or mariners, by which the freighters or owners are injured.[6] If the master should proceed on his voyage in the face of inevitable danger of capture, it is barratry.[7] It is sufficient for the plaintiff, in proof of barratry by the master, to prove that the misconduct was that of the person, who acted as master, and was in fact treated as such,

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[1] Bradford *v.* Levy, 2 C. & P. 137; Ry. & M. 331.

[2] Barlow *v.* McIntosh, 12 East, 311.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 84, 509, 560, 575; Rhind *v.* Wilkinson, 2 Taunt. 237; Kensington *v.* Inglis, 8 East, 273; Eyre *v.* Palsgrave, 2 Campb. 605.

[4] Camelo *v.* Britten, 4 B. & Ald. 184.

[5] Everth *v.* Tunno, 1 Stark. R. 508.

[6] Vallejo *v.* Wheeler, Cowp. 156, per Aston, J.; Lockyer *v.* Offley, 1 T. R. 259, per Willes, J.; Marshall on Ins. ch. 12, § 6; 1 Phillips on Ins. 258; Stone *v.* National Ins. Co. 19 Pick. 34, 36, 37, per Putnam, J.; Wiggin *v.* Amory, 14 Mass. 1; American Ins. Co. *v.* Dunham, 15 Wend. 9. Barratry may be committed by the general owner, as against the freighter. Vallejo *v.* Wheeler, *supra*.

[7] Earle *v.* Rowcroft, 8 East, 126; Richardson *v.* Maine F. & M. Ins. Co. 6 Mass. 102, 117.

without either showing negatively, that he was not the owner, or affirmatively, that some other person was the owner.[1] But it must appear, that the act was done from a fraudulent motive, or with a criminal intent, or in known violation of duty; for if it was well intended, though injudicious and disastrous in its results, it is not barratry.[2] If the property was barratrously carried into an enemy's blockaded port, and lawfully condemned as enemy's property, it does not disprove the allegation, that the loss was occasioned by the barratry of the master, in carrying the property to places unknown, whereby it was confiscated.[3]

§ 391. A loss by *stranding* is proved by evidence, that the ship has been forced on shore, or on rocks or piles, by some unforeseen accident, and not in the ordinary course of navigation, and there rested, or was fixed, so that the voyage was interrupted. A mere temporary touching of the ground in passing over it, or grounding in a tide harbor in the place intended, is not a stranding, even though damage ensues, from some hard substance on the bottom.[4] And where a ship was run aground by collision with two others, in the Thames, this is said to have been held no stranding.[5] If the stranding is complete, the degree of damage, and the duration of the time of the vessel's remaining on shore, are not material.[6]

§ 392. The *amount of the loss*, if it is total, may be shown, as we have already seen, by the policy, with proof of *some*

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1 Ross *v.* Hunter, 4 T. R. 33.

2 Marshall on Ins. 521, (3d edit.); Phyn *v.* Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 7 T. R. 505. Gross malversation is evidence of fraud. Ibid.; Heyman *v.* Parish, 2 Campb. 150; Earle *v.* Rowcroft, 8 East, 126. See also Hucks *v.* Thornton, Holt's Cas. 30; Wiggin *v.* Amory, 14 Mass. 1.

3 Goldschmidt *v.* Whitmore, 3 Taunt. 508.

4 Harman *v.* Vaux, 3 Campb. 429; McDougle *v.* Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 4 M. & S. 503; Kingsford *v.* Marshall, 8 Bing. 458; Wells *v.* Hopwood, 3 B. & Ad. 20; Bishop *v.* Pentland, 7 B. & C. 224; 2 Phillips on Ins. 330–335; Marshall on Ins. 232, 233, (3d edit.)

5 Baring *v.* Henkle, Marshall on Ins. 232, (3d edit.) *Sed quære.*

6 Harman *v.* Vaux, 3 Campb. 430; Baker *v.* Towry, 1 Stark. R. 436.

interest, if it is a valued policy; or by any other competent evidence, if it is not.[1] *Shipwreck* is often, but not necessarily, evidence of a total loss of the ship. It depends upon the nature and extent of the injury or damage thereby occasioned. If the loss is not actually total, but the enterprise or voyage insured is defeated, or if the property insured specifically remains, but is damaged to a fatal extent, as, for example, to more than one half of its value, this, though in fact it may be but a partial loss, may be made constructively total, by an *abandonment* of the property by the assured, to the underwriter.[2] When, therefore, the assured goes for a construct-

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[1] See Ante, § 381; 3 Mason, 71. The value of goods, in an open policy, is made up of the invoice price, together with the premium and commissions. Marshall on Ins. 629, (3d edit.)

[2] Marshall on Ins. 566, 567, 592, (3d edit.); 1 Phillips on Ins. 382–388, 401–406, 441–449; 3 Kent, Comm. 318–335; Bradlie *v.* The Maryland Insurance Co. 12 Peters, 378. The law of abandonment was fully discussed, and all the cases reviewed by Mr. Justice Story, in his learned opinion in Peele *v.* Merchants Ins. Co. 3 Mason, 27–65. The general principle, extracted from all the cases, in regard to ships, he thus states: — "The right of abandonment has been admitted to exist, where there is a forcible dispossession or ouster of the owner of the ship, as in cases of capture; where there is a moral restraint or detention, which deprives the owner of the free use of the ship, as in case of embargoes, blockades, and arrests by sovereign authority; where there is a present total loss of the physical possession and use of the ship, as in case of submersion; where there is a total loss of the ship for the voyage, as in case of shipwreck, so that the ship cannot be repaired for the voyage in the port where the disaster happens; and, lastly, where the injury is so extensive, that by reason of it the ship is useless, and yet the necessary repairs would exceed her present value. None of these cases, will, I imagine, be disputed. If there be any general principle that pervades and governs them, it seems to be this, that the right to abandon exists, whenever from the circumstances of the case, the ship, for all the useful purposes of a ship for the voyage, is, for the present, gone from the control of the owner, and the time when she will be restored to him in a state to resume the voyage is uncertain, or unreasonably distant, or the risk and expense are disproportioned to the expected benefit and objects of the voyage. In such a case, the law deems the ship, though having a physical existence, as ceasing to exist for purposes of utility, and therefore subjects her to be treated as lost." See 3 Mason, 65. See also Am. Ins. Co. *v.* Ogden, 15 Wend. 532. Whether an abandonment is necessary, where the ship or goods have been necessarily sold by the master, *quære;* and see Roux *v.* Salvador, 1 Bing. N. C. 526, that it is; and Gordon *v.* Massachusetts

ively total loss, he must prove, first, the extent of the loss in fact, as exceeding half the value, or as being destructive of the enterprise; and secondly, his abandonment of the property to the underwriters. And in estimating the cost of repairs, in order to ascertain the right to abandon, if by reason of the perils insured against, it has become necessary to replace some decayed timbers with new ones, which, but for the injury, were strong enough for the voyage, the expense of such repairs is to be taken into the estimate; the rule in this respect being, that, when the injury which the insurers are obliged to make good, is the cause of the decayed parts requiring repairs, then the insured may abandon.[1] And more generally speaking, the rule is stated to be, that "If the vessel is so injured by a peril insured against, as to be useless to the owner, except at an expense that no prudent man, if uninsured, would incur, — an expense far exceeding her value when repaired, — this is, to all intents and purposes, a total loss."[2] But if the abandonment has been accepted, this supersedes the necessity of proof of the loss;[3] and long acquiescence without objection, under circumstances calling for some action on the part of the underwriters, is evidence from which an acceptance may be inferred by the Jury.[4]

§ 393. The amount of a loss may be proved by an *adjustment*, signed by the underwriters, which is usually indorsed on the back of the policy. But the form of it is not material;

F. & M. Ins. Co. 2 Pick. 249, 261, 267, and cases there cited; approved in 5 Peters, 623; that it is not.

[1] Hyde *v.* Louis. State Ins. Co. 1 Mart. 410, N. S.; 2 Phil. on Ins. 291, cited and affirmed in Phillips *v.* Naire, 11 Jur. 455.

[2] Irving *v.* Manning, 2 M. S. & Sc. 784, 788, per Pollock, C. B.

[3] 1 Phillips on Ins. 449, 450; Smith *v.* Robertson, 2 Dow, 474; Brotherston *v.* Barber, 5 M. & S. 418.

[4] Hudson *v.* Harrison, 3 B. & B. 97; 3 Moore, 288, S. C.; Smith *v.* Robertson, 2 Dow, 474. The observation of Story, J. in Peele *v.* Merchants Ins. Co. 3 Mason, 81, that the silence of the underwriter is not, *per se*, proof of his acceptance, is not conceived to impugn the rule in the text. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 197; Peele *v.* Suffolk Ins. Co. 7 Pick. 254; Reynolds *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 191; 1 Met. 160.

for the acceptance of an abandonment is an admission of the loss as total.[1] In whatever form the adjustment may be, it is an admission of all the facts, necessary to be proved by the assured, to entitle him to recover in an action on the policy. It is not, however, conclusive; but, like other *primâ facie* evidence, it throws the burden of proof on the other party, to impeach it; which he may do by showing that it was made under a mistake of fact, or procured by fraud in the assured or his agent.[2] In cases proper for general average, it is the duty of the master, on his arrival at the foreign port of destination, to have the loss adjusted by a competent person, according to the usage and law of the port; and being thus fairly made, it is conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned.[3]

§ 394. The clause usually inserted in policies, that the money is to be paid in a certain number of days *after preliminary proof of loss*, is liberally expounded, requiring only the best evidence of the fact in possession of the party at the time. Proof in the strict and legal sense, is not required. Thus, the protest of the master,[4] or a copy of a letter from him to the correspondents of the owner, transmitted by them to the owner, and stating the loss,[5] or, the report by a pilot

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[1] Bell *v.* Smith, 2 Johns. 98. An award of arbitrators is an adjustment. Newburyport Ins. Co. *v.* Oliver, 8 Mass. 402.

[2] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 209, 212; 3 Kent, Comm. 339; 1 Phillips on Ins. 500–502; Marshall on Ins. 642–647, (3d edit.), and cases there cited; Dow *v.* Smith, 1 Caines, R. 32; Bilbie *v.* Lumley, 2 East, 469; Faugier *v.* Hallett, 2 Johns. Cas. 233; Haigh *v.* De La Cour, 3 Campb. 319. An agent who has authority to subscribe a policy, has also authority to sign an adjustment of loss. Richardson *v.* Anderson, 1 Campb. 43, n.; The Chesapeake Ins. Co. *v.* Stark, 6 Cranch, 268.

[3] Strong *v.* New York Firem. Ins. Co. 11 Johns. 323; Simonds *v.* White, 2 B. & C. 805; 4 Dowl. & Ry. 375; Dalglish *v.* Davidson, 5 Dowl. & Ry. 6; Loring *v.* Neptune Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 411. But it does not bar the shipowner from claiming of the underwriter a loss not included in the foreign adjustment. Thornton *v.* U. States Ins. Co. 3 Fairf. 150; 3 Kent, Comm. 224.

[4] Lenox *v.* United Ins. Co. 3 Johns. Cas. 224.

[5] Lawrence *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 11 Johns. 241.

of the capture of the ship,[1] have been held sufficient, that being the best evidence the party possessed.[2] Under a policy containing this clause, proof of the loss alone has been held sufficient, without any proof of interest;[3] but if evidence of interest is required, the production of the usual mercantile documents, such as the bill of lading, invoice, bill of parcels, and the like is sufficient.[4] And whatever be the nature of the preliminary proof, if the underwriter does not object to its sufficiency at the time it is exhibited, but refuses to pay the loss on some other specified ground, the objection of insufficiency in the proof is waived.[5]

§ 395. The specific *defences* usually made to an action on a marine policy, are of two classes; namely, — (1.) Misrepresentation or Concealment of material facts, by the assured, during the time of treating for the policy; — (2.) Breach of Warranty.

§ 396. And first, as to *Misrepresentation* and *Concealment.* As this contract requires the highest degree of good faith, and the most delicate integrity, the assured is held bound to communicate to the underwriter, at the time of the treaty, every fact which is in truth material to the risk, and within his knowledge, whether he deems it material to the risk, or not; and all the information he possesses, in regard to material facts, though he does not know or believe it to be true, and it proves to be false.[6] And where there are successive underwriters on the same policy, a misrepresentation to the

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1 Munson *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co. 4 Mass. 88.

2 Ibid. See also Barker *v.* Phenix Ins. Co. 8 Johns. 307; Lovering *v.* Mercantile Ins. Co. 12 Pick. 348.

3 Talcott *v.* Marine Ins. Co. 2 Johns. 130.

4 Johnston *v.* Columbian Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 315.

5 Voss *v.* Robinson, 9 Johns. 192; Martin *v.* Fishing Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 389.

6 Lynch *v.* Hamilton, 3 Taunt. 37; Marshall on Ins. 449–478, (3d ed.); 1 Phillips on Ins. ch. vii.; Alston *v.* Mechanics Ins. Co. 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 329; Bryant *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 200; Curry *v.* Com'th Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 535; Seton *v.* Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1.

first has been held a misrepresentation to all.[1] Nor does innocency of intention, or mistake, on the part of the assured, make any difference; for the underwriter is equally injured, whether he was misled through ignorance or fraud, and the policy, in either case, is void.[2] But a representation, though untrue, will not avoid the policy, if the underwriter is not deceived by it; as, where a ship is cleared for one port, with liberty to touch at an intermediate port, but intending to go direct to the port of ultimate destination, such being the known and uniform course of trade at the time, for the sake of avoiding the operation of certain foreign regulations.[3] And it is in all cases sufficient if the representation be true in substance. If it is made by an agent, he also is bound to communicate all material facts within his own knowledge, and all the information he has received, in the same manner as if he were the principal; and this, whether the principal had knowledge or information of the facts or not.[4]

§ 397. On the other hand, the assured is *not bound* to state his *opinions* or belief or conclusions, respecting the facts communicated; nor to communicate matters, which lessen the risk; or which are known, or ought to be known to the underwriter; or which are equally open to both parties; or which are general topics of speculation; or are subjects of warranty.[5] And mere silence concerning a material fact

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[1] Barber *v.* Fletcher, 1 Doug. 305; Marsden *v.* Reid, 3 East, 573; 1 Phillips on Ins. 84; Pawson *v.* Watson, Cowp. 787; Marshall on Ins. 454, (3d ed.) But not as to an underwriter on a different policy, though on the same risk. Elting *v.* Scott, 2 Johns. 157. The doctrine of the text, however, has been questioned. See Forrester *v.* Pigou, 1 M. & S. 9; Brine *v.* Featherstone, 4 Taunt. 871.

[2] Bryant *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 200.

[3] Planche *v.* Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251.

[4] Marshall on Ins. 464. (3d ed.) The representation by a broker, made at the time of treating for the policy, is binding on the assured, unless it is withdrawn or qualified before the execution of the policy. Edwards *v.* Footner, 1 Camp. 530.

[5] Marshall on Ins. 453–460, 472, 473, (3d ed.); Walden *v.* New York Ins. Co. 12 Johns. 128; Bell *v.* Bell, 2 Campb. 475, 479; 1 Phillips on Ins. 103.

known to the underwriter, is not a culpable concealment, if no inquiry is made on the subject.[1] The question, whether the facts not disclosed were material to the risk, is for the Jury to determine ;[2] and to this point, the opinions of others, however experienced in sea risks, are not admissible,[3] unless, perhaps, where the materiality is purely a question of science.[4]

§ 398. The defence of concealment being nearly allied to the charge of fraud, the *burden of proof* is upon the underwriters, to establish both the existence of the fact concealed, and its materiality to the risk ; but the latter may be inferred from the nature of the fact itself.[5] If the fact concealed was a matter of general notoriety in the place of residence of the assured, this may be shown to the Jury, as tending to prove that the assured had knowledge of the fact.[6]

§ 399. Secondly, as to *Breach of warranty.* Besides the *express warranties*, frequently inserted in policies of insurance, such as, that the ship was *safe* or *sailed*, or was *to sail* on a given day, or should sail with *convoy*, or that the property was *neutral ;* there are certain *warranties implied* by law in every contract of this sort, namely, that the ship shall be *seaworthy* when she sails ; that she shall be *documented* and *navigated* in conformity with her national character, and with *reasonable skill* and care ; that the *voyage is lawful* and shall be *lawfully performed ;* and that it shall be pursued in the usual course, without wilful *deviation.* A breach, in any of these, is a valid defence to an action on the policy.[7]

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[1] Green *v.* Merchants Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 402. And see Laidlaw *v.* Organ, 2 Wheat. 178, 195.

[2] Littledale *v.* Dixon, 1 New Rep. 151; (4 B. & P. 151); McDowell *v.* Fraser, 1 Doug. 260; New York Ins. Co. *v.* Walden, 12 Johns. 513.

[3] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 441.

[4] Berthon *v.* Loughman, 2 Stark. R. 258; 2 Stark. Evid. 649.

[5] Tidmarsh *v.* Washington Ins. Co. 4 Mason 439, 441, per Story, J.; Fiske *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co. 15 Pick. 310, 316; 2 Phillips on Ins. 504; Ante, Vol. 1, § 34, 35, 80.

[6] 2 Phillips on Ins. 505; Livingston *v.* Delafield, 3 Caines, R. 51, 52, 53; Brander *v.* Ferriday, 16 Louis. 296; Ante, Vol. 1, § 138.

[7] Marshall on Ins. 353, 354, (3d edit.) ; 1 Phillips on Ins. 112, 113 ; Pad-

§ 400. The warranty of *seaworthiness* imports that the ship is stanch and sound, of sufficient materials and construction, with sufficient sails, tackle, rigging, cables, anchor, stores, and supplies, a captain of competent skill and capacity, a competent and sufficient crew, a pilot, when necessary, and, generally, that she is in every respect fit for the voyage insured.[1] And neither the innocence nor ignorance of the insured, nor the knowledge of the underwriter, will excuse a breach of this warrantry.[2] The beginning of the risk is the period to which this warranty relates. If the vessel subsequently becomes unseaworthy, the warranty is not broken, if the assured uses his best endeavor to remedy the defect; and of a neglect to do this, the underwriter can avail himself only when a loss has occurred in consequence thereof.[3]

§ 401. Where unseaworthiness of the ship is relied on, as a non-compliance with an implied warranty, the ship will be *presumed seaworthy*, and to continue so, until the contrary is proved by the underwriter, or shown from the evidence adduced on the other side.[4] And this may not only be shown by any competent direct evidence, but may be proved, inferentially, by evidence of the bad condition of the ship soon after sailing, without the occurrence of any new and sufficient

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dock *v.* Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227; Stocker *v.* Merrimack Ins. Co. 6 Mass. 220; Cleaveland *v.* Union Ins. Co. 8 Mass. 308.

[1] 1 Phillips on Ins. ch. 7. sec. 1, 2; Marshall on Ins. 146 – 160, (3d edit.)

[2] Marshall on Ins. 152 – 157, (3d edit.); Park on Ins. 343.

[3] 1 Phillips on Ins. 117, 118; Deblois *v.* Ocean Ins. Co. 16 Pick. 303; Weir *v.* Aberdeen, 2 B. & Ald. 320; Starbuck *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co. 19 Pick. 198; Paddock *v.* Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227; Copeland *v.* New Eng. Ins. Co. 2 Metc. 432; Watson *v.* Clark, 1 Dow, 344; Hollingsworth *v.* Brodrick, 7 Ad. & El. 40; 2 N. & P. 608; 1 Jur. 430.

[4] Parker *v.* Potts, 3 Dow, 23; Taylor *v.* Lowell, 3 Mass. 347; Barnewall *v.* Church, 1 Caines, R. 234, 246; Paddock *v.* Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227, 236, 237; Martin *v.* Fishing Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 389; Talcot *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 2 Johns. 124. But see Tidmarsh *v.* Washington Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 441, per Story, J. If the underwriters admit, in the policy, that the ship is seaworthy, they are bound by the admission, and cannot dispute the seaworthiness. Parfitt *v.* Thompson, 13 M. & W. 392.

cause.[1] After proof of her actual condition, experienced shipwrights, who never saw her, may be asked their opinion, whether, upon the facts sworn to, she was seaworthy or not.[2] But a sentence of condemnation for unseaworthiness, in a foreign Vice-Admiralty Court, after a survey, though conclusive to prove the fact of condemnation, has been held inadmissible as evidence of the fact recited in it, that, from prior defects, unseaworthiness might be presumed; nor are the reports of surveyors abroad, admissible evidence of the facts contained in them.[3]

§ 402. If the defence rests on the *violation of law* by the assured, whether in the object or the conduct of the voyage, such as, non-compliance with the convoy-act, or destination to a hostile port; or, on any neglect of duty in the master; the burden of proof is on the underwriter; it being always presumed that the law has been observed, and that duty has been done, until the contrary is shown.[4] The want of *neutral character* is usually shown by a decree of condemnation for that cause; and to this point, the sentence of a foreign tribunal of competent jurisdiction, is, as we have seen, conclusive.[5] The fabrication and spoliation of documents and papers are also admissible evidence to the same point, though not conclusive in law.[6] If the defendant would impugn the plaintiff's right to recover for a loss by capture, on the ground that the sentence of condemnation, rendered in a foreign Court, appears to have been founded

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[1] Marshall on Ins. 157; Watson *v.* Clark, 1 Dow, 344; Parker *v.* Potts, 3 Dow, 23; Douglas *v.* Scougall, 4 Dow, 269; Park on Ins. 333; 1 Phillips on Ins. 116.

[2] Beckwith *v.* Sydebotham, 1 Campb. 117; Thornton *v.* Royal Exch. Co. Peake's Cas. 25; Ante, Vol. 1, § 440.

[3] Marshall on Ins. 151, 152, (3d edit.); Wright *v.* Barnard, Ibid. p. 152; Dorr *v.* Pacific Ins. Co. 7 Wheat. 581; Watson *v.* North Amer. Ins. Co. 2 Wash. C. C. R. 152; Saltus *v.* Commercial Ins. Co. 10 Johns. 58.

[4] Thornton *v.* Lance, 4 Campb. 231; Ante, Vol. 1, § 34, 35, 80, 81; 2 Phillips on Ins. 503, 504.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 541.

[6] Ante, Vol. 1, § 37.

on the want of documents, not required by the law of nations, which the plaintiff ought to have provided; the burden of proof is on the defendant, to show the foreign law or treaty, which rendered it necessary for the plaintiff to provide such documents.[1]

§ 403. The defence of *deviation* is made out by proof that there has been a voluntary departure from, or delay in, the usual and regular course of the voyage insured, without necessity or reasonable cause. The ordinary cases of necessity, which justify a deviation, are, stress of weather; want of necessary repairs, or men; to join convoy; to succor ships in distress; to avoid capture, or detention; sickness of the captain or crew; mutiny; and the like.[2] And hence the objects or causes of deviation are distributed into two general classes, namely, first, to save life, and secondly, to preserve the property entrusted to the master's care.[3]

§ 404. In the SECOND PLACE, as to INSURANCE AGAINST FIRE. Here, the same general principles apply, as in the case of Marine Insurance. The declaration contains similar allegations as to the contract, the performance of conditions, and the loss; and the points to which the evidence is to be applied are generally the same, differing only so far as the subjects differ in their nature. The policy is to be produced and proved as in other cases, together with proof of the payment of the premium, and of the plaintiff's interest in the property, of his compliance with all the conditions precedent, and of the loss, by fire, within the period limited in the policy.[4]

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[1] Le Cheminant *v.* Pearson, 4 Taunt. 367.

[2] Marshall on Ins. 177 – 206, (3d edit.); 1 Phillips on Ins. 179 – 216; Coffin *v.* Newburyport Ins. Co. 9 Mass. 436; Stocker *v.* Harris, 3 Mass. 409. Putting into a port to put a vessel in good trim, if it could not be conveniently done at sea, is not a deviation. Chase *v.* Eagle Ins. Co. 5 Pick. 51.

[3] Turner *v.* Protection Ins. Co. 12 Shepl. 515.

[4] See Ellis on Fire and Life Insurance, p. 24 – 58, 61 – 66, 93, 94, in the

§ 405. The proof of loss must show an *actual ignition* by fire; damage by heat alone, without actual ignition, not

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Law Library, Vol, 4; 3 Kent, Comm. 370–376; Lawrence *v.* Columbian Ins. Co. 2 Peters, 25; 10 Peters, 507.

The following is the usual form of a count upon a valued Fire-Policy: — — " for that the plaintiff, on ——, was interested in a certain dwelling-house in ——, then occupied by him, to the value of —— dollars, and so continued interested until the destruction of said house by fire, as hereinafter mentioned: — and the said (*defendants*,) on the same day, in consideration of a premium in money then and there paid to them therefor by the plaintiff, made a policy of insurance upon the said dwelling-house, and thereby promised the plaintiff to insure —— dollars thereon, from said —— day of —— until the —— day of ——, against all such immediate loss or damage as should happen to said dwelling-house by fire, other than fire happening by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power, to the amount aforesaid, to be paid to the plaintiff in sixty days after notice and proof of the same; upon condition that the plaintiff, in case of such loss, should forthwith give notice thereof to said Company; and as soon thereafter as possible should deliver in a particular account thereof under his hand, and verified by his oath or affirmation; and if required should produce his books of account and other proper vouchers; and should declare on oath whether any and what other insurance was made upon said property; and should procure a certificate under the hand of a magistrate, notary public, or clergyman (most contiguous to the place of the fire, and not concerned in the loss, nor related to the plaintiff,) that he was, at the time of certifying, acquainted with the character and circumstances of the plaintiff, and knew or verily believed that he really, and by misfortune, and without fraud or evil practice, had sustained by such fire loss and damage to the amount therein mentioned: — and the plaintiff avers that afterwards, and before the expiration of the time limited in said policy, to wit, on the —— day of ——, the said dwelling-house was accidentally, and by misfortune, totally consumed by fire: — of which loss the plaintiff forthwith gave notice to said (*defendants*,) and as soon as possible thereafter, to wit, on ——, delivered to them a particular account thereof, under his hand, and verified by his oath, and did at the same time declare on his oath that no other insurance was made on said property; [except ——] and afterwards, on ——, did procure a certificate under the hand of [A. B.] Esquire, a magistrate most contiguous to the place of said fire, not concerned in said loss, nor related to the plaintiff, that he was then acquainted with the character and circumstances of the plaintiff, and verily believed that he really, and by misfortune, had sustained, by said fire, loss and damage to the amount of the sum in said certificate mentioned, to wit, ——, and on the same day the plaintiff produced and delivered said certificate to the said (*defendants*.) Yet, though requested, and though sixty days after such notice and proof of said loss have elapsed, the said (*defendants*) have never

being covered by the policy.[1] And as to the plaintiff's interest, it is not necessary that it be absolute, unqualified, or immediate; a trustee, mortgagee, reversioner, factor, or other bailee, being at liberty to insure their respective interests, subject only to the rules adopted by the underwriters, which generally require that such interests be distinctly specified.[2] But a policy against fire is a personal contract only; and therefore if the assured parts with all his interest in the property, before a loss happens, the policy is at an end; though, if he retains a partial or qualified interest, it will still be protected.[3]

§ 406. Though the plaintiff must here also, as in other cases, show a compliance with all *precedent conditions* and warranties; yet if any mistake or misrepresentation, in this or any other case, has been occasioned by the insurers themselves or their agents, the assured is excused.[4] The usual

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paid either of the sums aforesaid to the plaintiff," &c. See, as to stating the limitations and qualifications of the contract, 1 Chitty's Pl. 267–269, 316; Clarke *v.* Gray, 6 East, 564; Howell *v.* Richards, 11 East, 633; Hotham *v.* E. Ind. Co. 1 T. R. 638; Browne *v.* Knill, 2 B. & B. 395; Tampany *v.* Burnand, 4 Camp. 20; 6 Vin. Ab. 450, pl. 40; Anon. Th. Jones, 125; Butterworth *v.* Ld. Despencer, 3 M. & S. 150. And see *contra*, 8 Conn. 459.

[1] Austin *v.* Drew, 4 Camp. 360; 6 Taunt. 436. If the fire was caused by mere negligence of the assured, it is still covered by the policy. Shaw *v.* Robberds, 6 Ad. & El. 75; Waters *v.* Merchants Ins. Co. 11 Peters, 213; 3 Kent, Comm. 374.

[2] Ellis on Insurance, p. 22; Marshall on Ins. 789, (3d ed.); Lawrence *v.* Columbian Ins. Co. 2 Peters, R. 25, 49; 10 Peters, R. 507.

[3] Ætna Fire Ins. Co. *v.* Tyler, 16 Wend. 385; 2 Peters, R. 25; 10 Peters, R. 507. Where the policy prohibited any assignment of the interest of the assured, "unless by the consent of the company, manifested in writing," and the secretary, on application to him at the office of the company, indorsed and subscribed such consent on the policy; it was held, that his authority to do so, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, should be presumed; and that if proof were necessary, evidence that he had often indorsed such consent on other policies, would be *primâ facie* sufficient. Conover *v.* Mutual Ins. Co. of Albany, 3 Denio, 254

[4] Newcastle Ins. Co. *v.* McMorran, 3 Dow, 255. See, as to representations, 2 Phillips on Ins. 96–100; 136–142; 3 Kent, Comm. 372–375.

stipulation in these policies, that the insured shall, upon any loss, forthwith deliver an account of it, and procure a certificate from the nearest clergyman or magistrate, stating his belief that the loss actually occurred, and without fraud, &c., is a condition precedent, the performance of which must be particularly alleged and strictly proved.[1] But slight proof that the certifying magistrate is the nearest one, is sufficient.[2] And it is sufficient if the condition be performed in reasonable time.[3]

§ 407. In the estimation of *damages*, the question for the Jury is, the actual loss of the plaintiff; which is to be ascertained by the expense of restoring the property to the condition in which it was before; the contract being one of mere indemnity. Therefore, in case of the loss of a building by fire, the assured cannot recover for the damage occasioned by the interruption or destruction of his business, carried on in the building; nor for the gains which were morally certain to come to him if the building had not been destroyed; but only sufficient for the restoration of that which was insured, namely, the building.[4] The law of marine insurance respecting salvage does not apply to policies of insurance against fire. They assume the risk of the property to a fixed and agreed amount. If the loss is partial, the party is entitled to recover to the amount of that loss, if less than the sum insured; and if there is a total destruction of the property, then to the amount of the policy, the value stated being in that case in the nature of liquidated damages.[5]

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[1] Worsley *v.* Wood, 6 T. R. 710; 2 H. Bl. 574; Marshall on Ins. 807–811, (3d ed.)

[2] Cornell *v.* Le Roy, 9 Wend. 163.

[3] Lawrence *v.* Columbian Ins. Co. 10 Peters, R. 507.

[4] Niblo *v.* N. American Ins. Co. 1 Sandf. 551.

[5] Liscom *v.* Boston Mutual Ins. Co. 9 Metc. 205; Harris *v.* Eagle Fire Co. 5 Johns. 368, 373; 1 Phillips on Ins. 375; Vance *v.* Foster, 1 Irish Circuit Cas. 51, cited 3 Steph. N. P. 2084. By a misapprehension of the remarks of Pennefather, B. in this last case, it was erroneously stated, in the first edition of this volume, that no deduction was to be made for the difference of value between new and old materials, or any regard had to the

§ 408. Where the *defence* is, that the property was *wilfully burnt by the plaintiff* himself, the crime must be as fully and satisfactorily proved to the Jury, as would warrant them in finding him guilty on an indictment for the same offence.[1] If the defence is, that the *risk* has been *materially increased, contrary to a condition in the policy*, so as to render the policy void, the question, whether, upon the facts proved, the risk has been so increased, is for the Jury to determine.[2] But it is not necessary *in such case* for the defendant to show that any loss has resulted therefrom; for it is the change of circumstances and consequent increase of peril, that absolves the underwriter; and not the actual loss.[3] Such change of cir-

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cost of the property. See, *contra*, Brinley *v.* The National Ins. Co. 11 Met. 195.

[1] Thurtell *v.* Beaumont, 1 Bing. 339.

[2] Curry *v.* Commonwealth Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 585.

[3] Merriam *v.* Middlesex Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 162. In this case it was provided, in the act incorporating the company, that if any alteration should be made in any house or building, by the proprietor thereof, after insurance has been made thereon with said company, whereby it may be exposed to greater risk or hazard from fire, the insurance shall be void, unless an additional premium should be settled with and paid to the directors, &c. And the Court held, that as this constituted part of the contract between the parties, an alteration, such as there described, was fatal to the policy. So, where a similar provision was contained in the policy itself, the like judgment was given. Houghton *v.* Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 8 Met. 114, 121. The language of the Court on this point was as follows: — "There is another clause in the policy, to which the attention of the court was drawn at the argument, which is this; 'If the situation or circumstances, affecting the risk upon the property insured, shall be altered or changed, by or with the advice, agency, or consent of the assured or their agent, so as to increase the risk thereupon, without the consent of the company, the policy shall be void.' The court are of opinion, that this was a stipulation and condition, without a substantive compliance with which, the company, from the time of its happening, would cease to be bound by the contract. This provision binds the assured, not only not to make any alteration or change in the structure or use of the property, which will increase the risk, but prohibits them from introducing any practice, custom, or mode of conducting their business, which would materially increase the risk, and also from the discontinuance of any precaution, represented in the application to be adopted and practised with a view to diminish the risk. The clause in question, as well as the preceding clause, refers to the application and the representations contained in it. Taking this clause with the representations, we think the legal

cumstances alone, without consequent increase of risk, is not sufficient to avoid the policy; and therefore the erection of a wooden building, in actual contact with the building insured, will not have this effect, unless the risk is thereby increased.[1] The change of use, too, must be habitual, or of a permanent character. Thus, where the policy was on premises "where no fire is kept, and where no hazardous goods are deposited," a loss occasioned by making a fire once on the premises, and heating tar, for the purpose of making repairs, was held covered by the policy.[2] And where a kiln, used for drying corn, was upon one occasion used for the more dangerous process of drying bark, whereby the building took fire and was consumed, the underwriters, on the same principle, were held liable.[3]

§ 409. In the THIRD PLACE, as to INSURANCE UPON LIVES. The same principles, course of proceeding, defences, and

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effect is, that so far as these representations set forth certain usages and practices observed at the factory, as to the mode of conducting their business, and as to precautions taken to guard against fire, it is not only an affirmation that the facts are true at the time, but in effect a stipulation, that as far as the assured, and all those entrusted by them with the care and management of the property, are concerned, such modes of conducting the business shall be substantially observed, and such precautions substantially continue to be taken, during the continuance of the policy.

"By a *substantial* compliance, we mean the adoption of precautions, if not exactly those stated in the application, precautions intended to accomplish the same purpose, and which may be reasonably considered equally or more efficacious. For instance; when it is stated that ashes are taken up in iron hods, it would be a substantial compliance, if brass or copper were substituted. So, when it is represented that casks of water, with buckets, are kept in each story, if a reservoir were placed above, with pipes to convey water to each story, and found by skilful and experienced persons to be equally efficacious, it would be a substantial compliance." If there be no such stipulation in the contract, but the risk is materially increased by the fraud or misconduct of the assured, whereby the loss happens, it is conceived that he cannot recover. Stebbins *v.* The Globe Ins. Co. 2 Hall, N. Y. Rep. 632. And see Loundsbury *v.* The Protection Ins. Co. 8 Conn. 459; 5 Western Law Journ. 303.

1 Stetson *v.* Massachusetts Ins. Co. 4 Mass. 330.

2 Dobson *v.* Sotheby, 1 M. & Malk. 90.

3 Shaw *v.* Robberds, 6 Ad. & El. 75.

rules of evidence, are applicable here, as in policies on other subjects which have been already considered.[1] But in regard to the *interest* of the plaintiff in the life in question, it is not necessary, that it be such as to constitute the basis of any direct claim in favor of the plaintiff upon the party whose life is insured; it is sufficient if an indirect advantage may result to the plaintiff from his life; and therefore the reciprocal interests of husband and wife, parent and child, and brother and sister, in the lives of each other, are sufficient to support this contract.[2]

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[1] See 3 Kent, Comm. 365–370; Ellis on Ins. p. 161–171; 2 Phillips on Ins. p. 100–103, 143–145, 199; Marshall on Ins. p. 770–784, (3d edit.); 3 Steph. N. P. 2068–2076.

[2] Ibid.; Ellis on Ins. p. 122–128; Lord *v.* Dall, 12 Mass. 115.

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

§ 410. As the general principles and rules of proceeding are the same, whether the plaintiff has been slandered by words, or libelled by writing, signs, pictures, or other symbols, both these modes of injury will be treated together.[1]

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[1] The general form of a declaration for a *libel*, where no special inducement is requisite, is as follows: —

— "In a plea of trespass on the case; for that the said [*defendant*] wickedly intending to injure the plaintiff, heretofore, to wit, on —— did maliciously compose and publish, of and concerning the plaintiff, a certain false, scandalous, and defamatory libel, containing, among other things, the false, scandalous, and defamatory matters following, of and concerning the plaintiff, that is to say, [here state the libellous matter, *in hæc verba*, with proper *innuendos*.] By means of the committing of which grievances by the said [*defendant*], the plaintiff has been brought into public scandal and disgrace, and greatly injured in his good name, and otherwise injured." [If special damage has been sustained, by words not actionable in themselves, it should be here particularly alleged.]

The usual introductory averment of the plaintiff's good name and reputation, &c., is altogether superfluous, his good character being presumed.

For *verbal slander*, charging an indictable offence, and not requiring a special inducement, the declaration is as follows: —

— "for that the said (*defendant*) wickedly intending to injure the plaintiff, heretofore, to wit, on —— in a certain discourse which he then had of and concerning the plaintiff, did, in the presence and hearing of divers persons, maliciously and falsely speak and publish of and concerning the plaintiff, the following false, scandalous, and defamatory words, that is to say, [here state the words, with proper *innuendos*.] By means," &c., as before.

The following is an example of a count for words not in themselves actionable, with a special inducement: —

— "for that heretofore, and before the speaking of the words hereinafter mentioned, to wit, at the —— Court, begun and holden at ——, in and for the county of ——, on ——, a certain action was pending between the plaintiff and the said (*defendant*), upon the trial whereof in said Court, and in the due course of legal proceedings therein, the plaintiff, being duly sworn before the said Court, made affidavit and testified touching the loss of a certain promissory note in controversy in said action, and material to the issue joined therein; and the said (*defendant*,) wickedly intending to injure

In either case, the plea of the general issue will require the plaintiff to prove, (1.) the special character and extrinsic facts, when they are essential to the action; (2.) the speaking of the words, or publication of the libel; (3.) the truth of the *colloquium* and *innuendos;* (4.) the defendant's malicious intention, where malice in fact is material; and (5.) the damage, where special damages are alleged, or more than nominal damages are expected.

§ 411. It was formerly held, that the question, whether the publication proved was or was not a libel, or slanderous, was a question of law; and the general dislike of this doctrine has occasioned the enactment of statutes[1] for the purpose of referring this question, at least in criminal cases, to the Jury. But such statutes are now understood to be merely declaratory of the true doctrine of the Common Law; and accordingly it is now held, that the Judge is not bound to state to the Jury, as a matter of law, whether the publication is a libel, or not; but that the proper course is for him to define what is a libel in point of law, and to leave it to the Jury to say, whether the publication falls within that definition, and, as incidental to that, whether it is calculated to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.[2]

§ 412. (1.) Where the plaintiff's *office or special character* is alleged in *general terms*, it is sufficient to prove, by gen-

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the plaintiff, did afterwards, on —— in a certain discourse which he then had of and concerning the plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of divers persons, maliciously and falsely speak and publish of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning his affidavit aforesaid, the following false, scandalous, and defamatory words, that is to say, 'He,' (meaning the plaintiff,) 'has forsworn himself,' thereby meaning that the plaintiff, in his affidavit, had committed the crime of perjury. By means," &c. as before.

[1] 32 Geo. 3, c. 60; Constitution of Maine, Art, 1, § 4; Const. of New York. Art. 7, § 9; Rev. Stat. New York, Part 1, ch. 4, § 21.

[2] Parmiter *v.* Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105, 108; Baylis *v.* Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 920. And see Tuson *v.* Evans, 12 Ad. & El. 733, where the same doctrine is substantially confirmed. See acc. Dalloway *v.* Turrill, 26 Wend. 383; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 306, n. (1), by Wendell.

eral evidence, that he was in the actual possession and enjoyment of the office, or in the actual exercise of the calling, profession, or employment in question, without strict proof of any legal inception, investment, or appointment.[1] Thus the general allegation that the plaintiff was a magistrate, or peace officer, or an attorney of a particular Court, may be proved by general evidence, that he acted in such character.[2] So, it seems, if he alleges himself a *physician;*[3] though formerly some doubts have been entertained on this point; principally on the ground, that the statute prohibited the practice of that profession, without certain previous qualifications. But this objection proceeds on the presumption, that the law has not been complied with; which is contrary to the rule of presumption as now well settled.[4] If, however, the plaintiff *specially* alleges the mode of his appointment, or otherwise qualifies the allegation of his special character, as, by stating that he is "a physician, and has regularly taken his degree of doctor of physic," the special matter must be strictly proved by the best evidence of the fact.[5] But if the special matter does not amount to a qualification of that which might have been more generally alleged, but is merely cumulative and independent, it is conceived that general evidence would still be sufficient.[6] And where the slander or libel assumes, that the plaintiff possesses the character alleged, as, if he was slanderously spoken of in that character, by his title of attor-

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[1] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 5, by Wendell. And see Picton *v.* Jackson, 4 C. & P. 257.

[2] Berryman *v.* Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Ante, Vol. 1, § 83, 92; Jones *v.* Stevens, 11 Price, 235; Pearce *v.* Whale, 5 B. & C. 38. Where the words were charged as spoken of the plaintiff in his office of treasurer and collector, evidence that he was treasurer only, was held insufficient. Sellers *v.* Till, 4 B. & C. 655.

[3] McPherson *v.* Chedeall, 24 Wend. 24; Finch *v.* Gridley, 25 Wend. 469; 1 Stark. on Slander, p. 361, [405]; Brown *v.* Minns, 2 Rep. Const. Ct. 235.

[4] Smith *v.* Taylor, 1 New Rep. 196, [4 B. & P. 196]; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 9, [6].

[5] Moises *v.* Thornton, 8 T. R. 303; Ante, Vol. 1, § 58, 195, n. 1.

[6] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 11, note (*p*), [8].

ney,[1] clergyman,[2] or other functionary,[3] proof of the words is sufficient evidence that he held the office.

§ 413. In regard to the prefatory allegations of *other extrinsic facts*, these, where they are material, must be strictly proved as alleged; but if they are in their nature divisible and independent, this part of the declaration will be maintained by evidence of so much as, if alleged alone, would have been sufficient.[4]

§ 414. (2.) The plaintiff must also prove the *fact of the publication* of the words by the defendant. Words spoken may be proved by any person who heard them, though they are alleged to have been spoken in the hearing of A. B. and others.[5] And here also, if the words are in themselves actionable, and the slanders are several and independent, it is sufficient to prove some of them;[6] but if they constitute one general charge, they must all be proved.[7] And in all cases, the words must be proved strictly as they are alleged. But though it is not competent for the witness to state the impression produced on his mind by the whole of the conversation;[8] yet it

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[1] Berryman *v.* Wise, 4 T. R. 366.

[2] Cummen *v.* Smith, 2 S. & R. 440.

[3] Yrisarri *v.* Clement, 3 Bing. 432. See also Rex *v.* Sutton, 4 M. & S. 548, 549, per Bayley, J.; Bagnall *v.* Underwood, 11 Price, 621; Gould *v.* Hulme, 3 C. & P. 625.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 58–63, 67; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 14, [12]. In libel as in other cases, there is an important difference between matters of mere allegation, and matters of description. In respect to the former, a variance in proof as to number, quantity, or time does not affect the plaintiff's right of recovery; but in respect to the latter, the variance is fatal. Hence the day on which a libel is alleged to have been published is not material. Cates *v.* Bowker, 18 Verm. R. 23.

[5] Bull. N. P. 5.

[6] 2 East, 434, per Lawrence, J.; Flower *v.* Pedley, 2 Esp. 491; Orpwood *v.* Barkes, 4 Bing. 461; Compagnon *v.* Martin, 2 W. Bl. 790; Easley *v.* Moss, 9 Ald. R. 266.

[7] Flower *v.* Pedley, 2 Esp. 491.

[8] Harrison *v.* Bevington, 8 C. & P. 708. A witness cannot be asked, in the first instance, on his examination in chief, what he understood by the words; but after a foundation has been laid by evidence showing something

has been held sufficient to prove the substance of the words, and the sense and manner of speaking them.[1] If they are alleged as spoken affirmatively, proof that they were spoken interrogatively will not support the count.[2] So, an allegation of words in the second person, is not proved by evidence of words in the third person ;[3] nor is an allegation of slanderous words, as founded on an asserted fact, supported by proof of the words as founded on the speaker's belief of such fact.[4] Nor will evidence of words spoken as the words of another, support an allegation in the common form as of words spoken by the defendant.[5] Words in a *foreign language*, whether spoken or written, must be proved to have been understood by those who heard or read them ; and a libel by pictures or signs must also be shown to have been understood by the spectators.[6] If the libel is contained in a letter, addressed to the plaintiff, this is no evidence of a publication in a civil action, though it would be sufficient to support an indictment, on the ground of its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace.[7] But if the letter, though addressed to the plaintiff, was forwarded during his known absence, and with intent that it should be opened and read by his family, clerks, or confidential agents, and it is so, it is a sufficient

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to prevent their being taken in their plain and obvious sense, the witness may then be asked, with reference to that evidence, in which sense he understood them. Daines *v.* Hartley, 12 Jur. 1093 ; 3 Exch. R. 200.

[1] Miller *v.* Miller, 8 Johns. 74 ; Whiting *v.* Smith, 13 Pick. 364.

[2] Barnes *v.* Holloway, 8 T. R. 150. Proof of special damage must be confined to the evidence of persons who received the slanderous statements from the defendant himself. Rutherford *v.* Evans, 4 C. & P. 74 ; 6 Bing. 451, S. C. ; Ward *v.* Weeks, 7 Bing. 211.

[3] Avarillo *v.* Rogers, Bull. N. P. 5 ; Whiting *v.* Smith, 13 Pick. 364 ; Miller *v.* Miller, 8 Johns. 74.

[4] Cook *v.* Stokes, 1 M. & Rob. 237. And see Brooks *v.* Blanshard, 1 Cr. & M. 779 ; Hancock *v.* Winter, 7 Taunt. 205 ; 2 Marsh. 502, S. C.

[5] McPherson *v.* Daniels, 10 B. & C. 274 ; Bell *v.* Byrne, 13 East, 554. And see Walters *v.* Mace, 2 B. & Ald. 756 ; Zenobio *v.* Axtell, 6 T. R. 162.

[6] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 14, [13] ; Du Bost *v.* Beresford, 2 Campb. 512.

[7] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 33, [35]; Hodges *v.* The State, 5 Humphr. 112.

publication.[1] If it was not opened by others, even though it were not sealed, it is no publication.[2]

§ 415. The publication of a *libel* by the defendant may be proved by evidence, that he distributed it with his own hand, or maliciously exposed its contents, or read or sang it in the presence of others; or, if it were a picture, or a sign, that he painted it; or, if it were done by any other symbol or parade, that he took part in it, for the purpose of exposing the plaintiff to contempt and ridicule.[3] But to show a copy of a caricature to an individual privately, and upon request, is not a publication.[4] Nor is the porter guilty of publishing, who delivers parcels containing libels, if he is ignorant of their contents.[5] So, if one sells a few copies of a periodical, in which, among other things, the libel is contained, it is still a question for the Jury, whether he knew what he was selling.[6] If the libel was published in a newspaper, evidence that copies of the paper containing it were gratuitously circulated in the plaintiff's neighborhood, though they be not shown to have been sent by the defendant who was the publisher, is admissible to show the extent of the circulation of the paper, and the consequent injury to the plaintiff.[7]

§ 416. Evidence, that a libel is in the *defendant's handwriting*, is not, of itself, proof of a publication by him; but it is admissible evidence, from which, if not explained, publication may be inferred by the Jury; the question of publica-

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[1] Delacroix *v.* Thevenot, 2 Stark. R. 63; Phillips *v.* Jansen, 2 Esp. 624; Ahern *v.* Maguire, 1 Armst. & Macartn. 39.

[2] Clutterbuck *v.* Chaffers, 2 Stark. R. 471; Lyle *v.* Clason, 1 Caines, R. 581.

[3] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 16, 44, [49]; De libellis famosis, 5 Co. 125; Lambe's case, 9 Co. 59. And see Johnson *v.* Hudson, 7 Ad. & El. 233. Lending a libellous paper, or sending it in manuscript to a printer, is publication, though it be returned to the party. Rex *v.* Pearce, Peake's Cas. 75; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 44 [49].

[4] Smith *v.* Wood, 3 Campb. 323.

[5] Day *v.* Bream, 2 M. & Rob. 54.

[6] Chubb *v.* Flannagan, 6 C. & P. 431.

[7] Gathercole *v.* Miall, 15 M. & W. 319; 10 Jur. 337.

tion, where the facts are doubtful, being exclusively within their province.[1] The mode of proof of hand-writing has been already considered.[2] If the manuscript is in the defendant's hand-writing, and is also proved to have been printed and published, this is competent evidence of a publication by him.[3] Where the action for a libel is against the *printer* or *bookseller*, the fact of publication may be proved by evidence that it was sold or issued by him, or in his shop, though it were only in the way of his trade; or by his agent or servant, in the ordinary course of their employment; and this, whether the master were in the same town at the time, or not; for the law presumes him to be privy to what is done by others in the usual course of his business, and the burden is on him to rebut this presumption, by evidence to the contrary; such as, that the libel was sold clandestinely, or contrary to his orders, or, that he was confined in prison, so that his servants had no access to him, or that some deceit or fraud was practised upon him, or the like.[4] If the defendant procure another to publish a libel, this is evidence of a publication by the defendant, whenever it takes place.[5] The sending of a letter by the post, is a publication in the place to which it is sent;[6] the date of the letter is *primâ facie* evidence that the letter was written at the place where it is dated;[7] and the post-mark is *primâ facie* evidence that

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1 Rex *v.* Beare, 1 Ld. Raym. 417; Lambe's case, 9 Co. 59; Baldwin *v.* Elphinston, 2 W. Bl. 1038. And see Rex *v.* Almon, 5 Burr. 2686. The seven Bishops' case, 4 St. Tr. 304; Rex *v.* Johnson, 7 East, 65, 68.

2 See Ante, Vol. 1, § 576–581.

3 Regina *v.* Lovett, 9 C. & P. 462; Bond *v.* Douglas, 7 C. & P. 626.

4 Rex *v.* Almon, 5 Burr. 2686; Rex *v.* Walter, 3 Esp. 21; Rex *v.* Gutch, 1 M. & Malk. 433; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 28–32, [30–34]. If the act of the servant was beyond the scope of his employment, it is no evidence of a publication by the master. Harding *v.* Greening, 1 Holt's Cas. 531; 1 J. B. Moore, 477, S. C.; Rex *v.* Woodfall, 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 73, § 10, note, (by Leach); Ante, Vol. 1, § 234.

5 Rex *v.* Johnson, 7 East, 65.

6 Rex *v.* Watson, 1 Campb. 215. Whether it is also a publication, or even a misdemeanor in the place *from* which it is sent, *quære;* and see Rex *v.* Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95.

7 Rex *v.* Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95.

the letter was put into the office at the place denoted by the mark,[1] and that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed.[2]

§ 417. (3.) The plaintiff must prove the *truth of the colloquium or innuendos*, or the application of the words to himself, and to the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration, where these are material to his right to recover. The meaning of the defendant is a question of fact, to be found by the Jury.[3] It may be proved by the testimony of any persons, conversant with the parties and circumstances; and from the nature of the case, they must be permitted to some extent to state their opinion, conclusion, and belief, leaving the grounds of it to be inquired into on a cross-examination.[4] If the words are ambiguous, and the hearers understood them in an actionable sense, it is sufficient; for it is this which caused the damage; and if a foreign language is employed, it must appear to have been understood by the hearers.[5] The rule is, that words must be construed in the sense which hearers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them; even though particular individuals, better informed on the matter alluded to, might form a different judgment on the subject.[6] But where the words are spoken in relation to extrinsic facts, in respect of which alone

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[1] Rex *v.* Johnson, 7 East, 65; Fletcher *v.* Braddyll, 3 Stark. R. 64. See 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 36, [38].

[2] Shipley *v.* Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680; Warren *v.* Warren, 4 Tyrw. 850; Callan *v.* Gaylord, 3 Watts, 321.

[3] Oldham *v.* Peake, 2 W. Bl. 959, 962; Cowp. 275, 278, S. C.; Van Vechten *v.* Hopkins, 5 Johns. 211; Roberts *v.* Camden, 9 East, 93, 96. If the innuendo does not refer to a preceding allegation, but introduces new matter, not essential to the action, it need not be proved. Ibid. It is for the Judge to decide whether the publication is capable of the meaning ascribed to it by an innuendo, and for the Jury to decide whether such meaning is truly ascribed to it. Blagg *v.* Sturt, 10 Ad. & El. 899, N. S.

[4] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 46, [51]. Evidence that the plaintiff had been made the subject of laughter at a public meeting, is admissible for this purpose, as well as in proof of damages. Cook *v.* Ward, 6 Bing. 409.

[5] Ibid.; Fleetwood *v.* Curley, Hob. 268.

[6] Per Pollock, C. B. in Hankinson *v.* Bilby, 16 M. & W. 445.

they are actionable, as, where they are spoken of one in his office of attorney, it is not necessary to prove that the hearers knew the truth of the extrinsic facts at the time of speaking; for they may afterwards learn the truth of the facts, or may report them to others, who already know the truth of them.[1] Where the libellous words do themselves assume the existence of the extrinsic facts, there, as we have just seen, they need not be proved.[2]

§ 418. (4.) As to the proof of *malice* or *intention*. If the words are in themselves actionable, malicious intent in publishing them is an inference of law, and therefore needs no proof; though evidence of express malice may perhaps be shown, in proof of damages.[3] But if the circumstances of the speaking and publishing were such, as to repel that inference, and exclude any liability of the defendant, unless upon proof of actual malice, the plaintiff must furnish such proof. To this end, he may give in evidence any language of the defendant, whether oral or written, showing ill will to the plaintiff, and indicative of the temper and disposition with which he made the publication; and this, whether such language were used before or after the publication complained of.[4] But if such collateral evidence consists of matter

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[1] Fleetwood *v.* Curley, Hob. 268.

[2] Jones *v.* Stevens, 11 Price, 235; Bagnall *v.* Underwood, Ibid. 621; Gould *v.* Hulme, 3 C. & P. 625; Yrisarri *v.* Clement, 3 Bing. 432.

[3] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 47, [53]. And see Bodwell *v.* Osgood, 3 Pick. 379, 384. Where the truth of the words had been pleaded in justification; and the plaintiff at the trial offered to accept an apology and nominal damages, if the defendant would withdraw the justification, which the defendant refused, but did not attempt to prove it; this conduct was held proper for the Jury to consider, with reference to the question of malice, as well as to that of damages. Simpson *v.* Robinson, 18 Law J. 73, Q. B.

[4] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 47 – 53 [53 – 60]. See Ante, § 271; Kean *v.* McLaughlin, 2 S. & R. 469; Pearson *v.* Le Maitre, 7 Jur. 748; Stuart *v.* Lovell, 2 Stark. R. 93; Chambers *v.* Robinson, 1 Str. 691; Wallis *v.* Mease, 3 Binn. 546; Macleod *v.* Wakley, 3 C. & P. 311; Plunkett *v.* Cobbett, 5 Esp. 136; Chubb *v.* Westley, 6 C. & P. 436. In some cases, the admissibility of other words or writings has been limited to those which were not in themselves actionable; Mead *v.* Daubigny, Peake's Cas. 125; Bodwell *v.* Swan, 3 Pick. 376; Defries *v.* Davis, 7 C. & P. 112; or for

actionable in itself, the Jury must be cautioned not to increase the damages on that account.[1]

§ 419. In ordinary cases, under the general issue, the plaintiff will not be permitted to prove the *falsity* of the charges made by the defendant, either to show malice, or to enhance the damages; for his innocence is presumed; unless the defendant seeks to protect himself under color of the circumstances and occasion of writing or speaking the words; in which case, it seems, that evidence that the charge was false, and that the defendant knew it to be so, is admissible to rebut the defence.[2] But where the action is for slander in giving a character to a former servant, or one who has been in the employment of the defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the character was given both falsely and maliciously.[3] Proof that the defendant was aware of its falsity, is sufficient proof of malice: and in proof of its falsity, general evidence of his good character is sufficient to throw the burden of proof upon the defendant.[4]

§ 420. (5.) As to the *damages*. Where special damage is

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which damages had already been recovered. Symmons *v.* Blake, 1 M. & Rob. 477. In other cases, it has been restricted to words or writings relating to those which are alleged in the declaration. Finnerty *v.* Tipper, 2 Campb. 72; Delegal *v.* Highley, 8 C. & P. 444; Barwell *v.* Adkins, 1 M. & G. 807; Ahern *v.* Maguire, 1 Armstr. & Macartn. 39; Bodwell *v.* Swan, 3 Pick. 376. In others, the admissibility of subsequent words has been limited to cases where the intention was equivocal, or the words ambiguous. Stuart *v.* Lovell, 2 Stark. R. 93; Pearce *v.* Ornsby, 1 M. & Rob. 455.

[1] Rustell *v.* Macquister, 1 Campb. 49, n.; Pearson *v.* Le Maitre, 7 Jur. 748; 5 Man. & Gran. 700; 6 Scott, N. R. 607. And see Finnerty *v.* Tipper, 2 Campb. 74, 75; Tate *v.* Humphrey, Ibid. 73, n. If the plaintiff collaterally introduces other libels in evidence, the defendant may rebut them by evidence of their truth. Stuart *v.* Lovell, 2 Stark. R. 93; Warne *v.* Chadwell, Ibid. 457.

[2] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 53, [59].

[3] Brommage *v.* Prosser, 4 B. & C. 256; Hargrave *v.* Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2425; Weatherstone *v.* Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110.

[4] Rogers *v.* Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587, 589; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 52, [58]; King *v.* Waring, 5 Esp. 13; Pattison *v.* Jones, 8 B. & C. 578.

essential to the action, the plaintiff must prove it, according to the allegation. We have already seen, that damages, which are the *necessary* results of the wrongful act complained of, need not be alleged; and that these are termed general damages; but that those which, though *natural*, are not *necessary results*, and which are termed special damages, must be specially alleged and proved; and that no damages can, in any case, be recovered, except those which are the natural and proximate consequences of the wrongful act complained of.[1] Even if the words are actionable in themselves, and *a fortiori* if they are not, no evidence of special damage is admissible, unless it is specially alleged in the declaration; and to such special allegation the evidence must be strictly confined.[2] Thus, if the loss of marriage is alleged as special damage, the individual must be named with whom the marriage might have been had, and no evidence can be received of a loss of marriage with any other person.[3] But where the damage is in the prevention of the sale of an estate by auction, a general allegation is sufficient, and evidence that any person would have bid upon it, is proof of such prevention.[4] So, where the damage consists in the desertion of a chapel,[5] or of a theatre,[6] by those who used to resort to it, it seems that a general allegation and proof of the diminution of receipts is sufficient. If the

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[1] See Ante, tit. Damages, § 254, 256, 267, 269, 271, 275. In a joint action by partners, for a libel in respect of their trade, damages cannot be given for any injury to their private feelings, but only for injury to their trade. Haythorn *v.* Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196.

[2] Ibid.; Herrick *v.* Lapham, 10 Johns. 281. Where the action was for alleging that the plaintiff's ship was unseaworthy, proof of special damage was held admissible, without any averment of special damage in the declaration; because, being a chattel, no action is maintainable without proof of some damage. Ingram *v.* Lawson, 9 C. & P. 326. *Sed quære.*

[3] 1 Saund. 243, n. 5, by Williams; Hunt *v.* Jones, Cro. Jac. 499; Anon. 2 Ld. Raym. 1007; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 55, [62, 63]. So, of the loss of customers, and the like. Ibid.; Tilk *v.* Parsons, 2 C. & P. 201; Ashley *v.* Harrison, 1 Esp. 48, 50.

[4] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 56, [63].

[5] Hartley *v.* Herring, 8 T. R. 130.

[6] Ashley *v.* Harrison, 1 Esp. 48.

defendant admits and justifies the fact of publication, without pleading the general issue, the plaintiff may show the manner of publication, as affecting the question of damages.[1]

§ 421. In the DEFENCE of this action under the *general issue*, the defendant may give in evidence any matter, tending to deny or disprove any material allegation of the plaintiff; such as, the speaking and publishing of the words, the malicious intention, or the injurious consequences resulting from the act complained of. If the plaintiff, in proof of malice, relies upon the falsity of the charge, the defendant may rebut the inference by evidence of the truth of the charge, even under the general issue. And where the occasion and circumstances of the publication or speaking were such, as to require from the plaintiff some proof of actual malice, the defendant may prove these circumstances under the general issue. Such is the case, where the alleged libel or slander consisted in communications, made to the *appointing power*, in relation to the conduct of the plaintiff as a *public officer;* or, to individuals or authorities, empowered by law to *redress grievances*, or supposed to possess influence and ability to procure the means of relief; or, where they were *confidential communications*, made in the ordinary course of lawful business, from good motives, and for justifiable ends. So, where the circumstances were such as to exclude the presumption of malice, as, if the words were spoken by the defendant in his office of *Judge*, *Juror*, *Attorney*, *Advocate*, *Witness*, or *Party*, in the course of a judicial proceeding, or, as a *member of a legislative assembly*, in his place, these also may be shown under the general issue.[2]

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[1] Vines *v.* Serell, 7 C. & P. 163. But evidence of the defendant's procuring testimony to prove the truth of his charges, and then declining to plead in justification, is not admissible to affect the damages, though it might be properly referred to the Jury, upon the question of malice. Bodwell *v.* Osgood, 3 Pick. 379.

[2] 1 Stark. on Slander, p. 401 – 406, by Wendell; Fairman *v.* Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642; Bradley *v.* Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Hoar *v.* Wood, 3 Met. 193; Coffin *v.* Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Remington *v.* Congdon, 2 Pick. 310. Confidential communications made in the usual course of business, or of domestic or

So, if a person having information materially affecting the interests of another, honestly communicates it privately to such other party, in the full and reasonably grounded belief that it is true ; he is justified in so publishing it, though he has no personal interest in the subject matter, and though no inquiry has been made of him, and though the danger to the other party is not imminent.[1] Under this plea, also, the defendant may prove that the publication was procured by the fraudulent contrivance of the plaintiff himself, with a view to an action ; or, that the cause of action has been *discharged* by an accord and satisfaction, or by a release.[2]

§ 422. But in all cases, where the occasion itself affords *primâ facie* evidence to repel the inference of malice, the plaintiff may rebut the defence, by showing that the object of the defendant was malignant, and that the occasion was laid hold of as a mere color and excuse for gratifying his private malice with impunity.[3]

§ 423. If, from the plaintiff's own showing, it appears that

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friendly intercourse, should be viewed liberally by juries ; and unless they see clearly that there was a malicious intention of defaming the plaintiff, they ought to find for the defendant. Todd *v.* Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88, per Alderson, B. See to the same effect, Wright *v.* Woodgate, 2 C. M. & R. 573 ; 1 Tyrw. & G. 12 ; Toogood *v.* Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 181 ; 4 Tyrw. 582 ; Shipley *v.* Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680 ; Story *v.* Challands, 8 C. & P. 234, 236 ; Wilson *v.* Robinson, 9 Jur. 726 ; Griffith *v.* Lewis, 7 Ad. & El. 61, N. S. ; Warr *v.* Jolly, 6, C. & P. 497 ; Padmore *v.* Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 380 ; Needham *v.* Dowling, 15 Law Journ. 9, N. S. ; Gardner *v.* Slade, 13 Jur. 826 ; Kershaw *v.* Bailey, 1 Exch. R. 743. Though the expressions were stronger than the circumstances required, it is still a question for the Jury, whether they were used with intent to defame, or in good faith to communicate facts, interesting to one of the parties. Dunman *v.* Bigg, 1 Camp. 269. n. ; Ward *v.* Smith, 4 C. & P. 302 ; 6 Bing. 749, S. C.

[1] Coxhead *v.* Richards, 10 Jur. 984. But whether such communication is privileged, *quære.* Ibid. And see Bennett *v.* Deacon, 15 Law Journ. 289, N. S. ; Blackham *v.* Pugh, Ibid. 290 ; Wilson *v.* Robinson, 9 Jur. 726.

[2] King *v.* Waring, 5 Esp. 13 ; Smith *v.* Wood, 3 Campb. 323 ; Lane *v.* Applegate, 1 Stark. R. 97.

[3] 2 Stark. Evid. 464.

the words were not used in an actionable sense, he will be nonsuited.[1] But if the plaintiff once establishes a *primâ facie* case, by evidence of the publishing of language apparently injurious and actionable, the *burden of proof* is on the defendant, to explain it.[2] But the defendant is entitled to have the whole of the alleged libel read, and the whole conversation stated, in order that its true sense and meaning may appear. And if the libel is contained in a letter, or a newspaper, the whole writing or paper is admissible in evidence.[3] The defendant may also give in evidence a letter written to him, containing a statement of the facts upon which he founded his charges, to show the *bona fides* with which he acted.[4]

§ 424. It is perfectly well settled, that, under the *general issue*, the defendant cannot be admitted to prove the *truth* of the words, either in bar of the action, or in mitigation of damages. And whether, for the latter purpose, he may show that the plaintiff was *generally suspected*, and commonly reported to be guilty of the particular offence imputed to him, is, as we have seen,[5] not universally agreed. But by the

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[1] Thompson *v.* Bernard, 1 Campb. 48.

[2] Penfold *v.* Westcote, 2 New Rep. 335; Christie *v.* Cowell, Peake's Cas. 4, and note by Day; Button *v.* Hayward, 1 Vin. Abr. 507, in marg.; 8 Mod. 24, S. C.

[3] Weaver *v.* Lloyd, 1 C. & P. 295; Thornton *v.* Stephen, 2 M. & Rob. 45; Cooke *v.* Hughes, Ry. & M. 112.

[4] Blackburn *v.* Blackburn, 3 C. & P. 146; 4 Bing. 395, S. C. See also Fairman *v.* Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642; Blake *v.* Pilford, 1 M. & Rob. 198; Pattison *v.* Jones, 8 B. & C. 578.

[5] Ante, § 275; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 77–95, by Wendell. See also Waithman *v.* Weaver, 11 Price, 257, n.; Wolmer *v.* Latimer, 1 Jur. 119. Where the defendant, when speaking the words, referred to certain current reports against the plaintiff, which he said he had reason to believe were true; it was held, under the general issue, that he might prove, by cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, that such reports had in fact prevailed in the plaintiff's neighborhood, and were the common topic of conversation, before the words were uttered by him. Richards *v.* Richards, 2 M. & Rob. 557.

weight of authorities it seems settled that the defendant may impeach the plaintiff's character, by general evidence, in order to reduce the amount of damages.[1] And if the plaintiff declares that he was never guilty, nor *suspected* to be guilty of the crime imputed to him, it has been held, that the

[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 55; Paddock *v.* Salisbury, 2 Cowen, 811. It must be *general* evidence. Ross *v.* Lapham, 14 Mass. 275; Stone *v.* Varney, 7 Metc. 86. In this case, the decisions on this much controverted point were fully reviewed by Mr. Justice Dewey, whose observations cannot but be acceptable, in this place, to the reader. It will be observed that in Massachusetts, the general issue may always be pleaded, accompanied by a notice of the special matter of defence intended to be set up. Having stated the question to be, whether the defendant can, in an action of slander, under the general issue accompanied by a notice that he will offer evidence to establish the truth of the charge in justification, give in evidence the general character of the plaintiff in mitigation of damages; the learned Judge proceeded as follows: — "This question is not new, but one that has often arisen, and been the subject of consideration. It was much discussed in the case of Foot *v.* Tracy, 1 Johns. 46, where it arose, however, under the single plea of the general issue, but was not decided; the members of the Court, who gave opinions, being equally divided. Kent and Thompson, Js. were for its admission, and Livingston and Tompkins *contra.* In a later case, reported in Anthon, 185, Springstein *v.* Field, Spencer, J. took occasion to remark, that he had no doubt about the admissibility of the evidence offered in the case of Foot *v.* Tracy, but for particular reasons connected with that case, he forbore to express any opinion on the hearing of the same. In Paddock *v.* Salisbury, 2 Cow. 811, the question came again before the Supreme Court of New York, when it was held that evidence of general character was admissible in mitigation of damages, under the general issue, which was the only plea filed in that case.

"This subject was much considered in the case of Root *v.* King, 7 Cow. 613. The Court there held that public reports of the facts stated in the libel were inadmissible as evidence in mitigation of damages, where a plea in justification had been filed, alleging the truth of the matter stated in the libel; but they also held that the general character of the plaintiff was put in issue in an action of slander, without regard to the pleading or notice of defence on the part of the defendant. Chief Justice Savage says, 'under any circumstances, the defendant may show that the plaintiff's reputation has sustained no injury, because he had no reputation to lose.' 'The rule is admitted, that the general character may be attacked, because this is relied upon as the ground of damages, and the plaintiff is supposed at all times to be prepared to sustain his general character.' See also Inman *v.* Foster, 8 Wend. 602, *acc.* Mr. Greenleaf, in his Treatise upon Evidence, Vol. I. § 55, says, 'Whether evidence impeaching the plaintiff's general character is admissible in an action of slander, as affecting the damages, is a point which has been

defendant may disprove the latter allegation, by evidence showing that he was suspected.[1] The defendant may also

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much controverted, but the weight of authority is in favor of admitting such evidence.' In 2 Stark. Ev. 369, it is said that in actions of slander, where the defendant has not justified, evidence of the plaintiff's bad character is admissible in reduction of damages; and in page 878, the author says, 'General evidence of bad character seems to be admissible, although the defendant has justified that the imputation is true, for if the justification should fail, the question as to the quantum of damages would still remain.' And such evidence has been held admissible in North Carolina, Ohio, and Kentucky, when a justification and the general issue are both pleaded. Vick *v.* Whitfield, 2 Hayw. 222; Dewit *v.* Greenfield, 5 Ham. 275; Eastland *v.* Caldwell, 2 Bibb, 21; Calloway *v.* Middleton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 372. See also Sawyer *v.* Hopkins, 9 Shepley, 268.

"In New York, as before seen, such evidence has been admitted, where the general issue has been the only plea. So in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New Hampshire. Brunson *v.* Lynde, 1 Root, 354; Austin *v.* Hanchett, 2 Root, 148; Henry *v.* Norwood, 4 Watts, 347; Buford *v.* M'Luny, 1 Nott & M'Cord, 268; Sawyer *v.* Erfert, 2 Nott & M'Cord, 511; Lamos *v.* Snell, 6 N. Hamp. 413. See also Waters *v.* Jones, 3 Porter, 442.

"In our own cases, we shall find that the general principles stated in Larned *v.* Buffinton, 3 Mass. 546, bear upon this question. The precise question of the competency of evidence touching the plaintiff's *moral character* was there waived, as no such evidence was embraced in the proposed proof. But it was ruled, that it was competent to give in evidence the plaintiff's rank and condition in life, either on the general issue, or a traverse of a justification; and the reasons assigned are, that 'the degree of injury the plaintiff may sustain by the slander, may very much depend on his rank and condition in society,' and also that 'it is a fact, in its nature, of general notoriety.' In Wolcott *v.* Hall, 6 Mass. 518, in which there was a justification pleaded, evidence was offered, in mitigation of damages, of *general reports* that the plaintiff had been guilty of the crime imputed to him in the slanderous words. This was rejected; but it was said by the Court, that evidence of general bad character may be considered by the Jury; 'for the worth of a man's *general* reputation among his fellow-citizens may entitle him to large damages for an attempt to injure it; which he ought not to obtain, if his character is of little or no estimation in society.' The principle here settled seems

[1] E. of Leicester *v.* Walter, 2 Campb. 251. But in an action for a libel, which was actionable only in respect of the plaintiff's office, where his due discharge of its duties was averred, the defendant was not permitted, under the general issue, to disprove this averment, by evidence of the plaintiff's negligence in discharging his official duties. Dance *v.* Robson, 1 M. & Malk. 294.

show, upon the question of damages, under this issue, that the charge was occasioned by the misconduct of the plaintiff,

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to be that *particular* reports injurious to one's reputation, are to be rejected, but a bad *general* character may be shown in mitigation of damages; and this, though a justification be pleaded. Alderman *v.* French, 1 Pick. 1, went no farther than to hold that evidence of a general report that the plaintiff had been guilty of the crime imputed to him, could not be received in mitigation of damages. In Ross *v.* Lapham, 14 Mass. 279, which was an action on the case for slanderous words, charging the plaintiff with perjury, and in which the Court held it incompetent to offer in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff was an atheist, yet it was assumed that by commencing an action of slander, 'the plaintiff put his general reputation at issue.' See also Commonwealth *v.* Snelling, 15 Pick. 344, which seems to recognize the same principle. In Bodwell *v.* Swan, 3 Pick. 378, while it was held that reports of particular facts were inadmissible, it was declared, as the rule of law, that 'the general bad character of the plaintiff may be shown, because he relies upon its goodness, before calumniated, as the principal ground of damages. A fair character has been maliciously attacked, and the law will repair the mischief by damages; but to a reputation already soiled the injury is small.'

"The English doctrine, as stated in Earl of Leicester *v.* Walter, 2 Campb. 251, and —— *v.* Moor, 1 M. & S. 284, seems to go farther than these doctrines, and to authorize the admission of mere public reports that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime imputed to him by the defendant. See also Richards *v.* Richards, 2 M. & Rob. 557; 3 Stephens, Nisi Prius, 2578. But this rule has not prevailed with us, and is supposed by Mr. Justice Jackson, in his opinion in Alderman *v.* French, 1 Pick. 18, 19, to have been only intended as an admission of evidence of the general reputation and standing of the plaintiff. In this view, they would bear upon this question. As admissions of reports, we should reject them as authority.

"It is said that the more recent English cases seem to consider evidence of general bad character as irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. It would seem, from the report of the case of Cornwall *v.* Richardson, Ry. & Mood. 305, that evidence of general good character was held not to be admissible for the plaintiff, where the defendant had filed special pleas of justification, as well as the general issue; and the presiding Judge seems to have assumed that such evidence was not competent to either party. See also Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 326; Matthews *v.* Huntley, 9 N. Hamp. 146. This decision is directly opposed to the case of Harding *v.* Brooks, 5 Pick. 244. In Jones *v.* Stephens, 11 Price, 255, which contains much reasoning against the competency of such evidence, the question arose upon a plea in justification, containing general allegations against the plaintiff's character, and the real question was, whether it was competent to support the plea, and disprove the declaration, by producing evidence that the general character of the plaintiff, as an attorney, was bad. This is the view taken of that case

either in attempting to commit the crime, or in leading the defendant to believe him guilty, or in contemporaneously

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by Mr. Greenleaf, in his note to § 55 of the 1st volume of his Treatise on Evidence.

"This review of the adjudicated cases, and particularly the decisions in this Commonwealth, and in the State of New York, seems necessarily to lead to the conclusion, that evidence of general bad character is admissible in mitigation of damages. That it is so where no justification has been pleaded, seems to be everywhere sanctioned, unless a contrary opinion is found in the recent English decisions to which I have alluded. Suggestions have been made, in some of the cases, that such evidence was not admissible where the defendant pleaded the truth in justification. But, upon principle, this distinction, I apprehend, will be found untenable. There is, doubtless, a class of cases, where the defendant, by pleading the truth in justification, may deprive himself of a defence upon which he might have relied, if he had pleaded the naked general issue; as that the words were spoken in passion, in giving the character of a servant, &c. In such cases, the very fact of pleading a justification, and putting upon the record an allegation of the truth of the words, has been supposed to take away the defence of the character above alluded to. But under our statutes, (Rev. Stats. c. 100, § 18, 19,) perhaps even this rule may be considered as modified, and indeed effectually changed. By § 18, it is provided that matter in one plea shall be no evidence in another; and by § 19, that a plea in justification in slander, that the words spoken were true, shall not be proof of malice.

"The reasons which authorize the admission of this species of evidence, under the plea of general issue, seem alike to exist, and to require its admission, where a justification has been pleaded, but the defendant has failed in sustaining it. It is not offered, in either case, as sustaining the justification, or making out a defence, but is solely applicable to the question of damages. I agree with Mr. Justice Thompson, in his opinion, as stated in Foot *v.* Tracy, 1 Johns. 47, that 'it cannot be just, that a man of infamous character should, for the same libellous matter, be entitled to equal damages with the man of unblemished reputation; yet such must be the result, unless character be a proper subject of evidence before a Jury.' Ld. Ellenborough, in 1 M. & S. 286, also says, 'Certainly a person of disparaged fame is not entitled to the same measure of damages with one whose character is unblemished; and it is competent to show that by evidence.'

"The theory of trials is, that the Jury are to decide solely upon the evidence before them. If so, they surely cannot make the distinction between a plaintiff of good name and fame, and one who is really infamous, unless evidence of this fact is allowed to be given. Cases often occur where the Jury are entire strangers to the parties, and if not so, they ought not to act upon the statements of any of their fellows, given in the Jury room, and not under the sanction of an oath. There seems to be no alternative but to admit this species of evidence; and this as well when there is a justification pleaded,

assailing the defendant with opprobrious language; or, that it was made under a mistake which was forthwith corrected;[1] or, that he had the libellous statement from a third person;[2] or, being the proprietor of a newspaper, that he merely copied the statement from another paper, giving his authority;[3] or, that he was insane, and known to be so, at the time of speaking the words.[4] And in an action for a libel upon the plaintiff in his trade of bookseller, as the publisher of immoral and foolish books, it has been held, that the defendant, under this issue, may show that the supposed libel is nothing more than a fair stricture upon the general nature of the plaintiff's publications.[5]

§ 425. It is obvious, that evidence in mitigation of dam-

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as when the defence is on the general issue alone. In the former case, the evidence is to be applied solely to the question of damages; and it would be the duty of the Court to advise the Jury that it could not be used to sustain the justification, but was properly introduced, because both questions were before them, and if the justification failed, upon the evidence applicable thereto, they would consider the evidence of the character of the plaintiff, in assessing damages for the injury occasioned by the defamatory words; but *for other purposes*, the evidence would be irrelevant. This evidence should be confined to the general character of the plaintiff, as it existed before the publication of the slanderous words." See 7 Met. 88 – 94. In Williston *v.* Smith, 3 Kerr, 443, it was held by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, that the evidence, in order to be admissible, must relate to the plaintiff's general reputation in respect to the subject matter of the charge.

[1] Ante, § 275; Bradley *v.* Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

[2] Duncombe *v.* Daniell, 2 Jur. 32; Maitland *v.* Goldney, 2 East, 426; *Sed vid.* Mills *v.* Spencer, Holt's Cas. 513. Its effect will depend on the intent with which the name of the author was mentioned. Dole *v.* Lyon, 10 Johns. 447. The fact, that the defendant heard the words from another, whose name he mentioned at the time of speaking them, was formerly held a good *justification*, and therefore pleadable in bar. See 1 Stark. on Slander, ch. xiv.; Ibid. p. 301, note (1), by Wendell. But this doctrine has been solemnly denied in the United States; Ibid.; Dole *v.* Lyon, 10 Johns. 447; and has of late been repudiated in England. De Crespigny *v.* Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392.

[3] Saunders *v.* Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Creevy *v.* Carr, 7 C. & P. 64. See also Mullett *v.* Hulton, 4 Esp. 248; Wyatt *v.* Gore, Holt's Cas. 303; East *v.* Chapman, 2 C. & P. 570; 1 M. & Malk. 46, S. C.

[4] Dickinson *v.* Barber, 9 Mass. 225.

[5] Tabart *v.* Tipper, 1 Camp. 350.

ages must be such as involves an admission of the falsity of the charge. If the defendant would prove that the charge is true, he can do this only under a special plea in justification; it is only evidence of facts, not sufficient to justify, that is admissible under the general issue, to reduce the damages.[1] And if such facts have been specially pleaded in justification, but the plea is withdrawn before the trial, and the plaintiff is therefore not prepared with evidence to disprove it, the defendant may, under circumstances, still be permitted to prove the facts under the general issue, to affect the amount of damages to be recovered.[2] It has also been held, that where the facts, offered in evidence in mitigation of damages, would be sufficient to justify *a part only* of the libel, they must be specially pleaded in justification of that part, and cannot otherwise be received.[3] But these rules, it is conceived, do not preclude the defendant from showing, under the general issue, all such facts and circumstances as belong to the *res gestæ*, and go to prove the intent with which the words were spoken, or the publication was made.[4] And if a justification is pleaded, the defendant may still give *general evidence*, in mitigation of damages, under the general issue, though he will not be permitted, under a plea in justification, to give evidence of particular facts and circumstances respecting the charge, which go merely to the amount of damages.[5]

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[1] Underwood *v.* Parkes, 2 Stra. 1200; Knobell *v.* Fuller, Peake's Ad. Cas. 139; Andrews *v.* Vanduzer, 11 Johns. 38.

[2] East *v.* Chapman, 2 C. & P. 570; 1 M. & Malk. 46, S. C.

[3] Vesey *v.* Pike, 3 C. & P. 512.

[4] See 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 88, n. (1), by Wendell. In several of the United States, the course is to plead the general issue in all cases, with a brief statement of the special matter to be given in evidence under it. It has been held, that where such statement, in an action of slander, is ruled out, as not amounting to a justification, the matter is not admissible in evidence in mitigation of damages; for the reason that, so far as it goes, it tends to prove the charge to be well founded. Cooper *v.* Barber, 24 Wend. 105. And see Turrill *v.* Dolloway, 17 Wend. 426. But the soundness of these decisions has been combated, with great force of reasoning, by Mr. Wendell, in the Introduction to his valuable edition of Starkie on Slander, p. 27 – 55.

[5] 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 83 – 94, and notes, by Wendell. See also Stone

§ 426. To support a special plea in *justification*, where *crime* is imputed, the same evidence must be adduced as would be necessary to convict the plaintiff upon an indictment for the crime imputed to him; and it is conceived, that he would be entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubts of his guilt, in the minds of the Jury, in the same manner as in a criminal trial. And if the evidence falls short of proving the commission of the crime, the Jury may still consider the circumstances, as tending to lessen the character of the plaintiff, and to reduce the amount of damages.[1] But wherever the truth of a charge of crime is pleaded in justification, the plaintiff may give his own character in evidence, to rebut the charge.[2]

§ 427. Where the libel is upon a lawyer, charging him with *divulging confidential communications* made to him by his client, it is not necessary for the defendant, in support of a plea in justification, to prove that the communications were of such strictly privileged character, that the plaintiff could not have been compelled to disclose them, if called as a witness in a court of justice; but it will suffice to show, that the matters disclosed by the plaintiff were confidential communications, acquired by him professionally, in the more enlarged and popular sense of the word.[3]

§ 428. Where the matter is actionable only in respect of the special damage, the plaintiff must generally show express malice in the defendant. Such is the case in actions for

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v. Varney, 7 Law Reporter, 533; Mullett *v.* Hulton; 4 Esp. 248; East *v.* Chapman, 2 C. & P. 570; 1 M. & Malk. 46, S. C.; Newton *v.* Rowe, 1 C. & K. 616; Crandall *v.* Dawson, 1 Gilm. Ill. R. 556. But see Larned *v.* Buffinton, 3 Mass. 546.

[1] Chalmers *v.* Shackell, 6 C. & P. 475. A charge of polygamy, by marrying three persons, may be justified by proof of actual marriage to two wives, and cohabitation and reputation as to the third. Wilmett *v.* Harmer, 8 C. & P. 695.

[2] Harding *v.* Brooks, 5 Pick. 244.

[3] Moore *v.* Terrell, 4 B. & Ad. 870. But see Riggs *v.* Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198.

slander of title. In these cases, the defendant, under the general issue and in disproof of malice, may give in evidence, that he spoke the words, claiming title in himself;[1] or, as the attorney of the claimant; or, that the words were true.[2]

§ 429. In actions of this nature, where the general issue is pleaded, with a justification, the usual course is for the plaintiff to prove the libel, and leave it to the defendant to make out his justification; after which the plaintiff offers all his evidence rebutting the defence. And if the plaintiff elects, in the opening of his case, to offer any evidence to repel the justification, he is ordinarily required to offer it all in that stage of the cause, and is not permitted to give further evidence in reply.[3] But this rule is not imperative, the subject resting in the discretion of the Judge, under the circumstances of the case.[4]

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[1] Smith *v.* Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246.

[2] Watson *v.* Reynolds, 1 M. & Malk. 1; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 98, 99, [103], [104]; Pitt *v.* Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639.

[3] Browne *v.* Murray, Ry. & M. 254; Ante, Vol. 1, § 431.

[4] For the *damages* in this action, see Ante, tit. DAMAGES, § 275.

LIMITATIONS.

§ 430. The Statute of Limitations is set up in bar either of *rights of entry*, or of rights of action. In the former case, when the defendant claims title to land under a long possession, he must show that the possession was open and visible, notorious, exclusive, and adverse to the title of the plaintiff.[1] It must be such, that the owner may be presumed to know, that there is a possesion adverse to his title;[2] but his actual knowledge is not necessary, it being sufficient if, by ordinary observation, he might have known.[3] It must be knowingly and designedly taken and held; an occupancy by accident and mistake, such as, through ignorance of the dividing line, or the like, is not sufficient.[4] And it must be with exclusive claim of title in the possessor; and not in submission to the title of the true owner.[5]

§ 431. Where the Statute of Limitations is set up in bar of a *right of action*, by the plea of *actio non accrevit infra sex annos*, which is traversed, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, to show both a cause of action, and the suing out of process within the period mentioned in the statute.[6]

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[1] Taylor *v.* Horde, 1 Burr. 60; Cowp. 689; Jerritt *v.* Weare, 3 Price, R. 575; 4 Kent, Comm. 482–489; Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Laboree, 2 Greenl. 273; Little *v.* Libby, Ibid. 242; Little *v.* Megquier, Ibid. 176; Norcross *v.* Widgery, 2 Mass. 506.

[2] Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Coburn *v.* Hollis, 3 Met. 125; Bates *v.* Norcross, 14 Pick. 224; Prescott *v.* Nevers, 4 Mason, R. 326.

[3] Poignard *v.* Smith, 6 Pick. 172.

[4] Brown *v.* Gay, 3 Greenl. 126; Gates *v.* Butler, 3 Humphreys, R. 447; Ross *v.* Gould, 5 Greenl. 204.

[5] Small *v.* Proctor, 15 Mass. 495; Little *v.* Libby, 2 Greenl. 242; Peters *v.* Foss, 5 Greenl. 182; Teller *v.* Burtis, 6 Johns. 197.

[6] Hurst *v.* Parker, 1 B. & Ald. 92; 2 Chitty, R. 249, S. C.; Wilby *v.* Henman, 6 Tyrw. 957; 2 Cr. & Mees. 658.

By suing out of process, in these cases, is meant any resort to legal means for obtaining payment of the debt from the defendant; such as, filing the claim in set-off, in a former action between the same parties, which was discontinued;[1] or, filing it with the commissioners on an insolvent estate.[2] And the suit is commenced by the first or incipient step taken in the course of legal proceedings, such as the actual filling up and completing the writ, or original summons, without showing it served;[3] the true time of doing which may be shown by extrinsic evidence, irrespective of the date of the process;[4] though the date of the process is *primâ facie* evidence of the time when it was sued out.[5] So, the true time of filing the declaration may be shown, without regard to the term of which it is intituled.[6] The issuing of a latitat is the true commencement of a suit by bill of Middlesex;[7] and so is the issuing of a capias, in the Common Pleas.[8] The filing of a bill in Chancery is also

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[1] Hunt *v.* Spaulding, 18 Pick. 521.

[2] Guild *v.* Hale, 15 Mass. 455.

[3] Gardiner *v.* Webber, 17 Pick. 407; Williams *v.* Roberts, 1 Cr. M. & R. 676; 5 Tyrw. 421; Burdick *v.* Green, 18 Johns. 14; Beekman *v.* Satterlee, 5 Cowen, 519; Johnson *v.* Farwell, 7 Greenl. 370; Parker *v.* Colcord, 2 N. Hamp. R. 36; Thompson *v.* Bell, 6 Monroe, R. 560. But see Bonnet *v.* Ramsay, 3 Martin, R. 776; Jencks *v.* Phelps, 4 Conn. 149; Perkins *v.* Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Day *v.* Lamb, 7 Verm. 426.

[4] Bilton *v.* Long, 2 Keb. 198, per Kelyng, C. J.; Johnson *v.* Smith, 2 Burr. 950, 959; Young *v.* Kenyon, 2 Day, 252.

[5] Bunker *v.* Shed, 8 Metc. 150.

[6] Granger *v.* George, 5 B. & C. 149; Snell *v.* Phillips, Peake's Cas. 209; Robinson *v.* Burleigh, 5 N. Hamp. 225.

[7] Johnson *v.* Smith, 2 Burr. 950.

[8] Leader *v.* Moxon, 2 W. Bl. 925. Where the writ and declaration disagree, as, where the writ is in trespass, and the declaration is in assumpsit, as is practised in the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, it must be shown, not only that the writ was seasonably issued, but that it was entered and continued, down to the time of filing the declaration; for otherwise it will not appear, that the writ was sued out for the present cause of action. But in the United States this is seldom necessary; and where the course of proceeding would seem to require it, the continuances are mere matters of form, and may be entered at any time. See Angell on Limitations, p. 315–320; Schlosser *v.* Lesher, 1 Dall. 311; Beekman *v.* Satterlee, 5 Cowen, 519; Soulden *v.* Van Rensselaer, 3 Wend. 472; Davis *v.* West, 5 Wend. 63.

a good commencement of an action, unless the bill is dismissed on the ground that the subject is cognizable only at law.[1]

§ 432. If writ is *abated*, by the death of the plaintiff, or by her marriage, if a feme sole, the operation of the statute is prevented, by the commencement of a *new suit*, by the proper parties, within a *reasonable time;* and this, where it is not otherwise regulated by statute, is ordinarily understood to be one year, this period having been adopted from the analogy of the fourth section in the Statute of Limitations of James I., providing for the cases of judgments reversed or arrested.[2] But this rule does not apply to an action determined by voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff, as, in case of a *nonsuit*.[3]

§ 433. In cases of *tort*, and in actions on the case sounding in tort, a distinction is to be observed between acts wrongful in themselves, which directly affect the rights of the plaintiff, and for which, therefore, an action may be instantly maintained without proof of actual damages; and those cases where the injury is consequential, and the right of action is founded on the special damages suffered by the plaintiff. In the former class of cases, the statute period begins to run from the time when the act is done, without regard to any actual damages, or to any knowledge by the party injured. But in the latter cases, it runs from the time when the special damage accrued. Thus, in slander, where the words impute an indictable offence, the time runs from the speaking of them; but if they are actionable only in respect of the

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[1] Gray *v.* Berryman, 4 Munf. 181. See further, Angell on Limitations, p. 321–325.

[2] Kinsey *v.* Heyward, 1 Ld. Raym, 434, per Treby, C. J.; Forbes *v.* Ld. Middleton, Willes, 259, note (*c*); Matthews *v.* Phillips, 2 Salk. 424, 425; Angell on Limitations, p. 325–330; Huntington *v.* Brinkerhoff, 10 Wend. 278.

[3] Richards *v.* Maryland Ins. Co. 8 Cranch, 84, 93; Harris *v.* Dennis, 1 S. & R. 236. But see Cretien *v* Theard, 2 Martin, R. 747.

special damage, as, in slander of title, it runs from the time when this damage was sustained.[1] So, in *trover*, the time is computed from the act of conversion of the goods.[2] And in actions for official or *professional negligence*, the cause of action is founded on the *breach of duty*, which actually injured the plaintiff, and not on the consequential damage. Thus, in an action against an attorney, for neglect of professional duty, it has been held, that the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time when the breach of duty was committed, and not from the time when the consequential damage accrued.[3] So, in an action against the sheriff, for an insufficient return upon a writ, by reason whereof the judgment was reversed, the statute begins to run from the time of the return, and not from the reversal of the judgment.[4] But in an action for taking insufficient bail, the injury did not arise to the plaintiff, until he had recovered judgment, and the principal had avoided, for until then, the bail might have surrendered the principal; and therefore the statute begins to run from the return of *non est inventus* on the execution.[5]

§ 434. The same distinction has been recognized, in expounding private and local statutes, which have limited the remedy to a certain period of time from the *act done*.[6] Where the act was in itself lawful, so far as the rights of the plaintiff

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[1] Law *v.* Harwood, Cro. Car. 140; Saunders *v.* Edwards, 1 Sid. 95.

[2] Compton *v.* Chandless, 4 Esp. 20, per Ld. Kenyon; Granger *v.* George, 5 B. & C. 149; Denys *v.* Shuckburg, 4 Y. & C. 42.

[3] Howell *v.* Young, 2 C. & P. 238; 5 B. & C. 259, S. C. confirmed in Smith *v.* Fox, 12 Jur. 130; Brown *v.* Howard, 4 J. B. Moore, 508; 2 B. & B. 73, S. C.; Short *v.* McCarthy, 3 B. & Ald. 626. See also Leonard *v.* Pitney, 5 Wend. 30; The Bank of Utica *v.* Childs, 5 Cowen, 238; Stafford *v.* Richardson, 15 Wend. 302; Argall *v.* Bryant, 1 Sandf. 98.

[4] Miller *v.* Adams, 16 Mass. 456.

[5] Rice *v.* Hosmer, 12 Mass. 127, 130; Mather *v.* Green, 17 Mass. 60.

[6] Whether a mere non-feasance and omission can be regarded as an *act done*, so as to be within the protection of these statutes, has been much doubted. See Blakemore *v.* Glamorganshire Canal Co. 3 Y. & J. 60; Gaby *v.* Wilts. & Berks. Canal Co. 3 M. & S. 580; Umphelby *v.* McLean, 1 B. & Ald. 42; Smith *v.* Shaw, 10 B. & C. 277, per Bayley, J.

were concerned, but occasioned a subsequent and consequential damage to him, the time has been computed from the commencement of the damage, this being the act done, within the meaning of the law. But where the original act was in itself a direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights, the time has been computed from such original act. Thus, where a surveyor of highways, in the execution of his office, undermined a wall adjoining a highway, and several months afterwards it fell, the statute period limiting the remedy was computed from the falling of the wall, this alone being the specific wrong for which an action was maintainable.[1] And the same principle has been applied to similar acts, done by commissioners and others, acting under statutes.[2] On the other hand, where the action is for an illegal seizure of goods under the revenue laws, though they were originally stopped for examination only, and afterwards finally and absolutely detained, the time is computed from the original act of stopping the goods, and not from the commencement of special damages, or from the final detention, or from the re-delivery of the goods.[3] So, where a trespass was committed by cutting down trees, which the defendant afterwards sold, it was held that the statute attached at the time of cutting the trees, and not at the time of sale.[4]

§ 435. In cases of *contract*, the general principle is, that the statute attaches as soon as the contract is broken; because the plaintiff may then commence his action. And though special damage has resulted, yet the limitation is computed from the time of the breach, and not from the time when the

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[1] Roberts *v.* Read, 16 East, 215; 6 Taunt. 40, n. (*b*); Wordsworth *v.* Harley, 1 B. & Ad. 391.

[2] Gillon *v.* Boddington, 1 C. & P. 541; Lloyd *v.* Wigney, 6 Bing. 489; Sutton *v.* Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29. But see Smith *v.* Shaw, 10 B. & C. 277; Heard *v.* The Middlesex Canal, 5 Met. 81.

[3] Godin *v.* Ferris, 2 H. Bl. 14; Saunders *v.* Saunders, 2 East, 254; Crook *v.* McTavish, 1 Bing. 167.

[4] Hughes *v.* Thomas, 13 East, 474, 485.

special damage arose.[1] If money is lent, and a bill of exchange is given for the payment at a future day, the latter period is the time when the limitation commences.[2] If a bill is payable at a certain time after sight,[3] or a note is payable at so many days after demand,[4] the statute attaches only upon the expiration of the time after presentment or demand. But where the right of action accrues after the death of the party entitled, the period of limitation does not commence until the grant of administration; for until then, there is no person capable of suing.[5] Where the action is against a factor, for not accounting and paying over, the statute begins to run from the time of demand; for until demand made, no action accrued against him.[6] And where a contract of service is entire, as, for a year, or, for a voyage, the limitation does not commence until the whole term of service is expired.

§ 436. The bar of the Statute of Limitations may be avoided by showing, (1.) that the plaintiff was under any *disability* mentioned in the statute; or, (2.) that the claim has been recognized by the defendant as valid, by an *acknowledgment*, or a *new promise*, within the statute period; or, (3.) that the cause of action was *fraudulently concealed* by the defendant, until within that period.

§ 437. (1.) The *disabilities* of *infancy*, *coverture*, and

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[1] Battely *v.* Faulkner, 3 B. & Ad. 290; Short *v.* McCarthy, Ibid. 626. If the right of action was in a trustee, it is barred by his neglect to sue, though the *cestui que trust* was under disability. Wych *v.* E. Ind. Co. 3 P. Wms. 309.

[2] Wittersheim *v.* Countess of Carlisle, 1 H. Bl. 631.

[3] Holmes *v.* Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323.

[4] Thorpe *v.* Booth, Ry. & M. 388; Thorpe *v.* Combe, 8 D. & R. 347; Anon. 1 Mod. 89.

[5] Murray *v.* E. Ind. Co. 5 B. & Ald. 204. And see Cary *v.* Stephenson, 1 Salk. 421; Pratt *v.* Swaine, 8 B. & C. 285. In some of the United States, cases of this kind are specially provided for by statutes, extending the period of limitation for a further definite time.

[6] Topham *v.* Braddick, 1 Taunt. 572. And see Pecke *v.* Ambler, W. Jones, 329.

[7] Ewer *v.* Jones, 6 Mod. 26.

insanity, will be found treated under their appropriate heads. The disability arising from absence out of the country, is usually expressed by being *beyond sea;* but the principle on which this exception is founded, is, that no presumption can arise against a party for not suing in a foreign country, nor until there is somebody within the jurisdiction whom he can sue;[1] and therefore the words "beyond sea," in the statute of any State, are expounded as equivalent to being "out of the State," and receive the same construction.[2] And the latter form of words is held equivalent to being "out of the actual jurisdiction;" that is, beyond the reach of process; so that where a part of the territory of a State, in time of war, is actually and exclusively occupied by the enemy, a person within the enemy's lines is out of the State, within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations.[3] The rule, as applied to a defendant, has therefore been limited to the case where he was personally absent from the State, having no attachable property within it.[4] A foreigner, resident abroad, is not within the operation of the statute, even though he has an agent, resident in the country.[5]

§ 438. In the case of *partners*, the absence of one from the country does not prevent the statute from attaching, for the others might have sued for all.[6] Nor does the disability of one *coparcener*, or *tenant in common*, preserve the title of

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[1] Per Best, C. J., in Douglas *v.* Forrest, 4 Bing. 686.

[2] Faw *v.* Roberdeau, 3 Cranch, 177, per Marshall, C. J.; Murray *v.* Baker, 2 Wheat. 541; Angell on Limitations, p. 219–222. In some of the United States, the disability of the plaintiff is limited, by statute, to his absence from the United States; and that of the defendant, to his absence from the particular State in which he resided.

[3] Sleght *v.* Kane, 1 Johns. Cas. 76, 81.

[4] White *v.* Bailey, 2 Mass. 371; Little *v.* Blunt, 16 Pick. 359.

[5] Strithorst *v.* Græme, 2 W. Bl. 723; 3 Wils. 145, S. C.; Wilson *v.* Appleton, 17 Mass. 180. If a plaintiff be beyond sea at the time of the action accruing, he may sue at any time before his return, as well as within the time limited by statute for the commencement of a suit after his return. Le Veux *v.* Berkeley, 5 Ad. & El. 836, N. S. And see Townsend *v.* Deacon, 13 Jur. 366.

[6] Perry *v.* Jackson, 4 T. R. 516, 519; Pendleton *v.* Phelps, 4 Day, 476.

the other; for each may sue for his part.[1] But in the case of *joint-tenants* and *joint-contractors*, it is otherwise."[2]

§ 439. When the time mentioned in the statute has once begun to run, it is a settled rule of construction, that no disability, subsequently arising, will arrest its progress.[3] If, therefore, the party be out of the jurisdiction when the cause of action accrues, and afterwards returns within it, the statute attaches upon his return. But in the case of a defendant, his return must be open, and such as would enable the plaintiff, by using reasonable diligence, to serve process upon him. If it was only temporary and transient, in a remote part of the State, so that it could not have been seasonably known to the plaintiff; or if the defendant concealed himself, except on Sundays, so that he could not be arrested, it is not such a return as to bring the case within the operation of the statute.[4]

§ 440. (2.) Where the statute is pleaded in bar, and the plaintiff would avoid the bar by proof of an acknowledgment of the claim, this can be done only under a special replication of a *new promise*, within the period limited. It is to be observed, that the statute of limitations is regarded by the Courts as a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment of a just debt, from lapse of time, but to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal

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[1] Roe *v.* Rowlston, 2 Taunt. 441; Doolittle *v.* Blakesley, 4 Day, 265.

[2] Marsteller *v.* McClean, 7 Cranch, 156; Fannin *v.* Anderson, 9 Jur. 969; 14 Law Journ. 282, N. S.

[3] Doe *v.* Jones, 4 T. R. 300, 310; Angell on Limitations, p. 146, 147; Smith *v.* Hill, 1 Wils. 134. In some of the United States, the rule is differently established, by statutes. See Rev. Stat. of Mass. ch. 120, § 9; Rev. Stat. Maine, ch. 146, § 28.

[4] Fowler *v.* Hunt, 10 Johns. 464, 467; White *v.* Bailey, 3 Mass. 271, 273; Byrne *v.* Crowninshield, 1 Pick. 263; Little *v.* Blunt, 16 Pick. 359; Ruggles *v.* Keeler, 3 Johns. 264; Crosby *v.* Wyatt, 10 Shepl. 156.

of witnesses.[1] Wherever, therefore, the bar of the statute is sought to be removed by proof of a new promise, the promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved in a clear and explicit manner, and be in its terms unequivocal and determinate.[2] In the absence of any express statute to the contrary, parol evidence of a new promise would be sufficient; but in England, and in several of the United States, no acknowledgment or promise is now sufficient to take any case out of the operation of this statute, unless such acknowledgment or promise is made or contained by or in some writing, signed by the party chargeable thereby.[3] It is not necessary, however, that the promise should be express; it may be raised, by implication of law, from the *acknowledgment* of the party.[4] But such acknowledgment ought to contain an unqualified and direct admission of a present subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there be accompanying circumstances, which repel the presumption of a promise or intention to pay; or, if the expressions be equivocal, vague, and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inferences, which may affect different minds in different ways; it has been held, that they ought not to go to a Jury, as evidence of a new promise, to revive the cause

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[1] Bell *v.* Morrison, 1 Peters, S. C. Rep. 360, per Story, J.; Mountstephen *v.* Brooke, 3 B. & Ald. 141, per Abbott, C. J.; Tanner *v.* Smart, 6 B. & C. 603. The legal effect of acknowledging a debt, barred by the statute, is that of a promise to pay the old debt; which promise the law implies from the acknowledgment, and for which the old debt is a consideration in law. But if the promise is limited to payment at a particular time, or in a certain manner, or out of a specific fund, the creditor can claim nothing more than the new promise gives him; for the old debt is revived only so far as to form a consideration for the new promise. Phillips *v.* Phillips, 3 Hare, 299. If therefore the new promise was not made until after action brought, it cannot prevent the operation of the statute. Bateman *v.* Pinder, 3 Ad. & El. 574, N. S.

[2] Bell *v.* Morrison, 1 Peters, S. C. Rep. 362; Cambridge *v.* Hobart, 10 Pick. 232; Gardiner *v.* Tudor, 8 Pick. 206; Bangs *v.* Hall, 2 Pick. 368.

[3] 9 Geo. 4, ch. 14; Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 120, § 13; Rev. Stat. Maine, ch. 146, § 19.

[4] Angell on Limitations, p. 228.

of action.[1] If the new promise was coupled with any condition, the plaintiff must show that the condition has been performed, or performance duly tendered.[2] And if it were a promise to pay when he is able, the plaintiff must show that he is able to pay.[3]

§ 441. Upon this general doctrine, which, after much conflict of opinion, is now well established, it has been held, that the acknowledgment must not only go to the original justice of the claim, but it must admit that it is *still due*.[4] No set form of words is requisite; it may be inferred even from facts, without words.[5] It is sufficient, if made to a stranger,[6] or, in the case of a negotiable security, if made to a prior holder;[7] or, in any case, if made while the action is pending.[8] If it is made by the principal debtor, it binds the surety;[9] or, if

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[1] Bell *v.* Morrison, 1 Peters, S. C. Rep. 362 – 365; Bell *v.* Rowland, Hardin, 301; Angell on Limitations, p. 247 – 250; Bangs *v.* Hall, 2 Pick. 368; Stanton *v.* Stanton, 2 N. Hamp. 426; Jones *v.* Moore, 5 Binn. 573; Perley *v.* Little, 3 Greenl. 97; Porter *v.* Hill, 4 Greenl. 41; Deshon *v.* Eaton, Ibid. 413; Miles *v.* Moodie, 3 S. & R. 211; Eckert *v.* Wilson, 12 S. & R. 397; Purdy *v.* Austin, 3 Wend. 187; Sumner *v.* Sumner, 1 Met. 394; Allcock *v.* Ewen, 2 Hill, S. Car. Rep. 326; Humphreys *v.* Jones, 14 M. & W. 1; 9 Jur. 333.

[2] Wetzell *v.* Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309.

[3] Davies *v.* Smith, 4 Esp. 36; Tanner *v.* Smart, 6 B. & C. 603; Scales *v.* Jacob, 3 Bing. 638; Ayton *v.* Bolt, 4 Bing. 105; Haydon *v.* Williams, 7 Bing. 163; Edmunds *v.* Downes, 2 C. & M. 459; Robbins *v.* Otis, 1 Pick. 368; 3 Pick. 4; Gould *v.* Shirley, 2 M. & P. 581. The statute will in such case begin to run from the time when the debtor became able to pay, without respect to the creditor's knowledge of that fact. Waters *v.* Thanet, 2 Ad. & El. 757, N. S.

[4] Clementson *v.* Williams, 8 Cranch, 72.

[5] Whitney *v.* Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; East Ind. Co. *v.* Prince, Ry. & M. 407.

[6] Ibid.; Halliday *v.* Ward, 3 Campb. 42; Mountstephen *v.* Brooke, 3 B. & Ald. 141; Sluby *v.* Champlin, 4 Johns. 461. It seems that, in England, since the statute of 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, an acknowledgment made to a stranger would not be sufficient. Grenfell *v.* Girdlestone, 2 Y. & C. 662.

[7] Little *v.* Blunt, 9 Pick. 488.

[8] Yea *v.* Fouraker, 2 Burr. 1099; Danforth *v.* Culver, 11 Johns. 146.

[9] Frye *v.* Barker, 4 Pick. 382.

by the guardian of a spendthrift, it binds the ward;[1] and if by one of several joint debtors, it binds them all.[2] And where the plaintiff proves a general acknowledgment of indebtment, the burden of proof is on the defendant, to show that it related to a different demand from the one in controversy.[3] Nor is it necessary, unless so required by express statute, that the acknowledgment should be in writing, even though the original contract is one which was required to be in writing by the statute of frauds; for it was the original contract in writing which fixed the defendant's liability, and the verbal acknowledgment within six years only went to show that this liability had not been discharged.[4]

§ 442. It has already been observed, that an acknowledgment, in order to remove the bar of the statute, must be such as raises an implication of a promise to pay. It must be a distinct admission of present indebtment. If, therefore, the party, at the time of the conversation, or in the writing, should state that he *had a receipt*, or other written discharge of the claim, which he would or could produce, this does not take the case out of the statute, even though he should fail to produce the discharge.[5] So, if he admits that the claim has been previously made, but denies that he is bound to pay it, whether because of its want of legal formality, as, for

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[1] Manson *v.* Felton, 13 Pick. 206.

[2] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 174, 176; Patterson *v.* Patterson, 7 Wend. 441. But where one party was a feme covert at the time of the new promise by the other, it was held not sufficient to charge her and her husband. Pittam *v.* Foster, 1 B. & C. 248. The question whether an acknowledgment by one partner is sufficient to avoid the statute as to all, was raised in Clark *v.* Alexander, 8 Jur. 496; 8 Scott, N. R. 147. But see Walton *v.* Robinson, 5 Ired. 341; Wheelock *v.* Doolittle, 3 Washb. 440, that it is, even after dissolution. *Semb.* that an acknowledgment by one of several executors is not. Scholey *v.* Walton, 12 M. & W. 510, per Parke, B.

[3] Whitney *v.* Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; Frost *v.* Bengough, 1 Bing. 266; Baillie *v.* Ld. Inchiquin, 1 Esp. 435. But see Sands *v.* Gelston, 15 Johns. 511; Clarke *v.* Dutcher, 9 Cowen, 674.

[4] Gibbons *v.* McCasland, 1 B. & Ad. 690.

[5] Brydges *v.* Plumptre, 9 D. & R. 746; Birk *v.* Guy, 4 Esp. 184.

example, a stamp,[1] or of its want of consideration,[2] or the like. If the language is ambiguous, it is for the Jury to determine, whether it amounts to an explicit acknowledgment of the debt, or not.[3] But if it is in writing, and is clear, either as an acknowledgment, or otherwise, the Judge will be justified in so instructing the jury.[4]

§ 443. The terms of the acknowledgment, moreover, must all be *taken together*, so that it may be seen, whether, upon the whole, the party intended distinctly to admit a *present debt* or duty. If, in affirming that the debt, once due, has been discharged, he claims it to have been *discharged by a writing*, to which he particularly refers with such precision, as to exclude every other mode, and the writing being produced or proved, does not in law afford him a legal discharge, his acknowledgment will stand unqualified, and will bind him.[5] So, if the defendant challenges the plaintiff to produce a particular mode of proof of his liability, such as, to prove the genuineness of the signature, or the like, and he does so, the implied acknowledgment will be sufficient to take the case out of the statute.[6] But if the acknowledgment is

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[1] A'Court *v.* Cross, 3 Bing. 329.

[2] Easterby *v.* Pullen, 3 Stark. 186; De la Torre *v.* Barclay, 1 Stark. 7; Miller *v.* Lancaster, 4 Greenl. 159; Sands *v.* Gelston, 15 Johns. 511.

[3] Lloyd *v.* Maund, 2 T. R. 760; East Ind. Co. *v.* Prince, Ry. & M. 407. In the Circuit Court of the United States, it has been held, that the sufficiency of the evidence to take a case out of the statute, is a question of law for the Court; and that the Jury are only to determine whether the evidence applies to the debt in suit, and to what part of it. Penaro *v.* Flournoy, 9 Law Reporter, 269.

[4] College *v.* Horn, 3 Bing. 119; Brigstocke *v.* Smith, 1 C. & M. 483; 2 Tyrw. 445.

[5] Partington *v.* Butcher, 6 Esp. 66. This is doubtless the case alluded to by Gibbs, C. J. in Hellings *v.* Shaw, 1 J. B. Moore, 340, 344; where he is made to confine his observation to the case of a discharge by a *written* instrument. His remarks, as reported in the same case, in 7 Taunt. 612, are general, and applicable to any other mode of discharge; but to this unlimited extent their soundness is questioned by Bailey, J. in Beal *v.* Nind, 4 B. & Ald. 568, 571. And see Dean *v.* Pitts, 10 Johns. 35.

[6] Hellings *v.* Shaw, 7 Taunt. 612, per Gibbs, C. J.; Seaward *v.* Lord, 1 Greenl. 163; Robbins *v.* Otis, 1 Pick. 370; 3 Pick. 4.

accompanied with circumstances or declarations, showing an intention to *insist on the benefit of the statute*, it is now held that no promise to pay can be implied.[1] And if the cause of action arose from the doing or omitting to do some *specific act* at a particular time, an acknowledgment, within six years, that the contract has been broken, is held insufficient to raise the presumption of a new promise to perform the duty.[2]

§ 444. Where a specific sum of money was due, as, upon a promissory note, the *payment of a part* of the debt is also held, at Common Law, to be a sufficient acknowledgment, that the whole debt is still due, to authorize the presumption of a promise to pay the remainder; though it seems it would not be sufficient, if no specific sum was due, but the demand was only for a *quantum meruit*.[3] But it is the payment itself, and not the indorsement of it on the back of the security, that has this effect; though where the indorsement is proved to have been actually made before the cause of action was barred by the statute, and consequently against the interest of the party making it, the course is, to admit it to be considered by the Jury among the circumstances showing an actual payment.[4] And if such payment be made by one of several *joint debtors*, who is not otherwise discharged from the obligation, it is evidence against them

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[1] Coltman *v.* Marsh, 3 Taunt. 380; Rowcroft *v.* Lomas, 4 M. & S. 457; Bangs *v.* Hall, 2 Pick. 368; Knott *v.* Farren, 4 D. & R. 179; Danforth *v.* Culver, 11 Johns. 146.

[2] Boydell *v.* Drummond, 2 Campb. 157; Whitehead *v.* Howard, 2 B. & B. 372; Wetzell *v.* Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309.

[3] Burn *v.* Bolton, 15 Law Journ. 97, N. S.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 121, 122; Whitney *v.* Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; Hancock *v.* Cook, 18 Pick. 30, 33; Rose *v.* Bryant, 2 Camp. 321; Conclin *v.* Pearson, 1 Rich. 391. This subject is now regulated by statutes, in England, and in several of the United States, by which the indorsement, if made by the creditor or in his behalf, without the concurrence of the debtor, is of no avail to take the case out of the statute. Stat. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 14; Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 120, § 17; Rev. Stat. Maine, ch. 146, § 23.

all.[1] But as this rule is founded on the community of interest among the debtors, and the presumption, that no one of them would make an admission against his own interest, it results, that, where the party making the payment is no longer responsible, as, for example, where it is received under a dividend in bankruptcy, it raises no presumption against the others.[2]

§ 445. The existence of *mutual accounts* between the parties, if there are items on *both sides* within the period of limitation, is such evidence of a mutual acknowledgment of indebtment, as to take the case out of the operation of the statute.[3] And if the defendant's account contains an item within that period, this has been held sufficient to save the account of the plaintiff;[4] but if the items in the defendant's account are all of an earlier date, though some of those in the plaintiff's account may be within the statute period, the statute will bar all the claim, except the last mentioned items.[5] If the account has been stated between the parties, the statute period commences at the time of stating it;[6] but

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[1] See Ante, § 441; Vol. 1, § 174. But the effect of such payment is now restricted by statutes, in some of the United States, and in England, to the party paying. Stat. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 14; Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 120, § 14, 18; Rev. Stat. Maine, ch. 146, § 20, 24.

[2] Brandram *v.* Wharton, 1 B. & Ald. 463; Ante, Vol. 1, § 174, n. (3).

[3] Cogswell *v.* Dolliver, 2 Mass. 217; Bull. N. P. 149; Chamberlain *v.* Cuyler, 9 Wend. 126; Tucker *v.* Ives, 6 Cowen, 193; Fitch *v.* Hilleary, 1 Hill, S. Car. Rep. 292. See also, Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 120, § 5. A similar effect has been attributed to continuity of service of a domestic, until a short time previous to the suit. Viens *v.* Brickle, 1 Martin, 611. If the items are all on one side, those within six years will not save the others from the operation of the statute. Hadlock *v.* Losee, 1 Sandf. 220.

[4] Davis *v.* Smith, 4 Greenl. 337; Sickles *v.* Mather, 20 Wend. 72.

[5] Gold *v.* Whitcomb, 14 Pick. 188; Bull. N. P. 149. In England, since Ld. Tenterden's Act, (9 Geo. 4, ch. 14,) the existence of items within six years, in an open account, will not operate to take the previous portion of the account out of the Statute of Limitations. Cottam *v.* Partridge, 4 M. & G. 271.

[6] Farrington *v.* Lee, 1 Mod. 269; 2 Mod. 311; Cranch *v.* Kirkman, Peake's Cas. 121, and note (1), by Day; Union Bank *v.* Knapp, 3 Pick. 96.

a mere cessation of dealings, or any act of the creditor alone, or even the death of one of the parties, is not, in effect, a statement of the account.[1]

§ 446. It may here be further observed, that, where the cause of action arises *ex delicto*, as in trespass and trover; or is given by positive statute, irrespective of any promise or neglect of duty by the party, as in the case of actions against executors and administrators upon the contracts of their testators or intestates; if the action is once barred by lapse of time, no admission or acknowledgment, however unequivocal and positive, will take it out of the operation of the statute.[2]

§ 447. The Statute of Limitations of 21 *Jac.* 1, *c.* 16, which has been copied nearly *verbatim*, in its principal features, in most of the United States, contains an exception of "such *accounts* as concern the *trade of merchandise* between *merchant and merchant*, their factors or servants." To bring a case within this exception, it must be alleged in the replication, and shown by proof, to conform to the statute in each of those particulars; every part of the exception being equally material. The exception is not of actions, nor of special contracts, nor of any other transactions between merchants, but is restricted to that which is properly *matter of account*, or consists of debits and credits properly arising in account.[3] It

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[1] Trueman *v.* Hurst, 1 T. R. 40; Mandeville *v.* Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; Bass *v.* Bass, 5 Pick. 187; McLellan *v.* Crofton, 6 Greenl. 307.

[2] Hurst *v.* Parker, 1 B. & Ald. 92; 2 Chitty, 249; Oothout *v.* Thompson, 20 Johns. 277; Brown *v.* Anderson, 13 Mass. 201; Thompson *v.* Brown, 16 Mass. 172; Dawes *v.* Shed, 15 Mass. 6; Ex parte Allen, Ib. 58; Parkman *v.* Osgood, 3 Greenl. 17.

[3] Spring *v.* Gray, 5 Mason, 525, per Story, J.; 6 Peters, 155, S. C.; Cottam *v.* Partridge, 4 M. & G. 271; 4 Scott, N. R. 819. A mere open account, without any agreement that the goods delivered on one side shall go in payment of those delivered on the other, is not *therefore* an account of merchandise, between merchants. Ibid. It has recently been held in England, that the exception as to merchants' accounts does not apply to an action of *indebitatus assumpsit*, but only to the action of account, or

has therefore been held, that such claims as bills of exchange,[1] or a contract to receive half the profits of a voyage in lieu of freight,[2] were not merchants' accounts, within this exception. And as the exception was intended to be carved out of cases for which an action of account lies, and as this action does not lie where an account has already been stated between the parties, it has been held, that a *stated account* is not within the exception in the statute.[3] But an account *closed*, by a mere cessation of dealings, we have just seen, is not deemed an account stated. Whether any but *current accounts*, that is, those which contain items within the statute period, are within this exception, is a point upon which the authorities, both in England and America, are not uniform. On the one hand, it is maintained, upon the language of the statute, that if the accounts come within its terms, it is sufficient to save them, though there have been no dealings within the six years.[4] On the other hand it has been held, that where all accounts have ceased for more than six years, the statute is a bar; and that the exception applies only to accounts running within the six years; in which last case, the whole account is saved as to the antecedent items.[5] The accounts also, to be within the exception, must be such as concern the *trade of merchandise;* that is, such as concern traffic in merchandise, where there is a buying and selling of goods, and an account properly arising therefrom.[6]

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perhaps to an action on the case for not accounting. Inglis *v.* Haigh, 5 Jur. 704; 8 M. & W. 769.

[1] Chievly *v.* Bond, 4 Mod. 105; Carth. 226; 1 Show. 341. S. C.

[2] Spring *v.* Gray, 5 Mason, 505; 6 Peters, 155, S. C.

[3] Webber *v.* Tivill, 2 Saund. 124, 127, note (6), (7), by Williams; 5 Mason, 526, 527.

[4] Mandeville *v.* Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; Bass *v.* Bass, 6 Pick. 362, confirmed in 8 Pick. 187, 192; McLellan *v.* Crofton, 6 Greenl. 307. Such is now the rule in England. See Robinson *v.* Alexander, 8 Bligh, N. S. 352; Inglis *v.* Haigh, 5 Jur. 704; 8 M. & W. 769, S. C.

[5] Welford *v.* Liddel, 2 Vez. 400; Coster *v.* Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 522; Spring *v.* Gray, 5 Mason, 505, 528; 6 Peters, 155. See Angell on Limitations, p. 206–215; Ramchander *v.* Hammond, 2 Johns. 200.

[6] Spring *v.* Gray, 5 Mason, 529, per Story, J.; 6 Peters, 155. And

The existence of mutual debits and credits, there being no agreement that the articles delivered on one side shall go in payment for those delivered on the other, has been held insufficient to constitute the accounts, intended in this exception.[1] And it is necessary, moreover, that the parties to the account be *merchants*, or persons who traffic in merchandise, their factors, or servants.[2]

§ 448. The bar of this statute may also be avoided by proof of *fraud* in the defendant, committed under such circumstances as to *conceal* from the plaintiff all knowledge of the fraud, and thus prevent him from asserting his right, until a period beyond the time limited by the statute. But such fraudulent concealment can be shown only under a proper replication of the fact. And it must be alleged and proved, not only that the plaintiff did not know of the existence of the cause of action, but, that the defendant had practised fraud, in order to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining that knowledge at an earlier period.[3]

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see Sturt *v.* Mellish, 2 Atk. 612; Bridges *v.* Mitchell, Bunb. 217; Gilb. Eq. R. 224.

[1] Cottam *v.* Partridge, 4 M. & G. 271; 4 Scott, N. R. 819, S. C.

[2] 5 Mason, 530, per Story, J., and authorities there cited; 5 Com. Dig. 52, tit. Merchant, A.; 2 Salk. 445; Hancock *v.* Cook, 18 Pick. 32; Wilkinson on Limitations, p. 21–30.

[3] Angell on Limitations, p. 190–196; Bree *v.* Holbeck, 2 Doug. 654; confirmed in Brown *v.* Howard, 2 B. & B. 73, 75; 4 J. B. Moore, 508, S. C.; and in Clark *v.* Hougham, 2 B. & C. 149, 153; Short *v.* McCarthy, 3 B. & Ald. 626; Granger *v.* George, 5 B. & C. 149. And see Macdonald *v.* Macdonald, 1 Bligh, 315. See also Sherwood *v.* Sutton, 5 Mason, 143, where all the authorities are reviewed by Story, J. First Mass. Turnp. Co. *v.* Field, 3 Mass. 201; Homer *v.* Fish, 1 Pick. 435; Welles *v.* Fish, 3 Pick. 74; Farnham *v.* Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Jones *v.* Conoway, 4 Yeates, 109; Bishop *v.* Little, 3 Greenl. 405; Walley *v.* Walley, 3 Bligh, 12. In New York, fraudulent concealment of the cause of action will not prevent the operation of the statute. Troup *v.* Smith, 20 Johns. 40; Allen *v.* Mille, 17 Wend. 202.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

§ 449. To maintain an action for this injury, the plaintiff must prove — (1.) That he has been prosecuted by the defendant, either criminally, or in a civil suit; and that the prosecution is at an end; — (2.) That it was instituted maliciously, and without probable cause; (3.) That he has thereby sustained damage. It is not necessary that the whole proceedings be utterly groundless; for if groundless charges are maliciously and without probable cause coupled with others, which are well founded, they are not on that account the less injurious, and therefore constitute a valid cause of action.[1] Nor is the form of the prosecution material; the *gravamen* being, that the plaintiff has improperly been made the subject of legal process to his damage. If, therefore, a commission of bankruptcy has been sued out against him, though it was afterwards superseded;[2] or his house has been searched under a warrant for smuggled or stolen goods;[3] or, if a commission of lunacy has been taken out against him;[4] or, if special damage has resulted from a false claim of goods;[5] or, if goods have been extorted from him by duress of imprisonment, or abuse of legal process;[6] or, if he has been arrested and held to bail for a debt not due, or for more than was due;[7] and it was done maliciously, and without probable

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[1] Reed *v.* Taylor, 4 Taunt. 516; Wood *v.* Buckley, 4 Co. 14; Pierce *v.* Thompson, 6 Pick. 193; Stone *v.* Crocker, 24 Pick. 81.

[2] Brown *v.* Chapman, 3 Burr. 1418; Chapman *v.* Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145.

[3] Boot *v.* Cooper, 1 T. R. 535.

[4] Turner *v.* Turner, Gow, 20.

[5] Green *v.* Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 118.

[6] Grainger *v.* Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212; 3 Scott, 561; Plummer *v.* Dennett, 6 Greenl. 421.

[7] Savage *v.* Brewer, 15 Pick. 453; Wentworth *v.* Bullen, 9 B. & C.

cause; he may have this remedy for the injury. The action, moreover, is to be brought against the party who actually caused the injury, and not against one who was only a nominal party. And therefore, if one commence a suit in the name of another, without his authority, and attach the goods of the defendant, with malicious intent to vex and harass him, this action lies, though the suit was for a just cause of action.[1] But where the suit was commenced by the attorney of the party, in the course of his general employment, though without the knowledge or assent of his client, it seems, that the party himself is liable.[2] The attorney is not liable, unless he acted wholly without authority, or conspired with his client to oppress and harass the plaintiff.[3] Nor is it material, that the plaintiff was prosecuted by an insufficient process, or before a Court not having jurisdiction of the matter; for a bad indictment may serve all the purposes of malice, as well as a good one; and the injury to the party is not on that account less, than if the process had been regular, and before a competent tribunal.[4]

§ 450. (1.) The fact of the *prosecution* will be proved by duly authenticated copies of the record and proceedings.[5] Some evidence must also be given, that the defendant was the prosecutor. To this end, a copy of the indictment, with the defendant's name indorsed as a witness, is admissible as evidence, that he was sworn to the bill; but this fact may also be proved by one of the grand jury, or other competent

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810; Ray *v.* Law, 1 Peters, C. C. Rep. 210; Sommer *v.* Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19.

[1] Pierce *v.* Thompson, 6 Pick. 193.

[2] Jones *v.* Nichols, 3 M. & P. 12.

[3] Bicknell *v.* Dorion, 16 Pick. 468.

[4] Chambers *v.* Robinson, 1 Stra. 691; Anon. 2 Mod. 306; Saville *v.* Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 381; Jones *v.* Givin, Gilb. Cas. 185, 201–206, 221; Pippet *v.* Hearn, 5 B. & Ald. 634.

[5] For the law respecting *variance* between the allegation and the proof, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 63, 64, 65. If the prosecution was in a foreign country, a copy of the record is not indispensably necessary, but other evidence of the facts may be received. Young *v.* Gregory, 3 Call, 446.

testimony.[1] It may also be shown, that the defendant employed counsel or other persons, to assist in the prosecution; or, that he gave instructions, paid expenses, procured witnesses, or was otherwise active in forwarding it.

§ 451. Where the suit is for causing the plaintiff to be maliciously arrested and detained until he gave bail, it is sufficient for him to show a detention, without proving that he put in bail; for the detention is the principal *gravamen;* and is in itself *primâ facie* evidence of an arrest,[2] though the mere giving of bail is not.[3] But if the declaration is framed upon the fact of maliciously causing the plaintiff to be held to bail, no evidence of a previous arrest is necessary.[4]

§ 452. It must also appear, that the *prosecution is at an end.*[5] If it was a *civil suit*, its termination may be shown by proof of a rule to discontinue on payment of costs, and that the costs were taxed and paid; without proof of judgment or production of the record;[6] but an order to stay proceedings is not alone sufficient.[7] If it was terminated by a judgment, this is proved by the record. But where the action is for abusing the process of law, in order illegally to compel a party to do a collateral thing, such as, to give up his property, it is not necessary to aver and prove, that the process improperly employed is at an end, nor that it was

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[1] Rex *v.* Commerell, 4 M. & S. 203; Rex *v.* Smith, 1 Burr. 54; Rex *v.* Kettleworth, 5 T. R. 33; Johnson *v.* Browning, 6 Mod. 216. See, as to the competency of grand jurors, Ante, Vol. 1, § 252.

[2] Bristow *v.* Haywood, 1 Stark. 18; 4 Camp. 213, S. C.; Whalley *v.* Pepper, 7 C. & P. 506.

[3] Berry *v.* Adamson, 6 B. & C. 528; 2 C. & P. 503, S. C.

[4] Ibid.; Small *v.* Gray, 2 C. & P. 605.

[5] Arundell *v.* Tregono, Yelv. 116; Hunter *v.* French, Willes, 517; Lewis *v.* Farrell, 1 Stra. 114.

[6] Bristow *v.* Haywood, 4 Camp. 213; French *v.* Kirk, 1 Esp. 80; Brook *v.* Carpenter, 3 Bing. 297; Watkins *v.* Lee, 6 M. & W. 270.

[7] Wilkinson *v.* Howell, 1 M. & Malk. 495. Nor is an order to supersede the commission sufficient, in a case of bankruptcy. Poynton *v.* Forster, 3 Camp. 60.

sued out without reasonable or probable cause.[1] So, if it was a *criminal prosecution*, the like evidence must be given of its termination. And it must appear, that the plaintiff was *acquitted* of the charge; it is not enough, that the indictment was ended by the entry of a *nolle prosequi;* though if the party pleaded not guilty, and the Attorney General confessed the plea, this would suffice.[2] So, if he was acquitted because of a defect in the indictment, it is sufficient.[3] If the party has been arrested and bound over, on a criminal charge, but the grand jury did not find a bill against him, proof of this fact is not enough, without also showing, that he has been regularly discharged by order of Court; for the Court may have power to detain him, for good cause, until a further charge is preferred for the same offence.[4] But in other cases, the return of *ignoramus* on a bill, by the grand jury, has been deemed sufficient.[5]

§ 453. (2.) The plaintiff must also show, that the prosecution was instituted *maliciously, and without probable cause;* and both these must concur.[6] If it were malicious and unfounded, but there was probable cause for the prosecution, this action cannot be maintained.[7] The question of *malice* is for the Jury; and to sustain this averment, the charge must be shown to have been wilfully false.[8] In a

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1 Grainger *v.* Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212; 3 Scott, 561, S. C.

2 Goddard *v.* Smith, 1 Salk. 21; 6 Mod. 261, S. C.; Smith *v.* Shackelford, 1 Nott & M'C. 36; Fisher *v.* Bristow, 1 Doug. 215; Morgan *v.* Hughes, 2 T. R. 225.

3 Wicks *v.* Fentham, 4 T. R. 247.

4 Thomas *v.* De Graffenreid, 2 Nott & M'C. 143.

5 Morgan *v.* Hughes, 2 T. R. 225; Anon. Sty. 10, 372; Atwood *v.* Monger, Sty. 378; Jones *v.* Givin, Gilb. Cas. 185, 220.

6 Farmer *v.* Darling, 4 Burr. 1971; Stone *v.* Crocker, 24 Pick. 81, 83. Bell *v.* Graham, 1 Nott & M'C. 278. Whether, therefore, this action lies against a corporation, *quære*, and see McLellan *v.* Bank of Cumberland, 9 Law Rep. 82.

7 Arbuckle *v.* Taylor, 3 Dowl. 160; Turner *v.* Turner, Gow, 20.

8 Cohen *v.* Morgan, 6 D. & R. 8; Johnstone *v.* Sutton, 1 T. R. 540; Jackson *v.* Burleigh, 3 Esp. 34; Austin *v.* Debnam, 3 B. & C. 139; Burley *v.* Bethune, 5 Taunt. 580; Grant *v.* Duel, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 17.

legal sense, any unlawful act, done wilfully and purposely to the injury of another, is, as against that person malicious.[1] And if the immediate act be done unwillingly and by coercion, as, where the party preferred an indictment because he was bound over so to do, yet, if he was himself the cause of the coercion, as, by originally making a malicious charge before the magistrate, this will sustain the averment of malice.[2] The proof of malice need not be direct; it may be inferred from circumstances; but it is not to be inferred from the mere fact of the plaintiff's acquittal for want of the prosecutor's appearance when called;[3] nor, in

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[1] Commonwealth *v.* Snelling, 15 Pick. 321, 330; Stokley *v.* Harnidge, 8 C. & P. 11. The law, as to malice, was clearly illustrated by Park, J., in Mitchell *v.* Jenkins, 5 B. & Ad. 588, 594, in the following terms; — "I have always understood, since the case of Johnstone *v.* Sutton, 1 T. R. 510, which was decided long before I was in the profession, that no point of law was more clearly settled than that, in every action for a malicious prosecution or arrest, the plaintiff must prove what is averred in the declaration, viz. that the prosecution or arrest was malicious, and without reasonable or probable cause; if there be reasonable or probable cause, no malice, however distinctly proved, will make the defendant liable; but when there is no reasonable or probable cause, it is for the Jury to infer malice from the facts proved. That is a question in all cases for their consideration, and it having in this instance been withdrawn from them, it is impossible to say, whether they might or might not have come to the conclusion, that the arrest was malicious. It was for them to decide it, and not for the Judge. I can conceive a case, where there are mutual accounts between parties, and where an arrest for the whole sum claimed by the plaintiff would not be malicious; for example, the plaintiff might know that the set-off was open to dispute, and that there was reasonable ground for disputing it. In that case, though it might afterwards appear, that the set-off did exist, the arrest would not be malicious. The term 'malice,' in this form of action, is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual, but of *malus animus*, and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. That would not be the case where, there being an unsettled account, with items on both sides, one of the parties, believing *bona fide* that a certain sum was due to him, arrested his debtor for that sum, though it afterwards appeared that a less sum was due; nor where a party made such an arrest, acting *bona fide* under a wrong notion of the law, and pursuant to legal advice."

[2] Dubois *v.* Keates, 4 Jur. 148; 3 P. & D. 306, S. C.

[3] Purcell *v.* Macnamara, 9 East, 361; 1 Campb. 199, S. C.; Sykes *v.* Dunbar, Ib. 202, n.

the case of a civil suit, from the party's suing out the writ, or neglecting to countermand it, after payment of the debt.[1] But it may be inferred by the Jury, from the want of probable cause.[2] Malice may also be proved by evidence of the defendant's conduct and declarations, and his forwardness and activity in exposing the plaintiff, by a publication of the proceedings against him, or by any other publications by the defendant, on the subject of the charge.[3] And if the prosecution was against the plaintiff jointly with another, evidence of the defendant's malice against the other party is admissible, as tending to show his bad motives against both.[4]

§ 454. The want of *probable cause* is a material averment, and, though negative in its form and character, it must be proved by the plaintiff, by some affirmative evidence ;[5] unless the defendant dispenses with this proof, by pleading singly the truth of the facts involved in the prosecution.[6] It is independent of malicious motive, and cannot be inferred, as

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[1] Gibson *v.* Chaters, 2 B. & P. 129 ; Scheibel *v.* Fairbain, 1 B. & P. 388 ; Page *v.* Wiple, 3 East, 314. Nor from the action being non-prossed, or discontinued ; Sinclair *v.* Eldred, 4 Taunt. 7 ; unless coupled with other circumstances. Bristow *v.* Heywood, 1 Stark. 48 ; Nicholson *v.* Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21 ; 6 D. & R. 12.

[2] Murray *v.* Long, 1 Wend. 140 ; Crozer *v.* Pilling, 4 B. & C. 26 ; Mitchell *v.* Jenkins, 5 B. & Ad. 588 ; 1 Nev. & M. 301 ; Turner *v.* Turner, Gow, 20 ; Merriam *v.* Mitchell, 1 Shepl. 439. *Crassa ignorantia* has been held to amount to malice. Brookes *v.* Warwick, 2 Stark. 389.

[3] Chambers *v.* Robinson, 1 Stra. 691.

[4] Caddy *v.* Barlow, 1 M. & Ry. 275.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 78 ; Purcell *v.* Macnamara, 1 Camp. 199 ; 9 East, 361 ; McCormick *v.* Sisson, 7 Cowen, 715 ; Murray *v.* Long, 1 Wend. 140 ; Gorton *v.* De Angelis, 6 Wend. 418 ; Incledon *v.* Berry, 1 Camp. 203, n. ; Taylor *v.* Williams, 2 B. & Ad. 845 ; 6 Bing. 183. Where the declaration alleged a prosecution of the plaintiff for perjury in a certain cause, and the indictment was set forth containing two several assignments of perjury ; it was held that the declaration was supported by proof of malice and the want of probable cause as to one only of the assignments. Ellis *v.* Abrahams, 10 Jur. 593.

[6] Morris *v.* Corson, 7 Cowen, 281. See also Sterling *v.* Adams, 3 Day, 411.

a necessary consequence, from any degree of malice which may be shown.[1] Probable cause for a criminal prosecution is understood to be such conduct on the part of the accused, as may induce the Court to infer that the prosecution was undertaken from public motives.[2] In the case of a private suit, it may consist of such facts and circumstances, as lead to the inference, that the party was actuated by an honest and reasonable conviction of the justice of the suit. And in either case, it must appear that the facts, or so much of them as was sufficient to induce the belief, were communicated to the defendant before he commenced the prosecution or suit.[3] In revenue and admiralty cases, probable cause for a seisure or a capture is made out, when the officer shows such reasons for the act as were sufficient to warrant a prudent, intelligent, and cautious man in drawing the same conclusion.[4] Thus, where the commander of a national vessel was prosecuted for the capture of a vessel on the coast of Africa, on suspicion of her being a slaver; proof that he "acted with intelligent and honorable discretion" in arresting and sending her to this country for adjudication was held sufficient evidence of probable cause.[5] The question of probable cause is composed of law and fact; it being the province of the Jury to determine, whether the circumstances alleged are true or not; and of the Court to determine, whether they amount to probable cause.[6] Regularly, the facts material to

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[1] 1 Campb. 206, n. (*a*); Sykes *v.* Dunbar, Ibid. 502, n. (*a.*)

[2] Ulmer *v.* Leland, 1 Greenl. 135. Or, such a suspicion as would induce a reasonable man to commence a prosecution. Cabaness *v.* Martin, 3 Dev. 454. Or, a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant a cautious man in believing that the party is guilty of the offence. Munns *v.* Dupont, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 31; Foshay *v.* Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617.

[3] Delegal *v.* Highly, 3 Bing. N. C. 950; Seibert *v.* Price, 5 Watts & Serg. 438; Foshay *v.* Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617.

[4] Shattuck *v.* Maley, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 247, 249.

[5] Lovett *v.* Bispham, 2 Am. Law Journ. 97, 109, N. S.

[6] Johnstone *v.* Sutton, 1 T. R. 545; 1 Bro. P. C. 76, S. C.; Blachford *v.* Dod, 2 B. & Ad. 184; Ulmer *v.* Leland, 1 Greenl. 135; Stone *v.* Crocker, 24 Pick. 81; Panton *v.* Williams, 1 G. & D. 504; 2 Ad. & El. 169, N. S.; Watson *v.* Whitmore, 8 Jur. 964; 14 Law Journ. 41, N. S.

this question are first to be found by the Jury, and the Judge is then to decide, as a point of law, whether the facts, so found, establish probable cause or not.[1] But if the matter of fact and matter of law, of which the probable cause consists, are intimately blended together, the Judge will be warranted in leaving the question to the Jury.[2] Thus, where the question was, whether the defendant believed that there was reasonable and probable cause for preferring the indictment, and the Judge left this question to the Jury ; who found that the defendant preferred the indictment from improper motives, and the Judge thereupon held that there was evidence of malice ; it was adjudged that this direction was right.[3] If the Judge, upon the plaintiff's evidence, is of opinion that there was not probable cause for the prosecution, but upon proof of an additional fact by the defendant, by a witness who is not impeached nor contradicted, he is of opinion that there was probable cause, he is not bound to submit the evidence to the Jury, but may well nonsuit the plaintiff.[4] But where the prosecution was founded on a charge of menaces of the prosecutor's life, it is not for the Judge alone to determine, whether the menaces justified the charge, but it is for the Jury first to determine, whether the defendant believed them ; for his disbelief is material to the question of fact, as it goes directly to the motive of the prosecution.[5]

§ 455. What will or will not amount to probable cause, will depend on the circumstances of each particular case. If express malice is proved, and the cause of the former proceedings was peculiarly within the knowledge of the defend-

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1 Turner *v.* Ambler, 10 Ad. & El. 252, N. S.

2 McDonald *v.* Rooke, 2 Bing. N. C. 217; 2 Scott, 359, S. C.; Ante, Vol. 1, § 49. And see Taylor *v.* Willans, 2 B. & Ad. 845.

3 Wren *v.* Heslop, 12 Jur. 600.

4 Davis *v.* Hardy, 6 B. & C. 225. In considering whether there was probable cause for an arrest, the Judge will not regard any expressions of general malice on the part of the defendant. Whalley *v.* Pepper, 7 C. & P. 506.

5 Venafra *v.* Johnson, 10 Bing. 301 ; 6 C. & P. 50, S. C.; Broad *v.* Ham, 5 Bing. N. C. 722; Foshay *v.* Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617.

ant, slight evidence on the part of the plaintiff of the absence of probable cause will be deemed sufficient.[1] The discharge of the plaintiff, by the examining magistrate is *primâ facie* evidence of the want of probable cause, sufficient to throw upon the defendant the burden of proving the contrary.[2] But in ordinary cases, it will not be sufficient to show, that the plaintiff was acquitted of an indictment by reason of the non-appearance of the defendant, who was the prosecutor;[3] nor, that the defendant, after instituting a prosecution, did not proceed with it;[4] nor, that the grand jury returned the bill "not found."[5] Nor will the mere possession of goods, supposed to have been stolen, afford sufficient probable cause for prosecuting the possessor, if no inquiry was made of him, nor any opportunity given him to explain, how his possession was acquired. And, on the other hand, the fact that the party's goods have not been stolen, but were accidentally mislaid, will not alone establish the want of probable cause for prosecuting one as having stolen them.[6] Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case, in point of fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party prosecuting.[7] It must appear, that the defendant knew of the existence of those facts which tended to

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[1] Incledon *v.* Berry, 1 Camp. 203, n. (*a*); Bull. N. P. 14; Nicholson *v.* Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21.

[2] Secor *v.* Babcock, 2 Johns. 203; Johnston *v.* Martin, 2 Murphy, 248; Bostick *v.* Rutherford, 4 Hawks, 83. But see Stone *v.* Crocker, 24 Pick. 81, 88.

[3] Purcell *v.* Macnamara, 1 Campb. 199; 9 East, 361, S. C.

[4] Wallis *v.* Alpine, 1 Campb. 204, n.

[5] Byne *v.* Moore, 5 Taunt. 187; Freeman *v.* Arkell, 2 B. & C. 494; 3 D. & R. 669, S. C. But the prosecutor may still be liable for slander. Bull. N. P. 13.

[6] Swaim *v.* Stafford, 4 Iredell, 392, 398.

[7] James *v.* Phelps, 11 Ad. & El. 489; Delegal *v.* Highley, 3 Bing. N. C. 950; Seibert *v.* Price, 5 Watts & Serg. 438; Swaim *v.* Stafford, 4 Iredell, 389; Plummer *v.* Gheen, 3 Hawks, 66. Though the indictment were for an assault and battery, yet if there was no excess of force beyond what was necessary for the occasion, and the defendant preferred the indictment with a consciousness that he was in the wrong, the prosecution was without probable cause. Hinton *v.* Heather, 14 M. & W. 131.

show reasonable and probable cause, because, without knowing them, he could not act upon them; and also that he believed, that the facts amounted to the offence which he charged, because, otherwise, he will have made them the pretext for prosecution, without even entertaining the opinion that he had a right to prosecute. And whether he did so believe, or not, is rather a fact to be found by the Jury, than an inference of law to be made by the Judge, to whom only the legal effect of the facts is properly referred.[1] Yet if this belief, however confident and strong, was induced by the prosecutor's own error, mistake, or negligence, without any occasion for suspicion given by the party prosecuted, it will not amount to probable cause.[2]

§ 456. (3.) As to the *damages*. Whether the plaintiff has been prosecuted by indictment, or by civil proceedings, the principle of awarding damages is the same; and he is entitled to indemnity for the peril occasioned to him in regard to his life or liberty, for the injury to his reputation, his feelings, and his person, and for all the expenses to which he necessarily has been subjected.[3] And if no evidence is given of particular damages, yet the Jury are not therefore obliged to find nominal damages only.[4] Where the prosecution was by suit at Common Law, no damages will be given for the ordinary taxable costs, if they were recovered in that action; but if there was a malicious arrest, or the suit was malicious, and without probable cause, the extraordinary costs, as between attorney and client, as well as all other expenses necessarily incurred in defence, are to be taken into the estimate of damages.[5] Whatever was admis-

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[1] Turner *v.* Ambler, 11 Jur. 346, per Ld. Denman, C. J.

[2] Merriam *v.* Mitchell, 1 Shepl. 439.

[3] Bull. N. P. 13, 14; Tompson *v.* Mussey, 3 Greenl. 305.

[4] Tripp *v.* Thomas, 3 B. & C. 427.

[5] Sandback *v.* Thomas, 1 Stark. 306; Gould *v.* Barratt, 2 M. & Rob. 171. And see Doe *v.* Davis, 1 Esp. 358; Nowell *v.* Roake, 7 B. & C. 404. In Sinclair *v.* Eldred, 4 Taunt. 7, it was decided that the extra costs of defence could not be recovered, unless there had been a malicious arrest of the

sible in evidence to defeat the original malicious suit, is admissible for the plaintiff in this action, to maintain his right to recover for the injury sustained.[1]

§ 457. The *defence* of this action usually consists in disproving the charge of malice, or in showing the existence of probable cause for the prosecution. And in proof of probable cause for a criminal prosecution, it seems that the testimony of the defendant himself, to facts peculiarly within his own knowledge, given upon the trial, *diverso intuito*, is admissible in the action against him for causing that prosecution.[2] But the testimony of other witnesses, given on that occasion, cannot be proved but by the witnesses themselves, or, if they are dead, by the usual secondary evidence.[3] Probable cause may also be proved by evidence, that the acquittal of the plaintiff, in the suit or prosecution against him, was the result of deliberation by the Jury, the testimony having been sufficient to induce them to pause;[4] or, that he had been convicted of the offence before a Justice of the Peace, who had jurisdiction of the case, though he was afterwards acquitted on an appeal from the sentence.[5] If the original suit was for the recovery of money claimed as a debt, and the defendant, submitting to the demand, obtains a suppression of the process by the payment of part of the sum demanded, this,

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person; and Best, C. J., in Webber *v.* Nicholas, Ry. & M. 417, felt himself reluctantly bound by this decision; but said he thought Ld. Ellenborough's opinion in Sandback *v.* Thomas, the correct one.

[1] Hadden *v.* Mills, 4 C. & P. 486.

[2] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 352; Bull. N. P. 14. Or, the evidence of his wife. Johnson *v.* Browning, 6 Mod. 216. And see Burlingame *v.* Burlingame, 8 Cowen, 141; Jackson *v.* Bull, 2 M. & Rob. 176; Scott *v.* Wilson, Cooke, 315; Moodey *v.* Pender, 2 Hayw. 29; Guerrant *v.* Tinder, Gilmer, 36; Watt *v.* Greenlee, 2 Murphy, 246.

[3] Burt *v.* Place, 4 Wend. 591.

[4] Smith *v.* Macdonald, 3 Esp. 7; Grant *v.* Duel, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 17.

[5] Whitney *v.* Peckham, 15 Mass. 243; Griffis *v.* Sellars, 2 Dev. & Bat. 492; Commonwealth *v.* Davis, 11 Pick. 433, 438. Such conviction is conclusive evidence of probable cause, unless it was obtained chiefly or wholly by the *false* testimony of the defendant. Witham *v.* Gowen, 2 Shepl. 362; Payson *v.* Caswell, 9 Shepl. 212.

under ordinary circumstances, is a conclusive admission of the existence of probable cause for the suit.[1]

§ 458. Ordinarily, the character of the plaintiff is not in issue in this action. But in one case, where the charge against him was for larceny, the defendant was allowed, in addition to the circumstances of suspicion, which were sufficient to justify his taking the plaintiff into custody, to prove that he was a man of notoriously bad character.[2] Circumstances of suspicion are also admissible in evidence, in mitigation of damages.[3]

§ 459. How far the *advice of counsel* may go, to establish the fact of probable cause for the prosecution, is a point upon which there has been some diversity of opinion. It is agreed, that if a full and correct statement of the case has been submitted to legal counsel, the advice thereupon given furnishes sufficient probable cause for proceeding accordingly.[4] But whether the party's omission to state to his counsel a fact, well known, but honestly supposed not to be material, or his omission through ignorance, to state a material fact which actually existed, will render the advice of counsel unavailable to him as evidence of probable cause, does not appear to have been expressly decided.[5] The rule, however, as recog-

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[1] Savage *v.* Brewer, 16 Pick. 453.

[2] Rodriguez *v.* Tadmire, 2 Esp. 721. And see 12 Rep. 92; 2 Inst. 51, 52; 2 Phil. Evid. 258. In Newsam *v.* Carr, 2 Stark. 69, upon a question being put to one of the witnesses, whether he had not searched the plaintiff's house on a former occasion, and whether he was not a person of suspicious character, it was objected to; but it is said, that "Wood, B. overruled the objection;" though the observations, attributed to him by the reporter, seem to show that in his opinion the question was improper.

[3] Hitchcock *v.* North, 5 Rob. Louis. R. 328.

[4] Hewlett *v.* Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277. And see Snow *v.* Allen, 1 Stark. 502; Ravenga *v.* McIntosh, 2 B. & C. 693.

[5] In Tompson *v.* Mussey, 3 Greenl. 305, 310, the defendant had prosecuted the plaintiff for misconduct as an assessor, in not giving public notice, *in the warrant* calling a town meeting, of the time and place of the meeting of the assessors, to receive evidence of the qualifications of voters whose names were not on the public list. The county attorney had advised the

nized in a recent American case, seems broad enough to protect any party, acting in good faith, and without gross negligence. For it is laid down, that if the party "did *not withhold* any information from his counsel, *with the intent* to procure an opinion that might operate to shelter and protect him against a suit, but, on the contrary, if he, being doubtful of his legal rights, consulted learned counsel with a view to ascertain them, and afterwards pursued the course pointed out by his legal adviser, he is not liable to this action, notwithstanding his counsel may have mistaken the law."[1]

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defendant, that the notice was required by law to be inserted in the warrant; but in this case it was obtained in a separate paper, posted up by the side of the warrant; but this fact, though known to the defendant, he did not state to the grand jury. And the Court seemed to think, that if this omission had not been intentional and fraudulent, the opinion of the county attorney would have furnished probable cause for the prosecution.

[1] Stone *v.* Swift, 4 Pick. 393. In this case, however, no question was made, whether any material fact had been omitted. See acc. Tompson *v.* Mussey, 3 Greenl. 310. See also Blunt *v.* Little, 3 Mason, 102; Commonwealth *v.* Bradford, 9 Metc. 268.

MARRIAGE.

§ 460. Marriage is a civil contract, *jure gentium*, to the validity of which the consent of parties, able to contract, is all that is required by natural or public law. If the contract is made *per verba de præsenti*, though it is not consummated by cohabitation, or, if it be made *per verba de futuro*, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage, in the absence of all civil regulations to the contrary.[1] And though in most if not all the United States there are statutes, regulating the celebration of the marriage rites, and inflicting penalties on all who disobey the regulations, yet it is generally considered that, in the absence of any positive statute, declaring that all marriages, not celebrated in the prescribed manner, shall be absolutely void, or that none but certain magistrates or ministers shall solemnize a marriage, any marriage, regularly made according to the Common Law, without observing the statute regulations, would still be a valid marriage.[2] A marriage, celebrated in any

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[1] Kent, Comm. p. 87; Fenton *v.* Reed, 4 Johns. 52; Jackson *v.* Winne, 7 Wend. 47.

[2] 2 Kent, Comm. p. 90, 91; Reeve's Dom. Rel. p. 196, 200, 290; Milford *v.* Worcester, 7 Mass. 55, 56: Londonderry *v.* Chester, 2 N. Hamp. 268; Cheseldine *v.* Brewer, 1 Har. & McH. 152; Hantz *v.* Sealey, 6 Binn. 405. It has more recently been held in England, by Dr. Lushington, that prohibitory words, in a *marriage*-act, will not authorize an inference of nullity of the marriage, unless the nullity was declared in the act. Catterall *v.* Sweetman, 1 Roberts, Eccl. R. 304. In a subsequent cause between the same persons, it appeared that they had been married in New South Wales, by a minister of the Scotch Presbyterian Church, according to the forms of the statute provided for members of that Church alone, in that Colony; but that neither of the parties belonged to that Church, and so were not within the terms of the statute. But the same learned Judge held that the marriage, nevertheless, was sufficiently valid, as between the parties, to found thereon a decree of divorce for a violation of the marriage vow. His observations on this delicate question were as follows: — "The question which I

country according to its own laws, is recognized as valid in every other country, whose laws or policy it may not

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have to decide on the present occasion is, whether the marriage which has taken place between these parties is a sufficient marriage to enable the Court to pronounce a sentence of separation by reason of adultery, which it is admitted on all hands has been committed by the wife. It is true, that the allegation given in the case commences by pleading the local act of the Legislature of New South Wales, from which it would appear to follow, that it was intended to plead that the marriage was had in pursuance of the local act. Whether that is so or not, if the Court is satisfied that the marriage is sufficiently valid to enable it to pronounce for a separation, it will not be necessary to enter into a consideration of this act. I shall not give my judgment at length for this obvious reason : when the case came for my consideration in July, 1845, (9 Jur. 950 ; 1 Roberts. 304,) I then stated, after great consideration, all the reasons that occurred to me to bring my mind to the conclusion that the marriage in question was not void. Now, if I could not pronounce that the marriage in question was void, it seems to me that I must pronounce it valid for certain purposes ; and if valid for certain purposes, valid for the husband or the wife, as the case might be, to obtain a separation for a violation of the marriage vow. How does the case stand? New South Wales is a colony of Great Britain, amenable, according to all the authorities, to all those acts of Parliament and all that law which elonged to the mother country, and which were considered to be applicable to a new colony. No doubt very great difficulties have from time to time arisen, both as to what common law, and what acts of Parliament, should be imported into a colony. But it is unnecessary to discuss this question, because it has been discussed over and over again by more able Judges than myself. And there can be no doubt that the ancient law of Great Britain must have been carried to this colony, because Lord Hardwicke's Act, being expressly confined to England and Wales, could not be imported to a colony ; and, consequently, the law that existed in New South Wales was the original law of England, as it existed before Lord Hardwicke's Act. Upon that has been engrafted, under the authority of an act of Parliament, this act of the Local Legislature. I have already determined, and I shall not repeat my reasons, that, whatever may be the effect of the local act, it does not render the marriage invalid ; then the simple question is, if the local act does not render it invalid, whether, according to the ancient law of England, a marriage before a Presbyterian minister is valid, and valid only to the extent upon which I am required to pronounce an opinion, namely, to pronounce a separation *à mensâ et thoro*. When I consider how much that was discussed in the celebrated case of The Queen *v.* Millis, (10 Cl. & Fin. 534,) when all the authorities that could be adduced were brought to bear in the opinions of the learned Judges on that occasion, I am justified in saying this ; there was nothing fell from any one of the Judges in the House of Lords — I am not speaking of the opinion of the Common Law Judges — but of the law

contravene;[1] but the converse of this rule is not universally true.[2]

Lords — which in any way intimated that the marriage would not be sufficient to enable this Court to proceed to a separation *à mensâ et thoro*. I am not disposed to make the decision of The Queen *v.* Millis any authority further than it goes, and for two reasons; first, the law Lords were divided, and it was only in consequence of the form in which the case came before them, that it could be considered a judgment at all. In the next place, and for a reason equally strong, that, throughout the whole of our colonies, at various times and various places, if I were to hold that the presence of a priest in the orders of the Church of England was necessary to the validity of a marriage, I should be going the length of depriving thousands of married couples of a right to resort to this Court for such benefit as it can give in cases of adultery or cruelty. It is notorious that, till within a few years, there were no chaplains belonging to the East India Company; and if I were to adopt another principle, the result would be this: that, as to all those marriages had by the collectors in the service of the East India Company, and had by Judges when no priest was procured, I should be entering into this disquisition, a disquisition impossible to follow, namely, whether there was a marriage *ex necessitate*, because no clergyman was to be found. Now, until I am controlled by a superior authority, I unquestionably, in this case, and in all others, wherever I find, in any of the colonies, no local law prohibiting a marriage of this description, and no act of Parliament reaches it — in all these cases I shall look at the marriage according to the ancient canon law; and where it has been had, not before a clergyman, but consent is had *de facto*, I shall hold that sufficient to enable the Court to pronounce a decree, when it is necessary to pronounce one. I have no right to postpone my decision and give a more deliberate judgment, because I do not know that any time I could give would throw light on the question beyond what is to be collected from former decisions; and I am certain that no examination into the cases will induce me to change my opinion until I am overruled by an authority superior to mine." See Catterall *v.* Catterall, 11 Jur. 914.

[1] Scrimshire *v.* Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 407, 419; 2 Kent, Comm. 91, 92. The exceptions to the generality of the rule, that the *lex loci* governs the contract of marriage, are of three classes; (1.) in cases of incest and polygamy; (2.) when prohibited by positive law; (3.) when celebrated in desert or barbarous countries, according to the law of the domicil. Story, Confl. Laws, § 114 – 119.

[2] Per Ld. Stowell, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 390, 391; Story, Confl. Laws, § 119 – 121. If parties go abroad for the purpose of contracting in a foreign State a marriage, which could not have been contracted in their own country, but is not in violation of good morals, it seems, that it is to be held valid, if not made invalid by express statute. Medway *v.* Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Putnam *v.* Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Bull. N. P. 113, 114; Phillips *v.* Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 412; Story, Confl. Laws, § 123, *a*, *b*, 124.

§ 461. The *proof of marriage*, as of other issues, is either by direct evidence, establishing the fact, or by evidence of collateral facts and circumstances, from which its existence may be inferred. Evidence of the former kind, or what is equivalent to it, is required upon the trial of indictments for polygamy and adultery, and in actions for criminal conversation.[1] It being necessary, in such cases, to prove a marriage, valid in all respects. It is not sufficient to prove that the parties went through a religious ceremony purporting to be a marriage, unless it is also shown that it was recognized by the law of the country as the form of contracting a valid marriage.[2] But in all other cases, any other satisfactory evidence is sufficient. The affirmative sentence of a Court having jurisdiction of the question of marriage or no marriage, is conclusive evidence of the marriage.[3] Other direct proof is made either by the testimony of a witness present at the celebration, or of either of the parties themselves, where they are competent; or by an examined or certified copy of the register of the marriage, where such registration is required by law, with proof of the identity of the parties.[4] It is not necessary, in other cases,

[1] Morris *v.* Miller, 4 Burr. 2059; Leader *v.* Barry, 1 Esp. 353; Commonwealth *v.* Norcross, 9 Mass. 492; Commonwealth *v.* Littlejohn, 15 Mass. 163; The People *v.* Humphrey, 7 Johns. 314. On the trial of an indictment for polygamy, or adultery, the prisoner's deliberate declaration, that he was married to the alleged wife, is admissible as sufficient evidence of the marriage. Regina *v.* Upton, 1 C. & Kir. 165, n. Especially if the marriage was in another country. Regina *v.* Simmonsto, Ibid. 164; Regina *v.* Newton, 2 M. & Rob. 503; Cayford's case, 7 Greenl. 57; Truman's case, 1 East, P. C. 470. So in an action for criminal conversation. Rigg *v.* Curgenven, 2 Wils. 399, citing Morris *v.* Miller, 4 Burr. 2057; Forney *v.* Hallacher, 8 S. & R. 159; Aslsleger *v.* Erb, 2 Am. Law J. 49, N. S. But see *contra*, The People *v.* Miller, 7 Johns. 314; The State *v.* Roswell, 6 Conn. 446. In Massachusetts, in the trial of a libel for divorce, the fact of the marriage may be proved by any circumstantial evidence, competent in civil causes in general. Stat. 1840. ch. 84.

[2] Catherwood *v.* Caslon, 13 M. & W. 261; The State *v.* Hodgskins, 1 Applet. 155.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 484, 493, 541, 545.

[4] Ibid. See, as to proof by the parties themselves, Cowp. 593; Lomax *v.* Lomax, Cas. temp. Hardw. 380; Hubback, Evidence of Succession, p. 241, 242, 244; Standen *v.* Standen, Peake's Cas. 32.

to prove any license, publication of banns, or compliance with any other statute formality, unless the statute expressly requires it as preliminary evidence.[1]

§ 462. Marriage may also be proved, in civil cases, other than actions for seduction, by *reputation*, *declarations*, *and conduct* of the parties, and other circumstances usually accompanying that relation. The nature and admissibility of the evidence of *reputation*, has already been considered in the preceding volume.[2] In regard to the language and *conduct of the parties*, it is competent to show their conversation and letters, addressing each other as man and wife ;[3] their elopement, as lovers, and subsequent return as married persons ;[4] their appearing in respectable society, and being there received as man and wife ;[5] their observance of the customs and usages of society, peculiar to the entry upon or subsistence of that relation ;[6] the assumption by the woman of the name of the man, the wedding ring, the apparel (where such difference exists) appropriate to married women, and any other conduct, *sciente*, *vidente*, *et patiente viro*, indicative of her marriage to him.[7] Their cohabitation also, as man and wife, is presumed to be lawful until the

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1 Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 239.

2 Ante, Vol. 1, § 103, 104, 106, 107, 131 – 134. It has been stated, in a work of distinguished merit (Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 244,) that reputation of marriage, unlike that of other matters of pedigree, may proceed from persons who are not members of the family. But in the principal case cited to this point (Evans *v.* Morgan, 2 C. & Jer. 453,) the chief reason for admitting the sufficiency of such evidence, after verdict, was, that the witness was not cross-examined, and that the defendant did not put the want of proof of the marriage to the Judge, as a ground of nonsuit, so that the plaintiff might have had an opportunity of supplying the defect by other evidence. See Johnson *v.* Lawson, 9 Moore, 187 ; 2 Bing. 88, S. C. ; Roe *v.* Gore, 9 Moore, 187, n.

3 Alfray *v.* Alfray, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 547.

4 Cooke *v.* Lloyd, Peake's Cas. App. lxxiv.

5 Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 247.

6 Eaton *v.* Bright, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 85 ; Fownes *v.* Ettricke, Ibid. 257.

7 Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 247, 248.

contrary appears. The like inference is drawn from the baptism, acknowledgment, and treatment of their children by them as legitimate ;[1] and from their joining as man and wife in the conveyance of her real estate, or her joining with him in a deed or other act, releasing her right of dower in his estate ;[2] and from the disposition of property to a party by a mode of assurance, which is operative only where legal consanguinity exists ; such as, a covenant to stand seised, and the like, or, by the devolution upon, and enjoyment by children, of property, to which, unless they were legitimate, they would not have been entitled.[3] The recognition or proof of collateral relationship, also, is admissible as evidence of the lawful marriage of those through whom that relationship is derived.[4]

§ 463. Where a *contract in writing* is by the law of the country, or of the religious community, made essential to the marriage, as is the case among the Jews, it should be produced, as the proper evidence of the fact.[5] And where written contracts are not requisite nor usual, yet if they have been in fact made, though by words *de futuro*, these, as well as marriage articles, and other ante-nuptial and dotal acts, are admissible in evidence, as tending to raise a presumption that the contemplated marriage took effect.[6] A *certificate of marriage*, also, by the officiating clergyman or magistrate, though ordinarily not in itself evidence of the

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[1] Doe *v.* Fleming, 4 Bing. 266 ; Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 248 – 251 ; Bond *v.* Bond, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 45 ; The People *v.* Humphrey, 7 Johns. 314 ; Newburyport *v.* Boothbay, 9 Mass. 414.

[2] Hervey *v.* Hervey, 2 W. Bl. 877 ; Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 248.

[3] Slaney *v.* Wade, 1 My. & C. 358 ; Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 248, 254.

[4] Eaton *v.* Bright, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 85 ; Ibid. 161, S. C. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 194.

[5] *Semb.* Horn *v.* Noel, 1 Campb. 61. See, as to the Jewish contract, Lindo *v.* Belisario, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 225, 247, App. 9 ; Goldsmid *v.* Bromer, Ibid. 324.

[6] Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 257.

fact it recites, yet if proved to have been carefully kept in the custody of the party whom it affects, and produced from the proper custody, it may be read as collateral proof, in the nature of a declaration and assertion by the party, of the fact stated in the paper.[1] Such certificate, also, or a copy of the parish register, or other document of the like character, may be read as evidence confirmatory of the proof by reputation and cohabitation.[2] And where the marriage appeared to have been solemnized by one who publicly assumed the office of a priest, in a public chapel, and was followed by long cohabitation of the parties, this was held sufficient to warrant the presumption that he was really a priest, and that the marriage was therefore valid.[3]

§ 464. The evidence of marriage may be *rebutted* by proof that any circumstances, rendered indispensably necessary by law to a valid marriage, were wanting.[4] Thus, it may be shown that either of the parties had another husband or wife, living at the time of the marriage in question; or, that the parties were related within the prohibited degrees; or, that consent was wanting, the marriage having been effected by force, or fraud; or, that one of the parties was at the time an idiot, or *non compos mentis*, or insane.[5] And where marriage is inferred from cohabitation, the presumption may be destroyed by evidence of the subsequent and long continued separation of the parties.[6]

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[1] Hubback, Evid. of Succession, p. 258, 259.

[2] Doe *v.* Grazebrook, 4 Ad. & El. 406, N. S.

[3] Rex *v.* Brampton, 10 East, 287.

[4] Milford *v.* Worcester, 7 Mass. 48.

[5] 2 Kent, Comm. p. 76, 77; 1 Bl. Comm. 438; Gathings *v.* Williams, 5 Ired. 487. Where the marriage is invalidated on the ground of want of consent, the subject must have been investigated and the fact established, in a suit instituted for the purpose of annulling the marriage. 2 Kent, Comm. p. 77; Wightman *v.* Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 343. See also Middleborough *v.* Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; Turner *v.* Myers, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 414.

[6] Van Buskirk *v.* Claw, 18 Johns. 346.

NUISANCE.

§ 465. Nuisance, in its largest sense, signifies, "any thing that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage."[1] It is either public, annoying all the members of the community; or it is private, injuriously affecting the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of an individual. The latter only will be here considered.

§ 466. Nuisances to one's *dwelling-house*, are all acts done by another from without, which render the enjoyment of life within the house uncomfortable; whether it be by infecting the air with noisome smells, or, with gases injurious to health; or by exciting the constant apprehension of danger, whether by keeping great quantities of gunpowder near the house, or by deep and dangerous excavation of the neighboring soil, or, by suffering the adjoining tenement to be ruinous, and in danger of falling upon or otherwise materially injuring the neighboring house and its inmates;[2] or, by the exercise of a trade by machinery, which produces continual noise and vibration in the adjoining tenement, or, by so exercising a trade, as naturally to produce strife, collision, and disorderly conduct among the persons resorting to the premises. So it is a nuisance, if one overhangs the roof of his neighbor, throwing the water upon it from his own; or, if he obstructs his neighbor's ancient lights; or if, without due precaution, he pulls down his own walls or vaults, whereby injury is caused to the buildings or wall of his neighbor. But the mere circumstance of juxtaposition does not oblige him to give notice

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[1] 3 Bl. Comm. 215.

[2] Keilw. 98, b, pl. 4; Co. Lit. 56, a, note (2,) 56, b; Loring *v.* Bacon, 4 Mass. 575, 578.

to his neighbor of his intention to remove his own walls; nor is he bound to use extraordinary caution, where he is ignorant of the existence of the adjacent wall, as, if it be under the ground.[1]

§ 467. In regard to *lands*, it is a nuisance to carry on a trade in the vicinity, by means of which the corn and grass or the cattle are injured; or to neglect to repair and keep open ditches, by means of which the land is overflowed. It is also a nuisance to stop or divert water, that uses to run to another's mill, or through or by his lands; or to corrupt a watercourse and render it offensive or less fit for use.[2] For every man is entitled to the enjoyment of the air in its natural purity, of his ancient lights without obstruction, of the flow of waters in their natural course and condition through his own land; and to the support of the neighboring soil, both to preserve the surface of his own in its natural state, unbroken, and to uphold his ancient buildings thereon.[3] But it is not a nuisance to divert a subterranean flow of water under another's land, by lawful operations on one's own.[4]

§ 468. In regard to *incorporeal hereditaments*, nuisances consist in obstructing or otherwise injuriously affecting a way, which one has annexed to his estate, over the lands of another; or in impairing the value of his fair, market, ferry, or other franchise, by any act causing a continuing damage.[5]

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1 Trower *v.* Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 334; 3 Scott, 699, S. C.; Chadwick *v.* Trower, 6 Bing. N. C. 1; Panton *v.* Holland, 17 Johns. 92; The People *v.* Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524.

2 3 Bl. Comm. 216–218.

3 Wyatt *v.* Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871; Dodd *v.* Holme, 1 Ad. & El. 493; 3 N. & M. 739. And see the learned notes of Mr. Rand, to the opposing case of Thurston *v.* Hancock, 12 Mass. 212, 227 *a*, 228 *a*; Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 216–227.

4 Acton *v.* Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324.

5 3 Bl. Comm. 218, 219.

§ 469. If the nuisance is injurious to the *reversion*, the reversioner, and the tenant in possession, may each have an action for his separate damage;[1] and in the action by the former the tenant is a competent witness.[2] And though the nuisance might be abated before the estate comes into possession, yet if it is capable of continuance, the reversioner may maintain an action.[3]

§ 470. In an action upon the case for a nuisance, the plaintiff must prove, (1.) his *possession* of the house or land, or his *reversionary interest* therein, if the action is for an injury to this species of interest; or, his title to the *incorporeal right* alleged to have been injured; (2.) the *injurious act* alleged to have been done by the defendant; and (3.) the *damages* thence resulting. The action is local; but, ordinarily, the allegation of the place will be taken merely as *venue*, unless a local description is precisely and particularly given, in which case it must be proved as laid.[4]

§ 471. (1.) If the injury is done to the plaintiff's *incorporeal* right, and the title is alleged by *prescription*, such title must be proved; but though it was formerly held necessary to allege specially a right by prescription, it is now deemed sufficient to allege the right generally, as incident to the plaintiff's possession of the house or land.[5] A legal title to an incorporeal hereditament is proved by an uninterrupted

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[1] Biddlesford *v.* Onslow, 3 Lev. 209; Shadwell *v.* Hutchinson, 4 C. & P. 333.

[2] Doddington *v.* Hudson, 1 Bing. 257.

[3] Jesser *v.* Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141; Shadwell *v.* Hutchinson, 3 C. & P. 615.

[4] Hamer *v.* Raymond, 5 Taunt. 789.

[5] 1 Chitty on Pl 330; 2 Saund. 175 *a*, note; Yelv. 216 *a*, note (1), by Metcalf; Story *v.* Odin, 12 Mass. 157. Proof of the plaintiff's possession of part of the premises, is sufficient to support the general allegation, that he was possessed of a certain messuage and premises. Fenn *v.* Grafton, 2 Bing. 617. And see, as to *user*, Page *v.* Hatchett, 10 Jur. 634.

adverse enjoyment for twenty years;[1] and it may be presumed by the Jury, from such enjoyment for a shorter period, if other circumstances support the presumption. It may also be claimed by a *quasi* estoppel; as, if one build a new house on his land and afterwards sell it to another, neither the vendor, nor any one claiming under him, can obstruct the lights.[2] In either case, the extent of the right is ascertained by the extent and nature of the enjoyment. Therefore, if an *ancient window* to a shop or malthouse is somewhat darkened, no action lies, if there is still light enough for the purpose for which it has been used.[3] And if an ancient window is enlarged, the adjoining owner cannot obstruct the passage of light through the old window, notwithstanding the party may derive an equal quantity of light from the new one.[4] But to maintain this action, there must be a substantial privation of light, so as to render the occupation of the house uncomfortable, or impair its value; the merely taking off a ray or two is not sufficient.[5] So, in regard to a *way* by prescription; the extent of the enjoyment determines the extent of the right. If therefore such a way has always been used for one purpose, as, to cart fuel, it cannot be used for a different purpose, as, to cart stones; and if it has been used only for a way to Black acre, it cannot be used for a way to White acre, which lies adjoining and beyond it, though belonging to the same person.[6]

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[1] Lewis *v.* Price, cited 2 Saund. 175 *a*; Winchelsea Causes, 4 Burr. 1963; Rex. *v.* Dawes, Ibid. 2022; Bealey *v.* Shaw, 6 East, 215; Hill *v.* Crosby, 2 Pick. 466; Angell on Adverse Enjoyment, p. 23–29, 62, 63; Ante, Vol. 1, § 17, and cases there cited.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 39, 45; Best on Presumptions, p. 102, 103, 106; Palmer *v.* Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122; Compton *v.* Richards, 1 Price, 27; Riviere *v.* Bower, Ry. & M. 24; Coutts *v.* Gorham, 1 M. & Malk. 396; Story *v.* Odin, 12 Mass. 157.

[3] Martin *v.* Goble, 1 Camph. 320, 322.

[4] Chandler *v.* Thompson, 3 Camph. 80; Bealey *v.* Shaw, 6 East, 208.

[5] Back *v.* Stacy, 2 C. & P. 465; Pringle *v.* Wernham, 7 C. & P. 377; Wells *v.* Ody, Ibid. 410.

[6] Senhouse *v.* Christian, 1 T. R. 569, per Ashhurst, J.; Howell *v.* King, 1 Mod. 190; 39 H. 6, 6; Davenport *v.* Lamson, 21 Pick, 72.

§ 472. (2.) As to the proof, that the injury was *caused by the defendant*, it is sufficient to show, that it was done by his authority, or, that, having acquired the title to the land after the nuisance was erected, he has continued it.[1] Thus, if the nuisance is erected on the defendant's land, by his permission, he is liable.[2] And if the defendant, after judgment against him for the nuisance, lets the same land to a tenant, with the nuisance continuing upon it, he, as well as his tenant, is liable for its continuance, in another action.[3] So, if the plaintiff has purchased a house, against which a nuisance has been committed, he may maintain this action for the continuance of the nuisance, after request to abate it.[4]

§ 473. Ordinarily, every person is bound to use reasonable care to avoid or prevent danger or damage to his person and property. Wherever, therefore, the injury complained of would never have existed but for the misconduct or *culpable neglect of the plaintiff*, as in the case of an obstruction within the limits of the highway, but outside of the travelled path, against which he negligently drove his vehicle;[5] or, in the case of a collision at sea, wholly imputable to his own negligence;[6] or, of his neglect to shore up his own house, for want of which it was injured by the pulling down of the defendant's adjoining house, notwithstanding due care taken by the latter;[7] in these and the like cases the plaintiff cannot

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[1] Penruddock's case, 5 Co. 100; Dawson *v.* Moore, 7 C. & P. 25.

[2] Winter *v.* Charter, 3 Y. & J. 308. If the injury is caused by a wall erected partly on the defendant's land, case lies for the nuisance, though the wall is erected in part on the plaintiff's land, by an act of trespass. Wells *v.* Ody, 1 M. & W. 452.

[3] Rosewell *v.* Prior, 2 Salk. 460; Staple *v.* Spring, 10 Mass. 72.

[4] Penruddock's case, 5 Co. 100, 101; Willes, R. 583.

[5] Smith *v.* Smith, 2 Pick. 621. See also Flower *v.* Adam, 2 Taunt. 314; Steele *v.* Inland W. L. Nav. Co. 2 Johns. 283; Lebanon *v.* Olcott, 1 N. Hamp. 339.

[6] Vanderplank *v.* Miller, 1 M. & Malk. 169. And see Butterfield *v.* Forrester, 11 East, 60.

[7] Peyton *v.* Mayor, &c. of London, 9 B. & C. 725. And see Blyth *v.*

recover, but must bear the consequences of his own fault. So, if the act of the defendant was at first no annoyance to the plaintiff, but has become so by his own act, as, by opening a new window in his house, this being the proximate cause of the annoyance, he cannot recover.[1] If the injury is wholly *imputable to the defendant*, it is perfectly clear that he is liable. The case of *faults on both sides*, is one of greater embarrassment; but the result of the authorities seems to be this, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that, notwithstanding any neglect or fault on his part, the injury is in no respect attributable to himself, but is wholly attributable to the misconduct on the part of the defendant, as the *proximate cause*.[2] Thus, if injury results to the plaintiff's house by the actual negligence and misconduct of the defendant in pulling down his own, the plaintiff may recover his damages, notwithstanding he has not himself used the precautions of shoring up his walls.[3] If the fault was *mutual*, the plaintiff cannot recover.[4] Thus, where the injury was occasioned by negligence in taking down a party-wall, and the plaintiff appointed an agent to superintend the work jointly with the defendant's agent, both of whom were to blame, it was held, that neither could impute negligence to the other.[5] If the injury resulted from an omission of duty by the defendant,

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Topham, Cro. Jac. 158; Whitmore *v.* Wilks, 3 C. & P. 364; Massey *v.* Goyner, 4 C. & P. 161. And see Armsworth *v.* S. East. Railw. Co. 11 Jur. 758; Ante, tit. CARRIERS, § 220.

[1] Lawrence *v.* Obee, 3 Campb. 514.

[2] Walters *v.* Pfeil, 1 M. & Malk. 362; Dodd *v.* Holme, 2 Ad. & El. 493; 3 N. & M. 739; Bradley *v.* Waterhouse, 3 C. & P. 318; Brock *v.* Copeland, 1 Esp. 203; Bird *v.* Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628; Ilott *v.* Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald. 304; Flower *v.* Adam, 2 Taunt. 314; Hawkins *v.* Cooper, 8 C. & P. 473.

[3] Walters *v.* Pfeil, 1 M. & Malk. 362.

[4] Vanderplank *v.* Miller, 1 M. & Malk. 169. See the interesting case of Dean *v.* Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489; 2 Marsh. 577; 1 Moore, 203, commented on in Bird *v.* Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628.

[5] Hill *v.* Warren, 2 Stark. 377. And see Stafford Canal Co. *v.* Hallen, 6 B. & C. 317.

such as to repair a way, or a fence, his obligation must be proved.[1]

§ 474. (3.) In proof of the *damages*, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that, by reason of the injurious act or omission of the defendant, he cannot enjoy his right in as full and ample a manner as before, or, that his property is substantially impaired in value. If the injury is a direct infringement of his absolute right, abridging his power and means of exercising it, such as diverting or polluting a watercourse flowing through his land, or obstructing his private way, or projecting a roof so as to overhang his grounds, or the like, no evidence of special damage will be necessary, in order to entitle him to recover; but where the damages are consequential, or affect his relative rights, some damage must be proved.[2] Where the injury consists in the destruction of a tenement, the measure of damages is the value of the old tenement, and not the cost of replacing it by a new one.[3]

§ 475. The *defence* to this action, aside from defect of proof on the part of the plaintiff, generally consists either in a license from the plaintiff to do the act complained of, or in a denial of its injurious consequences, or, where the plaintiff claims a prescriptive right, in opposing it by another and adverse enjoyment, of sufficiently long duration. Thus, if the evidence of title to a right of way, or to the use of lights, is derived from an enjoyment of twenty years' duration, it may be rebutted by evidence, that during the whole or a part of that period, the premises were in the occupation of the defendant's tenant; for by his *laches* the defendant was

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[1] Co. Lit. 56, *a*, note (2), Harg. & Butl. edit.; Russell *v.* The Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 671; Loring *v.* Bacon, 4 Mass. 575, 578; Payne *v.* Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 349.

[2] Cotterell *v.* Griffiths, 4 Esp. 69; Allen *v.* Ormond, 8 East, 4; Fay *v.* Prentice, 9 Jur. 877; 1 M. G. & S. 828; Rose *v.* Groves, 5 M. & G. 613; 6 Scott, N. R. 645.

[3] Lukin *v.* Godsall, 2 Peake's Cas. 15.

not concluded;[1] or, that the enjoyment of the right by the plaintiff, was under the express leave or favor of the defendant, or by mistake, and not adverse to the defendant's title.[2] So, the plaintiff's claim to the natural flow of water across or by his land, without diminution or alteration, may be rebutted by evidence of an adverse right, founded on more than twenty years' enjoyment, to divert or use it for lawful purposes.[3] If the act complained of, was done by the *parol license* of the plaintiff, at the defendant's expense, this is a good defence, though if the license were executory, it might have been void by the statute of frauds; for even a parol license, when executed, is not countermandable.[4]

§ 476. As it is the enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament that gives the prescriptive right, so the *ceasing to enjoy* destroys the right, unless, at the time when the party discontinues the enjoyment, he does some act to show that he intends to resume it within a reasonable time.[5] Evidence of abandonment by the plaintiff will therefore be a good defence against his claim; and the burden of proof will be on him to show, that the abandonment was but temporary, and that he intended to resume the enjoyment of the right.[6] If the plaintiff, having a right to the unobstructed access of

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[1] Daniel *v.* North, 11 East, 372. See also Barker *v.* Richardson, 4 B. & Ald. 578.

[2] Campbell *v.* Wilson, 3 East, 294. And see Brown *v.* Gay, 3 Greenl. 126; Gates *v.* Butler, 3 Humphreys, 447; Cooper *v.* Barber, 3 Taunt. 99.

[3] Bealy *v.* Shaw, 6 East, 214, per Ld. Ellenborough. And see Balston *v.* Bensted, 1 Camp. 463.

[4] Winter *v.* Brockwell, 8 East, 308. See also 1 Hayw. 28; Liggins *v.* Inge, 7 Bing. 690; Web *v.* Paternoster, Palm. 71; Bridges *v.* Blanchard, 1 Ad. & El. 536. But no license to alter windows can be inferred from the fact, that the adjoining owner witnessed the alterations as they were going on, without objection; so as to prevent him from afterwards obstructing them by building on his own land. Blanchard *v.* Bridges, 4 Ad. & El. 176.

[5] Moore *v.* Rawson, 3 B. & C. 332, 337, per Bayley, J. And see Garritt *v.* Sharp, 3 Ad. & El. 325.

[6] Ibid.

light and air through a window, should materially alter the form of the wall in which the window is put out, as by changing it from straight to circular, this will amount to an abandonment of the right.[1]

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[1] Blanchard *v.* Bridges, 4 Ad. & El. 176.

PARTNERSHIP.

§ 477. The question of partnership is raised in actions either between the partners themselves, or between them and third persons; but the evidence which would prove a partnership against the partners, in favor of other persons, is sufficient, *primâ facie*, to prove it in actions between the partners alone, and also in actions in their favor, against third persons.[1]

§ 478. It is a general rule, that, where the action is *by several plaintiffs*, they must prove either an express contract by the defendant with them all, or the joint interest of all in the subject of the suit. If they are jointly interested as partners, they may sue jointly upon a contract made by the joint agent of all, though the names of all are not expressed in the instrument. But it must appear, that all who sue were partners at the time of making the contract;[2] for one who has been subsequently admitted as a partner cannot join, though it were agreed that he should become equally interested with the others in all the existing property and rights of the firm; unless, upon or after the accession of the incoming partner, there has been a new and binding promise to pay to the firm as newly constituted;[3] or unless

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[1] Peacock *v.* Peacock, 2 Campb. 46, per Ld. Ellenborough; Stearns *v.* Haven, 14 Verm. R. 540. In the latter case a stranger cannot object, that the contract does not constitute a partnership, in legal strictness, if the parties themselves have treated it as such a contract. Ibid. See also Bond *v.* Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357.

[2] Ord *v.* Portal, 3 Campb. 239, 240, n.; Ege *v.* Kyle, 2 Watts, 222; McGregor *v.* Cleveland, 5 Wend. 475.

[3] Wilsford *v.* Wood, 1 Esp. 182. And see Wright *v.* Russell, 3 Wils. 530; 2 W. Bl. 934; Ex parte Marsh, 2 Rose, 239. The mere transfer of a balance due to the old firm into the books of the new firm, does not vest

the security, being negotiable, has been transferred by indorsement.[1] Where several plaintiffs sue as indorsees of a bill indorsed in blank, they are not bound to prove any partnership, nor any transfer expressly to themselves; unless it should appear, that it had once been specially transferred to some of them, and not to all.[2] And where a negotiable security due by one firm is indorsed to another firm, or a debt is due in any other form by one firm to another, and one of the individuals is a partner in both firms, no action can be maintained for the debt, for no one can be interested as a party on both sides of the record.[3] If business is carried on in the names of several persons who in fact are not partners, the entire interest being in one only, he may sue alone; but he must distinctly prove, that the others were not his partners;[4] to prove which they are competent witnesses.[5] On the other hand, if an express contract is made with one alone, he may maintain an action upon it in his own name only, though others, whose names are not mentioned in the contract, are interested in it jointly with himself,[6] and might well have joined in the action.[7] If the name of the firm has remained a long time the same, but the partners have

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in the latter a right of action for such balance, unless the assent of the debtor is proved. Armsby *v.* Farnham, 16 Pick. 318.

[1] Pease *v.* Hirst, 10 B. & C. 122; Ord *v.* Portal, 3 Campb. 239; Ege *v.* Kyle, 2 Watts, 222; McGregor *v.* Cleveland 5 Wend. 475.

[2] Rordasnz *v.* Leach, 1 Stark. 446; Machell *v.* Kinnear, Ibid. 499.

[3] Bosanquet *v.* Wray, 6 Taunt. 597; Mainwaring *v.* Newman, 2 B. & P. 120; Moffatt *v.* Van Millingen, Ibid. 124, n. The purchase of such a bill or note would be regarded as payment of it, for account of the partner in question. Ibid. And the giving of such a security would seem, on the same principle, to amount only to evidence of a similar payment.

[4] Teed *v.* Elworthy, 14 East, 210; Atkinson *v.* Laing, 1 D. & Ry. Cas. 16; Davenport *v.* Rackstrow, 1 C. & P. 89.

[5] Parsons *v.* Crosby, 5 Esp. 199; Glossop *v.* Colman, 1 Stark. 25.

[6] Lloyd *v.* Archbowle, 2 Taunt. 324; Mawman *v.* Gillett, Ibid. 325, n.

[7] Leveck *v.* Shaftoe, 2 Esp. 468; Skinner *v.* Stocks, 4 B. & Ald. 437; Lord *v.* Baldwin, 6 Pick. 348. But proof, that the contract was expressly made with one alone, upon his assertion, that the subject-matter was his sole property, will be conclusive to defeat an action on that contract by all the partners. Lucas *v.* De la Cour, 1 M. & S. 249.

been changed, parol evidence is admissible, in an action upon a contract made in the name of the firm, to show that the plaintiffs were in fact the real members of the firm at the time of making the contract.[1]

§ 479. The usual proof of partnership is by the evidence of clerks, or other persons, who know that the parties have actually carried on business as partners. Though the partnership was constituted by indentures, or other writings, it is ordinarily not necessary, in an action between the partners and third persons, to produce them.[2] And if the witness called to prove a partnership in fact, is unable to recollect the names of all who are members of the firm, his memory may be assisted by suggesting them.[3]

§ 480. In *defence* of an action of *assumpsit* brought by partners, the defendant may show any separate agreement between him and one of the plaintiffs, which would have been available if made by all; such as, an agreement by one to provide for the payment of a bill, accepted by the defendant for the accommodation of the firm;[4] or an agreement with the drawer of a bill, by A., a partner in the house of A. and B., to provide for the payment of the bill, which was negotiated by them to the firm of A. & C., in which also he was a partner.[5] So, where the defendant has allowed to one partner the amount of the partnership debt, on settlement of his private account against the partner, if done in good faith, it is a valid defence against the firm.[6] So, if, in the particular transaction, the conduct of one partner has been fraudulent, as, if he sell and deceitfully pack goods, in a foreign country, to be imported in fraud of the revenue laws, it is a good de-

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1 Moller *v.* Lambert, 2 Campb. 548.

2 Alderson *v.* Clay, 1 Stark. 405; Collyer on Partn. 406.

3 Ante, Vol. 1, § 435; Acerro *v.* Petroni, 1 Stark. 400.

4 Richmond *v.* Heapy, 1 Stark. 202; Sparrow *v.* Chisman, 9 B. & C. 241; Jones *v.* Yates, 9 B. & C. 532.

5 Jacaud *v.* French, 12 East, 317.

6 Henderson *v.* Wild, 2 Campb. 561.

fence to an action by the firm for the price, though his partners were ignorant of the fraud.[1]

§ 481. As *between the parties* themselves, a partnership is constituted by a voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a communion of the profits thereof between them.[2] The proof of the partnership, therefore, will be made by any competent evidence of such an agreement. If it is contained in written articles, these, in an action between the partners, must be produced or proved; and the parties themselves will be governed by their particular terms, but their precise limitations will not affect strangers, to whom they are unknown.[3]

§ 482. In favor of third persons, and *against the partners* themselves, the same agreement ought generally to be established by such competent evidence as is accessible to strangers. Where there is a community of interest in the property, and also a community of interest in the profits, there is a partnership. If there is neither of these, there is no partnership. If one of these ingredients exists, without the presence of the other, the general rule is, that no partnership will be created between the parties themselves, if it would be contrary to their real intentions and objects. And none will be created between themselves and third persons, if the whole transactions are clearly susceptible of a different interpretation,

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[1] Biggs *v.* Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454.

[2] Story on Partn. § 2; 3 Kent, Comm. p. 23, 24; Collyer on Partn. p. 2. A surgeon, selling out his business, but retaining a moiety of the first year's net profits, for introducing his patients to his successor, and other like services, held not a partner. Rawlinson *v.* Clarke, 15 M. & W. 292. A proprietor of a newspaper selling out, but retaining a share in the profits, held a partner, under the circumstances of the case. Barry *v.* Nesham, 10 Jur. 1010. And see Pott *v.* Eyton, 15 Law Journ. 257, N. S.

[3] Winship *v.* United States Bank, 5 Peters, 529; Gill *v.* Kuhn, 6 S. & R. 333; Churchman *v.* Smith, 6 Whart. 146; Tillier *v.* Whitehead, 1 Dall. 269; United States Bank *v.* Binney, 5 Mason, 176.

or exclude some of the essential ingredients of partnership.[1] The cases, in which a liability as partners as to third persons

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[1] Story on Partn. § 30. This learned author proceeds to discuss the distinction between an agreement for a compensation proportioned to the profits, and an agreement for an interest in such profits, so as to entitle him to an account as a partner, and then observes as follows; — "Admitting, however, that a participation in the profits will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership between the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other opposing circumstances, it remains to consider, whether the rule ought to be regarded, as any thing more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and therefore liable to be repelled, and overcome by other circumstances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them. In other words, the question is, whether the circumstances, under which the participation in the profits exists, may not qualify the presumption, and satisfactorily prove, that the portion of the profits is taken, not in the character of a partner, but in the character of an agent, as a mere compensation for labor and services. If the latter be the true predicament of the party, and the whole transaction admits, nay, requires, that very interpretation, where is the rule of law, which forces upon the transaction the opposite interpretation, and requires the Court to pronounce an agency to be a partnership, contrary to the truth of the facts, and the intention of the parties? Now, it is precisely upon this very ground, that no such absolute rule exists, and that it is a mere presumption of law, which prevails in the absence of controlling circumstances, but is controlled by them, that the doctrine in the authorities alluded to is founded. If the participation in the profits can be clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the presumption of partnership is repelled. In this way the law carries into effect the actual intention of the parties, and violates none of its own established rules. It simply refuses to make a person a partner, who is but an agent for a compensation, payable out of the profits; and there is no hardship upon third persons, since the party does not hold himself out as more than an agent. This qualification of the rule (the rule itself being built upon an artificial foundation) is, in truth, but carrying into effect the real intention of the parties, and would seem far more consonant to justice and equity, than to enforce an opposite doctrine, which must always carry in its train serious mischiefs, or ruinous results, never contemplated by the parties." Ibid. § 38. And after citing and commenting on the principal cases upon this subject, he concludes thus; — "These may suffice as illustrations of the distinction above alluded to. The whole foundation, on which it rests, is, that no partnership is intended to be created by the parties *inter sese;* that the agent is not clothed with the general powers, rights, or duties of a partner; that the share in the profits given to him is not designed to make him a partner, either in the capital stock or in the profits, but to excite his diligence, and secure his personal skill and exertions, as an agent of the concern, and is contemplated merely as a compensation therefor. It is, therefore, not only susceptible of being treated purely as a case of

exists, have been distributed into five classes. First, where, although there is no community of interest in the capital

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agency; but in reality it is positively and absolutely so, as far as the intention of the parties can accomplish the object. Under such circumstances, what ground is there in reason, or in equity, or in natural justice, why in favor of third persons this intention should be overthrown, and another rule substituted, which must work a manifest injustice to the agent, and has not operated either as a fraud, or a deceit, or an intentional wrong upon third persons? Why should the agent, who is by this very agreement deprived of all power over the capital stock, and the disposal of the funds, and even of the ordinary rights of a partner to levy thereon, and an account thereof, be thus subjected to an unlimited responsibility to third persons, from whom he has taken no more of the funds or profits, (and, indeed, ordinarily less so,) than he would have taken, if the compensation had been fixed and absolute, instead of being contingent? If there be any stubborn rule of law, which establishes such a doctrine, it must be obeyed; but if none such exists, then it is assuming the very ground in controversy to assert, that it flows from general analogies or principles. On the contrary, it may be far more correctly said, that even admitting, (what, as a matter unaffected by decisions, and to be reasoned out upon original principles, might well be doubted,) that where each party is to take a share of the profits indefinitely, and is to bear a proportion of the losses, each having an equal right to act as a principal, as to the profits, although the capital stock might belong to one only, it shall constitute, as to third persons, a case of partnership; yet that rule ought not to apply to cases, where one party is to act manifestly as the mere agent for another, and is to receive a compensation for his skill and services only, and not to share as a partner, or to possess the rights and powers of a partner. In short, the true rule, *ex æquo et bono*, would seem to be, that the agreement and intention of the parties themselves should govern all the cases. If they intended a partnership in a capital stock, or in the profits, or in both, then, that the same rule should apply in favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were intended between the parties, then, that there should be none as to third persons, unless where the parties had held themselves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated as a fraud or deceit upon third persons. It is upon this foundation, that the decisions rest, which affirm the truth and correctness of the distinction already considered, as a qualification of the more general doctrine contended for. And in this view it is difficult to perceive, why it has not a just support in reason, and equity, and public policy. Wherever the profits and losses are to be shared by the parties in fixed proportions and shares, and each is intended to be clothed with the powers, and rights, and duties, and responsibilities of a principal, either as to the capital stock, or the profits, or both, there may be a just ground to assert, in the absence of all controlling stipulations and circumstances, that they intend a partnership. But where one party is stripped of the powers

stock, yet the parties agree to have a community of interest or participation in the profit and loss of the business or adventure, as principals, either indefinitely or in fixed proportions. Secondly, where there is, strictly speaking, no capital stock, but labor, skill, and industry are to be contributed by each in the business, as principals, and the profit and loss thereof are to be shared in like manner. Thirdly, where the profit is to be shared between the parties, as principals, in like manner, but the loss, if any occurs beyond the profit, is to be borne exclusively by one party only. Fourthly, where the parties are not in reality partners, but hold themselves out, or at least are held out by the party sought to be charged, as partners to third persons, who give credit to them accordingly. Fifthly, where one of the parties is to receive an annuity out of the profits, or as a part thereof.[1] Wherever, therefore, the evidence brings the case within either of these classes, a partnership, as against the parties, will be sufficiently proved.

§ 483. It is essential, in an *action ex contractu against partners* that the evidence of partnership should extend to

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and rights of a partner, and clothed only with the more limited powers and rights of an agent, it seems harsh, if not unreasonable, to crowd upon him the duties and responsibilities of a partner, which he has never assumed, and for which he has no reciprocity of reward or interest. It has, therefore, been well said by Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his learned Commentaries, that 'to be a partner, one must have such an interest in the profits, as will entitle him to an account, and give him a specific lien or preference in payment over other creditors. There is a distinction between a stipulation for a compensation for labor proportioned to the profits, which does not make a person a partner; and a stipulation for an interest in such profits, which entitles the party to an account, as a partner.' And Mr. Collyer has given the same doctrine in equally expressive terms, when he says, that in order to constitute a communion of profits between the parties, which shall make them partners, the interest in the profits must be mutual; that is, each person must have a specific interest in the profits, as a principal trader." Ibid. § 48, 49.

[1] Story on Partn. § 54; Ibid. § 55–70; Collyer on Partn. ch. 1, sec. 2, p. 43–56.

all the defendants;[1] otherwise the plaintiff will be non-suited. But the utmost strictness of proof is not required; for though where they sue as plaintiffs, they may well be held to some strictness of proof, because they are conusant of all the means whereby the fact of partnership may be proved; yet where they are defendants, the facts being less known to the plaintiff, it is sufficient for him to prove, that they have acted as partners, and that, by their habit and course of dealing, conduct and declarations, they have induced those with whom they have dealt to consider them as partners.[2] Hence if two persons have in many instances traded jointly, this will be admissible evidence towards the proof of a general partnership, and sufficient, if the instances of joint dealing outweigh the instances of separate dealing, to throw upon the defendants the burden of proving that it was not such a partnership.[3] And though the partnership was established by deed, yet, against the parties, it may be proved by oral evidence of partnership transactions,[4] or by the books of the firm.[5] But evidence of general reputation, or common report of the existence of the partnership, is not admissible, except in corroboration of previous testimony;

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[1] Young *v.* Hunter, 4 Taunt. 582. In *assumpsit*, the fact of partnership is put in issue by the plea of *non assumpsit*. Tomlinson *v.* Collett, 3 Blackf. 436.

[2] 2 Stark. Evid. 585, 586; Evans *v.* Curtis, 2 C. & P. 296. If it be clear that the party, at the time of the acts and admissions, was not a partner, they will not render him liable for a prior debt of the firm. Saville *v.* Robertson, 4 T. R. 720. Nor will an admission of a partnership in one transaction bind the party as a partner in another matter not connected with it. De Berkom *v.* Smith, 1 Esp. 29.

[3] Newnham *v.* Tethrington, cited in Collyer on Partn. p. 450; Etheridge *v.* Binney, 9 Pick. 272. The signature of a joint note by two persons, is no evidence of a partnership between them. Hopkins *v.* Smith, 11 Johns. 161. But the signature of the name of a firm, is evidence against the person signing it, that he is one of the partners. Spencer *v.* Billing, 3 Camp. 312.

[4] Alderson *v.* Clay, 1 Stark. 405; Widdifield *v.* Widdifield, 2 Binn. 249; Allen *v.* Rostain, 11 S. & R. 362.

[5] Richter *v.* Selin, 8 S. & R. 425; Champlin *v.* Tilley, 3 Day, 306; Hill *v.* Manchester Waterw. Co. 2 N. & M. 573.

unless it be to prove the fact, that the partnership, otherwise shown to exist, was known to the plaintiff.[1]

§ 484. A partnership may also be proved against the parties, by their respective *declarations and admissions*, whether verbal, or in letters, or other writings. Thus where, upon the trial of the question of partnership, the defendants, in order to render a witness competent, executed a release to him, the release was permitted to be read by the plaintiff, as competent evidence in chief, to establish the partnership.[2] So also, an entry at the Custom-house, by one partner in the name of the firm, is admissible, though not conclusive evidence, for the same purpose.[3] In other cases, the act, declaration, or admission of one person is not admissible in evidence to establish the fact, that others are his partners, though it is ordinarily sufficient to prove it as against himself.[4] But if, in an action against three as partners, two have acknowledged the existence of articles of copartnership, which the third, on due notice, refuses to produce at the trial, the jury will be warranted in finding the fact of partnership upon this evidence alone.[5] In one case, where the issue of partnership was raised by a plea in abatement, for the non-joinder of parties as defendants, the admission of liability as a partner, by one not joined in the

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[1] Allen *v.* Rostain, 11 S. & R. 362; Whitney *v.* Sterling, 14 Johns. 215; Bernard *v.* Torrance, 5 Gill & Johns. 383. See also Gowan *v.* Jackson, 20 Johns. 176; Halliday *v.* McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Brander *v.* Ferriday, 16 Louis. R. 296.

[2] Gibbons *v.* Wilcox, 2 Stark. 43. And see Parker *v.* Barker, 1 B. & B. 9. Declarations made to a third person are admissible, though not made in the presence of the other parties. Short *v.* Strealfield, 1 M. & Rob. 8.

[3] Ellis *v.* Watson, 2 Stark. 453.

[4] Burgue *v.* De Tastet, 3 Stark. 53; Flower *v.* Young, 3 Campb. 240; Tinkler *v.* Walpole, 14 East, 226; Cooper *v.* South, 4 Taunt. 802; Whitney *v.* Ferris, 10 Johns. 66; Tuttle *v.* Cooper, 5 Pick. 414; Robbins *v.* Willard, 6 Pick. 464; McPherson *v.* Rathbone, 7 Wend. 216. See Ante, Vol. I, § 177; McCutchin *v.* Bankston, 2 Kelly, 244; Grafton Bank *v.* Moore, 13 N. Hamp. 99.

[5] Whitney *v.* Sterling, 14 Johns. 215.

suit, being good in an action against him, was held to be also receivable on this issue, to prove him a partner.[1]

§ 485. The *proof of partnership* may be *answered* by the defendant, by evidence of an arrangement between the parties, by which either the power of the acting partner to bind the firm, or the defendant's liability on the contracts of the firm, was limited, qualified, or defeated; provided the plaintiff had previous and express notice.[2] The defendant may also show, that he was not a partner in the particular trade in which the transaction took place, and that the plaintiff knew the fact;[3] or, that the partnership was previously dissolved; or, that he had notified the plaintiff not to deal with his partner, without his own concurrence.[4]

§ 486. In an action against the administrators of a deceased partner, the *surviving partner* is a competent witness to prove the partnership; for he has no interest in the matter, such an action not being maintainable at law.[5] But in an action brought by the surviving partner, as such, the *widow of his deceased partner* is not a competent witness for him, her testimony going to increase the fund, of which she is entitled to a distributive share.[6] A *dormant partner* is a competent witness for his partner, in an action by the latter, if he releases his interest in the subject of the suit.[7]

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[1] Clay *v.* Langslow, 1 M. & Malk. 45. *Sed quære*, and see Ante, Vol. I, § 395; Miller *v.* M'Clenachan, 1 Yeates, 144.

[2] Minnett *v.* Whitney, 5 Bro. P. C. 489; Collyer on Partn. 214, 456; Ex parte Harris, 1 Madd. 583; Alderson *v.* Clay, 1 Campb. 404.

[3] Jones *v.* Hunter, Dan. & Lloyd, 215; Collyer on Partn. 456.

[4] Willis *v.* Dyson, 1 Stark. 164; Ld. Galway *v.* Matthew, 10 East, 264.

[5] Grant *v.* Shurter, 1 Wend. 148.

[6] Allen *v.* Blanchard, 9 Cowen, 631.

[7] Clarkson *v.* Carter, 3 Cowen, 84.

PATENTS.

§ 487. The remedy for the infringement of a patent right, both by statute and Common Law, is by an action on the case.[1] From the nature of the action, and the tenor of the declaration, as stated below, it is apparent that the plaintiff, under the general issue may be required, and therefore should

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[1] Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, § 14; 1 Chitty on Plead. 131. The declaration for the infringement of this right is given by Mr. Phillips, in his excellent Treatise on the Law of Patents, p. 520, as follows: — "To answer to A. of B. in the county of S. in the district of , manufacturer, in a plea of trespass on the case, for that the plaintiff was the original and first inventor [or discoverer] of a certain new and useful art [machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement on any art, machine, &c., taking the words of the statute most applicable to the subject of the invention] in the letters-patent hereinafter mentioned and fully described, the same being a new and useful [here insert the title or description given in the letters-patent] which was not known or used before his said invention [or discovery], and which was not, at the time of his application for a patent as hereinafter mentioned, in public use or on sale with his consent or allowance; and the plaintiff, being so as aforesaid the inventor [or discoverer] thereof, and being also a citizen of the United States [if the fact is so],[1] on the day of [here insert the date of the patent] upon due application therefor, did obtain certain letters-patent therefor in due form of law under the seal of the patent office of the United States, signed by the secretary of state, and countersigned by the commissioner of patents of the United States, bearing date the

[1] "It has been suggested, in a preceding part of this work, p. 408," (says Mr. Phillips in his note on this place,) "that the citizenship of the patentee need not be proved by the plaintiff, and, if so, it need not be averred. This will, however, depend upon the construction that shall be given to the 15th section of the act of 1836, c. 357, by which, if the patentee be an alien, the defendant is permitted to give matter in evidence, tending to show that the patentee has 'failed and neglected for the space of eighteen months from the date of the patent to put and continue on sale to the public, on reasonable terms, the invention or discovery.' The position referred to in p. 408 assumes, that the burden on this point is, in conformity to the langugae of the statute, in the first instance, on the defendant. But to go on the safer side, the above form of declaring assumes the burden to be on the plaintiff to aver and prove, in the first instance, that the patentee is a citizen of the United States, or, if an alien, and the eighteen months have expired before the date of the writ, that he has put and continued the invention on sale in the United States on reasonable terms.

be prepared to prove, (1.) the grant and issuing of the letters-patent, together with the specification, and the assign-

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day and year aforesaid, whereby there was secured to him, his heirs, administrators, executors, or assigns,[1] for the term of fourteen years from and after the date of the patent, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the said invention [machine, improvement, or discovery], as by the said letters-patent, in Court to be produced,[2] will fully appear.[3] And the plaintiff further says, that from the time of the granting to him of the said letters-patent, hitherto, he has made, used, and vended to others to be used, [or he has made, *or* has used, *or* has vended to others to be used, as the case may be] the said invention [machine, improvement, or discovery] to his great advantage and profit [or if he has not made, used, or vended, then, instead of the above averments, may be substituted after the word 'hitherto,' 'the said exclusive right has been and now is of great value to him, to wit, of the value of $.'][4] Yet the said D.' well knowing the premises, but contriving to injure the plaintiff,[5] did on the [some day after the date of the patent] and at divers times before and afterwards, during the said term of fourteen years, mentioned in said letters-patent, and before the purchase of this writ, at C. in the county of M. in said district of , unlawfully and wrongfully, and without the

[1] "Act of 4th of July, 1836, ch. 357, s. 5.

[2] "Which the plaintiff brings here into Court. Chit. Pl. v. 2, p. 765, 5th ed.

[3] "The English precedents here state the making and filing of the specification, the assignment of the patent, and the recording of the assignment, if the action be in the name of an assignee, or if an assignee of part of the right is joined.

"If the patentee is an alien, and the counsel chooses to declare very cautiously, if eighteen months have expired from the date of the patent, he may here introduce the averment, that within eighteen months from the date of the patent, namely, on, &c, at, &c. he (or his assignees,) put the invention on sale in the United States, on reasonable terms, and from that time always afterwards to the time of purchasing the writ, he, (or they, or he and they) had continued the same on public sale in the United States on reasonable terms.

[4] "The principle upon which these averments are made is the same as that upon which, in an action for trespass upon personal property, the value of the property it alleged, by way of showing that it was a thing in respect to which the plaintiff might sustain damage. Mr. Gould says of this averment, 'As he (the plaintiff) is not obliged to state the true value, the rule requiring it to be stated would seem to be of no great practical use.' Gould's Pl. c. 4, s. 37, p. 187. Mr. Chitty says the above averments as to profit, by making, using, and vending, are sometimes omitted. The propriety of making the averment of the value seems to depend upon the question, whether the allegation of ownership of an article or species of personal property, or interest in it, and possession of it, imports a value to the plaintiff without specifically alleging its value; for if it does, then a ground of action distinctly appears without any such specific allegation.

[5] "'Contriving and wrongfully intending to injure the plaintiff, and to deprive him of the profits, benefits, and advantages, which he might and otherwise would have derived and acquired from the making, using, exercising, and vending of the said invention, after the making of the said letters-patent, and within the said term of fourteen years in said letters-patent mentioned.' Chit. Pl. 5th ed. v. 2, p. 766.

ment to him, if he claims as assignee; (2.) that the invention was that of the patentee, and was prior to that of any other person; (3.) that it is new and useful, and has been reduced to practice; (4.) that it has subsequently been infringed by the defendant; and the damages, if any beyond a nominal sum, are claimed.

§ 488. (1.) The *letters patent*, to which, in the United States, a copy of the *specification* is annexed as a part thereof, are proved either by the production of the originals, or by copies of the record of the same, under the seal of the patent office, and certified by the Commissioner of Patents, or, if his office be vacant, by the chief clerk.[1] If the patent is for an improvement, and the specification refers to the former patent, without which it is not sufficiently clear and intelligible, the former patent with its specification must also

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consent or allowance, and against the will of the plaintiff, make [use and vend to others to be used, or did make, or did use, or did vend to others to be used, as the case may be] the said invention [machine, improvement, or discovery] in violation and infringement of the exclusive right so secured to the plaintiff by said letters-patent as aforesaid, and contrary to the form of the statutes of the United States in such case made and provided, whereby the plaintiff has been greatly injured, and deprived of great profits and advantages, which he might and otherwise would have derived from said invention; and has sustained actual damage to the amount of , and by force of the statute aforesaid, an action has accrued to him, to recover the said actual damage, and such additional amount, not exceeding in the whole three times the amount of such actual damages,[1] as the Court may see fit to order and adjudge. Yet the said D., though requested, has never paid the same, or any part thereof, to the plaintiff, but hath refused, and yet refuses so to do."

[1] Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, § 4, 5. By this act, no letters-patent are to be issued until the specification is filed; which it is the duty of the clerk to enrol; and therefore no particular evidence of the enrolment is required on the part of the plaintiff. But in England, where the letters-patent are issued before the specification is filed, the party is bound to see to the enrolment of his specification within a limited time, and therefore is bound to show that this requirement has been complied with. Ex parte Beck, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 578; Ex parte Koops, 6 Ves. 599; Watson *v.* Pears, 2 Campb. 294.

[1] "Act of 4th of July, 1836, ch. 357, s. 14."

be produced.[1] Where the proof is by an exemplification, it must be of the whole record, and not of a part only. The drawings, if any, must be produced, whenever they form part of the specification.

§ 489. As letters-patent are not granted as restrictions upon the rights of the community, but to promote science and the useful arts,[2] the Courts will give a *liberal construction* to the language of patents and specifications, adopting that interpretation, which gives the fullest effect to the nature and extent of the claim made by the inventor.[3] The meaning, is a question for the Court, the words of art having been interpreted by the Jury.[4] If there is any obscurity in them, reference may be had to the affidavit of the patentee, made and filed prior to the issuing of the patent.[5] No precise form of words is necessary, provided their import can be clearly ascertained by fair interpretation, even though the expressions may be inaccurate.[6] But if the claim is of an abstract principle or function only, detached from machinery, it is void.[7]

§ 490. The plaintiff must give some evidence of the *sufficiency* of the specification, if denied; such as, the evidence of persons of science, and workmen, that they have read the specification, and can understand it, and have practised the invention according to it; and such evidence will be suffi-

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[1] Lewis *v.* Davis, 3 C. & P. 502; Phillips on Patents, p. 401, 402.

[2] Blanchard *v.* Sprague, 3 Sumn. 535.

[3] Ryan *v.* Goodwin, 3 Sumn. 514. Where a patent is granted for a term of years, the day of the date of the patent is reckoned inclusive. Russell *v.* Ledsam, 9 Jur. 557, 558.

[4] Neilson *v.* Harford, 8 M. & W. 806.

[5] Pettibone *v.* Derringer, 4 Wash. 215.

[6] Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273; Minter *v.* Mower, Webst. Pat. Cas. 138, 141; 6 Ad. & El. 735, S. C.; Derosne *v.* Fairie, Ibid. 154, 157; 5 Tyrw. 393; 1 M. & Rob. 457, S. C.

[7] Blanchard *v.* Sprague, 3 Sumn. 535; Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273; Lowell *v.* Lewis, 1 Mason, 187; Earle *v.* Sawyer, 4 Mason, 1; Phillips on Patents, p. 95 – 100, 109 – 113; Godson on Patents, ch. iii. sec. v.

cient, unless the defendant can show, that persons have been misled by the specification, or have incurred expense in attempting to follow it, and were unable to ascertain what was meant.[1] The sufficiency of the specification, in matters of description, is a question for the Jury.[2] If a whole class of substances be mentioned as suitable, the plaintiff must show, that each and every of them will succeed; for otherwise the difficulty of making the instrument will be increased, and the public will be misled.[3] But if the title describes the patent to have been granted for improvements, in the plural, whereas the specification discloses only one improvement, it is no variance.[4] The object of the specification is, that after the expiration of the term, the public shall have the benefit of the discovery.[5] It must be understood according to the acceptation of practical men at the time of its enrolment; and be such as, taken in connection with the drawings, if any, to which it refers, will enable a skilful mechanic to perform the work.[6] If it contain an untrue statement in fact, which, if literally acted upon by a competent workman, would mislead him, and cause the experiment to fail, it is bad, even though a competent workman, acquainted with the subject, would perceive and in practice correct the error.[7]

§ 491. Besides the formal proof of the *assignment*, where the plaintiff claims as assignee, he must show that the assign-

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1 Turner *v.* Winter, 1 T. R. 602; Cornish *v.* Keene, 3 Bing. N. C. 570; 4 Scott, 337, S. C. See, on the requisites of a sufficient specification, Phillips on Patents, ch. xi.; Godson on Patents, ch. iv. See also Bickford *v.* Skewes, Webst. Pat. Cas. 219; Household Co. *v.* Neilson, Ibid, 692.

2 Walton *v.* Potter, Webst. Pat. Cas. 595.

3 Bickford *v.* Skewes, 6 Jur. 167; 1 Gale & D. 736, S. C.

4 Nickels *v.* Haslam, 7 M. & G. 378.

5 Liardet *v.* Johnson, Bull. N. P. 76; Newberry *v.* James, 2 Meriv. 446.

6 Crossly *v.* Beverley, 9 B. & C. 63; 3 C. & P. 513, S. C.; Bloxam *v.* Elsee, 1 C. & P. 558; 6 B. & C. 169; Morgan *v.* Seaward, 2 M. & W. 544.

7 Neilson *v.* Harford, 8 M. & W. 806.

ment has been recorded in the Patent office, before he can maintain any suit, either at law or in equity, either as sole or joint plaintiff, at least as against third persons.[1]

§ 492. (2.) The next step in the plaintiff's proof is to show, that the *invention* is original, and *his own*, and *prior* to any other. Of this point, as the applicant for a patent is required to make affidavit of the fact before the patent is issued, the possession of the patent has been held *primâ facie* evidence, in a *scire facias* for its repeal;[2] and it is now held, that the oath of the patentee, made *diverso intuitu*, that he was the true and first inventor, may be opposed to the oath of a witness whose testimony is offered to the contrary, in an action for infringement of the right.[3] The person who first suggests the principle, is the true and first inventor,[4] provided he has also first perfected and adapted the invention to use; for until it is so perfected and adapted to use, it is not patentable.[5] In a race of diligence between two independent and contemporaneous inventors, he, who first reduces his invention to a fixed and positive form, has the priority of title to a patent therefor. But if the first inventor is using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting his invention, he will have the prior right, notwithstanding a second inventor has in fact first perfected the same, and first reduced it to practice in a positive form.[6] The language of the statute,[7] "not known or used by others before his or their discovery thereof," does not require, that the invention

[1] Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273.

[2] Stearns *v.* Barrett, 1 Mason, 153. And see Minter *v.* Wells, Webst. Pat. Cas. 129; 5 Tyrw. 163. On the same principle it has been held in England, irrespective of any oath of the party, that the introducer is *primâ facie* the inventor. Minter *v.* Hart, Webst. Pat. Cas. 131.

[3] Alden *v.* Dewey, 1 Story, R. 336; Ante, Vol. 1, § 352; Woodworth *v.* Sherman, 1 Story, R. 171.

[4] Minter *v.* Hart, Webst. Pat. Cas. 131.

[5] Reed *v.* Cutter, 1 Story, R. 590; Bedford *v.* Hunt, 1 Mason, 302; Woodcock *v.* Parker, 1 Gallis. 438.

[6] Ibid. See, as to the Novelty and Originality of Invention, Phillips on Patents, p. 65, 66, 150–168; Godson on Patents, p. 36–50.

[7] Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, § 6.

should be known or used by more than one person, but merely indicates, that the use should be by some other person or persons than the patentee.[1]

§ 493. (3.) It must also be shown by the plaintiff, that the invention is *new and useful*, and that it has been *reduced to practice*.[2] The fact of novelty does not necessarily follow from the fact of its invention by the patentee ; for there may have been several inventors of the same thing, independent of each other. But the question of novelty, in our practice, can hardly arise upon opening the plaintiff's case, inasmuch as the patent itself, issued as it is upon the oath of the applicant, that the invention is new, seems to be *primâ facie* evidence of that fact.[3] It is sufficient under the statute of the United States, though it is otherwise in England and France, if it appears that the thing in question was not known or used before the invention thereof by the patentee, though it may have been used prior to the date of the patent.[4] Nor is it necessary to the validity of the patent, that any of the ingredients should be new or unused before for the purpose ; the true question being, whether the combination of them by the patentee is substantially new.[5]

§ 494. The question of *utility* is a question for the Jury ; who have frequently found, that all that was new in a patent was immaterial or useless.[6] It will be sufficient, however, if the amount of invention and of utility, taken together, be considerable. Novelty may frequently exist without utility ;

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[1] Reed *v.* Cutter, 1 Story, 590.

[2] The facts being undisputed, the question whether the invention is new is for the Court. Morgan *v.* Seaward, 2 M. & W. 544; Webst. Pat. Cas. 172.

[3] Phillips on Patents, p. 406, 407.

[4] Ibid. 150–164, 407.

[5] Ryan *v.* Goodwin, 3 Sumn. R. 514.

[6] By "useful" is meant, not as superior to all other modes now in practice, but as opposite to frivolous or mischievous inventions, or, inventions injurious to the moral health or good order of society. Lowell *v.* Lewis, 1 Mason, 182; Bedford *v.* Hunt, Ibid. 302.

but great utility cannot be conceived to exist without novelty. Hence great utility does of itself, for all practical purposes, constitute novelty; and the latter may be assumed wherever the former is proved to exist in any degree. Ordinarily, both may be proved by the testimony of persons well conversant with the subject, to the effect, that they had never seen or heard of the invention before, and that the public had given large orders for the article, or that licenses had been taken for the exercise of the right.[1] If the invention has never gone into general use, or has never been pursued, it is a presumption against its utility.[2]

§ 495. The plaintiff must also show, that the invention has been *reduced to practice*, and that it effects what the specification professes, and in the mode there described. For the thing to be patented is not a mere elementary principle, or intellectual discovery, but a principle put in practice, and applied to some art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.[3]

§ 496. (4.) The plaintiff, lastly, must prove the *infringement* of his right by the defendant, before the commencement of the action, together with his *damages*, if he claims any beyond a nominal sum. On the point of infringement, the presumption is in favor of the defendant. The statute secures to the patentee "the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the invention or discovery."[4] It will be sufficient, therefore, to prove the

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[1] Webster on Patents, p. 10, 11, 30; Cornish *v.* Keene, 3 Bing. N. C. 570; 4 Scott, 337, S. C.; Galloway *v.* Bleaden, Webst. Pat. Cas. 526; 1 M. & G. 247. And see Hill *v.* Thompson, 8 Taunt. 375; Holt, Cas. 636; Earle *v.* Sawyer, 4 Mason, 6.

[2] Morgan *v.* Seaward, 2 M. & W. 544; 1 Jur. 527; Minter *v.* Mower, 6 Ad. & El. 735; Simister's patent, Webst. Pat. Cas. 723.

[3] Earle *v.* Sawyer, 4 Mason, 1, 6, per Story, J.; Phillips on Patents, ch. 7, sec. 8, p. 109 – 112, 409.

[4] Stat. 1836, ch. 357, § 5. Merely exhibiting for sale is no infringement. Minter *v.* Williams, 4 Ad. & El. 251; 5 Nev. & M. 647, S. C.

making of the thing patented, for use or sale, though the defendant has never either used or sold it.[1] In the proof of *using*, which is a matter of great delicacy, a distinction is to be observed between the use of an article about or upon which a patented material or machine has been employed, and the act of applying such material or machine. It is the latter only, which is a violation of the right. Thus, if a carriage has been finished with patented paint, it is the builder, and not the purchaser, who violates the right of the patentee.[2] So, where a quantity of wire watch chains were made to order, in the manufacture of which a patented instrument was unlawfully used, it was held, that the manufacturer alone was liable to the patentee, though the purchaser knew that the instrument in question was used, and approved of its use.[3] But where the defendant *ordered* the goods to be manufactured by the plaintiff's process, which goods he afterwards received and sold, he was held liable.[4] The use of the article merely for philosophical experiment, or for the purpose of ascertaining the verity and exactness of the specification, is not an infringement of the right.[5] As to the fact of using, it may here be observed, that, though this ordinarily is proved only by direct evidence, yet the conduct of the defendant, in refusing to permit the manner of his manufacture, and course of his operations to be inspected, is admissible in evidence, as furnishing a presumption that he has infringed the plaintiff's right. If the article, made by the defendant, agrees in all its qualities with one made upon

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[1] Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 429. In Boyce *v.* Dorr, 3 McLean, 528, it was held that if the maker was ignorant that it had been patented, none but nominal damages should be given. And it has been held, in the Court of Exchequer, that if a patent has been infringed unintentionally, the patentee is not entitled to any redress. But this doctrine has been disapproved. See Heath *v.* Unwin, 15 Sim. 552; 11 Jur. 420; 16 Law J. 283, Chan.

[2] Phillips on Patents, p. 361–363.

[3] Keplinger *v.* De Young, 10 Wheat. 358; Boyd *v.* McAlpen, 3 McLean, 427.

[4] Gibson *v.* Brand, 4 M. & G. 179. Ibid.

[5] Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 429; Phillips on Patents, p. 366.

the plaintiff's plan, it is *primâ facie* evidence, that it was so made.[1]

§ 497. If the use of the machine or other subject of the patent is shown to have been *prior to the grant* of the patent, it is no infringement; but it cannot be afterwards continued. So, if a patent proves to be void, on account of a formal defect in the specification, for which reason it is surrendered, and a new patent is taken out; but in the interim, another person without license, erects and uses the thing invented, his continued use of it, after the second patent is issued, will be an infringement of the right; but he will not be liable for the intermediate use, before the issuing of the second patent.[2] And the law is the same, where a patent, originally void, is amended by filing a disclaimer, under the statute.[3]

§ 498. It must also appear, that the machine used by the defendant, is *identical* with the subject of the patent. Machines are the same if they operate in the same manner, and produce the same results, upon the same principles.[4] If the differences between the two machines are substantial, they are not alike; but if formal only, then they are alike. To this point, the opinion of *experts* is admissible in evidence; but it is still but matter of opinion, to be weighed and judged of by all the other circumstances of the case. The question, whether the principles are the same in both machines, when all the facts are given, is rather a matter of law, than of the

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[1] Huddart *v.* Grimshaw, Webst. Pat. Cas. 91; Hall *v.* Jarvis, Ibid. 102; Godson on Patents, p. 242; Gibson *v.* Brand, Webst. Pat. Cas. 627, 630.

[2] Ames *v.* Howard, 1 Sumn. 482; Phillips on Patents, p. 368, 370; Dixon *v.* Moyer, 4 Wash. 68.

[3] Perry *v.* Skinner, 2 M. & W. 471; 1 Jur. 433, S. C.; Stat. U. S. 1837, ch. 45, § 7, 9, which is essentially similar to Stat. 5 & 6 W. 4, ch. 83, § 1.

[4] Gray *v.* Osgood, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 394; Odiorne *v.* Winkley, 2 Gall. 51. A witness, who has previously constructed a machine like the plaintiff's, may look at a drawing, not made by himself, and say, whether he has such a recollection of the machine, as to be able to say, that it is a correct drawing of it. Rex *v.* Hadden, 2 C. & P. 184.

opinion of mechanics;[1] but the general question of identity, as well as the general question of infringement, being a mixed question of law and fact, is submitted to the Jury, under proper instructions from the Court.[2]

§ 499. The purchaser of a license to use an invention, is a *competent witness* for the plaintiff, in an action for infringement of the patent right; for he has no direct pecuniary interest in supporting the patent, but, on the contrary, it may be for his advantage that it should not be supported.[3]

§ 500. The *defence*, in an action for infringement of a patent right, is usually directed either to the patent itself, in order to invalidate the plaintiff's title; or to the fact of its violation by the defendant; and it is ordinarily made under the general issue, with notice of special matter to be given in evidence, which the statute permits.[4] The notice of special matter must have been given to the plaintiff or his attorney thirty days before the trial. Any special matter is admissible, "tending," as the statute expresses it, "to prove, (1.) that the description and specification filed by plaintiff does not contain the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery; or (2.) that it contains more than is necessary to produce the described effect; which concealment or addition shall fully appear to have been made for the purpose of

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[1] Barrett *v.* Hall, 1 Mason, 470, 471. And see Morgan *v.* Seaward, Webst. Pat. Cas. 171.

[2] Ibid.; Morgan *v.* Seaward, Webst. Pat. Cas. 168; Jupe *v.* Pratt, Ibid. 146; Macnamara *v.* Hulse, 1 Car. & Marshm. 471; Boulton *v.* Bull, 2 H. Bl. 480.

[3] Deronse *v.* Fairie, Webst. Pat. Cas. 154; 1 M. & Rob. 457, S. C.

[4] Where the defendant pleaded, 1. not guilty; 2. that the plaintiff was not the true and first inventor; 3. That the invention had previously been wholly or in part publicly and generally known, used, practised, and published; it was held, that the issue on the first plea must be determined by the acts done by the defendant, without reference to the intention with which they were done; that the second plea would be proved by showing a publication before the date of the letters-patent; and that the third plea only raised a question of user before the grant of the letters-patent. Stead *v.* Anderson, 4 C. B. 806.

deceiving the public; or (3.) that the patentee was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of the thing patented, or of a substantial and material part thereof claimed as new; or (4.) that it had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery thereof by the patentee; or (5.) had been in public use or on sale with the consent and allowance of the patentee before his application for a patent; or (6.) that he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for that which was in fact invented or discovered by another, who was using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same; or (7.) that the patentee, if an alien at the time the patent was granted, had failed and neglected, for the space of eighteen months from the date of the patent, to put and continue on sale to the public, on reasonable terms, the invention or discovery for which the patent issued; (8.) and whenever the defendant relies in his defence on the fact of a previous invention, knowledge, or use of the thing patented, he shall state, in his notice of special matter, the names and places of residence of those whom he intends to prove to have possessed a prior knowledge of the thing, and where the same had been used; in either of which cases, judgment shall be rendered for the defendant, with costs; (9.) *Provided, however*, That whenever it shall satisfactorily appear, that the patentee, at the time of making his application for the patent, believed himself to be the first inventor or discoverer of the thing patented, the same shall not be held to be void on account of the invention or discovery, or any part thereof, having been before known or used in any foreign country; it not appearing, that the same, or any substantial part thereof, had before been patented or described in any printed publication."[1]

§ 501. As the proof of *novelty* of invention, on the side of the plaintiff, must of necessity be negative in its character, it may be successfully opposed, on the part of the defendant, by a single witness, testifying, that he had seen the inven-

[1] Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, sec. 15.

tion in actual use, at a time anterior to the plaintiff's invention. The facility with which this defence may be made, affords a strong temptation to the crime of subornation of perjury; to prevent which the defendant is required to state, in his notice, the names and residence of the witnesses by whom the alleged previous invention is to be proved. But notwithstanding its liability to abuse, the evidence is admissible, to be weighed by the Jury, who are to consider, whether, upon the whole evidence, they are satisfied of the want of novelty.[1] If the action is brought by an assignee against the patentee himself, he is estopped by his own deed of assignment from showing, that it was not a new invention.[2]

§ 501 *a*. The question, whether the plaintiff is the true and *original inventor* or not, depends on the question whether he borrowed the invention from a source open to the public, or not.[3] It seems that his title is not destroyed by the fact that the same invention has been previously made, if it had altogether been lost sight of.[4] If the invention has been distinctly described, not by way of mere speculation or suggestion, but as a complete, successful, and perfect invention, in a book, whether written or printed, which has been publicly circulated, whether at home or abroad, this is a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's claim as the first inventor, whether he knew of the publication or not.[5]

§ 502. The *public use and exercise* of an invention, which prevents it from being considered as new, is a use in public, so as to come to the knowledge of others than the inventor, as contra-distinguished from the use of it by himself in pri-

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[1] Manton *v.* Manton, Dav. Pat. Cas. 250; Phillips on Patents, p. 415–417; Lewis *v.* Marling, 10 B. & C. 22; Cornish *v.* Keene, 3 Bing. N. C. 570. It is sufficient if the invention is new as to general use and public exercise. Lewis *v.* Marling, Webst. Pat. Cas. 492.

[2] Oldham *v.* Langmead, cited 3 T. R. 441.

[3] Walton *v.* Potter, Webst. Pat. Cas. 592.

[4] Household Co. *v.* Neilson, Webst. Pat. Cas. 690.

[5] Ibid.; Stead *v.* Williams, 8 Jur. 930; 7 M. & G. 818; Brooks *v.* Jenkins, 3 McLean, 250.

vate, or by another by his license, and in order to test its qualities; and does not mean a use by the public generally.[1] But it is not necessary, that the use should come down to the time when the patent was granted; proof of public use, though it has been discontinued, is sufficient to invalidate the patent.[2] And the place of the use, whether at home or abroad, makes no difference;[3] provided, in the case of foreign use, the invention has also been described in a printed publication.[4] It is sufficient to prove, that it was not first reduced to practice by the patentee;[5] but it is not sufficient to prove, that another was the first inventor, if he neither reduced the invention to practice, nor used due diligence in adapting and perfecting it.[6] The proof of use may be rebutted by the plaintiff, by showing, that it was by his license.[7]

§ 503. The defendant may also prove in defence, a *subsequent patent*, granted to the same patentee, either alone or jointly with another person, and either for the whole or a part of the same invention.[8] So, he may show, that *different and distinct inventions* are joined in the same patent; or, that the invention is *not lawful*, or, is *pernicious*.[9]

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[1] Carpenter *v.* Smith, 9 M. & W. 300; Webst. Pat. Cas. 534. And see Pennock *v.* Dialogue, 4 Wash. 544; 2 Peters, 1, S. C.; Bedford *v.* Hunt, 1 Mason, 302; Bentley *v.* Fleming, 1 C. & K. 587.

[2] Household Coal & Iron Co. *v.* Neilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 788. The question of public use, as, whether it were a use for manufacture, or only for experiment which had been abandoned, is a question for the Jury. Elliott *v.* Aston, Webst. Pat. Cas. 224; Cornish *v.* Keene, 3 Bing. N. C. 570.

[3] Brown *v.* Annandale, Webst. Pat. Cas. 433; Phillips on Patents, ch. vii. sec. xvi.; Anon. 1 Chitty, 24, n.

[4] Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, sec. 15.

[5] Woodcock *v.* Parker, 1 Gall. 436; Tennant's case, Webst. Pat. Cas. 125, n.; Dav. Pat. Cas. 429, S. C.

[6] Pennock *v.* Dialogue, 4 Wash. 538; Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, sec. 15.

[7] Phillips on Patents, p. 422.

[8] Treadwell *v.* Bladen, 4 Wash. 709; Phillips on Patents, p. 420; Odiorne *v.* The Amesbury Nail Factory, 2 Mason, 28; Barrett *v.* Hall, 1 Mason, 447.

[9] Phillips on Patents, p. 128, 421.

§ 504. The defendant may also show an *abandonment* of the invention by the plaintiff, and a *dedication* or *surrender* of it to public use, prior to the issuing of the patent.[1] And if such dedication was made, or the public use of the invention was acquiesced in for a long period, subsequent to the issuing of the patent, this is a good defence in equity, if the fact is explicitly relied on, and put in issue by the answer.[2] But the public use or sale of an invention, in order to deprive the inventor of his right to a patent, must be a public use or sale by others, with his knowledge and consent, and before his application for the patent. A sale or use of it with such knowledge or consent, in the interval of time between the application for a patent and the grant thereof, has no such effect.[3] Nor is it material, whether the public use was originally by express permission of the inventor, or by piracy; for in either case it is his acquiescence in the public use, that renders the subsequent patent void. And he is presumed to acquiesce, where he knows or might know of the public use.[4]

§ 505. A *material defect in the specification*, whether accidental or designed and fraudulent, may also be shown in defence of this action, both by Common Law, and by statute.[5] So, if the specification is designedly ambiguous and obscure; or, if it seeks to cover more than is actually new and useful, this also is a good defence.[6] Whether the want of *utility* can

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[1] Phillips on Patents, ch. vii. sec. xix. p. 181–205, 422; Pennock *v.* Dialogue, 4 Wash. 538; 2 Peters, 1, S. C.; Treadwell *v.* Bladen, 4 Wash. 709; Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 478. A disuse of the invention *after* the grant of letters-patent, is no defence at law. Gray *v.* James, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 394.

[2] Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273, 282. But it is no defence at law. Shaw *v.* Cooper, 7 Pet. 292.

[3] Ryan *v.* Goodwin, 3 Sumn. 514.

[4] Shaw *v.* Cooper, 7 Pet. 292; Whittemore *v.* Cutter, 1 Gall. 482; Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 15. See also Mellus *v.* Silsbee, 4 Mason, 108.

[5] Rex *v.* Cutler, 1 Stark. 354; Phillips on Patents, p. 424; Stat. U. S. 1836, ch. 357, § 15.

[6] Galloway *v.* Bleaden, Webst. Pat. Cas. 524; Hill *v.* Thompson, 8

be given in evidence under the general issue, has been questioned; but the better opinion is, that it may, as it cannot justly be said to be a surprise on the plaintiff.[1]

§ 506. In regard to the *fact of infringement*, the general doctrine is, that the use of any substantial part of the invention, though with some modifications of form, or apparatus, is a violation of the patent right. It is the substance and the principle of the machine, and not the mere form, the identity of purpose, and not of name, which are to be regarded. A specious variation in form, or an alteration in the mode of adaptation, however ingenious, do not render it any the less an infringement.[2] It is a question peculiarly for the Jury; who must say, whether the defendant has availed himself of the invention of the plaintiff, without having so far departed therefrom, as to give to his act the denomination of a new discovery.[3] If the patent is for several distinct improvements, or for several machines, the use of one only is a violation of the right;[4] but where the patent is for the entire combination of three things, and not of any two of them, it is no infringement to construct a machine containing only two of the combinations.[5] Evidence, that the invention of the defendant is better than that of the plaintiff is improper, except to show a substantial difference between the two inventions.[6]

Taunt. 375; Lowell *v.* Lewis, 1 Mason, 182; Evans *v.* Eaton, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 322. Unless the excess is disclaimed. Stat. U. S. 1837, ch. 45, § 7, 9.

[1] Phillips on Patents, p. 426; Langdon *v.* De Groot, 1 Paine, 203; Haworth *v.* Hardcastle, 1 Bing. N. C. 182.

[2] Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273; Hill *v.* Thompson, 8 Taunt. 375; Walton *v.* Potter, 3 M. & G. 411; 4 Scott, N. R. 91; Webst. Pat. Cas. 585; Morgan *v.* Seaward, Webst. Pat. Cas. 171; Cutler's patent, Ibid. 427.

[3] Walton *v.* Potter, Webst. Pat. Cas. 586, 587.

[4] Moody *v.* Fisk, 2 Mason, 112; Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273; Gillett *v.* Wilby, 9 C. & P. 334; Cornish *v.* Keene, 3 Bing. N. C. 570.

[5] Prouty *v.* Draper, 1 Story, R. 568.

[6] Alden *v.* Dewey, 1 Story, R. 336.

§ 507. Where the patent was originally too broad in its specification, including more than the patentee is entitled to hold, the error may now be cured by a *disclaimer*, filed pursuant to the statute.[1] But the disclaimer, to be effectual,

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[1] Stat. U. S. 1837, ch. 45, § 7, 9; the provisions of which are these: — "Sec. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That, whenever any patentee shall have, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, made his specification of claim too broad, claiming more than that of which he was the original or first inventor, some material and substantial part of the thing patented being truly and justly his own, any such patentee, his administrators, executors, and assigns, whether of the whole or of a sectional interest therein, may make disclaimer of such parts of the thing patented as the disclaimant shall not claim to hold by virtue of the patent or assignment, stating therein the extent of his interest in such patent; which disclaimer shall be in writing, attested by one or more witnesses, and recorded in the Patent Office, on payment by the person disclaiming, in manner as other patent duties are required by law to be paid, of the sum of ten dollars. And such disclaimer shall thereafter be taken and considered as part of the original specification, to the extent of the interest which shall be possessed in the patent or right secured thereby, by the disclaimant, and by those claiming by or under him subsequent to the record thereof. But no such disclaimer shall affect any action pending at the time of its being filed, except so far as may relate to the question of unreasonable neglect or delay in filing the same.

"Sec. 9. *And be it further enacted* (any thing in the fifteenth section of the act to which this is additional to the contrary notwithstanding,) That whenever, by mistake, accident, or inadvertence, and without any wilful default or intent to defraud or mislead the public, any patentee shall have in his specification claimed to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part of the thing patented, of which he was not the first and original inventor, and shall have no legal or just right to claim the same, in every such case, the patent shall be deemed good and valid for so much of the invention or discovery as shall be truly and *bonâ fide* his own; *Provided*, It shall be a material and substantial part of the thing patented, and be definitely distinguishable from the other parts so claimed without right as aforesaid. And every such patentee, his executors, administrators, and assigns, whether of a whole or of a sectional interest therein, shall be entitled to maintain a suit at law or in equity on such patent for any infringement of such part of the invention or discovery as shall be *bonâ fide* his own as aforesaid, notwithstanding the specification may embrace more than he shall have any legal right to claim. But, in every such case in which a judgment or verdict shall be rendered for the plaintiff, he shall not be entitled to recover costs against the defendant, unless he shall have entered at the Patent Office, prior to the commencement of the suit, a disclaimer of all that part of the thing patented, which was so claimed without right: *Provided*,

must be filed in the Patent Office before the suit is brought; otherwise, the plaintiff will not recover the costs of suit, even though he should prove, that the infringement was in a part of the invention not disclaimed. And where a disclaimer has been filed, whether before or after the suit is commenced, yet if the filing of it has been unreasonably neglected or delayed, this will constitute a good defence to the action.[1] If the patentee has assigned his patent in part, and a joint suit in Equity is brought by him and the assignee for a perpetual injunction, a disclaimer by the patentee alone, without the assignee's uniting in it, will not entitle them to the benefit of the statute.[2]

§ 508. In regard to the *competency of witnesses*, it has been held, that persons who have used the machine in question, as the defendant has done, are not thereby rendered incompetent witnesses for him, notwithstanding the object of the defence is to invalidate the patent, as well as to defeat the claim of damages; for in such a case the witness stands in the same predicament as the rest of the community; and the objection to competency would equally apply to every witness, since, if the patent were void in law, every person might use it, and therefore every person might be said to have an interest in making it public property.[3] Another patentee claiming adversely to the plaintiff, and under whose license the defendant has acted, is also a competent witness for the defendant.[4]

§ 509. The subject of COPY-RIGHT, which is usually treated in connection with that of Patents, may properly be considered in this place.

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however, That no person bringing any such suit shall be entitled to the benefits of the provisions contained in this section, who shall have unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter at the Patent Office a disclaimer as aforesaid."

[1] Reed *v.* Cutter, 1 Story, R. 590.

[2] Wyeth *v.* Stone, 1 Story, R. 273.

[3] Evans *v.* Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356; Evans *v.* Hettich, Ibid. 453.

[4] Treadwell *v.* Bladen, 4 Wash. 704.

§ 510. The remedy for an infringement of copyright, is either at Law, by an action for the statute penalties, or by an action on the case for damages, or in Equity, by a bill for an injunction;[1] but in either case, the evidence, necessary on both sides, is substantially the same, the plaintiff being obliged to prove his title to the exclusive privilege claimed, and the fact of its violation, or, in Equity, at least an intended violation, by the defendant.

§ 511. The plaintiff, to make out his *title*, must prove, that, prior to the publication of his work, he deposited a printed copy of its title in the clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, for the District where he resided at the time, and that notice of the copyright was given on the title-page, or the page next following, or, if it be a map, or print, or musical composition, then on its face, in the form prescribed by the statute. He is also required to deliver to the District clerk a copy of the work, within three months after its publication;[2] and it seems, that a

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[1] Stat. U. S. 1831, ch. 16. The subject of literary property, both by common law and by statute, received a very full and elaborate discussion in the leading case of Wheaton *v.* Peters, 8 Peters, 591.

[2] Stat. U. S. 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 5. These sections are as follows: — "Sec. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, unless he shall, before publication, deposit a printed copy of the title of such book, or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut or engraving, in the clerk's office of the district court of the district wherein the author or proprietor shall reside, and the clerk of such court is hereby directed and required to record the same thereof forthwith, in a book to be kept for that purpose, in the words following (giving a copy of the title under the seal of the court, to the said author or proprietor, whenever he shall require the same;) 'District of —— to wit: Be it remembered, that on the —— day of —— anno domini, —— A. B. of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, (map, chart, or otherwise as the case may be,) the title of which is in the words following, to wit: (here insert the title;) the right whereof he claims as author (or proprietor as the case may be;) in conformity with an act of Congress, entitled "An act to amend the several acts respecting copy-rights." C. D. Clerk of the district.' For which record, the clerk shall be entitled to receive, from the person claiming such right as aforesaid, fifty cents; and the like sum for every copy

compliance with this requirement also must be strictly shown.[1] Of these facts, the certificate of the District clerk, and the production of a copy of the work, will be sufficient *primâ facie* evidence.

§ 511 *a*. The author of any book, or other composition enumerated in the statutes respecting the law of copy-right, is also required to deliver a copy thereof to the librarian of the Smithsonian Institution, and another copy to the librarian of the Congress Library, for the use of those libraries, within three months after the publication of the book, map, &c.[2] But whether this provision is to be understood as another condition, added to those already made precedent to the exclusive right of the author, is not known to have been judicially determined.

§ 512. It is frequently necessary for the plaintiff to go

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under seal, actually given to such person or his assigns. And the author or proprietor of any such book, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut or engraving, shall, within three months from the publication of said book, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or engraving, deliver, or cause to be delivered a copy of the same to the clerk of said district. And it shall be the duty of the clerk of each district court, at least once in every year, to transmit a certified list of all such records of copy-right, including the titles so recorded, and the date of record, and also all the several copies of books or other works deposited in his office according to this act, to the secretary of state, to be preserved in his office.

"Sec. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, unless he shall give information of copy-right being secured, by causing to be inserted, in the several copies of each and every edition published during the term secured on the title-page, or the page immediately following, if it be a book, or, if a map, chart, musical composition, print, cut or engraving, by causing to be impressed on the face thereof, or if a volume of maps, charts, music, or engravings, upon the title or frontispiece thereof, the following words, viz.: 'Entered according to act of Congress, in the year —— by A. B., in the clerk's office of the district court of ————' (as the case may be.)"

[1] Such was the construction of a similar provision in the act of 1790, ch. 42, sec. 4. Ewer *v.* Coxe, 4 Wash. 487; Wheaton *v.* Peters, 8 Peters, 591.

[2] Stat. U. S. 1846, ch. 178, § 10.

farther, and prove, that he is the author of the work; for which purpose the original manuscript, which it is always expedient to preserve, is admissible, and generally is sufficient evidence; it being proved to be the handwriting of himself or of his amanuensis. If it is lost or destroyed, it must be proved by secondary evidence. If the subject was an engraving, it may be proved by producing one of the prints taken from the original plate; the production of the plate itself not being required.[1]

§ 513. Where the action is by an assignee, he must deduce his title by legal *assignment* from the original author or proprietor, in addition to the proof already mentioned. The instrument of assignment must be proved or acknowledged in the same manner as deeds of land are required to be proved or acknowledged in the State or District where the original copyright is deposited and recorded; and in order to be valid against a subsequent purchaser without notice, it must also be recorded in the clerk's office of the same District within sixty days after its execution.[2]

§ 514. The plaintiff must prove the *infringement* of his right by the defendant. And it is an infringement, if the defendant has published so much of the plaintiff's work as to serve as a substitute for it; or has extracted so much as to communicate the same knowledge; whether it be in the colorable form of an abridgment, or a review, or by incorporating it into some larger work, such as an encyclopedia, or in any other mode.[3] For the question of violation of copyright may depend upon the value, rather than on the quantity of the selected materials.[4] If so much of the

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[1] Maugham on Literary Property, p. 165; Thompson *v.* Symonds, 5 T. R. 41, 46.

[2] Stat. U. S. 1831, ch. 157, § 1; Curtis on Copyright, ch. 8, p. 216–235.

[3] 2 Kent. Comm. 382, 383; Godson on Patents, p. 475, 476, 2d edit.; Maugham on Literary Property, Part 3, ch. 1, p. 126–136; Gray *v.* Russell, 1 Story, R. 11. See Curtis on Copyright, ch. 5, p. 169–192, where the subject of Originality is treated with clearness and just discrimination.

[4] Gray *v.* Russell, 1 Story, R. 11.

work be taken, in form and substance, that the value of the original work is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the author are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by another, it constitutes, in law, *pro tanto*, a piracy.[1] But a fair and real abridgment, or a fair quotation, made in good faith, is no violation; and of this intent the Jury are to judge.[2] If the main design be not copied, the circumstance, that part of the composition of one author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, sufficient to support an action. Nor will it suffice, if the effect of the new publication is prejudicial in some degree to that of the plaintiff, unless it is substantially so. If it is substantially a copy, it is actionable, however innocent the intention of the defendant in publishing it; on the other hand, if it is not substantially a copy, or a colorable selection, or an abridgment, the publication is lawful, however corrupt the motive. It is the middling class of cases, which involve the greatest difficulty, namely, where there is not only a considerable portion of the plaintiff's work taken, but also much that is not; and here the question, upon the whole, is, whether it is a legitimate use of the plaintiff's publication, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, entitling it to the character of an original work.[3]

§ 515. In the *defence* of this action, on other grounds than that of defect in the plaintiff's case, it may be shown, that the plaintiff's publication was itself pirated,[4] or that it

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[1] 2 Kent, Comm. 383, note (b), 4th edit.; Roworth *v.* Wilkes, 1 Campb. 94.

[2] Ibid.; Godson on Patents, p. 477, 478; Maugham on Literary Property, p. 98 99, 129–132.

[3] Wilkins *v.* Aikin, 17 Ves. 422, 426. It is sometimes said, that in these cases the question is, whether it was done *animo furandi*, or not. But the accuracy of this test is not very readily perceived. The subject of Infringement is copiously discussed in Curtis on Copyright, ch. 9, p. 236–305.

[4] In order to prove a prior publication in a foreign country, it is not enough to prove, by a witness, that he has seen it there, in print, without accounting for the non-production of the printed copy. Boosey *v.* Davidson, 13 Jur. 678.

was obscene, or immoral, or libellous, either on government, or on individuals; or that it was in other respects of a nature mischievously to affect the public morals or interests.[1] But in Equity, it seems, that an injunction may be granted, notwithstanding the bad character of the subject, if the author, repenting of his work, seeks by this mode to suppress it.[2] If the defence is made under the plaintiff's *license* for the publication, the defendant, in an action at law, must prove it by a writing, signed by the plaintiff, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses.[3]

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[1] Godson on Patents, p. 478, 479; Maugham on Literary Property, p. 88–99.

[2] Southy *v.* Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 438.

[3] Stat. U. S. 1831, ch. 16, § 6, 7, 9.

PAYMENT.

§ 516. The defence of payment may be made under the general issue, in assumpsit, but in an action of debt on a specialty or a record, it must be specially pleaded. In either case, the burden of proof is on the defendant, who must prove the payment of money, or something accepted in its stead, made to the plaintiff, or to some person authorized in his behalf to receive it. The word "payment" is not a technical term; it has been imported into law proceedings from the exchange, and not from law treatises. When used in pleading, in respect to cash, it means immediate satisfaction; but when applied to the delivery of a bill or note, or other collateral thing, it does not necessarily mean payment in immediate satisfaction and discharge of the debt, but may be taken in its popular sense, as delivery only, to be a discharge when converted into money.[1]

§ 517. If a *receipt* was given for the money, it is proper and expedient to produce it; but it is not necessary; parol evidence of the payment being admissible, notwithstanding the written receipt, and without accounting for its absence.[2] And if produced, it is not conclusive against the plaintiff, but may be disproved and contradicted by parol evidence.[3]

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[1] Manning *v.* The Duke of Argyle, 6 M. & G. 40. If payment of the whole sum due is pleaded, but the proof is of the payment of part only, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of this evidence by way of reduction of damages. Lord *v.* Ferrand, 1 Dowl. & L. 630. And proof of the payment and acceptance of the whole debt will support a plea of payment of debt and damages, where the latter are merely nominal. Beaumont *v.* Greathead, 3 Dowl. & L. 631.

[2] Southwick *v.* Hayden, 7 Cowen, 334.

[3] Ante, Vol. 1, § 305; Skaife *v.* Jackson, 5 D. & R. 290.; 3 B & C. 421.

§ 518. Respecting the *person to whom* the payment was made, if it was made to an *agent* of the plaintiff, his authority may be shown in any of the modes already stated under that title.[1] If it was made to an *attorney at law*, his employment by the creditor must be proved; in which case, the payment is ordinarily good, upon the custom of the country, until his authority has been revoked.[2] Payment of a judgment to the attorney of record who obtained it, though made more than a year after the judgment was recovered, has been held good;[3] but if the payment was made to an agent employed by the attorney, or to the attorney's clerk, not authorized to receive it, it is otherwise.[4] Even if land has been set off to the creditor by extent, in satisfaction of an execution, pursuant to the statutes in such cases, payment of the money to the creditor's attorney of record, within the time allowed by law to redeem the land, is a good payment.[5] But proof of payment made to the attorney after his authority has been revoked, will not discharge the liability of the party paying.[6] It is also a good payment, if made to a person *sitting in the counting-room* of the creditor, with account books near him, and apparently entrusted with the conduct of the business;[7] but not if made to an *apprentice*, not in the usual course of business, but on a *collateral transaction*.[8] Payment is also good, if made to one of several partners, trustees, or executors.[9] And if the plaintiff has drawn an *order*, on the

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[1] Ante, tit. AGENCY, per tot.

[2] Hudson *v.* Johnson, 1 Wash. 10.

[3] Langdon *v.* Potter, 13 Mass. 219; Jackson *v.* Bartlett, 8 Johns. 361; Branch *v.* Burnley, 1 Call, 147; Lewis *v.* Gamage, 1 Pick. 347; Kellogg *v.* Gilbert, 10 Johns. 220; Powell *v.* Little, 1 W. Bl. 8.

[4] Yates *v.* Freckleton, 2 Doug. 623; Perry *v.* Turner, 2 Tyrw. 128; 1 Dowl. P. C. 300; 2 C. & J. 89, S. C.

[5] Gray *v.* Wass, 1 Greenl. 257.

[6] Parker *v.* Downing, 13 Mass. 465; Wurt *v.* Lee, 3 Yeates, 7.

[7] Barrett *v.* Deere, 1 M. & Malk. 200.

[8] Saunderson *v.* Bell, 2 C. & Mees. 304; 4 Tyrw. 224, S. C.

[9] Porter *v.* Taylor, 6 M. & S. 156; Stone *v.* Marsh, Ry. & M. 364; Can *v.* Reed, 3 Atk. 695.

defendant, payable to a third person, upon which the defendant has made himself absolutely liable to the holder, this, as against the plaintiff, is a good payment of his claim to that amount, even though the plaintiff has subsequently countermanded it.[1] The possession of the order, by the debtor on whom it was drawn, is *primâ facie* evidence that he has paid it.

§ 519. As to the *mode of payment*, it may be by any lawful method, agreed upon between the parties, and fully executed. The *meaning and intention* of the parties, where it can be distinctly known, is to have effect, unless that intention contravene some well established principle of law. This intention is to be ascertained, in ordinary cases, by the Jury; but it is sometimes legally presumed by the Court.[2] Thus, the giving of a *higher security*, is conclusively taken as payment of a simple contract debt. Where the payment is made by giving the *party's own security*, it is either negotiable, or not. Ordinarily, the giving of a new security of the same kind with the former, and for the amount due thereon, as, a new note for an old one, familiarly known in the Roman and modern continental law as a Novation, is equivalent to payment of the latter;[3] but if it is for a less amount, it is not.[4] If a promissory note is taken as a satisfaction, by express agreement, it will be so held, even though the debt was due of record.[5]

§ 520. Where the debtor's own *negotiable note* or *bill* is

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[1] Hodgson *v.* Anderson, 3 B. & C. 842; Tatlock *v.* Harris, 3 T. R. 180.

[2] Millikin *v.* Brown, 1 Rawle, 397, 398; Watkins *v.* Hill, 8 Pick. 522, 523; Thatcher *v.* Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Johnson *v.* Weed, 9 Johns. 310.

[3] Story on Bills, § 441; Poth. Obl. by Evans, n. 546 – 564; Cornwall *v.* Gould, 4 Pick. 444; Huse *v.* Alexander, 2 Met. 157.

[4] Canfield *v.* Ives, 18 Pick. 253; Heathcote *v.* Crookshanks, 2 T. R. 24; Fitch *v.* Sutton, 5 East, 230; Smith *v.* Bartholomew, 1 Met. 276.

[5] The New York State Bank *v.* Fletcher, 5 Wend. 85; Clark *v.* Pinney, 6 Cowen, 297.

given for a pre-existing debt, it is *primâ facie* evidence of payment, but is still open to inquiry by the Jury. The reason is, that, otherwise, the debtor might be obliged to pay the debt twice.[1] If such note or bill is given for part of the debt, it is deemed payment of such part,[2] even though the debt is collaterally secured by a mortgage.[3] If the creditor receives the debtor's *check* for the amount, it is payment, if expressly accepted as such ;[4] unless it was drawn colorably, or fraudulently, and knowingly without effects.[5] But in the absence of any evidence of an agreement to receive a check or draft in payment, it is regarded only as the means whereby the creditor may obtain payment ;[6] or, as payment provisionally, until it has been presented and refused ; if it is dishonored, it is no payment of the debt for which it was drawn.[7] And if a bill of exchange, given in payment of a debt, is not admissible in evidence, by being written on a *wrong stamp*, it is not deemed as payment, even if the parties would have paid it on due presentment.[8]

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1 Johnson *v.* Johnson, 11 Mass. 361 ; Hebden *v.* Hartsink, 4 Esp. 46 ; Thatcher *v.* Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299 ; Holmes *v.* D'Camp, 1 Johns. 34 ; Pintard *v.* Tackington, 10 Johns. 104 ; Maneely *v.* M'Gee, 6 Mass. 143 ; Butts *v.* Dean, 2 Met. 76 ; Reed *v.* Upton, 10 Pick. 522 ; Jones *v.* Kennedy, 11 Pick. 125 ; Watkins *v.* Hill, 8 Pick. 522, 523 ; Cumming *v.* Hackley, 8 Johns. 202 ; Comstock *v.* Smith, 10 Shepl. 202 ; Dogan *v.* Ashbey, 1 Rich. 36. By the English decisions, it seems that the receipt of bills is not deemed payment, unless expressly so agreed, or the bills have been negotiated, and are outstanding against the defendant. Burden *v.* Halton, 4 Bing. 454 ; Rolt *v.* Watson, Ibid. 273. And see Raymond *v.* Merchant, 3 Cowen, 147.

2 Ilsley *v.* Jewett, 2 Met. 168.

3 Fowler *v.* Bush, 21 Pick. 230.

4 Barnard *v.* Graves, 16 Pick. 41.

5 Dennie *v.* Hart, 2 Pick. 204 ; Franklin *v.* Vanderpool, 1 Hall, N. Y. R. 78 ; Stedman *v.* Gooch, 1 Esp. 5 ; Puckford *v.* Maxwell, 6 T. R. 52.

6 Cromwell *v.* Lovett, 1 Hall, N. Y. Rep. 56 ; The People *v.* Howell, 4 Johns. 296 ; Olcott *v.* Rathbone, 5 Wend. 490.

7 Pearce *v.* Davis, 1 M. & Rob. 365 ; Everett *v.* Collins, 2 Campb. 515 ; Puckford *v.* Maxwell, 6 T. R. 52 ; Bond *v.* Warden, 9 Jur. 198.

8 Wilson *v.* Vysar, 4 Taunt. 288 ; Brown *v.* Watts, 1 Taunt. 253 ; Wilson *v.* Kennedy, 1 Esp. 245 ; Gordon *v.* Strange, 1 Exch. R. 477, S. P.

§ 521. But where the debtor's own security, *not negotiable*, and of no higher nature, is taken for a simple contract debt, it is not ordinarily taken as payment, unless expressly so agreed; except where it is given as a renewal, as before stated. Whether it was intended as payment or not, is a question for the Jury.[1]

§ 522. Payment may be proved by evidence of the delivery and acceptance of *bank notes;* which will be deemed as payment at their par value.[2] But if, at the time of delivery and acceptance of the notes, the bank had actually stopped payment, or the notes were counterfeit, the loss falls on the debtor, however innocent or ignorant of the facts he may have been.[3]

§ 523. Proof of the acceptance of the promissory *note or bill of a third person*, will also support the defence of payment. But here it must appear to have been the voluntary act and choice of the creditor, and not a measure forced upon him, by necessity, where nothing else could be obtained.[4] Thus, where the creditor received the note of a stranger

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[1] Howland *v.* Coffin, 9 Pick. 42; Cumming *v.* Hackley, 8 Johns. 202; Tobey *v.* Barber, 5 Johns. 68. So, of the debtor's order on a third person. Hoar *v.* Clute, 15 Johns. 224.

[2] Phillips *v.* Blake, 1 Met. 246; Snow *v.* Perry, 9 Pick. 539, 542.

[3] Lightbody *v.* The Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 9; 13 Wend. 101; Markle *v.* Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455; Young *v.* Adams, 6 Mass. 182; Jones *v.* Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488; Gloucester Bank *v.* Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 42, 43. It has been said in Massachusetts, that the solvency of the bank, where both parties were equally innocent, was at the risk of the creditor. See 6 Mass. 185. But this was reluctantly admitted, on the ground of supposed usage alone, and was not the point directly in judgment. The same has been held in Alabama. Lowry *v.* Murrell, 2 Porter, R. 280.

[4] The creditor's omission to have the notes indorsed by the party from whom he receives them, is *primâ facie* evidence of an agreement to take them at his own risk. Whitbeck *v.* Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409; Breed *v.* Cook, 15 Johns. 241. Whether the security was accepted in satisfaction of the original claim, is a matter of fact for the Jury. Hart *v.* Boller, 15 S. & R. 162; Johnson *v.* Weed, 9 Johns. 310.

who owed his debtor, the note being made payable to the agent of the creditor, it was held a good payment, though the promissor afterwards failed.[1] So, where goods were bargained for, in exchange for a promissory note held by the purchaser as indorsee, and were sold accordingly, but the note proved to be forged, of which, however, the purchaser was ignorant, it was held a good payment.[2] So, where one, entitled to receive cash, receives instead thereof notes or bills against a third person, it is payment, though the securities turn out to be of no value.[3] But if the sale was intended for cash, the payment by the notes or bills being no part of the original stipulation,[4] or the vendor has been induced to take them by the fraudulent misrepresentation of the vendee as to the solvency of the parties,[5] or they are forged,[6] or they are forced upon the vendor by the necessity of the case, nothing better being attainable,[7] it is no payment. If, however, a creditor, who has received a draft or note upon a third person, delays for an unreasonable time to present it for acceptance and payment, whereby a loss accrues, the loss is his own.[8] So, if he alters the bill, and thus vitiates it, he thereby causes it to operate as a satisfaction of the debt.[9]

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1 Wiseman *v.* Lyman, 7 Mass. 286.

2 Ellis *v.* Wild, 6 Mass. 321. And see Alexander *v.* Owen, 1 T. R. 225. So, though it be genuine. Harris *v.* Johnston, 3 Cranch, 311.

3 Fydell *v.* Clark, 1 Esp. 447. See also Rew *v.* Barber, 3 Cowen, 272; Frisbie *v.* Larned, 21 Wend. 450; Arnold *v.* Camp, 12 Johns. 409.

4 Ellis *v.* Wild, 6 Mass. 321. And see Owenson *v.* Morse, 7 T. R. 64. In this case, the vendor received the notes of bankers who were in fact insolvent, and never afterwards opened their house. See also Salem Bank *v.* Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1.

5 Pierce *v.* Drake, 15 Johns. 475; Wilson *v.* Force, 6 Johns. 110; Brown *v.* Jackson, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 24.

6 Markle *v.* Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455; Bank of the United States *v.* Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333; Hargrave *v.* Dusenbury, 2 Hawks, 326.

7 This was Ld. Tenterden's view of the facts in Robinson *v.* Read, 9 B. & C. 449.

8 Chamberlyn *v.* Delarive, 3 Wils. 353; Bishop *v.* Chitty, 2 Stra. 1195; Watts *v.* Willing, 2 Dall. 100; Popley *v.* Ashley, 6 Mod. 147; Raymond *v.* Baar, 13 S. & R. 318; Roberts *v.* Gallaher, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 191; Copper *v.* Power, Anthon, R. 49.

9 Alderson *v.* Langdale, 3 B. & Ad. 660.

So, if he accepts from the drawee other bills in payment of the draft, and they turn out to be worthless.[1]

§ 524. The *foreclosure of a mortgage*, given to secure the debt, may also be shown as a payment, made at the time of complete foreclosure; but if the property mortgaged is not at that time equal in value to the amount due, it is only payment *pro tanto*.[2] A *legacy*, also, will sometimes be deemed a payment and satisfaction of a debt due from the testator. But to be so taken, the debt must have been in existence and liquidated, at the date of the will.[3] And parol evidence is admissible to prove extraneous circumstances, from which the intent of the testator may be inferred, that the legacy should go in satisfaction of the debt.[4]

§ 525. When payment is made by a *remittance* by post to the creditor, it must be shown, on the part of the debtor, that the letter was properly sealed and directed, and that it was delivered into the post-office, and not to a private carrier or porter. He must also prove, either the express direction of the creditor to remit in that mode, or a usage or course of dealing, from which the authority of the creditor may be inferred. Where these circumstances concur, and a loss happens, it is the loss of the creditor.[5]

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[1] Bolton *v.* Reichard, 1 Esp. 106.

[2] Amory *v.* Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562; Hatch *v.* White, 2 Gall. 152; Omaly *v.* Swan, 3 Mason, 474; West *v.* Chamberlin, 8 Pick. 336; Briggs *v.* Richmond, 10 Pick. 396; Case *v.* Boughton, 11 Wend. 106; Spencer *v.* Hartford, 4 Wend. 381.

[3] Le Sage *v.* Coussmaker, 1 Esp. 187. And see Strong *v.* Williams, 12 Mass. 391; Williams *v.* Crary, 5 Cowen, 368.

[4] Cuthbert *v.* Peacock, 2 Verm. 593; Fane *v.* Fane, 1 Vern. 31, n. (2,) by Mr. Raithby; Ante, Vol. 1, § 287, 288, 296. And see Clark *v.* Bogardus, 12 Wend. 67; Mulheran *v.* Gillespie, Ibid. 349; Williams *v.* Crary, 8 Cowen, 246.

[5] Warwicke *v.* Noakes, 1 Peake, 67; Hawkins *v.* Rutt, Ibid. 186; Walter *v.* Haynes, Ry. & M. 149. It is held by some, that the sending of bank notes uncut will not discharge the debtor; because, among prudent people, it is usual to cut such securities in halves, and send them at different times. Peake on Evid. by Norris, p. 412.

§ 526. Payment may also be proved by evidence of the delivery and acceptance of any *specific article* or *collateral thing* in satisfaction of the debt; as has already been shown in the preceding pages.[1] Such payment is a good discharge even of a judgment.[2] Payment even of part of the sum, may be a satisfaction of the whole debt, if so agreed, provided it be in a manner collateral to the original obligation; as, if it be paid before the day, or in a manner different from the first agreement, or be made by a stranger, out of his own moneys, or under a fair compensation with all the creditors of the party.[3]

§ 527. Payment may also be *presumed* or inferred by the Jury, from sufficient circumstances. Thus, where, in the ordinary course of dealing, a security, when paid, is given up to the party who pays it; the possession of the security by the debtor, after the day of payment, is *primâ facie* evidence that he has paid it.[4] But the mere production of a bill of exchange from the custody of the acceptor affords no presumption that he has paid it, without proof that it was once in circulation after he accepted it.[5] Nor is payment presumed from a receipt, indorsed on the bill, without evidence that it is the handwriting of a person entitled to demand payment.[6] Nor will it be presumed from the circumstance of the defendant's having drawn a check on a bank or on his banker, payable to the plaintiff *or bearer*, without proof that the money had been paid thereon to the plaintiff; and of this, the plaintiff's name on the back of the check will be

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[1] Ante, tit. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

[2] Brown *v.* Feeter, 7 Wend. 301.

[3] Co. Lit. 212, b.; Steinman *v.* Magnus, 11 East, 390; Lewis *v.* Jones, 4 B. & C. 506; Ellis on Debtor and Creditor, p. 412, 413. And see Ante, tit. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

[4] Brembridge *v.* Osborne, 1 Stark. 374; Gibbon *v.* Featherstonhaugh, Ibid. 225; Weidner *v.* Schweigart, 9 S. & R. 385. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 38.

[5] Pfiel *v.* Vanbatenberg, 2 Campb. 439.

[6] Ibid.

sufficient evidence.[1] And where a bill of exchange, on presentment by the bankers of the indorsee to the acceptor, was not paid, but afterwards a stranger called on the banker's clerk and paid it, the clerk giving up the bill to him after indorsing upon it a general receipt of payment; this receipt was held no evidence of payment *by the acceptor*, in a subsequent action by the indorsee against him.[2]

§ 528. Payment is also *presumed from lapse of time.* The lapse of twenty years, without explanatory circumstances, affords a presumption of law that the debt is paid, even though it be due by specialty, which the Court will apply, without the aid of a Jury.[3] But it may be inferred by the Jury from circumstances, coupled with the lapse of a shorter period.[4] It may also be inferred from the *usual course of trade* in general, or from the habit and course of dealing between the parties. Thus, where the defendant was regular in his dealings, and employed a large number of workmen, whom he was in the habit of paying every Saturday night, and the plaintiff had been one of his workmen, and had been seen among them, waiting to receive his wages, but had ceased to work for the defendant for upwards of two years; this was held admissible evidence to found a presumption, that he had been paid with the others.[5] So, where the course of dealing between the parties, engaged in daily sales of milk to customers, was to make a daily settlement and payment of balances without writing, this was held a sufficient ground to presume payment, until the plaintiff should prove the con-

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1 Egg *v.* Barnett, 3 Esp. 196.

2 Phillips *v.* Warren, 14 M. & W. 379.

3 Ante, Vol. 1, § 39; Colsell *v.* Budd, 1 Campb. 27; Cope *v.* Humphreys, 14 S. & R. 15; Ellis, Law of Debtor and Creditor, p. 414.

4 Best on Presumptions, § 137; Lesley *v.* Nones, 7 S. & R. 410. If the debt itself is disputed by the defendant, who admits that it has not been paid, lapse of time, though it cannot afford any presumption of payment, may afford a presumption against the original existence of the debt. Christophers *v.* Sparke, 2 J. &. W. 228.

5 Lucas *v.* Novosilieski, 1 Esp. 296.

trary.[1] So also, a receipt for the last year's or quarter's rent, is *primâ facie* evidence that all rents, previously due, have been paid.[2]

§ 529. In regard to the ascription or *appropriation of payments*, the general rule of law is, that a debtor, owing several debts to the same creditor, has a right to apply his payment, at the time of making it, to which debt he pleases. But this rule applies only to voluntary payments, and not to those made under compulsory process of law.[3] If he makes a general payment without appropriating it, the creditor may apply it as he pleases. And where neither party appropriates it, the law will apply it, according to its own view of the intrinsic justice and equity of the case.[4]

§ 530. An *appropriation by the debtor* may be proved, either by his express declaration, or by any circumstances

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[1] Evans *v.* Birch, 3 Campb. 10.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 38.

[3] Blackstone Bank *v.* Hill, 10 Pick. 129.

[4] Per Story, J. in Cremer *v.* Higginson, 1 Mason, 338; 1 Story on Equity, § 459, *b*; United States *v.* Wardwell, 5 Mason, 85; Seymour *v.* Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403; Chitty on Contracts, p. 382, and cases there cited. Clayton's case, in Devaynes *v.* Noble, 1 Meriv. 605–607; Ellis on Debtor and Creditor, p. 406–412. The doctrine of the Roman Law on this subject, and its recognition in adjudged cases in the Common Law, are stated by Mr. Cowen, in a note to the case of Pattison *v.* Hull, 9 Cowen, 747, as follows: — "A moment's recurrence to the civil law will convince the learned reader how much we have borrowed from it almost without credit. The whole text of that law, in relation to the subject under consideration, is contained *passim* in the Digest (Lib. 46, tit. 3, *De solutionibus et liberationibus*); as is rendered into English by Strahan from the French of Domat's Civ. L. in its natural order, as follows:

"'1. If a debtor who owes to a creditor different debts, hath a mind to pay one of them, he is at liberty to acquit whichsoever of them he pleases; and the creditor cannot refuse to receive payment of it; for there is not any one of them which the debtor may not acquit, although he pay nothing of all the other debts, provided he acquit entirely the debt which he offers to pay.'

"This is precisely the common law. Owing two debts to the same person, you may pay which you please, but you must tender the whole debt.

from which his intention can be inferred.[1] But it seems, that this intention must be signified to the creditor at the

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The creditor is not bound to take part of it, though he may do so if he choose. (22 Ed. 4, 25; Br. Condition, pl. 181; Lofft's Gilb. 330; Pinnel's case, 5 Co. 117; Colt *v.* Netterville, 2 P. Wms. 304; Anon. Cro. Eliz. 68.) Hawkshaw *v.* Rawlings, (1 Stra. 23,) that the debtor shall not apply the money, is not law. There are fifteen or twenty cases the other way.

"'2. If, in the same case of a debtor who owes several debts to one and the same creditor, the said debtor makes a payment to him, without declaring at the same time, which of the debts he has a mind to discharge, whether it be that he gives him a sum of money indefinitely in part payment of what he owes him, or that there be a compensation [i. e. a set-off] of debts agreed on between the debtor and creditor, or in some other manner, the debtor will have always the same liberty of applying the payment to whichsoever of the debts he has a mind to acquit. But if the creditor were to apply the payment, he could apply it only to that debt which he himself would discharge in the first place, in case he were the debtor, for equity requires that he should act in the affair of his debtor, as he would do in his own. And if, for example, in the case of two debts, one of them were controverted, and the other clear, the creditor could not apply the payment to the debt which is contested by the debtor.'

"The right of the debtor to apply the payment, whether total or partial, if he do so at the time, is recognized by all the cases. As to the above doctrine restraining the creditor to an application most favorable to the rights of the debtor, one cannot read the case of Goddard *v.* Cox, (2 Str. 1194,) without being struck with the similarity both in principle and illustration. The defendant owed the plaintiff three debts, one he contracted himself, a second he owed absolutely in right of his wife, and the third was due from his wife as executrix. The defendant made several indefinite payments, after which his creditor sued him. Chief Justice Lee held the whole of the above civil law doctrine: 1. It was agreed the defendant had the first right to apply the payments; 2. The Chief Justice held, there being no direction by him, that thereby the right devolved to the plaintiff. And the defendant being by the marriage equally a debtor for what his wife received *dum sola*, as for what was after, the plaintiff might apply the money received to discharge the wife's own debt. 'But as to the demand against her as executrix, the validity of which depended on the question of assets, and manner of administering them, he was of opinion the plaintiff could not apply any of the money paid by the defendant to the discharge of that demand.'

"'3. In all cases where a debtor, owing several debts to one and the same

[1] Waters *v.* Tompkins, 2 C. M. & R. 723; 1 Tyrw. & Grang. 137, S. C.; Peters *v.* Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Newmarch *v.* Clay, 14 East, 239; Stone *v.* Seymour, 15 Wend. 19. The same rule applies to appropriations by creditors. Seymour *v.* Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403.

time; for an entry made in his own books has been held insufficient to determine the application of the payment.[1]

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creditor, is found to have made several payments, of which the application has not been made by the mutual consent of the parties, and where it is necessary that it be regulated either by a court of justice, or by arbitrators, the payments ought to be applied to the debts which lie heaviest on the debtor, and which it concerns him most to discharge. (12 Mod. 559; 2 Brownl. 107, 108; 1 Vern. 24; 2 Freem. 261; 1 Ld. Raym. 286; 1 Comb. 463; Peake, N. P. Cas. 64.) Thus a payment is applied rather to a debt of which the non-payment would expose the debtor to some penalty, and to costs and damages, (12 Mod. 559; 2 Browl. 107, 108; 1 Vern. 24; 2 Freem. 261; 1 Ld. Raym. 286; 1 Comb. 463; Peake, N. P. Cas. 64; 4 Har. & John. 754; 2 Ibid. 402; 8 Mod. 236;) or in the payment of which his honor might be concerned, than to a debt of which the non-payment would not be attended with such consequences. Thus a payment is applied to the discharge of a debt for which a surety is bound, rather than to acquit what the debtor is singly bound for without giving any security; (Marryatts *v.* White, 2 Stark. Rep. 101; Plomer *v.* Long, 1 Ibid. 153, contra;) or to the discharge of what he owes in his own name, rather than what he stands engaged for as surety for another. Thus a payment is applied to a debt for which the debtor has given pawns and mortgages, rather than to a debt due by a simple bond or promise; (1 Vern. 24; 1 Har. & John. 754; 2 Ibid. 402;) rather to a debt of which the term has already come, than the one that is not yet due; (Hammersly *v.* Knowlys, 2 Esp. R. 666; Niagara Bank *v.* Rosevelt, per Woodworth, J. 9 Cowen, R. 412; Baker *v.* Stackpoole, per Savage, Ch. J. 9 Cowen, R. 436;) or to an old debt before a new one; (1 Meriv. 608;) and rather to a debt that is clear and liquid, than to one that is in dispute; (Goddard *v.* Cox, 2 Str. 1194;) or to a pure and simple debt before one that is conditional; (Ibid. and 9 Cowen, R. 412.

"I have here interpolated the common law cases in the text of the civil law. On examining them, it will be found that almost every word of the last quotation has been expressly sanctioned by the English courts.

"'4. When a payment made to a creditor to whom several debts are due, exceeds the debt to which it ought to be applied, the overplus ought to be applied to the discharge of the debt which follows, according to the order explained in the preceding article, unless the debtor makes another choice.'

"This follows, of course, from principles before stated.

"'5. If a debtor makes a payment to discharge debts which of their nature bear interest, such as treat of a marriage portion, or what is due by virtue of a contract of sale, or that the same be due by a sentence of a court of justice, and the payment be not sufficient to acquit both the principal and

[1] Manning *v.* Westerne, 2 Vern. 606.

Thus, where the debtor owed his creditor a private debt, and also was indebted to him as the agent of several annuitants, for which latter debts his surety was also liable; and both the debtor and his surety being called upon in behalf of the annuitants, the debtor made a general payment, without any

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the interest due thereon, the payment will be applied in the first place to the discharge of the interest, and the overplus to the discharge of a part of the principal sum.

"'6. If, in the cases of the foregoing article, the creditor had given an acquittance in general for principal and interest, the payment would not be applied in an equal proportion to the discharge of a part of the principal and of a part of the interest; but in the first place all the interest due would be cleared off, and the remainder would be applied to the discharge of the principal.'

"The two last paragraphs contain a doctrine perfectly naturalized by all our cases, from Chase *v.* Box, (2 Freem. 261,) to State of Connecticut *v.* Jackson, (1 John. Ch. Rep. 17,) and vid. Stoughton *v.* Lynch, (2 Ibid. 209.) Vid. also Hening's ed. of Maxims in Law in Equity, App. 1 to Francis's Maxims, pp. 106, 108, 113, and the cases there cited. Also Williams *v.* Houghtaling, (3 Cowen, 86, 87, 88, 89, note (a), with the cases there cited.

"'7. When a debtor, obliging himself to a creditor for several causes at one and the same time, gives him pawns or mortgages, which he engages for the security of all the debts, the money which is raised by the sale of the pawns and mortgages, will be applied in an equal proportion to the discharge of every one of the debts. (Perry *v.* Roberts, 2 Ch. Cas. 84, somewhat similar in principle.) But if the debts were contracted at divers times upon the security of the same pawns and mortgages, so as that the debtor had mortgaged for the last debts what should remain of the pledge, after payment of the first, the moneys arising from the pledges would, in this case be applied in the first place to the discharge of the debt of the oldest standing. And both in the one and the other case, if any interest be due on account of the debt which is to be discharged by the payment, the same will be paid before any part thereof be applied to the discharge of the principal.'

"'This paragraph contains the familiar doctrine of priority of pledges; and follows out the corollary of applying partial payment to discharge interest in the first place. The proposition, that a payment on pawns, &c. for simultaneous debts shall be distributed between the two debts, has never been exactly adjudged with us, though the case interpolated is about the same in principle. And see what Holt, Ch. J. says in Styart *v.* Rowland, (2 Show. Rep. 216.)" See 9 Cowen, R. 773–777. See also Smith *v.* Screven, 1 McCord, 368; Mayor, &c. of Alexandria *v.* Patten, 4 Cranch, 316; Mann *v.* Marsh, 2 Caines, 99.

specific appropriation at the time; it was held, that the circumstances showed his intention to apply it to the annuities, and that the creditor was therefore not at liberty to ascribe it to his private debt.[1] So, if there be two debts, and the debtor pays, without appropriation, a sum precisely equal to what remains due on one of them, but greater than the amount of the other, this will be regarded as having been intended in discharge of the former debt.[2] So, if there be two debts, the validity of one of which is disputed, while the other is acknowledged, a general payment will be presumed to have been made on account of the latter.[3] But this right of the debtor to appropriate his payment is not without some limitation. Thus, for example, he cannot apply it to the principal only, where the debt carries interest; for, by law, every payment towards such debts shall be first applied to keep down the interest.[4]

§ 531. The right of *appropriation by the creditor*, where the debtor makes none, is subject to some *exceptions*. Thus, if one debt was due by the debtor as executor, and another was due in his private capacity, the creditor shall not ascribe a general payment to the former debt, for its validity will depend on the question of assets.[5] So, if one of two debts was contracted while the debtor was a trader within the bankrupt laws, and the other afterwards, the creditor will not be permitted to apply a general payment to the latter, so as to expose the debtor to a commission of bankruptcy.[6] So, if one of the creditor's claims is absolute, and the other is

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1 Shaw *v.* Picton, 4 B. & C. 715.

2 Robert *v.* Garnie, 3 Caines, 14; Marryatts *v.* White, 2 Stark. 101.

3 Tayloe *v.* Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 20, 21.

4 Gwinn *v.* Whitaker, 1 H. &. J. 754; Frazier *v.* Hyland, Ib. 98; Tracy *v.* Wikoff, 1 Dall. 124; Norwood *v.* Manning, 2 Nott & McCord, 395; Dean *v.* Williams, 17 Mass. 417; Fay *v.* Bradley, 1 Pick. 194.

5 Goddard *v.* Cox, 2 Stra. 1194.

6 Meggott *v.* Mills, 1 Ld. Raym. 287: Dawe *v.* Holdsworth, 1 Peake, 64.

contingent, as, if he is an indorser or surety for the debtor, who makes a general payment; the creditor will be bound to appropriate it to the absolute debt alone.[1] And if one of two claims is legal, and the other equitable, the creditor is bound to apply the payment to the former.[2] And if a partner in trade, being indebted both as a member of the firm, and also on his own private account, pays the money of the firm, the creditor is bound to apply it to the partnership debt.[3]

§ 531 *a*. The *principle*, on which these and other exceptions are founded, seems to be this; that the debtor, by waiving his right of appropriation in favor of the creditor, could not have intended that it should be exercised to his own injury; but on the contrary, that he relied on the creditor's making an appropriation to which he could not reasonably or justly object. The creditor, therefore, never acquires the right to apply a payment with a view merely to his own interest or convenience, unless the debtor has had an opportunity to direct its application, by having the money pass through his own hands, or under his own control. And upon the above principle it has been held, that where a general payment was made to a creditor, who held three promissory notes against the debtor, all which were within the bar of the statute of limitations, the creditor was not at liberty to apply a part of the money to each of the notes, so as to revive his remedy upon them all; but must make his election of one only, and apply the payment to that one alone.[4]

§ 532. At *what time* the creditor must exercise this right of appropriation, whether forthwith, upon the receipt of a general payment, or whether at any subsequent time, at his

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[1] Niagara Bank *v.* Rosevelt, 9 Cowen, 409, 412.

[2] Birch *v.* Tebbutt, 2 Stark. 74; Goddard *v.* Hodges, 1 C. & Mees. 33; 3 Tyrw. 259, S. C. But where the equitable debt was prior to the other, the creditor has in one case been permitted to apply the payment to the former. Bosanquet *v.* Wray, 6 Taunt. 597.

[3] Thompson *v.* Brown, 1 M. & Malk. 40.

[4] Ayer *v.* Hawkins, 19 Verm. 26.

pleasure, is not clearly settled by the English decisions; but the weight of authority seems in favor of his right to make the election at any time when he pleases.[1] And this unlimited right has been recognized in the United States; subject only to this restriction, that he cannot appropriate a general payment to a debt created after the payment was made.[2]

§ 532 *a*. *After a payment has been rightfully ascribed* to one of several debts, it is not in the power of either party alone to change it. But if both parties consent, the ascription may be changed to another debt; in which case the indebtment discharged by the former appropriation of the money, is revived.[3]

§ 533. Where neither party has applied the payment, but it is left to be *appropriated by law*, the general principle, adopted by the American Courts, is to apply it as we have already stated, according to the intrinsic justice and equity of the case. But this principle of application is administered by certain rules, found by experience usually to lead to equitable results. It has sometimes been held, that the appropriation ought to be made according to the interest of the debtor, such being his presumed intention. This is the rule of the Roman Law, and probably is the law of modern continental Europe;[4] and it has been recognized in several of the United States.[5]

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[1] Clayton's case, in Devaynes *v*. Noble, 1 Meriv. 605, 607; Ellis on Debtor & Creditor, p. 406 – 408; Mills *v*. Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 455, per Coltman, J.

[2] Mayor, &c. of Alexandria *v*. Patten, 4 Cranch, 317; Baker *v*. Stackpoole, 9 Cowen, 420, 436. And see Marsh *v*. Houlditch, cited in Chitty on Bills, p. 437, note (c), 8th edit.

[3] Rundlett *v*. Small, 12 Shepl. 29.

[4] Poth. Obl. Part III. c. 1, art. vii. § 530; 1 White's New Recopil. B. 2, tit. 11, p. 164, 165; Van Der Linden's Laws of Holland, B. 1, ch. 18, sec. 1, Henry's edit. p. 267; Grotius, Introd. to Dutch Jurisp. B. 3, ch. 39, sect. 15, p. 458, Herbert's Tr.; Clayton's case, in Devaynes *v*. Noble, 1 Meriv. 605, 606; Baker *v*. Stackpoole, 9 Cowen, 435; Civil Code of France, Art. 1253 – 1256; Gass *v*. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 99, 110.

[5] Pattison *v*. Hull, 9 Cowen, 747, per Cowen, J.; Civil Code of Louisiana, Art. 2159 – 2161.

But, on the other hand, the correctness of this rule, as one of universal application, has been expressly denied by the highest authority. For as, when a debtor fails to avail himself of the power which he possesses, in consequence of which that power devolves on the creditor, it does not appear unreasonable to suppose, that he is content with the manner in which the creditor will exercise it; so, if neither party avails himself of his power, in consequence of which it devolves on the Court, it would seem equally reasonable to suppose, that both were content with the manner in which the Court will exercise it; and that the only rule, which it can be presumed that the Court will adopt, is the rule of justice and equity between the parties.[1] Therefore, where a general payment is made without application by either party, and there are divers claims, some of which are but imperfectly and partially secured, the Court will apply it to those debts, for which the security is most precarious.[2] So, where there are items of debt and credit in a running account, in the absence of any specific appropriation, the credits will ordinarily be applied to the discharge of the items of debt antecedently due, in the order of the account.[3] But this rule may be varied by circumstances.[4] Thus, where an agent renders an account, charging himself with a balance, and continues afterwards to receive moneys for his principal, and to make payments, his subsequent payments are not necessarily to be ascribed to the previous balance, if the subsequent receipts are equal to such payments.[5] Where the mortgagee of two parcels of land, mortgaged for

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[1] Field *v.* Holland, 6 Cranch, 8, 27, 28. And see Chitty *v.* Naish, 2 Dowl. P. C. 511; Brazier *v.* Bryant, Ibid. 477; Henniker *v.* Wigg, 4 Ad. & El. 792, N. S.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Postmaster General *v.* Furber, 4 Mason, 333; Gass *v.* Stinson, 3 Sumn. 99, 112; The United States *v.* Wardwell, 5 Mason, 82, 87; The United States *v.* Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720; Sterndale *v.* Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393; Smith *v.* Wigley, 3 M. & Scott, 174; Thompson *v.* Brown, 1 M. & Malk. 40.

[4] Wilson *v.* Hirst, 1 Nev. & Man. 746.

[5] Lysaght *v.* Walker, 5 Bligh, N. S. 1.

the same debt, released one of them to the assignee of the mortgagor of that parcel, the money received for the release was appropriated to the mortgage debt, in favor of an assignee of the other parcel, notwithstanding the mortgagor was indebted to the creditor on other accounts.[1] So, if one debt is illegal and the other is lawful, or, if one debt is not yet payable, but the other is already over-due, a general payment will be ascribed to the latter.[2] And if one debt bears interest, and another does not, the payment will be applied to the debt bearing interest.[3]

§ 534. The mere fact, that one of several debts is secured by a *surety*, does not of itself entitle that debt to a preference in the appropriation of a general payment. And therefore, where there was a prior debt outstanding, and afterwards a new debt was created, for which a bond was given with a surety, the creditor was held at liberty to ascribe a general payment to the prior debt, though the surety was not informed of its existence when he became bound; for he should have inquired for himself.[4] But where a guaranty was expressed to be for goods to be thereafter delivered, and not for a debt which then existed; and goods were accordingly supplied from time to time, and payments made, for some of which a discount was allowed for payments in anticipation of the usual term of credit upon such sales; it was held, in favor of the surety, that the payments ought to be applied to the latter account.[5]

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[1] Hicks *v.* Bingham, 11 Mass. 300; Gwinn *v.* Whitaker 1 H. & J. 754.

[2] Wright *v.* Laing, 3 B. & C. 165; 4 D. & R. 783, S. C.; Ex parte Randleson, 2 Dea. & Chit. 534; McDonnell *v.* The Blackstone Canal Co. 5 Mason, 11; Gass *v.* Stinson, 3 Sumn. 99, 112.

[3] Heyward *v.* Lomax, 1 Vern. 24; Bacon *v.* Brown, 1 Bibb, 334; Ante, § 530.

[4] Kirby *v.* D. of Marlborough, 2 M. & S. 18. And see Brewer *v.* Knapp, 1 Pick. 337; Mitchell *v.* Dall, 4 G. & J. 361; Plumer *v.* Long, 1 Stark. 153; Clark *v.* Burdett, 2 Hall, N. Y. Rep. 185.

[5] Marryatts *v.* White, 2 Stark. 101.

§ 535. And if one of two demands is within the operation of the *statute of limitations*, and the other is not, this circumstance does not prevent the ascription of a general payment to the former demand, where the debtor himself has not appropriated it at the time.[1] So, if one of two bills is void for want of a *stamp*, a general payment may still be applied to it by the creditor.[2]

§ 536. In some cases, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, and for the sake of equal justice, will apply general payments, in a *ratable proportion*, to all the existing debts. Thus, if a broker, having sold goods of several principals to one purchaser, receives from him a general payment in part, after which the purchaser becomes insolvent, the payment shall be applied in proportion to each debt.[3] So, if the agent blends a demand due to his principal with one due from the same debtor to himself, and receives a general payment thereon;[4] or if an insolvent assigns all his property for the benefit of his creditors, and a dividend is paid to one of them, who holds divers demands against the insolvent;[5] or if several demands, some of which are collaterally secured, are included in one judgment, and the execution is satisfied in part;[6] in these and the like cases, the payment will be ascribed in a ratable proportion to each debt.

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[1] Mills *v.* Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 455; 3 Jur. 406; Williams *v.* Griffith, 5 M. & W. 300.

[2] Biggs *v.* Dwight, 1 M. & Rob. 308.

[3] Favenc *v.* Bennett, 11 East, 36.

[4] Barrett *v.* Lewis, 2 Pick. 123; Cole *v.* Trull, 9 Pick. 325.

[5] Scott *v.* Ray, 18 Pick. 360; Commercial Bank *v.* Cunningham, 24 Pick. 270.

[6] Blackston Bank *v.* Hill, 10 Pick. 129. And see Perris *v.* Roberts, 1 Vern. 34; 1 Poth. Obl. by Evans, Part 3, ch. 1, art. 7, § 528–535; Shaw *v.* Picton, 4 B. & C. 715.

PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM.

§ 537. Prescription, in its more general acceptation, is defined to be "a title, acquired by possession, had during the time and in the manner fixed by law." After the lapse of the requisite period, the law adds the right of property to that which before was only possession.[1] The subject of prescription is real property; but the title to corporeal hereditaments, derived from exclusive adverse possession, being regulated by the statutes of Limitation, of which we have already treated, under that head, the title by prescription, in its stricter sense, is applied only to things incorporeal, such as rents, commons, ways, franchises, and all species of easements or liberties without profit, which one man may be entitled to enjoy in the soil of another, without obtaining any interest in the land itself.[2]

§ 538. This prescriptive title to things incorporeal was originally founded on uninterrupted enjoyment for a period of indefinite antiquity, or beyond the memory of man; and is termed a positive prescription. When writs of right were limited to a fixed period, it was thought unreasonable to allow a longer time to claims by prescription; and accordingly prescriptive rights were held indefeasible, if proved to have existed previous to the first day of the reign of King Richard I., that being the earliest limitation of writs of right, and were invalidated if shown to have had a subse-

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1 Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 86; Co. Lit. 113, b.

2 See 3 Cruise's Digest, tit. xxxi. ch. 1. The law of Prescriptions is stated with great clearness by Mr. Best, in his Treatise on Presumptions, ch. iii. p. 87–110. See also Mr. Angell's Treatise on Adverse Enjoyment.

quent origin. When later statutes reduced the period of limitation of real actions to a certain number of years, computed back from the commencement of each action, it was to have been expected, that the period of legal memory in regard to prescriptions would have been shortened by the Courts of law in like manner, upon the same reason; but it was not done, and the time of prescription for incorporeal rights remained as before. This unaccountable omission has occasioned some inconvenience in the administration of justice, and some conflict of opinion on the bench, and in the profession at large. The inconvenience, however, has been greatly obviated in practice, by introducing a new kind of title, namely, the presumption of a grant, made and lost in modern times; which the Jury are advised or directed to find, upon evidence of enjoyment for sufficient length of time. But whether this presumption is to be regarded as a rule of law, to be administered by the Judges, or merely as a subject fit to be emphatically recommended to the Jury, is still a disputed point in England, though now reduced to little practical importance, especially since the recent statute on this subject.[1]

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[1] See Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 89-97; Pritchard *v.* Powell, 10 Jur. 154. By Stat. 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71, § 1, no prescription for any right in land, except tithes, rents, and services, where the profit shall have been actually taken and enjoyed by the person claiming right thereto, without interruption, for thirty years, shall be defeated by showing an earlier commencement. And if enjoyed in like manner for sixty years, the right is deemed indefeasible and absolute, unless shown to have been enjoyed by express consent or agreement, by deed or in writing. By § 2, a similar effect is given to the like enjoyment of ways, easements and watercourses, and rights for the period of twenty years, unless defeated in some legal way other than by showing an earlier commencement; and for forty years, unless by consent in writing, as in the preceding section. And by § 3, the enjoyment of lights for twenty years without interruption, confers an absolute and indefeasible title, unless it was by consent in writing, as in the other cases. Thus the enjoyment for the shorter period, in the first two cases, is made a *præsumptio juris* of title, excluding only one method of defeating it; and the enjoyment for the longer period, in every case, is made a *presumptio juris et de jure*, against all opposing proof, except that of consent in writing. See Best on Presumptions, § 98, p. 116-129.

§ 539. In the United States, grants have been very freely presumed, upon proof of an *adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years;* it being the policy of the Courts of law to limit the presumption to periods analogous to those of the statutes of limitation, in all cases where the statutes do not apply; but whether this was a presumption of law or of fact, was for a long time as uncertain here as in England, and perhaps may not yet be definitely settled in every State. But by the weight of authority, as well as the preponderance of opinion, it may be stated as the general rule of American law, that such an enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament affords a conclusive presumption of a grant, or a right, as the case may be; which is to be applied as a *præsumptio juris et de jure*, wherever, by possibility, a right may be acquired in any manner known to the law.[1]

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[1] Tyler *v.* Wilkinson, 7 Mason, 402, per Story, J. And see Ante, Vol. 1, § 17, and cases there cited; Sims *v.* Davis, 1 Cheves, 2; 3 Kent, Comm. p. 441, 442. On this subject, Mr. Justice Wilde, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Coolidge *v.* Learned, 8 Pick. 504, remarked as follows: — "That the time of legal memory, according to the law of England, extends back to the remote period contended for by the plaintiff's counsel, cannot be denied; but for what reason, or for what purpose, such a limitation should have been continued down to the present day, we are unable to ascertain. Cruise says, 'that it seems somewhat extraordinary, that the date of legal prescription should continue to be reckoned from so distant a period.' And to us it seems, that for all practical purposes it might as well be reckoned from the time of the creation. The limitation in question (if it can now be called a limitation) was first established soon after the Stat. Westm. 2, (13 Ed. 1, c. 39,) and was founded on the equitable construction of that statute, which provided that no writ of right should be maintained except on a seisin from the time of Richard I.

"It was held, that an undisturbed enjoyment of an easement for a period of time sufficient to give a title to land by possession, was sufficient also to give a title to the easement. 2 Roll. Abr. 269; 2 Inst. 238; Rex *v.* Hudson, 2 Str. 909; 3 Stark. on Ev. 1205. Upon this principle, the time of legal memory was first limited, and upon the same principle, when the limitation of a writ of right was reduced by the statute of 32 Hen. 8. c. 2, to sixty years, a similar reduction should have been made in the limitation of the time of legal memory. This was required, not only by public policy, to quiet long continued possessions, but by a regard to consistency, as it would have been only following up the principle upon which the first limitation was founded.

In order, however, that the enjoyment of an easement in another's land may be conclusive of the right, it must have

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"And of this opinion was Rolle, (2 Roll. Abr. 269,) though he admits, that at his time the practice was otherwise. Why the opinion of this eminent Judge, founded as it was on reasoning so solid and satisfactory, was not adopted by the Courts, does not appear. But it does appear, that the principle on which his opinion was founded, was respected, and carried into operation in another form. For although the Courts continued to adhere to the limitation before adopted, yet the long enjoyment of an easement was held to be a sufficient reason, not only to authorize, but to require the Jury to presume a grant. And it has long been settled, that the undisturbed enjoyment of an incorporeal right affecting the lands of another for twenty years, the possession being adverse and unrebutted, imposes on the Jury the duty to presume a grant, and in all such cases Juries are so instructed by the Court. Not, however, because either the Court or Jury believe the presumed grant to have been actually made, but because public policy and convenience require that long continued possession should not be disturbed.

"The period of twenty years was adopted in analogy to the statute of limitations, by which an adverse possession of twenty years was a bar to an action of ejectment, and gave a possessory title to the land. Thus it appears, that although prescriptive rights commencing after the reign of Richard I. are not sustained in England, yet a possession of twenty years only is sufficient to warrant the presumption of a grant; which is the foundation of the doctrine of prescription. In the one case, the grant is presumed by the Court, or rather is presumed by the law, and in the other case it is presumed by the Jury under the direction of the Court. The presumption in the latter case is in theory, it is true, a presumption of fact, but in practice and for all practical purposes, it is a legal presumption, as it depends on pure legal rules; and as Starkie remarks, 'It seems to be very difficult to say, why such presumptions should not at once have been established as mere presumptions of law, to be applied to the facts by the Courts, without the aid of a Jury. That course would certainly have been more simple, and any objection, as to the want of authority, would apply with equal if not superior force to the establishing such presumptions indirectly through the medium of a Jury.'

"But however this may be, it is clear that, when the law became settled as it now is, and a party was allowed to plead a non-existing grant, and the Jury were bound to presume it, on proof of twenty years' possession, he would hardly be induced to set up a prescriptive right; and the limitation of legal memory thus became in most cases of very little importance. And this is probably the reason why the period of legal memory, as it was limited soon after the statute of Westm. 1, has been suffered to go on increasing to the present time, although it has long since ceased to be of any practical utility, and is utterly inconsistent with the principle on which the limitation was originally founded.

been *adverse*, that is, under a claim of title, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the land, and unin-

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"The question then is, whether the Courts in this country were not at liberty to adopt the English law of prescription, with a modification of the unreasonable rule adhered to by the English Courts in regard to the limitation of the time of legal memory. Certainly the law without the rule of limitation might have been adopted, and the Courts here had competent authority to establish a new rule of limitation suited to the situation of the country. They had the same authority in this respect, that the Courts in England had to establish the English rule of limitation. This rule could not be adopted here without a modification, and it was modified accordingly; and in conformity with the principle of the English rule of limitation. This cannot be ascertained with certainty, but it is evident, that the English rule could not have been adopted, and it is to be presumed, that the period of sixty years was fixed upon as the time of limitation, in analogy to the statute of 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, and in conformity with the opinion of Rolle. At what period of our history the law of prescription was first introduced into practice in the Courts of Massachusetts, cannot now be determined, but certainly it was before the time of legal memory, as we understand the limitation of it; and innumerable pleas of prescriptive rights are to be found in the records of our Courts. So the cases reported by Dane show that the doctrine of prescription has been repeatedly recognized and sanctioned by this Court, 3 Dane, 253, c. 79, art. 3, § 19. The only question has been, whether our time of legal memory was limited to sixty years, or whether it was to extend to a period beyond which no memory or record goes as to the right in question. The general opinion, we think, has been in favor of the limitation of sixty years; and we think it decidedly the better opinion. This seems to us a reasonable limitation, and, as before remarked, it is founded on the principle of the English rule of limitation, which was adopted in reference to the limitation of the writ of right by the statute of Westm. 1. Whether since the writ of right has been limited to forty years, a similar limitation of the time of legal memory ought to be adopted, is a question not raised in this case, and upon which we give no opinion." 8 Pick. 508–511. The conclusiveness of the presumption was again asserted in Sargent *v.* Ballard, 9 Pick. 251. Afterwards, the point of time being before the same Court, it was adjudged, that the exclusive uninterrupted use and enjoyment for forty years, of an incorporeal right affecting another's land, was sufficient to establish a title by prescription. Melvin *v.* Whiting, 10 Pick. 295. And subsequently, a similar enjoyment for twenty years was held equally effectual. Bolivar Man. Co. *v.* Neponset Man. Co. 16 Pick. 241. This rule is now expressly recognized, in several of the States, by statutes. See Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 60, § 27; Rev. Stat. Maine, ch. 147, § 14. And it seems to be either assumed or necessarily implied in the legislation of other States. See Elmer's Dig. LL. New Jersey, p. 314, 317, tit. Limitations, § 1, 16; Den *v.* McCann, Penningt. 331, 333; 1 Rev. Stat. N. Car. ch. 64, § 1, p. 371, 372; Rev. Stat. Delaware, 1839, tit. Limitations, § 1, p. 396; 2 LL. Ken-

terrupted; and the *burden of proving* this is on the party claiming the easement. If he leaves it doubtful, whether the enjoyment was adverse, known to the owner, and uninterrupted, it is not conclusive in his favor.[1]

§ 539 *a*. It seems, that to constitute an *adverse* enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament, the act of enjoyment must be of such a character as to afford ground for an action by the other party. It must be either a direct invasion of his vested rights, or else consequently injurious to their free exercise. The foundation of prescriptive title is the presumed grant of the party whose rights are adversely affected; but where it appears that the enjoyment has existed by the consent or license of such party, no presumption of grant can be made. Thus, in the case of lights, if the building, in which they are made, is erected on the party's own land, and no building stands on the land of the adjoining proprietor, it has been held that, against the latter, no right is acquired by lapse of time.[2]

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tucky, p. 1125, tit. Limitations, § 2, (Morehead & Brown's edit.); Morgan *v.* Banta, 1 Bibb, 582; Simpson *v.* Hawkins, 1 Dana, 306; Clay's Dig. LL. Alabama, p. 329, § 93; Rev. Stat. Missouri, p. 392, tit. Limitations, Art, 1, § 1; 2 Rev. LL. New York. p. 293, § 5, 7; 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. 31, ch. 1, § 21, note. (Greenleaf's ed.) See also Shaw *v.* Crawford, 10 Johns. 236; Johns *v.* Stevens, 3 Verm. 316. The case of Bolling *v.* The Mayor, &c. of Petersburg, 3 Rand. 563, 577, which has been cited to the contrary, was a writ of right, respecting a corporeal hereditament, and turned upon the statute of limitations.

[1] Sargent *v.* Ballard, 9 Pick. 251; Davies *v.* Stephens, 7 C. & P. 570; Jarvis *v.* Dean, 3 Bing. 447.

[2] Pierre *v.* Fernald, 13 Shepl. 436. Shepley, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court in this case, said: — "Nothing in the law can be more certain, than one's right to occupy and use his own land, as he pleases, if he does not thereby injure others. He may build upon it, or occupy it as a garden, grass plat or passage way, without any loss or diminution of his rights. No other person can acquire any right or interest in it, merely on account of the manner, in which it has been occupied. When one builds upon his own land immediately adjoining the land of another person and puts out windows overlooking that neighbor's lands, he does no more than exercise a legal right. This is admitted. Cross *v.* Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686. By the exercise of a legal right he can make no encroachment upon the rights of his neighbor,

§ 540. There are two kinds of positive prescription; the one being a personal right, exercised by the party and his ancestors, or by a body politic and its predecessors; and the other being a right attached to an hereditament held in fee simple, and exercisable only by those who are seised of that estate; and this is termed a prescription in a *que estate.*[1]

§ 541. Nothing can be claimed by prescription, which owes its origin to, and can only be had by *matter of record;* but lapse of time, accompanied by acts done, or other circumstances, may warrant the Jury in presuming a grant or title by record.[2] Nor can any thing be claimed by prescription, unless it might have been created by *grant;* nor any thing, which the law itself gives of *common right.* Nor can any thing be prescribed for in a *que estate,* unless it is appendant or appurtenant to land, and lies in grant.[3]

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and cannot thereby impose any servitude or acquire any easement by the exercise of such a right for any length of time. He does no injury to his neighbor by the enjoyment of the flow of light and air, and does not therefore claim or exercise any right adversely to the rights of his neighbor. Nor is there any thing of similitude between the exercise of such a right and the exercise of rights claimed adversely. It is admitted that the defendant cannot obtain redress by any legal process. In other words, that his rights have not been encroached upon; and that he has no cause of complaint. And yet, while thus situated for more than twenty years, he loses his right to the free use of his land because he did not prevent his neighbor from enjoying that, which occasioned him no injury and afforded him no just cause of complaint. The result of the doctrine is, that the owner of land not covered by buildings, but used for any other purpose, may be deprived of the right to build upon it by the lawful acts of the owner of the adjoining land performed upon his own land and continued for twenty years.

"It may be safely affirmed, that the common law originally contained no such principle. The doctrine as stated in the more recent decisions appears to have arisen out of the misapplication in England of the principle, by which rights and easements are acquired by the adverse claim and enjoyment of them for twenty years, to a case, in which no adverse or injurious claim was either made or enjoyed." And see Parker *v.* Foote, 19 Wend. 309; Ray *v.* Lines, 10 Ala. R. 63.

[1] 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. xxxi. ch. 1, § 8, 9, (White's edit.)

[2] 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. xxxi. ch. § 10, (White's edit.); Farrar *v.* Merrill, 1 Greenl. 17; Battles *v.* Holley, 6 Greenl. 145; Ante, Vol. 1, § 46; Best on Presumptions, § 111.

[3] 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. xxxi. ch. 1, § 11, 17, 18, 19, (Greenleaf's edit.)

§ 542. *Customary rights* differ from prescriptive rights only in this, that the former are local usages, belonging to all the inhabitants of a particular place or district; whereas the latter are rights belonging to individuals, wherever they may reside.[1]

§ 543. From this view of the present state of the law on this subject, it appears, that the plea of prescription will be maintained by any competent evidence of an uninterrupted, exclusive enjoyment of the subject prescribed for, during the period of twenty years, with claim of title, and with the actual or presumed knowledge of those adversely interested. The time of enjoyment by a former owner, whose title has escheated to the State by forfeiture, cannot be added to the time of enjoyment by the grantee of the State, to make up the twenty years; but the times of enjoyment by those in privity with the claimant, as in the relation of heir and ancestor, or grantor and grantee, may be thus joined.[2]

§ 544. If the evidence of the claim extends over the requisite period of time, the prescriptive title will not be defeated by proof of *slight*, *partial*, or *occasional variations* in the exercise or extent of the right claimed. Thus, if a water-course is prescribed for to a fulling mill, but the party has converted it into a grist-mill;[3] or, if the subject of prescription be a towing-path along the banks of a navigable river, and it has been converted by statute into a floating harbor,[4] the right is not thereby lost; for in the former case, the substance of the right is the mill, and not the kind of mill to which the same propelling power was applied; and in the latter case, the use made by the public was essentially the same as before, namely, for facility of navigation. So, proof of the exercise of the right whenever the party had occasion to do so, as, for example, the right to take clay to

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[1] Ibid. § 7; Best on Presumptions, § 79.

[2] Sargent *v.* Ballard, 9 Pick. 251.

[3] Lutterel's case, 4 Co. 86. And see Blanchard *v.* Baker, 8 Greenl. 253.

[4] Rex *v.* Tippett, 3 B. & Ald. 193; Codling *v.* Johnson, 9 B. & C. 933.

make bricks, is sufficient, without showing that it was in fact exercised at all times of the year; though it is so alleged in the plea.[1] Thus also, the plea will be supported by proof of a right, larger than the right claimed, if it be of a nature to include it.[2] And if the prescription is for a common appurtenant to a house and twenty acres, it will be supported by proof of a right appurtenant to a house and eighteen acres.[3] But the prescription, being an entire thing, must be *proved substantially* as laid;[4] and therefore a variance in any part, material or essentially descriptive, will be fatal. Thus, if the prescription is for common for commonable cattle, and the evidence is of common for only a particular species of commonable cattle;[5] or if the prescription pleaded is general and absolute, but the proof is of a prescriptive right coupled with a condition;[6] or subject to exceptions;[7] or if the right claimed is of common in a certain close, and it appears that the claimant has released his title in part of the land;[8] in these, and the like cases, the plea is not supported.

§ 545. The claim of a prescriptive right may be *defeated* by evidence, showing that it has been *interrupted*, within the legal period; but this must be an interruption of the *right*, and not simply an interruption of the use or possession.[9] Thus, if estovers for a house be by prescription, and the house be pulled down and rebuilt, the right is not lost.[10] Nor will the right be destroyed by a *tortious* interruption, nor by a

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[1] Clayton *v.* Corby, 8 Jur. 212; 2 Ad. & El. 813, N. S.

[2] Bailey *v.* Appleyard, 8 Ad. & El. 167; Bailiffs of Tewksbury *v.* Bicknell, 1 Taunt. 142; Welcome *v.* Upton, 6 M. & W. 540, per Alderson, B.; Bushwood *v.* Pond, Cro. El. 722.

[3] Gregory *v.* Hill, Cro. El. 531; Rickets *v.* Salwey, 2 B. & Ald. 360.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 63, 67, 71, 72; Paddock *v.* Forrester, 1 Dowl. N. C. 527; Drewell *v.* Towler, 3 B. & Ad. 735.

[5] Bull. N. P. 59. And see Rex *v.* Hermitage, Carth. 241.

[6] Gray's case, 5 Co. 78, b; Lovelace *v.* Reignolds, Cro. El. 563; Paddock *v.* Forrester, 3 M. & G. 903.

[7] Griffin *v.* Blandford, Cowp. 62.

[8] Rotherham *v.* Green, Cro. El. 593.

[9] Co. Lit. 114, *b*; 2 Inst. 653, 654; Canham *v.* Fisk, 2 C. & J. 126, per Bayley, B.; Carr *v.* Foster, 3 Ad. & El. 581, N. S.

[10] 4 Co. 87; Cowper *v.* Andrews, Hob. 39.

discontinuance by the lease of a terre-tenant.[1] It may also be defeated by proof of *unity of title* to the easement and to the land to which it was attached, where both titles are of the same nature and degree; or, by evidence of the final *destruction* of the subject to which the right was annexed;[2] or, by showing that its commencement and continuance were by the *agreement and consent* of the adverse party, or by his *express grant*, within the legal period. But proof of an older grant will not defeat the claim, if it appear to be in *confirmation* of a prior right.[3] And if the exercise of the right claimed was by consent of one who had only a *temporary interest* in the land, as, for example, a tenant for life, his negligence in not resisting the claim will not be allowed to prejudice the owner of the inheritance.[4] The acquiescence of the owner, however, may be inferred from circumstances;[5] and where the time has once begun to run against him, the interposition of a particular estate does not stop it.[6]

§ 546. It is hardly necessary to add, that, though the usage proved may not be sufficiently long to support the claim of a right by prescription, yet, coupled with other circumstances, it may be sufficient to support the plea of title by a lost grant, which the Jury will be at liberty and sometimes be advised to find accordingly.[7]

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[1] 2 Inst. 653, 654.

[2] Co. Lit. 114, *b*; 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. xxxi. ch. 1, § 35, 36, (Greenleaf's edit.); 6 Com. Dig. 83, tit. Præscription, G.; Morris *v.* Edgington, 3 Taunt. 24.

[3] Addington *v.* Clode, 2 W. Bl. 989; Biddulph *v.* Ather, 2 Wils. 23; Best on Presumptions, § 87.

[4] Bradbury *v.* Grinsell, 2 Saund. 175 *d*, note by Williams; Daniel *v.* North, 11 East, 372; Barker *v.* Richardson, 4 B. & Ald. 579; Runcorn *v.* Doe, 5 B. & C. 696; Wood *v.* Veal, 5 B. & Ald. 454. See also Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 108–117. So, if it was by mutual mistake. Campbell *v.* Wilson, 3 East, 294.

[5] Gray *v.* Bond, 2 B. & B. 667.

[6] Cross *v.* Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686; Best on Presumptions, § 89.

[7] Bealey *v.* Shaw, 6 East, 208; Ante, Vol. 1, § 17, 45, and cases there cited; Best on Presumptions, § 86–90; Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 93–95.

REAL ACTIONS.

§ 547. The principal rules of evidence, applicable to actions for the recovery of lands and tenements, have already been considered, under the title of Ejectment; this being the form of remedy pursued in most of the United States. But in several of the States, this remedy has been essentially modified; as in South Carolina, where its fictions are abolished, and an action of "trespass to try titles" is given by statute; and in Alabama, where a similar action, or a writ of ejectment, is given, at the election of the party. In other States, namely, in Georgia and Louisiana, the remedy in this, as in all other civil cases, is by petition, in which the entire case of the plaintiff is fully and distinctly stated, and is answered by the defendant, much in the manner of proceedings in Equity. In others, as in Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Illinois, the forms of action, known to the Common Law, are all recognized, but the remedies in most frequent use are the writ of right, the writ of dower *unde nihil habet*, the writ of *formedon*, in the very few cases of entailments which now occur, and especially a writ, properly termed a writ of entry upon disseisin. This last is now almost the only remedy resorted to, except for dower, since the limitation of all real actions and rights of entry, in all the States last mentioned, except Connecticut, as well as in most others, is now reduced to one uniform period of twenty years. In Connecticut the limitation is fifteen years, and in one or two other States the period is still shorter.

§ 548. There is diversity in the laws of the several States on another point, namely, the remedy for *mesne profits*. In some States, this remedy is by an action of trespass, as at Common Law. In others, as in Massachusetts, Maine, and

Illinois, and, to a limited extent, in Vermont, the damages for mesne profits are assessed by the Jury, at the trial of the writ of entry, the real action being thus changed by statute into a mixed action. In Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, and Missouri, they are assessed, with various restrictions, by the Jury at the trial of the writ of ejectment. In Ohio and Alabama, where the value of his lasting improvements is claimed by the defendant, and the value of the land, exclusive of the improvements, is also assessed at the request of the plaintiff, the claim for mesne profits is merged and barred, by statute, in these proceedings.

§ 549. The proceedings last mentioned relate to another feature, peculiar in the law of real remedies of some of the United States, but unknown in others; namely the right of the occupant of land to recover against the true owner, on eviction by him, the value of the *lasting improvements*, popularly termed *betterments*, which in good faith he has made upon the land. This right, to a certain extent, is a familiar doctrine in Courts of Equity, and it is freely administered whenever the owner, after recovery of the land, resorts to a bill in Equity against the late occupant, for an account of the rents and profits; but whether those Courts would sustain a bill, originally brought by the occupant for the value of his improvements, was, until of late, wholly an open question, but is now, in one class of cases, settled in favor of the remedy.[1] At Common Law, it is well known,

[1] See 2 Kent, Comm. p. 334 - 338; Bright *v.* Boyd, 1 Story, R. 478. In this case, which was a bill in Equity, the plaintiff had purchased the premises in question at a sale, made by the administrator of the defendant's ancestor for payment of his debts; but the title being defective, by reason of illegality in the administrator's proceedings, the defendant, who was the devisee under a foreign will, had recovered the land from the present plaintiff, in an action at law. The present plaintiff, not having had possession of the land for a sufficient length of time to enable him to claim the value of his lasting improvements under the statute of Maine, in the action at law, now filed this bill for that and some other purposes, in the Circuit Court of

that no such claim could be maintained; but the situation of the United States, as a new country in the course of rapid and even tumultuous occupation, having given rise to great uncertainties in the titles to land, the rule of the Common Law was found to operate inequitably in very

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the United States. The principal question was discussed by Mr. Justice Story in the following terms: — "The other question, as to the right of the purchaser, *bonâ fide* and for a valuable consideration, to compensation for permanent improvements made upon the estate, which have greatly enhanced its value, under a title, which turns out defective, he having no notice of the defect, is one, upon which, looking to the authorities, I should be inclined to pause. Upon the general principles of Courts of Equity, acting *ex æquo et bono*, I own, that there does not seem to me any just ground to doubt, that compensation, under such circumstances, ought to be allowed to the full amount of the enhanced value, upon the maxim of the Common Law, *Nemo debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo;* or, as it is still more exactly expressed in the Digest, *Jure naturæ æquum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.*[1] I am aware, that the doctrine has not as yet been carried to such an extent in our Courts of Equity. In cases where the true owner of an estate, after a recovery thereof at law, from a *bonâ fide* possessor for a valuable consideration without notice, seeks an account in Equity, as plaintiff, against such possessor, for the rents and profits, it is the constant habit of Courts of Equity to allow such possessor (as defendant) to deduct therefrom the full amount of all the meliorations and improvements, which he has beneficially made upon the estate; and thus to recoup them from the rents and profits.[2] So, if the true owner of an estate holds only an equitable title thereto, and seeks the aid of a Court of Equity to enforce that title, the Court will administer that aid only upon the terms of making compensation to such *bonâ fide* possessor for the amount of his meliorations and improvements of the estate, beneficial to the true owner.[3] In each of these cases, the Court acts upon an old and established maxim in its jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity must do equity.[4] But it has been supposed, that Courts of Equity do not and ought not to go further, and to grant active relief in favor of such a *bonâ fide* possessor, making permanent meliorations and improvements, by sustaining a bill, brought by him therefor, against the true owner, after he has recovered the premises at law. I find, that Mr. Chancellor Walworth, in Putnam *v.* Ritchie, 6 Paige, 390, 403, 404, 405, entertained this opinion, admitting at the same time, that he could find no case in England or

[1] Dig. lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 206.

[2] 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 799 a., § 799 b., § 1237, 1238, 1239; Green *v.* Biddle, 8 Wheat. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81.

[3] See also 2 Story Eq. Jurisp. § 799 b., and note; Ibid. § 1237, 1238.

[4] Ibid.

many cases, and sometimes to work gross injustice ; and hence several of the States have been led to provide remedies at law, for the protection of honest occupants, and for securing to them the fruits of their labor, fairly bestowed in the permanent improvement of the land.

§ 550. There is great diversity also in the modes by which

America, where the point had been expressed or decided either way. Now, if there be no authority against the doctrine, I confess, that I should be most reluctant to be the first Judge to lead to such a decision. It appears to me, speaking with all deference to other opinions, that the denial of all compensation to such a *bonâ fide* purchaser, in such a case, where he has manifestly added to the permanent value of an estate by his meliorations and improvements, without the slightest suspicion of any infirmity in his own title, is contrary to the first principles of equity. Take the case of a vacant lot in a city, where a *bonâ fide* purchaser builds a house thereon, enhancing the value of the estate to ten times the original value of the land, under a title apparently perfect and complete ; is it reasonable or just, that in such a case, the true owner should recover and possess the whole, without any compensation whatever to the *bonâ fide* purchaser? To me it seems manifestly unjust and inequitable, thus to appropriate to one man the property and money of another, who is in no default. The argument, I am aware, is, that the moment the house is built, it belongs to the owner of the land by mere operation of law ; and that he may certainly possess and enjoy his own. But this is merely stating the technical rule of law, by which the true owner seeks to hold, what in a just sense he never had the slightest title to, that is, the house. It is not answering the objection ; but merely and dryly stating, that the law so holds. But, then, admitting this to be so, does it not furnish a strong ground why equity should interpose, and grant relief?

"I have ventured to suggest, that the claim of the *bonâ fide* purchaser, under such circumstances, is founded in equity. I think it founded in the highest equity ; and in this view of the matter, I am supported by the positive dictates of the Roman Law. The passage already cited shows it to be founded in the clearest natural equity. *Jure naturæ æquum est.* And the Roman Law treats the claim of the true owner, without making any compensation under such circumstances as a case of fraud or ill faith *Certe* (say the Institutes) *illud constat ; si in possessione constituto ædificatore, soli Dominus petat domum suam esse, me solvat pretium materiæ et mercedes fabrorum ; posse eum per exceptionem doli mali repelli ; utique si bonæ fidei possessor, qui ædificavit. Nam scienti, alienum solum esse, potest objici culpa, quod ædificaverit temere in eo solo, quod intelligebat alienum esse.*[1] It is a

[1] Just. Inst. lib. 2 tit. 1, § 30, 32; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 799 b; Vinn. Com. ad. Inst. lib. 2, tit, 1, Just. § 30, n. 3, 4, p, 194, 195.

this object is effected. In some of the States, the value of the improvements is allowed only by way of set-off to the

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grave mistake, sometimes made, that the Roman Law merely confined its equity or remedial justice, on this subject, to a mere reduction from the amount of the rents and profits of the land.[1] The general doctrine is fully expounded and supported in the Digest, where it is applied, not to all expenditures upon the estate, but to such expenditures only as have enhanced the value of the estate, (*quatenus pretiosior res facta est*,)[2] and beyond what he has been reimbursed by the rents and profits.[3] The like principle has been adopted into the law of the modern nations, which have derived their jurisprudence from the Roman Law; and it is especially recognized in France, and enforced by Pothier, with his accustomed strong sense of equity, and general justice, and urgent reasoning.[4] Indeed, some jurists, and among them Cujacius, insist, contrary to the Roman Law, that even a *malâ fide* possessor ought to have an allowance of all expenses, which have enhanced the value of the estate, so far as the increased value exists.[5]

"The law of Scotland has allowed the like recompense to *bonâ fide* possessors, making valuable and permanent improvements; and some of the jurists of that country have extended the benefit to *malâ fide* possessors to a limited extent.[6] The law of Spain affords the like protection and recompense to *bonâ fide* possessors, as founded in natural justice and equity.[7] Grotius, Puffendorf, and Rutherford, all affirm the same doctrine, as founded in the truest principles, *ex æquo et bono*.[8]

"There is still another broad principle of the Roman Law, which is applicable to the present case. It is, that where a *bonâ fide* possessor or purchaser of real estate pays money to discharge any existing incumbrance or charge upon the estate, having no notice of any infirmity in his title he is entitled to be repaid the amount of such payment by the true owner, seeking to recover the estate from him.[9] Now, in the present case, it cannot be overlooked, that the lands of the testator, now in controversy, were sold for the payment of his just debts, under the authority of law, although the authority was not regularly executed by the administrator in his mode of sale, by a non-compliance with one of the prerequisites. It was not, therefore, in

[1] See Green *v.* Biddle, 8 Wheat. 79, 80.

[2] Dig. lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 29, § 2; Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65; Ibid. l. 38; Pothier, Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, n. 43, 44, 45, 46, 48.

[3] Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 48.

[4] Pothier, De la Propriété, n. 343-353; Code Civil of France, art. 552, 555.

[5] Pothier, De la Propriété, n. 350; Vinn. ad. Inst. lib. 2 tit. 1, l. 30, n. 4, p. 195.

[6] Bell. Comm. on Law of Scotland, p. 159, § 538; Ersk. Inst. b. 3, tit. 1, § 11; 1 Stair, Inst. b. 1, tit. 8, § 6.

[7] 1 Mor. & Carl. Partrid. b. 3, tit. 28, l. 41, p. 357, 358; Asa & Manuel, Inst. of Laws of Spain, 102.

[8] Grotius, b. 2, ch. 10, § 1, 2, 3; Puffend. Law of Nat. & Nat. b. 4, ch. 7, § 61; Rutherf. Inst. b. 1, ch. 9, § 4, p. 7.

[9] Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65; Pothier, Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, n. 43: Pothier, De la Propriété, n. 343.

claim of the plaintiff for mesne profits. In others, the occupant has a remedy by filing a declaration in a special action

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a just sense, a tortious sale: and the proceeds thereof, paid by the purchaser, have gone to discharge the debts of the testator, and so far the lands in the hands of the defendant (Boyd) have been relieved from a charge, to which they were liable by law. So, that he is now enjoying the lands, free from a charge, which, in conscience and equity, he and he only, and not the purchaser, ought to bear. To the extent of the charge, from which he has been thus relieved by the purchaser, it seems to me, that the plaintiff, claiming under the purchaser, is entitled to reimbursement, in order to avoid a circuity of action, to get back the money from the administrator, and thus subject the lands to a new sale, or, at least, in his favor, in equity to the old charge I confess myself to be unwilling to resort to such a circuity, in order to do justice, where, upon the principles of equity, the merits of the case can be reached by affecting the lands directly with a charge, to which they are *æquo et bono*, in the hands of the present defendant, clearly liable.

"These considerations have been suggested, because they greatly weigh in my own mind, after repeated deliberations on the subject. They, however, will remain open for consideration upon the report of the master, and do not positively require to be decided until all the equities between the parties are brought by his report fully before the Court. At present, it is ordered to be referred to the master to take an account of the enhanced value of the premises, by the meliorations and improvements of the plaintiff, and those, under whom he claims, after deducting all the rents and profits received by the plaintiff, and those, under whom he claims; and all other matters will be reserved for the consideration of the Court upon the coming in of his report." See 1 Story, R. 494 – 499. Afterwards, upon the coming in of the report, by which the increased value of the land by reason of the plaintiff's improvements was ascertained at a certain sum, the learned Judge decreed, that the plaintiff was entitled to that sum, as a lien and charge on the land; concluding thus: — "I wish, in coming to this conclusion, to be distinctly understood as affirming and maintaining the broad doctrine, as a doctrine of Equity, that, so far as an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of any infirmity in his title, has, by his improvements and meliorations, added to the permanent value of the estate, he is entitled to a full remuneration, and that such increase of value is a lien and charge on the estate, which the absolute owner is bound to discharge, before he is to be restored to his original rights in the land. This is the clear result of the Roman law; and it has the most persuasive Equity, and, I may add, common sense and common justice, for its foundation. The Betterment Acts (as they are commonly called) of the States of Massachusetts and Maine, and of some other States, are founded upon the like Equity, and were manifestly intended to support it, even in suits at law for the recovery of the estate." See 2 Story, R. 607, 608. See also Swan *v.* Swan, 8 Price, 518; 3 Powell on Mort. 957, note Q, by Coventry.

on the case, after judgment for possession has been entered against him in the action of ejectment; in which case the writ of possession is stayed until a trial is had of the action for the value of the improvements, and the judgment in the latter case constitutes a lien on the land. In other States, upon the trial of the possessory action, the Jury, at the request of the respective parties, are required to assess, on the one hand, the increased value of the premises by reason of the improvements made by the occupant and those under whom he claims; and on the other hand, the value of the land, exclusive of those improvements; and the plaintiff is put to his election, either to take the land and pay the ascertained value of the improvements, or to abandon the land to the tenant, at the price found by the Jury; and the payments in either case are made by instalments fixed by law, and enforced by issuing or withholding the writ of possession.

§ 551. The *character of the occupants*, also, is the subject of some diversity of legislation. In general, the occupancy must have been in good faith, and without actual fraud. But in some States, the right to remuneration for improvements is given to all occupants, who have been in possession, claiming the exclusive title for a certain number of years; which of course includes disseisors, as well as those claiming under them; while in other States, it is restricted to persons claiming under patents, and public grants, and by deeds of conveyance; thus intending to exclude all who knowingly enter by wrong, and without color of title. In others, again, the improvements, made after notice of the paramount title, are expressly excluded from the consideration of the Jury.

§ 552. It is obvious, that in a work like the present, it would be inexpedient to treat of all these varieties of remedy, or indeed to do any thing more than to state the very few general rules of the Common Law, which are recognized in the absence of any statutory provisions; referring the reader to the statutes and decisions of each particular State, for whatever is peculiar in its own jurisprudence.

§ 553. It is a general rule in all these actions, as we have already remarked in respect to Ejectments, that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of his adversary's ; and that he must show, that he has the legal interest, and a possessory title, not barred by the statute of limitations.[1] The same rules also apply here, which have been already mentioned under the title of Ejectment, in regard to the method of proving the *plaintiff's title.*[2]

§ 554. In a *writ of right*, proof of a seisin is necessary, as well as in other cases ; but a title by disseisin is sufficient to maintain the action, if the tenant cannot show a better title ;[3] and the devisee of vacant and unoccupied land has, by operation of law, a sufficient seisin to maintain this action, without an actual entry.[4] Proof of actual perception of profits is not necessary, the averment of the taking of esplees not being traversable ;[5] and the tenant's right of possession is no bar to the demandant's right of recovery in this action.[6] The *mise*, when joined, puts in issue the whole title, including the statute of limitations ; and under it, the tenant may give in evidence a release from the demandant, after action brought, or any other matter, either establishing his own title, or disproving that of the demandant, except a collateral warranty.[7] But if a deed from the demandant to a stranger is shown, it may be rebutted, by evidence showing, that, at

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[1] See Ante, § 303. The writ of right being now limited to the same period with writs of entry, the proof of the right involves, of course, the proof of a possessory title.

[2] See Ante, § 905, 307 – 314, 316, 317, 318, 329.

[3] Bradstreet *v.* Clark, 12 Wend. 602 ; Hunt *v.* Hunt, 3 Met. 175 ; Speed *v.* Buford, 3 Bibb, 57 ; Jackson on Real Actions, p. 280.

[4] Ward *v.* Fuller, 15 Pick. 185 ; Green *v.* Chelsea, 24 Pick. 71. But if the land be not vacant and unoccupied, the devisee must prove his own seisin. Wells *v.* Prince, 4 Mass. 64.

[5] Green *v.* Liter, 8 Cranch, 246 ; Ward *v.* Fuller, 15 Pick. 185.

[6] Jackson on Real Actions, p. 282, 283.

[7] Ten Eyck *v.* Waterbury, 7 Cowen, 51 ; Poor *v.* Robinson, 10 Mass. 131, 134.

the time of its execution and delivery, the grantor was disseised, and that therefore nothing passed by the deed.[1]

§ 555. The *seisin* of the plaintiff or demandant, in any real action, is proved *primâ facie*, by evidence of his actual possession, which is always sufficient against a stranger. Such a possession, with claim of title, is sufficient to enable a grantor to convey; and the grantee, entering under such a conveyance, acquires a freehold,[2] even though the grantor be a person *non compos mentis;* the deed in that case being voidable only, and not void. But no seisin is conveyed by a naked release.[3] A seisin may also be proved by the extent of an execution on the land of a judgment debtor, which gives a seisin to the creditor.[4] If the actual possession is mixed and concurrent, the legal seisin is in him who has the title; and a legal seisin also carries with it the possession, if there is no adverse possession.[5] It is sufficient, *primâ facie*, to prove a seisin at any time anterior to the period in question since it will be presumed to continue, until the contrary is shown.[6]

§ 556. The plea of *nul disseisin*, in a writ of entry, puts in issue the legal title to the land, or, in other words, the seisin on which the demandant has counted, and the lawfulness of the tenant's entry.[7] If therefore, it is pleaded in bar of an action brought by a trustee, against the *cestui que*

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1 Knox *v.* Kellock, 14 Mass. 200.

2 Newhall *v.* Wheeler, 7 Mass. 189, 199; Higbee *v.* Rice, 5 Mass. 345, 352; Ward *v.* Fuller, 15 Pick. 185.

3 Wait *v.* Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217; Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Call, 1 Mass. 483.

4 Langdon *v.* Potter, 3 Mass. 215.

5 Codman *v.* Winslow, 10 Mass. 146; Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Call, 1 Mass. 483, 484.

6 Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Brimmer *v.* Long Wharf Prop'rs, 5 Pick. 131, 135.

7 Jackson on Real Actions, p. 5, 157; Green *v.* Kemp, 13 Mass. 515, 520; Wolcott *v.* Knight, 6 Mass. 418, 419.

trust, it entitles the demandant to recover.[1] Under this issue, the tenant cannot avail himself of any objection to the form of the action;[2] he cannot give non-tenure in evidence;[3] nor show, that he is but a tenant at will;[4] nor give in evidence the title of a stranger under which he does not claim, nor though he claims to hold as his servant;[5] nor a title acquired by himself by conveyance from a third person since the commencement of the action.[6] But under this issue, he may show a conveyance from the demandant or his ancestor to a stranger, for the purpose of disproving the demandant's allegation of seisin;[7] and the demandant, as has already been remarked in the case of a writ of right, may rebut this evidence by proof, that, at the time of the conveyance, the grantor was not seised, and so nothing passed by the deed.[8]

§ 557. Where the tenant claims by a *disseisin*, ripened into a good title by lapse of time, he must show an actual, open, and exclusive possession and use of the land as his own, adversely to the title of the demandant. It must be known to the adverse claimant, or be accompanied by circumstances of notoriety, such as erecting buildings or fences upon the land, from which he ought and may be presumed to know, that there is a possession adverse to his title.[9] But a fence made

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[1] Russell *v.* Lewis, 2 Pick. 508, 510.

[2] Green *v.* Kemp, 13 Mass. 515, 520.

[3] Higbee *v.* Rice, 5 Mass. 352, per Parsons, C. J.; Roberts *v.* Whiting, 16 Mass. 186; Alden *v.* Murdock, 13 Mass. 256, 259.

[4] Ibid.; Pray *v.* Pierce, 7 Mass. 381.

[5] Mechanics Bank *v.* Williams, 17 Pick. 438; Stanley *v.* Perley, 5 Greenl. 369; Shapleigh *v.* Pilsbury, 1 Greenl. 271; Heath *v.* Knapp, 4 Barr, 230.

[6] Andrews *v.* Hooper, 13 Mass. 472, 476.

[7] King *v.* Barns, 13 Pick. 24, 28; Stanley *v.* Perley, 5 Greenl. 369; Hall *v.* Stevens, 9 Metc. 418; Noyes *v.* Dyer, 12 Shepl. 468.

[8] Knox *v.* Kellock, 14 Mass. 200; Wolcott *v.* Knight, 6 Mass. 418; Ante, § 554.

[9] Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Doe *v.* Prosser, Cowp. 217; Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Call, 1 Mass. 483; Little *v.* Libby, 2 Greenl. 212; Poignard *v.* Smith, 6 Pick. 172; Norcross *v.* Widgery, 2 Mass. 506;

by the mere felling of trees on a line, lapping one upon another, is not sufficient for this purpose ;[1] much less is the running and marking of lines by a surveyor, under the direction of one not claiming title ; nor the occasional cutting of the grass.[2] An entry and occupancy under a deed of conveyance from a person without title, will constitute a disseisin of the true owner ;[3] extending to the whole tract described in the conveyance, if the deed is registered ; because the extent of the disseisor's claim may be known by inspection of the public registry.[4] But an entry under a registered deed, and the payment of taxes assessed upon the land, is not sufficient evidence of a disseisin, unless there was also a continued and open possession.[5] Where an inclosure of the land by fences is relied upon, it must appear, that the fences were erected with that intent, and not for a different purpose, such as the inclosure and protection of other lands of the party ; of which the Jury are to judge.[6] So, if the owner of a parcel of land should, through inadvertency, or ignorance of the dividing line, include a part of the adjoining tract within his inclosure, it is no disseisin of the true owner.[7]

§ 558. The evidence of disseisin may be *rebutted* by proof, that the disseisor had consented to hold under the disseisee ; or, that he had abandoned his possession.[8] But a

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Ante, § 311 ; Bryan *v.* Atwater, 5 Day, 181, 188, 189 ; Mitchell *v.* Warner, 5 Conn. 521 ; Teller *v.* Burtis, 6 Johns. 197.

[1] Coburn *v.* Hollis, 3 Metc. 125.

[2] Kennebec Prop'rs *v.* Springer, 4 Mass. 416.

[3] Warren *v.* Child, 11 Mass. 222; Northrop *v.* Wright, 7 Hill. N. Y. Rep. 476, 487–489, per Walworth, Ch. The party, thus in possession, may take a deed from a hostile claimant, for the mere purpose of quieting his title, without thereby abandoning his character of an adverse possessor. Ibid. See also Blight *v.* Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535 ; Fox *v.* Widgery, 4 Greenl. 214.

[4] Kennebec Prop's *v.* Lahoree, 2 Greenl. 275.

[5] Little *v.* Megquier, 2 Greenl. 176 ; Bates *v.* Norcross, 14 Pick. 224.

[6] Dennett *v.* Crocker, 8 Greenl. 239. And see Weston *v.* Reading, 5 Conn. 257, 258.

[7] Brown *v.* Gay, 3 Greenl. 126 ; Gates *v.* Butler, 3 Humphr. 447.

[8] Small *v.* Proctor, 15 Mass. 495.

mere mistake of the party in possession, which, as we have just seen, will not constitute a disseisin, will not, for the like reason, amount to proof of an abandonment of his possession.[1]

§ 559. Where the tenant, by the laws of the State is allowed a compensation for the *lasting improvements* made by him on the land, the evidence is to be directed, not to the amount of his expenditures, but to the present increased value of the premises, by reason of the improvements. And these ordinarily consist of buildings, wells, valuable trees planted by the tenant, durable fences, and other permanent fixtures.

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[1] Ross *v.* Gould, 5 Greenl. 204.

REPLEVIN.

§ 560. This action lies for the recovery, *in specie*, of any personal chattel which has been taking and detained from the owner's possession, together with damages for the detention; unless the taking and detention can be justified or excused, or the right of action is suspended or discharged.[1] It lies at Common Law, not only for goods distrained, but for goods taken and unjustly detained for any other cause whatever; except that where goods are taken by process of law, the party against whom the process issued cannot replevy them; but if the goods of a stranger to the process are taken, he may replevy them from the sheriff.[2]

§ 561. Where the issue raises the question of title, the plaintiff must prove, that at the time of the caption he had the general or a special *property* in the goods taken, and the right of *immediate and exclusive possession*.[3] But a *mere servant*, or a depositary for safe custody, has not such property as will support this action, his possession being that of the master or bailor.[4] It is not always necessary to prove

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[1] Hammond's Nisi Prius, p. 372.

[2] Gilbert on Replevin, p. 161; Rooke's case, 5 Co. 99; Callis on Sewers, p. 197; Clark *v.* Skinner, 20 Johns. 470. This point is treated ably and with deep research, in 12 Am. Jurist, p. 104, 117, where the above authorities with others are reviewed. See also Allen *v.* Crary, 10 Wend. 349; Seaver *v.* Dingley, 4 Greenl. 306. In New York, the right of a stranger to replevy goods taken by the sheriff, is limited to goods not in the actual possession of the judgment debtor at the time of the taking. Thompson *v.* Button, 14 Johns. 84; Judd *v.* Fox, 9 Cowen, 259.

[3] Co. Litt. 145 *b*; Gordon *v.* Harper, 7 T. R. 9; Gates *v.* Gates, 15 Mass. 310; Collins *v.* Evans, 15 Pick. 63; Rogers *v.* Arnold, 12 Wend. 30; Wheeler *v.* Train, 4 Pick. 168; Smith *v.* Williamson, 1 Har. & J. 147; Ingraham *v.* Martin, 3 Shepl. 373.

[4] Templeman *v.* Case, 10 Mod. 25; Waterman *v.* Robinson, 5 Mass. 303;

a taking of the goods, since the action may be maintained against a bailee, by proof of an unlawful *detention*.[1] But when a taking is to be shown, it must be an *actual taking*. Thus, it has been held, that merely entering at the custom-house, by the agent of the owners, goods already in the public stores, and paying the duties thereon, without any actual removal, but taking a permit for their delivery on payment of storage, is not such a taking as will support an action of replevin against the agent.[2] So this action cannot be maintained against a sheriff, who has made an attachment of the plaintiff's goods, but has left them in the custody of the plaintiff as his bailee, without any actual taking and removal of them.[3]

§ 562. The general issue in this action is *non cepit*, which admits the plaintiff's title, and under which it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove, that the defendant had the goods, in the place mentioned in the declaration; for the action being local, the place is material and traversable.[4] Proof of the original taking in that place is not necessary, for the wrongful taking is continued in every place in which the goods are afterwards detained.[5] But under this issue, the defendant cannot have a return of the goods; if found for

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Ludden *v.* Leavitt, 9 Mass. 104; Warren *v.* Leland, Ibid. 265; Dunham *v.* Wyckoff, 2 Wend. 280; Miller *v.* Adsit, 16 Wend. 335.

[1] F. N. B, [69] G.; Badger *v.* Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 362, per Putnam, J.; Shannon *v.* Shannon, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 327, per Ld. Redesdale; Baker *v.* Fales, 16 Mass. 147; Ilsley *v.* Stubbs, 5 Mass. 284; Seaver *v.* Dingley, 4 Greenl. 306; Galvin *v.* Bacon, 2 Fairf. 28. But see Meany *v.* Head, 1 Mason, 319, 322, that replevin does not lie without a tortious taking. See also Reeves *v.* Morris, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, 159.

[2] Whitwell *v.* Wells, 24 Pick. 25.

[3] Lathrop *v.* Cook, 2 Shepl. 414.

[4] Weston *v.* Carter, 1 Sid. 10; 1 Saund. 347, n. (1), by Williams; McKinley *v.* McGregor, 3 Whart. 369; Dover *v.* Rawlings, 2 M. & Rob. 544.

[5] Walton *v.* Kersop, 2 Wils. 354; Bull. N. P. 54; 1 Saund. 347 *a*, note by Williams; Johnson *v.* Wollyer, 1 Stra. 507; Abercrombie *v.* Parkhurst, 2 B. & P. 480.

him, it merely protects him from damages. If he would defend on the ground that he never had the goods in the place mentioned, he should plead *cepit in alio loco*, which is a good plea in bar of the action.[1] This plea does not admit the taking as laid in the declaration ; and therefore the plaintiff must prove such taking, or fail to recover.[2]

§ 563. If the defendant, besides the plea of *non cepit*, also pleads *property*, either in himself or a stranger, and traverses the right of the plaintiff, which he may do, with an avowry of the taking, the material inquiry is as to the property of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff must be prepared to prove, the *onus probandi* of this issue being on him ; for if the former issue is found for him, but the latter is either not found at all, or is found for the defendant, the plaintiff cannot have judgment.[3]

§ 564. An *avowry* or *cognizance* of the taking is ordinarily necessary, whenever the defendant would obtain judgment for a return of the goods, thereby making himself an actor in the suit, and obliging himself to make out a good title in all respects. Where the avowry or cognizance is for rent, it admits, that the property in the goods was in the plaintiff; but the terms of the contract or tenancy must be precisely stated, and proved as laid, or the variance will be fatal.[4] But it is not necessary to prove, that all the rent was due which is alleged ; for an allegation of two years' rent

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[1] Ibid. ; Bullythorpe *v.* Turner, Willes, 475; Anon. 2 Mod. 199; Williams *v.* Welch, 5 Wend. 290; Prosser *v.* Woodward, 21 Wend. 205.

[2] The People *v.* Niagara, C. P. 2 Wend. 644.

[3] 5 Com. Dig. 757, tit. Pleader, K. 12 ; Presgrave *v.* Saunders, 1 Salk. 5 ; Bemus *v.* Beekman, 3 Wend. 667 ; Sprague *v.* Kneeland, 12 Wend. 161; Rogers *v.* Arnold, Ibid. 30 ; Boynton *v.* Page, 13 Wend. 425 ; Clemson *v.* Davidson, 5 Binn. 399; Seibert *v.* McHenry, 6 Watts, 301 ; Hunt *v.* Chambers, 6 Penn. Law Journ. 82.

[4] Clarke *v.* Davies, 7 Taunt. 72 ; Brown *v.* Sayce, 4 Taunt. 320 ; Phillpot *v.* Dobbinson, 6 Bing. 104; 3 M. & P. 320 ; Cossey *v.* Diggons, 2 B. & Ald. 546 ; Davies *v.* Stacey, 12 Ad. & El. 506 ; Tice *v.* Norton, 4 Wend. 663. See also Jack *v.* Martin, 14 Wend. 507.

in arrear will be supported by proof of one only; the substance of the allegation being, that some rent was in arrear, and not the precise amount.[1]

§ 565. Under the issue of *non demisit*, or *non tenuit*, which is usually pleaded by the plaintiff, to an avowry for rent in arrear, the defendant must prove a demise, an agreement for one being not sufficient; and the demise proved must be precisely the same as that stated in the avowry.[2] But under this plea the plaintiff ordinarily cannot give in evidence any thing which amounts to a plea of *nil habuit in tenementis;* for as the tenant is not permitted directly to deny the title of his landlord by plea, he shall not be permitted to do it indirectly, by evidence to the same effect under another issue.[3] But where the defendant's title expired before the rent became due, or the plaintiff came in under another title, and had paid rent to the defendant in ignorance of the defect of his title to demand it, or has been evicted by the lessor, he may show this under the plea of *non tenuit.*[4] Proof of payment of rent to the avowant is always *primâ facie* evidence, that the title is in him.[5]

§ 566. The plea of *riens in arrear* admits the demise as laid in the avowry, putting in issue only the fact, that nothing is due; if therefore, as has just been stated, the avowant proves that any rent is due, he will be entitled to recover,

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[1] Forty *v.* Imber, 6 East, 434; Cobb *v.* Bryan, 3 B. & P. 348.

[2] Dunk *v.* Hunter, 5 B. & Ald. 322.

[3] Parry *v.* House, Holt's Cas. 489, and note by the reporter; Alchorne *v.* Gomme, 2 Bing. 54; Cooper *v.* Blandy, 1 Bing. N. C. 45. The rule, that the tenant shall not deny the title of his landlord, applies only where there is a tenancy in fact. Brown *v.* Dean, 3 Wend. 208.

[4] Gravenor *v.* Woodhouse, 1 Bing. 38; England *v.* Slade, 4 T. R. 682; Rogers *v.* Pitcher, 6. Taunt. 209; Fenner *v.* Duplock, 2 Bing. 10; Duggan *v.* O'Connor, 1 Hudson & Brooke, 459; Hopcraft *v.* Keys, 9 Bing. 613; Bridges *v.* Smith, 5 Bing. 411.

[5] Johnson *v.* Mason, 1 Esp. 90, 91; Knight *v.* Bennett, 3 Bing. 361; Mann *v.* Lovejoy, Ry. & M. 355.

though he should fail to prove that all is due which is alleged.[1] Under this issue, the plaintiff may prove that he has paid the rent in arrear to one who had a superior title, such as a prior mortgagee of the lessor,[2] or a prior grantee of an annuity or rent charge.[3]

§ 567. The allegation in the cognizance, that the conusor made the distress as *bailiff* to another, is traversable; but it may be proved by evidence of a subsequent assent to the distress, by the person in whose behalf it was made.[4] If it were made by one of several parceners, joint-tenants, or tenants in common, in behalf of all, no other evidence will be necessary, the title itself giving an authority in law to each one, to distrain for all.[5] If the conusor justifies as bailiff of an executor, for rent due to the testator, the plea will be supported by proof of a distress in the name of the testator, and by his previous direction, but made after his death, and afterwards assented to by the executor.[6]

§ 568. Where the avowry is for *damage feasant*, with a plea of title in the defendant to the *locus in quo*, which is traversed, the evidence will be the same as under the like plea of title in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*. And in general, whatever right is pleaded, the plea must be maintained by proof of as large a right as is alleged. If a larger right be proved, it will not vitiate; but proof of a more limited right will not suffice.[7] And if an absolute right

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[1] Hill *v.* Wright, 2 Esp. 669; Cobb *v.* Bryan, 3 B. & P. 348; Bloomer *v.* Juhel, 8 Wend. 449; Harrison *v.* Barnby, 5 T. R. 248.

[2] Johnson *v.* Jones, 9 Ad. & El. 809; Pope *v.* Biggs, 9 B. & C. 245.

[3] Taylor *v.* Zamira, 6 Taunt. 524. And see Stubbs *v.* Parsons, 3 B. & Ald. 516; Carter *v.* Carter, 5 Bing. 406; Dyer *v.* Bowley, 2 Bing. 94; Alchorne *v.* Gomme, 2 Bing. 54; Sapsford *v.* Fletcher, 4 T. R. 511.

[4] Lamb *v.* Mills, 4 Mod. 378; Trevilian *v.* Pine, 11 Mod. 112; 1 Saund. 347 *c*, note (4), by Williams.

[5] Leigh *v.* Shepherd, 2 B. &. B. 465.

[6] Whitehead *v.* Taylor, 10 Ad. & El. 210.

[7] Bull. N. P. 59, 60; Ante, tit. PRESCRIPTION, § 544; Johnson *v.* Thoroughgood, Hob. 64; Bushwood *v.* Pond, Cro. El. 722; Bailiffs of Tewksbury *v.* Bricknell, 1 Taunt. 142.

is pleaded, and the right proved is coupled with a condition or limitation, the plea is not supported; but evidence of an additional right, founded on another and subsequent consideration, will not defeat the plea.[1] If issue is taken on the averment, that the cattle distrained were levant and couchant, and the evidence is, that only part of them were so, the averment is not proved.[2]

§ 569. A *tender*, whether of rent, or of amends for damage by cattle, if made before the taking, renders the distress unlawful; and if made after the distress, but before impounding, it renders the detention unlawful.[3] But it must appear, that the tender, if not made to the party himself, was made to a person entitled to receive the money in his behalf; for if it was made to one who was not his receiver, but only his bailiff to make the distress, or, to his receiver's agent, it is not sufficient.[4] And a tender, even to a receiver, is bad, if the principal be present, for in such case it should have been made to the principal.[5]

§ 570. The party, under whom the defendant makes cognizance as bailiff, is not a *competent witness* for the defendant, for he comes in support of his own title.[6] But he is competent to testify for the plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff cannot give in evidence his declarations.[7] And if distinct cognizances are made for the same goods, under different parties, not connected in interest, but one of the cognizances is abandoned at the trial, the party under whom it was made is thereby rendered a stranger to the suit, and

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[1] Bull. N. P. 59; Gray's case, 5 Co. 79; Cro. El. 405, S. C.; Lovelace *v.* Reynolds, Cro. El. 546; Brook *v.* Willett, 2 H. Bl. 224.

[2] Bull. N. P. 299; 2 Roll. Abr. 706, pl. 41; 1 Saund. 346 *d*, note by Williams.

[3] The Six Carpenters' case, 8 Co. 146; Pilkington's case, 5 Co. 76.

[4] Pilkington's case, 5 Co. 76; Pimm *v.* Grevill, 6 Esp. 95; Browne *v.* Powell, 4 Bing. 230.

[5] Gilbert on Replevins, p. 63; Pilkington *v.* Hastings, Cro. El. 813.

[6] Golding *v.* Nias, 5 Esp. 272; Upton *v.* Curtis, 1 Bing. 210.

[7] Hart *v.* Horn, 2 Campb. 92.

therefore a competent witness.[1] A commoner, who claims by the same custom as the plaintiff, is not a competent witness in support of the custom; but where the plaintiff claims by prescription, a person claiming under a like prescription is still competent to testify for the plaintiff; for his interest at most is in the question only, and not in the subject-matter or event of the suit.[2]

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[1] King *v.* Baker, 2 Ad. & El. 333. But a mere offer to abandon is not sufficient to render the witness competent. Girdlestone *v.* McGowran, 1 Car. & Kir. 702.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 389, 405.

SEDUCTION.[1]

§ 571. In an action for seduction, the plaintiff must be prepared to prove, (1.) that the person seduced was his servant; and (2.) the fact of seduction; both these points being put in issue by the plea of not guilty.[2]

§ 572. (1.) Though the relation of *servant* to the plaintiff

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[1] For the evidence in an action for *criminal conversation* with the plaintiff's wife, see Ante, tit. Adultery, and tit. Marriage.

[2] Holloway *v.* Abell, 7 C. & P. 528. It has been disputed, whether this action should be in the form of trespass, or case; but it is now settled, that it may well be brought in either form. Chamberlain *v.* Hazlewood, 5 M. & W. 515; 3 Jur. 1079; 7 Dowl. P. C. 816, S. C.; Parker *v.* Bailey, 4 D. & R. 215. See Ante, tit. Case, § 226; Moran *v.* Dawes, 4 Cowen, 412; Parker *v.* Elliott, 6 Munf. 587.

The form of the declaration in Case is as follows; — "For that the said (defendant) on —— and on divers days and times after that day and before the commencement of this suit, debauched and carnally knew one E. F., she then being the [daughter and] servant of the plaintiff; whereby the said E. F. became sick and pregnant with child, and so continued for a long time, to wit, until the —— day of —— when she was delivered of the child of which she was so pregnant; by means of all which the said E. F., was unable to perform the business of the plaintiff, being her [father and] master aforesaid, from the day first aforesaid hitherto, and the plaintiff has wholly lost her service, and been put to great expenses for her delivery, cure, and nursing. To the damage," &c.

The form in Trespass is thus: — "For that the said [defendant] on —— and on divers days and times after that day and before the commencement of this suit, with force and arms assaulted one E. F. she then being the [daughter and] servant of the plaintiff, and then debauched and carnally knew the said E. F. whereby [here proceed as in the preceding form, to the end, concluding thus,] and other wrongs to the plaintiff the said [defendant] then and there did, against the peace. To the damage," &c.

Where the injury was done in the house of the father or master, the remedy may be pursued in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, the seduction being laid in aggravation of the wrong. 1 Chitty on Plead. 128.

is indispensable to the maintenance of this action, yet it is not necessary to prove an express contract of service ;[1] nor is the amount or value of the service actually performed of any importance, if the plaintiff had the right to command the immediate service, or personal attendance of the party, at the time of the seduction.[2] If this right existed, it is not material whether the servant was seduced while at home, or abroad on a visit. Nor is it material whether the servant was a minor, or of full age ; nor whether the relation of master and servant still continues, it being sufficient if it existed when the act of seduction was committed.[3] Neither does the concurrent existence of any other relation, such as that of parent or other relative, affect the action ; for such relation will not aid to support the action, if the party seduced was actually emancipated and free from the control of the plaintiff when the injury was committed.[4]

§ 573. It has accordingly been held, that this part of the issue is maintained by evidence, that the party seduced was the adopted child of the plaintiff,[5] or his niece,[6] or his daughter,[7] as well as where she was merely his hired servant,[8] it also appearing, that she was actually subject to his commands, and was bound to perform such offices of service or of kindness and duty as were usually performed by persons in that relation, and in similar rank in society. So it is held sufficient, if any acts of service or of duty are performed, though the party were a married woman, separated from her husband, and had returned to live with the plaintiff, who is her father.[9] The smallest degree of service will suffice, such

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[1] Bennett *v.* Alcott, 2 T. R. 166.

[2] Maunder *v.* Venn, 1 M. & Malk. 323.

[3] Though the father turned the daughter out of doors, upon discovery of her pregnancy, he may still maintain this action. 3 Steph. N. P. 2353.

[4] 2 Selw. N. P. 1103, 1104, (10th edit.) ; 3 Steph. N. P. 2351 – 2353.

[5] Irwin *v.* Dearman, 11 East, 23.

[6] Edmondson *v.* Machell, 2 T. R. 4 ; Manvell *v.* Thompson, 2 C. & P. 303.

[7] 2 Selw. N. P. 1103 ; Bennett *v.* Alcott, 2 T. R. 166.

[8] Fores *v.* Wilson, 1 Peake, 55.

[9] Harper *v.* Luffkin, 7 B. & C. 387.

as presiding at the tea-table,[1] even though she slept in another house, or was absent on a visit, if she was still under the plaintiff's control.[2] But if she was not in his service in any of these modes, the father cannot maintain this action, though he received part of her wages, and she was under age.[3] If the defendant himself hired her as his own servant, with the fraudulent intent to obtain possession of her person and seduce her, this is no bar to the father's action, though she was of full age ; provided she was in her father's family at the time of the hiring ; for in such case, the hiring being fraudulent, the relation of master and servant was never contracted between them.[4]

§ 574. On the other hand, it has been decided, that where the daughter was in the domestic service of another person at the time of the injury, though with the intent to return to her father's house as soon as she should quit that service, unless she should go into another, the action cannot be maintained.[5] Much less can it be maintained, where she had no such intention of returning.[6]

§ 575. Though the slightest proof of the relation of master and servant will suffice, yet as the action is founded upon that relation, it must be shown to have existed at the time.[7]

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[1] Carr *v.* Clarke, 2 Chitty, 261, per Abbott, C. J.; Blaymire *v.* Hayley, 6 M. & W. 56 ; Manvell *v.* Thompson, 2 C. & P. 304.

[2] Mann *v.* Barrett, 6 Esp. 32 ; Holloway *v.* Abell, 7 C. & P. 528. And see Anon. 1 Smith, 333 ; Harris *v.* Butler, 2 M. & W. 542 ; Martin *v.* Payne, 9 Johns. 387 ; Moran *v.* Dawes, 4 Cowen, 412 ; Nickleson *v.* Stryker, 10 Johns. 115 ; Hornketh *v.* Barr, 8 S. & R. 36.

[3] Carr *v.* Clarke, 2 Chitty, 260 ; Postlethwaite *v.* Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878 ; Grinnell *v.* Wells, 7 Man. & Gr. 1033.

[4] Speight *v.* Oliviera, 2 Stark. 493.

[5] Blaymire *v.* Hayley, 6 M. & W. 55. And see Postlethwaite *v.* Parkes, 3 Burr. 1878. Davies *v.* Williams, 10 Ad. & El. 725, N. S.

[6] Dean *v.* Peel, 5 East, 45 ; Anon. 1 Smith, 333.

[7] The allegation of her relation of servant, and the *per quod servitium amisit* are material ; and the omission of them will not be supplied by an averment that the plaintiff, her father, being of sufficient ability, was compelled to support her. Grinnell *v.* Wells, 7 Man. & Gr. 1033.

Therefore it has been held, that where the seduction took place in the lifetime of the father, the action could not be maintained by the mother, after his decease, though the expenses of the daughter's confinement fell upon the mother.[1] Nor can the mother maintain the action in any case, without proof of service.[2]

§ 576. Where the daughter was a minor, and under the father's control, proof of this alone will suffice to maintain this part of the issue, service in that case being presumed; but where she was of full age, the plaintiff ought to be provided with some additional evidence of service in fact, though, as has already been stated, slight evidence will suffice.[3]

§ 577. (2.) The *fact of seduction* may be proved by the testimony of the person herself; but it is not necessary to produce her, though the withholding of her is open to observation.[4] Her general character for chastity is considered to be involved in the issue, and may therefore be impeached by the defendant by general evidence, and supported by the plaintiff in the like manner; but she cannot be asked, whether she had not been previously criminal with other men.[5] But though the defendant cannot interrogate the

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[1] Logan *v.* Murray, 6 S. & R. 175. But see Coon *v.* Moffet, 2 Penningt. 583.

[2] Satterthwaite *v.* Dewhurst, 4 Doug. 315; 5 East, 47, n.

[3] Nickleson *v.* Stryker, 10 Johns. 115; Martin *v.* Payne, 9 Johns. 387; Hornketh *v.* Barr, 8 S. & R. 36; Logan *v.* Murray, 6 S. & R. 177; Vanhorn *v.* Freeman, 1 Halst. 322; Mercer *v.* Walmsley, 5 Har. & Johns. 27.

[4] Revill *v.* Satterfit, Holt's Cas. 451; Cock *v.* Wortham, 2 Stra. 1054.

[5] Bamfield *v.* Massey, 1 Camp. 460; Dodd *v.* Norris, 3 Campb. 519; Bate *v.* Hill, 1 C. & P. 100; Ante, Vol. 1, § 54, 458. And see Magrath *v.* Browne, 1 Armstr. & Macartn. 136; Carpenter *v.* Wahl, 11 Ad. & El. 803. Where she had been abandoned by her seducer, and in consequence of that abandonment became ill, whereby her services were lost to the father, it has been contended that for such loss of service an action might be maintained; but the particular case was disposed of on another point. Boyle *v.* Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738.

party herself as to acts of unchastity with others, yet he may call those other persons to testify to their own criminal intercourse with her, and the time and place; but notwithstanding this evidence, if the Jury are satisfied, from the whole evidence, that the defendant was the father of the child, their verdict must be for the plaintiff, though perhaps for diminished damages.[1]

§ 577 *a*. The mere fact that the defendant has had a *criminal connection* with the plaintiff's servant, is not alone sufficient to maintain this action, without proof of *some* injury thence resulting to the plaintiff; for otherwise, it is in principle nothing but the case of an assault upon the servant, without damage to the master; and if such connection were held to be a loss of service, it is difficult, as a learned Judge has remarked, to see where it would stop. Therefore, where a parent brought an action for the seduction of his daughter, then in his service, and it was proved that the defendant had had connection with her, and also that she had been delivered of a child, but the Jury found that the child was not the defendant's, it was held that the Jury were rightly instructed to return a verdict for the defendant, there being no loss of service from his act.[2]

§ 578. In the *defence* of this action, under the general issue, the defendant may not only show, that the person seduced was not the servant of the plaintiff,[3] but he may also prove, in bar of the action, that the plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct, in permitting the defendant to visit his daughter as a suitor, after he knew that he was a married man, and had received a caution against admitting him into his family, or in otherwise conniving at her criminal intercourse with him.[4]

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[1] Verry *v.* Watkins, 7 C. & P. 308.

[2] Eager *v.* Grimwood, 34 Legal Obs. 360; 1 Exch. R. 61, S. C.

[3] Holloway *v.* Abell, 7 C. & P. 528.

[4] Reddie *v.* Scoolt, 1 Peake, 240; Akerley *v.* Haines, 2 Caines, 292; Seagar *v.* Sligerland, Ibid. 219.

§ 579. The *damages* in this action are given not only for the loss of service, but also for all that the plaintiff can feel from the nature of the injury. Therefore, if the plaintiff is the parent of the seduced, the Jury may consider his loss of the comfort as well as the service of the daughter, in whose virtue he can feel no consolation, and his anxiety as the parent of other children, whose morals may be corrupted by her example.[1] The plaintiff may give evidence of the terms on which the defendant visited his house, and that he was paying his addresses upon the promise or with intentions of marriage;[2] and the defendant, on the other hand, may give evidence not only of the loose character and conduct of the daughter, but also, as it seems, of the profligate principles and dissolute habits of the plaintiff himself.[3]

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[1] Bedford *v.* McKowl, 3 Esp. 119. And see Tullidge *v.* Wade, 3 Wils. 18; Andrews *v.* Askey, 8 C. & P. 7; Irwin *v.* Dearman, 11 East, 24; Grinnell *v.* Wells, 8 Scott, N. R. 741; 7 M. & Gr. 1033.

[2] Elliott *v.* Nicklin, 5 Price, 641; Tullidge *v.* Wade, 3 Wils. 18; Capron *v.* Balmond, 3 Steph. N. P. 2356; Watson *v.* Bayless, and Murgatroyd *v.* Murgatroyd, cited 2 Stark. on Evid. 732, note (*t*); Ante, § 269. But see Dodd *v.* Norris, 3 Campb. 519, contra.

[3] Dodd *v.* Norris, 3 Campb. 519.

SHERIFF.

§ 580. The law of evidence in actions against any officers, for misconduct in regard to civil process in their hands for service, will be treated under this head; the sheriff being the officer principally concerned in that duty. He is identified, in contemplation of law, with all his under officers, and is directly responsible, in the first instance, for all their acts, done in the execution of process.[1]

§ 581. Actions against sheriffs are either for non-feasance, or mere omission of duty; such as, (1.) not serving process; (2.) taking insufficient pledges or bail; (3.) not paying over money levied and collected; or, for misfeasance, or improperly doing a lawful act; such as, (4.) suffering the party arrested to escape; (5.) making a false return; or, for malfeasance, or doing an unlawful act, under color of process; such as, (6.) extortion; (7.) seizing the goods of one who is a stranger to the process. These will be considered briefly in their order.

§ 582. Where the action for any of these causes is founded on the misconduct of an *inferior officer*, acting under the sheriff, his *connection with the sheriff* must be proved. If he is an under-sheriff or deputy, recognized by statute as a public officer, it will be sufficient, *primâ facie*, to show that

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[1] Saunderson *v.* Baker, 2 W. Bl. 832; Jones *v.* Perchard, 2 Esp. 507; Smart *v.* Hutton, 2 N. & M. 426; 8 Ad. & El. 568, note, S. C.; Anon. Lofft, 81; Ackworth *v.* Kempe, 1 Doug. 40; Woodman *v.* Gist, 8 C. & P. 213; Watson *v.* Todd, 5 Mass. 271; Draper *v.* Arnold, 12 Mass. 449; Knowlton *v.* Bartlett, 1 Pick. 271; The People *v.* Dunning, 1 Wend. 16; Gorham *v.* Gale, 7 Cowen, 739; Walden *v.* Davison, 15 Wend. 575; M'Intire *v.* Trumbull, 7 Johns. 35; Grinnell *v.* Phillips, 1 Mass. 530.

he has acted publicly and notoriously in that character.[1] But if he is only a private agent or servant of the sheriff, other evidence is necessary. In these cases, a warrant is delivered to the bailiff, authorizing him to serve the process in question; and as this is the most satisfactory evidence of his appointment, it is expedient to produce it, or to establish its loss, so as to admit secondary evidence of its existence and contents.[2] A paper, purporting to be a copy of the warrant left with the debtor by the bailiff, is not sufficient, it being the mere act of the bailiff, and of the nature of hearsay; nor will it suffice to produce a general bond of indemnity, given by the bailiff to the sheriff; for this does not make him the sheriff's general officer, but is only to cover each distinct liability that he may come under, in regard to every several warrant.[3] But any subsequent act of recognition of the bailiff's authority, by the sheriff, such as returning the process served by the bailiff, or giving instructions for that purpose, is admissible to establish the agency of the bailiff.[4] The bailiff himself is a competent witness to prove the warrant under which he acted; but it will seldom be expedient for the plaintiff to call him, as he will be liable to cross examination by the defendant, in a cause which is virtually his own.[5]

§ 583. It may also here be stated, that the *admissions* of an under-sheriff, or deputy, tending to charge himself, are receivable in evidence against the sheriff, wherever the un-

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 83, 92. If the allegation is, that the defendant was sheriff on the day of delivery of the writ to him, and until the return day thereof, proof of the former averment is sufficient, the latter being immaterial. Jervis *v.* Sidney, 3 D. & R. 483.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 559 – 563, 574, 575, 84, n.

[3] Drake *v.* Sykes, 7 T. R. 113, as explained in Martin *v.* Bell, 1 Stark. 413.

[4] Martin *v.* Bell, 1 Stark. 413; Saunderson *v.* Baker, 3 Wils. 309; 2 W. Bl. 832; Jones *v.* Wood, 3 Campb. 228. The return of a person styling himself deputy-sheriff, is not of itself sufficient evidence against the sheriff, of the deputy's appointment. Slaughter *v.* Barnes, 3 A. K. Marsh. 413.

[5] Morgan *v.* Brydges, 2 Stark. 314. And see Ante, Vol. 1, § 445.

der-officer is bound by the record; and he is thus bound, and the record is conclusive evidence against him, both of the facts which it recites, and of the amount of damages, wherever he is liable over to the sheriff, and has been duly notified of the pendency of the action, and required to defend it.[1] This principle applies to all declarations of the under-officer, without regard to the time of making them. But in other cases, where the record is not evidence against the under-officer, his declarations seem to be admissible against the sheriff, only when they accompanied the act which he was then doing in his character of the sheriff's agent, and as part of the *res gestæ*,[2] or while the process was in his hands for service.[3] Upon the same general principle of identity in interest, the declarations of the creditor, who has indemnified the sheriff, are admissible in evidence against the latter in an action by a stranger for taking his goods.[4]

§ 584. (1.) Where the action is against the sheriff for *not serving mesne process*, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the *cause of action;* for which purpose any evidence is competent, which would be admissible in the suit against the debtor.[5] Hence, the acknowledgment of the debtor, that the debt is justly due, is admissible against the sheriff.[6] The plaintiff must also prove the *issuing of process*, and the *delivery* of it to the officer. If the process has been returned, the regular proof is by a copy; if not, its existence must be estab-

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 180, and note 8.

[2] Ibid. See also Vol. 1, § 113, 114; Bowsher *v.* Calley, 1 Campb. 391, n.; North *v.* Miles, Ibid. 389; Snowball *v.* Goodricke, 4 B. & Ad. 541.

[3] Jacobs *v.* Humphrey, 2 C. & M. 413; 4 Tyrw. 272, S. C.; Mott *v.* Kip, 10 Johns. 478; Mantz *v.* Collins, 4 H. & McHen. 216.

[4] Proctor *v.* Lainson, 7 C. & P. 629.

[5] Gunter *v.* Cleyton, 2 Lev. 85, approved in Alexander *v.* Macauley, 4 T. R. 611; Parker *v.* Fenn, 2 Esp. 477, note; Sloman *v.* Herne, Ibid. 695; Riggs *v.* Thatcher, 1 Greenl. 68.

[6] Gibbon *v.* Coggon, 2 Campb. 188; Williams *v.* Bridges, 2 Stark, 42; Sloman *v.* Herne, 2 Esp. 695; Kempland *v.* Macaulay, 4 T. R. 436; Dyke *v.* Aldridge, 7 T. R. 665.

lished by secondary evidence; and if it is traced to the officer's hands, he should be served with notice to produce it.[1] And here, and in all other cases, where the issuing of process is alleged, the allegation must be precisely proved, or the variance will be fatal.[2] Some evidence must also be given of the officer's *ability to execute* the process; such as, that he knew, or ought to have known, that the person against whom he held a *capias* was within his precinct; or, that goods, which he might and ought to have attached, were in the debtor's possession.[3] The averment of *neglect* of official duty, though negative, it seems ought to be supported by some proof on the part of the plaintiff, since a breach of duty is not presumed; but from the nature of the case, very slight evidence will be sufficient to devolve on the defendant the burden of proving that his duty has been performed.[4] The *damages* will at least be nominal, wherever any breach of duty is shown; and may be increased, according to the evidence.[5]

§ 585. In *defence* of actions of this description, where the suit is for neglecting to attach or seize goods, the sheriff may show, that there were reasonable doubts as to the ownership of the goods, and that the plaintiff refused to give him an indemnity for taking them;[6] or, that they did not belong to

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 521, 560.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 63, 64, 70, 73; Phillipson *v.* Mangles, 11 East, 516; Bevan *v.* Jones, 4 B. & C. 403; Bromfield *v.* Jones, Ibid. 380; Webb *v.* Herne, 1 B. & P. 281. See further, Stoddart *v.* Palmer, 4 D. & R. 624; 3 B. & C. 2; Lewis *v.* Alcock, 6 Dowl. P. C. 78.

[3] Beckford *v.* Montague, 2 Esp. 475; Frost *v.* Dougal, 1 Day, 128.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 78–81.

[5] Baker *v.* Green, 2 Bing. 317; Clifton *v.* Hooper, 8 Jur. 958; 6 Ad. & El. 468, N. S.; Williams *v.* Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145; Marzetti *v.* Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415. If the deputy-sheriff undertakes to receive the amount of the debt and costs, on mesne process, and stay the service of the writ, the sheriff is liable forthwith for the amount received, without any previous demand. Green *v.* Lowell, 3 Greenl. 373.

[6] Marsh *v.* Gold, 2 Pick. 975; Bond *v.* Ward, 7 Mass. 123; Perley *v.* Foster, 9 Mass. 112.

the debtor.[1] And where the neglect was in not serving a writ of execution, he may impeach the plaintiff's judgment by showing that it is founded in fraud;[2] first proving that he represents a judgment-creditor of the same debtor, by a legal precept in his hands.[3] He may also show, in defence of such action, that there were attachments on the same goods prior to that of the plaintiff, for which he stood liable to the attaching creditors, whose liens still existed, and that these would absorb the entire value of the goods.[4] And his return to a *fieri facias*, setting forth a valid excuse for not having sold the goods, such as, that they were casually destroyed by fire, or, that proceedings were stayed by a Judge's order, or the like, is *primâ facie* evidence of the fact, in his own favor.[5]

§ 586. (2.) As to the action for *taking insufficient pledges or bail.* Here also, though the allegation of the insufficiency of the sureties is negative in its terms, yet some evidence to support it must be produced by the plaintiff, though slight proof will suffice, the fact of their sufficiency being best known to the defendant, who took them;[6] and it is a legal maxim, that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it is in the power of one side to produce, and in the power of the other to contradict.[7] To establish the fact of the insufficiency of sureties, it is admissible to prove, that they have been pressed for payment of their debts by the importunity of creditors, and have violated their repeated promises to pay.[8] It is not necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove, that the sheriff knew the sureties to be insufficient; it is enough *primâ facie* to charge him, if it appears that

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1 Canada *v.* Southwick, 16 Pick. 556.

2 Pierce *v.* Jackson, 6 Mass. 242. But he cannot impeach it on any other ground. Adams *v.* Balch, 5 Greenl. 188.

3 Clark *v.* Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 296. See Post, § 593, 597.

4 Commercial Bank *v.* Wilkins, 9 Greenl. 28.

5 Browning *v.* Hanford, 7 Hill. N. Y. Rep. 120.

6 Saunders *v.* Darling, Bull. N. P, 60.

7 Per Ld. Mansfield, Cowp. 65.

8 Gwyllim *v.* Scholey, 6 Esp. 100.

they were in fact so at the time when he accepted them.[1] This liability the sheriff may avoid, by showing that they were at that time apparently responsible, and in good credit; or, that he exercised a reasonable and sound discretion in deciding upon their sufficiency; of which the Jury are to judge.[2] But their own statement to the sheriff as to their responsibility is not enough; though they are competent witnesses for him on the trial.[3] On the other hand, the plaintiff may show, that the sheriff had notice of their insufficiency, or did not act with due caution, under the circumstances of the case; or, that their pecuniary credit was low, in their own neighborhood.[4] And it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show, that he has taken any steps against the bail, in order to establish their insufficiency, as the fact may be proved by any other competent evidence.[5]

§ 587. (3.) As to the action for *not paying over money* levied and collected. The money in this case, as soon as it

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[1] Concanen *v.* Lethbridge, 2 H. Bl. 36; Evans *v.* Brander, Ibid. 547; Yea *v.* Lethbridge, 4 T. R. 433; Sparhawk *v.* Bartlett, 2 Mass. 188. If the officer accepts a forged bail bond, he is liable to the plaintiff, though he believed it to be genuine. Marsh *v.* Bancroft, 1 Met. 497.

[2] Hindle *v.* Blades, 5 Taunt. 225; Jeffery *v.* Bastard, 4 Ad. & El. 823; Sutton *v.* Waite, 8 Moore, 27.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Scott *v.* Waitham, 3 Stark. 168. Bail is still regulated by the Statute 23 Hen. 6, c. 10, which has always been recognized in the United States as Common Law. The first branch of this statute, for it consists of only one section, requires the sheriffs to "let out of prison all manner of persons arrested, or being in their custody, by force of any writ, bill, or warrant, in any action personal, or by cause of indictment of trespass, upon reasonable sureties of sufficient persons having sufficient within the counties where such persons be so let to bail or mainprise," &c. This clause was introduced for the benefit of the sheriff; and therefore though he may insist upon two sureties, yet he may admit to bail upon a bond with one surety only. 2 Saund. 61 *d*, note (5), by Williams. But where he takes but one surety, the sheriff is responsible for his solvency, at all events. Long *v.* Billings, 9 Mass. 479; Rice *v.* Hosmer, 12 Mass. 129, 130; Glezen *v.* Rood, 2 Met. 490; Sparhawk *v.* Bartlett, 2 Mass. 194.

[5] Young *v.* Hosmer, 11 Mass. 89.

comes into the officer's hands, is money had and received to the creditors's use ; and where the precept does not otherwise direct him, he is bound to pay it over to the creditor on the return day of the process under which it was levied, without any demand, and earlier if demanded ; upon failure of which an action lies.[1] The evidence on the part of the plaintiff consists of proof of the receipt of the money by the officer, and, where a demand is requisite, that it has been demanded. The most satisfactory proof of the receipt of the money is the officer's return on the writ of execution ; which is shown by an examined copy, if the precept has been returned, and by secondary evidence, if it has not. The return is conclusive evidence against the sheriff, that he has received the money ; but it does not prove, nor will it be presumed, that the money has been paid over to the creditor.[2] If the money was levied by an under-officer or bailiff, his connection with the sheriff must be established by farther evidence, as already has been stated.[3]

§ 588. In the *defence* of an action for this cause, the sheriff may show that the goods, out of which he made the money, were not the property of the judgment-debtor, but of a stranger to whom he is liable ; or, that the judgment-debtor had become bankrupt, and that the money belonged to his assignees ; and this, notwithstanding his return, that he had levied on the goods of the debtor.[4] He may also show, that the plaintiff had directed him to apply the money to another purpose, which he had accordingly done ;[5] or, that it was absorbed in the expenses of keeping the goods.[6] The amount

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[1] Dale *v.* Birch, 3 Campb. 347 ; Wilder *v.* Bailey, 3 Mass. 294, 295; Rogers *v.* Sumner, 10 Pick. 387 ; Longdill *v.* Jones, 1 Stark. 345. And see Morland *v.* Pellatt, 8 B. & C. 722, 725, 726, per. Bayley, J. ; Green *v.* Lowell, 3 Greenl. 373.

[2] Cator *v.* Stokes, 1 M. & S. 599.

[3] Ante, § 582; Wilson *v.* Norman, 1 Esp. 154 ; McNeil *v.* Perchard, Ibid. 263.

[4] Brydges *v.* Walford, 6 M. & S. 42 ; 1 Stark. 389, n.

[5] Comm'rs *v.* Allen, 2 Rep. Const. Court S. Car. 88.

[6] Twombly *v.* Hunewell, 2 Greenl. 221.

due to him for his collection fees or poundage is to be deducted from the gross amount in his hands.[1]

§ 589. (4.) In an action against the sheriff for an *escape*, the plaintiff must prove, first, his character of creditor; secondly, the delivery of the process to the officer; thirdly, the arrest; fourthly, the escape; and lastly, the damages or debt. If the escape was from an arrest upon *execution*, the plaintiff's *character of creditor* is proved by a copy of the judgment; and if the action is brought in *debt*, the plaintiff, by the Common Law, is entitled to recover the amount of the judgment, at all events, and without deduction, or regard to the circumstances of the debtor.[2] But where the action is brought in trespass on the case, as it must be where the arrest was upon *mesne process*, and it may be where the arrest was upon execution, the plaintiff must prove his debt, or cause of action, in the manner we have already stated, in actions for not serving process.[3] The *process* must be proved precisely as alleged, a material variance being fatal.[4] The *delivery* of the process to the officer will be proved by his return, if it has been returned; or by any other competent evidence, if it has not. The return of *cepi corpus* will be conclusive evidence of the *arrest;* and if there has been no return, the fact of arrest may be proved *aliunde*, and by parol.[5] The *escape* of the debtor is proved by any evidence, that he was seen at large after the arrest, for any time, however short, and even before the return of the writ.[6] The

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[1] Longdill *v.* Jones, 1 Stark. 346.

[2] Hawkins *v.* Plomer, 2 W. Bl. 1048; Porter *v.* Sayward, 7 Mass. 277. The Common Law has been altered in this particular, in some of the United States, by statutes, which provide, that in an action of debt for an escape, the plaintiff shall recover no more than such actual damage as he may prove that he has sustained.

[3] Ante, § 584.

[4] Ante, § 584, Vol. 1, 63, 64, 70, 73; Phillipson *v.* Mangles, 11 East, 516; Bromfield *v.* Jones, 4 B. & C. 380.

[5] Fairlie *v.* Birch, 3 Campb. 397.

[6] Hawkins *v.* Plomer, 2 W. Bl. 1048; 3 Com. Dig. 642-646, tit. Escape, C. D.

difficulty of defining the going at large, which constitutes an escape, has been felt and acknowledged by Judges.[1] Mr. Justice Buller said, that wherever the prisoner in execution is in a different custody from that which is likely to enforce payment of the debt, it is an escape;[2] which he illustrated by the case of a prisoner permitted to go to a horse-race, attended by a bailiff. And where a coroner having an execution against a deputy gaoler, arrested him, and left him in the gaol-house, neither the sheriff nor any other authorized person being there to receive him, it was held an escape in the sheriff; upon the principle, as laid down by Parsons, C. J., that every liberty given to a prisoner, not authorized by law, is an escape.[3] If the liberty was given through mistake, it seems it is still an escape;[4] but if he be taken from prison through necessity, and without his own agency, in case of sudden sickness, or go out for the preservation of life from danger by fire, and return as soon as he is able, it is not an escape.[5]

The damages in this case will hereafter be considered.

§ 590. The party escaping is a *competent witness* for either party, in an action for a voluntary escape, for he stands indifferent; but where the action is for a negligent escape, he is not a competent witness for the defendant, to disprove the escape, because he is liable over to the sheriff.[6] But though the count is for a voluntary escape, yet under it evidence of a negligent escape is admissible, for the substance of the issue is the escape, and not the manner.[7]

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[1] Per Eyre, C. J., 1 B. & P. 27.

[2] Benton *v.* Sutton, 1 B. & P. 24, 27.

[3] Colby *v.* Sampson, 5 Mass. 310, 312, per Parsons, C. J.

[4] See Call *v.* Hagger, 8 Mass. 429.

[5] Baxter *v.* Taber, 4 Mass. 361, 369; Cargil *v.* Taylor, 10 Mass. 207; 1 Roll. Abr. 808, pl. 5, 6.

[6] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 394, 404; Cass *v.* Cameron, 1 Peake, 124; Hunter *v.* King, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Sheriffs of Norwich *v.* Bradshaw, Cro. El. 53; Eyles *v.* Faikney, 1 Peake, 143, n.

[7] Bovey's case, 1 Ventr. 211, 217; Bonafous *v.* Walker, 2 T. R. 126.

§ 591. In *defence* of the action for an escape, the sheriff will not be permitted to show, that the process was irregularly issued; nor, that the judgment was erroneous; nor, that the plaintiff knew of the escape, yet proceeded in his action to judgment, and had not charged the debtor in execution, though he had returned to the prison;[1] nor, that the plaintiff had arrested the debtor upon a second writ, by another sheriff, and had discharged him without bail.[2] But under the general issue, he may show that the Court from which the process was issued had no jurisdiction of the matter, and that therefore the process was void.[3] He may also show, that before the expiration of the term in which the writ was returnable, but not afterwards, the debtor did put in and perfect bail, or that he had put in bail, and seasonably rendered himself in their discharge, though no bond was taken;[4] or that the prisoner, while going to gaol on mesne process, was rescued; but not if he was taken in execution.[5] So he may show, that the escape was by fraud and covin of the plaintiff in interest.[6] If he pleads that there was no escape, this is an admission of the arrest as alleged.[7]

§ 592. (5.) As to the action for a *false return*. In the case of a false return to *mesne process*, the plaintiff must prove the cause of action,[8] the issuing of the process, and the delivery of it to the officer, in the same manner as has already been shown, in the action for not serving mesne process. If it was a writ of *execution*, he should produce a copy of the judgment, and prove the issuing of the execution; of which the clerk's certificate in the margin of the record is usually received as sufficient evidence. The officer's *return* must, in

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[1] Bull. N. P. 66, 69.

[2] Woodman *v.* Gist, 2 Jur. 942.

[3] Bull. N. P. 65, 66.

[4] Pariente *v.* Plumtree, 2 B. & P. 35; Moses *v.* Norris, 4 M. & S. 397.

[5] May *v.* Proby, Cro. Jac. 419; 1 Stra. 435; Bull. N. P. 68.

[6] Hiscocks *v.* Jones, 1 M. & Malk. 269. See also Doe *v.* Trye, 5 Bing. N. C. 573.

[7] Bull. N. P. 67.

[8] See Parker *v.* Fenn, 2 Esp. 477, n.

either case, be shown, and some evidence must be adduced of its falsity ; but slight, or *primâ facie* evidence of its falsity will be sufficient to put the sheriff upon proof of the truth of his return ; such, for example, as showing the execution-debtor to be in possession of goods and chattels, without proving the property to be in him, when the sheriff is sued for falsely making a return of *nulla bona*.[1] If the sheriff has omitted to seize the goods, in consequence of receiving an indemnity, the controversy being upon the title of the debtor, the plaintiff must be prepared with evidence of the debtor's property. And if the process was against several, and the allegation is, that they had goods which might have been seized, the allegation, being severable, will be supported by proof, that any one of them had such goods.[2]

§ 593. In the *defence* of the action for a false return of *nulla bona* to a writ of execution, the sheriff may show that the plaintiff assented to the return, after being informed of all the circumstances ; [3] or, where part of the money only was levied, that the plaintiff accepted that part with intent to waive all further remedy against the sheriff, and with full knowledge of the facts ;[4] or, that the plaintiff has lost his priority, by ordering the levy of his execution to be stayed, another writ having been delivered to the sheriff ;[5] or, that the first levy, for not returning which the action is brought,

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[1] Magne *v.* Seymour, 5 Wend. 309. And see Stubbs *v.* Lainson, 1 M. & W. 728. The judgment-debtor is a competent witness against the sheriff, in an action for a false return of *nulla bona*. Taylor *v.* The Commonwealth, 3 Bibb, 356.

[2] Jones *v.* Clayton, 4 M. & S. 349.

[3] Stuart *v.* Whitaker, 2 C. & P. 100.

[4] Beynon *v.* Garratt, 1 C. & P. 154. Here, the officer levied a part, and returned *nulla bona* as to the residue, and the plaintiff accepted the part levied ; which was held to be a waiver of all further claim on the sheriff, the plaintiff *having been previously advised that it would have that effect*. *Sed quære*, and see Holmes *v.* Clifton, 10 Ad. & El. 673, where it was held, that the mere receipt of the money levied will be no bar to the action.

[5] Smallcomb *v.* Cross, 1 Ld. Raym. 251; Kempland *v.* Macauley, 1 Peake, 65.

was fraudulently made, and so void;[1] or, that the plaintiff's judgment was entered up by fraud and collusion with the debtor, the sheriff first proving that he represents another creditor of the same debtor, by showing a legal precept in his hands.[2] He may also show, that the goods of the debtor were absorbed by a prior execution in his hands; and in such case, the plaintiff may rebut this evidence, by proving that the prior execution was concocted in fraud, and that the sheriff had previous notice thereof, and was required by the plaintiff not to pay over the proceeds to the prior creditor.[3] He may also prove, that the debtor had previously become bankrupt, for which purpose the petitioning creditor is a competent witness to prove his own debt; the commission being otherwise proved.[4] And if the assignees are the real defendants, the plaintiff may give in evidence, the petitioning creditor's declarations in disparagement of his claim, though he has not been called as a witness by the defendant.[5]

§ 594. In answer to the defence of *nulla bona*, founded on an alleged sale and assignment of his goods by the debtor, the plaintiff may prove that the assignment or sale was fraudulent.[6] So, if the sheriff defends his return on the ground, that the debtor was an ambassador's domestic servant, the plaintiff, in reply, may show that his appointment was colorable and illegal.[7] Questions of this sort, though extremely embarrassing to the sheriff, the Common Law ordinarily obliges him to determine at his peril; but where there are reasonable doubts as to the property of the debtor

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[1] Bradley *v.* Windham, 1 Wils. 44.

[2] Clark *v.* Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 296; 7 Greenl. 348. And see Turvil *v.* Tipper, Latch, 222, admitted in Tyler *v.* Duke of Leeds, 2 Stark. 218, and in Harrod *v.* Benton, 8 B. & C. 217. See also Pierce *v.* Jackson, 6 Mass. 242; Ante, § 585.

[3] Warmoll *v.* Young, 5 B. & C. 660.

[4] Wright *v.* Lainson, 2 M. & W. 739. And see Brydges *v.* Walford, 6 M. & S. 42.

[5] Dowden *v.* Fowle, 4 Campb. 38.

[6] Dewey *v.* Bayntun, 6 East, 257.

[7] Delvalle *v.* Plomer, 3 Campb. 47.

in the goods in his possession, or which the sheriff is directed to seize, or in regard to the lawfulness of an arrest, he may refuse to act until he is indemnified by the creditor.[1] By the Common Law, he might also apply to the Court to enlarge the time for making his return, until an indemnity was given.[2] Where he is entitled to an inquisition to ascertain whether the property in goods seized on execution is in the debtor or not, the finding is not conclusive for him; and in England it has been held inadmissible in his favor, unless upon an issue whether he has acted maliciously;[3] but in the United States, it has been admitted in evidence, and held conclusive in his favor, in an action by the creditor for a false return of *nulla bona*, where he acted in good faith;[4] though it is no justification, but is only admissible in mitigation of damages, in an action of trespass by the true owner of the goods, for illegally taking them.[5]

§ 595. Where the action is for *refusing to take bail*, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the arrest, the offer of sufficient bail, and the commitment. And it is not for the sheriff to say, that the plaintiff did not tender a bail bond; for it was his own duty to prepare the bond, though the party arrested is liable to pay him for so doing.[6]

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[1] Bond *v.* Ward, 7 Mass. 123; Marsh *v.* Gold, 2 Pick. 285; Perley *v.* Foster, 9 Mass. 112, 114; Pierce *v.* Partridge, 3 Met. 44; King *v.* Bridges, 7 Taunt. 294; Shaw *v.* Tunbridge, 2 W. Bl. 1064.

[2] Watson on Sheriffs, p. 195; Sewell on Sheriffs, p. 285. In England, by the interpleader act, 1 & 2 W. 4, ch. 58, a summary mode is provided for the speedy determination of such questions. In some of the United States, there are statutory provisions for the like purpose, and for the sheriff's protection; but in others, where the Court has no power to enlarge the time of return, it being fixed by statute, it is conceived that the refusal of the party to indemify the sheriff, in a case of reasonable doubt in regard to the service of process, would afford him a good defence to the action, or, at least, would reduce the damages to a nominal sum.

[3] Latkow *v.* Eamer, 2 H. Bl. 437; Glossop *v.* Poole, 3 M. & S. 175; Farr *v.* Newman, 4 T. R. 633; Sewell on Sheriffs, p. 243; Watson on Sheriffs, p. 198.

[4] Bayley *v.* Bates, 8 Johns. 185.

[5] Townsend *v.* Phillips, 10 Johns. 98.

[6] Millne *v.* Wood, 5 C. & P. 587.

§ 596. (6.) The sheriff is also liable to an action for *extortion;* which consists in the unlawful taking, by color of his office, either in money or other valuable thing, of what is not due, or before it is due, or of more than is due. If the money levied is not sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, the retaining of any part, which ought to have been paid over to the plaintiff, is an indirect receiving and taking from him.[1] In this action, the principal points to be proved by the plaintiff are, (1.) the process; and if it be an execution, he must prove the judgment also, on which it issued, if it is stated, though unnecessarily, in the declaration;[2] (2.) the connection between the officer and the sheriff who is sued; and (3.) the act of extortion. The evidence to prove the two former of these points has already been considered.[3] The last is made out by any competent evidence of the amount paid, beyond the sum allowed by law.

§ 597. (7.) Where the action against the sheriff is for *taking the goods of the plaintiff*, he being a stranger to the process, the controversy is usually upon the validity of the plaintiff's title as derived from the judgment debtor, which is impeached on the ground, that the sale or assignment by the debtor to the plaintiff was fraudulent and void as against creditors. Here, if the plaintiff has never had possession of the goods, so that the sale, whatever it was, is incomplete, for want of delivery, the proof of this fact alone will suffice to defeat the action. But if the transaction was completed in all the forms of law, and is assailable only on the ground of fraud, the sheriff must first entitle himself to impeach it, by showing, that he represents a prior creditor of the debtor; and this is done by any evidence, which would establish this fact in an action by the creditor against the debtor himself, with the additional proof of the process in the sheriff's hands, in favor of that creditor, under which the goods were seized.

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[1] Buckle *v.* Bewes, 3 B. & C. 688.

[2] Savage *v.* Smith, 2 W. Bl. 1101, explained in 5 T. R. 498.

[3] See Ante, § 582, 584.

This evidence has already been considered, in treating of actions for not executing process, and for an escape.[1] It is only necessary here to add, that, when the sheriff justifies under final process, he need not show its return, unless some ulterior proceeding is requisite to complete the justification; for, being final, and executed, the creditor has had the effect of his judgment; but in the case of mesne process, as the object of the writ is to enforce the appearance of the party, and to lay the foundation of further proceedings, the officer will not be permitted to justify under it, after it is returnable, unless he shows that he has fully obeyed it, in making a return.[2] The proofs in regard to fraud are considered as foreign to the designs of this work.[3]

§ 598. In regard to the *competency of witnesses* for and against the sheriff, in addition to what has already been stated respecting his deputies and the execution creditor,[4] it may here further be observed, that, where the issue is upon a fraudulent conveyance by the judgment debtor, his declarations, made at the time of the conveyance, are admissible as part of the *res gestæ;* and that, where the question is wholly between his own vendee and the attaching creditor, his interest being balanced, he is a competent witness for either party;[5] but where a question remains between him and his vendee, as to the title, he is not a competent witness for the sheriff, to impeach it.[6] A surety is a competent

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[1] Ante, § 584, 589. And see Martyn *v.* Podger, 5 Burr. 2631, 2633; Lake *v.* Billers, 1 Ld. Raym. 733; Ackworth *v.* Kempe, 1 Doug. 40; Damon *v.* Bryant, 2 Pick. 411; Glasier *v.* Eve, 1 Bing. 209. The recital of the writ, in the sheriff's warrant to his officer, is some evidence of the precept in his hands. Bessey *v.* Windham, 6 Ad. & El. 166, N. S.

[2] Rowland *v.* Veale, Cowp. 18; Cheasley *v.* Barnes, 10 East, 73; Freeman *v.* Bluett, 1 Salk. 410; 1 Ld. Raym. 633, 634; Clark *v.* Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 296.

[3] See Roberts on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 542 – 590, 2 Kent, Comm. 532 – 536, where this subject is fully treated.

[4] Ante, § 583, 593.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 397, 398.

[6] Bland *v.* Ansley, 2 New Rep. 331. In this case, the debtor had sold a house to the plaintiff, but whether he sold the goods in it also, was a matter

witness for the sheriff, in an action for taking insufficient sureties.[1] The owner of goods, who has forcibly rescued them out of the sheriff's hands, is also a competent witness for the sheriff, in an action for falsely returning *nulla bona* on an execution; for such return precludes the sheriff from maintaining an action against him for the rescue.[2]

§ 599. The *damages* to be recovered in an action against the sheriff will, in general, be commensurate with the extent of the injury. But in debt, for an escape on execution, the measure of damages is the amount of the judgment, without abatement on account of the poverty of the debtor, or any other circumstances.[3] And where the sheriff has falsely returned bail, when he took none, and an action is brought against him for refusing to deliver over the bail bond to the creditor, he is liable for the whole amount of the judgment, and cannot show, in mitigation of damages, that the debtor was unable to pay any part of the debt; for this would be no defence for the bail themselves, and the sheriff, by his false return, has placed himself in their situation.[4] But in other cases, though the judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the debtor is *primâ facie* evidence of the extent of the injury, which the plaintiff has sustained by the officer's breach of duty in regard to the service and return of the process, yet it is competent for the officer to prove, in mitigation of the injury, any facts showing that the plaintiff has suffered

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in dispute between them; and he was therefore held incompetent to testify in favor of his own claim.

[1] 1 Saund. 195 *f*, note by Williams.

[2] Thomas *v.* Pearse, 5 Price, 517.

[3] Hawkins *v.* Plomer, 2 W. Bl. 1048; Alsept *v.* Eyles, 2 H. Bl. 108, 113; Ante, § 589; Bernard *v.* The Commonwealth, 4 Litt. R. 150; Johnson *v.* Lewis, 1 Dana, 183; Shewell *v.* Fell, 3 Yeates, 17; 4 Yeates, 47. Interest, from the date of the writ, may also be computed. Whitehead *v.* Varnum, 14 Pick. 523. In some of the United States, the rule of the Common Law, that the whole sum must be given, has been altered by statutes abolishing the action of debt for an escape; and the rule is never applied, in any State, to an action of debt upon the sheriff's bond.

[4] Simmons *v.* Bradford, 15 Mass. 82.

nothing or but little, by his *unintentional* default or breach of duty.[1] The Jury may give more than the amount of the judgment, if they believe that the wrong was wilful on the part of the officer, by adding to it the incidental expenses of the plaintiff, and the costs not taxable. On the other hand, if it should be apparent that the wrong done by the officer was not the result of a design to injure, and that by it the plaintiff is not placed in a worse situation than he would have been in, had the officer done his duty, the Jury will be at liberty, and it will be their duty, to see that a humane or mistaken officer is not made to pay greater damages than the party has actually suffered by his wrong.[2] In cases, therefore, of the latter description, the sheriff has been permitted to show, in mitigation of damages, that the debtor was poor, and unable to pay the debt ;[3] or, that he might still be arrested as easily as before, the sheriff having omitted to arrest him while sick and afflicted ;[4] or that, for any other reason, the plaintiff has not been damnified.[5] If the action is for an escape on mesne process, and the sheriff afterwards had the debtor in custody, the plaintiff cannot maintain the action, without proof of actual damages.[6] In the action for taking insufficient sureties, the plaintiff can recover no more against the sheriff, than he could have recovered against the sureties.[7]

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[1] Evans *v.* Manero, 7 M. & W. 463, 473, per Ld. Abinger, C. B. ; Williams *v.* Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145. And see Weld *v.* Bartlett, 10 Mass. 470; Gerrish *v.* Edson, 1 New Hamp. 82 ; Burrell *v.* Lithgow, 2 Mass. 526 ; Smith *v.* Hart, 2 Bay, 395.

[2] Weld *v.* Bartlett, 10 Mass. 470, 473, per Parker, J.

[3] Brooks *v.* Hoyt, 6 Pick. 468.

[4] Weld *v.* Bartlett, 10 Mass. 470.

[5] Baker *v.* Green, 2 Bing. 317; Potter *v.* Lansing, 1 Johns. 215 ; Russell *v.* Turner, 7 Johns. 189 ; Young *v.* Hosmer, 11 Mass. 89 ; Nye *v.* Smith, Ibid. 188 ; Eaton *v.* Ogier, 2 Greenl. 46.

[6] Planck *v.* Anderson, 5 T. R. 37, confirmed in Williams *v.* Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145, 154, where Baker *v.* Green, 2 Bing. 317, is, as to this point, overruled. See also Bales *v.* Wingfield, 4 Ad. & El. 580, N. S.

[7] Evans *v.* Brander, 2 H. Bl. 547, confirmed in Baker *v.* Garratt, 3 Bing. 56.

TENDER.

§ 600. The plea of *tender* admits the existence and validity of the debt or duty, insisting only on the fact, that there has been an offer to pay or perform it. And though the contract be one which the statute of frauds requires to be in writing, yet the plea of tender dispenses with the necessity of proving it.[1] The general proposition maintained in the plea is, that the defendant has done all that was in the power of any debtor alone to do, towards the fulfilment of his obligation; leaving nothing to be done towards its completion, but the act of acceptance on the part of the creditor. If the tender was of money, it is pleaded with an averment, that the defendant was always and still is ready to pay it, and the money is produced in Court. But if the obligation was for the delivery of specific chattels, other than money, a plea of the tender alone, without an averment of subsequent readiness to perform, is sufficient; the rule requiring only the averment of an offer and readiness to do that, which is a discharge of the obligation.[2]

§ 601. To support the issue of a tender of *money*, it is necessary for the defendant to show, that the precise sum,[3] or more, was actually produced, in current money, such as is made a legal tender by statute, and actually offered to the plaintiff.[4] But if a tender is made in bank notes it is good,

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[1] Middleton *v.* Brewer, 1 Peake, 15.

[2] 2 Roll. Abr. 523; Tout temps prist, A. pl. 1, 3, 5; Carley *v.* Vance, 17 Mass. 392.

[3] A tender of part of an entire demand is inoperative. Dixon *v.* Clark, 5 C. B. 365; 5 Dowl. & L. 155.

[4] The current money of the United States, which is made a legal tender by statute, consists of all the gold and silver coins of the United States; together with Spanish milled dollars and their parts, at the rate of one hun-

if the want of its being in current coins is waived; and if the creditor places his refusal to receive the money on some other ground, or even if he makes no objection to the tender on the express ground that it is in bank notes, it is held a waiver of this objection.[1] So, if the tender is made in a bank check, which is refused because it is not drawn for so much as the creditor demands, it is a good tender.[2]

§ 602. It must also appear, that the money, or other thing tendered, was *actually produced* to the creditor. It must be in sight, and capable of immediate delivery, to show that, if the creditor were willing to accept it, it was ready to be paid.[3] If it be in bags, held under the party's arm, and not laid on the table or otherwise actually offered to the creditor, it is not sufficient.[4] And if it be in the debtor's hand, and

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dred cents for a dollar weighing not less than seventeen pennyweights and seven grains; the dollars of Mexico, Peru, Chili, and Central America, of not less weight than four hundred and fifteen grains each, at the same rate; those re-stamped in Brazil, of the like weight, of not less fineness than ten ounces and fifteen pennyweights of pure silver to the pound troy of twelve ounces of standard silver; and the five franc pieces of France, of not less fineness than ten ounces and sixteen pennyweights of pure silver to the like pound troy, and weighing not less than three hundred and eighty-four grains each, at ninety-three cents each. Stat. 1837, ch. 3, § 9, 10; Stat. 1834, ch. 71, § 1; Stat. 1806, ch. 22, § 2. Foreign gold coins ceased to be a legal tender, after November 1, 1819, by Stat. 1819, ch. 507, § 1. Copper cents and half-cents are established as part of the currency, and by implication made a legal tender, by Stat. 1792, ch. 39, § 2. A tender of the creditor's own promissory note, due to the debtor, is not good. Cary *v.* Bancroft, 14 Pick. 315; Hallowell & Augusta Bank *v.* Howard, 13 Mass. 235.

[1] Right *v.* Reed, 3 T. R. 554; Snow *v.* Perry, 9 Pick. 542; Brown *v.* Saul, 4 Esp. 267; Polglase *v.* Oliver, 2 C. & J. 15; Warren *v.* Mains, 7 Johns. 476; Towson *v.* Havre De Grace Bank, 6 H. & J. 53; Coxe *v.* State Bank, 3 Halst. 72; Bank of the United States *v.* Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333.

[2] Jones *v.* Arthur, 4 Jur. 859; 8 Dowl. P. C. 442, S. C.

[3] Thomas *v.* Evans, 10 East, 101; Glasscott *v.* Day, 5 Esp. 48; Dickinson *v.* Shee, 4 Esp. 68; Bakeman *v.* Pooler, 15 Wend. 637; Kraus *v.* Arnold, 7 Moore, 59; Breed *v.* Hurd, 6 Pick. 356; Newton *v.* Galbraith, 5 Johns. 119.

[4] Bull. N. P. 155; Wade's case, 5 Co. 115.

the sum is declared, and it is offered by way of tender, it is good, though it be in bank notes, twisted in a roll, and not displayed to the creditor.[1] But if the sum is not declared,[2] or the party says he will pay so much, putting his hand in his pocket to take it, but before he can produce it the creditor leaves the room;[3] it is not a good tender. Great importance is attached to the production of the money, as the sight of it might tempt the creditor to yield, and accept it.[4]

§ 603. The *production* of the money is *dispensed with*, if the party is ready and willing to pay the sum, and is about to produce it, but is prevented by the creditor's declaring that he will not receive it.[5] But his bare refusal to receive the sum proposed, and demanding more, is not alone sufficient to excuse an actual tender.[6] The money or other things must be actually at hand and ready to be produced immediately, if it should be accepted; as, for example, if it be in the next room, or up stairs; for if it be a mile off, or can be borrowed and produced in five minutes, or being a bank check, it be not yet actually drawn, it is not sufficient.[7] The question whether the production of the money has been dispensed with, is a question for the Jury; and if they find the facts specially, but do not find the fact of dispensation, the Court will not infer it.[8]

§ 604. If the debtor *tendered a greater sum* than was due,

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[1] Alexander *v.* Brown, 1 C. & P. 288.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Leatherdale *v.* Sweepstone, 3 C. & P. 342.

[4] Finch *v.* Brook, 1 Bing. N. C. 253, per Vaughan, J.

[5] Black *v.* Smith, 1 Peake, 88; Read *v.* Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86; Barker *v.* Packenhorn, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 142; Calhoun *v.* Vechio, 3 Wash. 165; Blight *v.* Ashley, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 15; Slingerland *v.* Morse, 8 Johns. 474.

[6] Dunham *v.* Jackson, 6 Wend. 22.

[7] Harding *v.* Davies, 2 C. &. P. 77; Dunham *v.* Jackson, 6 Wend. 22, 33, 34; Breed *v.* Hurd, 6 Pick. 356. And see Searight *v.* Calbraith, 4 Dall. 325, 327; Fuller *v.* Little, 7 N. Hamp. 535; Brown *v.* Gilmore, 8 Greenl. 107.

[8] Finch *v.* Brook, 1 Bing. N. C. 253.

it must appear that it was so made, as that the creditor might take therefrom the sum that was actually due to him; as, if twenty dollars were tendered, when only fifteen were due; or else it must appear that the debtor remitted the excess.[1] And therefore it has been held, that, where the tender is to be made in bank notes, a tender of a larger note than the sum due, is bad.[2] But if the creditor does not object to it on that account, but only demands a larger sum, the tender will be good, though the debtor asked for change.[3]

§ 605. It must also appear, that the tender was *absolute;* for if it be coupled with a condition, as, for example, if a larger sum than is due be offered, and the creditor be required to return the change;[4] or if the sum be offered in full of all demands;[5] or if it be on condition, that the creditor will give a receipt or a release;[6] or if it be offered by way of boon, with a denial that any debt is due;[7] or if any other terms be added, which the acceptance of the money would cause the other party to admit, the tender is not good.[8] But if the

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[1] Wade's case, 5 Co. 115; Douglass *v.* Patrick, 3 T. R. 683; Hubbard *v.* Chenango Bank, 8 Cowen, 88, 101; Dean *v.* James, 4 B. & Ad. 546; Bevan *v.* Rees, 7 Dowl. P. C. 510; Thorpe *v.* Burgess, 4 Jur. 799; 8 Dowl. P. C. 603.

[2] Betterbee *v.* Davis, 3 Campb. 70.

[3] Black *v.* Smith, 1 Peake, 88; Saunders *v.* Graham, Gow, 121; Cadman *v.* Lubbock, 5 D. & R. 289.

[4] Robinson *v.* Cook, 6 Taunt. 336; Betterbee *v.* Davis, 3 Campb. 70.

[5] Sutton *v.* Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 259; Mitchell *v.* King, 6 C. & P. 237; Cheminant *v.* Thornton, 2 C. & P. 50; Strong *v.* Harvey, 3 Bing. 304; Evans *v.* Judkins, 4 Campb. 156; Wood *v.* Hitchcock, 20 Wend. 47; Robinson *v.* Ferreday, 8 C. & P. 752.

[6] Ryder *v.* Ld. Townsend, 7 D. & R. 119, per Bayley, J.; Laing *v.* Meader, 1 C. & P. 257; Griffith *v.* Hodges, Ibid. 419; Thayer *v.* Brackett, 12 Mass. 450; Glasscott *v.* Day, 5 Esp. 48; Loring *v.* Cook, 3 Pick. 48; Hepburn *v.* Auld, 1 Cranch, 321; Higham *v.* Baddely, Gow, 213. But see Richardson *v.* Jackson, 8 M. & W. 298; Finch *v.* Miller, 5 C. B. 428.

[7] Simmons *v.* Wilmott, 3 Esp. 94, per Ld. Eldon.

[8] Hastings *v.* Thorley, 8 C. & P. 573, per Ld. Abinger; Huxham *v.* Smith, 2 Campb. 21; Jennings *v.* Major, 8 C. & P. 61; Brown *v.* Gilmore, 8 Greenl. 107. But if the condition be, that the creditor shall do an act, which he is bound by law to do upon payment of the money, it is a good

creditor places his refusal to receive the money on some other ground than because it is coupled with a condition, this is evidence of a waiver of that objection, to be considered by the Jury ;[1] whose province it is to decide, whether a tender was made conditionally, or not.[2] If there be several debts, due from divers persons to the same creditor, and a gross sum be tendered for all the debts, this is not a good tender for any one of them.[3] But if there be several creditors, who are all present, and the debtor tenders a gross sum to them all, sufficient to satisfy all their demands, which they all refuse, insisting that more is due, it is a good tender to each one.[4]

§ 606. The tender must be *made to the creditor* himself, or to his *agent*, *clerk*, *attorney* or *servant*, who has authority to receive the money.[5] A tender to the attorney at law, to whom the demand has been entrusted for collection, or to his clerk or other person having charge of his office and business in his absence, is good, unless the attorney disclaims his authority at the time.[6] And generally, if a tender be made to a person whom the creditor permits to occupy his

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tender. Saunders *v.* Frost, 5 Pick. 259, 270. A tender made "under protest," is absolute, and a good tender. Manning *v.* Lunn, 2 C. & K. 13. So, if a tender is made as the whole that is due, it is sufficient. Henwood *v.* Oliver, 1 Ad. & El. 409, N. S.; Bull *v.* Parker, 2 Dowl. 345, N. S.; Bowen *v.* Owen, 11 Jur. 972, 11 Ad. & El. 130, N.S.

[1] Ante, § 601, 604; Richardson *v.* Jackson, 8 M. & W. 298; 9 Dowl. P. C. 715, S. C.; Eckstein *v.* Reynolds, 7 Ad. & El. 80; Cole *v.* Blake, 1 Peake, 179.

[2] Marsden *v.* Goode, 2 C. & K. 133; Eckstein *v.* Reynolds, 7 Ad. & El. 80.

[3] Strong *v.* Harvey, 3 Bing. 304.

[4] Black *v.* Smith, 1 Peake, 88.

[5] Goodland *v.* Blewith, 1 Campb. 477. If the clerk or servant is directed not to receive the money, because his master has left the demand with an attorney for collection, still the tender to him is a good tender to the principal. Moffat *v.* Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307.

[6] Wilmot *v.* Smith, 3 C. & P. 453; Crozer *v.* Pilling, 4 B. & C. 29; Bingham *v.* Allport, 1 Nev. & Man. 398. It is not necessary to tender also the amount of the attorney's charge for a letter to the debtor, demanding payment. Kirton *v.* Braithwaite, 1 M. & W. 310.

place of business, in the apparent character of his clerk or agent, it is a good tender to the creditor.[1] So, if it is sent by the debtor's house servant, who delivers it to a servant in the creditor's house, by whom it is taken in, and an answer returned as from the master, this is admissible evidence to the Jury, in proof of a tender.[2]

§ 607. As to the *time of tender*, it must in all cases, by the Common Law, be made at the time the money became due; a tender made after the party has broken his contract being too late, and therefore not pleadable in bar of the action;[3] though it stops the interest, and, by leave of Court, the money may be brought in upon the common rule. But where the defendant is not *in morâ*, as, for example, if no day of payment was agreed upon, and the money has not been demanded, or if amends are to be offered for an involuntary trespass, proof of a tender, made at any time before the suit is commenced, is sufficient to support the plea of tender.[4] In the case of damage-feasant, a tender is good, if made at any time before the beasts are impounded, though it be after they were distrained.[5]

§ 608. The plaintiff may avoid the plea of a tender of money, by replying a *subsequent demand and refusal;* the burden of proving which, if traversed, lies upon him. And he must show, that the demand was made of the precise sum

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[1] Barrett *v.* Deere, 1 M. & M. 200.

[2] Anon. 1 Esp. 349.

[3] Hume *v.* Peploe, 8 East, 168, 170; City Bank *v.* Cutter, 3 Pick. 414, 418; Suffolk Bank *v.* Worcester Bank, 5 Pick. 108; Dewey *v.* Humphrey, Ibid. 187; Giles *v.* Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 254; Savery *v.* Goe, 3 Wash. 140; Gould *v.* Banks, 8 Wend. 562. Aliter in Connecticut. Tracy *v.* Strong, 2 Conn. 659. In several of the United States, provision has been made by statute for a tender of the debt and costs, even after action brought. Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 100, § 14, 15; Rev. Stat. Maine, p. 767. And see Hay *v.* Ousterout, 3 Ham. Ohio, 585.

[4] Watts *v.* Baker, Cro. Car. 264.

[5] Pilkington *v.* Hastings, Cro. El. 813; The Six Carpenters' case, 8 Co. 147.

mentioned in the replication, a variance herein being fatal.[1] He must also prove, that the demand was made either by himself in person, or by some one, authorized to receive the money and give a discharge for it.[2] A demand made by letter, to which an answer, promising payment, was returned, was in one case held sufficient;[3] but this has since been doubted, on the ground, that the demand ought to be so made as to afford the debtor an opportunity of immediate compliance with it.[4] If there be two joint debtors, proof of a demand made upon one of them will support the allegation of a demand upon both.[5]

§ 609. *Specific articles* are to be delivered at some particular *place*, and not, like money, to the person of the creditor wherever found. If no place is expressly mentioned in the contract, the place is to be ascertained by the intent of the parties, to be collected from the nature of the case and its circumstances.[6] If the contract is for the delivery of goods from the vendor to the vendee on demand, the vendor being the manufacturer of the goods, or a dealer in them, and no place being expressly named, the manufactory or store of the vendor will be understood to be the place intended, and a tender there will be good. And if the specific articles are at another place at the time of sale, the place where they are at that time is generally to be taken as the place of delivery.[7] But where the contract is for the payment of a debt in specific articles which are *portable*, such as cattle, and the like, at a time certain, but without any designation of the place, in the absence of other circumstances from which the intent

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[1] Rivers *v.* Griffiths, 5 B. & Ald. 630; Spybey *v.* Hide, 1 Campb. 181; Coore *v.* Callaway, 1 Esp. 115.

[2] Coles *v.* Bell, 1 Campb. 478, n.; Coore *v.* Callaway, 1 Esp. 115, Ante, § 606.

[3] Hayward *v.* Hague, 4 Esp. 93.

[4] Edwards *v.* Yeates, Ry. & M. 360.

[5] Peirse *v.* Bowles, 1 Stark. 323.

[6] 2 Kent, Comm. 505, 506; Poth. Obl. No. 512; Goodwin *v.* Holbrook, 4 Wend. 377; Howard *v.* Miner, 2 Applet. 325.

[7] Ibid.

of the parties can be collected, the creditor's place of abode at the date of the obligation will be understood as the place of payment.[1] And on the same principle of intention, a note given by a farmer, payable in "*farm produce*," without any designation of time or place, is payable at the debtor's farm. Indeed the same rule governs, in the case of a similar obligation to pay or deliver any other portable specific articles on demand; for the obligation being to be performed on demand, this implies that the creditor must go to the debtor to make the demand, before the latter can be in default.[2] But wherever specific articles are tendered, if they are part of a larger quantity, they should be so designated and set apart, as that the creditor may see and know what is offered to be his own.[3]

§ 610. If the goods are *cumbrous*, and the place of delivery is not designated, nor to be inferred from collateral circumstances, the presumed intention is, that they were to be delivered at any place which the creditor might reasonably appoint; and accordingly, it is the duty of the debtor to call upon the creditor, if he is within the State, and request him to appoint a place for the delivery of the goods. If the creditor refuses, or, which is the same in effect, names an unreasonable place, or avoids, in order to prevent the notice, the right of election is given to the debtor; whose duty it is to deliver the articles at a reasonable and convenient place, giving previous notice thereof to the creditor if practicable. And if the creditor refuses to accept the goods when properly tendered, or is absent at the time, the property, nevertheless, passes to him, and the debtor is forever absolved from the obligation.[4]

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[1] Ibid.; Chipman on Contracts, p. 24, 25, 26; Goodwin *v.* Holbrook, 4 Wend. 377, 380.

[2] 2 Kent, Comm. 508; Chipman on Contracts, p. 28, 29, 30, 49; Lobdell *v.* Hopkins, 5 Cowen, 516; Goodwin *v.* Holbrook, 4 Wend. 380.

[3] Veazy *v.* Harmony, 7 Greenl. 91.

[4] 2 Kent, Comm. 507, 508, 509; Co. Lit. 210, *b.*; Aldrich *v.* Albee, 1 Greenl. 120; Howard *v.* Miner, 2 Applet. R. 325; Chipman on Contracts, p. 51–56; Lamb *v.* Lathrop, 13 Wend. 95. Whether if the

§ 611. By the Roman Law, where the house or shop of the creditor was designated or ascertained as the intended place of payment, and the creditor afterwards and before payment changed his domicil or place of business to another town or place, less convenient to the debtor, the creditor was permitted to require payment at his new domicil or place, making compensation to the debtor for the increased expense and trouble thereby caused to him. But by the law of France, the debtor may in such case require the creditor to nominate another place, equally convenient to the debtor; and on his neglecting so to do, he may himself appoint one; according to the rule, that *nemo, alterius facto, prægravari debet.*[1] Whether, in the case of articles not portable, but cumbrous, such removal of domicil may, at Common Law, be considered as a waiver of the place, at the election of the debtor, does not appear to have been expressly decided.[2]

§ 611 *a.* In regard to the *manner of tender of goods*, it is well settled that a tender of goods does not mean an offer of packages containing them; but an offer of those packages, under such circumstances that the person, who is to pay for the goods, shall have an opportunity afforded him, before he is called upon to part with his money, of seeing that those, presented for his acceptance, are in reality those for which he has bargained.[3]

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creditor is out of the State, no place of delivery having been agreed upon, this circumstance gives to the debtor the right of appointing the place, *quære;* and see Bixby *v.* Whitney, 5 Greenl. 192; in which, however, the reporter's marginal note seems to state the doctrine a little broader than the decision requires, it not being necessary for the plaintiff, in that case, to aver any readiness to receive the goods, at any place, as the contract was for the payment of a sum of money, in specific articles, on or before a day certain.

[1] Poth. on Oblig. No. 238, 239, 513.

[2] See Howard *v.* Miner, 2 Applet. R. 325, 330.

[3] Isherwood *v.* Whitmore, 11 M. & W. 347, 350. And see 10 M. & W. 757, S. C.

TRESPASS.

§ 612. The evidence in actions of trespass against the person having already been considered, under the head of Assault and Battery, it remains in this place to treat of the evidence applicable to actions of trespass upon property, whether real or personal.

§ 613. Though the right of *property* may and often does come in controversy in this action, yet the *gist* of the action is the injury done to the plaintiff's *possession*. The substance of the declaration, therefore, is, that the defendant has forcibly and wrongfully injured property, in the possession of the plaintiff; and under the general issue the plaintiff must prove, (1.) that the property was in his possession at the time of the injury, and this, rightfully, as against the defendant; and (2.) that the injury was committed by the defendant, with force.

§ 614. (1.) The *possession* of the plaintiff may be actual or constructive. And it is *constructive*, when the property is either in the actual custody and occupation of no one, but rightfully belongs to the plaintiff; or when it is in the care and custody of his servant, agent, or overseer, or in the hands of a bailee for custody, carriage, or other care or service, as depositary, mandatary, carrier, borrower, or the like, where the bailee or actual possessor has no vested interest or title to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, but on the contrary, the owner may take it into his own hands, at his pleasure. Where this is the case, the general owner may sue in trespass, as for an injury to his own actual possession, and this proof will maintain the averment.[1] The general property

[1] 1 Chitty on Plead. 188, 195, (7th edit.); Lotan *v.* Cross, 2 Campb. 464;

draws to it the possession, where there is no intervening adverse right of enjoyment. And this action may also be maintained by the actual possessor, upon proof of his possession *de facto*, and an authority coupled with an interest in the thing, as carrier, factor, pawnee, or sheriff.[1] A tenant at will, and one entitled to the mere profits of the soil, or *vestura terræ*, with the right of culture, may also sue in trespass, for an injury to the emblements, to which he is entitled.[2]

§ 615. The general owner has also a *constructive possession*, as *against* his *bailee* or *tenant* who, having a special property, has violated his trust by destroying that which was confided to him. Thus, if the bailee of a beast kill it, or if a joint tenant or tenant in common of a chattel destroy it, or if a tenant at will cuts down trees, the interest of the wrongdoer is thereby determined, and the possession by legal intendment, immediately reverts to the owner or co-tenant, and proof of the wrongful act will maintain the allegation that the thing injured was in his possession.[3] So if one enters

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Bertie *v.* Beaumont, 16 East, 33; Aikin *v.* Buck, 1 Wend. 466; Putnam *v.* Wyley, 8 Johns. 432; Thorp *v.* Burling, 11 Johns. 285; Hubbell *v.* Rochester, 8 Cowen, 115; Root *v.* Chandler, 10 Wend. 110; Oser *v.* Storms, 9 Cowen, 687; Wickham *v.* Freeman, 12 Johns. 183; Smith *v.* Milles, 4 T. R. 480; Corfield *v.* Coryell, 4 Wash. 387; Hingham *v* Sprague, 15 Pick. 102; Starr *v.* Jackson, 11 Mass. 519; Walcott *v.* Pomeroy, 2 Pick. 121.

[1] Wilbraham *v.* Snow, 2 Saund. 47; Ibid. 47, *a*, *b*, note (1) by Williams; Colwill *v.* Reeves, 2 Campb. 575.

[2] Co. Litt. 4, *b*; Wilson *v.* Mackreth, 3 Burr. 1824; Crosby *v.* Wadsworth, 6 East, 602; Stammers *v.* Dixon, 7 East, 200; Stewart *v.* Doughty, 9 Johns. 108; Stultz *v.* Dickey, 5 Binn. 285; Austin *v.* Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 39.

[3] Co. Litt. 57, *a*; Ibid. 200, *a*, *b*; Countess of Salop *v.* Crompton, Cro. El. 777, 784; 5 Co. 13, S. C.; Phillips *v.* Covert, 7 Johns. 1; Erwin *v.* Olmstead, 7 Cowen, 229; Campbell *v.* Procter, 6 Greenl. 12; Daniels *v.* Pond, 21 Pick. 367; Allen *v.* Carter, 8 Pick. 175; Keay *v.* Goodwin, 16 Mass. 1. Trespass will lie by one tenant in common against another, for any act of permanent injury to the inheritance, such as making pits in the common, digging turves, and the like, when not done in the lawful exercise

upon land, and cuts timber under a parol agreement, for the purchase of the land, which he afterwards repudiates as void under the Statute of Frauds, his right of possession also is thereby avoided *ab initio*, and is held to have remained in the owner, who may maintain trespass for cutting the trees.[1] And generally, where a right of entry, or other right of possession is given by law, and is afterwards abused by any act of unlawful force, the party is a trespasser *ab initio*;[2] but if the wrong consists merely in the detention of chattels, beyond the time when they ought to have been returned, the remedy is in another form of action.[3]

§ 616. But where the general owner has conveyed to another the exclusive right of present possession and enjoyment, retaining to himself only a *reversionary interest*, the possession is that of the lessee, or bailee, who alone can maintain an action of trespass for a forcible injury to the property; the remedy of the general owner or reversioner being by an action upon the case.[4] Thus, a tenant for years may have an action of trespass, for cutting down trees;[5] and a tenant at will may sue in this form for throwing down the fences erected by himself, and destroying the grass;[6] or the lessee of a chattel, for taking and carrying it away during the term;[7] the lessor or general owner never being permitted to maintain this action, for an injury done to the property while it was in the possession of the lessee, or of a bailee,

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of a right of common. Wilkinson *v.* Haggarth, 11 Jur. 104. A tenant at will, by refusing to quit the premises, becomes a trespasser. Ellis *v.* Paige, 1 Pick. 43; Rising *v.* Stannard, 17 Mass. 282.

[1] Suffern *v.* Townsend, 9 Johns. 35.

[2] The Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Co. 145; Adams *v.* Freeman, 12 Johns. 408.

[3] Gardiner *v.* Campbell, 15 Johns. 401.

[4] Chitty on Plead. 195, 196, (7th edit.); Lienow *v.* Ritchie, 8 Pick. 235.

[5] Evans *v.* Evans, 2 Campb. 491; Blackett *v.* Lowes, 2 M. & S. 499.

[6] Little *v.* Palister, 3 Greenl. 6.

[7] Corfield *v.* Coryell, 4 Wash. 371, 387; Ward *v.* Macauley, 4 T. R. 489; Gordon *v.* Harper, 7 T. R. 9.

entitled to the exclusive enjoyment.[1] But the existence of a mere easement in land will not impair or affect the possession of the owner of the soil. Thus, for example, the existence of a public way over the plaintiff's land, will not prevent him from maintaining an action of trespass against a stranger who digs up the soil, or erects a building within the limits of the highway;[2] and proof the plaintiff's possession of the land adjoining the highway, is presumptive evidence of his possession of the soil *ad medium filum viæ*.[3]

§ 617. Where the subject of the action is a *partition fence* between the lands of two adjoining proprietors, it is presumed to be common property of both, unless the contrary is shown.[4] If it is proved to have been originally built upon the land of one of them, it is his; but if it were built equally upon the land of both, though at their joint expense, each is the owner in severalty of the part standing on his own land.[5] If the boundary is *a hedge*, and *one ditch*, it is presumed to belong to him on whose side the hedge is; it being presumed that he who dug the ditch, threw the earth upon his own land, which alone was lawful for him to do, and that the hedge was planted, as is usual, on the top of the bank thus raised.[6] But if there is a *ditch on each side* of

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[1] Ibid.; Campbell *v.* Arnold, 1 Johns. 511; Tobey *v.* Webster, 3 Johns. 468. But the owner of the subsoil may maintain trespass against one who has the exclusive right to the possession of the surface, as, for example, to cut the grass, if the latter should make holes in the earth, of such a depth as to penetrate into the subsoil and so interfere with the rights of the owner. Cox *v.* Glue, 12 Jur. 185, 5 C. B. 533. If the injury merely affects the surface, and not the subsoil, as, by riding over it, the remedy belongs only to the owner of the surface. Ibid.

[2] Cortelyou *v.* Van Brundt, 2 Johns. 357, 363; Gidney *v.* Earl, 12 Wend. 98; Grose *v.* West, 7 Taunt. 39; Stevens *v.* Whistler, 11 East, 51; Robbins *v.* Borman, 1 Pick. 122; Adams *v.* Emerson, 6 Pick. 57; Perley *v.* Chandler, 6 Mass. 454.

[3] Cook *v.* Green, 11 Price, 736; Headlam *v.* Headley, Holt, Cas. 463; Grose *v.* West, 7 Taunt. 39.

[4] Wiltshire *v.* Sidford, 8 B. & C. 259, note (a); Cubitt *v.* Porter, Ibid. 257.

[5] Matts *v.* Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20.

[6] Vowles *v.* Miller, 3 Taunt. 138, per Lawrence J.

the hedge, or no ditch at all, the hedge is presumed to be the common property of both proprietors.[1] If a *tree* grows so near the boundary line, that the roots extend into the soil of each proprietor, yet the property in the tree belongs to the owner of the land in which the tree was originally sown or planted.[2] But if the tree stands directly upon the line between adjoining owners, so that the line passes through it, it is the common property of both, whether it be marked as a boundary, or not; and trespass will lie if one cuts it down without the consent of the other.[3]

§ 618. It may further be observed, that proof of an actual and exclusive *possession* by the plaintiff, even though it be *by wrong*, is sufficient to support this action *against a mere stranger* or wrong-doer, who has neither title to the possession in himself, nor authority from the legal owner.[4] And where both parties rely on a title by mere possession, without any evidence of a legal title, a contract by one of them, to purchase the land from the true owner, is admissible in evidence to show the character of his possession.[5] So, the possession of her bed-room, by a female servant in the house, it seems will be sufficient to entitle her to maintain this action against a wrong-doer, who forces himself into it while she is in bed there.[6] The finder of goods, also, and the prior occupant of land, or its produce, has a sufficient possession to maintain this action, against any person except

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[1] Archbold's N. P. 328.

[2] Holder *v.* Coates, 1 M. & Malk, 112; Masters *v.* Pollie, 2 Roll. Rep. 141. See also Dig. lib. xlvii. tit. 7, l. 6, § 2, with which agrees the Instit. lib. ii. tit. 1, § 31, *as expounded* by Professor Cooper. See Cooper's Justinian, p. 80.

[3] Griffin *v.* Bixby, 12 N. Hamp. R. 454.

[4] Graham *v.* Peat, 1 East, 244; Harker *v.* Birkbeck, 3 Burr. 1556, 1563; Catteris *v.* Cowper, 4 Taunt. 547; Revett *v.* Brown, 5 Bing. 9; Townsend *v.* Kerns, 2 Watts, 180; Barnstable *v.* Thacher, 3 Met. 239; Shrewsbury *v.* Smith, 14 Pick. 297; Fiske *v.* Small, 12 Shepl. 453; Brown *v.* Ware, Ibid. 411.

[5] Moore *v.* Moore, 8 Shepl. 350.

[6] Lewis *v.* Ponsford, 8 C. & P. 687.

the true owner.[1] And the owner of the sea-shore has the possession of wrecked property, *ratione soli*, against a stranger.[2] The wrongful possessor, however, though he be tenant by sufferance, has no such remedy against the rightful owner, who resumes the possession ;[3] though this resumption of possession will not defeat the prior possessor's action of trespass against a stranger.[4]

§ 618 *a*. In trespass *quare clausum fregit*, if the close is particularly described by its boundaries, it will be necessary to prove them as laid ; for if one may be rejected, they all may be disregarded, and the identity lost ; but it will not be necessary to prove a title to the entire close.[5] The identity, thus necessary to be established, may be proved by the testimony of any competent witness who is acquainted with the lines and monuments of the tract.[6]

§ 619. But though such proof of possession, actual or constructive, will maintain the averment of the plaintiff's possession, yet a mere *right of entry* on lands is not sufficient. Hence a disseisee, though he may maintain trespass for the original act of disseisin, cannot have this action for any subsequent injury, until he has acquired the possession by reentry ; which will relate back to the original disseisin, and entitle him to sue in trespass for any intermediate wrong to the freehold.[7] Hence, also, a deed of mere release and quit

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[1] 2 Saund. 47, *b*, *c*, *d*, note by Williams; Rackham *v*. Jessup, 3 Wils. 332.

[2] Barker *v*. Bates, 13 Pick. 255.

[3] Taunton *v*. Costar, 7 T. R. 431 ; Turner *v*. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158 ; Sampson *v*. Henry, 13 Pick. 36.

[4] Cutts *v*. Spring, 15 Mass. 235. In trespass *quare clausum fregit*, if title to the freehold is asserted by each party, the burden of proof is on the defendant to make out that the title is in himself. If each party shows a title precisely equal to the other, the defendant fails. Heath *v*. Williams, 12 Shepl. 209.

[5] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 62 ; Wheeler *v*. Rowell, 7 N. Hamp. 515.

[6] Leadbetter *v*. Fitzgerald, 1 Pike, 488.

[7] Liford's Case, 11 Co. 51 ; 3 Bl. Comm. 210 ; Bigelow *v*. Jones, 10 Pick. 161 ; Blood *v*. Wood, 1 Met. 528 ; Kennebec Prop'rs *v*. Call, 1 Mass. 486.

claim, without proof of possession at the time by the grantor, or of an entry by the grantee, though admissible in evidence, is not sufficient to prove a possession.[1]

§ 620. If animals *feræ naturæ* are the subject of this action, the plaintiff must show, either that they were already captured, or domesticated, and of some value; or, that they were dead; or, that the defendant killed or took them on the plaintiff's ground; or, that the game was started there, and killed or captured elsewhere, the plaintiff asserting his local possession and property by joining in the pursuit.[2] But pursuit alone gives no right of property. Therefore where one was hunting a fox, and another, in sight of the pursuer, killed and carried him off, it was held that trespass could not be maintained against him.[3] So, where the parties were owners of several boats employed in fishing, and the plaintiff's boat cast a seine round a shoal of mackerel, except a small opening which the seine did not quite fill up, but through which, in the opinion of experienced persons, the fish could not have escaped; and the defendant's boat came through the opening and took the fish; it was held that the plaintiff's possession was not complete, and that therefore he could not maintain trespass for the taking.[4]

§ 621. (2.) The plaintiff must, in the next place, prove that the injury was *committed by the defendant*, with force. And the defendant will be chargeable, if it appear that the act was done by his direction or command, or by his *servant*

And see Taylor *v.* Townsend, 8 Mass. 411, 415; Tyler *v.* Smith, 8 Met. 599. But the disseisor does not, by the disseisin, acquire any right to the rents and profits, nor to trees severed by him or by another from the freehold; but the owner may take them. Brown *v.* Ware, 12 Shepl. 411.

[1] Marr *v.* Boothby, 1 Applet. 150.

[2] Ireland *v.* Higgins, Cro. El. 125; Grymes *v.* Shack, Cro. Jac. 262; Churchward *v.* Studdy, 14 East, 249; 6 Com. Dig. 386, Trespass, A. (1.); Sutton *v.* Moody, 2 Salk. 556; Pierson *v.* Post, 3 Caines, 175.

[3] Pierson *v.* Post, 3 Caines, 175.

[4] Young *v.* Hichens, 1 Dav. & Meriv. 592; 6 Ad. & El. N. S. 606, S. C.

in the course of his master's business, or while executing his orders with ordinary care; or if it be done by his domestic or reclaimed animals.[1] So, if the defendant participated with others in the act, though it were but slightly; or, if he procured the act to be done by inciting others.[2] But it seems that persons, entering a dwelling-house in good faith, to assist an officer in the service of legal process, are not trespassers, though he entered unlawfully, they not knowing how he entered.[3] So, if the defendant unlawfully exercised an authority over the goods, in defiance or exclusion of the true owner, as where, being a constable, he levied an execution on the plaintiff's goods in the hands of the execution debtor, who was a stranger, taking an inventory of them, and saying he would take them away unless security were given; though he did not actually touch the goods, he is a trespasser.[4] So, if the defendant were one of several *partners in trade*, and the act were done by one of the firm, provided it were of the nature of a taking, available to the partnership, and they all either joined in ordering it, or afterwards knowingly participated in the benefit of the act, this is evidence of a trespass by all.[5] But if a servant were ordered to take the goods of another, instead of which he took the goods of the defendant,

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[1] Gregory *v.* Piper, 9 B. & C. 591; Broughton *v.* Whallon, 8 Wend. 474; 6 Com. Dig. 392, Trespass, C. (1.); Root *v.* Chandler, 10 Wend. 110. Where the allegation was, that the defendant struck the plaintiff's cow several blows, whereof she died, and the evidence was, that after the beating, which was unmerciful, the plaintiff killed the cow to shorten her miseries, it was held no variance. Hancock *v.* Southall, 4 D. & R. 202.

[2] Flewster *v.* Royle, 1 Campb. 187; Stonehouse *v.* Elliot, 6 T. R. 315; Parsons *v.* Loyd, 3 Wils. 341; Barker *v.* Braham, Ibid. 368. Evidence of the conduct of the parties before the trespass, is receivable, if it had reference to the trespass; but evidence of the conduct of one of several trespassers, long after the trespass, is not receivable against the others. Newton *v.* Wilson, 1 C. & K. 537.

[3] Oystead *v.* Shed, 13 Mass. 520, 524.

[4] Wintringham *v.* Lafoy, 7 Cowen, R. 735; Miller *v.* Baker, 1 Met. 27; Gibbs *v.* Chase, 10 Mass. 125; Robinson *v.* Mansfield, 13 Pick. 139; Phillips *v.* Hall, 8 Wend. 610. And see Boynton *v.* Willard, 10 Pick. 166; Rand *v.* Sargent, 10 Shepl. 326.

[5] Petrie *v.* Lamont, 1 Car. & Marsh. 93.

the master will not be liable; unless in the case of a sheriff's deputy, which the law, on grounds of public policy, has made an exception.[1]

§ 622. It will not be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, that the act was done with any *wrongful intent;* it being sufficient, if it was without a justifiable cause or purpose, though it were done accidentally, or by mistake.[2] And though the original entry or act of possession were by authority of law, yet if a subsequent act of force be unlawfully committed, such as would have made the party a trespasser if no authority or right existed, he is a trespasser *ab initio*.[3] If the authority were a license in fact, the remedy is not in trespass, but in an action upon the case.[4] Nor is it necessary, in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, to prove that the defendant *actually entered* upon the land; for evidence that he stood elsewhere, and shot game on the plaintiff's land, will support the averment of an entry.[5] And after a wrongful entry and the erection of a building, for which the owner

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[1] McManus *v.* Crickett, 1 East, 106; Germantown Railroad Co. *v.* Wilt, 4 Whart. 143; Fox *v.* Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & Serg. 123; Saunderson *v.* Baker, 3 Wills. 312; Ackworth *v.* Kempe, 1 Doug. 49: Grinnell *v.* Phillips, 1 Mass. 530.

[2] 1 Chitty on Plead. 192, (7th edit.); Covell *v.* Laming, 1 Camp. 497; Colwill *v.* Reeves, 2 Campb. 575; Baseley *v.* Clarkson, 3 Lev. 37; Higginson *v.* York, 5 Mass. 341; Hayden *v.* Shed, 11 Mass. 509, per Jackson, J.; Ibid. 507. See Guille *v.* Swan, 19 Johns. 381, where the owner of a balloon, which accidentally descended into the defendant's garden, was held liable in trespass.

[3] The Six Carpenters' case. 8 Co. 145; Shorland *v.* Govett, 5 B. & C. 485; Ante, § 615; Dye *v.* Leatherdale, 3 Wils. 20.

[4] Ibid.; Cushing *v.* Adams, 18 Pick. 110. Trespass does not lie against a tenant by sufferance, until after entry upon him by the lessor. Rising *v.* Stannard, 17 Mass. 282; Dorrell *v.* Johnson, 17 Pick. 263. Whether the landlord may expel him by force, and thereby acquire a lawful possession to himself, *quære*, and see Newton *v.* Harland, 1 Man. & Grang. 644, that he may not. But see *contra*, Harvey *v.* Lady Brydges, 9 Jur. 759, 14 M. & W. 437.

[5] Anon. cited per Ld. Ellenborough in Pickering *v.* Rudd, 1 Stark. R. 56, 58. But see Keble *v.* Hickringill, 11 Mod. 74, 130.

has already recovered damages, the *continuance* of the building, after notice to remove it, is a new trespass, for which this action may be maintained.[1]

§ 623. It is essential to this form of remedy, that the act be proved to have been done with *force directly applied*, this being the criterion of trespass; but the degree of force is not material.[2] While the original force or *vis impressa* continues, so as to become the proximate cause of the injury, the effect is immediate, and the remedy may be in trespass; but where the original force had ceased before the injury commenced, trespass cannot be maintained, and the only remedy is by an action on the case.[3]

§ 624. The allegation of the *time* when the trespass was committed is not ordinarily material to be proved; the plaintiff being at liberty to prove a trespass at any time before the commencement of the action, whether before or after the day laid in the declaration. But in trespass with a *continuando*, the plaintiff ought to confine himself to the time in the declaration; yet he may waive the *continuando*, and prove a trespass on any day before the action brought; or, he may give in evidence only part of the time in the *continuando*.[4] So, where a trespass is alleged to have been done between a certain day, and the day of the commencement of the action, the plaintiff may prove either one trespass before the certain day mentioned, or as many as he can within the period of time stated in the declaration, but he cannot do both, and must waive one or the other.[5] And in trespass against

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[1] Holmes *v.* Wilson, 10 Ad. & El. 503.

[2] Harvey *v.* Brydges, 14 M. & W. 437; The State *v.* Armfield, 5 Ired. 207.

[3] 1 Chitty on Plead. 140, 141, 199, (7th edit.); Smith *v.* Rutherford, 2 S. & R. 358.

[4] Co. Lit. 283 *b*; Bull. N. P. 86; Webb *v.* Turner, 2 Stra. 1095; Hume *v.* Oldacre, 1 Stark. R. 351; Joralmion *v.* Pierpont, Anth. 42.

[5] 2 Selw. N. P. 1341, per Gould, J.; Pierce *v.* Pickens, 16 Mass. 470, 472. In this case, the law on this subject was thus stated by Jackson, J. "Originally every declaration in trespass seems to have been confined to

several, the plaintiff, having proved a joint trespass by all, will not be permitted to waive that, and give evidence of another trespass by one only;[1] nor will he be permitted, where the declaration contains but one count, after proof of one trespass, to waive that and prove another.[2] So, where the action is against three, for example, and the plaintiff proves a joint trespass by two only, he will not be allowed to give evidence of another trespass by all the three, even as against those two alone.[3]

§ 625. In the *defence* of this action, the general issue is *not guilty;* under which the defendant may give evidence of

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one single act of trespass. When the injury was of a kind that could be continued without intermission, from time to time, the plaintiff was permitted to declare with a *continuando*, and the whole was considered as one trespass. In more modern times, in order to save the trouble and expense of a distinct writ, or count, for every different act, the plaintiff is permitted to declare, as is done in this case, for a trespass on divers days and times between one day and another; and, in that case, he may give evidence of any number of trespasses within the time specified. Such a declaration is considered as if it contained a distinct count for every different trespass. This is for the advantage and ease of the plaintiff; but he is not obliged to avail himself of the privilege, and may still consider his declaration as containing one count only, and as confined to a single trespass. When it is considered in that light, the time becomes immaterial, and he may prove a trespass at any time before the commencement of the action, and within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations.

"But it would be giving an undue advantage to the plaintiff if he could avail himself of the declaration in both of these modes, and would frequently operate as a surprise on the defendant. He is, therefore, bound to make his election before he begins to introduce his evidence. He must waive the advantage of this peculiar form of declaration, before he can be permitted to offer evidence of a trespass at any other time. The rule, therefore, on this subject was mistaken on the trial. It is not that the plaintiff shall not *recover* for any trespass within the time specified, and also for a trespass at another time; but he shall not *give evidence* of one or more trespasses within the time, and of another at another time."

[1] Tait *v.* Harris, 1 M. & Rob. 282. See also Wynne *v.* Anderson, 3 C. & P. 596.

[2] Stante *v.* Pricket, 1 Campb. 573.

[3] Hitchen *v.* Teale, 2 M. & Rob. 30; Sedley *v.* Sutherland, 3 Esp. R. 202.

any facts, tending to disprove either of the propositions, which, as we have seen, the plaintiff is obliged to make out in order to maintain the action. Every defence which admits the defendant to have been *primâ facie* a trespasser, must be specially pleaded; but any matters which go to show that he never did the acts complained of, may be given in evidence under the general issue. Thus, for example, under this issue may be proved, that the plaintiff had no property in the goods; or, that the defendant did not take them; or, that he did not enter the plaintiff's close. So, the defendant may show, under this issue, that the freehold and immediate right of possession is in himself, or in one under whom he claims title; thus disproving the plaintiff's allegation, that the right of possession is in him.[1] But if he acted by license, even from the plaintiff, without claiming title in himself;[2] or, if he would justify under a custom to enter;[3] or, under a right of way;[4] or, if the injury was occasioned by the plaintiff's own negligence, or was done by the defendant from any other cause, short of such extraneous force as deprived him of all agency in the act, it cannot be shown under this issue, but must be specially pleaded.[5] So, a *distress* for rent, when made on the demised premises, may be shown under this issue; but if it were made elsewhere, or for any other cause, it must be justified under a special plea.[6] Matters in *discharge* of the action must be specially pleaded; but matters

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[1] 1 Chitty on Plead. 437; Dodd *v.* Kyffin, 7 T. R. 354; Argent *v.* Durrant, 8 T. R. 403. See also Monumoi *v.* Rogers, 1 Mass. 159; Anthony *v.* Gilbert, 4 Blackf. 348; Rawson *v.* Morse, 4 Pick. 127. But where the plaintiff is in the actual possession and occupation of the close, the defendant will not be permitted, under the general issue, to prove title in a stranger, under whom he does not justify. Philpot *v.* Holmes, 1 Peake, R. 67; Carter *v.* Johnson, 2 M. & Rob. 263.

[2] Milman *v.* Dolwell, 2 Campb; Philpot *v.* Holmes, 1 Peake, R. 67; Ruggles *v.* Lesure, 24 Pick. 187.

[3] Waters *v.* Lilley, 4 Pick. 145.

[4] Strout *v.* Berry, 7 Mass. 385.

[5] 1 Chitty on Plead. 437, 438; Ante, § 94; Knapp *v.* Salsbury, 2 Campb. 500.

[6] 1 Chitty on Plead. 439.

in *mitigation* of the wrong and damages, which cannot be so pleaded, may be given in evidence under the general issue.[1] And it seems, that a *variance* in the description of the *locus in quo*, is available to the defendant under this issue, as the allegation of place, in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, is essentially descriptive of the particular trespass complained of.[2] But the variance, to be fatal, must be in some essential part of the description; and even the abuttals will not be construed very strictly. Thus, if the close be described as bounded on the east by another close, and the proof be, that the other close lies on the north, with a point or two towards the east; or if it be on the north-east, or south-east;[3] or if it be described as abutting on a windmill, and the proof be, that a highway lies between it and the windmill;[4] it will be sufficient.

§ 626. The plea of *liberum tenementum* admits the fact, that the plaintiff was in possession of the close described in the declaration; and that the defendant did the acts complained of; raising only the question, whether the close described was the defendant's freehold or not.[5] And his title must be proved either by deed, or other documentary evidence, or by an actual, adverse, and exclusive possession for

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[1] Ibid. p. 441, 442. But where the defendant pleaded the general issue, to an action for taking the plaintiff's goods, it was recently held that he could not be permitted, under this issue, to show in mitigation of damages a repayment, *after action brought*, of the money produced by the sale of the goods. Rundle *v.* Little, 6 Ad. & El. 174, N. S.

[2] 3 Stephens, N. P. 2642; Webber *v.* Richards, 10 Law Journ. 203; 1 Salk. 452, per Holt, C. J.; Taylor *v.* Hooman, 1 Moor, 161; Harris *v.* Cook, 8 Taunt. 539.

[3] Mildmay *v.* Dean, 2 Roll. Abr. 678; Roberts *v.* Karr, 1 Taunt. 495, 501, per Heath, J.

[4] Nowell *v.* Sands, 2 Roll. Abr. 677, 678. And see Doe *v.* Salter, 13 East, 9; Brownlow *v.* Tomlinson, 1 M. & G. 484; Walford *v.* Anthony, 8 Bing. 75; Lethbridge *v.* Winter, 2 Bing. 49; Doe *v.* Harris, 5 M. & S. 326.

[5] Cocker *v.* Crompton, 1 B. & C. 489; Lempriere *v.* Humphrey, 3 Ad. & El. 181; Caruth *v.* Allen, 2 McCord, 126; Doe *v.* Wright, 10 Ad. & El. 763. Ryan *v.* Clarke, 13 Jur. 1000.

twenty years; inasmuch as, under this issue, he undertakes to show a title in himself, which shall do away the presumption arising from the plaintiff's possession.[1] Proof of a tenancy in common with the plaintiff is not admissible under this issue.[2] If the defendant succeeds in establishing a title to that part of the close on which the trespass was committed, he is entitled to recover, though he does not prove a title to the whole close; the words "the close in which," &c., constituting a divisible allegation.[3]

§ 627. The plea of *license* may be supported by proof of a license in law, as well as in fact; and it is immaterial whether it be expressed, or implied from circumstances. Thus, an entry to execute legal process, or to distrain for rent, or for damage feasant; or an entry by a remainder-man, or a reversioner, to see whether waste has been done, or repairs made; or by a commoner, to view his cattle; or by a traveller, into an inn; or by a landlord, to take possession, after the expiration of the tenant's lease; or an entry into another's house at usual and reasonable hours, and in the customary manner, for any of the ordinary purposes of life, may be given in evidence under this plea.[4] So, an entry after a forfeiture by non-performance of covenants, the lease containing a clause that upon such non-performance the landlord may enter and expel the tenant, may also be shown in the like manner.[5] Evidence of a familiar intimacy in the family, may also be given in support of this plea.[6] So, if the plaintiff's goods, being left in the defendant's building, were an incumbrance, and he removed them to the plaintiff's close; or, if the plaintiff unlawfully took the defendant's goods, and conveyed them within the plaintiff's close, and the defendant thereupon,

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1 Brest *v.* Lever, 7 M. & W. 593.

2 Voyce *v.* Voyce, Gow, R. 201; Roberts *v.* Dame, 11 N. Hamp. 226.

3 Smith *v.* Royston, 8 M. & W. 381; Richards *v.* Peake, 2 B. & C. 918.

4 5 Com. Dig. 806, tit. Pleader, 3 M. 35; Ditcham *v.* Bond, 3 Campb. 524; Feltham *v.* Cartwright, 5 Bing. N. C. 569.

5 Kavanagh *v.* Gudge, 7 Man. & Gr. 316; 7 Scott, N. R. 1025.

6 Adams *v.* Freeman, 12 Johns. 408.

making fresh pursuit, entered and retook them ; the facts in either case furnish, by implication, evidence of a license to enter.[1] The mere circumstance, that the defendant's goods were upon the plaintiff's close, and therefore he entered and took them, is not alone sufficient to justify the entry.[2] But if the owner of the land had sold the goods there to the defendant, a license to enter and take them is implied in the contract.[3] The evidence must cover all the trespasses proved, or it will not sustain the justification.[4] So, if a license to erect and maintain a wall be pleaded, and the evidence be of a license to erect only, the plea is not supported.[5] Evidence of a verbal agreement for the sale of the land by the plaintiff to the defendant, is admissible under a plea of license to enter, and may suffice to support the plea as to the entry only; but it is not sufficient to maintain the plea, in respect to any acts which a tenant at will may not lawfully do.[6] Nor will such license avail to justify acts done after it has been revoked.[7]

§ 628. Under the plea of a *license in law*, the plaintiff cannot give in evidence a subsequent act of the defendant, which rendered him a trespasser *ab initio ;* but it must be specially replied.[8] So, if the defendant justifies as preventing a tortious act of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff relies on a license to do the act, he cannot give the license in evidence under the general replication of *de injuriâ*, but must allege it in a special replication.[9]

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1 Rex *v.* Sheward, 2 M. & W. 424 ; Patrick *v.* Colerick, 3 M. & W. 483.

2 Anthony *v.* Harreys, 8 Bing. 186; Williams *v.* Morris, 8 M. & W. 488.

3 Wood *v.* Manley, 11 Ad. & El. 34 ; Nettleton *v.* Sikes, 8 Met. 34.

4 Barnes *v.* Hunt, 11 East, 451 ; Symons *v.* Hearson, 12 Price, 369, 390, per Hullock, B.

5 Alexander *v.* Bonnin, 4 Bing. N. C. 799, 813.

6 Carrington *v.* Roots, 2 M. & W. 248 ; Cooper *v.* Stower, 9 Johns. 331 ; Suffern *v.* Townsend, Ibid. 35.

7 Cheever *v.* Pearson, 16 Pick. 266.

8 Aitkenhead *v.* Blades, 5 Taunt. 198. And see Taylor *v.* Cole, 3 T. R. 292, 296, per Buller, J. ; Six Carpenters' case, 8 Co. 146.

9 Taylor *v.* Smith, 7 Taunt. 157. See Post, § 632, 633.

§ 629. Where the trespass is justified under *civil or criminal process*, whether it be specially pleaded, or given in evidence under a brief statement, filed with the general issue, the party must prove every material fact of the authority under which he justifies. If the action is by the person against whom the process issued, it is sufficient for the officer who served it, to prove the process itself, if it appear to have issued from a Court of competent jurisdiction, under its seal, and to be tested by the Chief Justice, or other magistrate whose attestation it should bear, and be signed by the clerk or other proper officer. And if it is mesne process and is returnable, he should in ordinary cases show that it is returned; unless he is a mere bailiff or servant, who is not bound to make a return.[1] But in trespass against the plaintiff in a former action or against a stranger, or where the action is brought by a stranger whose goods have been wrongfully taken by the sheriff, under an execution issued against another person, the sheriff or his officers, justifying under the process, will be held also to prove the judgment upon which it issued.[2] If the defendant in fact had the process in his hands at the time, he may justify under it, though he then declared that he entered the premises for another cause.[3]

§ 630. If the defendant justifies the destruction of the plaintiff's property by the *defence of his own*, he must aver and prove, that he could not otherwise preserve his own property.[4] If, however, the plaintiff's dog were killed in the act of pursuing the defendant's deer in his park, or rabbits in

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[1] Britton *v.* Cole, 1 Salk. 408; 1 Ld. Raym. 305; Barker *v.* Miller, 6 Johns. 195; Blackley *v.* Sheldon, 7 Johns. 32; Crowther *v.* Ramsbottom, 7 T. R. 654; Cheasley *v.* Barnes, 10 East, 73; Middleton *v.* Price, 1 Wils. 17; Rowland *v.* Veale, Cowp. 20.

[2] Martyn *v.* Podger, 5 Burr. 2631; Lake *v.* Billers, 1 Ld. Raym. 733; Britton *v.* Cole, 1 Salk. 408, 409.

[3] Crowther *v.* Ramsbottom, 7 T. R. 654.

[4] Wright *v.* Ramscott, 1 Saund. 84; Vere *v.* Cawdor, 11 East, 568; Janson *v.* Brown, 1 Campb. 41.

his warren, or poultry within his own grounds, this will justify the killing without proof of any higher necessity.[1]

§ 631. Where the issue is upon a *right of way*, the defendant must prove either a deed of grant to him, or those under whom he claims, or an exclusive and uninterrupted enjoyment for at least twenty years.[2] If the issue is upon *a right to dig and take gravel* or other material for necessary *repairs*, the defendants must allege and prove that the repairs were necessary, and that the materials were used or in the process of being used for that purpose.[3]

§ 632. If a *right of way*, or any other *easement* is pleaded in justification of a trespass on lands, whether it be in the defendant himself, or in another under whose command he acted, the plaintiff cannot controvert this right by evidence under the general replication of *de injuriâ suâ*, but must *specifically traverse* the right as claimed.[4] And where a right of way is claimed, under a non-existing grant from a person who was seised in fee, and the plaintiff traverses the grant, he cannot, under this issue, dispute the seisin in fee for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of a grant, for it is impliedly admitted by the replication.[5]

§ 633. Wherever the defendant pleads matter of fact in justification, as distinguished from mere matter of record, title, or authority, it may be traversed by the plaintiff, by the general replication *de injuriâ suâ, absque tali causâ*.[6] This replication being a traverse of the whole plea, the plaintiff is at liberty under it to adduce any evidence disproving the facts

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[1] Barrington *v.* Turner, 3 Lev. 28; Wadhurst *v.* Damme, Cro. Jac. 45; Janson *v.* Brown, 1 Camp. 41; Vere *v.* Cawdor, 11 East, 568, 569.

[2] Hewlins *v.* Shippam, 5 B. & C. 221; Cocker *v.* Cowper, 1 Cr. M. & R. 418. See Ante, tit. PRESCRIPTION, § 537 – 546.

[3] Peppin *v.* Shakespear, 6 T. R. 748.

[4] Crogate's case, 8 Co. 66. And see Lowe *v.* Govett, 3 B. & Ad. 863.

[5] Cowlishaw *v.* Cheslyn, 1 Cr. & J. 48.

[6] See Gould on Pleading, ch. vii. § 26 – 30.

alleged in the plea. But he cannot go into any evidence of new matter, which shows that the defendant's allegation, though true, does not justify the trespass. Thus, in an action for trespass and false imprisonment, if the defendant justifies the commitment as a magistrate, for an offence which is bailable, to which the plaintiff replies *de injuriâ*, he cannot, under this replication, avoid the justification by evidence of a tender and refusal of bail.[1] So, if the defendant justifies an assault and battery by the plea of *son assault demesne*, and the plaintiff replies *de injuriâ*, he will not be permitted to show that the defendant, having entered the plaintiff's house, misbehaved there.[2] Thus, also, in trespass by a tenant, against his landlord, for turning him out of possession, where the defendant pleaded a fact by which the lease was forfeited, to which the plaintiff replied *de injuriâ*, it was held, after proof of the fact of forfeiture, that the plaintiff under this replication could not prove the acceptance of rent by the defendant, as a waiver of the forfeiture, for he should have replied it specially, in avoidance of the plea.[3] The general rule is, that all matters which confess and avoid, whether alleged by the plaintiff or defendant, must be specially pleaded; otherwise, the proof of them is not admissible.[4]

§ 634. The same principle applies to all cases, where the defendant justifies the trespass by a plea answering the gist of the action, and the plaintiff would avoid the plea by proving, that the defendant exceeded the authority under which he acted, and thus became a trespasser *ab initio*. In such cases the plaintiff cannot show the *excess* under a general replication; but must distinctly allege it in a special replication, in the nature of a *new assignment*.[5] Thus, in trespass for

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[1] Sayre *v.* E. of Rochford, 2 W. Bl. 1165, 1169, per De Grey, C. J.

[2] King *v.* Phippard, Carth. 280.

[3] Warrall *v.* Clare, 2 Campb. 629.

[4] 2 Stark. Ev. 825.

[5] Gould on Pleading, ch. vi. part 2, § 110; 1 Chitty on Pleading, p. 512, 513, 542 – 552; Monprivatt *v.* Smith, 2 Campb. 175; Warrall *v.* Clare, Ib. 629.

taking and impounding the plaintiff's cattle, where the defendant justifies for that he took them *damage feasant*, the plaintiff will not be permitted, under a general replication, to prove that the defendant abused one of the beasts, so that it died, whereby he became a trespasser *ab initio;* for he should have specially replied the excess.[1] So, in trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house, and expelling him from it, where the defendant justified the breaking and entering, under a writ of *fieri facias*, which, it was held, covered the expulsion, it was also held, that the plaintiff could not be permitted to rely on the expulsion as an excess, without specially replying it.[2] The replication of excess admits the justification as alleged, and precludes the plaintiff from offering any evidence to disprove it.[3]

§ 635. If a justification is pleaded, and thereupon the plaintiff makes a *new assignment*, to which the defendant pleads not guilty, if the plaintiff proves only one trespass, he must also clearly show, that the trespass proved is a different one from that mentioned in the plea; for if the circumstances are alike, the Jury will be instructed to presume it to be the same.[4]

§ 635 *a*. The *rule of damages* in this action has already been discussed, in treating the subject of Damages;[5] where we have seen that the declaration involves not only the principal transaction, but all its attendant circumstances, and its natural and injurious results; all which are put in issue by the plea of not guilty. Upon this principle it has been held, in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, where the defendant's sheep trespassed on the plaintiff's close and commingled with his own, that evidence of a deadly disease, communicated by

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[1] Gates *v.* Bayley, 2 Wils. 313; Gargrave *v.* Smith, 1 Salk. 221; Bull. N. P. 81; Moore *v.* Taylor, 5 Taunt. 69.

[2] Taylor *v.* Cole, 3 T. R. 292, 296.

[3] Pickering *v.* Rudd, 1 Stark. R. 56; 4 Campb. 219.

[4] Darby *v.* Smith, 2 M. & Rob. 184.

[5] See Ante, § 254, 256, 266, 268.

the defendant's flock to the plaintiff's, was admissible, as showing part of the damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. And the knowledge of the defendant was held immaterial to be proved, unless to increase the damages.[1] And generally, where the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his property for a time, by the act complained of, the value of the use, during such period, is to be taken into the estimation of damages;[2] the return of the property to the owner's possession and his acceptance of it, being available to the wrong-doer only in mitigation of damages, but not in bar of the action.[3] So, if the value of the property has been lawfully applied to the owner's use, this, as has been seen in another place, may be shown to reduce the damages.[4]

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[1] Barnum *v.* Vandusen, 16 Conn. R. 200.

[2] Warfield *v.* Walter, 11 G. & J. 80; Hammatt *v.* Russ, 4 Shepl. 171.

[3] Hanmer *v.* Wilsey, 17 Wend. 91.

[4] See Ante, § 272, 276. It is agreed that, where the property has gone to the plaintiff's use by his consent, either express or implied, this will avail to reduce his damages. But several of the cases seem to turn on the question whether the property was so applied by the wrong-doer himself, or by a mere stranger. And upon this distinction it has been held, where property was taken upon an *illegal* process against the owner, for which taking an action of trespass was commenced, against the creditor who directed it, and afterwards a *legal* process was sued out, under which the same property, which had not gone back into the owner's possession, was seized and sold for his debt; that the defendant was not at liberty to prove this fact in mitigation of damages, it being a mere act of his own. Hanmer *v.* Wilsey, 17 Wend. 91. The like point, upon the same distinction, was again decided in Otis *v.* Jones, 21 Wend. 394. So, where one wrongfully took goods under a belief of right so to do, and they were afterwards taken out of his hands by distress for rent due from the owner to his landlord, it was held, in an action of trespass brought by the owner against the tortfeazor, that the latter might show this fact, in mitigation of damages, *because* of his belief of his right to take the goods. Higgins *v.* Whitney, 24 Wend. 379. And still later, in an action against a sheriff for an unauthorized seizure of goods under a *fieri facias*, he was permitted to show, in mitigation of damages, that the goods were afterwards taken from his custody, and lawfully sold on a distress warrant issued against the plaintiff in favor of a third person; the sale being independent of any agency of the defendant. Sherry *v.* Schuyler, 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 204.

Other Courts, however, have held, that *wherever* the property has been applied to the plaintiff's use, this may be shown in mitigation of damages. See Irish *v.* Cloyes, 8 Verm. R. 30, 33.

But this rule will generally be found to have been applied only in cases of illegal seizures or sales of goods by officers, who have subsequently either regularly sold the goods, or applied the proceeds of the irregular sale, in satisfaction of final process against the owner. Such were, in substance, the cases of Farrar *v.* Barton, 5 Mass. 395; Prescott *v.* Wright, 6 Mass. 20; Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356; Daggett *v.* Adams, 1 Greenl. 198; Board *v.* Head, 3 Dana, 489, 494; Stewart *v.* Martin, 16 Verm. R. 397. Even where the defendant was a mere trespasser, without pretence of title, he has been permitted to show, in mitigation of damages, that the goods had been duly taken out of his hands and sold by an officer, by virtue of a legal precept against the plaintiff. Squire *v.* Hollenbeck, 9 Pick. 551.

Perhaps the true principle will be found to be this; that where the appropriation of the goods or their value, to the plaintiff's use, was by his consent, expressed or implied, it goes in reduction of the damages; it being in the nature of a return and acceptance of the goods; and that such consent may always be implied, where the goods have been legally seized and sold under process against him. If the appropriation was made in any other manner, his consent may be shown by any evidence of a subsequent ratification; such as claiming the benefit of it, if it were delivered in payment to his own creditor, or the like.

In trespass *de bonis asportatis*, if the Jury find for the plaintff, the goods being still out of his possession, they must award him the value of the goods; they cannot award damages for the taking alone, on the ground that the goods are still the property of the plaintiff. Woolley *v.* Carter, 2 Halst. 85. But if the plaintiff has received the goods again, it is otherwise. Merrill *v.* How, 11 Shepl. 196.

TROVER.

§ 636. This action, the form of which is fictitious, is in substance a remedy to recover the value of personal chattels, wrongfully converted by another to his own use. To entitle the plaintiff to recover, two points are essential to be proved; —(1.) property in the plaintiff,[1] and a right of possession at the time of the conversion; and (2.) a conversion of the thing by the defendant to his own use. Whether the defendant originally came to the possession of the thing by right or by wrong, is not material. The plaintiff should also be prepared to prove the value of the goods at the time and place of the conversion; though this is not essential to the maintenance of the action.

§ 637. (1.) The *property* in the plaintiff may be either general and absolute, or only special; the latter of these interests being sufficient for the purpose.[2] And where the plaintiff has a special property, he may maintain this action against even the general owner, if he wrongfully deprives him of the possession.[3] Special property, in a strict sense, may be said to consist in the lawful custody of the goods, with a right of detention against the general owner;[4] but a lower

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[1] Per Ld. Mansfield, 1 T. R. 56. See also 2 Saund. 47 *a* to 47 *k*, note (1.)

[2] Webb *v.* Fox, 7 T. R. 398, per Lawrence, J.

[3] Roberts *v.* Wyatt, 2 Taunt. 268; Spoor *v.* Holland, 8 Wend. 445.

[4] The nature of special property is thus discussed by Mr. Justice Story. "What is meant by a special property in a thing? Does it mean a qualified right or interest in the thing, a *jus in re*, or a right annexed to the thing? Or does it mean merely a lawful right of custody or possession of the thing, which constitutes a sufficient title to maintain that possession against wrongdoers by action or otherwise? If the latter be its true signification, it is little more than a dispute about terms; as all persons will now admit, that

degree of interest will sometimes suffice, against a stranger; for a mere wrong-doer is not permitted to question the title of

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every bailee, even under a naked bailment from the owner, and every rightful possessor by act or operation of law, has in this sense a special property in the thing. But, this certainly is not the sense in which the phrase is ordinarily understood. When we speak of a person's having a property in a thing, we mean, that he has some fixed interest in it, (*jus in re,*) or some fixed right attached to it, either equitable or legal; and when we speak of a special property in a thing, we mean some special fixed interest, or right therein, distinct from, and subordinate to, the absolute property or interest of the general owner. Thus, for example, if goods are pledged for a debt, we say, that the pledgee has a special property therein; for he has a qualified interest in the thing, co-extensive with his debt, as owner *pro tanto*. So we say, that artificers and workmen, who work on or repair a chattel, and warehousemen, and wharfingers, and factors, and carriers, have a special property in the chattel confided to them for hire, for the particular purpose of their vocation, because they have a lien thereon for the amount of the hire due to them, and a rightful possession in virtue of that lien, even against the general owner, which he cannot displace without discharging the lien. So the sheriff, who has lawfully seized goods on an execution, may in this sense be said, without, perhaps, straining the propriety of language, to have a special property in the goods, although, more correctly speaking, the goods should be deemed to be in the custody of the law, and his possession a lawful possession, binding the property for the purposes of the execution against the general owner, as well as against wrong-doers. But, it seems a confusion of all distinctions, to say, that a naked bailee, such as a depositary, has a special property, when he has no more than the lawful custody or possession of the thing, without any vested interest therein, for which he can detain the property, even for a moment, against the lawful owner. It might, with far more propriety, be stated, that a gratuitous borrower has a special property in the thing bailed to him, because, during the time of the bailment, he has a right to the use of the thing, and seems thus clothed with a temporary ownership for the purposes of the loan. Yet this has sometimes been a matter denied or doubted.

" Mr. Justice Blackstone has defined an absolute property to be, ' Where a man has solely and exclusively the right, and also the occupation, of any movable chattels, so that they cannot be transferred from him, or cease to be his, without his own act or default;' and qualified, limited, or special property to be such, ' as is not in its nature permanent, but may sometimes subsist, and at other times not subsist.' And, after illustrating this doctrine by cases of qualified property in animals *feræ naturæ*, and in the elements of fire, light, air, and water, he then proceeds; ' These kinds of qualification in property depend upon the peculiar circumstances of the subject-matter, which is not capable of being under the absolute dominion of any proprietor.

a person in the actual possession and custody of the goods, whose possession he has wrongfully invaded. The naked

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But property may also be of a qualified or special nature, on account of the peculiar circumstances of the owner, when the thing itself is very capable of absolute ownership. As in case of bailment, or delivery of goods to another person for a particular use; as to a carrier to convey to London, to an innkeeper to secure in his inn, or the like. Here there is no absolute property in either the bailor or the bailee, the person delivering, or him to whom it is delivered; for the bailor hath only the right, and not the immediate possession; the bailee hath the possession, and only a temporary right. But it is a qualified property in them both; and each of them is entitled to an action, in case the goods be damaged or taken away; the bailee, on account of his immediate possession; the bailor, because the possession of the bailee is, immediately, his possession also. So also in case of goods pledged or pawned upon condition, either to repay money or otherwise; both the pledgor and pledgee have a qualified, but neither of them an absolute, property in them; the pledgor's property is conditional, and depends upon the performance of the condition of repayment, &c.; and so, too, is that of the pledgee, which depends upon its non-performance. The same may be said of goods distrained for rent, or other cause of distress; which are in the nature of a pledge, and are not, at the first taking, the absolute property of either the distrainor, or the party distrained upon; but may be redeemed, or else forfeited, by the subsequent conduct of the latter. But a servant, who hath the care of his master's goods or chattels, as a butler of plate, a shepherd of sheep, and the like, hath not any property or possession, either absolute or qualified, but only a mere charge or oversight.' The cases, here put by the learned Commentator, of qualified property, are clearly cases, where the bailee has an interest or lien *in rem*. Mr. Justice Lawrence, on one occasion, said: 'Absolute property is, where one, having the possession of chattels, has also an exclusive right to enjoy them, and which can only be defeated by some act of his own. Special property is where he, who has the possession, holds them subject to the claims of other persons. There may be special property in various instances. There may be special property without possession; or there may be special property, arising simply out of a lawful possession, and which ceases, when the true owner appears. Such was the case of Armory *v.* Delamirie.'

"Now, with reference to the case in judgment, the language of the learned Judge may be strictly correct; for it is by no means clear, that the bankrupt had not an absolute property in the chattels, good against all the world, until his assignees asserted some title to it. The case cited, of Armory *v.* Delamirie, was the case of goods coming to the party's possession by finding, where he might justly be said to be entitled to it, as well as possessed of it, as absolute owner, against all the world, until the rightful owner appeared and claimed it; and if it was never claimed, his title as finder remained

possession of goods with claim of right, is sufficient evidence of title, against one who shows no better right.[1] Hence the sheriff, who has attached goods, may maintain this action against one who takes them from his possession, or from that of his bailee for mere custody.[2]

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absolute. The case of a naked depositary does not seem to have been here presented to the mind of the learned Judge. Indeed, there is no small refinement and subtilty in suggesting, that a person, lawfully in possession of a thing, has, at the same time, a special property therein against strangers, and no property at all against the true owner. What sort of special property is that, which has no existence against the owner of the thing, and yet, at the same time, has an existence against other persons? Can there be property, and no property, at the same time? If the language were, that, when a party has a right of possession, that right cannot lawfully be violated by mere wrong-doers; but, if violated, it may be redressed by an action of trespass or trover, it would be intelligible. If the language were, that a person may have a present temporary or defeasible property in a thing, subject to be devested by the subsequent claim of the rightful owner under his paramount title, (such as in the case of the finder of chattels,) or a temporary property not special, which is to become absolute, or extinguished, by future events, (such as the possession of an abstract of the title of the vendor by the vendee, under a contract for a sale and conveyance of real estate,) there would be little difficulty in comprehending the nature and quality of the right, as a *jus in re*. It would be a present fixed right of property, subject to be devested or destroyed by matters *in futuro*. In short, it would be a defeasible, but vested interest *in rem*. But in the case of a naked deposit, by the very theory of the contract, the bailor never means to part for a moment with his right of property, either generally or specially, but solely with his present possession of it; and the undertaking of the bailee is not to restore any right of property, but the mere possession to the bailee. It is this change of possession, which constitutes the known distinction between the custody of a bailee, and that of a mere domestic servant; for, in the latter case, there is no change whatever of possession of the goods, but the possession remains in the master, and the servant has but a charge, or oversight; whereas, in the case of a bailee, there is a positive change of possession. The true description of the right conferred on a naked bailee, is that, which Mr. Justice Blackstone, in the passage before cited, calls a 'possessory interest,' or right of possession, in contradistinction to a general or special property." See Story on Bailments, § 93 *g*, *h*, *i*.

[1] Sutton *v.* Buck, 2 Taunt. 302; Armory *v.* Delamirie, 1 Str. 505; Burton *v.* Hughes, 2 Bing. 173; Giles *v.* Grover, 6 Bligh, 277; Story on Bailments, § 93 *d*, *e*, *f*; Duncan *v.* Spear, 11 Wend. 54; Faulkner *v.* Brown, 13 Wend. 63.

[2] Wilbraham *v.* Snow, 2 Saund. 47: Story on Bailments, § 93 *e*, *f*;

§ 638. Where the plaintiff claims title to goods under a *sale*, and a question is made as to the time when the property passed, it will be material for him to prove, that every thing that the seller had to do was already done, and that nothing remained to be done on his own part, but to take away the specific goods. They must have been weighed or measured, and specifically designated and set apart by the vendor, subject to his control, the vendor remaining, at most, but a mere bailee.[1] If they were sold at auction, the property passes to the vendee, although the goods were not to be delivered to him until the auctioneer had paid the duties to the government; or although they were to be kept by the auctioneer as a warehouseman, for a stipulated time.[2] If, before the terms of sale are complied with, the vendor's servant delivers them to the vendee by mistake, no property passes.[3] Nor does any property pass by a verbal contract of sale, which the statute of frauds requires to be in writing.[4] If a specific article, such as a ship, for example, is to be built, and the price is to be paid by instalments as the work advances, the payment of the instalments as they fall due vests the property of the ship in the vendee; but if the contract is general, without instalments, it is otherwise.[5] But though the property thus passes by the contract of sale, in the manner above stated, yet by rescinding the contract the property of the vendee is divested,

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§ 132 – 135; Brownell *v.* Manchester, 1 Pick. 232; Badlam *v.* Tucker, Ibid. 389. Whether the sheriff's bailee for safe keeping can maintain trover, is a point upon which the decisions are not uniform. See Story on Bailments, § 133; Ludden *v.* Leavitt, 9 Mass. 104; Poole *v.* Symonds, 1 New Hamp. R. 289; Odiorne *v.* Colley, 2 New Hamp. R. 66.

[1] Tarling *v.* Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360; Bloxam *v.* Saunders, 4 B. & C. 948; Simmons *v.* Swift, 5 B. & C. 857.

[2] Hinde *v.* Whitehouse, 7 East, 558, 571; Phillimore *v.* Barry, 1 Campb. 513.

[3] Bishop *v.* Shillito, 2 B. & Ald. 329, note (*a*), per Bayley, J. And see Brandt *v.* Bowlby, 2 B. & Ad. 932.

[4] Bloxsome *v.* Williams, 3 B. & C. 234.

[5] Woods *v.* Russell, 5 B. & Ald. 942; Clarke *v.* Spence, 4 Ad. & El. 448; Goss *v.* Quinton, 3 M. & G. 825; Bishop *v.* Crawshay, 3 B. & C. 419; Mucklow *v.* Mangles, 1 Taunt. 318.

and the vendor is remitted to his former right.[1] If the sale is fraudulent, or illegal, or if the goods were obtained by false pretences, or were stolen and sold by the thief to an innocent purchaser, no property passes.[2]

§ 639. Where the plaintiff claims title as the holder of a *bank note*, *bill of exchange*, *promissory note*, *exchequer bill*,[3] government bond made payable to the holder,[4] or other *negotiable security*, whether payable to bearer, or to order, and indorsed in blank; it is sufficient for him to show, that he took it *bonâ fide* and for a valuable consideration; for this vests the title in him, without regard to the title or want of title in the person from whom he received it. It was formerly held, that if the latter came to the possession by felony, or fraud, or other *mala fides*, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show, that he had used due and reasonable caution in taking it; but though gross negligence in the transferee may still be shown, as evidence of fraud, though not equivalent to it, yet his title is now held to depend, not on the degree of caution which he used, but on his good faith in the transaction.[5] If the security was lost by the plaintiff, and has been found and converted by the defendant, who has paid part of the proceeds to the plaintiff; the acceptance of such part is no waiver of the tort, but trover still lies for the security.[6]

§ 640. There must also be shown in the plaintiff a right to the *present possession* of the goods. If he has only a special property, there must, ordinarily, be evidence of actual

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[1] Pattison *v.* Robinson, 5 M. & S. 105; Ante, § 615.

[2] Wilkinson *v.* King, 2 Campb. 335; Noble *v.* Adams, 7 Taunt. 59; Packer *v.* Gillies, 2 Campb. 336, *n.*; Peer *v.* Humphrey, 2 Ad. & El. 495.

[3] Wookey *v.* Pole, 4 B. & Ald. 1.

[4] Gorgier *v.* Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45.

[5] Story on Bills, § 415, 416; Story on Promissory Notes, § 193-197, 382; Bayley on Bills, p. 130, 131, 524, 531 (5th edit.); Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 254-257; Goodman *v.* Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870; Uther *v.* Rich, 10 Ad. & El. 784.

[6] Burn *v.* Morris, 4 Tyrw. 485.

possession ;[1] but the general property has possession annexed to it, by construction of law.[2] If, however, there is an intermediate right of possession in another person as lessee, the general owner cannot maintain this action. Therefore a lessor of chattels cannot have an action of trover against one who has taken them from the possession of his lessee, so long as the right of the lessee remains in force.[3] But if the interest of the tenant or possessor is determined, whether by forfeiture or otherwise, the general owner may sue. Thus, if the tenant has unlawfully sold the machinery demised with a mill ;[4] or, if a stranger cuts down and removes a tree, during the term ;[5] the general owner may maintain this action against the purchaser or stranger. Upon the same general principle of right to the immediate possession, the purchaser of goods, not sold on credit, has no right to this form of remedy, until he has paid or tendered the price ;[6] even though he has the key of the apartment where the goods are stored, if the vendor still retains the general con-

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[1] Coxe *v.* Harden, 4 East, 211 ; Hotchkiss *v.* M'Vickar, 12 Johns. 407; Sheldon *v.* Soper, 14 Johns. 352; Dennie *v.* Harris, 9 Pick. 364. A factor to whom goods have been consigned, but which have not yet come to hand, may maintain trover for them ; and this is said to contradict, or at least to form an exception to the rule stated in the text. See Fowler *v.* Down, 1 B. & P. 47, per Eyre, C. J. But the possession of the carrier being the possession of the factor, whose servant he is for this purpose, the case would seem on this ground, to be reconcilable with the rule. Bull. N. P. 36 ; Dutton *v.* Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 584; Dawes *v.* Peck, 8 T. R. 330; Chitty on Contr. p. 384; Story on Contr. § 509.

[2] Gordon *v.* Harper, 7 T. R. 12, per Grose, J. ; 2 Saund. 47 *a*, note (1) ; Ayer *v.* Bartlett, 9 Pick. 156; Foster *v.* Gorton, 5 Pick. 185.

[3] Ibid. ; Smith *v.* Plomer, 15 East, 607 ; Wheeler *v.* Train, 3 Pick. 255; Pain *v.* Whittaker, Ry. & M. 99 ; Fairbank *v.* Phelps, 22 Pick. 535 ; Ante, § 616. And see Farrant *v.* Thompson, 5 B. & A. 826. But an intervening right by way of lien, such as that of a carrier, will not deprive the general owner of this remedy, against a wrong-doer. Gordon *v.* Harper, 7 T. R. 12 ; Nichols *v.* Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659.

[4] Farrant *v.* Thompson, 5 B. & A. 826.

[5] Berry *v.* Heard, Cro. Car. 242; Palm. 327 ; 7 T. R. 13; Blaker *v.* Anscombe, 1 New Rep. 25.

[6] Bloxam *v.* Saunders, 4 B. & C. 941; Miles *v.* Gorton, 4 Tyrw. 295.

trol of the premises.[1] So, if the purchaser of lands, being permitted to occupy until default of payment, the title remaining in the vendor for his security, cuts down and sells timber without leave from the vendor, the latter may have trover against the purchaser.[2] And if the bailee of goods for a special purpose, transfers them to another in contravention of that purpose, the remedy is the same.[3] The bailee of materials to be manufactured, may also have this action against a stranger, though the goods were taken by the defendant from the possession of a third person, whom the plaintiff had hired to perform the work.[4] So, a ship-owner may maintain trover for the goods shipped, against the sheriff who attaches them without payment or tender of the freight due.[5]

§ 641. An *executor* or *administrator* has the property of the goods of his testator or intestate vested in him before his actual possession; and therefore may have trover or trespass against one who has previously taken them. And though he does not prove the will, or receive letters of administration, for a long time after the death of the testator or intestate, yet the property will be adjudged to have been in him, by relation, immediately upon the decease.[6] If he relies on his constructive possession, and a conversion after the death

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1 Milgate *v.* Kebble, 3 Man. & Gr. 100.

2 Moores *v.* Wait, 3 Wend. 104.

3 Wilkinson *v.* King, 2 Campb. 335; Loeschman *v.* Machin, 2 Stark. R. 311. But if a consignee of goods for sale, at a price not less than a certain sum, sells them for a less sum, it is not a conversion, but the remedy is by a special action on the case. Serjeant *v.* Blunt, 16 Johns. 74.

4 Eaton *v.* Lynde, 15 Mass. 242.

5 De Wolf *v.* Dearborn, 4 Pick. 466.

6 1 Com. Dig. 341, tit. Administration, B. 10; Ibid. 311, tit. Action upon the Case upon Trover, B; Rex *v.* Horsley, 8 East, 410, per Ld. Ellenborough; Doe *v.* Porter, 3 T. R. 13, 16; Long *v.* Hebb, Sty. 341; Locksmith *v.* Creswell, 2 Roll. Abr. 399, pl. 1; Anon. Comb. 451, per Holt, C. J.; 2 Selw. N. P. 777, 10th ed.; Patten *v.* Patten, 1 Alcock & Napier, R. 493, 504. In Woolley *v.* Clark, 5 B. & Ald. 744, it was said, that, as to the administrator, his title being derived wholly from the Ecclesiastical Court, no right vested in him until the grant of letters of administration;

of the testator or intestate, he must produce and prove at the trial his letters testamentary, or of administration.[1]

§ 642. (2.) The plaintiff must in the next place show, that the defendant has *converted* the goods to his own use. A *conversion* in the sense of the law of trover, consists either in the appropriation of the thing to the party's own use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion or defiance of the plaintiff's right, or in withholding the possession from the plaintiff, under a claim of title, inconsistent with his own.[2] It may, therefore, be either direct, or constructive; and of course is proved either directly, or by inference. Every *unlawful taking*, with intent to apply the goods to the use of the taker, or of some other person than the owner, or having the effect of destroying or altering their nature, is a conversion.[3] But if it does not interfere with the owner's dominion over the property, nor alter its condition, it is not. Upon these principles, it has been held, that if a ferryman wrongfully put the horses of a passenger out of the boat, without farther intent concerning them, it may be a trespass, but is not a

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but the resolution of this point was not essential to the decision in that case, as the defendant, who sold the goods as administrator, sold them after notice of the existence of the will, by which the plaintiff was appointed executrix.

[1] Robinson *v.* M'Donald, 2 Kelly, R. 119.

[2] Fouldes *v.* Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 546–551; Keyworth *v.* Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 685; Bristol *v.* Burt, 7 Johns. 254; Murray *v.* Burling, 10 Johns. 172; Hare *v.* Pearson, 4 Ired. 76; Page *v.* Hatchett, 10 Jur. 634. But the mere cutting down of trees, without taking them away, is not a conversion. Mires *v.* Solebay, 2 Mod. 245.

[3] Bull. N. P. 44; 2 Saund. 47 *g*, by Williams; Prescott *v.* Wright, 6 Mass. 20; Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356; Thurston *v.* Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18. But if a tortious taking has been subsequently assented to by the owner, the remedy in trover is gone. Hewes *v.* Parkman, 20 Pick. 90; Rotch *v.* Hawes, 12 Pick. 136; Clarke *v.* Clarke, 6 Esp. 61; Brewer *v.* Sparrow, 7 B. & C. 310. Taking the plaintiff's goods by mistake, supposing them to be defendant's own, and a subsequent promise to restore them, the performance of which was neglected, have been held sufficient evidence of a conversion. Durrell *v.* Mosher, 8 Johns. 445. See further, Harrington *v.* Payne, 15 Johns. 431.

conversion; but if he make any farther disposition of them, inconsistent with the owner's rights, it is a conversion.[1] So, the taking possession of the bankrupt's goods, by his assignees, is a conversion, as against him, for which he may maintain trover, to try the validity of the commission, without making a demand.[2] So, *using* a thing, without license of the owner, is a conversion; as is also the *misuse* or *detention* of a thing, by the finder, or other bailee.[3] So, the *adulteration* of wine or other liquor by putting water into it, is a conversion of the whole quantity; but the taking away of part is not so, if the residue remains in the same state as before, and is not withheld from the owner.[4] And though a factor, entrusted with goods for sale, may in many cases lawfully deliver them over to another for the same purpose; yet if a bailee of goods deliver them over to another, in violation of the orders of the bailor, it is a conversion.[5] A *mis-delivery* of goods, also, by a wharfinger, carrier, or other bailee, is a conversion;[6] but the accidental loss of them by the mere omission of the carrier is not.[7] A *wrongful sale* of

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[1] Foulds *v.* Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 540.

[2] Summersett *v.* Jarvis, 3 Brod. & Bing. 2.

[3] Mulgrave *v.* Ogden, Cro. El. 219; Ld. Peter *v.* Heneage, 12 Mod. 519; Wheelock *v.* Wheelwright, 5 Mass. 104; Story on Bailm. § 188, 233, 241, 269, 396; Portland Bank *v.* Stubbs, 6 Mass. 422, 427; Ripley *v.* Dolbier, 6 Shepl. 382.

[4] Richardson *v.* Atkinson, 1 Stra. 586; Philpott *v.* Kelley, 3 Ad. & El. 306; Dench *v.* Walker, 14 Mass. 500; Young *v.* Mason, 8 Pick. 551. The mere fact of a bailee's bottling a cask of wine, is not evidence of a conversion. Ibid.

[5] Bromley *v.* Coxwell, 2 B. & P. 438; Seyds *v.* Hay, 4 T. R. 260.

[6] Devereux *v.* Barclay, 2 B. & Ald. 702; Youl *v.* Harbottle, 1 Peake, R. 49; Stephenson *v.* Hart, 4 Bing. 483; Story on Bailm. § 450, 451, 545 *b*.

[7] Ross *v.* Johnson, 5 Burr. 2825; Kirkman *v.* Hargreaves, 1 Selw. N. P. 425; Dwight *v.* Brewster, 1 Pick. 50, 53; Owen *v.* Lewyn, 1 Ventr. 223; Anon. 2 Salk. 655; Hawkins *v.* Hoffman, 6 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 586. There are two cases seeming to the contrary of this; but in one of them, (Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt, 17 Pick. 1,) this point was not raised, but the defendant's liability for a loss was assumed, the case turning wholly on the question of damages; and in the other, (La Place *v.* Aupoix, 1 Johns. Cas. 406,) the case sufficiently shows, that there was an actual conversion.

another's goods, is also a conversion of them ;[1] and though the custody of the goods remains unaltered, yet the delivery of the documentary evidence of title, and the receipt of the value, completes the act of conversion ;[2] but a mere purchase of goods, in good faith, from one who had no right to sell them, is not a conversion of them, against the lawful owner, until his title has been made known and resisted.[3] Nor is the averment of a conversion supported by evidence of nonfeasance alone ; as, if a factor, employed to sell goods, neglects to sell them, or sells them without taking the requisite security.[4]

§ 643. On the other hand, though there has been an actual use or disposition of the goods of another, yet if it was done under the pressure of moral *necessity*, a *license* will sometimes be presumed, and it will not be a conversion. Such is the case, where a shipmaster throws goods into the sea, to save the ship from sinking.[5] So it is, if the thing was taken to do a work of *charity*, or to do a *kindness* to the owner, and without any intention of injury to it, or of converting it to his own use.[6]

§ 644. Where the circumstances do not, of themselves, amount to an actual conversion, it will be incumbent on the plaintiff to give evidence of a *demand and refusal*, at any day prior to the commencement of the action, the time not being material, and also to show that the defendant, at the time of

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1 Edwards *v.* Hooper. 11 M. & W. 363 ; Featherstonhaugh *v.* Johnston, 8 Taunt. 237 ; Lovell *v.* Martin, 4 Taunt. 799 ; Alsager *v.* Close, 10 M. & W. 576 ; Robson *v.* Rolls, 1 M. & Rob. 239 ; Everett *v.* Coffin, 6 Wend. 603 ; Kyle *v.* Gray, 11 Ala. R. 233. But if the sale was by defendant's agent, without his knowledge, *quære ;* and see Machell *v.* Ellis, 1 C. & K. 682.

2 Jackson *v.* Anderson, 4 Taunt. 24.

3 McCombie *v.* Davies, 6 East, 538 ; Baldwin *v.* Cole, 6 Mod. 212.

4 Bromley *v.* Coxwell, 2 B. & P. 438 ; Cairnes *v.* Bleecker, 12 Johns. 300 ; Jenner *v.* Joliffe, 6 Johns. 9.

5 Bird *v.* Astcock, 2 Bulstr. 280. See also Clarke *v.* Clarke, 6 Esp. R. 81.

6 Drake *v.* Shorter, 4 Esp. R. 165.

the demand, had it in his power to give up the goods.[1] But the demand and refusal are only *evidence of a prior conversion*, not in itself conclusive, but liable to be explained and rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[2] The refusal, moreover, must be absolute, amounting to a denial of the plaintiff's title to the possession; and not a mere excuse or apology for not delivering the goods at present;[3] but it need not be expressed; it may be inferred from non-compliance with a proper demand.[4] If, however, the refusal is qualified by a condition which the party had no right to impose, it is evidence of a conversion.[5] And so it is, if it is grounded on a claim of right by a third party.[6] If the demand was made by an agent, the plaintiff must also prove his authority to make it; otherwise the refusal will be no evidence of a conversion.[7]

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[1] Bull. N. P. 44; Vincent *v.* Cornell, 13 Pick. 294; Nixon *v.* Jenkins, 2 H. Bl. 135; Edwards *v.* Hooper, 11 M. & W. 366, per Parke, B.; Smith *v.* Young, 1 Campb. 441. See Kinder *v.* Shaw, 2 Mass. 398; Chamberlain *v.* Shaw, 18 Pick. 278; Leonard *v.* Tidd, 2 Met. 6; Jones *v.* Fort, 9 B. & C. 764; Anon. 2 Salk. 655.

[2] 2 Saund. 47 *e*, by Williams; Wilton *v.* Girdlestone, 5 B. & Ald. 847, per Cur.; Thompson *v.* Rose, 16 Conn. 71. Ordinarily, the Jury are instructed to find a conversion, upon evidence of a demand and refusal; but it will not be inferred by the Court, as a deduction of law. Mires *v.* Solebay, 2 Mod. 244; 10 Co. 56, 57; 2 Roll. Abr. 693; Jacoby *v.* Laussat, 6 S. & R. 300. A cow, going at large in the highway, without a keeper, joined a drove of cattle, without the knowledge of the driver, and was driven with them to a distant town and there depastured with the others, during the summer. After the driver's return, the owner of the cow called on him to make inquiries, and demanded his cow; and on the return of the drove in the autumn, the driver delivered the cow to the owner, who received her. In an action of trover against the driver, it was held, that his omission to deliver the cow, on demand, was not proof of a conversion. Wellington *v.* Wentworth, 8 Met. 548.

[3] Severin *v.* Keppell, 4 Esp. R. 156. And see Addison *v.* Round, 7 C. & P. 285; Philpott *v.* Kelley, 3 Ad. & El. 106; Pattison *v.* Robinson, 5 M. & S. 105; Caunce *v.* Spanton, 7 M. & G. 903.

[4] Watkins *v.* Woolley, 1 Gow, R. 69; Golightly *v.* Ryn, Lofft, R. 88; Davies *v.* Nicholas, 7 C. & P. 339. A demand in writing, left at the defendant's house, is sufficient. Ibid.; Logan *v.* Houlditch, 1 Esp. 22.

[5] Davies *v.* Vernon, 6 Ad. & El. 443, N. S.

[6] Caunce *v.* Spanton, 7 M. & G. 903.

[7] Gunton *v.* Nurse, 2 Brod. & Bing. 447.

And if the demand is made upon a bailee of goods, entrusted to him to keep on the joint account of several owners, a demand by one alone, without the authority of the others, is not sufficient.[1] So also, if goods are bailed to two, a demand on one alone is not sufficient to charge the other in trover, though it may suffice to charge him in an action *ex contractu*.[2]

§ 645. Even an absolute refusal is not always evidence of a conversion. Thus, where the plaintiff's goods were attached in the hands of his bailee, who on that account refused to deliver them, it was held no conversion.[3] So it is, where the possessor of goods refuses to deliver them up, until some ownership is shown in the claimant;[4] or, until some other condition, lawfully imposed by him is complied with;[5] as, where a servant, having the custody of goods apparently his master's, refuses to deliver them without an order from his master.[6] So, if the bailee of goods asks time to return them to the person from whom he received them, that the owner may claim them from the latter rather than from himself;[7] or if the owner has coupled his demand with a claim that the goods shall be returned in a certain plight, in the way of repairs, which the other party denies his liability to make;[8] this is not evidence of a conversion. So where the principal refers the claimant to his agent, in whose

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1 May *v.* Harvey, 13 East, 197.

2 Nicoll *v.* Glennie, 1 M. & S. 588; White *v.* Demary, 2 N. Hamp. 546; Griswold *v.* Plumb, 13 Mass. 298; Ante, Vol. 1, § 112, 174; Mitchell *v.* Williams, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 13.

3 Verrall *v.* Robinson, 2 C. M. & R. 495.

4 Solomons *v.* Dawes, 1 Esp. 82, per Ld. Kenyon; Green *v.* Dunn, 3 Campb. 215, *n.*

5 Davies *v.* Vernon, 6 Ad. & El. 443, N. S.

6 Alexander *v.* Southey, 5 B. & Ald. 247; Coles *v.* Wright, 4 Taunt. 198; Shotwell *v.* Few, 7 Johns. 302. But see Judah *v.* Kemp, 2 Johns. Cas. 411.

7 Dowd *v.* Wadsworth, 2 Dev. 130.

8 Rushworth *v.* Taylor, 3 Ad. & El. 699, N. S.

hands the goods actually are at the time;[1] and where a general agent refuses to deliver the goods, the refusal not having been directed by his principal.[2] But where the refusal is within the scope of the agent's authority, it is otherwise. Thus a refusal by a pawnbroker's servant has been held evidence of a conversion by his master.[3] If, however, the servant actually disposes of the property, or withholds it, though for his master's use, as, if he sells it, or tortiously takes it, or, it being a negotiated bill of exchange delivered to him by an agent for discount, he passes it to the agent's credit in his master's books, and afterwards refuses to restore it to the principal, it is a conversion by the servant.[4] So, if the demand is qualified by the claimant's requiring that the goods be restored in their original plight, a general refusal is not evidence of a conversion.[5]

§ 646. If the parties are *tenants in common* of the chattel which is the subject of this action, it will not be sufficient for the plaintiff to prove, that the defendant has taken the chattel into his exclusive custody, and withholds the possession from the plaintiff; for this either party may lawfully do, each being equally entitled to the possession and use.[6] And for the like reason, this action will not lie against one part-owner who has changed the form of the chattel, by converting it to its ultimately intended and profitable use.[7] But the plaintiff, in such cases, must prove that the act of the defendant was tortious, having the effect, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, of a total destruction of the property.[8]

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[1] Canot *v.* Hughes, 2 Bing. N. C. 448.

[2] Pothonier *v.* Dawson, Holt, Cas. 383.

[3] Jones *v.* Hart, 2 Salk. 441. And see Catterall *v.* Kenyon, 6 Jur. 507.

[4] Cranch *v.* White, 1 Bing. N. C. 414; Perkins *v.* Smith, 1 Wils. 328; Stephens *v.* Elwall, 4 M. & S. 260.

[5] Rushworth *v.* Taylor, 6 Jur. 945; 3 Ad. & El. N. S. 699, S. C.

[6] Barnardiston *v.* Chapman, cited 4 East, 120; Holliday *v.* Camsell, 1 T. R. 658; Daniels *v.* Daniels, 7 Mass. 137, per Parsons, C. J.

[7] Fennings *v.* Ld. Greenfield, 1 Taunt. 241.

[8] 1 Taunt. 249; Co. Litt. 200 *a*, *b*; Bull. N. P. 34, 35; 2 Saund. 47 *h*,

§ 647. If trover is brought by *husband and wife*, for goods which were the sole property of the feme, and were taken

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by Williams; Guyther *v.* Pettijohn, 6 Ired. 388; Weld *v.* Oliver, 21 Pick. 559. Whether the absolute sale of the whole of the entire chattel by one of several owners in common, is of itself sufficient evidence of a conversion, to make him liable in trover at the suit of his co-tenant, is a point upon which there is some difference of opinion. The rule of the Common Law, that trespass lies, where one party destroys the thing owned in common, is not controverted. And it is generally conceded, that the party is equally liable in trover for an actual conversion of the property to his own use, at least, where the act of appropriation is such, as finally, by its nature, to preclude the other party from any future enjoyment of it. Such is the case where it is consumed in the use. And upon the same principle, where the sale is one of a series of acts, whether by the vendor or vendee, which result in putting the property forever out of the reach of the other party, it is a conversion. Such was the case of Barnardiston *v.* Chapman, 4 East, 121, where the defendants forcibly took the ship, owned in common, from the plaintiff's possession, changed her name, and sold her to a stranger, in whose possession she was lost in a storm at sea. Here the Court resolved, that the taking from the plaintiff's possession was not a conversion; but left it to the Jury to find, from the circumstances, that the ship was destroyed by the defendant's means; which they did, and it was held well. But a sale alone was deemed insufficient to establish a conversion, by the opinion of the whole Court, in Heath *v.* Hubbard, 4 East, 110, 128, though the case itself was decided on the ground, that in the instance before them there was not a legal sale. Such also was the opinion of Best, J. in Barton *v.* Williams, 5 B. & Ald. 395; to which Holroyd, J. inclined; though Bayley, J. was of a different opinion, and Abbott, C. J. was inclined to think with him, that the sale in that case, which was of India warrants, was a conversion. But afterwards, in the same case, upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber, 1 M'Cl. & Y. 406, 415, 416, the Court observed, that there was "great weight in the argument," that the original plaintiffs being tenants in common with the defendants, could not maintain trover in a Court of law on the ground of a sale; but they did not decide the cause on that point, being of opinion that the tenancy in common had been previously severed by the parties. In this country, in a case where two being tenants in common of a quantity of wool, one of them, having the possession, sold a part of it, and retained the residue, claiming the whole as his own, and refusing to deliver up any part to the other, this was held not such a conversion of the property as to sustain an action of trover. Tubbs *v.* Richardson, 6 Verm. R. 442. See also Selden *v.* Hickock, 2 Caines, R. 166. The same doctrine was held in Oviatt *v.* Sage, 7 Conn. 95, where one tenant in common of a quantity of cheese had sold the whole to a stranger. That there must either be "a destruction of the chattel, or something that is equivalent to it," was the opinion of Chambre, J. in Fennings *v.* Ld. Grenville, 1 Taunt. 249. And

before the marriage, proof of a conversion before or after the marriage will support the action; but if the husband sues

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accordingly in this case it was resolved, that the conversion of the chattel into its ultimately destined and profitable material, as, of a whale, into oil, was no severance of the tenancy in common. On the same principle, namely, that while the thing substantially exists within the reach of the party, the tenancy in common remains unchanged, it has been repeatedly held, that a sale of the entire chattel, by the sheriff, on an execution against one of the owners, does not sever the tenancy, or devest the property of the others. St. John *v.* Standring, 2 Johns. 468; Mersereau *v.* Norton, 15 Johns. 179. But a disposition of a perishable article by one joint-owner, which prevents the other from recovering the possession, is deemed equivalent to its destruction. Lucas *v.* Wasson, 3 Dev. Rep. 398; confirmed in Cole *v.* Terry, 2 Dev. & Bat. 252, 254. See also Farrar *v.* Beswick, 1 M. & W. 688. Mayhew *v.* Herrick, 18 Law J. 179, C. P.

But there are cases, on the other hand, in which it has been said that a sale alone, by one tenant in common, is sufficient to charge him in trover, for a conversion of the entire chattel. The earliest and leading case to this effect, is that of Wilson et al. *v.* Reed, 3 Johns. 175; in which it appeared, that the plaintiffs and one Gibbs were joint-owners of a hogshead of rum and a pair of scale beams, which the sheriff seized and sold *in toto* to the defendant, by virtue of an execution against Gibbs. The defendant sold the rum at retail to his customers; and in an action of trover brought against him for the goods, by the other two owners, the Judge at *nisi prius* instructed the Jury, that the retailing of the rum by the defendant was in law a destruction, so as to enable the plaintiffs to maintain the action to this extent; and his instructions were held correct. The learned Judge, who delivered the opinion of the Court in bank, placed it, as to this point, on the general ground, that a sale was a conversion of the property. But as in this case the property had actually been consumed by the vendee, beyond the power of recovery, it was to all intents an actual conversion, and the general remark was wholly uncalled for by the case in judgment. The same doctrine, however, was recognized in Hyde *v.* Stone, 9 Cowen, R. 230. This was an action of trover for certain articles of household furniture, farming utensils, and other personal property, of which the plaintiff was tenant in common with his step-father, the defendant. It was admitted by the defendant that some of these articles had been sold by him, at different times since his marriage, during a period of six or seven years; and that others had been destroyed, and others nearly worn out; of all which it appeared that he had exhibited an account, estimating the value of the several articles, and charging the plaintiff for the value of his board, &c., leaving a balance due to the plaintiff, for which he admitted himself liable, and promised to pay. Hereupon the Judge instructed the Jury, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of his share of the goods; and these instructions were held correct. Here, also, it is manifest, that the articles

alone, he must prove a conversion after the marriage.[1] If the action is against the husband and wife, the plaintiff must aver and prove, either a conversion by the wife alone, before the marriage, or a subsequent conversion by the joint act of both; and it seems, that in the latter case the evidence ought to show some act of conversion other than that which merely goes to the acquisition or detention of the property to their

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which had been sold, were utterly and forever gone beyond the reach of the plaintiff, by means of the wrongful act of the defendant; and that as to these, as well as those destroyed, the proof of actual conversion was complete. The remark, therefore, of the learned Judge, who delivered the opinion of the Court, that for a sale, trover will lie by one tenant in common against another, referring to the case of Wilson *v.* Reed, was not called for by the case before him, and may be regarded as an *obiter dictum*. A new trial having been granted, upon other grounds, the Jury were again instructed, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of his two thirds of all the property sold, lost or destroyed. But it is observable, that the Court, in their final judgment, (7 Wend. 356–358,) regarded the property as wholly lost to the plaintiff, by the fault of the defendant; the only proposition laid down as the basis of their judgment being the settled doctrine, that trover will lie by one tenant in common, against another, for the loss or destruction of the chattel, while in his possession. Of a similar character was the case of Mumford *v.* McKay, 8 Wend. 442, which was a sale of wheat, in the grain; and of Farr *v.* Smith, 9 Wend. 338, which was a sale of wheat in the sheaf; in both of which cases the conversion was actual; though in both also, and apparently without much consideration, a sale seems to have been taken as in itself, and in all circumstances, a conversion. But the point was subsequently brought directly before the Supreme Court of the same State, in White *v.* Osborn, 21 Wend. 72, which was the sale of an entire sloop plying on Lake Champlain; which was held a conversion. The decision of the Court in this case was placed partly on the ground of the *dicta* above quoted, and partly on the decisions in Wilson *v.* Reed, Mumford *v.* McKay, and Hyde *v.* Stone, which have just been considered. Subsequently, it has been held in New York, that if the sheriff sells the entire property in goods owned by two, on an execution against one of them only, it is an abuse of his legal authority, which renders him liable as a trespasser *ab initio*. Waddell *v.* Cook, 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 47. See also Melville *v.* Brown, 15 Mass. 82, which, though briefly reported, was in fact very elaborately argued and well considered. But this point stands entirely clear of the question, whether one tenant in common may have trover for a sale only by the other. See further, Lowe *v.* Miller, 3 Gratt. 205; Hurd *v.* Darling, 14 Verm. 214; Weld *v.* Oliver, 21 Pick. 559; Rains *v.* McMarry, 4 Humph. 356.

[1] 2 Saund. 47 *g*, by Williams.

use; for if the goods remain in specie in their hands, it is a conversion only by the husband.[1]

§ 648. The DEFENCE of this action, in the United States, when it does not consist of matters of law, is almost universally made under the general issue of *not guilty;* a special plea in trover being as seldom seen here, as it was in England under the old rules of practice. And though in the latter country this plea is now held, and perhaps wisely, to put in issue only the fact of conversion, and not its character, as rightful or otherwise, nor any other matter of inducement in the declaration, such as the title of the plaintiff, nor any matter of title or claim in the defendant, or of subsequent satisfaction or discharge of the action; yet in this country, as formerly in England, this plea still puts the whole declaration in issue.[2] Under it, therefore, the defendant may prove, by any competent evidence, that the title to the goods was in himself, either absolutely, as general owner, or as joint-owner with the plaintiff, or specially, as bailee, or by way of lien;[3] or that he took the goods for tolls, or for rent in arrear;[4] or he may disprove the plaintiff's title by showing a paramount title in a stranger, or otherwise;[5] or he may prove facts showing a license;[6] or, a subsequent ratification of the taking;[7] or, that the plaintiff has discharged other joint par-

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[1] 2 Saund. 47 *h*, *i*, by Williams; Draper *v.* Fulkes, Yelv. 165, and note (1), by Metcalf; Keyworth *v.* Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 685.

[2] 2 Selw. N. P. 1068, [2d Am. edit.]; 1 Chitty, Pl. 436, [5th Am. edit.]; Bull. N. P. 48.

[3] Skinner *v.* Upshaw, 2 Ld. Raym. 752; Bull. N. P. 45. But to rebut the evidence of a demand and refusal, he must show, that he mentioned his lien at the time of refusal. Boardman *v.* Sill, 1 Campb. 410, *n.* See further, Laclough *v.* Towle, 3 Esp. 114, and the cases of lien collected in Roscoe on Evid. 408 – 412, [1st Am. edit.], 517 – 524, [6th Lond. edit.]

[4] Wallace *v.* King, 1 H. Bl. 13; Kline *v.* Husted, 3 Caines, R. 275; Shipwick *v.* Blanchard, 6 T. R. 298.

[5] Dawes *v.* Peck, 8 T. R. 330; Schermerhorn *v.* Van Volkenburg, 11 Johns. 529; Kennedy *v.* Strong, 14 Johns. 128; Rotan *v.* Fletcher, 15 Johns. 207.

[6] Clarke *v.* Clarke, 6 Esp. R. 61; Bird *v.* Astcock, 2 Bulstr. 280.

[7] Hewes *v.* Parkman, 2 Pick. 90.

ties with the defendant, in the wrongful act complained of.[1] It has been said, that a release is the only special plea in trover;[2] but the statute of limitations, also, is usually pleaded specially;[3] and indeed there seems to be no reason why the same principle should not be admitted here, which prevails in other actions, namely, that the defendant may plead specially any thing, which, admitting that the plaintiff had once a cause of action, goes to discharge it.[4]

§ 649. The measure of *damages* in this action has already been considered under its appropriate head.[5] It may be added, that special damages are recoverable, if particularly alleged.[6] If the subject is a bill of exchange, or other security, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to the sum recoverable upon it, though the defendant may have sold it for a less sum.[7] And though the defendant cannot, under the general issue, show the non-joinder of another part owner, to defeat the action, yet he may give that fact in evidence, in order to reduce the plaintiff's damages to the value of his own interest or share in the property.[8] Where the property has not been restored, the general measure of damages is the value of the thing taken, to which the Jury may, in their discretion, add interest on the value;[9] and if the goods have been fairly

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[1] Dufresne *v.* Hutchinson, 3 Taunt. 117.

[2] Per Twisden, J. in Devoe *v.* Corydon, 1 Keb. 305.

[3] Bull. N. P. 48; Wingfield *v.* Stratford, Sayer, R. 15, 16; Swayn *v.* Stephens, Cro. Car. 245; Granger *v.* George, 5 B. & C. 150; 1 Campb. 558, per Ld. Ellenborough, 1 Danv. Abr. 25.

[4] 1 Tidd's Pr. 598. See Yelv. 174 *a*, note (1), by Metcalf.

[5] Ante, tit. DAMAGES, § 276. See also Ante, § 635 *a*. See further, Countess of Rutland's case, 1 Roll. Abr. 5.

[6] Davis *v.* Oswell, 7 C. & P. 804; Moon *v.* Raphael, 2 Bing. N. C. 310; Bodley *v.* Reynolds, 10 Jur. 310, 8 Ad. & El. 779.

[7] Alsager *v.* Close, 10 M. & W. 576; McLeod *v.* M'Ghie, 2 Man. & Gr. 326; Mercer *v.* Jones, 3 Campb. 477.

[8] Bloxam *v.* Hubbard, 5 East, 420; Nelthrope *v.* Dorrington, 2 Lev. 113; Wheelright *v.* Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471.

[9] Finch *v.* Blount, 7 C. & P. 478, per Patterson, J.; Johnson *v.* Sumner, 1 Metc. 172; Mathews *v.* Menedger, 2 McLean, 145.

sold under authority of law, the amount realized by the sale will ordinarily be taken as their true value.[1] But it has been held in England, that the Jury are not bound to find the value at the time of the conversion, but they may find, as damages, the value at a subsequent time, at their discretion.[2] In this country, however, the courts are inclined to adhere to the value at the time of the conversion, unless this value has subsequently been enhanced by the defendant.[3] But if the property has been restored to the plaintiff, this will go in mitigation of the damages; and if it has been recovered by him, by the payment of a reward or otherwise, the expense so incurred is to be allowed to him by the Jury.[4] If he can be indemnified by a sum of money less than the full value, as for example, where he has only a special property, subject to which the defendant is entitled to the goods, that sum is the measure of damages. But if he is responsible over to a third person, or if the defendant is not entitled to the balance of the value, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the whole value.[5] Where the action is against an executor *de son tort*, proof that the goods have been applied in payment of debts of the intestate is admissible to reduce the damages; but he cannot retain for his own debt; nor, as it seems, for moneys of his own which he has expended in payment of other debts of the intestate, if the goods still remain in his hands.[6]

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[1] Whitmore *v.* Black, 13 M. & W. 507. If the goods have been converted into money by the defendant, to his own use, this sum, with interest, will be the lowest measure of damages. Ewart *v.* Kerr, 2 McMullen, 141.

[2] Greening *v.* Wilkinson, 1 C. & P. 625. And see Cook *v.* Hartle, 8 C. & P. 568; Whitehouse *v.* Atkinson, 3 C. & P. 344.

[3] Ante, tit. DAMAGES, § 276.

[4] Greenfield Bank *v.* Leavitt, 17 Pick. 1. And see Pierce *v.* Benjamin, 14 Pick, 356, 361; Yale *v.* Saunders, 16 Verm. R. 243. So, if the goods have been illegally sold, in discharge of a lien, and bought in by the owner, who sues the seller in trover. Hunt *v.* Haskell, 11 Shepl. 309.

[5] Chamberlain *v.* Shaw, 18 Pick. 278, 283, 284.

[6] Bull. N. P. 48; Whitehall *v.* Squire, Carth. 104; Mountford *v.* Gibson, 4 East, 441, 447.

WASTE.

§ 650. WASTE is "a spoil or destruction in corporeal hereditaments, to the disherison of him that hath the remainder or reversion in fee simple or fee tail."[1] It includes every act of lasting damage to the freehold or inheritance; and is punishable either by an action of waste, or by an action on the case. The former is a mixed action, in which the plaintiff generally recovers possession of the place wasted, which is forfeited by the tenant, together with damages for the injury; but in the latter action, damages only are recovered.

§ 651. The old action of waste still lies in some of the United States, the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5, having been brought over and adopted in those States as part of the Common Law;[2] though it is seldom resorted to; but in others, it has never been recognized; the only remedy being either an action on the case, or an injunction.[3]

§ 652. The *action of waste* lies against a tenant for life or for years, in favor of him only who has the next immediate estate of inheritance, in reversion or remainder. The material averments in the declaration, and which the plaintiff must be prepared to prove, are, (1.) the title of the plaintiff, in stating which he must show how he is entitled to the

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1 2 Bl. Comm. 281; Co. Lit. 52 *b*, 53.

2 Jackson on Real Actions, p. 340; Carver *v.* Miller, 4 Mass. 559; Randall *v.* Cleaveland, 6 Conn. R. 329.

3 Shult *v.* Baker, 12 S. & R. 273; Findlay *v.* Smith, 6 Munf. 134; Bright *v.* Wilson, 1 Cam. & Norw. 24; Sheppard *v.* Sheppard, 2 Hayw. 382.

inheritance, as fully and correctly as in a writ of entry on intrusion, or any other writ in which an estate for life or years is set forth in the tenant; (2.) the demise, if there be one, or other title of the tenant, but with no more particularity than is necessary in stating an adversary's title; (3.) the quality, quantity and amount of the waste, and the place in which it was committed, as, whether in the whole premises, or in a distinct part of them, and whether it were done *sparsim*, as by cutting trees in different parts of a wood, or totally, as by prostrating an entire building. The averment of tenure may be either in the *tenet* "which the said *T. holds*," or in the *tenuit*, "which he *held*," as it has reference to the time of the waste done and not the time of bringing the action. In the former case, the plaintiff will recover the place wasted, namely, that part of the premises in which the waste was exclusively done, if it were done in a part only, together with treble damages. But in the latter case, the tenancy being at an end, he will have judgment for his damages alone. If the waste was committed by an assignee of a tenant in dower or by the curtesy, the action, if brought by the heir of the husband or feme, must be against the original tenant, the assignee being regarded only as his bailiff or servant. But if the reversioner has also assigned his inheritance, and the assignee of the tenant for life has attorned, the latter is considered as the tenant, and he alone is liable for waste done by himself. So, if any lessee for life or years commits waste, and afterwards assigns his whole estate, the action of waste lies against the original tenant, and the place wasted may be recovered from the assignee, though he is not a party to the suit, the title of his assignor having been forfeited previous to the assignment. But if the assignee himself committed the waste, he alone is liable to the action. It follows, that a general plea of *non-tenure* is not a good plea to this action; but the defendant may plead a special non-tenure, as, for example, if he was lessee for life, and not a tenant in dower or by the curtesy, he may plead, that he assigned over all his estate, previous to which no waste was committed; or, if

he was the assignee, he may plead the assignment, and that no waste had subsequently been committed.[1]

§ 653. The plea usually termed the *general issue*, in the action of waste, is, that the defendant "did not make any waste, sale, or destruction in the messuage and premises aforesaid, as the plaintiff in his writ and declaration has supposed." This plea has been said to put in issue the whole declaration ;[2] but the better opinion seems to be, that it puts in issue only the fact and circumstances of the waste done, to which point alone, therefore, is any evidence admissible. If the defendant would contest the plaintiff's title, or would show any matter in justification or excuse, such as, that he cut the timber for repairs, or the wood for fuel, or, that his lease was without impeachment of waste, or, that he has subsequently repaired the damage, prior to the commencement of the action, or, that he did the act by license from the plaintiff, or has any other like ground of defence, he must plead it specially.[3]

§ 654. In an *action on the case*, in the nature of waste, brought by a landlord, whether lessor, heir, or assignee, against his tenant, whether lessee or assignee, their respective titles are not set out with so much precision as in the action of waste, but their relations to each other are stated in a more general manner, namely, that the defendant was possessed of the described premises during the period mentioned, and held and occupied them as tenant to the plaintiff, to whom the reversion during the same period belonged, under a certain demise previously made, and for a certain rent payable there-

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[1] See Jackson on Real Actions, p. 329 – 337, where also may be found precedents of the various counts in this action. See also 2 Inst. 301, 302 ; 2 Saund. 252 *a*, note (7), by Williams.

[2] This opinion of Sergeant Williams, 2 Saund. 238, note (5), founded on an implied admission of the point in a case in 2 Lutw. 1547, is shown to be not well founded, in Jackson on Real actions, p. 338, 339.

[3] 2 Saund. 338, note (5), by Williams ; Jackson on Real Actions, p. 339, 340.

for to the plaintiff. But if the defendant is tenant for life, and the plaintiff is remainder-man or reversioner, it seems necessary to set forth the quantity of the defendant's estate ; but it is not necessary to state the quantity of the estate of the plaintiff ; nor is it expedient ; for if he does state it, and mistakes it, the variance will be fatal.[1]

§ 655. In *both these kinds of action*, it seems necessary to state in the declaration the *special waste* complained of, as, whether it were voluntary or not, and whether in the house, and in what part thereof, or whether in the fences or trees, and the like ; and the plaintiff will not be allowed to give evidence of one kind of waste, under an averment of another ; as, if the defendant is charged with uncovering the roof of the house, the plaintiff will not be permitted to prove waste in the removal of fixtures ; and if the averment is, that the defendant permitted the premises to be out of repair, evidence of acts of voluntary waste is inadmissible.[2] But it is not necessary, in either form of action, for the plaintiff to prove the whole waste stated ; nor in an action on the case, is there any need that the Jury should find the particular circumstances of the waste, or find for the defendant as to so much of the waste as the plaintiff fails to prove ; for in this action the plaintiff goes only for his damages.[3]

§ 656. Under the *general issue, of not guilty*, in the action on the case, the entire declaration being open, the *plaintiff* must prove, (1.) his title, and the holding by the defendant,

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[1] 2 Saund. 252, *c, d*, note by Williams.

[2] 2 Saund. 252 *d*, note by Williams; Edge *v.* Pemberton, 12 M. & W. 187 ; Ante, Vol. 1, § 52. If the waste is only permissive, it seems, that an action on the case in the nature of waste does not lie, the remedy, if any, being only in contract. Countess of Pembroke's case, 5 Co. 13 ; Gibson *v.* Wells, 1 New Rep. 290 ; Herne *v.* Bembow, 4 Taunt. 764 ; Jones *v.* Hill, 7 Taunt. 392 ; Martin *v.* Gillam, 7 Ad. & El. 540. But this action lies for waste done by a tenant, holding over after the expiration of his lease. Kinlyside *v.* Thornton, 2 W. Bl. 1111 ; Burchell *v.* Hornsby, 1 Campb. 360.

[3] 2 Saund. 252 *d, e*, note by Williams.

as alleged; (2.) the waste complained of; and (3.) the damages. But it is to be observed, that in the United States the law of waste is not held precisely in the same manner as in England; but it is accommodated to the condition and circumstances of a new country, still in the progress of settlement. Therefore, to cut down trees is not always held to be waste here, in every case where, by the Common Law of England, it would be so held; but regard is had to the condition of the land, and to the object of felling the trees, and whether good husbandry required that the land should be cleared and reduced to tillage; and generally, whether the tenant has, in the act complained of, conformed to the known usage and practice of the country in similar cases.[1] And to what extent wood and timber may be felled without waste, is a question of fact for the Jury to decide, under the direction of the Court.[2] Under this issue, therefore, it would seem, that the *defendant* may show that the act done was according to the custom of the country, and for the benefit of the land, it being virtually to show that it is no waste; though by the Common Law of England, such a defence, being matter in justification or excuse, must be specially pleaded.[3] But it is no defence to show that the defendant was bound by covenant to yield up the premises in good repair at the end of the term, and that therefore the plaintiff should resort to his remedy on the covenant; for he may have remedy in either mode, at his election; otherwise, he might lose his recompense, by being obliged to wait until the end of the term.[4]

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[1] Findlay *v.* Smith, 6 Munf. 134; Jackson *v.* Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 233; Parkins *v.* Cox, 2 Hayw. 339; Hastings *v.* Crunkleton, 3 Yeates, 261. See 1 Cruise's Dig. tit. iii. Estates for Life, ch. 2.

[2] Jackson *v.* Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 233.

[3] Ibid. See Simmons *v.* Norton, 7 Bing. 640; 5 Moore & P. 645, S. C.

[4] 2 Saund. 252 *c*, note by Williams; Kinlyside *v.* Thornton, 2 W. Bl. 1111; Jefferson *v.* Jefferson, 3 Lev. 130.

WAY.

§ 657. A PRIVATE right of way may be said to exist only by grant, or agreement; for prescription is but a conclusive presumption of an original grant or right; and necessity, such as creates a right of way, may be regarded as a conclusive presumption of a grant or a license.[1] The nature of a prescription, whether for a right of way, or other incorporeal franchise, has already been considered, under that title.[2]

§ 658. A right of *way of necessity* is founded on an implied grant; but convenience alone is not sufficient to raise the implication of a way.[3] Where one has a way of necessity over another's land, the party, while the way remains undefined, may pass over any part of the land, in the course least prejudicial to the owner and passable with reasonable convenience. But it is the right of the owner of the land to designate the particular course of such way; and he is bound to designate a convenient course. If he neglects so to do, the other party may select the tract for himself.[4] And if the way of necessity results from successive levies of executions upon the debtor's land, the land taken by the creditor, whose levy creates the necessity, must be burdened with the easement.[5]

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[1] Nichols *v.* Luce, 24 Pick. 102; Woolrych on Ways, p. 72, note (*q.*) Gayethy *v.* Bethune, 14 Mass. 49, 53.

[2] Ante, § 537 – 546.

[3] Nichols *v.* Luce, 24 Pick. 102. And see Brice *v.* Randall, 7 Gill & J. 349.

[4] Holmes *v.* Seeley, 19 Wend. 507; Russell *v.* Jaikson, 2 Pick. 574; Capers *v.* Wilson, 3 McCord, 170.

[5] Russell *v.* Jackson, 2 Pick. 574, 578. And see Pernam *v.* Weed, 2 Mass. 203; Taylor *v.* Townsend, 8 Mass. 411; Collins *v.* Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 423; Farnum *v.* Platt, 8 Pick. 339.

§ 659. The *proof of a private way* must correspond with the description, whether it be in the declaration in an action for disturbance of the right, or in a special plea in trespass. Evidence of user of a right of way for all manner of carriages, is not sufficient to support an allegation of such right for all manner of cattle, though it is admissible under that issue; nor does evidence of a user of a way with horses, carts and carriages, for certain purposes, necessarily prove a right of way for all purposes.[1] But the allegation of a foot-way, is supported by evidence of a carriage-way; and the allegation of a private way is supported by evidence of a public way; for in these cases the latter includes the former.[2] The extent of the right is a question for the Jury, under all the circumstances proved. But a user for all the purposes for which the party had occasion, is evidence of a general right of way.[3] The *termini* of the way are also material to be proved as alleged; for if the proof stops short of either, it is fatal, unless the pleadings are amended.[4] But the words "towards and unto" do not necessarily bind the party to the proof of a straight road;[5] nor is it a fatal variance, if it appear that the way, in its course, passes over an intermediate close of the party himself who claims it.[6]

§ 659 *a*. Where a private way is claimed by virtue of a conveyance of land, and as *appurtenant* to the same, evidence

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[1] Ballard *v*. Dyson, 1 Taunt. 279; Cowling *v*. Higginson, 4 M. & W. 245. And see Brunton *v*. Hall, 1 Ad. & El. 792, N. S.; Higham *v*. Rabett, 3 Jur. 588; 5 Bing. N. C. 622, S. C.

[2] Davies *v*. Stephens, 7 C. & P. 570, per Ld. Denman; Brownlow *v*. Tomlinson, 1 Man. & Gr. 484.

[3] Cowling *v*. Higginson, 4 M. & W. 245; Allan *v*. Gomme, 11 Ad. & El. 759. See Ante, § 544, 545. If the proof is of a use, common to all others, as well as to the party claiming the way, it does not establish a *private* way. Prince *v*. Wilbourn, 1 Rich. 58.

[4] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 58, 62, 63, 71, 72; Wright *v*. Rattray, 1 East, 377.

[5] Rex *v*. Marchioness of Downshire, 4 Ad. & El. 232.

[6] Jackson *v*. Shillito, cited 1 East, 381, 382. See Simpson *v*. Lewthwaite, 3 B. & Ad. 226.

aliundè, by parol or otherwise, may be given, to prove that a particular way was then in use by the grantor; in which case it passed as parcel of the estate conveyed.[1]

§ 660. In an action on the case for *disturbance of a way*, or other easement, the defendant, on a traverse of the right, may show, that it has ceased to exist; or that, during the period of the supposed acquisition of a way by user, the land was in the possession of a tenant of the plaintiff; or, that the way was only by sufferance, during his own pleasure, for which the plaintiff paid him a compensation, or submitted to the condition of a gate across it;[2] or, that the plaintiff had submitted to an obstruction upon it for more than twenty years;[3] or, that the right has been extinguished by unity of title and possession in the same person;[4] or that the right is released and gone, by reason of an extinction or abandonment of the object for which it was granted; as, if it be a way to a warehouse, and the house is afterwards pulled down, and a dwelling house is built upon the place.[5] And if the way is claimed by necessity, he may show, that the plaintiff can now approach the place by passing over his own land.[6]

§ 661. In *trespass*, also, if the defendant pleads a right of

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[1] Atkins *v.* Boardman, 2 Met. 457, 464; White *v.* Crawford, 10 Mass. 183; U. States *v.* Appleton, 1 Sumn. 492, 501, 502; Staples *v.* Hayden, 6 Mod. 4; Kent *v.* Waite, 10 Pick. 138.

[2] Reignolds *v.* Edwards, Willes, R. 282.

[3] Bower *v.* Hill, 1 Bing. N. C. 549, 555, per Tindal, C. J.; Rex *v.* Smith, 4 Esp. 109.

[4] Woolrych on Ways, p. 70, 71; Onley *v.* Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 496; Thomas *v.* Thomas, 2 C. M. & R. 34; Clayton *v.* Corby, 2 Ad. &. El. 813, N. S.

[5] Allan *v.* Gomme, 11 Ad. & El. 759.

[6] Holmes *v.* Goring, 2 Bing. 76. The soundness of this decision is questioned by Mr. Woolrych, in his treatise on Ways, p. 72, n.; but the rule is recognized in the United States as good law. McDonald *v.* Lindall, 3 Rawle, 492; Collins *v.* Prentice, 15 Conn. R. 39; Smith *v.* Higbee, 12 Verm. R. 113. See 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. 21, § 10, note, (Greenleaf's ed.)

way, which is traversed, the same evidence is admissible on the part of the plaintiff, by way of rebutting the defence. So, under this issue, in any action it may be shown, that the way has been duly discontinued or stopped.[1] But under a traverse of the right of way pleaded, it is not competent for the plaintiff to show, that the trespass complained of was committed beyond the limits of the right alleged; for it is irrelevant to the issue, and should be shown either by a replication of *extra viam*, or by a new assignment.[2]

§ 662. The existence of a *public way* is proved, either by a copy of the record, or by other documentary evidence of the original laying out by the proper authorities, pursuant to statutes;[3] or, by evidence either of immemorial usage,[4] or, of *dedication* of the road to public use. In the latter case, two things are essential to be proved; the *act of dedication*, and the *acceptance* of it on the part of the public; and this may be either limited and partial, as of a way excluding carriages, or it may be absolute and total.[5] Nor is it necessary that the dedication be made specifically, to a corporate body, capable of taking by grant; it may be to the general public, and limited only by the wants of the community.[6] If accepted and used

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[1] Davison *v.* Gill, 1 East, 64.

[2] Stott *v.* Stott, 16 East, 343, 349.

[3] The question whether a way is public or private, where the evidence is conflicting, is to be determined by the Jury. Deake *v.* Rogers, 3 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 604.

[4] Commonwealth *v.* Low, 3 Pick. 408; Stedman *v.* Southbridge, 17 Pick. 162; Williams *v.* Cummington, 18 Pick. 312; The State *v.* Hunter, 5 Ired. 369; Valentine *v.* Boston, 22 Pick. 75; Reed *v.* Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; Odiorne *v.* Wade, 5 Pick. 421; Young *v.* Garland, 6 Shepl. 409. Long use of a way by the public is *primâ facie* evidence that it was duly laid out as a public highway; and for this purpose, twelve years have been held sufficient. Colden *v.* Thurber, 2 Johns. 424. So has "a considerable time." Pritchard *v.* Atkinson, 3 New Hamp. R. 335, 339. And see The State *v.* Campton, 2 New Hamp. R. 513; Sage *v.* Barnes, 9 Johns. 365; Drury *v.* Worcester, 21 Pick. 44.

[5] Marq. of Stafford *v.* Coyney, 7 B. & C. 257; The State *v.* Trask, 6 Verm. R. 355.

[6] New Orleans *v.* The United States, 10 Pet. 662; Bryant *v.* McCandless, 7 Ohio R. (Part 2), 135; Pawlet *v.* Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, 331.

by the public in the manner intended, it works an estoppel *in pais*, precluding the owner, and all claiming in his right, from asserting any ownership inconsistent with such use. Nor is it necessary to prove who was the owner; nor, that he was a private person; for a dedication may be presumed, even against the sovereign; and in all cases; unless the state of the property was such that a dedication of the soil was impossible.[1] The right of the public does not rest upon a grant by deed, nor upon a twenty years' possession; but upon the use of the land, with the assent of the owner, for such a length of time, that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment.[2] The issue is therefore a mixed question, of law and fact, to be found by the Jury, under the direction of the Court, upon consideration of all the circumstances. The length of the time of enjoyment furnishes no rule of law on the subject, which the Court can pronounce without the aid of a Jury, unless, perhaps, where it amounts to twenty years; but it is a fact for the Jury to consider, as tending to prove an actual dedication, and an acceptance by the public.[3] Hence the Jury have been held justified in finding a dedica-

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[1] Reg. *v.* East Mark, 12 Jur. 332. In this case the way had been used fifty years; which was said to be "extremely strong evidence of an intention of the owner of the soil, whoever he was, to dedicate it to the public, unless there was conclusive proof that he had not consented." Per Erle, J.

[2] Cincinnati *v.* White, 6 Peters, R. 431, 437–440; Reg. *v.* East Mark, 12 Jur. 332; The State *v.* Catlin, 3 Verm. R. 230; Jarvis *v.* Dean, 3 Bing. 447; Brown *v.* Manning, 6 Ohio R. 298. 303; LeClerq *v.* Gallipolis, 7 Ohio R. 217, 219; Lade *v.* Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004; Pawlet *v.* Clark, 9 Cranch, 331; Olcott *v.* Banfill, 4 N. Hamp. 537, 545, 546; Abbot *v.* Mills, 3 Verm. R. 519. In Dwinel *v.* Barnard, 2 Law Rep. 339, 344, N. S., it was held by the Supreme Judical Court of Maine, that though it must appear that the owner of the land designedly offered it for public or common use, yet the law does not require the lapse of any particular time to authorize the inference of a dedication.

[3] In the case of a public way by *user*, the Jury may be authorized, by the circumstances, to find that its limits extended beyond the travelled path, to the breadth usually laid out as a highway. Sprague *v.* Waite, 17 Pick. 309; Hannum *v.* Belchertown, 19 Pick. 311.

tion after "four or five years" of enjoyment.[1] In another great case, which was much contested, six years were held sufficient;[2] and in others it has been held, that after a user of "a very few years," without prohibition, or any visible sign that the owner meant to preserve his rights, the public title was complete.[3] It is a question of intention, and therefore may be proved or disproved by the acts of the owner, and the circumstances under which the use has been permitted.[4] It does not follow, however, that, because there is a dedication of a public way by the owner of the soil, and the public use it, the town or parish or county is therefore bound to repair. To bind the corporate body to this extent, it is said, that there must be some evidence of acquiescence or adoption by the corporation itself; such as, having actually repaired it, or erected lights or guide posts thereon, or having assigned it to the proper surveyor of highways for his supervision, or the like.[5]

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[1] Jarvis *v.* Dean, 3 Bing. 447; Poole *v.* Huskinson, 11 M. & W. 830. See Best on Presumptions, p. 133, 134, § 101.

[2] Per Ld. Kenyon, in 11 East, 376, *n.* Eight years were held sufficient by Ld. Kenyon, in Rugby Charity *v.* Merryweather, 11 East, 375, *n.*; but both these cases were questioned by Mansfield, C. J. in 5 Taunt. 142, though Chambre J. was of Ld Kenyon's opinion. Ibid. 137. See also 5 B. & Ald. 457, per Holroyd, J.; Rex *v.* Hudson, 2 Stra. 909; Hobbs *v.* Lowell, 19 Pick. 405. "Six or seven years" were recognized as sufficient, in Barclay *v.* Howell, 6 Peters, R. 498, 513. But see The State *v.* Marble, 4 Ired. 318.

[3] British Museum *v.* Finnis, 5 C. & P. 460; Rex *v.* Lloyd, 1 Campb. 260. See also Best on Presumptions, p. 133–137, § 101, 102; Lade *v.* Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004; Commonwealth *v.* McDonald, 16 S. & R. 392; Hobbs *v.* Lowell, 19 Pick. 405; Springfield *v.* Hampden, 10 Pick. 59; Cleaveland *v.* Cleveland, 12 Wend. 172; Denning *v.* Roome, 6 Wend. 651.

[4] Barraclough *v.* Johnson, 8 Ad. & El. 99; Woodyer *v.* Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125; Rex *v.* Wright, 3 B. & Ad. 681; Surrey Canal Co. *v.* Hall, 1 Man. & Gr. 392; Rex *v.* Benedict, 4 B. & Ald. 447; Hannum *v.* Belchertown, 19 Pick. 311; Sprague *v.* Waite, 17 Pick. 309.

[5] Rex *v.* Benedict, 4 B. & Ald. 447, per Bayley, J. But see Rex *v.* Leake, 5 B. & Ad. 469; Hobbs *v.* Lowell, 19 Pick. 410. See also Todd *v.* Rome, 2 Greenl. 55; Estes *v.* Troy, 5 Greenl. 368; Rowell *v.* Montville, 4 Greenl. 270; Moore *v.* Cornville, 1 Shepl. 293; The State *v.* Campton, 2 N. Hamp. 513.

§ 663. The dedication, however, must have been made by the *owner of the fee*, or, at least, with his assent. The act of the tenant will not bind the landlord; though after a long lapse of time, and a frequent change of tenants, the knowledge and assent and concurrence of the landlord may be presumed from the notorious and uninterrupted use of the way by the public.[1]

§ 664. The evidence of dedication of a way may be *rebutted* by proof of any acts on the part of the owner of the soil, showing that he only intended to give license to pass over his land, and not to dedicate a right of way to the public. Among acts of this kind may be reckoned putting up a bar, though it be for only one day in a year, or excluding persons from passing through it by positive prohibition.[2] But the erection of a gate is not conclusive evidence of a prohibition, since it may have been an original qualification of the grant.[3]

§ 665. In the case of a *public way*, no length of time, during which it may not have been used, will operate of itself to prevent the public from resuming the right, if they think proper.[4] But in regard to private easements, though generally they are not lost by non-user for twenty years, unless the right as well as the possession is interrupted,[5] yet

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[1] Baxter *v.* Taylor, 1 Nev. & Man. 13; Wood *v.* Veal, 5 B. & Ald. 454; Rex *v.* Bliss, 7 Ad. & El. 550; Davies *v.* Stephens, 7 C. & P. 570; Rex *v.* Barr, 4 Campb. 16; Harper *v.* Charlesworth, 4 B. & C. 574.

[2] Best on Presumptions, p. 134, § 101; Rex *v.* Lloyd, 1 Campb. 260; Roberts *v.* Karr, Ibid. 261, *n.*; British Museum *v.* Finnis, 5 C. & P. 465; per Patteson, J.

[3] Davies *v.* Stephens, 7 C. & P. 570. But see Commonwealth *v.* Newbury, 2 Pick. 57.

[4] Per Gibbs, J. in Rex *v.* St. James, 2 Selw. N. P. 1334, (10th edit.); Vooght *v.* Winch, 2 B. & Ald. 667, per Abbott, C. J.; Best on Presumptions, p. 137, § 103. But see Commissioners *v.* Taylor, 2 Bay, 286.

[5] Ante, tit. Prescription and Custom, § 545; Emerson *v.* Wiley, 10 Pick. 310, 316; Yelv. 142, note (1) by Metcalf; White *v.* Crawford, 10 Mass. 183, 189.

in the case of a *private way*, or other intermittent easement, it is said, that, though slight intermittence of the user, or slight alterations in the mode of enjoyment, will not be sufficient to destroy the right, when circumstances do not show any intention of relinquishing it, yet a much shorter period than twenty years, when it is accompanied by circumstances, such as disclaimer, or other evidence of intention to abandon the right, will be sufficient to justify the Jury in finding an extinguishment.[1]

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[1] Gale & Whatley on Easements, p. 381, 382; Norbury *v.* Meade et al. 3 Bligh, 241; Harmer *v.* Rogers, 3 Bligh, N. S. 447; Best on Presumptions, p. 137, 140, § 104, 106; Doe *v.* Hilder, 2 B. & Ald. 791, per Abbott, C. J.; Hoffman *v.* Savage, 15 Mass. 130, 132.

WILLS.

§ 666. In order to ascertain the quantity and kind of proof necessary to establish a will, regard is to be had either to the law of the domicil of the testator, or to the law of the country where the property is situated, and sometimes to both. The mode of proof is also affected by the nature of the proceedings, under which it is offered. In some cases, it is necessary to prove the concurrence of all the circumstances essential to a valid will, by producing all the subscribing witnesses, after due notice to the parties in interest; while in others, it is sufficient for the occasion, to prove it by a single witness. There is also a diversity in the effect of these different modes of proof, the one being in certain cases conclusive, and the other not. There is, moreover, a diversity of rule, arising from the nature of the property given by the will; a few States still recognizing the distinction between a will of personalty, at Common Law, and a devise of lands, under the Statute of Frauds, in regard to the formalities of their execution; and others having by statute established one uniform rule, in all cases. These varieties of law and practice create great embarrassments in the attempt to state any general rules on the subject. But still it will be found that, on the question as to what law shall govern, in the requisites of a valid will, there is great uniformity of opinion; and that the several United States, in their legislation respecting wills, have generally adopted the provisions of the statute of 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, commonly called the Statute of Frauds.

§ 667. It will therefore be attempted, first to consider by what law wills are governed, and then to state the formalities generally required in the execution of wills, noting some local exceptions as we proceed. Thus it will be seen to what extent the evidence must be carried, in the complete and formal proof of any will.

§ 668. (1.) As to *what law is to govern* the formalities of a will, a distinction is to be observed between a will of personalty or movables, and a will of immovable or real property. In regard to a will of *personal or movable property*, the doctrine is now fully established, that the law of the actual domicil of the testator is to govern; and if the will is void by that law, it is a nullity everywhere, though executed with the formalities required by the law of the place where the personal property is locally situate. There is no difference in this respect, between cases of succession by testament, and by intestacy, both being alike governed by the rule *Mobilia personam sequuntur*.[1] And if, after making a valid will, the testator changes his domicil to a place by whose laws the will thus made is not valid, and there dies, his will cannot be established; but if, still surviving, he should return to and resume his former domicil, or should remove to another place having similar laws, the original validity of his will or testament will be revived.[2] It results, that a will of personalty may be admitted to probate, if it is valid by the law of the testator's last domicil at the time of his decease, though it is not valid by the law of the place of the probate.[3]

§ 669. From this rule it would seem to follow, almost as a matter of necessity, that the *same evidence* must be admitted to establish the validity and authenticity of wills of *movables*, made abroad, as would establish them in the domicil of the testator; for otherwise the general rule above stated might be sapped to its very foundation, if the law of evidence in any country, where the movable property was

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1 Story, Confl. Laws, § 467, 468, 469; Stanley *v.* Barnes, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 373; Dessebats *v.* Berquier, 1 Binn. 336; Crofton *v.* Ilsley, 4 Greenl. 134; Vattel, b. 2, ch. 8, § 110, 111; 4 Kent, Comm. 513; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 2–6, and notes by Perkins; De Zichy Ferraris *v.* Marq. of Hertford, 3 Curt. 468.

2 Story, Confl. Laws, § 473; 4 Burge on Colon. and For. Law, p. 580, 591.

3 In re De Vera Maraver, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 498.

situate, was not precisely the same as in the place of the testator's domicil. And therefore parol evidence has been admitted, in Courts of Common Law, to prove the manner in which a will is made and proved in the place of the testator's domicil, in order to lay a suitable foundation to establish the will elsewhere.[1]

§ 670. But in regard to wills of *immovable* or *real property*, it is equally well established, that the law of the place, where the property is locally situated, is to govern, as to the capacity or incapacity of the testator, the extent of his power to dispose

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[1] Story, Confl. Laws, § 636; De Sobry *v.* De Laistre, 2 Har. & Johns. 191, 195; Clark *v.* Cochran, 3 Martin, R. 353, 361, 362. And see Wilcox *v.* Hunt, 13 Peters, R. 378, 379; Don *v.* Lippmann, 5 Cl. & Fin. 15, 17; Yates *v.* Thompson, 3 Cl. & Fin. 544, 574. The rule, that a devise of lands must be executed in the form required by the law of the place where the lands lie, though a general rule of law, has been expressly enacted in the Statutes of *Maine*, *New Hampshire*, *Delaware*, *Rhode Island*, *Indiana*, and *Missouri*. In several other States a contrary rule is adopted, by which lands in those States may pass by a will, made in a foreign State, in the form required by the law of the place where it was made. But to have this effect, the foreign will must have been first proved abroad, and then be admitted, by a certified copy, to be filed and registered in the State where the lands lie. Such is the rule, as expressly enacted, in *Massachusetts*, *Vermont*, *Florida*, *Michigan*, *Illinois*, *Louisiana*, and *Arkansas*. Whether such is the legitimate effect of the rule adopted in other States, as in *Virginia*, *Ohio*, *New Jersey*, *Kentucky*, *Tennessee*, *Mississippi*, and *Alabama*; where a copy of the foreign will being duly proved abroad, may be allowed by the Court of Probate, and admitted to be recorded, *quære*. See Dublin *v.* Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433; Bailey *v.* Bailey, 8 Ohio, 239; Mease *v.* Keefe, 10 Ohio, 362; 1 Jarm. on Wills, p. 1, 2, note by Perkins; Maine Rev. St. 1840, ch. 107, § 20; Mass. Stat. 1843, ch. 92; N. Hamp. Rev. St. 1842, ch. 157, § 13; R. Isl. Rev. St. 1844, p. 237; Verm. Rev. St. 1839, ch. 45, § 24; Del. Rev. St. 1829, p. 557; Ind. Rev. St. 1843, ch. 30, § 51; Misso. Rev. St. 1845, ch. 185, § 35; Flor. Thomps. Dig. p. 194; Mich. Rev. St. 1846, ch. 68, § 21–24; Illinois Rev. St. 1839, p. 688; Louis. Civ. Code, art. 1589; Ark. Rev. St. 1837, ch. 157, § 36; Tate's Dig. p. 900; Ohio Rev. St. 1841, ch. 129, § 29–33; N. Jersey Rev. St. 1846, Tit. 10, ch. 9, § 2; Ky. Rev. St. 1834, Vol. 2, p. 1548; Ten. Rev. St. 1836, p. 593; Missi. Rev. St. 1840, ch. 36, § 13, 14; Ala. Toulm. Dig. p. 885. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 5, § 69, note, (Greenleaf's ed.)

of the property, and the forms and solemnities to give the will its due attestation and effect.[1]

§ 671. In the *interpretation* of wills, whether of movable or immovable property, where the object is merely to ascertain the meaning and intent of the testator, if the will is made at the place of his domicil, the general rule of the Common Law is, that it is to be interpreted by the law of that place, at the time when the will was made. Thus, for example, if the question be, whether the terms of a foreign will include the "real estate" of the testator, or what he intended to give under those words; or whether he intended, that the legatee should take an estate in fee or for life only; or who are the proper persons to take, under the words "heirs at law," or other *designatio personarum*, recourse is to be had to the law of the place where the will was made and the testator domiciled.[2] And if the will is made in the place of his actual domicil, but he is in fact a native of another country; or if it is made in his native country, but in fact his actual domicil at the time is in another country; still it is to be interpreted by reference to the law of the place of his actual domicil.[3] The question, whether, if the testator makes his will in one place, where he is domiciled, and afterwards acquires a new domicil in another country, where he dies, the rule of interpretation is changed by his removal, so that if the terms have a different meaning in the two countries, the law of the new domicil shall prevail, or whether the interpretation shall remain as it stood by the law of the domicil where the will was made, is a question, which does not seem

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[1] Story Confl. Laws, § 474, and authorities there cited; 4 Burge on Colon. & For. Law, p. 217, 218; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 1, 2, and notes by Perkins; 4 Kent, Comm. 513.

[2] Story, Confl. Laws, § 479, *a*, *b*, *c*, *e*, *h*, *m*; Harrison *v.* Nixon, 9 Peters, R. 483.

[3] Story, Confl. Laws, § 479 *f*; 4 Burge on Colon. & For. Law, 590, 591; Anstruther *v.* Chalmer, 2 Sim. R. 1; Ante, Vol. 1, § 282, 287–292; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 5–8.

yet to have undergone any absolute and positive decision in the Courts acting under the Common Law.[1]

§ 672. In determining the *effect of the probate* of wills, regard is to be had to the jurisdiction of the Court where the will is proved, and to the nature of the proceedings. For, as we have heretofore seen, it is only the judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point in question, that are conclusive everywhere, and upon all persons.[2] In England, the Ecclesiastical Courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over wills, except those of personal estate; and hence the probate of wills, by the sentence or decree of those Courts, is wholly inoperative and void, except as to personal estate; being, as to the realty, not even evidence of the execution of the will. The validity of will of real estate is there cognizabe only in the Courts of Common Law, and in the ordinary forms of suits; and the verdict and judgment are conclusive only upon the parties and privies, as in other cases. But as far as the personal estate is concerned, the sentence or decree of the proper Ecclesiastical Court, as to the validity or invalidity of the will, is final and conclusive upon all persons, because it is in the nature of proceedings *in rem*, in which all persons may appear and be heard upon the question, and it is the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, directly upon the subject-matter in controversy.[3] But in many of the United States, Courts are constituted by statute, under the title of Courts of Probate, Orphans' Courts, or other names, with general power to take the probate of wills, no distinction being expressly mentioned between wills of personalty, and wills of real estate; and where such power is conferred in general terms, it is understood to give to those Courts complete jurisdiction over the probate of wills as well of real as of personal estate, and therefore to render their

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[1] Harrison *v.* Nixon, 9 Peters, R. 483, 505; Story, Confl. Laws, § 479 *g*.

[2] Ante, Vol. 1, § 528, 550.

[3] 1 Williams on Executors, b. 6, ch. 1, p. 339-348, (1st Am. edit.); 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 22, 23, and notes by Perkins; Tompkins *v.* Tompkins, 1 Story, R. 547.

decrees conclusive upon all persons, and not re-examinable in any other Court.[1]

§ 673. (2.) The highest degree of solemnity, which is required in the *formal execution* of wills, is that which is required in a will of lands, by the statute of frauds;[2] and this chiefly respects the *signature* and the *attestation by witnesses*. These formalities, all of which are ordinarily re-

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[1] Such is the law in *Maine* and *Massachusetts*. Potter *v.* Webb, 2 Greenl. 257; Small *v.* Small, 4 Greenl. 220, 225; Osgood *v.* Breed, 12 Mass. 533, 534; Dublin *v.* Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433, 441; Laughton *v.* Atkins, 1 Pick. 548, 549; Brown *v.* Wood, 17 Mass. 68, 72. So, in *Rhode Island*, Tompkins *v.* Tompkins, 1 Story, R. 547. So, in *New Hampshire*. Poplin *v.* Hawke, 8 New Hamp. 124. So, in *Connecticut*. Judson *v.* Lake, 3 Day, R. 318; Bush *v.* Sheldon, 1 Day, R. 170. So, in *Ohio*. Bailey *v.* Bailey, 8 Ohio, R. 239, 246. So, in *Louisiana*. Lewis's Heirs *v.* His Ex'rs, 5 Louis. R. 387, 393, 394; Donaldson *v.* Winter, 1 Louis, R. 137, 144. So, in *Virginia*. Bagwell *v.* Elliot, 2 Rand, 190, 200. So, in *Alabama*, after five years. Toulmin's Dig. 887; Tarver *v.* Tarver, 9 Peters, R. 180.

In *Pennsylvania* and *North Carolina*, the probate of a will of lands is *primâ facie* evidence of the will, but not conclusive. Smith *v.* Bonsall, 5 Rawle, 80, 83; Coates *v.* Hughes, 3 Binn. 498, 507; Stanley *v.* Kean, 1 Taylor, 93.

In several other States, the English rule is followed; as, in *New York;* Jackson *v.* Le Grange, 19 Johns. 386; Jackson *v.* Thompson, 6 Cowen, R. 178: Rogers *v.* Rogers, 3 Wend. 514, 515; and in *New Jersey;* Harrison *v.* Rowan, 3 Wash. 580; and in *Maryland;* Smith *v.* Steele, 1 Har. & McH. 419; Darby *v.* Mayer, 10 Wheat. 470; and in *South Carolina;* Crossland *v.* Murdock, 4 McCord, 217.

Whether a will of lands, duly proved and recorded in one State, so as to be evidence in the Courts of that State, is thereby rendered evidence in the Courts of another State, under the Constitution of the United States, Art. 4, does not appear to have been decided. See Darby *v.* Mayer, 10 Wheat. 465. In Ohio, it is made evidence by statute. Bailey *v.* Bailey, 8 Ohio, R. 239, 240.

[2] 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 5. By Stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9, it is now provided, that no will, whether of real or personal estate, (except certain wills of soldiers and sailors,) shall be valid, "unless it shall be in writing, and signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or some other person in his presence and by his direction; and unless such signature be made or acknowledged by him in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time, and unless such witnesses attest and subscribe the will in his presence; and no publication other than is implied in the execution so attested, shall be necessary."

quired to be shown upon the probate of wills in the Courts of Probate in the United States, we now proceed to state.

§ 674. And first, as to the *signature by the testator.* A "signature" consists both of the *act of writing* the party's name, and of the *intention* of thereby finally authenticating the instrument. It is not necessary that the testator should write his entire name. His *mark* is now held sufficient, even though he was able to write.[1] And if the signature is made by another person guiding his hand, with his consent, it is sufficient.[2] But sealing alone, without signing, will not suffice; nor is a seal necessary in any case, unless it is required by an express statute.[3] One signature by the testator is enough, though the will is written upon several sheets of paper; and if the *testimonium*-clause refers to the preceding sheets as severally signed with his name, whereas he has signed at the end only, this will suffice, if it appears to have been in fact intended to apply to the whole.[4] Such intention would probably be presumed from his acknowledgment of the instrument, to the attesting witnesses, as his will, without alluding to any farther act of signing.[5] Nor is it material on what part of the document the signature is written, if it was made with the design of completing the instrument, and without contemplating any further signature. On this ground, a will written by the testator, and beginning, —

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[1] Baker *v.* Dening, 8 Ad. & El. 94; Jackson *v.* Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144; In re Field, 3 Curt. 752; Taylor *v.* Draing, 3 N. &. P. 228; In re Bryce, 2 Curt. 325; Wilson *v.* Beddard, 12 Sim. 28; Harrison *v.* Elwin, 3 Ad. & El. 117, N. S. In *Pennsylvania*, the will must be signed at the end, with the testator's own name, if he is able to write it; and if not, by some person in his presence and by his express direction; the incompetency and signature by request being proved by two witnesses. Purdon's Dig. 971.

[2] Stevens *v.* Vancleve, 4 Wash. 262, 269.

[3] Pratt *v.* McCullough, 1 M'Lean, R. 69. And see Avery *v.* Pixley, 4 Mass. 460, 462; Hight *v.* Wilson, 1 Dall. 94; Doe d. Knapp *v.* Pattison, 2 Blackf. 355; Ante, Vol. 1, § 272. A *seal* is not requisite to the validity of a will, in any of the United States, except *New Hampshire.*

[4] Winsor *v.* Pratt, 2 B. & B. 650.

[5] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 70, 71.

"I A. B. do make," &c., has been held, under the circumstances, sufficiently signed.[1]

§ 675. *Publication* is defined to be that, by which the party designates that he means to give effect to the paper as his will.[2] A *formal publication* of the will by the testator, is not now deemed necessary, it being held, that the will may be good, under the Statute of Frauds, without any words of the testator, declaratory of the nature of the instrument, or any formal recognition of it, or allusion to it.[3] But though sanity is generally presumed, yet it is incumbent on the party, asking for the probate of a will, affirmatively to establish that the testator, at the time of executing it, knew that it was his will.[4] It is not necessary, however, that this knowledge be proved by direct evidence; it may be inferred from his observance of the forms and solemnities required by statute for the due execution of a will.[5] And where the tes-

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[1] Lemayne *v.* Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 70, and note (3) by Perkins; Right *v.* Price, 1 Dougl. 241; Doe *v.* Evans, 1 C. & M. 42; 3 Tyrw. 56; Sarah Miles's Will, 4 Dana, 1. In *Ohio*, *Pennsylvania*, *New York*, and *Arkansas*, the signature is by statute required to be placed at the end of the will. 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y. p. 63; Watts *v.* The Public Administrator, 4 Wend. 168; Rev. Stat. Ark. ch. 157, § 4. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 5, § 1, 9, 14, notes, (Greenleaf's ed.)

[2] Per Gibbs, C. J. in Moodie *v.* Reid, 7 Taunt. 362.

[3] Ibid.; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 71. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 5, § 14, 18, 52, notes, (Greenleaf's ed.) White *v.* The British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; Wright *v.* Wright, 7 Bing. 457; Warren *v.* Postlethwaite, 9 Jur. 721. And see 4 Kent, Comm. p. 515, 516; Small *v.* Small, 4 Greenl. 220. This question is now settled accordingly, in England, by Stat. 1 Vict. ch. 26, § 9, 11, 12, 13.

[4] White *v.* The British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; Sweet *v.* Boardman, 1 Mass. 258; 4 Dane, Abr. p. 568; Gerrish *v.* Nason, 9 Shepl. 438. In *New York*, a declaration of the testator, that the instrument in his will, is required, by 2 Rev. Stat. p. 63, § 40. See Brinckerhoof *v.* Remsen, 8 Paige, 488; 26 Wend. 325, 330, S. C. So in *North Carolina*. 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 71, note (1) by Perkins.

[5] Ray *v.* Walton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 71. And see Trimmer *v.* Jackson, 4 Burn's Eccl. L. p. 130, (8th edit.) On proof of the signature of the testator, it will ordinarily be presumed that he knew the contents of the will. Billinghurst *v.* Vickers, 1 Phillim. Eccl. R. 191; Fawcett *v.* Jones, 3 Phillim. Eccl. R. 476; Wheeler *v.* Alderson, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 587. But

tator knowing the instrument to be his will, produced it to three persons, asking them to attest it as witnesses ; and they did so in his presence, and returned it to him, this was considered as a sufficient acknowledgment to them, in fact, that the will was his.[1]

§ 676. Nor is it deemed necessary, that the witnesses should *actually see* the testator sign his name. The statute does not in terms require this, but only directs that the *will* be "attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by three or four credible witnesses." They are witnesses of the entire transaction ; and therefore it is held, that an acknowledgment of the instrument, by the testator, in the presence of the witnesses, whom he requests to attest it, will suffice ; and that this acknowledgment need not be made simultaneously to all the witnesses, but is sufficient if made separately to each one, and at different times.[2] Nor is it necessary that the acknowledgment be made in express terms ; it may be implied from circumstances, such as requesting the persons to sign their names as witnesses. But in such cases, it must appear that the instrument had previously been signed by the testator.[3]

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this presumption may be repelled by proof of any circumstances of an opposite nature, such as his ignorance, sickness, state of mind, or the like ; or, the inconsistency of its provisions with his obvious duty or known affections ; or, the character and interests of the person who wrote the instrument. Ibid. ; Ingram *v.* Wyatt, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 384 ; Parke *v.* Ollat, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 324 ; Paine *v.* Hall, 18 Ves. 475 ; Durling *v.* Loveland, 2 Curt. 226.

[1] White *v.* The British Museum, 6 Bing. 310. See also Hall *v.* Hall, 17 Pick. 373.

[2] Ilott *v.* George, 3 Curt. 160. In re Rawlins, 2 Curt. 326. In re Warden, Ibid. 334. In re Ashmore, 3 Curt. 607. Blake *v.* Knight, Ibid. 547.

[3] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 71, 72, and note (1) by Perkins ; Grayson *v.* Atkinson, 2 Ves. 454, 460 ; Hall *v.* Hall, 17 Pick. 373 ; Dewey *v.* Dewey, 1 Metc. 349 ; Gaze *v.* Gaze, 3 Curt. 551 ; Keigwin *v.* Keigwin, Ibid. 607 ; Cooper *v.* Bockett, 4 Moore, P. C. Rep. 419. It is held otherwise in New Jersey, under the act of 1714. Den *v.* Matlock, 2 Harrison, R. 86 ; 4 Kent. Comm. 514, n. ; Johnson *v.* Johnson, 1 Cr. & M. 140 ; Hall *v.* Hall, 17 Pick. 373 ; Ante, § 295.

§ 677. The will must also be attested and subscribed by at least three competent *witnesses*.[1] And here also, as in the

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[1] By the *New York* Revised Statutes (Vol. 2, p. 63, § 40, 41,) the testator is to subscribe the will at the end of it, in the presence of at least two witnesses, who are to write their places of residence opposite their names, under the penalty of fifty dollars; but the omission to do it will not affect the validity and efficiency of their attestation. Three witnesses, as in the English Statute of Frauds, are required in *Vermont*, *New Hampshire*, *Maine*, *Massachusetts*, *Rhode Island*, *Connecticut*, *New Jersey*, *Maryland*, *Florida*, *Wisconsin*, *South Carolina*, *Georgia*, *Alabama*, and *Mississippi*. Two witnesses only are required in *New York*, *Ohio*, *Michigan*, *Delaware*, *Virginia*, *Indiana*, *Illinois*, *Missouri*, *North Carolina*, *Kentucky*, *Tennessee*, and *Arkansas*. In some of the States, the provision as to attestation is more special. In *Pennsylvania*, a devise of lands in writing will be good without any subscribing witnesses, provided the authenticity of it can be proved by two witnesses; and if the will be subscribed by witnesses, proof of it may be made by others. Hight *v.* Wilson, 1 Dallas, 94; Per Huston, J., 1 Watts, 463. Proof of the signature of the testator to a will by two witnesses, is *primâ facie* evidence of its execution, although the body of it be not in the handwriting of the testator. Weigel *v.* Weigel, 5 Watts, 486. In *North Carolina* two witnesses are required to a will of real estate, unless the will is in the handwriting of the deceased person, and is found among his valuable papers, or lodged with some person for safe keeping. The name of the testator in such case must be proved by the opinion of three witnesses. 1 Rev. Laws, N. C. 619, 620, ch. 122, § 1. So in *Tennessee*. In *Virginia*, if the will is not wholly written by the testator, it must be attested by two or more credible witnesses, &c. 1 Rev. Code, Virg. 375. In *Mississippi*, there must be three witnesses to a will of real, and one to a will of personal estate, unless wholly written and subscribed by the testator. Howard & Hutch. Dig. Laws Mis. (1840,) p. 386, ch. 36, § 2. In *Arkansas*, a will written through by the testator, needs no subscribing witness, but the will must be proved in such case by three disinterested witnesses, swearing to their opinion. Still, a will in due form subscribed, will be effectual as against one not so subscribed. Rev. Stat. ch. 157, § 4, 5. Every person in that State who subscribes the testator's name, shall sign as witness, and state that he signed the testator's name at his request. Ibid. A will executed in *South Carolina* in the presence of two witnesses, who alone subscribe it, is not sufficiently executed under the statute to pass real estate, although the scrivener was also present at the execution, and a codicil executed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, one of whom was different from the two witnesses to the will, does not give effect to the will, as to the real estate. Dunlap *v.* Dunlap, 4 Desaus. 305. The laws of South Carolina, at the time of the above decision, required three witnesses to a will of real estate only; but now they require three witnesses to a will of personal estate also. Statutes at Large of S. Car. Vol. 3, p. 342, No. 544, § 2; Ibid. Vol. 4, p. 106, No.

case of the testator, a *mark*, made by the witness as his signature, is a sufficient attestation.[1] No particular form of words is necessary in the attestation-clause, nor need it express, that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator, it being sufficient if this is actually proved. It may also be inferred, from the regular appearance of the instrument, or other circumstances in the case.[2]

§ 678. The requisition that the witnesses should subscribe their names *in the presence of the testator*, is in order that he may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument attested as his will, and to prevent the fraudulent substitution of another. To constitute this "presence" it is necessary, not only that the testator be corporally present, but that he be mentally capable of recognizing, and be actually conscious of, the act which is performed before him. Therefore if, after he has signed and published his will, and before the witnesses subscribe it, he falls into a state of insensibility, whether temporary or permanent;[3] or, if the will is subscribed by the witnesses in a secret and clandestine manner, without his knowledge, though it be in the same apartment; in both cases it is alike void.[4] To be corporally present, it is not essential that the testator be in the same apartment; for

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1455, § 2; Ibid. Vol. 6, p. 238, No. 2334, § 8." See 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 69 *a*, note by Perkins; 4 Kent, Comm. 514; Ante, Vol. 1, § 272, n. (1.) 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 5, § 1, note; Ibid. § 14, note, (Greenleaf's ed.)

[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 272; Harrison *v.* Harrison, 8 Ves. 185; Addy *v.* Grix, Ibid. 504; George *v.* Surrey, 1 M. & Malk. 516; Jackson *v.* Van Deusen, 5 Johns. 144; Adams *v.* Chaplin, 1 Hill, S. Car. Rep. 266; 9 Louis. R. 512; 4 Kent, Comm. 514, n.; Harrison *v.* Elwin, 3 Ad. & El. 117, N. S.; Doe *v.* Davis, 11 Jur. 182.

[2] Handy *v.* James, 2 Com. R. 531; Croft *v.* Pawlett, 2 Stra. 1109; Jackson *v.* Christman, 4 Wend. 277; Burgoyne *v.* Showler, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 5.

[3] Right *v.* Price, 1 Doug. 241. In *New York*, the statute has not made it necessary, that the witnesses should subscribe in the presence of the testator. 4 Kent, Comm. 514, 515. So, in *Arkansas*, and in *New Jersey*. In *Vermont* alone, the witnesses are required to sign in presence of each other. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 5, § 1, 23, notes, (Greenleaf's ed.)

[4] Longford *v.* Eyre, 1 P. Wms. 740.

if the situation and circumstances of the parties are such, that the testator, in his actual position, might have seen the act of attestation, it is enough, though they are not in the same apartment,[1] nor even in the same house;[2] and, on the other hand, if his view of the proceedings is necessarily obstructed, the mere proximity of the places of his signature and of their attestation, will not suffice, even though it were in the same apartment.[3] An attestation, made in the same room with the testator, is presumed to have been made in his presence, until the contrary is shown; and an attestation, not made in the same room, is presumed not to have been made in his presence, until it is shown to have been otherwise.[4] In the absence of opposing evidence, it will also be presumed, that the attestation was subscribed in the most convenient part of the room for that purpose, taking into consideration the kind and the ordinary or actual position of the furniture therein.[5]

§ 679. It is proper here to add, that, after the lapse of

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[1] Shires *v.* Glascock, 2 Salk. 688; 1 Ld. Raym. 507, S. C.; Winchilsea *v.* Wauchope, 3 Russ. 441, 444; Tod *v.* E. of Winchelsea, 2 C. & P. 488, S. C.; Davy *v.* Smith, 3 Salk. 395. In Russell *v.* Falls, 3 Har. & McHen. 463, 464, which was very much considered, it was held, that it was necessary that the testator should have been able to see the attestation, without leaving his bed. And see, to the same effect, Doe *v.* Manifold, 1 M. & S. 294.

[2] Casson *v.* Dade, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 99; Dewey *v.* Dewey, 1 Metc. 349.

[3] Edlestone *v.* Speake, 1 Show. 89; Eccleston *v.* Petty al. Speke, Carth. 79. S. C.; Edelen *v.* Hardey, 7 Har. & J. 61; Russell *v.* Falls, 3 Har. & McHen. 457; In re Colman, 3 Curt. 118. But see Newton *v.* Clark, 2 Curt. 320. The cause of the witnesses' absence does not affect the rule, even though it were at the request of the testator. Broderick *v.* Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239; Machell *v.* Temple, 2 Show. 288.

[4] Neil *v.* Neil, 1 Leigh, R. 6.

[5] Winchilsea *v.* Wauchope, 3 Russ. 441. The will of a blind man is valid, notwithstanding his blindness, if it clearly appears that no imposition was practised upon him, and that all other legal formalities were observed. 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 29, 30; Longchamp *v.* Fisk, 2 New Rep. 415; Fincham *v.* Edwards, 3 Curt. 63; Boyd *v.* Cook, 3 Leigh, R. 32; Lewis *v.* Lewis, 6 S. & R. 489; In the goods of Piercy, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 278.

thirty years, with possession of the estate according to the tenor of the will, its regular execution will be presumed, without proof, by subscribing witnesses.[1] Whether the thirty years are to be computed from the date of the will, or from the death of the testator, is a question upon which learned Judges are not agreed; some holding the former, which is now considered the better opinion, upon the ground, that the rule is founded on the presumption that the witnesses are dead, and the consequent impossibility of proving the execution of the will;[2] and others holding the latter, on the ground, that it is the accompanying possession alone which establishes the presumption of authenticity in an ancient deed.[3]

§ 680. A will of lands, thus proved to have been made with all the legal formalities, is presumed to have existed until the death of the testator;[4] but this presumption may be rebuked by proof of its subsequent *revocation*.[5] And this revocation may be proved by evidence of an *express* act of revocation by the testator, such as *cancelling*, *obliterating*, or *destroying* the instrument, or executing some other will or codicil, or *writing* of revocation; or it may be *implied* from other acts and circumstances, inconsistent with the continuance of any intention that the will should stand, such as *alienation* or *alteration of the estate*, *marriage and the birth of issue*, or other sufficient material change in the relations and condition of the testator. The former class falls under

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[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 21, 142 – 144, 570; Croughton *v.* Blake, 12 M. & W. 205, 208; Jackson *v.* Thompson, 6 Cowen, R. 178, 180; Fetherly *v.* Waggoner, 11 Wend. 599.

[2] Jackson *v.* Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292, 295, per Spencer, J. See accordingly, Oldnall *v.* Deakin, 3 C. & P. 402; Gough *v.* Gough, 4 T. R. 707, *n.*; McKenire *v.* Frazer, 9 Ves. 5; Doe *v.* Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22; Ante, § 310; and Vol. 1, § 570.

[3] Jackson *v.* Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292, 298, per Kent, C. J. and Van Ness, J.; Shaller *v.* Brand, 6 Binn. 435, 439, 444, 447.

[4] Jackson *v.* Betts, 9 Cowen, R. 208; Irish *v.* Smith, 8 S. & R. 573.

[5] As to the revocation of wills, see 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 6, (Greenleaf's ed.) where the American law is stated in the notes.

the Statute of Frauds, which enacts, that "no devise of lands, tenements or hereditaments, nor any clause thereof, shall be revocable, otherwise than by some other will or codicil, in writing, or other writing, declaring the same; or by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating the same, by the testator himself, or in his presence, and by his directions and consent."[1] And to such writing of revocation, the attestation of three witnesses, at least, is required.

§ 681. The acts of *express revocation* are therefore of three classes. First, by a subsequent will or codicil, inconsistent with the former, or plainly intended as a substitute for it; and this must be executed in the manner we have already considered. If the subsequent instrument, whether it be a will or a codicil, though it professed an intent to make a different disposition of the whole estate, does in fact so dispose of a part only, it is but a revocation *pro tanto*.[2] Secondly, by a written instrument of revocation; which, it is to be observed, the statute does not require should be attested in the presence of the testator, like a will; but to take effect as a revocation only, it must contain an express declaration of an intention to revoke. If the instrument purports to be a subsequent will, and is well executed to take effect as a will, it will also have effect as a revocation of all former wills touching the same matter, without any words of revocation; but if it does not contain any testamentary disposition, then, though it is well executed as a revocation, it will not so operate, unless such

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[1] Stat. 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 6. Such is in general the language of the American statutes on this subject. 4 Kent, Comm. 514, 520, 521, n. The difference between wills of land and of personal property, in regard to the evidence of revocation, as well as the formalities of execution, is now admitted in so few, if any, of the United States, that it is deemed inexpedient here to advert to it.

[2] Brant *v.* Willson, 8 Cowen, R. 56; Harwood *v.* Goodright, Cowp. 87. See also Hearle *v.* Hicks, 1 Cl. &. Fin. 20; Henfrey *v.* Henfrey, 4 Moore, P. C. Rep. 29. The republication of a former inconsistent will, is also a revocation of a subsequent will. Havard *v.* Davis, 2 Binn. 406.

intention is expressed.[1] Thirdly, by some act of reprobation, spoliation, or destruction, done upon the instrument, *animo revocandi.* But if the act be done without such intention,[2] or not in the presence of the testator, though by his direction, it is of no force.[3] It has accordingly been held, that slightly tearing the will, and throwing it on the fire, though it were only singed,[4] or a partial burning of the paper,[5] or tearing off a seal, though superfluous,[6] the intention thereby to revoke being clear, was a sufficient revocation. So, if a material part of a devise or bequest be obliterated by the testator, it is a sufficient revocation *pro tanto*, although it be merely by drawing the pen across, and the writing be still legible.[7] But if it be an obliteration of the name of a devisee or legatee, in some parts of the will, while in other parts it is left standing, the Court will not, ordinarily, feel warranted in

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[1] Roberts on Frauds, 463 – 466; Onions *v.* Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 343; Limbery *v.* Mason, 2 Com. R. 451; Bethell *v.* Moore, 2 Dev. & Bat. 311; 1 Jarm. on Wills, 121, 122, 129, 125, 156. The same principle applies to an intended revocation by obliteration; if it be not duly attested, it has no effect. Ibid.; Kirke *v.* Kirke, 4 Russ. 435. But though the second will should fail of taking effect, yet if it is perfectly executed, and the failure arises merely from some incapacity of the party for whose benefit it is made, to take under it, the second will may still operate as a revocation of the first. Laughton *v.* Atkins, 1 Pick. 535, 543.

[2] Hence, if the testator were insane, the destruction of the instrument by his order is no revocation. Ford *v.* Ford, 7 Humph. 92.

[3] Onions *v.* Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 343, 345; Scruby *v.* Fordham, 1 Add. 74; Trevelyan *v.* Trevelyan, 1 Phillim. 149; Haines *v.* Haines, 2 Vern. 441; Dan *v.* Brown, 4 Cowen, R. 490; Boudinot *v.* Bradford, 2 Dall. 266; 2 Yeates, 170, S. C.; Ante, Vol. 1, § 273.

[4] Bibb *v.* Thomas, 2 W. Bl. 1043; Winsor *v.* Pratt, 2 B. & B. 650; Johnson *v.* Brailsford, 2 Nott & McCord, 272. The mere direction to another by the testator, to destroy his will, is not sufficient, unless some act of destruction is thereupon done. Giles *v.* Giles, 1 Cam. & Nor. 174; Ford *v.* Ford, 7 Humph. 92.

[5] Doe *v.* Harris, 6 Ad. & El. 209.

[6] Avery *v.* Pixley, 4 Mass. 462. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 273.

[7] Sutton *v.* Sutton, Cowp. 812; Mence *v.* Mence, 18 Ves. 348, 350. As to the time when alterations are presumed to have been made, see Ante, Vol. 1, § 564. The cases of Burgoyne *v.* Showler, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 5, and Cooper *v.* Bockett, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 419, on this point, turn on the language of the Stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, § 21.

holding that the bequest is thereby revoked.[1] So, if the obliteration is on the envelop only, it is not sufficient.[2] If an alteration or obliteration is in *pencil*, it may be final, or it may be deliberative. From the nature of the act, unexplained, it is held to be, *primâ facie*, deliberative and not final; but it will be left for the Jury to determine, upon the collateral evidence, the actual intent with which it was made.[3] If the will is proved to have been in the testator's possession, and cannot afterwards be found, it will be presumed that he destroyed it, *animo revocandi;* but if it is shown out of his possession, the party asserting the revocation must show that it came again into his custody, or was actually destroyed by his direction.[4]

§ 682. If the will was *executed in duplicate*, and the testator destroys one part, the inference generally is, that he intended to revoke the will; but the strength of the presumption will depend much on the circumstances. Thus, if he destroys the only copy in his possession, an intent to revoke is very strongly to be presumed; but if he was possessed of both copies, and destroys but one, it is weaker; and if he alters one, and then destroys it, retaining the other entire,

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[1] Martins *v.* Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73; Utterton *v.* Utterton, 3 Ves. & Beames, 122. If the will is found in the testator's possession, obliterated, the presumption is, that it was so done by him; and the burden of showing that it was done otherwise, lies on the party offering it for probate, or claiming under it. Baptist Ch. *v.* Robberts, 2 Barr, 110. And see Wynn *v.* Heveringham, 1 Coll. N. C. 630. But if it has been in the possession of one adversely interested, the presumption does not arise. Bennett *v.* Sherrod, 3 Ired. 303.

[2] Grantley *v.* Garthwaite, 2 Russ. 90.

[3] Francis *v.* Grover, 5 Hare, 39. And see Edwards *v.* Astley, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 493, 494; Hawkes *v.* Hawkes, Ibid. 321; Rymes *v.* Clarkson, 1 Phillim. Eccl. R. 25, 35; Parkin *v.* Bainbridge, 3 Phillim. Eccl. R. 321; Dickenson *v.* Dickenson, 2 Phillim. Eccl. R. 173; Lavender *v.* Adams, 1 Addams, 403; Ravenscroft *v.* Hunter, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 68.

[4] 1 Jarman on Wills, 119, and cases there cited; Minkler *v.* Minkler, 14 Verm. R. 174; Helyar *v.* Helyar, 1 Phillim. R. 417, 421, 427, n., 430, 439, n.; Lillie *v.* Lillie, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 184; Loxley *v.* Jackson, 3 Phillim. 126. But see Jackson *v.* Betts, 9 Cowen, R. 208.

the presumption has been said still to hold, though more faintly;[1] but the contrary also has been asserted.[2] If the will is destroyed, but a codicil is left entire, the question, whether the destruction of the will operates as a revocation of the codicil also, will depend much upon their contents. If they are inseparably connected, the codicil will be held revoked also; but if, from the nature of its contents, it is capable of subsisting independently of the will, its validity may not be affected.[3]

§ 683. Where the latter of two inconsistent wills is subsequently destroyed, or otherwise revoked, by the testator, it was formerly held, that this revived and restored the original will to its former position, provided it remained entire.[4] But this doctrine has since been greatly modified, if not wholly abandoned, in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and the question is now held open for decision either way, according to the circumstances.[5]

§ 684. In regard to *implied revocations*, these are said to

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[1] Seymour's case, cited 1 P. Wms. 346; 2 Com. R. 453; Burtonshaw *v.* Gilbert, Cowp. 49, 52; Pemberton *v.* Pemberton, 13 Ves. 310. And see O'Neall *v.* Farr, 1 Rich. 80.

[2] Roberts *v.* Round, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 548.

[3] Usticke *v.* Bawden, 2 Add. 116; Medlycot *v.* Assheton, Ibid. 229; Togart *v.* Hooper, 1 Curt. 289.

[4] Goodright *v.* Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512; Lawson *v.* Morrison, 2 Dall. 289; James *v.* Marvin, 3 Conn. 576; Taylor *v.* Taylor, 2 Nott & McCord, 482.

[5] Usticke *v.* Bawden, 2 Add. 116; James *v.* Cohen, 3 Curt. 770. See 4 Kent Comm. 531, and cases there cited; and 1 Jarm. on Wills, 122, 123, and cases in notes by Perkins; Moore *v.* Moore, 1 Phillim. 375, 400, 406; Boudinot *v.* Bradford, 2 Dall. 268; Linginfetter *v.* Linginfetter, Hardin, R. 119; Bohanon *v.* Walcott, 1 How. Mis. R. 336. By Stat. 1 Vict. c. 26 § 22, no will, once revoked, can be revived, otherwise than by a re-execution thereof. Hence parol evidence of an intention to set up the prior will by cancelling the second, has been rejected. Major *v.* Williams, 3 Curt. 432. In *New York*, by Rev. Stat. Vol. 2. p. 126, 3d edit., "the destruction, cancelling, or revocation of such second will shall not revive the first, unless it appear by the terms of such revocation, that it was his intention to revive and give effect to his first will," or unless the first is afterwards republished.

be founded on the reasonable presumption of an alteration of the testator's mind, arising from circumstances since the making of the will, producing a change in his previous obligations and duties.[1] A *subsequent marriage* alone, if the testator was a feme sole, will always have this effect, even though she should survive her husband; for by the marriage her will ceased to be ambulatory, and was therefore void.[2] But the marriage of a man is not, alone, a revocation of his will; for the Common Law has made sufficient provision for the wife, by her right of dower. Nor is the birth of a child, after the making of the will, in itself, and independent of statutory provisions, a revocation of a will made subsequent to the marriage; for, the testator is presumed to have contemplated such an event. But a subsequent marriage and the birth of a child, taken together, are held to be a revocation of his will, whether of real or personal estate, as they amount to such a change in his situation as to lead to a presumption that he could not intend that the previous disposition of his property should remain unchanged.[3] But this presumption is not conclusive; it may be repelled by intrinsic proof of circumstances showing that the will, though made previous to the marriage, was in fact made in contemplation of both marriage and the birth of issue;[4] such as, a provision of any sort in the will itself, for the future wife

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[1] 4 Kent, Comm. 521 – 524.

[2] 1 Williams on Executors, p. 93 – 95; Forse *v.* Hembling's case, 4 Co. 60; Hodsden *v.* Lloyd, 2 Bro. Ch. Cas. 544, and notes by Eden.

[3] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 107; 1 Williams on Executors, p. 95 – 98; Doe *v.* Lancashire, 5 T. R. 58. See also Church *v.* Crocker, 3 Mass. 17, 21; Brush *v.* Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 506. A testator, dangerously ill, and unmarried, made a will in favor of his intended wife. Being restored to health, he married her and had issue four children. The will was carefully preserved and recognized by him, but never was reëxecuted. The wife and children survived him; but it was held, that the will was revoked. Matson *v.* Magrath, 13 Jur. 350. Prerog. C.

[4] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 107, 109, 110; 1 Williams on Executors, p. 94, Fox *v.* Marston, 1 Curt. 494. And see Johnston *v.* Johnston, 1 Phillim. 447; Gibbens *v.* Cross, 2 Add. 455; Talbot *v.* Talbot, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 705; Jacks *v.* Henderson, 1 Desaus. R. 543, 557; Brush *v.* Wilkins, 4 Johns.

and children; or a provision for children alone;[1] but provision for the wife only, has been held insufficient.[2] Any other evidence of intent, to have this effect, it seems must amount to proof of republication of the will, after the birth of the issue. For any other purpose than this, parol evidence of the intentions of the testator, that his will should stand unrevoked, has been held to be inadmissible to control the presumption resulting from marriage and the birth of issue.[3]

Ch. R. 506; Yerby *v.* Yerby, 3 Call. R. 334. The doctrine that the presumption is not conclusive, has been overruled, upon great consideration, in the cases of Marston *v.* Roe, 8 Ad. & El. 14; and Israell *v.* Rodon, 2 Moore, P. C. R. 51; in the former of which the following points were resolved: —

1. Where an unmarried man, without children by a former marriage, devises all the estate he has at the time of making his will, and leaves no provision for any child of a future marriage, *the law annexes to such will, the tacit condition*, that if he afterwards marries, and has a child born of such marriage, the will shall be revoked. Upon the happening, therefore, of those two events, the will is, *ipso facto*, revoked.

2. Evidence not amounting to proof of publication, cannot be received in a court of law, to show that the testator intended that his will should stand good, notwithstanding his subsequent marriage and the birth of issue; because these events operate as a revocation, by force of a *rule of law*, and independent of the testator.

3. The operation of this rule of law is not prevented by a provision in the will, or otherwise, for the future wife only; such provision must also extend to the children of the marriage.

4. The provision, also, must be made by the will; the condition, annexed to it, by law, so far as relates to the existence or extent of the provision, having reference, in its own nature, to the existing state of things at the time the will itself was made. And it must give to the child a beneficial and not a merely legal interest as a trustee.

Therefore it was held, that the descent of after-acquired lands upon the child, did not prevent the operation of the rule of revocation above stated; especially as the child, in the case at bar, took only a legal estate in trust for the devisee. See also, as to the conclusiveness of the presumption. Goodtitle *v.* Otway, 2 H. Bl. 522, by Eyre, C. J.; Doe *v.* Lancashire, 5 T. R. 58, per Ld. Kenyon; Gibbons *v.* Caunt, 4 Ves. 848; Walker *v.* Walker, 2 Curt. 854. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 6, § 48, note. (Greenleaf's ed.)

[1] Kenebel *v.* Scrafton, 2 East, 530; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 109.

[2] Marston *v.* Roe, 8 Ad. & El. 14.

[3] Ibid. In several of the United States, the effect of marriage and the

§ 685. The rule, that marriage and the birth of issue, operates as a revocation of the previous will, is not affected by

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birth of a child, upon a prior will, has been definitively settled by statute. Thus, in *Rhode Island*, a will is *ipso facto* revoked "by a marriage of the testator subsequent to the date thereof." R. Isl. Rev. St. 1844, p. 231. In *Connecticut*, "If, after the making of a will, a child shall be born to the testator, and no provision shall be made in the will for such contingency, such *birth* shall operate as a revocation of such will." Conn. Rev. St. 1849, p. 316, 347.

In *New York*, the enactment is more particular. "If, after the making of any will, disposing of the *whole* estate of the testator, such testator shall marry, and have issue of such marriage, born either in his lifetime, or after his death, and the wife or the issue of such marriage shall be *living at the death of the testator*, such will shall be deemed revoked, unless provision shall have been made for such issue by some settlement, or unless such issue shall be provided for in the will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision; and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of such revocation shall be received." N. Y. Rev. St. Vol. 2, p. 124, § 35, 3d. ed. In *Arkansas*, *Indiana*, and *Missouri*, the language of the statutes is substantially the same as in New York. Ark. Rev. St. 1837, ch. 157, § 7. Ind. Rev. St. 1843, ch. 30, § 8. Misso. Rev. St. 1845, ch. 185, § 7.

In *Pennsylvania*, if the testator, after making his will, "shall marry or have a child not provided for in such will, and die leaving a widow and child, or either a *widow or child*, though such child be born after the death of the father, every such person, *so far* as shall regard the widow or child, shall be deemed and construed to die intestate." Dunlop's Dig. p, 573, § 15. Coates *v.* Hughes, 3 Binn. 498. Tomlinson *v.* Tomlinson, 1 Ashm. 224.

In *Virginia*, if the testator, having no issue then living, shall make a will, wherein any child he may have is not provided for nor mentioned, and shall at his death leave a child, or leave his wife pregnant of a child which shall be born; the will "shall have no effect during the life of such after-born child, and shall *be void*, *unless* the child die, without having been married, *and* before he or she shall have attained the age of twenty-one years." Tate's Dig. p. 892. In *New Jersey*, in the like case, the will is declared void; without reference either to the marriage or majority of the child. N. Jer. Rev. St. 1846, p. 368, § 20.

In *South Carolina*, a will is revoked by the subsequent *marriage* of the testator, *and his death*, *leaving issue*. S. Car. Stat, at Large, Vol. 5, p. 107. Jacks *v.* Henderson, 1 Desau. 543, 557.

In *Georgia*, the will is revoked, if the testator shall afterwards marry *or* have a child born; no provision being made for either wife or child in the will, and no alteration being made in the will, subsequent to the marriage or birth of the child. Geo. Rev. St. 1845. p. 457, § 16.

In *Ohio*, "If the testator had no children at the time of executing his will,

the circumstance, that the testator was married at the time of making the will, and survived his wife, and afterwards married again and had issue by the second wife; but such second marriage and the birth of issue is equally a revocation of the will, as though it had been made while he was single. Nor does it make any difference that the issue was posthumous; nor, that the testator died, without knowing that his wife was pregnant;[1] nor, that the child died in the lifetime of the testator.[2]

§ 686. Another case of implied revocation, is that which arises from an *alteration of the estate* of the devisor, after the

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but shall afterwards have a child living, or born alive after his death, such will shall be deemed revoked;" unless the child shall have been provided for by some settlement, or in the will, or so mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision; "and no other evidence, to rebut the presumption of such revocation, shall be received." Ohio Rev. St. 1841, ch. 129, § 40.

In *Louisiana*, "the testament falls by the *birth* of legitimate children of the testator, posterior to its date." Louis. Civil Code, art. 1698.

In all the other States, this subject is believed to have been left to the implication of law.

Whether the birth of a child by the first wife, after the making of the will; and after the death of the first wife, a second marriage, but no more children; is a revocation of the will; — *quære*. See 4 Ves. 848. Yerby *v.* Yerby, 3 Call, 334. 1 Jarm. on Wills, 108. See 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 6, § 45, 46, notes. (Greenleaf's ed.) As to the effect of marriage upon the will of a *feme sole*, see 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 2, § 5, note. Ibid. ch. 6, § 57, note. (Greenleaf's ed.)

[1] Christopher *v.* Christopher, Dick. 445, cited 4 Burr. 2171, marg.; Ibid. 2182. See *supra*, § 684 note and cases there cited. In Doe *v.* Barford, 4 M. & S. 10, the will was held not revoked, where the testator died leaving his wife pregnant, of which fact he was ignorant. But if, as is now settled by the cases of Marston *v.* Roe, and Israell *v.* Rodon, *supra*, the revocation results from an imperative rule of law, and not from any supposed change of intention, the propriety of that decision may well be questioned.

[2] Wright *v.* Netherwood, 2 Salk. 593, note (*a*) by Evans; more fully reported in 2 Phillim. 266, note (*c*). See also Emerson *v.* Boville, 1 Phillim. 342. In England it is now provided, by Stat. 7 W. 4, & 1 Vic. c. 26, § 18, that "every will, made by a man or woman, shall be revoked by his or her marriage," except wills made under powers of appointment, in certain cases; and that "no will shall be revoked, by any presumption of an intention on the ground of an alteration of circumstances."

making of the will; it being generally considered essential to the validity of a devise of lands, that the testator should be seised thereof at the making of the will, and that he should continue so seised thereof until his decease. If therefore, a testator, after making his will, should by deed aliene the lands which he had disposed of by the will, the disposition by will thereby becomes void; and should he afterwards acquire a new freehold estate in the same lands, such newly acquired estate will not pass to the devisee under the will.[1] And

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[1] See 1 Jarman on Wills, ch. 7, sec. 3, p. 130 – 148; 2 Williams on Executors, Part 3, b. 3, ch. 2, sec. 1, p. 820 – 827. See also 6 Cruise's Dig. tit. 38, ch. 6, (Greenleaf's ed.) where the subject of recovations by an alteration of the estate is more largely treated.

After-acquired lands also pass by the will, if such was the intent of the testator, by the statutes of most of the United States. But such intent must clearly appear on the face of the will, by the statutes of *Maine*, *Massachusetts*, *New Hampshire*, *New York*, *Virginia*, *Ohio*, *Michigan*, and *Kentucky*. It is inferred, from the general terms of a devise of all his estate, by the statutes of *Pennsylvania*, and *Indiana*; and also of *Connecticut*, unless apparently otherwise intended. In *Vermont*, the intent must appear in the will, or be found "by a proper construction." In *Rhode Island*, the lands pass, if such intent "appears by the express terms of his will." In *Illinois*, and *Mississippi*, the statutes empower the testator to devise all the estate which he has "or may have at the time of his death;" which seems imperatively to include after-acquired lands, if not excluded by the terms of the will. See Maine Rev. St. 1840, ch. 92, § 13; Mass. Rev. St. 1836, ch. 62. § 3; Cushing *v.* Aylwin, 12 Met. 169; Pray *v.* Waterston, Ibid. 262; New Hamp. Rev. St. 1842, ch. 156, § 2; Verm. Rev. St. 1839, ch. 45, § 2; R. Isl. Rev. St. 1844, p. 231; Conn. Rev. St. 1849, Tit. 14, ch. 1, § 4; Brewster *v.* McCall, 15 Conn. 290; N. York Rev. St. vol. 2, p. 119; Dunlop's Dig. LL. Pa. p. 572; Tate's Dig. LL. Va. p. 889, 1 Wash. 75; 8 Cranch, 69, 70; Ohio Rev. St. 1841, ch. 129, § 48; Mich. Rev. St. 1846, ch. 68, §. 3; LL. Ky. vol. 2 p. 1537, § 1; Roberts *v.* Elliot, 3 Monr. 396; Robertson *v.* Barber, 6 Monr. 524; Ind. Rev. St. 1843, ch. 30, § 4; Ill. Rev. St. 1839, p. 686, § 1; Mis. Rev. St. 1840, ch. 36, § 2. See also Allen *v.* Harrison, 3 Call, 289; Walton *v.* Walton 7, J. J. Marsh. 58; Denis *v.* Warder, 3 B. Monr. 173; Smith *v.* Jones, 4 Ohio R. 115; Willis *v.* Watson, 4 Scam. 64. 4 Kent, Comm. 511 – 513.

In the absence of any statute, lands purchased after the date of a devise will pass by a codicil made after their purchase; the codicil containing no expressions limiting the effect of the devise to lands comprised in the will. Yarnold *v.* Wallis, 4 Y. & C. 160. And see Bridge *v.* Yates, 14 Law Journ. N. S. 426.

though the conveyance be for a partial, or a mistaken or unnecessary purpose, yet if it embraces the whole estate which is the subject of the devise or bequest, it is a total revocation. But if it is only a conveyance of part of the testator's estate or interest, as, for example, if owning the fee, or entire interest, he makes a lease for years, or a mortgage, or pledges the property, it is only a revocation *pro tanto*, or a gift by will, subject to the lien thus created.[1] But a subsequent partition of lands, held in common at the time of making the will, is no revocation ; as it does not affect the nature or quantity of the estate, but only the manner of enjoyment.[2] Nor will an interruption of the testator's seisin work a revocation of the will, where it is involuntary and temporary ; for if he be disseised subsequently to making the will, and afterwards re-enters, he is restored to his original seisin, by relation back, and the devise is not revoked.[3]

§ 687. Even a *void conveyance* may sometimes operate as a revocation of a previous devise, on the principle, that it is inconsistent with the testamentary disposition.[4] This rule is applied to cases, where the failure of the conveyance arises from the incapacity of the grantee, as where the husband conveys by deed directly to his wife, lands which he had previously devised to another ;[5] and also to cases where the conveyance is inoperative for the want of some ceremony essential to its validity, as where it is by feoffment, but there

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[1] 4 Kent's Comm. 511, 512. Brydges *v.* Duchess of Chandos, 2 Ves. 417, 427, 428 ; Carter *v.* Thomas, 4 Greenl. 341.

[2] 1 Jarman on Wills, 134, 135, Perkins's edit. ; Risley *v.* Baltinglass, T. Raym. 240 ; Brydges *v.* Duchess of Chandos, 2 Ves. 417, 429.

[3] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 133 ; Goodtitle *v.* Otway, 1 B. & P. 576, 602 ; 2 H. Bl. 516, S. C. ; Cave *v.* Holford, 3 Ves. 650, 670 ; Attorney General *v.* Vigor, 8 Ves. 256, 282. In Pennsylvania, it seems that a testator may devise lands of which he is disseised at the time. Hume *v.* McFarlane, 4 S. & R. 435.

[4] 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 149 – 152 ; Walton *v.* Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 269 ; Hodges *v.* Green, 4 Russ. 28.

[5] Beard *v.* Beard, 3 Atk. 72, 73.

is no livery of seisin.[1] But the rule does not apply to a conveyance which is void at law on account of fraud or covin; yet if the deed is valid in law, but impeachable in equity, it will be held in equity as a revocation.[2]

§ 688. The *formal proof* of a will may also be *rebutted* by evidence, showing that it was obtained by *fraud and imposition* practised upon the testator, or, by *duress;* or, that the testator was *not of competent age;* or, was a *feme covert;* or, was *not of sound and disposing mind and memory;* or, that it was obtained by *undue influence.* But it is said that undue influence is not that which is obtained by modest persuasion, or by arguments addressed to the understanding, or by mere appeals to the affections; it must be an influence obtained either by flattery, excessive importunity, or threats, or in some other mode by which a dominion is acquired over the will of the testator, destroying his free agency, and constraining him to do, against his free will, what he is unable to refuse.[3]

§ 688 *a.* If the will is *proved to be lost,* it may still be

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[1] 1 Ibid.; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 150.

[2] Simpson *v.* Walker, 5 Simons, R. 1; Hawes *v.* Wyatt, 2 Cox, R. 263, per Ld. Alvanley, M. R. And see S. C. in 3 Bro. Ch. R. 156, and notes by Perkins.

[3] Marshall's case, 2 Barr, 388. And see Duffield *v.* Morris, 2 Harringt. 375; O'Neall *v.* Farr, 1 Rich. 80; Lide *v.* Lide, 2 Brev. 403; Harrison's case, 1 B. Munroe, 351; Brown *v.* Moore, 6 Yerg. 272. Where the testator is left free from undue influence, and at liberty to act upon his own perceptions, less mind is ordinarily requisite to make a will, than to make a contract of sale. But mere *passive* memory is not alone sufficient. He must retain sufficient *active* memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind long enough to perceive at least their more obvious relations to each other, and to form a rational judgment in regard to them. The elements of such a judgment should be, the number of his children, their deserts with reference to conduct and capacity as well as need, and what he had done for them in the way of advancement, the amount and condition of his property, and the like. See Converse *v.* Converse, Sup. Court, Vt. 1849. 2 Law Rep. 516, N. S., Per Redfield, J.

admitted to probate, upon secondary evidence, as in the case of lost deeds and other writings.[1] And though, as we have seen,[2] if the will, shown once to have existed, cannot be found after the death of the testator, the presumption is that he destroyed it, *animo revocandi*, yet this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. But if it be so rebutted, yet the contents of the will cannot be proved, unless by the clearest and most stringent evidence.[3]

§ 689. In regard to *insanity* or want of sufficient soundness of mind, we have heretofore seen that, though, in the probate of a will, as the real issue is whether there is a valid will or not, the executor is considered as holding the affirmative,[4] and therefore may seem bound affirmatively to prove the sanity of the testator; yet we have also seen, that the law itself presumes every man to be of sane mind, until the contrary is shown.[5] The burden of proving unsoundness or imbecility of mind in the testator, is therefore on the party impeaching the validity of the will for this cause. But, as has also been shown,[6] insanity or imbecility of mind, once proved to have existed, is presumed to continue, unless it was accidental or temporary in its nature, as, where it was occasioned by the violence of disease. And, on the other hand, the proof of insanity at the time of the transaction, may be rebutted, by

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[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 84, 509, 575.

[2] See Ante, § 681.

[3] Davis *v.* Sigourney, 8 Met. 487; Davis *v.* Davis, 2 Addams, 223; Thornton's case, 2 Curt. 913; Betts *v.* Jackson, 6 Wend. 173; Clark *v.* Wright, 3 Pick. 67; 1 Jarman on Wills, 119, by Perkins; Huble *v.* Clark, 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 115; Steele *v.* Price, 5 B. Munroe, 58.

[4] Ante, Vol. 1, § 77.

[5] Ante, Vol. 1, § 42; Ante, tit. INSANITY, § 373; Brooks *v.* Barrett, 7 Pick. 94.

[6] Ante, tit. INSANITY, § 371. And see Vol. 1, § 42. Evidence of prior bodily disease, and of different intentions, previously expressed, has been held admissible, in proof of incapacity at the time of making the will. Irish *v.* Smith, 8 S. & R. 573. But *moral insanity*, or the perversion of the moral feelings, not accompanied with insane delusion, which is the *legal* test of insanity, is held insufficient to invalidate a will. Frere *v.* Peacocke, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 442.

evidence that the act was done during a *lucid interval* of reason, the burden of proving which, is devolved on the party asserting this exception.[1]

§ 690. In the *proof of insanity*, though the evidence *must relate to the time of the act* in question,[2] yet evidence of insanity immediately before or after the time is admissible.[3] *Suicide*, committed by the testator soon after making his will, is admissible as evidence of insanity, but it is not conclusive.[4] The fact of his being *under guardianship* at the time, falls under the same rule; being *primâ facie* evidence of incapacity, but open to explanation by other proof.[5] It may here be added, that where a devisee or legatee is party in a suit touching the validity of a will, his *declarations and admissions* in disparagement of the will, are competent to be given in evidence against him; but if he is not party to the record, nor party in interest, it is otherwise.[6] So the declaration of his opinion in favor of the sanity of the testator, is admissible against a party opposing the probate of the will on the ground of his insanity.[7] The *declarations of the testator* himself are admissible only when they were made so near the time of

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[1] Attorney-Gen. *v.* Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 441; Ex parte Holyland, 11 Ves. 11; White *v.* Wilson, 13 Ves. 87; Cartwright *v.* Cartwright, 1 Phillim. R. 100. And see 1 Williams on Executors, p. 17–30; 1 Jarman on Wills, ch. 3; Ray's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, ch. 14, § 230–246.

[2] Attorney-Gen. *v.* Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 441, 443; White *v.* Wilson, 13 Ves. 87.

[3] Dickinson *v.* Barber, 9 Mass. 225.

[4] Brooks *v.* Barret, 7 Pick. 94.

[5] Stone *v.* Damon, 12 Mass. 488; Breed *v.* Pratt, 18 Pick. 115.

[6] Atkins *v.* Sanger, 1 Pick. 192; Phelps *v.* Hartwell, 1 Mass. 71; Bovard *v.* Wallace, 4 S. & R. 499; Nussear *v.* Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323, 328, 329.

[7] Ware *v.* Ware, 8 Greenl. 42; Atkins *v.* Sanger, 1 Pick. 192. But declarations by a devisee, that he procured the devise to be made, are not admissible for this purpose; it not being unlawful so to do, provided there were no fraud, imposition, or excessive importunity. Miller *v.* Miller, 8 S. & R. 267; Davis *v.* Calvert, 5 Gill & Johns. 265.

the execution of the will as to become a part of the *res gestæ*.[1]

§ 691. The *attesting witnesses* are regarded in the law as persons placed round the testator, in order that no fraud may be practised upon him, in the execution of the will, and to judge of his capacity. They must therefore be competent witnesses at the time of attestation; otherwise the will is not well executed.[2] On this ground, these witnesses are permitted to testify as to the opinions they formed of the testator's capacity, at the time of executing his will; though the opinions of other persons are ordinarily inadmissible, at least unless founded upon facts, testified by themselves or others in the cause.[3]

§ 692. The foregoing requisites to the formal execution of a valid will are all demanded, whenever the instrument is to be proved in the more ample or *solemn form;* and this mode of proof, as we have before intimated, is now generally required in the United States, the probate of the will being ordinarily held conclusive in the Common Law Courts, for reasons already given. And this amount of proof, by all the attesting witnesses, if they can be had, may be demanded by any person, interested in the will.[4]

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[1] Smith *v.* Fenner, 1 Gall. R. 170. See, also, as to declarations of testators, Den *v.* Vancleve, 2 South. 589; Reel *v.* Reel, 1 Hawks, 248; Farrar *v.* Ayers, 5 Pick. 404; Wadsworth *v.* Ruggles, 6 Pick. 63; Rambler *v.* Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90; Betts *v.* Jackson, 6 Wend. 173.

[2] Such was the opinion of Lord Camden, which he maintained in an energetic protest against that of a majority of the Court, in Doe d. Hindson *v.* Hersey, reported in 4 Burn, Eccl. L. 88, and in a note to Cornwell *v.* Isham, 1 Day, R. 41–88. His opinion is now acquiesced in, as the true exposition of the statute of wills. See Brograve *v.* Winder, 2 Ves. 634, 636; Amory *v.* Fellows, 5 Mass. 219, 229; Sears *v.* Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358, 361; Antsey *v.* Dowsing, 2 Stra. 1253, 1255; Ante, Vol. I, § 333, 353, 440; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 63, 64, 66.

[3] Ante, Vol. I, § 440, and cases there cited; Hathorn *v.* King, 8 Mass. 371; Dickinson *v.* Barber, 9 Mass. 225.

[4] See 1 Williams on Executors, p. 192–200; Sears *v.* Dillingham, 12

§ 693. Upon the trial of an issue of *devisavit vel non*, or other issue of *title to lands*, in the Courts of Common Law, in those States in which the probate of the will is not regarded as conclusive in respect to lands, it is necessary, in the first place, to *produce the original will*, or to prove its former existence and its subsequent loss, in order to let in the secondary evidence of its contents.[1] And for this purpose, the probate of the will, or an exemplification, is not received as evidence, without proof *aliundè*, that it is a true copy.[2]

§ 694. It is ordinarily held sufficient, in the Courts of Common Law, to call *one only, of the subscribing witnesses*, if he can speak to all the circumstances of the attestation; and it is considered indispensable that he should be able, alone, to prove the perfect execution of the will, in order to dispense with the testimony of the other witnesses, if they are alive and within the jurisdiction.[3] But in Chancery, a dis-

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Mass. 358; Chase *v.* Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236. In *Massachusetts*, a will devising land, must be proved and allowed in the Probate Court, before it can be used as evidence of title in a Court of Common Law. Shumway *v.* Holbrook, 1 Pick. 114; Laughton *v.* Atkins, Ibid. 535, 549. And for this purpose, it may be admitted to probate, though more than twenty years have elapsed since the death of the testator. Ibid.

[1] See Ante, Vol. 1, § 557 – 563, 569 – 575; Ibid. § 84, note. The nature and effect of probate in general, has already been considered. See Ante, Vol. 1, § 518, 550. Also, Vol. 2, § 315. The issue of *devisavit vel non* involves only the question of the valid execution of the will; and not of its contents. Patterson *v.* Patterson, 6 S. & R. 55.

[2] Doe *v.* Calvert, 2 Campb. 389; Bull. N. P. 246.

[3] Longford *v.* Eyre, 1 P. Wms. 741; Bull. N. P. 264; Jackson *v.* Le Grange, 19 Johns. 386; Dan *v.* Brown, 4 Cowen, R. 483; Jackson *v.* Vickory, 1 Wend. 406; Jackson *v.* Betts, 6 Cowen, R. 377; Turnipseed *v.* Hawkins, 1 McCord, 272. In *Pennsylvania*, two witnesses are required in proof of every testamentary writing, whether in the general probate before the Register of Wills, or upon the trial of an issue at Common Law; and each witness must separately depose to all facts necessary to complete the chain of evidence, so that no link may depend on the credibility of but one. Lewis *v.* Maris, 1 Dall. 278; Hock *v.* Hock, 4 S. & R. 47. And if there are three witnesses, and the proof is fully made by two only, it is enough, without calling the third. Jackson *v.* Vandyke, 1 Coxe, R. 28; Fox *v.*

tinction is taken, in principle, between a suit by a devisee, to establish the will against the heir, and a bill by the heir at law, to set aside the will for fraud, and to have it delivered up. For, in the former case, a decree in favor of the will is final and conclusive against the heir; but in the latter, after a decree against him, dismissing the bill, his remedies at law are still left open to him. It is therefore held incumbent on the devisee, whenever he sues to establish the will against the heir, to produce all the subscribing witnesses, if they may be had, that the heir may have an opportunity of cross-examining them; but where the heir sues to set aside the will, this degree of strictness may, under circumstances, be dispensed with, on the part of the devisee.[1]

Evans, 3 Yeates, 506. But if one or both witnesses are dead, the will may be proved by the usual secondary evidence. Miller *v.* Carothers, 6 S. & R. 215.

[1] Bootle *v.* Blundell, 19 Ves. Tatham *v.* Wright, 2 Russ. & My. 1. In the latter case, which was a bill by the heir to set aside the will, the rule was expounded by Tindal, C. J., in the following terms: — "It may be taken to be generally true, that in cases where the devisee files a bill to set up and establish the will, and an issue is directed by the Court upon the question *devisavit vel non*, this Court will not decree the establishment of the will, unless the devisee has called all the subscribing witnesses to the will, or accounted for their absence. And there is good reason for such a general rule. For as a decree in support of the will is final and conclusive against the heir, against whom an injunction would be granted, if he should proceed to disturb the possession after the decree, it is but reasonable that he should have the opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses to the will, before his right of trying the title of the devisee is taken from him. In that case, it is the devisee who asks for the interference of this Court, and he ought not to obtain it until he has given every opportunity to the heir at law to dispute the validity of the will. This is the ground upon which the practice is put in the cases of Ogle *v.* Cooke (1 Ves. Sen. 178), and Townsend *v.* Ives (1 Wils. 216). But it appears clearly from the whole of the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor in the case of Bootle *v.* Blundell (1 Mer. 193; Cooper, 136), that this rule, as a general rule, applies only to the case of a bill filed to establish the will (*an establishing bill*, as Lord Eldon calls it in one part of his judgment), and an issue directed by the Court upon that bill. And even in cases to which the rule generally applies, this Court, it would seem, under particular circumstances, may dispense with the necessity of the three witnesses being called by the plaintiff in the issue. For, in Lowe *v.* Jolliffe (1 W. Black. 365), where the bill was filed by the devisees under the will, and an issue

§ 695. The *competency of the witnesses*, and the admissibility of their *opinions* in evidence have already been considered in the preceding volume.[1]

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devisavit vel non, was tried at bar, it appears from the report of the case, that the subscribing witnesses to the will and codicil, who swore that the testator was utterly incapable of making a will, were called by the defendant in the issue, and not by the plaintiff; for the reporter says, 'to encounter this evidence, the plaintiff's counsel examined the friends of the testator, who strongly deposed to his sanity;' and, again, the Chief Justice expressed his opinion to be, that all the defendant's witnesses were grossly and corruptly perjured. And after the trial of this issue the will was established. In such a case, to have compelled the devisee to call these witnesses, would have been to smother the investigation of the truth. Now, in the present case, the application to this Court is not by the devisee seeking to establish the will, but by the heir at law, calling upon this Court to declare the will void, and to have the same delivered up. The heir at law does not seek to try his title by an ejectment, and apply to this Court to direct that no mortgage or outstanding terms shall be set up against him to prevent his title from being tried at law, but seeks to have a decree in his favor, in substance and effect to set aside the will. This case, therefore, stands upon a ground directly opposed to that upon which the cases above referred to rest. So far from the heir at law being bound by a decree which the devisee seeks to obtain, it is he who seeks to bind the devisee, and such is the form of his application, that if he fails upon this issue, he would not be bound himself. For the only result of a verdict in favor of the will would be, that the heir at law would obtain no decree, and his bill would be dismissed, still leaving him open to his remedies at law. No decided case has been cited, in which the rule has been held to apply to such a proceeding; and, certainly, neither reason nor good sense demands that this Court should establish such a precedent under the circumstances of this case. If the object of the Court, in directing an issue, is to inform its own conscience by sifting the truth to the bottom, that course should be adopted with respect to the witnesses, which, by experience, is found best adapted to the investigation of the truth. And that is not attained by any arbitrary rule, that such witnesses must be called by one, and such by the other party; but, by subjecting the witnesses to the examination in chief of that party, whose interest it is to call him, from the known or expected bearing of his testimony, and to compel him to undergo the cross-examination of the adverse party, against whom his evidence is expected to make." See 2 Russ. & Mylne, p. 13–15.

[1] Ante, Vol. 1, § 327–430, 440. As to the competency of executors and trustees, see particularly § 333, 409.

INDEX.

A.

SECTION

ABATEMENT,
- plea of alien enemy in 19
- defective or improper service of process . . 20
- misnomer 21
- bill not found by twelve of the grand jury . 22
- non-tenure and disclaimer 23
- want of parties 24
- in partnership 25
- pendency of prior suit 26
- judgement in, when peremptory 27
- damages in 27

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,
- substance of this issue 28
- what is a good accord and satisfaction . . . 28
- who is to judge of it . . . . . 28 *a*
- when admissible under the general issue, and when not 29
- proper parties to 30
- accord alone, when no bar 30
- accord, with tender of satisfaction, when sufficient . 31
- when payment and acceptance in satisfaction are both put in issue 32
- when presumed from lapse of time alone . . . 33

(*See* PAYMENT.)

ACCOUNT,
- action of 35
- between whom it lies 35
- pleadings in 36
- privity necessary to support 37
- material averments in 37
- evidence under issue of *plene computavit* . . 38
- plea of *ne unques bailiff* 38
- auditors in 39

SECTION

ACCOUNT, *continued.*
auditors in trial of issues certified by . . . 39
judgment *quod computet*, effect of 39
ACCOUNT STATED,
what amounts to proof of . . . . . 127 – 129
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT,
what amounts to . . . . . 440 – 443
effect of . . . . . 440 *n.*
ACT OF GOD,
what is 219
when it excuses 219
ADMISSION,
of signature 164, 165
of seaworthiness . . . . . 401, *n.*
of marriage 462
ADULTERY,
nature of the evidence to establish 40
proved by evidence of proximate circumstances . 41
general cohabitation . . . 41
general conduct, creating a *suspicio violenta* . . . 41
when proved by impression and belief of witnesses . 42
when continuance of presumed, after proof of one act 43
of wife, when birth of child evidence of . . . 44
of husband, acts in proof of 44
of either, when proved by visit to brothel . . . 44
by disease 44
when proved by confession of party . . . 45
by evidence of *particeps criminis* . 46
to what time the evidence must relate . . . 47
when evidence of acts not charged is admissible . 47
proof of, upon indictment for this crime . . . 48
when and what evidence of marriage is requisite . 49, 50
proof of identity of parties, when requisite . . 50
evidence in defence of action for crim. con. . . 51
of collusion between husband and wife . 51
of passive sufferance of husband . . 51
under plea of recrimination . . . 52
condonation 53, 54
proof of damages 55
in mitigation of damages 56
letters of wife, when admissible for husband . . 57

SECTION

ADULTERY, *continued.*
general character of wife in issue 58
(*See* SEDUCTION.)
AGENCY,
nature and definition of 59
proof of, directly or indirectly 60
by deed, when necessary 61
where a corporation aggregate is principal . 62
by writing, when necessary 63
by testimony of the agent himself . . 63
by inference from relative situation . 64, 64 *a*
by habit and course of dealing . . . 65, 66
by possession of negotiable or other security . 65
by subsequent ratification 66
by long acquiescence 67
effect of ratification, of tortious act 68
liability of principal for tortious act 68
revocation of . . . . . 68 *a*
ALLEGATIONS,
when descriptive 12
ALTERATION,
in a will, when deliberative and when not . . 681
AMENDMENT,
of record, when allowed 11
of process, in the names of parties . . . . 11 *a*
of pleadings . . . . . 11 *b*
under recent English statutes . . . . 11 *c*, *d*
when not allowed . . . . . 11 *e*
ARBITRATION AND AWARD,
modes of the submission, and remedies thereon . 69
remedy by action of debt, when preferable . . 70
proof of the submission 71
when by parol 72
of the authority of the umpire 73
of the execution of the award 74
of notice, publication, and delivery of the award 75
of demand of payment, when necessary . . 76
of performance by plaintiff 77
defences to an action upon an award . . . 78
arbitrators, when and how far competent witnesses . 78
proof of revocation of the submission . . . 79
minority of party 80

SECTION

ARBITRATION AND AWARD, *continued.*
proof of refusal of arbitrators to act 80
evidence under *non assumpsit* 81
ASCRIPTION OF PAYMENTS . . . . . 529 - 536
ASSAULT AND BATTERY,
assault, what 82
assault, intent material in 83
battery, what 84
intent material in 85
or, freedom from fault . . 85
when not necessary to be proved . . . 87
when defence must be specially pleaded . . . 85
proof of time and place, how far material . . 86
when plaintiff may waive one trespass and prove another 86
when he is bound to elect 86
actual battery needs not to be proved . . . 87
consequential damages, when to be specially laid . 88, 89
proof of 88
when not necessary to allege . 89
damages, what to be alleged, and what may be proved
without special averment 89
(*See* DAMAGES.)
confessions and admissions, when admissible . . 90
conviction on indictment, when evidence in a civil action 90
allegation of *alia enormia*, its office . . . 91
defences in, classes of, and mode of pleading . . 92
evidence under the general issue 93
evidence of intention, when material . . . 94
when admissible . . . 94
necessity, when admissible . . . 94
evidence under plea of *son assault demesne*
with replication of *de injuria* 95
with replication in justification 95
when pleaded with the general issue 95
replication of *de injuria* . . . 96
plea of *moderate castigavit* . . 97
molliter manus imposuit . . 98
justification of act done to preserve the
peace 99, 100
ASSUMPSIT,
when implied 102
when not 103

SECTION

ASSUMPSIT, *continued.*

when plaintiff must declare on the special contract . 104
when plaintiff may declare on common counts only . 104
form of common counts . . . . . 105, *n.*
proof of the consideration 105
conditions precedent 105
other material facts, under the general issue 106
damages 106
proof of request 107, 108
moral obligation, when sufficient 107
promise, when implied 108
from tortious conversion . . . . . 108, *n.*
privity, what is sufficient 109
parties, want of proper, when fatal 110
proof of particular capacity of plaintiff . . 110, 129
unlawfulness of contract, when fatal . . . 111
count for money lent, proof of 112
money paid 113
when defendant's order to pay must be proved . 114
what payments are deemed officious . . . 114
when contribution may be had 115
under a judgment . . . 116
count for money had and received, proof of . 117, 118
when delivered in trust . . 119
count for money had and received, when obtained by wrong 120, 121
count for money had and received, when paid upon a forged security 122
count for money had and received, when paid upon a mistake of facts or of law 123
count for money had and received, when paid upon a consideration which has failed 124
count for money had and received, when paid upon an agreement rescinded 124
count for money had and received by agent, action for 125
count upon an account stated, proof of 126, 127, 128, 129
for work and labor . . . . . 136 *a*

SECTION

ASSUMPSIT, *continued.*
pleas by defendant in abatement, of misnomer . . 130
coverture . . 130
want of parties 131, 132
partnership . 134
replication to plea of want of parties . . . 133
when *nolle prosequi* may be entered . . . 133
replication of infancy, when bad 133
general issue, what may generally be shown under . 135
what matters in discharge may be shown under when failure of consideration may be shown under . . . 136
ATTORNEYS,
actions by, in general 138
actions for fees, evidence in 139
by partners 140
retainer, effect of 141, 142
conduct of business by 142
extent of their undertaking, and liability . . 144, 145
defences to action by, for fees 143
when negligence may be shown 143
what damages recoverable against 146
when amenable to summary jurisdiction . . . 147
actions against, for misconduct causing loss of debt . 148
loss of title . 149

B.

BANKER'S CHECKS,
presentment of . . . . . 195 *a*
BASTARDY,
who are bastards 150
adulterine, how proved . . . . . 150, n.
when parents are competent witnesses . . . 151
period of gestation 152
may be shown by proving marriage void . . . 153
parents divorced . . 153
may not be shown by proving marriage voidable . 153
when legitimacy will be presumed 153
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES,
by what law governed . . . . . 153 *d.*
varieties of liability and remedies upon . . . 154

SECTION

BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. *continued.*

material allegations in actions upon 155
must be pleaded according to their legal effect . . 14, 15
forms of declarations upon . . . . 155, n
(1.) existence of the instrument, proof of . . . 156
when lost . . 156
when made by partner 167
what further must be shown under the general issue 156
signature of the instrument, proof of . 158, 159, 162
when dispensed with . 159
identity of the instrument, what is descriptive of . 160
of parties to the instrument, proof of . 158, 160
currency, when value of to be proved . . . 160
usances, when to be proved 160
acceptance, when not necessary to be proved . . 160
(2.) proof that defendant is a party to the instrument . 161
by his acceptance . 161
by his promise to accept a non-existing bill 161, n.
proof that defendant is a party by testimony of other parties, when . 161
(3.) plaintiff's interest, or title to sue, must be proved . 163
when admitted by acts of defendant . 164
limitation of such admissions . . 165
admission of procuration, what is 164
of indorsements, what is 165
indorsements, what must be alleged and proved . 166
partnership, when to be proved 167
indorsement in blank, effect of 168
action by drawer *v.* acceptor, evidence in . . 169
indorser *v.* acceptor 169
accommodation acceptor *v.* drawer . . 170
other actions founded on return of bill, evidence in . 169
consideration, when impeachable . . . 171 – 173
(4.) plaintiff must prove breach of contract by defendant 174
presentment, when . . 174 – 176, 186 *a*
presentment, when not excused 177
at what time to be made . 178, 179, 181
at what place . . . . 180, 180 *a*

Section

BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. *continued.*

presentment, when provable by entries . . . 182
protest, when necessary to be proved . . . 183
when want of excused . . . 184, 196
when not necessary 185
dishonor, notice of, necessary 186
form of notice, and by whom to be given 186
when to be given . . 186, 187
when sent by post . . . 187
when plaintiff must prove that it was received 187
by agent or banker . . . 187*a*
when agent or banker treated as holder 187*a*
where parties reside in the same town 188
variance in, what . . . 189
when waived . . . 190, 190*a*
when not 190
by letter, how proved . 191, 193
notice to produce . . 191, 192
to what place to be sent . . 194
want of notice of, when excused 195, 196
in case of banker's checks . 195*a*
dishonor, want of notice of, excuse need not be averred 197
defences to actions on 198–202
by impeaching consideration . 199
by other equities between original parties 200
by matter in discharge of acceptor . . 201
of other parties . 201
of parties collaterally liable . . . 202
by new agreement 202
competency of parties to, as witnesses . . . 203
drawer . . . 203
partner . . . 203
maker 204
acceptor or drawee . 205
payee 206
indorser . . . 207

SECTION

C.

CARRIERS,
liability of, and remedies against 208
forms of declaration against . . 210, n.
(1.) contract, proof of 209
when it must be proved in *tort* . . . 214
termini, and variance 209
proper parties to the suit 212
common, proof of contract supplied by law . . 210
who are such 211
(2.) delivery of goods, proof of 213
(3.) loss or non-delivery of goods, proof of . . . 213
when plaintiff's oath admissible . . 213
proof of joint interest in *assumpsit* 214
in *tort* 214
whether carrier may restrict his own liability . . 215
notice by, burden of proving 216
when by advertisement, proof of . . 216
when several and different notices . . 217
effect of, how avoided 218
waiver of 218
negligence, &c., on whom is the burden of proof . 218
private, excused by accident 219
common, what excuses 219
when excused by act of plaintiff 220
of passengers, liabilities of 221
liable only for negligence . . 222
burden of proof on 222
breaking of coach presumptive proof of negligence 222
when not bound to receive or convey 222 *a*

CASE, ACTION UPON THE,
distinction between trespass and case . . . 224
lies for injuries to relative rights 225
when trespass or case lies 225
whether case lies for injuries to absolute rights with force 226
proof of joint interest in plaintiffs 227
joint liability in defendants, when . . 228
allegation of time, when material to be proved . . 229
malice and negligence, proof of . . 230
general issue, evidence under 231

SECTION

CASE, ACTION UPON THE, *continued.*
damage resulting from misrepresentation . . . 230 *a*
special pleas, when necessary 232
liability of master for servant . . . . . 232 *a*
CONSIDERATION,
when divisible 136
CONTRACT,
entire when . . . . . 136 *a*, 261 *a*
COPYRIGHT, 510 – 515
(*See* PATENTS.)
COVENANT,
declarations in . 239, n., 240, n., 242, n., 243, n., 245, n.
no general issue in 233
proof of the instrument 234
performance of condition precedent . . 235
breach of covenant 236, 237
of indemnity . . 236
breach to be substantially proved 237
notice, when necessary 238
against defendant, as assignee of covenantor . . 239
defences by 239
by plaintiff, as assignee, evidence by . . . 240
real, what are such 240
who may sue thereon 240
of seisin, what is a breach of 241
of freedom from incumbrance, breach of . . . 242
for quiet enjoyment, breach of 243
of warranty, breach of 244
against assigning and under-letting, breach of . . 245
to repair, breach of . . . . . 245 *a*
plea of *non est factum*, effect of 246
evidence under . . . 246
plea of performance, who must prove . . . 247
COUNT,
when several and when not . . . . 105, n.
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION, (*See* ADULTERY, MARRIAGE.)
CUSTOM,
what 248
its difference from Prescription and Usage . . 248
local, who is competent to prove 249
usage, who is competent to prove 249
local, how proved 250

SECTION

CUSTOM, *continued.*

usage, what, and how proved 251
and usage must both be proved by evidence of facts only 252
by what witnesses . 252
usage founded in foreign laws, how proved . . 252
proof of, one witness not enough . . . 252
. (*See* PRESCRIPTION.)

D.

DAMAGES,

what, and when given 253
general and special, defined 254
to be assessed by the Jury 255
nominal, when plaintiff may take judgment for . 254, 255
the natural and proximate cause of the wrongful act 256, 635
liquidated, by whom to be proved 257
what are such 258, 259
proof of, not confined to number and value alleged . 260
may be assessed beyond alleged value . . . 260
not beyond *ad damnum* . . . 260
measure of, general rule 261
when no particular sum or quantity is proved 255
on bills of exchange 261
on contracts to deliver goods . . . 261
to replace stock . . . 261
for labor and service . 261, 261 *a*
where not prevented by plaintiff . . 261
on breach of warranty of goods . . 262
in debt on bond 263
measure of, whether beyond the penalty and interest 257, n., 263
on covenants of title 264
of warranty . . . 264
ordinarily measured by the actual injury . . 253, n., 265
exceptions to this rule 265
aggravated and mitigated, when 266
in actions for injuries to the person 267
in actions for injuries to the reputation . . 267, 269
proof of, how restricted 268
to what time computed . . . . . 268 *a*
prospective, when allowed . . . . . 268 *b*

SECTION

DAMAGES, *continued.*
when and how far affected by the character and rank of the parties 269
whether affected by intention of the party 230 *a*, 270, 272
when dependent wholly on the intention . . . 271
when increased by bad intention 272
evidence in mitigation of 272, 458, 625
when excluded . . . 274
in aggravation of 273
in case for nuisance 474
for seduction . . . . . 577 *a*
in slander 275
in trespass . . . . . 635 *a*
in trover 276, 649
in violation of patents . . . . . 496, n.
for waste 650
against several for a joint *tort* 277
severally assessed, election *de melioribus damnis* . 277
alia enormia, evidence under this allegation . . 278
DATE,
when essential to be proved 12, 13, 160
when reckoned inclusive . . . . . 489, n.
DEBT,
when it lies 279
forms of declarations in 279
plea of *non est factum*, evidence under . . 279, 292
nil bet . . . 280, 281, 281 *a*, 282, 287
nil habuit in tenementis 281
Statute of Limitations 282
former recovery 282
for a penalty, proof in support of . . . 283, 284
proof in defence 285
for bribery at an election, proof in support of . . 286
proof in defence . . 287
for an escape 288
assignment of breaches on record 289
plea of *solvit ad diem*, evidence under . . 290, 291
solvit post diem 290, 291
parol proof of . . . 291 *a*
DEDICATION, (*See* WAY.)
DEED
how far put in issue, by plea of *non est factum* . 293

SECTION

DEED, *continued.*
plea of *non est factum*, burden of proof under 294, 300
how proved . . . 294
proof of signing . . 295
of sealing . . . 296
of delivery . . 297
foreign authentication . 298
acknowledgment . 298
what may be shown in defence, under this issue . 300
burden of proof when on defendant . . . 300
DEMAND,
when necessary to be proved . . . . 174 – 176
DEVISE, (*See* WILLS.)
DRUNKENNESS, ... 171, n., 300, 374
DURESS,
what 301
per minas 301
of imprisonment 302
money paid by 121

E.

EJECTMENT,
nature of, and ground of recovery in . . . 303
points to be proved by plaintiff 304
title of plaintiff, when not necessary to be proved . 305
who are estopped to deny it . . 305
proof of by payment of rent . . 306
when both parties claim under the same 307
possession of the lands by defendant, proof of . . 308
title of heir or devisee, proof of pedigree and descent 309
seisin of ancestor 310, 311
entry, by whom made 312
title of remainderman &c., proof of . . . 313
legatee of term of years, proof of . . 314
executor or administrator, proof of . . 315
guardian 315
purchaser under sheriff's sale . . . 316
title by a joint demise 317
title, by several demises 317
when proved to be part only of the land . . 317
ouster of one tenant in common, by another . . 318

SECTION

EJECTMENT, *continued.*
by landlord against tenant, plaintiff must prove tendency determined 319
by lapse of time . . . 320
by notice to quit . . . 321
service of notice . . 322, 324
form of notice . . . 323
notice, when not necessary . 325
when waived . . 325
by forfeiture 326
for non-payment of rent . . 326
for other breach . 327
for underletting . 328
between mortgagee and mortgagor . . . 329
defence of mortgagor, by proof of payment . . 330
usury . . . 330
what may be shown in defence of this action . . 331
damages in 332
trespass for mesne profits, plaintiff must prove the judgment 333
defendant's entry . . 333
his own possession . . 334
defendant's occupancy . 335
what damages plaintiff may recover . . 336
lasting improvements, remedy of defendant for . 337
other defences in 337
(*See* REAL ACTIONS.)

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,
profert by, of letters testamentary 338
character of, how put in issue 338
how controverted 344
when they must sue as such 338
character of, how proved when plaintiff . . . 339
by probate . . 339, 343, n.
how rebutted . 339
by record . . 340, 341
administrator *de bonis non*, how proved 341
plea of Statute of Limitations, when avoided by new promise to 342
de son tort, when liable as such 343
to what extent . . 345

SECTION

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, *continued.*
de son tort retainer by 350
character of, burden of proving 344
plea of *ne unques executor*, consequence of . . 345
plene administravit, proof of assets under . 346
what is evidence of *assets* 347
devastavit 347 *a*
how rebutted 348
when this plea is proper 348, n.
plea of *plene administravit*, evidence under . . 350
retainer, when it may be claimed . . . 349, 350
outstanding judgments, plea of 351
debts of higher nature, plea of 351
admissions by one of several executors, effect of . 352
(*See* TROVER.)
EXTORTION,
money obtained by 121

H.

HEIR,
proof heirship 354
death of ancestor 355
liability of . . . . . 356 – 358
plea of *riens per descent* 359
proof of assets 360
by lands in a foreign State . . . 361

I.

IDENTITY,
of person, proof of, when requisite . . . 50
of close 625
INFANCY,
burden of proof of 362
evidence of 363
plea of, how avoided 364
necessaries, what 365, 366
evidence of, how rebutted . . 366, 367
new promise by 367
no defence in actions *ex delicto* 368

SECTION

INSANITY,
when it is a good defence, or not, in civil cases . 369, 370
in criminal cases . 372
how proved 371, 689
what constitutes it 373
from *drunkenness*, when it is a defence . . . 374
INSURANCE,
declaration on marine policy 376
proof (1.) of the *policy* 377
(2.) *interest* . . . . . 378 – 381
legal or equitable . . . 379
proof of *interest* in the goods 380
under open or valued policy . . 381
(3.) inception of *risk* 382
(4.) performance of *conditions* . . . 383
compliance with *warranties* . . 383, 384
sailing with *convoy* 384
(5.) *loss* . . . . . 385 – 394
proximate cause of 387
by perils of the sea 387
by perils of rivers . . . . 387, n.
by *capture* 387, 388
when voyage *licensed* 389
by *barratry* 390
by *stranding* 391
total or partial 392
proved by *shipwreck* . . . 392
by *abandonment* accepted . 392
amount of, proved by *adjustment* . . 393
preliminary proof of 394
matters in *defence*, viz.
misrepresentation and concealment . . . 396, 397
burden of proof . 398
breach of warranties . 399 – 401
unseaworthiness . . 400, 401
illegality of voyage . . 402
want of documents . . 402
want of neutrality . . 402
deviation 403
against fire, declaration in 404
proof of loss 405

SECTION

INSURANCE, *continued.*
against fire, proof of loss, performance of conditions 406
rule of estimation of damages . . 407
defences in 408
upon lives 409
nature of interest insurable . . . 409
ISSUE, what 3
how formed 3, 4
general and special 5
general, in *assumpsit*, its extent . . . . 6 – 8
in English practice 8
in American practice 8

J.

JUDGE AND JURY,
their respective provinces, 28 *a*, 186, 442, n., 490, 504, n., 605, 662

L.

LAW AND FACT, (*See* JUDGE AND JURY.)
LIBEL AND SLANDER,
to be defined by the Court, and tried by the Jury . 411
declarations in 410
points of plaintiff's proof 410
special character . . 412
other prefatory allegations . 413
publication of words . . . 414
by defendant . 115
by his agents 415, 416
when printed . 416
by letters . . 416
colloquium and *innuendoes* . 417
malice . . 418, 419, 422
damages 420
defence, under the general issue . . . 421 – 425
when the truth may be given in evidence . 521
words spoken in discharge of duty . . 421
in confidence . . . 421
in honest belief of their truth 421

SECTION

LIBEL AND SLANDER, *continued.*
defence, whole libel to be read 423
damages, evidence in mitigation of . . . 424, 425
justification of, degree of proof required . . . 426
charging violation of professional confidence . . 427
slander of title 428
other special damages 428
course of trial 429
LICENSE,
proof of 627, 643
LIMITATIONS,
in bar of rights of entry 430
of action 431
avoided by suing out of process 431
new suit, after abatement . . . 432
time, from period or act computed . . . 433 – 435
not arrested, when once begun to run . . 439
avoided by showing absence, out of the jurisdiction . 437
when, in case of joint liabilities . 438
how rebutted . 439
new promise . . . 440 – 445
acknowledgment of indebtment 440
what amounts to 441 – 445
when not admissible 446
merchants' accounts, what . 447
fraud in defendant . . . 448

M.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
nature of, and what amounts to 449
whether it lies against a corporation . . 453, n.
action for, proofs by plaintiff . . . . 450 – 456
proof of the prosecution . . . 450, 451
prosecution ended . . 452
malice and want of probable cause 453
burden of proof of . . 454
probable cause, what is 454, 455
proof of by defendant . 457
damages 456

SECTION

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, *continued.*
defence in this action 457
by proof of plaintiff's bad character, when . 458
advice of counsel . . . 459
MARRIAGE,
nature of the contract of, and when valid . . 460
modes of proof of 461
by reputation 462
by admissions of parties . . . 462
by conduct 462
by written document . . . 463
how rebutted 464
MASTER AND SERVANT,
master, when liable . . . . . 232 *a*
(*See* CASE.)
MONEY COUNTS,
what evidence is admissible under . . 112 – 125, 129 *a*

N.

NUISANCE,
what is . . . . . 465 – 469
to dwelling-house 466
to lands 467
to incorporeal hereditaments . . . 468
to reversionary interests 469
action for, is local 470
proofs by plaintiff . . . . 470 – 474
possession, or title . . . 471
injury by defendant . . . 472
when by plaintiff's own fault 473
when by mutual faults . 473
when by defendant's own fault 473
proximate cause of . . 473
damages 474
defences to this action 475, 476
by proof of abandonment of right
by plaintiff . . . 476

SECTION

O.

OBLITERATION. (*See* ALTERATION.)

P.

PARTNERSHIP,
evidence of . . . . . 477 – 479
in actions by partners 478
in defence 480
as between the partners 481
as against them . . . . . 482 – 484
must extend to all . . 483
by common report 483
by admissions of the parties . . . 484
how rebutted 485
when the parties are competent witnesses 486

PATENTS,
remedy for infringement of right 487
declaration for . . . . . 487, n.
proofs on plaintiff's part . . . . . 487 – 498
letters patent 488
specification 488
how expounded 489
sufficiency of 490
assignment 491
invention his own 492
invention new, and reduced to practice 493, 495
useful 493, 495
infringement . . 496, 497, 506
damages 496
identity of machines . 498, 506
purchaser a competent witness . 499
defences, and special notices of 500
by evidence of previous use . 501, 501 *a*, 502
in a foreign country 502
subsequent patent . . 503
duplicity of patent . . 503
unlawfulness . . . 503
injurious tendency . 503, 505

SECTION

PATENTS, *continued.*

defences, by evidence of abandonment by patentee . 504
dedication to public . . 504
defective specification . . 505
disclaimer, when it may be made 507
other violators of, competent witnesses . . . 508
adverse patentees, competent witnesses . . . 508
COPYRIGHT, action for infringing 510
proofs by plaintiff 511–514
entry of copyright . 511
authorship . . . 512
assignment . . . 513
infringement . . .514
defences in this action 515
when injunction may issue . . . 515

PAYMENT,

what is 516
when it must be pleaded 516
by whom to be proved 516
receipt given, when to be produced . . . 517
proof of, when made to agent or attorney . . 518
to order 518
by higher security given 519
by debtor's own security 519, 520
by Novation, what 519
by debtor's check 520
by negotiable note, or bill 520
by note not negotiable 521
by bank notes 522
by note or bill of a third person 523
by foreclosure of mortgage 524
by legacy 524
by remittance by post 525
by delivery of specific articles 526
by any collateral thing 526
presumption of, from security taken up . . . 527
from lapse of time 528
from course of trade . . . 528
from habit of dealing . . . 528
ascription, or appropriation of payments . . 529–536
by the debtor . 529, 530
by creditor . . 531

SECTION

PAYMENT, *continued.*
ascription, or appropriation of payments, when to be made 532
when it may be changed 532 *a*
by law . . . 533
where there is a surety 534
where one debt is barred by lapse of time . 535
where one security is void 535
when ratably made . 536
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, ... 1–18
PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM,
Prescription, what 537, 538
lost grant, when presumed . . 538, 539
how proved 546
kinds of 540
what may not be claimed by . . 541
plea of, how maintained . . . 543
customary right, what 542
plea of, what proof will support it . . . 544, 545
or defeat it . . . 544, 455
lost grant, proof of 546
(*See* CUSTOM.)
PRESUMPTION,
of amount and quantity . . . . . 129 *a*
of possession of letters testamentary . . . 344
of payment 32, 33, 527, 528
of knowledge of the contents of a will . . 675, n.
of alteration of will by testator 681
of time when alteration made . . . . 681, n.
of sanity 689
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
(*See* AGENCY.)
PROBATE OF WILLS,
mode of proof of . . . . . 339, 343, n.
effect of 672
PUBLICATION,
of will, what, and when necessary 675

SECTION

R.

REAL ACTIONS,
various forms of, in the United States . . . 547
of remedies for *mesne profits* . . 548
remedies for betterments . . . . 549 – 551
writ of right, evidence in 554
seisin of plaintiff, proof of 555
plea of *nul disseisin*, evidence under . . . 556
disseisin, how proved 557
how rebutted 558
lasting improvements or betterments, what . . 559
(*See* EJECTMENT.)
RECOUPMENT,
when allowed 136
REPLEVIN,
when it lies 560
what title plaintiff must prove 561
plea of *non cepit*, evidence under 562
property in defendant 563
avowry or cognizance 564
pleas of *non demisit* and *non tenuit*, proof under . 565
nil habuit in tenementis 565
riens in arrear 566
cognizance as bailiff 567
avowry for *damage feasant* . . . 568
tender 569
competency of witnesses 270
REVOCATION,
of authority or agency . . . . . 68 *a*
of submission 79
of will . . . . . 680 – 687

S.

SEDUCTION,
action for, what plaintiff must prove . . 571 – 577
declaration in . . . . . 571, n.
proof of relation of *servant* 572
hiring not necessary 573
what acts of service sufficient . . . 573

SECTION

SEDUCTION, *continued.*
proof of when absence from plaintiff's house is not a bar 573
is a bar 574
service must have existed at time of seduction 575
when service will be presumed . . . 576
will not be presumed . . 576
fact of *seduction* 577
damages . . . . . 577 *a*
general issue, evidence under 578
damages, grounds and proof of 579
(*See* ADULTERY.)

SHERIFF,
is identified with his under officers 580
action against 581
for misconduct of deputy . . . 582
official character of deputy when and how proved 582
declarations of deputy, when admissible 583
declarations of creditor, when admissible 583
for *not serving process*, plaintiff's proofs in 584
defences in . 585
for taking insufficient pledges, plaintiff's proofs in 586
defences in . 586
for not paying over money, plaintiff's proofs in 587
defences in . 588
his return, when evidence for him 585
for an escape, plaintiff's proofs in 589, 590
defences in . . . 591
for false return, plaintiff's proofs in . 592
defences in . . 593
how rebutted . . 594
for refusing bail 595
for extortion 596
for taking goods of plaintiff . . . 597
competency of witnesses in these actions . . . 598
damages 599

SIGNATURE,
proof of 71, 164, 165
by initials, when good . . . . . 158 n.
of wills 674

Section

SUNDAY,
contracts made on, void . . . . . 199 n.
SUSPICION,
when it may be shown in mitigation of damages 272, 458

T.

TENDER,
nature and effect of, ... 600
of money, plea of, how proved 601
in bank notes or checks 601
production of the money necessary . . . 602
when dispensed with . 603
of a greater sum, when good 604
must be absolute 605
may be under protest . . . . . 605 n.
when there are several debts 605
several creditors 605
to whom to be made 606
at what time to be made 607
avoided by subsequent demand 608
of specific articles, where to be made . . 609 – 611
how to be made . . . 611 *a*
(*See* PAYMENT.)
TRESPASS,
gist of, and points of plaintiff's proof . . . 613
(1.) possession of plaintiff 614
constructive 615
by lessee or bailee 616
by general owner or reversioner . . 616
of partition fences 617
of line trees 617
by wrong-doer 618
by occupant or lodger 618
by finder of goods 618
ratione soli 618
of animals *feræ naturæ* 620
right of entry not sufficient 619
boundaries, when necessary to be proved . . 618 *a*
(2.) injury by defendant, with force 621
wrongful intent not necessary . 622

SECTION

TRESPASS, *continued.*
injury by defendant, with force directly applied . 623
proof of time when material 624
proof of trespass, when it may be waived and another proved 624
general issue, evidence under 625
plea of *liberum tenementum*, evidence under . . 626
license 627
in law 628
justification under process 629
defence of property 630
right of way 631, 632
right to dig gravel 631
replication *de injuria*, evidence under . . . 633
new assignment in 634, 635
TROVER,
proofs in, by plaintiff . . . . . 636 – 647
(1.) of property in plaintiff 637
special, nature of . . 637, n.
in goods, by sale . . . 638
in negotiable securities . . 639
right of present possession 640
property as executor, &c. 641
(2.) conversion by defendant, what is . . . 642
license, when presumed . 643
when proved by demand and refusal . . 644, 645
when not . . . 645
between tenants in common, evidence in . . . 646
when a sale by one is a conversion 646, n.
by husband and wife 647
defences in this action 648
damages in 649

U.

UNDUE INFLUENCE,
what 688
USE AND OCCUPATION,
defence to action for 135

SECTION

V.

VARIANCE 11, 12, 13, 160, 189, 625

W.

WASTE,
what is, and how punishable 650
damages in 650
action of 651, 652
pleas in 653
action on the case for, by landlord . . . 654
proofs in . . . 654
must be specially stated and proved . . . 655
general issue in, evidence under 656
by plaintiff . . 656
by defendant . . 656

WAY,
private, how it may exist 657
by necessity . . . 658
appurtenant . . . 659 *a*
how proved 659
when lost by non-user 665
proofs by defendant, in action for disturbance of . 660
in trespass 661
public, how proved 662
proved by dedication 662
by whom made . . 663
how rebutted . . 664
not lost by non-user 665

WILLS,
diversities in modes of proof of 666
by what law governed 668
as to movables . . 668, 669
as to immovables . . . 670
by what law interpreted 671
probate, effect of 672
when conclusive 672
mode of proof of 343
signature of, by testator, what is sufficient . . 674
publication of, what is, and when necessary . . 675

	Section
WILLS, *continued.*	
witnesses, need not see testator actually sign	676
how many necessary	677
must sign in testator's presence	678
presence of testator, what is	678
thirty years old, need not be proved	679
revocation of, what is	680
express, by subsequent will	681
revocation of, express, by deed of revocation	681
by cancellation	681
by cancellation of duplicate	682
when avoided by destroying the instrument of revocation	683
implied, on what principle	684
by marriage and issue	684, 685
by alteration of estate	686
by void conveyance	687
revival of	683
how avoided	688
obtained by undue influence, when	688
insanity of testator, burden of proving	689
at time of executing the will	690
what is evidence of	690
proved by admissions, when	690
declarations of devisees in disparagement of	690
attesting witnesses, why required	691
must be competent	691
may testify as to belief	691
proof of in Courts of Common Law	692, 693
when lost	688 *a*
under issue of *devisavit vel non*	693, 694
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS,	
production of	11
variance in proof of	11
date of, when material	12, 13
how to be pleaded	14, 15
proof of, when it may be called for	16
loss of, how proved	17

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